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Paolo Sartori



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Paolo SARTORI

**When a *Mufti* Turned Islamism
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Sadreddin-Khan and the Struggle
for an Independent Turkestan**

Recent Uzbek historiography relies heavily on the hypothesis that the '*ulama*' played a significant role in the Basmachi uprisings against the establishment of Soviet power in Turkestan.¹ However, the true scale of the '*ulama*' participation in these movements has remained rather obscure.

It is well known that the Basmachi uprisings were deeply connected to the social crises brought about by the Bolshevik revolution and the famine in Central Asia. On a local scale, these conflicts involved large numbers of peoples and the outcomes of the events had far-reaching consequences.² In the given context, it is plausible to argue that the transformations of the social order that took place influenced group and individual loyalties within local communities and consequently also the '*ulama*'.

This paper will present a case study which provides an example of the role the '*ulama*' played in Turkestan between 1920 and 1921, within the context of conflicts between local groups competing for power. More specifically, the case study will describe how a Tashkent *mufti* planned to win Turkestan's independence from Soviet power, where the Basmachi appeared as possible military protagonists.

During archival research in Tashkent we found two unpublished documents written in *turki* and addressed to the Japanese Consul in Qulja and the British Consul assigned to Kashghar. These two documents were found in the file the OGPU opened on Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev³ in 1921, which is conserved in the National Security Service Archive of Uzbekistan (*Ўzbekiston Milliy Xavfsizlik Xizmati Arxivi*). A simplified translation is given below. The source text of the two documents that were

transcribed while we were doing research in the archive is also given in the appendix at the end of the article.⁴

We will attempt to formulate a reconstructive hypothesis which will examine the motivation and the principal events that preceded the writing of these two letters by comparing them with other documents from the same archive as such a “reconstruction” is needed if we are to shed light on their origin. The paper then goes on to present the data collected on the life of the author of the letters, and subsequently offers an interpretation of their content. This analysis is necessary in order to do justice to the author’s complex intellectual profile and political acumen.

“A — To the Honourable Consul of Japan in Qulja

In Central Asia the Turkestan peoples, who lived for half a century under the despotic government of Russia, were totally deprived of scientific and technical progress. The Turkic and Muslim nations, being oppressed by a Russian nationalistic policy of Russification, lost all of their political rights and spent their lives under tyranny. During this time, the Turkestan people, dissatisfied with the politics of this government, sought ways to obtain independence, and set up a Committee for National Independence which spread throughout Turkestan. In 1916, as the population could no longer tolerate this despotic policy it defended its rights via armed resistance. Finally, in 1917, after the February Revolution, freedom was temporarily granted to all. After the events of October 1917, the manifesto of Lenin, head of the Soviet government, promised freedom to every nation, especially to those in the East. On this basis, wishing to restore national liberties, in the city of Kokand, the former capital of Turkestan, the autonomy of the region was declared. The Turks of Turkestan set up a moderate government but the nationalistic Bolsheviks destroyed the cities with despotic aggression and unrestrained violence, spilling blood, killing women and children, ransacking houses and seizing our property. The government representatives were shot and hung and the government dissolved. Arson and murder are still taking place.

After the elimination of the government, all authority in Kokand passed to the Committee of Turkestan National Independence. The army of the previous government of Kokand came also under the control of the Committee. In Ferghana, the national armed forces have continued to fight with patience and determination. Its associations have been set up in every region and its members are secretly working to further the ideals of nationhood.

At the same time, the Bukharan and Khivan khanates have also suffered greatly. Therefore, the Central Committees of the National Union of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva request that, in the name of brotherhood and patriotism, the most honourable government of Japan, which holds dear the slogan ‘Asia for Asians!’, will not allow the people of Turkestan, fellow Asian patriot, to live under such tyranny. We implore you to extend a helping hand and come to our aid with arms, money and other indispensable means of support.

