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Exhuming Burie Stones: The Treaty of Timurung (1582) during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

Exhumer les pierres enfouies : le traité de Timurung (1582) aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles
Kathryn Wellen
p. 59-86

Résumés

Cet article examine le traité de Timurung conclu en 1582 entre les terres bugis de Boné, Wajo’ et Soppéng dans le sud de Sulawesi, Indonésie, ainsi que la manière dont ce traité a été évoqué au cours des deux siècles qui ont suivi sa conclusion. Il examine d’abord la nature des traités bugis en général, puis la manière dont le traité de Timurung a été utilisé dans diverses situations politiques. Celles-ci comprennent la guerre de Makassar (1666-69), les procès de La Maddukelleng dans les années 1760 et une crise de succession à Gowa à la fin des années 1770. Basé sur des sources publiées et non publiées, cet article comprend non seulement le texte du traité de Timurung, mais aussi des commentaires sur ce traité attribués à de nombreux fonctionnaires de l’État Bugis du début de lère moderne. Grâce à l’examen diachronique d’un seul traité d’une société peu connue, cet article offre un aperçu interculturel de l’utilisation des traités comme outil juridique.

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Texte intégral

Main toponyms mentioned in the text. (Map: V. Degroot)

Main toponyms mentioned in the text. (Map: V. Degroot)

1The Treaty of Timurung is one of the most significant agreements in the history of the Bugis, an ethnic group from South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Concluded in 1582, it joined the countries of Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng together in an alliance known as the Tellumpocco or “The Three Peaks.” Ceremonially sworn to and eternally binding, this treaty was referred to repeatedly throughout the centuries. The alliance was, however, viewed differently at various times as political circumstances changed radically. This article looks at the Treaty of Timurung, the manner in which it was concluded, and the ways in which it was remembered at different historical junctures spanning more than two centuries. In so doing, it offers diachronic and cross-cultural insights into treaties as a legal tool. This article does not purport to answer all the cross-cultural questions surrounding treaties but rather to contribute a detailed example of a single treaty from a lesser-known society to this discourse by pulling together a wide variety of published and unpublished sources to examine the Treaty of Timurung and its uses in Bugis politics.

2Numerous scholars have considered treaties as a variety of Bugis historical literature. In a foundational article published in 1951, Cense classifies treaties as one of seven different categories of historical writing. His other categories are diaries, notes pertaining to customary law, correspondence, historical episodes, chronicles and poetry (Cense, 1951). In his own article on Bugis historical sources, Zainal Abidin accords special attention to chronicles. Treaties are categorized as non-chronicle sources along with the other five remaining genres listed by Cense (Zainal Abidin, 1971: 167-70). Chambert-Loir, whose main focus is the historiography of Bima, is less specific regarding the historiographical traditions of South Sulawesi and groups treaties into the same category as letters, genealogies, notes and lists (Chambert-Loir, 2000: 230). Also relying on Cense, Resink touches briefly upon treaties in his chapter “The Law of Nations in Early Macassar” but, like Feddersen a half century later (Feddersen, 2017), his emphasis is on treaties concluded with the Dutch (Resink, 1968: 41-44).

3The most detailed examination of Bugis treaties to date is Leonard Andaya’s 1978 article “Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions.” This is a comparison between South Sulawesi and European ideas of treaties. The bulk of the article deals with Bugis treaties in particular. Andaya describes the manner in which treaties were concluded and preserved in South Sulawesi, the relationships they sought to establish, their intended political role and their characteristics including their sacrosanct nature. Of particular interest for the purposes of the present study is his observation regarding the longevity of Bugis treaties. He writes “Once a treaty had been agreed upon, it remained a permanent agreement which could be resurrected and renewed or allowed to recede into the background in face of other superior political and spiritual forces. These enduring sacred documents were made but once.” (Andaya, 1978: 284)

4Sacrosanct in nature, Bugis treaties were sworn to in a ceremony that, in the case of the Treaty of Timurung, involved the burial of stones. The present study shows specifically how the renewal and recession that Andaya mentions worked in practice. Providing specific examples of how leaders invoked the Treaty of Timurung, how they metaphorically exhumed the stones when it was favorable to do so, the present study is the first detailed diachronic examination of an individual Bugis treaty. It looks at changing political circumstances and other treaties to document how the importance of the Treaty of Timurung waxed and waned over the course of two centuries. Through its examination of the second trial of La Maddukelleng, this article also contributes a very rare example of how Indonesian legal documents were actually used during the eighteenth century on the basis of an as of yet unpublished Bugis manuscript. Focusing on a treaty between three Bugis lands, the article explicitly omits the study of treaties between Europeans and Asians.

5Understanding the relationship of the Treaty of Timurung to other treaties and the role of these treaties in political events requires a lot of historical background which is provided at the start of each section. The article also begins with a description of the Bugis and their historical records.

The Bugis and their unusual historical records

6Numbering roughly 6,400,000 people, the Bugis constitute one of more than 300 different ethnicities in Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country. Their homeland is on Sulawesi, the spidery-shaped island between Borneo and the Moluccas. Their language is Austronesian and their society shares certain cultural characteristics, such as founder-focused ideologies and social concerns for the birth order of siblings, with other Austronesian societies spread across half of the globe (Bellwood, Fox and Tryon, 2006:3). Historically the Bugis have mostly been farmers in the fertile rice lands of the southwestern peninsula but a highly-visible minority has emigrated and worked in a variety of capacities across the archipelago. Bugis lands were divided into kingdoms (or locally organized states) such as Tanété, Luwu’, Soppéng, Wajo’ and Boné, the boundaries of which, in many instances, have been remarkably consistent over the past four centuries (Caldwell, 1995: 395). The Bugis population of South Sulawesi is now spread across seven regencies and form a significant minority in the provincial capital of Makassar.

7The Bugis are remarkable for their historiographic traditions which extend back more than half a millennium. Historical record-keeping began around 1400 using an Indic-based writing system (Caldwell, 1988: 169-71) but in the absence of strong Indic or Islamic influences. For two centuries prior to converting to Islam, the Bugis and their neighbors the Makasars and Mandars recorded matters important to them and their own societies as opposed to matters that a world religion deemed important. Including genealogies, treaties and myths, the early writings of the Bugis, Makasars and Mandars provide a rare window into the history of Austronesian societies. This is because very few Austronesian societies began writing without adopting a world religion around the same time. Two of many cases in counterpoint are the Javanese whose society was profoundly influenced by Indic thought and the Hawaiians who adopted writing from Christian missionaries.

8One of the main incentives for the Bugis to adopt writing may have been the desire to document status. As has long been noted, the societies of South Sulawesi are especially status conscious (Chabot, 1950). An individual’s status is ascribed, meaning it is determined on the basis of birth. Documenting one’s ancestry is therefore very useful for securing and maintaining high status and its concomitant advantages for existing elites and their descendants (Macknight, 1993: 7; Caldwell and Wellen, 2016: 121). A similar dynamic existed among polities. Just as individuals and high-ranking families sought to document their position in society, so did communities known as wanua seek to secure their position within the political hierarchy. Precedence was significant but other factors, such as size, wealth, military prowess and diplomatic capabilities, also influenced a state’s position in the hierarchy. Once determined, committing political arrangements to writing enabled elites to record the status of their communities. It also resulted in the development of documents that correspond roughly to the western notion of a treaty in so far as they are (ostensibly) binding agreements between two or more sovereign nations detailing the relationship between each party. Thus, for both individuals and states, writing offered a means of recording comparative advantages and, ideally, securing them for future generations.

9While advantageous for some, when the Bugis first began writing it was not easy because the ideal materials for writing, namely pen and paper, were not readily available. Therefore, early Bugis manuscripts were inscribed on thin strips of lightly-colored palm leaves which were then smeared with dark paint. The paint on the surface could be easily rubbed off whereas paint remained in the inscribed fissures. The leaves were then sewn together to make a long strip which was rolled up into a scroll and fitted onto a reader with two spools. The manuscript was then read scrolling it from one spool to another, in a manner similar to a movie or a cassette tape (Macknight, 2016: 58-59).