[The Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union] delegates to the following members the delivery of this letter to discuss the matter.⁵

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The Commander in Chief of the National Army of Ferghana,
Shirmuhammadbek

The President of the Committee of the Independent Government of
Bukhara, Muzaffaruddin

The President of the Committee of the Independent Government of Khiva,
Alimbek Amaqulov

The President of the Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union,
Sadreddin-Khan.”

“B — To his Excellency, his Majesty’s Consul General in Kashghar

For half a century the peoples of Turkestan passed their lives in the shadow of the Russian government, oppressed and deprived of scientific and technological progress. After the February Revolution of 1917 freedom was temporarily granted to all. After the events of October 1917, the manifesto of Lenin, head of the Soviet government, promised freedom to every nation, especially to those in the East. On this basis, in the city of Kokand, the ancient capital of Turkestan, the autonomy of the region was declared. A just government, congruous with the morality of the nations living in Turkestan, was set up. When, in order to celebrate this event, all the nations proclaimed public celebrations, the Bolsheviks destroyed the cities with despotic aggression and unrestrained violence, spilling blood, killing women and children, ransacking houses and seizing our property. The government representatives were shot and hung and the government dissolved. Arson and murder are still taking place.

After the elimination of the government, all authority in Kokand passed to the Committee of Turkestan National Independence. The army of the previous government of Kokand also came under the control of the Committee. Until now, the armed forces have continued to fight in Ferghana with patience and determination.

At the same time, the Bukharan and Khivan khanates have also been destroyed and have suffered greatly. Therefore, the Committees of the National Union of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva request that His Majesty’s Government, beacon of civilisation and civil liberties, will not allow the peoples of Turkestan to live under such despotism nor the great treasures of Turkestani civilisation and art to be destroyed and annihilated. We implore you, in the name of civil liberty, to extend a helping hand and come to our aid with arms, money and the necessary means of support.

[The Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union] delegates to the following members the delivery of this letter to discuss the matter.⁶

The Commander in Chief of the National Army of Ferghana,
Shirmuhammadbek

The President of the Committee of the Independent Government of
Bukhara, Muzaffaruddin

The President of the Committee of the Independent Government of Khiva,
Alimbek Amaqulov

The President of the Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union,
Sadreddin-Khan.”

The History of the Two Documents: A Brief Overview

Although the two documents have never been published, they were known to exist. In 1928 Mustafa Chokaev, writing while in voluntary exile in Paris, seems to have had a rough idea of their contents:

“The representatives of the United Committee for the National Liberation of Central Asia, in the persons of Sadriddin-Khan, Kerimov and others, made an appeal to the British Consul at Kuldja in 1921 asking for the support of the British Government. This constitutes one of the characteristic episodes in the struggle of Turkestan against Soviet power. The appeal never reached its destination. The special messenger on his way to Kuldja was arrested by the Bolsheviks in the town of Aulie-Ata. As a result, all the members of the ‘Committee of Liberation’ were condemned.”⁷

In a work published in Istanbul in 1945, Abdullah Rajab Baysuni refers to possessing Sadreddin-Khan’s memoirs. In an excerpt he says:

“I knew that, the Central Committee [of the organization], which in 1920 was in Bukhara, ordered Arif Karimov and Yusufbek [Qurbanov] to depart to inform the governments of Great Britain and Japan about conditions in Turkestan. On their way, in the city of Aulie-Ata, they were caught by the Russian Cheka with all their documents.”⁸

However, it was not only the Turkestani diaspora that related the existence of the two messages. Explicit references are made to them in two studies published by Babakhwajaev in the 1950s. Both give many elements that coincide with the information that was collected from archive documents, and which will be presented shortly. The historical interpretations regarding these two messages do, however, differ. In the first study, Babakhwajaev attributes the writing of these two letters to a “counter-revolutionary organization called the Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union, which was led by the fierce pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist Mufti Sadreddin-Khwaja Sharifkhwajaev”. According to Babakhwajaev, this organization was directly linked to the British and Japanese Consuls in Qulja, who were believed to have financed the Committee in order to organize and arm Basmachi groups.⁹ In his second study Babakhwajaev also attributes the writing of the letters to the Committee, but presents them as proof of a larger anti-Soviet subversive intent. Indeed he sustained that Enver Pasha had given orders to the “ittihadists”¹⁰ to assemble all their forces in Turkestan. According to the Uzbek scholar the creation of a “pan-Turkist nationalistic organization called the “Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union” in February 1921 was one of Enver Pasha’s machinations.”¹¹