10With the advent of writing, Bugis historical record-keeping began its evolution from an oral cannon to a highly varied and unique written tradition within the Southeast Asian archipelago. This occurred over time and as a result of varied influences. Paper may have become available as early as the sixteenth century (Pelras, 2016: 20: Caldwell, 1988: 14) but it was not easy to obtain. Therefore, information was sometimes recorded on whatever paper was available. In many instances, a variety of Bugis texts were recorded in a single notebook of European paper. Such codices often had a theme (Macknight, 1984: 106) but they might also contain whatever information that the owner wanted to remember or convey to future generations. Thus, a notebook might contain not only a military technological treatise but also riddles and poems; and a diary might contain not only daily events but also the details of negotiations between community leaders. Writing with reference to diaries written during the late eighteenth century, Rahilah Omar notes that rulers’ diaries serve almost as state archives, presenting to, and preserving for, posterity the image that the ruler wished to convey (Rahilah Omar, 2003: 275-76). As case in point is the correspondence about the Treaty of Timurung described in the penultimate section of the present article.

11Despite the rich written tradition among the Bugis, the oral sphere retained its paramountcy into the modern era. In a groundbreaking article about the imbrication of the written and oral spheres, Pelras has shown the boundary between the two spheres to be very fluid among the Bugis. The two modes of expression share many features which facilitate crossing back and forth between them. Furthermore, the Bugis consider the content of written texts to be more important than their materiality. While there are sacred exceptions, even manuscripts held with tremendous esteem are sometimes allowed to physically deteriorate in conditions that are disadvantageous to conservation (Pelras, 2016: 19, 21). Writing was an important means of conserving information, but it was used in tandem with the spoken word which, in some instances, served as a more effective manner of conserving information than writing (Wellen, 2021). Committing political arrangements to writing helped preserve them for posterity but, for political efficacy, political arrangements did not have to be written; they needed to be agreed upon. As will be shown below, buy-in was necessary not only when a treaty was concluded but also when it was used. However, this did not preclude texts from being consulted nor preserved with sacred objects nor stored in an apparently haphazard manner. Pelras warns against judging this seemingly paradoxical situation with Western bias (Pelras, 2016: 21).

12Like all historiography, Bugis historiography is continuously developing. It was not the same when the Treaty of Timurung was concluded in 1582 as it was at the time of Sangkilang’s rebellion during the 1770s at which point this article concludes. Bugis diaries, for example, are likely to have been a result of Portuguese influence arriving via Makassar. Similarly, Bugis tributary and domain lists appear originally to have been a response to Dutch demands (Druce, 2014: 154). Both of these developments occurred after the Treaty of Timurung was concluded. The writing of chronicles in Bugis lands also appears to have started and ceased during the period covered by this study, with the exception of Wajo’ where the tradition of writing chronicles was continued into recent times (Druce, 2009: 67). In Wajo’ there was also an attempt to write an all-inclusive history the likes of which are not known in other Bugis lands. This is the Lontara’ Sukkuna Wajo’ or the Complete Chronicles of Wajo’ ostensibly written by Ranreng Béttémpola La Sangaji Puanna Sengngeng during the 1760s (Wellen, 2014: 13).

Bugis treaties

13Political arrangements among the Bugis pre-date the advent of writing. Some information about these arrangements was recorded on the basis of memory when writing was adapted. In turn, some of this information was incorporated into new historical genres when they developed. Written in the late seventeenth century, the Chronicle of Boné explicitly mentions that “the earlier kings who went back to (La) Galigo had already organised (the conduct of) negotiations” (Macknight, Mukhlis, Muhlis, 2020: 84). Furthermore, the Chronicle of Wajo’ is replete with descriptions of political arrangements such as the foundation of Wajo’s constituent polities (Noorduyn, 1955: 156-67). Written treaties, the tangible documents enabled by the advent of writing, were not a political novelty. Rather they were an extension of the verbal and ceremonial arrangements.

  • 1 Studied extensively by Stapel (1922), Andaya (1981) and Feddersen (2017), the Treaty of Bongaya acc (...)
  • 2 With reference to God, a word must be said about the religion of the Bugis. The Bugis converted to (...)

14The etymology of Bugis words corresponding with the word for treaty reflect the manner in which written treaties were an extension of pre-existing practices (Andaya, 1978: 278). Asitellereng, comes from sitelli meaningto swear mutual oaths” (Matthes, 1874: 366). Makkuluada means “to give one’s word of honor” and mattaroada, meaning “to agree” has a similar connotation (Matthes, 1874: 351, 875). Another Bugis word for “alliance” or “treaty” is ceppa which literally means “to participate in” or “to be part of something.” Ceppa is the word used in reference to the Treaty of Bongaya between Goa and the Netherlands East India Company in 1667, a treaty which had wide-ranging repercussions across the peninsula (Matthes, 1874: 423-24: Andaya, 1978: 279).1 Another word referring to treaties is mallamumpatu meaning “the burying of the stone” (Matthes, 1874: 558). “The burying of the stone” refers to a ceremony in which the Bugis called upon supernatural powers to witness and sanctify treaties. Each ruler threw a stone at an egg on the ground, smashing it as a metaphor for the devastation that would befall anyone who breaks the treaty. They then buried the stone, or stones, with which they had smashed the eggs. The verbal and ceremonial aspects of these arrangements were extremely important, especially in so far as they are supernaturally sanctioned. Indeed, God2 is sometimes called upon to witness treaties and may be asked to punish those who break treaties. An oft used curse is “May you be swept away like rubbish by the One God if you break your word” (Andaya, 1978: 279).

15The forces ceremoniously imbued into treaties when they were concluded and the parties’ consent to the political arrangements contained within gave strength and weight to treaties. The existence of a written document was of lesser importance. Even so, the written treaties were sometimes accorded respect. Copies of treaties appear to have been preserved by state officials in a sort of archive that could be referred to as needed (Cense, 1951:48). In some instances, treaties were also kept with the state regalia and rulers would use them as a means of obtaining guidance from the ancestors regarding just behavior or ways to safeguard the state (Andaya, 1978: 283). As described below, treaties are likely to have been among the documents the Bugis consulted during times of political crises.

16Bugis treaties generally have a tri-partite structure consisting of a preamble, the terms of the treaty and a concluding proclamation. The preamble establishes the relationship between the parties, generally in metaphoric terms. An unequal relationship in which one party is clearly the superior can be expressed as master and slave. Alternatively, such a relationship may be expressed in more poetic terms such as wind and leaves, the allusion being to the wind determines the direction that the leaves blow. Parties are often conceived of as family members. For example, mother and child denotes a close but unequal relationship. Conceiving of relationships in terms of siblings is also common and in such cases the birth order is significant; the relationship is considered almost equal but not quite. This is very important within the Austronesian context.

17The main body of the text contains the terms of the treaty. In addition to any terms specific to the political situation at hand, this section also includes assurances of mutual respect and mutual assistance. This is often expressed metaphorically as well, using terms such as “I consider you fat, not skinny” or “good, not evil” (Andaya, 1978: 281). Promises of mutual assistance might be made in practical terms such as returning each other’s runaway slaves or they might be made in metaphorical terms such as bringing a drowning party to shore.

18The concluding proclamation specifies that the treaty is binding upon future generations, or even eternally binding. This too is often expressed metaphorically. For example, the treaty is said to endure fires or survive the descent of heaven. Curses upon those who break the treaty are often included in this section. Because of their sacred nature, treaties could not simply be discarded when political circumstances changed. Instead they were allowed to recede into the background, to be called up again when appropriate. Their waxing and waning importance reflects changes in the political landscape and shifts in the balance of power among states.

19Another very important characteristic of Bugis treaties is that they guarantee the sovereignty of the concluding parties. Because sovereignty is a highly contested concept in the West and because Western epistemes are not universally applicable anyway, it is more useful to describe the sense in which the term is used in the present study rather than to debate the interchangeability of Austronesian and Latin concepts or to venture into what James Bryce in his essay entitled “The Nature of Sovereignty” referred to as “that dusty desert of abstractions through which successive generations of political philosophers have thought it necessary to lead their disciples” (Bryce, 1901: II, 50). For purposes of this study the word is used to describe the freedom that all parties concluding a treaty maintained to live according to their own laws and customs. Tangentially it also refers to the respect which the concluding parties had for each other. To describe this situation, “sovereignty” is preferable to “freedom” because it pertains not to individual freedoms but rather to the freedom of the realms involved.

20This guarantee of sovereignty is apparent in various specific provisions found in Bugis treaties such as respecting each other’s laws and in not interfering in each other’s internal affairs. The concomitant respect is apparent in provisions like believing in each other’s words and considering the other to be fat and not thin. Regardless of the political arrangements contained in the treaty, all of the concluding parties maintained their immutable right to exist. Furthermore, even in the event of an unequal treaty such as an agreement between overlord and vassal, subordinates maintained their right to rule themselves according to their own customs. As described below, judicial discussions between Bugis states reflect the seriousness with which such provisions were taken. This respect for sovereignty is likely to have facilitated the maintenance of even quite small kingdoms in South Sulawesi until the twentieth century.

The Burying of Stones at Timurung

  • 3 Timurung’s antiquity is presumed from the frequency with which it appears in very early genealogica (...)

21Named for one of the oldest Bugis settlements,3 the Treaty of Timurung is perhaps the most famous treaty in Bugis history. Concluded in 1582, it established an alliance known as the Tellumpocco or “the Three Peaks.” This was essentially a defensive alliance between Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng against the Makasar power of Goa on the southwestern extreme of the peninsula. Such a defensive alliance was necessitated by the rapid rise of Goa in the field of international commerce in the eastern archipelago and its eclipse of Luwu’ as the most powerful kingdom on the peninsula during the sixteenth century. As important as it was, the Treaty of Timurung did not eradicate earlier treaties. Instead, the earlier treaties were allowed to recede into the background, to be forgotten, remembered or changed as circumstances mandated.

  • 4 Topaceddo is thought to have been located in southern Wajo’ on the Cenrana River (Noorduyn, 1955: 6 (...)

22One such treaty was the Treaty of Topaceddo.4 For much of its early history Wajo’ was vassal of Luwu’. When Wajo’ grew important and powerful enough to provide Luwu’ with military assistance against Sidénréng, Luwu’ offered to elevate the status of Wajo’ to that of a younger brother. This arrangement was sanctified with the Treaty of Topaceddo. When it was concluded, the gods were called upon to witness the respective rulers throwing stones at eggs and burying the stones. The population also witnessed this ceremony and the Wajorese chronicle records that they cheered (Noorduyn, 1955: 68-69, 192-93). However, when circumstances changed, specifically after Luwu’ lost its paramouncy to Goa, the treaty changed as well. At the suggestion of Boné, which at the time was allied with Goa, Goa took over the Treaty of Topaceddo. Wajo’ pledged to follow Goa as it had followed Luwu’, to consider Goa’s enemies as its own and to provide military assistance in the event of war (Noorduyn, 1955: 75, 220-30). As is discussed below, Wajo’ took this pledge seriously. This pledge did not, however, preclude Wajo’ from joining other alliances such as the Tellumpocco.

23The Tellumpocco was formed when the three main Bugis lands in the Cenrana valley, Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng, found themselves in need of protection against Goa. Prior to the establishment of the Tellumpocco, there was concern about Wajo’ being Goa’s vassal, or slave, according to the Treaty of Topaceddo. According to the Chronicle of Wajo’, when the ruler of Boné suggested the tripartite alliance, the ruler of Wajo’ countered “How is that possible, Arumponé, for our three lands to be allies when Wajo’ is a slave of Goa and Boné and Goa are also allies?” The ruler of Boné dismissed his concern, saying “Your words are true, Arungmatoa. But let we three be allies. And Boné will help withstand Goa if it wants to keep Wajo’ in slavery. Let the three of us as allies stand against Goa” (Noorduyn, 1955:250-51). This exemplifies the manner in which previous arrangements were sometimes allowed to recede into the background to accommodate new political priorities. In 1582 Wajo’ no longer needed Goa’s help to defend itself from Luwu’. Instead it needed Boné and Soppéng’s help to defend itself from Goa.

  • 5 On privately held manuscripts in South Sulawesi, see the catalog of the Ford Foundation’s manuscrip (...)

24The burying of stones at Timurung or lamumpatuwé ri Timurung formalized the creation of the Tellumpocco. The text of the treaty is preserved as separate texts and as parts of other texts. The collection of the Dutch Bible Society (Nederlands Bijbelgenootshap or NBG) housed in the Leiden University library contains five separate copies of the treaty. One of these, Leid NBG 111 pages 3-6, serves as the base of the version Matthes published in his Bugis Chrestomathy (Matthes, 1864: I, 532-36). Other copies are found in Leid NBG 99, pages 7-9; Leid NBG 100, pages 108-110; Leid NBG 101, pages 108-110; Leid NBG 101, pages 57-59; and Leid NBG 208, pages 170-172 Noorduyn, 1955: 27-28). There are also copies in private collections in South Sulawesi.5 The versions differ slightly in matters such as the ending being shorter or longer, or the list of ministers and rulers who concluded it, but they largely concur. The Chronicle of Boné describes the treaty (Macknight, Mukhlis and Muhlis, 2020: 95-96) and the Chronicle of Wajo’ (Noorduyn, 1955: 250-53) includes information about its conclusion and the manner in which people rejoiced. The Chronicle of Wajo’ also includes the text of the treaty itself. Loosely translated, this text reads as follows:

Our lands are united as the strings of a ploughing rope in which one string does not break but supports the others, we do not threaten each other and we do not deceive each other, we believe each other’s words, in case of mistakes, we warn each other, we accept each other’s warnings and we do not sit waiting for each other’s mistakes, we do not snatch each other’s seedlings, nor plant on each other’s lands, nor weed each other’s gardens, nor exploit each other’s forests, we do not hold on to each other’s refugees and debtors, we fold the unbendable for each other, we castrate each other’s bulls, we do not hit each other’s slaves, we do not undermine each other’s customs, we do not hinder each other’s proclamations, we do not destroy each other’s regalia, we plant our rice outside [the lands of the Tellumpocco] and not inside [on each other’s lands], we do not plot war against each other, no fool brings us in conflict with each other, no idiot causes fights between us, nobody from outside decides over us, we do not break each other’s support, we do not hide each other’s goods in our houses, we watch out for each other’s wayward property, we do not divide children, we do not bring each other where we do not want to go, we do not buy each other’s slaves, we do not believe each other’s messages unless they are conveyed by an official messenger and he who does not believe it then shall be kicked to death by a buffalo even if it is the son of a ruler, we do not bring each other’s dead chickens back to life, we reach out to each other swimming, we help each other in case of potential drowning, in the event of floating away we bring each other to shore, we share prosperity and adversity, we share death and life, and fire does not burn it, adversity in the land does not annul it, no death takes it away, the alliance between our lands, even if the heavens fall and the underworld sinks away, still the alliance between our lands does not unravel. If anyone violates this treaty, the ground where he lives will break into shards as porcelain and in pieces as an egg, and the one God bears witness (Noorduyn, 1955: 250-53).

  • 6 These dates reflect not the very beginning of the settlements but rather their consolidation into l (...)
  • 7 With regards to precedence in the Austronesia world, see Michael P. Vischer (ed.), Precedence: Soci (...)

25The Chronicle of Boné, the Chronicle of Wajo’ as well as the version of the treaty contained in Matthes’ chrestomathy specify the relationship between Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng as one of full brothers, meaning from the same father and the same mother. Boné was the eldest, Wajo’ was the middle and Soppéng was the youngest brother. This hierarchy reflects not only the size but the respective ages of the three lands: Boné can be dated to approximately 1450, Wajo’ to approximately 1500 and Soppéng to approximately 1550.6 This is important because the birth order of siblings is significant across the Austronesian world. It is reflected in Austronesian languages as well as in the customs according various privileges and responsibilities to the respective siblings. The importance accorded to birth order is part of a larger complex of respect for precedence.7

26In the specific case of the Treaty of Timurung, the importance of siblingship is reflected in different ways. According to the Chronicle of Wajo’, Soppéng suggested that it be considered as the child of the other two lands but the ruler of Wajo’ argued that such a relationship might result in (unspecified) corruption. The ruler of Boné agreed and suggested that both Boné and Wajo’ give lands to Soppéng so that the relationship would be more equal. This practice of giving lands upon concluding a treaty was not without precedent among the Bugis; indeed, such a transfer was also made in conjunction with the Treaty of Topaceddo (Noorduyn, 1955: 68). In conjunction with the Treaty of Timurung, Boné gave Goagoa to Soppéng and Wajoq transferred Baringeng. As a result, Soppéng could be considered a brother rather than a child (Noorduyn, 1955: 250-51).

27The Treaty of Timurung served its defensive function in the short term. The allies were able to repulse Goa’s attacks on Boné is 1585 and 1588 and on Wajo’ in 1582 and 1590 (Andaya, 1981: 31). In the long term, however, the three lands did not always function as one rope. Less than a century later during the Makassar War (1666-1669), Wajo’ fought on the opposite side of Boné and Soppéng.