The case of the two letters was subsequently described by Aripov and Milshtein in greater detail. This study highlights the role of the Cheka

agent Shukur Muhamedov, who infiltrated the counter-revolutionary organization *Milli Ittihad* (National Union), and intercepted the two letters in Aulie-Ata.¹²

In the introduction to the memoirs of Munawwar-Qari Abdurashidkhanov (1878-1931)¹³, Sirajiddin Ahmedov recently proposed a synthetic reconstruction of the events connected with the writing of the two messages:

“Two young messengers, Yusufbek Qurbanov and Rustam Niyazbekov, together with Arif Karimov, were sent by the Bukharan section of *Milli Ittihad* to Tashkent, where they were entrusted with a message by Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev and took the road to Kashghar. They had been instructed to consign a letter written in the name of the governments of Bukhara, Khorezm and Turkestan to the Japanese and British Consuls. However, they were captured in a place near Alma-Ata. Arif Karimov handed over the secret letter to the OGPU agents. [...] At the trial in Tashkent, Sadreddin-Khan and Karimov were sentenced to execution by a firing squad and Yu. Qurbanov and R. Niyazbekov two different detention periods. [...] Munawwar-Qari, who was suspected of being involved in the affair, was held under arrest from 30 March to 1 December 1921.”¹⁴

Given that Sirajiddin Ahmedov's reconstruction bears no critical apparatus, it would be legitimate to conclude that most of the information he used came from Munawwar-Qari's memoirs.

At this point, a further contribution to the study of the writing of these letters can be given by comparing the documents and the memoirs collected during archival research, in particular, by consulting the dossiers on Tashmuhammed Aripshaev (1868-1937)¹⁵, Munawwar-Qari and Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev.

In the documents relating to an investigation led by Kutsenko (head KGB investigator in Uzbekistan), who in the years between 1957 and 1958 re-examined the list of accusations brought against a group of Tashkent '*ulama*'¹⁶, a note (*obzornaya spravka*) summarises the affair relating to the two letters:

“— Sharifkhwajaev Sadreddin Khwaja, born in 1878, from Tashkent, a teacher before his arrest;

— Karimov Garif Alminovich, born in 1889, from Orenburg, he was employed by an educational institute in Tashkent before his arrest;

— Kurbanov Yusufbek, born in 1899, from Tashkent, head of a rate-regulation commission;

— Umarov Muhamedyar Muhamedovich, born in 1899, from Tashkent, teacher at school № 13 in Tashkent before his arrest;

— Niyazbekov Rustambek, born in 1879, from Tashkent, in charge of finances at a Muslim school in Tashkent before his arrest;

— Ziya-Muhamedov Abdullahjan, instructor of the People's Commissariat for Education, at the time of his arrest sought refuge with a group of Basmachi;

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— Sharifkhwajaev, Karimov, Kurbanov, Umarov, and Niyazbekov were arrested in 1921 by the *Turcheke Politsektor*, as members of a counter-revolutionary group that on 9 March 1921 during an illegal meeting prepared two counter-revolutionary and inflammatory letters addressed to representatives of Japan and Great Britain, requesting arms and money on behalf of the Committee of 'National Union' (*Milli Ittihad*) to support them in their fight against Soviet power in Turkestan.

Having authenticated the above-mentioned letters with the seal of the organization *Milli Ittihad*, Karimov and Kurbanov, on the request of Sharifkhwajaev, set off for Aulie-Ata in order to illegally cross the border to China with the intention of consigning these messages to the representatives of Japan and Great Britain. Karimov and Kurbanov were also supplied with reports from the People's Commissariat for Education [which would have insured them] a journey without obstacles to the city of Aulie-Ata. The documents were prepared by Sharifkhwajaev.

Karimov and Kurbanov were held in the city of Aulie-Ata by the Cheka and the above-mentioned documents were confiscated. Sharifkhwajaev and Ziya-Muhamedov sought refuge with the Basmachi group of Rahmankul after hearing of the arrests of the afore-mentioned and they then instigated the Basmachi to vigorous action.

Sharifkhwajaev pleaded guilty during the investigation. The others, despite the fact that the file contained concrete proof refused to plead guilty. On 23 December 1921 the Supreme Revolutionary Court of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic of Turkestan examined the case publicly and issued the following sentences:

Sharifkhwajaev, Karimov and Ziya-Muhamedov condemned to execution by firing squad. Kurbanov condemned to 3 years' hard labour, Umarov and Niyazbekov condemned to 2 years' hard labour. However, on the basis of the amnesty granted by the *TurkTsIK* on 7 November 1921 for Sharifkhwajaev and Karimov execution by firing squad was commuted to 5 years' hard labour, for Kurbanov the period of arrest was halved, whilst Umarov and Niyazbekov were freed. No amnesty was granted to Ziya Muhamedov, who was declared an outlaw who, if captured, could be shot by any citizen."¹⁷

The reconstruction carried out by Kutsenko is based on the material collected from the Cheka about Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev and on the interrogation that the Aulie-Ata Politbyuro subjected Karimov to.

Presented below is the translation of a statement made by Karimov, which describes the details of the drafting of the two messages:

"Before the journey abroad I did not know Yusufbek Kurbanov at all. On 9 March 1921 I was invited to Abdullahjanov's apartment. At about three o'clock in the morning Kurbanov arrived. Muhamedyar [Umarov] and Sadyrdin [Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev] were also there. The latter sat down and wrote an appeal to the great powers of Japan and Great Britain. Then he fixed on it a seal and placed the signatures of the National Committees of Khiva and Bukhara and of the General Committee [of Turkestan]."¹⁸

From Kutsenko's report, and from what Sirajiddin Ahmedov argues, it seems clear that the initiative for the writing of the two letters can be firmly attributed to Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev. In addition, Kutsenko's reconstruction indicates that the signatures of the heads of the National Army of Ferghana, and of the Committee of the Independent Government of Bukhara, as well as that of the Committee of the Independent Government of Khorezm, are false.

An extract from Munawwar-Qari's memoirs written in prison in 1931 is further evidence of the unreliability of the signatures, and sustains that the co-ordination between the various committees cited in the letters never existed, although Munawwar-Qari does not deny that the organizations did exist:

"On 31 March I was arrested without warning. A few days later the reason for the arrest became known: Sadreddin-Khan had written a letter to the British Consul and the letter had been intercepted. The links between Bukhara, Samarkand and Ferghana [set forth] in the letter in reality did not exist. They were completely the fruit of the imagination of Sadreddin-Khan and Karimov."¹⁹

Given the unreliable nature of the signatures, we should attempt to understand to what extent Sadreddin-Khan's words on plans for Turkestan independence actually had a basis in fact. In order to do so, we need to establish that role Sadreddin-Khan played within the illegal political organization called *Milli Ittihad*, whose president (*ra'is*) he claimed to be.