The Treaty of Timurung and the Makassar War

28Less than a century later, the power balance had shifted again and the Treaty of Timurung waned accordingly. The Netherlands United East India Company (VOC) sought a monopoly on the spice trade in eastern Indonesia but Goa steadfastly refused to grant the trading concessions it desired. Eventually they reached an impasse. In the event, two ambitious individuals, the Dutchman Admiral Cornelis Janszoon Speelman (1628-1684) and Arung Palakka La Tenritatta (ca. 1635-1696) of Boné joined forces to subdue Goa and its twin kingdom Tallo’ in what became known as the Makassar War.

29This conflict forced Wajo’ to choose between its alliance with Goa according to the Treaty of Topaceddo and its alliance with Boné (and Soppéng) according to the Treaty of Timurung. Wajo’ chose Goa. One Wajorese source, Lontarak Akkarungan Wajoq, indicates that the Wajorese were very scared of allying with the Dutch. It further specifies that “For this reason, they [the Wajorese] opted to remember their treaty with Goa and felt very ashamed to let it [the Treaty of Topaceddo] go” (Anonymous, 1985: 84). In choosing to side with Goa, Wajo’ allowed the Treaty of Topaceddo to wax and the Treaty of Timurung to wane. Thereby Wajo’ aligned itself with the power with which it perceived its best interests to lay during the mid-seventeenth century. While various groups of Europeans had visited South Sulawesi since the Portuguese in the 1540s, a military alliance with a western power, such as Boné’s with the Dutch, was unprecedented in the history of South Sulawesi. Furthermore, during the mid-seventeenth century Wajo’’s recent experiences with Goa were more positive than its recent experiences with Boné. Wajo’ was wary of Boné because Boné’s ruler La Maddaremmeng (1626-1634) both tried to force a stricter version of Islam onto neighboring kingdoms and attacked Pénéki in Wajo’. For these reasons Wajo’ opted to emphasize its position as Goa’s vassal as opposed to its position as Boné’s younger brother.

  • 8 This section about the Treaty of Lamogo is based entirely on Andaya, 1981 who bases it on an unpubl (...)

30Soppéng also had a previous arrangement with Goa. The Treaty of Lamogo guaranteed the sovereignty and independence of Soppéng, a provision that Goa had respected. In the early 1660s, however, Soppéng reconsidered. Boné invited the Datu Soppéng and other important officials to discuss the possibility of an alliance between Boné and Soppéng. At this meeting Arung Palakka and his associate Arung Bila stressed the importance of honoring the Treaty of Timurung. Their attempts to persuade Soppéng exemplify the importance of buy-in. They also emphasized the importance of “tying our sarong up to our knees” in order to defeat Goa. This is a metaphor for hard work because one ties one’s sarong up high when one wishes to labor without hindrance. Soppéng hesitated. In particular Soppéng was concerned about the possibilities that they would fail, or that they would succeed in liberating their lands but that Boné would then become so powerful that it disregarded Soppéng’s sovereignty. Soppéng nevertheless agreed to what became known as the Treaty of the Raft at Atappang (Andaya, 1981: 52-53).8 Thereafter Soppéng and Boné were newly allied against Goa leaving Wajo’, the third brother of the Tellumpocco, on the losing side of the war.

  • 9 “Malampé’é Gemme’na” means “the Long-Haired One.” It is a reference to the vow Arung Palakka La Ten (...)

31Attempts to encourage buy-in did not always succeed. An especially long version of the Wajorese Chronicles relates Boné’s attempt to convince Wajo’ to adhere to the Treaty of Timurung. Arung Palakka, referred to here as Malampé’é Gemme’na,9 sent the following message to the Wajorese:

“I bring a message from your family Malampé’é Gemme’na, Wajo’ and Soppéng can only prosper if we adhere to the Tellumpocco, with each of us administering our own laws and each of us minding our own business.”

32To this Wajo’ replied:

“You are exactly right, but you Boné, are the one who strays, to the point of going together with Soppéng and calling the Dutch here. Wajo’ greatly fears God. Wajo’ is very ashamed to abandon its agreement with the Karaéng, ashamed to turn its back on its agreement with Karaéng Goa. The death of Goa is my death, the life of Goa is the life of Wajo’.”

33The emissary of Boné replied:

“Your family holds fast without slipping, as is witnessed by God and known by God, the death of Goa is your death, Goa’s life is your life. Your family is only trying to guide you to goodness and brightness, but you do not want [to listen], because Goa’s death is your death. Go then to your death and we will go to our life, holding fast to God Almighty. There is also the treaty that was concluded with stones in Timurung saying that if we forget, we will remind each other; if we fall down, we will help each other up; we will not covet each other’s pure gold [but rather] continually replace each other’s great wealth, each of us big externally and big internally, without breaking the thread, otherwise we break it together. Even if the sky falls and the earth is buried, it will not open the Tellumpocco Treaty of Timurung.” (Anonymous, 1985: 83-84)

34In this passage, the Bonéan emissary evokes the Treaty of Timurung to try to persuade Wajo’. He mentions very specific elements of the Treaty of Timurung, such as reminding each other in case of forgetfulness and helping each other up in case of falling. He also refers to the manner in which the Treaty of Timurung is supposed to endure even if the heavens fall and the earth is swallowed up. As previously explained, however, Wajo’ opted to emphasize the Treaty of Topaceddo and deemphasize the Treaty of Timurung. The possibility of making such a choice is facilitated by a basic principle of Bugis treaties, specifically mutual respect for the sovereignty of all parties.

35For its steadfast loyalty to Goa, Wajo’ would pay a high price. Boné and the Dutch emerged victorious from the Makassar War and the ruler of Boné Arung Palakka La Tenritatta became the effective overlord of the peninsula. Boné and the VOC sent forces to subdue various communities in Wajo’ which they accomplished with relative expediency. Many of Wajo’s vassals also switched allegiances, especially after the untimely death of the Wajorese leader To Sengngeng (r. 1658-1670). Under his successor the Wajorese capital of Tosora held out for a long time. The combined forces of the VOC and Boné laid siege to it for four months and Wajorese resistance earned Dutch admiration. Ultimately, however, the Wajorese surrendered and were forced to agree to harsh terms of surrender. These included submission to the VOC as a vassal, Dutch mediation in internal Wajorese affairs, destruction of all fortifications in Wajo’, trading restrictions and a war indemnity of 52,000 rijksdaalders. Concluded in 1670, the treaty between the VOC and the Wajorese was to apply not only to the signatories but also to future generations of Wajorese. It was sworn to on the Qur’an and with the drinking of weapon water (Heeres 1931:426-30), which can be considered as a Dutch concession to Bugis custom.

36As harsh as these conditions were, the actual treatment of the Wajorese following the Makassar War was worse. Perhaps angered by Wajorese refusal to uphold the Treaty of Timurung, Arung Palakka La Tenritatta was especially cruel towards Wajo’. Wajorese people were kidnapped, harassed, slapped and killed. They were also prohibited from possessing metal. This prevented them from wearing krisses which was a point of honor and therefore very humiliating. It also prevented them from using metal farm implements and thereby obstructed agriculture. In 1671 the Wajorese were desperate enough to request Dutch intervention. In turn the Dutch asked Arung Palakka La Tenritatta to show restraint, but this had little effect (Andaya, 1981: 142).

  • 10 While the 1670 treaty between the VOC and the Wajorese did not specify the surrender of these lands (...)

37The situation in Wajo’ grew dire. In 1678 the ruler of Wajo’ and numerous Wajorese nobles came to Makassar to complain about Boné’s cruelty. They also complained about Arung Palakka La Tenritatta’s seizure of the Wajorese lands of Wagé, Wugi’, Totinco, Pammana, Timurung and half of Singkang. Ostensibly Arung Palakka La Tenritatta did this in accordance with the peace treaty of 1670 but this treaty made no such provision.10 Indeed, the Dutch president Jacob Cops actually consulted the treaty of 1670 during the Wajorese delegation’s visit to Makassar to verify this fact (Andaya, 1981: 190). Whether intentionally incorrect or not, it appears that Arung Palakka La Tenritatta made a faulty reference to the treaty in order to justify his acts. When the Wajorese complained in Makassar, the Dutch governor confirmed that surrender of these lands was not part of the agreement. He further assured the Wajorese that he would attempt to resolve their grievances. Tellingly he also urged them to negotiate with Arung Palakka La Tenritatta themselves (Andaya, 1981: 190-91). A year later the situation had further deteriorated. Arung Palakka La Tenritatta took to enslaving Wajorese people he encountered outside of Wajo’. Skilled laborers were also forcibly relocated from Wajo’ to Boné, and Wajorese property including buffaloes and goods were confiscated. The Wajorese delegation returned to Makassar, but dared not complain vociferously. Instead, when the Governor General asked about conditions in Wajo’, the Arung Matoa put one hand on his mouth and drew the other hand across his throat indicating that his throat would be slit if he were to speak (Andaya, 1981: 191). A century later the Wajorese still remembered how difficult Arung Palakka La Tenritatta’s overlordship was. As will be seen in the following description of meetings held during the 1760s, the Wajorese also remembered the impossibility of persuading Arung Palakka La Tenritatta to adhere to the Treaty of Timurung after they themselves had not.

  • 11 Arung Palakka La Tenritatta was among the people of Boné whom Goa forced to dig ditches under harsh (...)

38In fairness, Arung Palakka La Tenritatta’s harsh treatment of the Wajorese was probably incited not only by the refusal of Wajo’ to adhere to the Treaty of Timurung but also by his own personality, specifically a strong desire for power, and perhaps also by his feelings of betrayal.11 La Maddukelleng (c. 1700-1765) is another example of a very strong personality influencing politics and, as with Arung Palakka La Tenritatta, his story offers window on uses of the Treaty of Timurung.

The Treaty of Timurung and the Trials of La Maddukelleng

39La Maddukelleng is the most well-known figure in the history of Wajo’. Modern Indonesian historiography regards him as a national hero for his efforts to expel the Dutch from Sulawesi (Nur Asiah, 2009: 65). Bugis historiography, on the other hand, has a more nuanced view, detailing both his acts of bravery and the havoc he wreaked (Noorduyn, 1955: 125-41 and Hadrawi, Wellen and Macknight, forthcoming). This section uses both published and unpublished Bugis and Dutch sources to describe the influence La Maddukelleng had on the Tellumpocco which is the alliance set up by the Treaty of Timurung and how this alliance functioned and was regarded by the three powers almost two centuries after the Treaty of Timurung was concluded.

  • 12 La Patau’s daughter Batari Toja ruled from 1714 to 1715, briefly in 1720, and for a third time from (...)
  • 13 Successive Wajorese leaders deliberately sought to expand international commerce and harness the po (...)

40La Maddukelleng was born to a noble Wajorese family around 1700. While still a young man, he offended the ruler of Boné. Either he was exiled or he had to flee because, in the very early eighteenth century, Boné was still an important power on the peninsula. After the death of Arung Palakka La Tenritatta’s nephew and successor La Patau (1696-1714), however, Boné entered an especially tumultuous period.12 Meanwhile Wajo’ not only recovered from the aftermath of the Makassar War but also transformed itself into a powerful trading nation.13 While Wajo’ reconstructed itself, La Maddukelleng sought his own fortunes in East Kalimantan. He married into the royal family of Pasir and eventually assumed the title Sultan Pasir.

41La Maddukelleng gained a widespread reputation for the use of violence, particularly at sea (Matthes, 1869: 25). His influence was also feared on land. A song recorded in the Complete Chronicles of Wajo’ emphasizes his potential impact on the Tellumpocco. The words are “The buffalo eats at sea. Its tail is so heavy that it does not move. Its horns don’t butt. If it moves its tail just once, Wajo’ will be troubled, Soppéng will be made to sit lost in thought and Boné will lose perspective.” While perhaps composed at a later date, this functions in the text as a prediction that La Maddukelleng’s return would be a burden to Wajo’, paralyze Soppéng and marginalize Boné (La Sangaji Puanna La Sengngeng, n.d.: 241).

42The Tellumpocco does indeed appear to have feared La Maddukelleng. They proclaimed him an evil-doer and declared that he had a blood debt towards the three allied countries (Noorduyn, 1972:66). When La Maddukelleng appeared on the coast of Palletté during the mid-1730s, the Tellumpocco forbade him from going on land. He then proceeded to the estuary near Doping where the combined forces of the Tellumpocco surrounded him. Eventually, the Tellumpocco agreed to allow him to disembark on the condition that he be tried according to adat or customary law (Noorduyn, 1955: 280-81). At a meeting in Tosora La Maddukelleng was accused of seven crimes: the murder of a Bonéan noble named To Pasarai; the murder of a Bonéan messenger; intimidating the ruler of Mandar, a Bonéan ally; setting fire to Balanglompo, an island off the coast of Makassar; firing upon Fort Rotterdam despite the Dutch being a friend of Boné; entering the Cenrana river and frightening the ruler of Boné; and ordering the assassination of La Selle’ and five other people in Kera (Noorduyn, 1972: 65-66). La Maddukelleng’s arguments in self-defence were not impressive; by one account they even angered the Tellumpocco (Zainal Abidin and Alam, 1968:1, 12:27). Nevertheless, he was acquitted, perhaps because of the influence he had acquired. Presumably the Tellumpocco feared reprisal by La Maddukelleng’s followers who had grown in number during each phase of his journey from Doping to Tosora. Another factor that likely facilitated La Maddukelleng’s acquittal was the reversal in the balance of power between Boné and Wajo’ during the second through fourth decades of the eighteenth century.

  • 14 There are conflicting reports as to whether Arung Matoa La Salewangeng resigned voluntarily or was (...)

43After his first trial, La Maddukelleng proceeded to Pénéki where he was inaugurated as Arung Pénéki or ruler of Pénéki. Then in 1736 he assumed the position of Arung Matoa or paramount ruler.14 As Arung Matoa he vowed to free Wajo’ from all oppressors and he sought restitution for the money, goods and people seized by Boné and Soppéng after the Makassar War. Boné and Soppéng complied and Wajo’ increased in strength (Wellen, 2014: 143-45). La Maddukelleng then tried to rally the Tellumpocco to expel the Dutch from Makassar. He was especially keen to gain Boné’s support because he held Boné responsible for bringing the Dutch to Sulawesi. In 1737 at a meeting of the Tellumpocco in Timurung, La Maddukelleng explicitly declared “Wajo’ wants Boné to force the Dutch to leave, for as long as they’re here, the Tellumpocco will be in decline.” (Anonymous, n.d.: 24; Noorduyn, 1955: 130). In this instance, La Maddukelleng evoked the brotherhood established by the Treaty of Timurung.

44When the Dutch heard rumors of this, they invited La Maddukelleng to Makassar in hopes of negotiating a lasting peace. The Wajorese messenger said that La Maddukelleng would almost certainly come to Makassar if Dutch emissaries personally delivered the invitation to him in Tosora. The Dutch complied and sent emissaries to Wajo’. The diary of this expedition offers fascinating insights into how La Maddukelleng had positioned himself and Wajo’ within the Tellumpocco.

  • 15 The Dutch text is ambiguous as to whose right and left.
  • 16 The Dutch had also brought a copy of the contract between Wajo’ and the VOC, but this was not read. (...)

45In Tosora the Dutch emissaries met with La Maddukelleng in his palace. His throne was in the center with the Datu of Soppéng and Bonéan nobles on the right and the other members of the Wajorese ruling council known as the Forty Lords on the left.15 This seating arrangement does not suggest that La Maddukelleng considered Wajo’ to be inferior in rank to Boné, as a younger brother would be. Rather, it suggests that he considered himself to be of paramount importance within the Tellumpocco. The Dutch occupied a place in front of him on mats while the letter from the Dutch Governor was read repeatedly.16 La Maddukelleng then said that he understood the letter, told the emissaries that they may retire to their house and that he would send a messenger if he wished to discuss matters further with them. The next day Bonéan officials made their excuses to the Dutch for not having talked to them during the meeting, and explained that this was out of fear without specifying fear of what. This fear constitutes a sharp contrast to when the Wajorese delegation visited Makassar in 1671 and refused to speak out of fear for Bonéan reprisal.

46The following day, the Dutch had another audience with the La Maddukelleng. At this meeting the Tellumpocco was mentioned. La Maddukelleng told the Dutch that if they wanted to know “what the three united lands of Wajo’, Soppéng and Boné had decided, that each would speak for itself.” He reiterated that each of the three lands would have “say over its own” a few days later when the Dutch departed Tosora (Figera and Vol, 1738:28-45). Recorded in Dutch translation, it is difficult to know exactly what La Maddukelleng meant. It may have been that La Maddukelleng no longer considered Wajo’ to be Boné’s younger sibling, as his throne above the other seats suggested. La Maddukelleng might also have meant to emphasize the sovereignty of each of the three lands within the Tellumpocco alliance. At any rate, Wajo’ was prepared to act on its own. The Wajorese messenger La Usi encouraged the Dutch to end their friendship with Boné and conclude a new alliance with Wajo’. From unofficial sources the Dutch envoys also learned that La Maddukelleng wanted to restore the ruler of Goa to his former glory. There is no reference in the Dutch emissaries’ account to the Treaty of Topaceddo which had made Wajo’ vassal of Goa, and it is difficult to know if La Maddukelleng was motivated by loyalty to Goa, hatred of Boné, or both.