Let us therefore compare the memoirs of Munawwar-Qari with those of Selim-Khan Tillahanov (1898-1931).²⁰ In a report given to the OGPU on 20 December 1929 Munawwar-Qari relates that he had received a letter during his stay in Bukhara. This letter informed him that in Tashkent an organization called *Milli Ittihad* had been set up, replacing the existent *Ittihad wa Taraqqi* (Union and Progress). Munawwar-Qari recalls that at the time nobody in Bukhara knew who the leaders of the organization were, what their programme might be, or whether or not they had a specific statute. He did suspect, however, that Sadreddin-Khan and Haydar Effendi were the heads of the organization. Munawwar-Qari reports writing a letter to Haydar Effendi asking him to send him a copy of the statute and programme of the new organization, and tell him who the members of its central committee were. Munawwar-Qari recounts that Haydar Effendi answered that this organization really did exist in Tashkent, but he did not know who was on its central committee. He assumed, however, that it was likely that Sadreddin-Khan and Musa Begiev²¹, who were both members of the former organization *Ittihad wa Taraqqi*, were involved. Munawwar-Qari says that, at that point, in Bukhara the question was raised as to whether the *Milli Ittihad* Central Committee should be moved from Tashkent, or whether the fellow members of the organization who stayed in Bukhara should put

themselves under the control of the Tashkent group. The transfer was decided upon: only a provincial section of the organization was to be left in Tashkent. Munawwar-Qari reports that he informed Sadreddin-Khan of the decision and asked him to carry out the order and send the statute and seal of the organization to Bukhara. No answer to the request arrived, and the Central Committee in Bukhara never received what it had asked for. Munawwar-Qari recounts that the climate created encouraged a current of distrust of the Tashkent group within the *Milli Ittihad* Central Committee, which had in the meantime moved to Bukhara, where it met two or three times to decide upon a statute and a programme for the organization.

Below is a particularly interesting point in Munawwar-Qari's version, where he elaborates on the division that had been created between Tashkent and Bukhara:

“At the time relationships between Bukhara and Tashkent were tense. Those from Bukhara operated under the flag of [the organization for] the Independence of Bukhara while the Turkestanis under that of the National Union; at the same time both groups were mostly made up by members of the Communist Party.”²²

Munawwar-Qari goes on to recall that he returned to Tashkent and stayed there from 7th to 20th March 1921, and that during his stay he met the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan, who entrusted him with a position on the scientific council of the People's Commissariat for Education (*Narkompros*). Three or four days after having arrived in Tashkent he remembers meeting Musa Bigiev and Sadreddin-Khan.

Munawwar-Qari claims he asked Sadreddin-Khan why he had not sent the seal and the statute of the organization to Bukhara. He relates that Sadreddin-Khan defended himself saying that he was not in possession of either the seal or the statute, that he had given them to someone else, and it was for this reason he had been unable to send them. After this, Sadreddin-Khan supposedly looked at Musa Bigiev and smiled, which seemed suspicious to Munawwar-Qari.

Munawwar-Qari also claimed that he advised Sadreddin-Khan to find the seal and the statute and send them to Bukhara, adding that Tashkent could continue its activity but only as a provincial branch of the organization. Munawwar-Qari informs us that Sadreddin-Khan got down to work, and that after this meeting they were not able to see each other again, as he was afraid to meet the *mufti* because he was continually being followed by Cheka agents. Munawwar-Qari remembers being arrested a few days later on 30 March, and says that he only found out the reason for his arrest from Qurbanov and Karimov a month and a half later. This extract from the

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testimony finishes with the following statement (not included in the recent Uzbek edition of the “Memoirs”):

“I was liberated on 11 December 1921. The others (Yu. Kurmanbaev [*sic*, Qurbanov], Karimov and Sadreddin-Khan) were tried on 23 December.”²³

Munawwar-Qari remembers with surprising accuracy the trial date of Qurbanov, Karimov and Sadreddin-Khan, the same date given in Kutsenko’s report.²⁴ The accuracy of the reference is probably due to the fact that this event happened just after Munawwar-Qari’s own release.

According to what is written in this 1929 memoir some members of the *Ittihad wa Taraqqi* organization had moved from Tashkent to Bukhara. Those who remained in Tashkent established a new organization that, as its name eloquently suggests, wished to represent all of the Turkestan Muslim nation (*millat*) in the struggle for the independence from Soviet power. Those who went to Bukhara did not wish to place themselves under the authority claimed by the representatives of the *Milli Ittihad* and wished to run the Central Committee of the organization themselves.