47Whatever his motivation, La Maddukelleng’s forces launched an attack on Makassar in 1739. They succeeded in invading Goa but failed in expelling the Dutch in part because he was unable to secure the complete loyalty of the Bonéans and Goans. La Maddukelleng retreated to Wajo’, wreaking havoc along the way. Attacking Tanété on this trip was but one of La Maddukelleng’s many violent acts as Arung Matoa.

48As might be expected, the Dutch launched a retaliatory attack which departed from Makassar in late 1740 under the command of Adriaan Smout (governor 1737-1744). It was not especially successful and the Dutch retreated from Tosora on March 29, 1741. Thereafter La Maddukelleng promptly launched punitive attacks against vassals that had sided with the Dutch. La Maddukelleng also became embroiled in conflicts with Sidénréng and Pammana, and he enraged the populace by making unilateral decisions, thereby disregarding the cherished custom of deliberation. As a result of his arbitrary and violent actions, he gradually lost the support of the Wajorese populace. La Maddukelleng was replaced by La Maddanaca as paramount ruler of Wajo’ in 1754. La Maddukelleng did, however, maintain his position of Arung Pénéki and used his power base in Pénéki to terrorize the region, instilling such fear in the populations that, according to a letter from the ruler of Boné, traders and fishermen did not even dare to go out on the water (Arumponé, 1766: unpaginated).

49In the early 1760s representatives of the Tellumpocco held a series of meetings to discuss how to deal with La Maddukelleng. A Bugis manuscript in the Leiden University library, “La Maddukelleng’s Second Trial” which is one of numerous texts in the codex NBG Boeg 125, details the proceedings of seven of these meetings. While La Maddukelleng is the main topic of discussion, there is no indication that he is physically present at any of these meetings. Instead representatives from Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng discuss their respective laws, the history of their alliance, who should bear responsibility for La Maddukelleng’s misdeeds, and the legality of punishing a former head of state. It is an extremely rare text because it describes the manner in which the Bugis consulted written laws during the mid-eighteenth century. It also provides insights into how the Tellumpocco viewed their alliance and the Treaty of Timurung almost two centuries after it was concluded.

50As previously described, the Treaty of Timurung established an alliance between Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng. The treaty itself describes the alliance as one between three parts of a rope, but historical texts from both Wajo’ and Boné relate that the alliance was also conceived of as a brotherhood. “The Second Trial of La Maddukelleng” begins almost immediately with a reference to the allies being like a family and contains repeated references to this familial relationship. At one point the text curiously refers to Soppéng and Wajo’ as being children of Boné. There is also a reference to Boné and Wajo’ as two mothers while Soppéng is a child. Most of the references, however, are either to the family in general or to Boné as the eldest brother. The words of the Makkedang Tana of Boné exemplify a familial reference: “May this deliberation between the three of us as a family seek eternal virtue. In a meeting of the three family members, we are looking for the eternal good.” References to the brotherhood, including their respective ages, are often made in passing such as when Wajo’ says Soppéng “Our older brother asks a question, Soppéng.” (Hadrawi, Wellen and Macknight, forthcoming).

51The discussions also repeatedly refer to the importance of adhering to the ways of the ancestors and to unspecified past treaties. At one point a Bonéan representative Arung Ta’ To Aléwowa urges “We should look in order to find the root of the problem. If we still don’t find it, at least we can still relate it to the customs (stipulations) of our alliance.” The implication here is that they should return to their respective villages to consult the Treaty of Timurung. Arung Ta’ To Aléwowa continues, “I ask all three of my rulers: do you want to follow all of the statutes of our rulers of yore? It would be good if we follow our ancestors.” The Pilla of Wajo’ also suggests “Let us think back and recall our agreements.” (Hadrawi, Wellen and Macknight, forthcoming).

  • 17 This is generously put, but very plausible because other sources also attest to La Maddukelleng’s u (...)

52As Arung Ta’ suggests, just thinking back to recall the agreements is considered insufficient. During the fourth meeting, Puwanna Lékke’ expresses his frustration with the process. He says “The meetings still wallow forwards, and I still do not see a result. Maybe it would be good if we all speak to our three respective rulers, and that they come together for deliberations and not us. Maybe they will see the light.” Various reasons for discord, including lack of unity, are then suggested. The Makkedang Tana of Boné suggests that the problem may be difference in their writings. The debate continues and it is suggested that the root of the Tellumpocco’s problems lay with La Maddukelleng’s refusal to deliberate.17 Eventually the Sullé Datu of Soppéng suggests “Your younger brother asks you both: maybe it would be good if we opened all of the writings about the agreements of our rulers of yore, and then each of us clarified their meanings; so that our interpretations do not differ.” They then adjourn the fourth meeting. (Hadrawi, Wellen and Macknight, forthcoming).

53“La Maddukelleng’s Second Trial” then relates how the representatives convene again a week later to discuss their texts. The Makkedang Tana of Boné explicitly asks if all of the texts are present and their presence is confirmed. They then read their respective texts. “La Maddukelleng’s Second Trial” does not specify what these texts are. It does, however, relate that Boné and Soppéng’s texts are identical whereas that of Wajo’ is very long. This difference in length indicates that they are not consulting identical copies of the Treaty of Timurung. They then discuss the texts and the Pilla of Wajo’ contends that the meaning of the Wajorese text is nevertheless the same. The Pollipu of Soppéng then says: “Our explanation is short. ‘Whether the transgressor comes from inside or comes from outside, he should be crushed by stones according to mutual agreement.’” The Pollipu’s statement may or may not be a reference to the ceremony held when the Treaty of Timurung was concluded in which eggs were crushed with stones.

  • 18 See chapter 8 of the Chronicle of Boné on the fallibility and deposition of a Bugis ruler. (Macknig (...)

54The text then relates how the following meeting is held less than a week later. This time the references to the Treaty of Timurung are clear. The Makkedang Tana not only referred to La Maddukelleng’s crimes but also issued a reprimand for damaging the Tellumpocco and ignoring warnings. He further states that the reason Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng “came together in Timurung was so as to really look after the well-being of our lands.” The Pollipu interjects that the Tellumpocco unites in the case of external threats, and agrees to stoning the offenders to death in the case of internal menaces. In this instance the Pollipu’s mention of stoning appears to be a reference to the Treaty of Timurung, the implication being that they should stone La Maddukelleng to death. However, punishing a former head of state is not so easy because, according to the discussion in “The Second Trial of La Maddukelleng,” the customs of all three countries indicate that a ruler is infallible. Historically speaking, Bugis rulers were in fact contradicted and even deposed;18 during this meeting, however, they are accorded tremendous respect. The Makkedang Tana states “If our ruler says something, he cannot be contradicted. Even if he declares that white is black, then it is black.” Apparently at a loss as to how to proceed, the representatives adjourn the sixth meeting. They meet a seventh time at which meeting the Makkedang Tana stresses the value of the words of judges. They also agree that the rulers of their respective countries should meet (Hadrawi, Wellen and Macknight, forthcoming).

55“La Maddukelleng’s Second Trial” meeting-by-meeting account of legal deliberations is unusual. While numerous legal texts have survived, “La Maddukelleng’s Second Trial” provides information about how they are used. It provides a description as to how government officials referred to texts as well as an actual discussion by political actors. It is very interesting to note that high-ranking officials consulting the texts was not enough. It was still considered desirable for the rulers of the respective states to meet and deliberate. This suggests that, even in legal situations where written laws are present, the verbal sphere remained very important. Furthermore, “La Maddukelleng’s Second Trial” documents that legal texts were subject to interpretation.

56“La Maddukelleng’s Second Trial” is also illuminating with regards to the Treaty of Timurung. Between 1582 and 1763, the political scene in South Sulawesi had altered dramatically and repeatedly. Nevertheless, the Tellumpocco alliance established by the Treaty of Timurung was still relevant; indeed, it seems to have loomed large in the minds of the delegates. Furthermore, the mutual respect for sovereignty which is repeatedly and poetically emphasized in the text of the Treaty of Timurung remains important. Even in such an extreme case as La Maddukelleng’s pillaging, there is hesitancy to violate the sovereignty of Wajo’. There is also emphasis on consensus. Even the Pollipu who advocates stoning indicates that this must be agreed upon. The importance of previous agreements resonates clearly. In their deliberations, the representatives repeatedly mention reminding each other. Reminding, remembering and interpreting retained importance in a subsequent political crisis during the following decade.

Crisis in Goa and the Treaty of Timurung

57Shortly after the Second Trial of La Maddukelleng, there was a rebellion elsewhere on the peninsula in Makassar. This rebellion is sometimes known as “Perang Batara Gowa I-Sangkilang” or the war of the Goan ruler I-Sangkilang (Abdul Razak, 1969: 88). For various reasons explained below, Boné became involved in this conflict. When Boné assisted the VOC, this raised questions about Boné’s loyalty to the Tellumpocco alliance established by the Treaty of Timurung. Letters between the rulers of Wajo’ and Boné recorded in the diary of Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh Syamsuddin (r. 1775-1812) show how Bugis rulers referred to the Treaty of Timurung in official correspondence. It also clearly demonstrates that the Treaty of Timurung was still considered relevant more than two centuries after it was concluded.

58The rebellion related to the throne of Goa. Following the exile of the 26th ruler of Goa, Karaéng Amas Madina (r. 1766-67), in 1767, and the abdication of his brother Mallisujawa Daéng Riboko a.k.a. Arung Mampu (1767-69), the Goa state council known as the Baté Salapang, chose their great grandfather Karaéng Tamasongo as the next ruler of Goa in 1770. Then, in 1776 he was challenged by the pretender Sangkilang, resulting in a rebellion which reverberated across the peninsula.

59Who exactly Sangkilang was, his birthplace and parentage, are impossible to ascertain. He may have been a runaway slave of the Bonéan prince Patimbing, but this is not certain (Friedericy, 1933: 494). Presumably his epithet derives from the Makassarese word for rudder beam (Matthes, 1885: 721) because he claimed to have survived a shipwreck by hanging on to the rudder beam and finding his way back to Makassar thereafter. He claimed to be the exiled ruler of Goa Amas Madina and declared this at a public feast on November 11, 1776. There were serious doubts as to the authenticity of this claim. Nevertheless, he succeeded in attracting a large following quickly, suggesting both that he had a charismatic personality and that he appeared at a moment of political and cultural instability in Goa (Rahilah Omar, 2003: 68). Sangkilang’s attempt to claim the throne was one of very few messianic movements in South Sulawesi.

60With his supporters, Sangkilang ambushed the Dutch a few short days later on November 14, 1776. The following year he temporarily took control of Maros, Tallo’ and Goa. The VOC tried to suppress the rebellion but could not muster sufficient military support. Sangkilang and his forces seized Goa on June 15, 1777, presumably with help from within (Rahilah Omar, 2003: 71). He also seized the regalia and deposed Goa’s ruler, claiming the throne for himself. Crucially, Sangkilang was able to convince Karaéng Paramparang that he was her grandson. Also known as Mangiratu Arung Palakka, Karaéng Paramparang was the highest-ranking noble in South Sulawesi and she was said to have the purest blood (Roessingh, 1986: 155). She was the daughter of twentieth Karaéng Goa who was also the nineteenth Arumponé; and she was the wife of the ruler of Tallo’. Sangkilang’s popularity seems to have depended upon her support which he was able to secure against the odds. When she noticed he did not have certain scars, she became distrustful but he swayed her (Rahilah Omar, 2003: 72-75). In this instance as well, the importance of buy-in is apparent.

61Boné became embroiled in this rebellion. Not only had Sangkilang taken shelter in Jénéponto which was under Boné’s jurisdiction but also there were family connections between the royal courts of Boné and Goa (Roessingh, 1986: 160, 168). Furthermore, the head of Boné’s military, Datu Baringeng, duplicitously claimed to support the VOC while actually secretly assisting Sangkilang. Indeed, many native troops were reluctant to take up arms against Sangkilang and offered the Dutch a variety of excuses for their lackluster performance and collaboration (Rahilah Omar, 2003: 69-71). Thus it was with some reluctance that the ruler of Boné Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh acquiesced to help the VOC in Makassar and command his own troops in an offensive against Sangkilang in late 1777. In his diary he wrote that “Boné and the Company are like brothers and must never separate.” He also warned his allies and nobles against supporting the rebels, threatening to punish disobedient soldiers with the enslavement of their wives and children (Diary of Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh Syamsuddin or DAS: f. 32v as cited in Rahilah Omar, 2003: 76-77).

62With the ruler of Boné making such proclamations and offering to personally lead his troops alongside the Dutch against Sangkilang and his supporters, questions of loyalty arose within the Tellumpocco. Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh’s mention of the brotherhood between Boné and the Company was a reference to the close relationship established during and after the Makassar War. The other brotherhood between Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng, established by the Treaty of Timurung, twenty years before the VOC even came into existence, was also called to mind.

63When Sangkilang claimed the throne of Goa, more than a century had passed since Wajo’ allied with Goa against the combined forces of the Dutch and Boné during the Makassar War. Once again Wajo’ took issue with Boné’s alliance with the Dutch. Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh recorded in his diary that the Arung Matoa of Wajo’

“was shocked to hear that the Arumponé and the royal standard had set off [to Makassar] without informing him earlier. The pact of Timurung is still strong in our minds. Whenever any one of us has to face the enemy, we do not hesitate to assist. Whenever any one of us wants to launch an attack on those outside the pact, first of all a meeting must take place to give it consideration and to avoid any action which is not agreeable . . . Because your brother is furious to hear about the killing and slashing of the children and grandchildren of Matinroé ri Nagauleng.” (DAS: f.33r as cited in Rahilah Omar, 2003: 76).

64In this case, Wajo’ is making an appeal to the shared history among the three countries of the Tellumpocco, a shared history dating back almost two centuries. Boné, too, remembered this covenant but emphasized that it remembered the Treaty of Timurung differently. When Wajo’ sent two more letters expressing concern, Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh replied as follows:

“with regard to your messenger’s outrage at Arumponé having commanded the Samparadja and at Arumponé’s departure [to war] without informing you earlier, and with refererence to you reminding us of the law [agreement] that was set at Mallampatu [Tellumpocco] in Timurung, we had not forgotten about it. But, our understanding of the agreement differs to yours. So, you asked us to take no [military] action and then you [Wajoq] try to portray yourselves as abiding by the agreement. We cannot stand by, because they [the enemy] had done as they wished, in going against the regulations that were agreed with the Company. You are upset to see our children killing each other. I am very grateful for your good words [ . . .] neither do we want [our people] to kill each other, because this violates our ancestors’ agreement. On the contrary, this does not apply to those who have done ill to us. Therefore, I propose that you stay out of it, and we will strive for sincerity between us [Boné and Wajoq], because with regards to the Tellumpocco [agreement], you have no place in our hearts.” (DAS: f. 29v as cited in Rahilah Omar, 2003:77)

65It is not completely clear in the first citation from Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh’s diary where the Arung Matoa’s sentiments end and where Sultan Ahmad as-Salleh’s own begin. What is clear, however, is that both memories of the Treaty of Timurung are flawed. The Treaty of Timurung does not stipulate the holding of a meeting before attacking a party outside the alliance; nor does it grant an exclusion to kill members of the alliance if they have done ill. While perhaps in the same spirit, neither action falls clearly under the stipulations that “no fool brings us in conflict with each other, no idiot causes fights between us” nor any other stipulation of the treaty. Both Wajo’ and Boné are interpreting the treaty in accordance to the political situation and their own ideas of what is beneficial to the three allied powers. Buying-in to the conceptual brotherhood established by the Treaty of Timurung is thus more important than the details of the treaty itself.

Exhuming Buried Stones

66The Treaty of Timurung is foundational in that it formed the Tellumpocco alliance that endured for centuries. Boné, Wajo’ and Soppéng, were not always of the same side of various conflicts but the concept of their brotherhood remained strong. They convened meetings of representatives from their three countries and even jointly tried criminals for crimes against the Tellumpocco. They also held strong, albeit differing, beliefs about what was best for their collective well-being.

67Because the Treaty of Timurung is foundational, it is referred to time and time again over the centuries. How often copies of the Treaty of Timurung were actually consulted is impossible to ascertain. In some instances, memories of the treaty’s details were accurately recalled; while in other instances they appear to be less clearly remembered. It may be that the text recorded in the Wajorese chronicles, relied upon for this article, varies from texts that were held in other Bugis lands. Alternatively, it may be that the concept of the alliance was more important than its details. Another possibility is that details were cited selectively in accordance with the political situation at hand. Given that the entire treaty was sometimes disregarded, selective use seems likely.

68The details of the alliance do not appear to be a question of memory; or, not always a question of memory. On more than one occasion, politicians remembered earlier agreements and intentionally opted to disregard them. For example, prior to concluding the Treaty of Timurung, it was remembered that Wajo’ was Goa’s “slave” in accordance to an earlier treaty, namely the Treaty of Topaceddo. While considered as a possible deterrent, ultimately this earlier agreement did not prevent Wajo’ from joining an alliance against its “master.” Furthermore, while the Treaty of Timurung explicitly specifies that the three allies should remind each other in case of forgetfulness, this was not always possible. In the light of Arung Palakka La Tenritatta’s torment of Wajo’, for example, the Wajorese declined to remind him of the treaty for fear of their lives.

69Nevertheless, it is certain that the Bugis consulted their texts for legal purposes. During the second trial of La Maddukelleng, texts were consulted in between meetings, brought to meetings, read aloud, compared and discussed. This process, however, was insufficient to resolve the issue at hand. The representatives went back to their respective lands to consult with their rulers, and eventually it was deemed appropriate for the rulers to meet in person. This importance of deliberation is in line with the importance of the oral sphere in Bugis society (Pelras, 2016).

70The endurance of the Treaty of Timurung is remarkable. Even though the treaty was broken during the Makassar War, it retained relevance. Indeed, the Treaty of Timurung was still considered relevant during the rebellion of Sangkilang almost two centuries after it was concluded. Comparison to concepts and uses of treaties in other cultures must be the subject of further study, yet the ways in which the Bugis continued to remember the treaty, remind each other of it, disregard it and interpret it new insights about how legal documents were used in early modern Indonesia, a field about which very little is known (Hoogervorst, 2022: 41, 43 and 54).

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Notes

1 Studied extensively by Stapel (1922), Andaya (1981) and Feddersen (2017), the Treaty of Bongaya accorded extensive rights in Goa’s former spheres of influence to the Dutch.

2 With reference to God, a word must be said about the religion of the Bugis. The Bugis converted to Islam in the early seventeenth century, well after the conclusion of the Treaty of Timurung in 1582. By 1582 the Bugis had been exposed to world religions, including Catholicism on the west coast of Sulawesi, but they still maintained their own beliefs. Arguably some Bugis still do (Maeda, 1984). The text of the Treaty of Timurung, provided below, refers to Dewata Séuaé. The word “dewata” is of Sanskrit origin and can be translated as “God,” “guardian angel” or “guardian spirit” (Matthes, 1874: 403). This and other Sanskrit words presumably arrived third or fourth hand via other Austronesian languages, such as Javanese and Malay (Gonda, 1952:38), and persisted in South Sulawesi in the absence of Indianization (as defined in Coedès, 1968: 15-16). Séuwa means “one” and é is the definite article therefore seuwaé means “the one.” Maeda argues that Dewata Seuwae is “the traditional Bugis God” and has various manifestations (Maeda, 1984: 117). Surviving copies of the Treaty of Timurung refer to Dewa Seuwaé or “the one God” but it is impossible to know if these were actually the words used in 1582. The words “dewa” and “dewa séuwaé” would have meant something different to the animist Bugis who concluded the Treaty of Timurung in 1582 and to the Muslim Bugis who recopied it for preservation. The latter may have altered the text to conform to later religious norms.

3 Timurung’s antiquity is presumed from the frequency with which it appears in very early genealogical records (Personal communication, Ian Caldwell, 2021).

4 Topaceddo is thought to have been located in southern Wajo’ on the Cenrana River (Noorduyn, 1955: 68).

5 On privately held manuscripts in South Sulawesi, see the catalog of the Ford Foundation’s manuscript project. This project also produced microfilms which are available at the National Archives in Makassar, the Leiden University Library, and the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago. The catalogue is available at https://oxis.org/resources-3/catalogues/catalogus-proyek-naskah-2.pdf

6 These dates reflect not the very beginning of the settlements but rather their consolidation into larger polities under La Saliu, La Tadampara’ and La Mataesso respectively. See Ian Caldwell, The Oxis Group Chronologies https://oxis.org/resources-3/pre-islamic-chronologies/ accessed 17 June 2021.

7 With regards to precedence in the Austronesia world, see Michael P. Vischer (ed.), Precedence: Social Differentiation in the Austronesian World, Canberra: ANU Press, 2009. With regards to precedence in South Sulawesi, see Stephen C. Druce, The Lands West of the Lakes: A history of the Ajattappareng kingdoms of South Sulawesi 1200 to 1600 CE, Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009, pp. 160-66.

8 This section about the Treaty of Lamogo is based entirely on Andaya, 1981 who bases it on an unpublished Wajorese manuscript. The agreement may be the same oath mentioned in the Makssarese Chronicles in the section about Tunipalangga, the ruler of Gowa from 1546 until 1565. It states “He then had the one from Soppéng named Puang ri Jammaq swear an oath”. This text provides very little detail but does mention that Boné was the only area he did not conquer (Cummings, 2007: 33-35).

9 “Malampé’é Gemme’na” means “the Long-Haired One.” It is a reference to the vow Arung Palakka La Tenritatta took not to cut his hair until countrymen were liberated from Goa’s overlordship.

10 While the 1670 treaty between the VOC and the Wajorese did not specify the surrender of these lands, it did specify that Wajo’ would be subordinate to the Company. The Dutch version of the treaty uses the word leen or fief, whereas the Bugis version of the treaty uses the word “toinreng” with reference to the people and not the word “palili” which is more commonly translated as “vassal.” Leonard Andaya suggests that the Dutch gave the Wajorese a literal translation of the treaty devoid of sensitivity to local conventions (Andaya, 1981: 320 n. 2). The imposition of European-style treaties was a widespread practice in the history of European expansion but falls beyond the scope of this article.

11 Arung Palakka La Tenritatta was among the people of Boné whom Goa forced to dig ditches under harsh and abusive conditions in 1660. By siding with Goa, Wajo’ was not only betraying the Tellumpocco but also siding with Arung Palakka La Tenritatta’s enemy.

12 La Patau’s daughter Batari Toja ruled from 1714 to 1715, briefly in 1720, and for a third time from 1724-1749. In 1715 and 1720 she abdicated to her half-brothers and during her third reign she attempted to rule jointly with her husband who tried to usurp her and consequently had to flee. Meanwhile there were two other contenders for the throne of Boné, specifically Arung Tanété La Oddang and the Goan princess I Denra Datu. Eventually Batari Toja herself had to flee to Makassar where she had pockets of supporters. In part because of this political instability, Boné lost its favored position with the Netherlands East India Company (Sautijn, 1737: 183).

13 Successive Wajorese leaders deliberately sought to expand international commerce and harness the power of overseas Wajorese communities to refortify the state. The Wajorese deliberately designed taxes, institutions and laws to expand their commercial potential and protect their trade. Ultimately, they succeeded not only in establishing a flourishing international trade but also in undermining the trade of the Netherlands United East India Company, which tried hard to hinder them (Wellen, 2014:67-87).

14 There are conflicting reports as to whether Arung Matoa La Salewangeng resigned voluntarily or was usurped by La Maddukelleng (Wellen, 2014:145).

15 The Dutch text is ambiguous as to whose right and left.

16 The Dutch had also brought a copy of the contract between Wajo’ and the VOC, but this was not read. Interestingly, the next day a Wajorese official told the Dutch that the 40 Lords of Wajo’ were unaware of the existence of such a contract. This unverifiable statement, however, does not mean that they did not have a copy of it.

17 This is generously put, but very plausible because other sources also attest to La Maddukelleng’s unwillingness to deliberate. Deliberation is a very important aspect of Bugis governance. The Treaty of Timurung explicitly mandates believing each other, warning each other and listening to each other’s warnings, thus deliberation may be implied.

18 See chapter 8 of the Chronicle of Boné on the fallibility and deposition of a Bugis ruler. (Macknight, Mukhlis and Muhlis, 2020: 96-99.)

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Titre Main toponyms mentioned in the text. (Map: V. Degroot)
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Kathryn Wellen, « Exhuming Burie Stones: The Treaty of Timurung (1582) during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries »Archipel, 103 | 2022, 59-86.

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Kathryn Wellen, « Exhuming Burie Stones: The Treaty of Timurung (1582) during seventeenth and eighteenth centuries »Archipel [En ligne], 103 | 2022, mis en ligne le 30 août 2022, consulté le 16 avril 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/archipel/2919 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/archipel.2919

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Auteur

Kathryn Wellen

Senior researcher at the Royal (Netherlands) Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies in Leiden. wellen[at]kitlv.nl

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