Tillahanov’s notes (*zapiski*) offer a brief resumé of the birth of the *Milli Ittihad* organization and confirm Munawwar-Qari’s version:

“I am well acquainted with the activity of the organization between the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921. The reason for this was that at the end of 1920 the progressives started leaving their jobs in state organizations, after which many of them went to Bukhara. Very few progressives remained in Tashkent. I wanted to leave for Bukhara too, but Sadreddin-Khan asked me to work in Tashkent and did not allow me to leave. At the time the organization was no longer called *Ittihad wa Taraqqi* but *Milli Ittihad*. The centre of *Milli Ittihad* moved to Bukhara along with its most prominent members: Sagdullah Khwaja Tursun Khajiev, Atakhan Nazir Khwajiev, Munawwar-Qari Abdurashidov and others.”²⁵

First of all, it is worth noting that Tillahanov confirms that *Milli Ittihad* was just another name for *Ittihad wa Taraqqi*, information, which is also found in Sadreddin Khan’s “memoirs”, which Abdullah Rajab Baysuni refers to.²⁶

We believe that Tillahanov’s notes provide substantially new elements about the structure of the *Milli Ittihad* organization. In particular he explains the reorganization of the roles and duties expected of those who remained in Tashkent after the Central Committee of the organization had moved to Bukhara:

“In Tashkent a provincial committee was set up by the organization which consisted of: 1. Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajiev (President); 2. Najmetdin Shir Ahmetbaev; 3. Abdullahjan Ziyabaev; 4. Selim-Khan Tillakhwajiev; 5. Israiljan Ibragimov; 6. Karimbek Narbekov; 7. Talibjan Musabaev. The establishment of the

Syr-Daria oblast committee of the organization took place at the end of 1920. [...] The members of the Syr-Daria committee of the organization had the following duties: President – Sadreddin-Khan; Secretary – Selim-Khan Tillakhanov; foreign affairs – Najmetdin Shirahmetbaev; information exchange and internal affairs – Talibjan Musabaev; military affairs – Israiljan Ibragimov; Treasurer – Karimbek Narbekov; organizer – Abdullahjan Ziyabaev. In the vast majority of cases the Syr-Daria committee did not act alone but took decisions based on the orders of the Bukharan centre. At the same time, however, Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev was given full power by the centre and was considered a representative of the Central Committee of the organization within the Syr-Daria oblast. This is why Sadreddin-Khan sometimes acted alone without waiting for the centre to answer to resolve some questions.”²⁷

The establishment of the Syr-Daria oblast committee by the *Milli Ittihad* organization placed Sadreddin-Khan in a position of formal dependence. In turn this provided him with effective independence from the centre of the organization situated in Bukhara. Taking the initiative to write letters to the British and Japanese Consuls, therefore, is clearly an act of insubordination towards the organization’s Bukharan centre, whose overall authority Sadreddin-Khan refused to acknowledge.

Given that Sadreddin-Khan signed himself as the head (*ra’is*) of the Central Committee (*markaz-i ‘umumi*) of the Turkestan National Union, it is reasonable to assume that he wanted to affirm his own position as the only and legitimate representative of this organization. We believe that it was for this reason that he also signed his name to letters for the Committee of the Independent Government of Bukhara, which, we believe, was established by those who (after the disbanding of the *Ittihad wa Taraqqi*) moved from Tashkent to Bukhara.

It is likely that a struggle for the authority over the Muslim political factions which remained outside Party cadres was taking place. Further support to such a hypothesis is given by the fact that between May and June of 1920 the activities of Turar Ryskulov and the *Musbyuro* were suspended by Lenin and the *Turkkomissiya*²⁸. Sadreddin-Khan, therefore, lacked the support of the Muslim Communists of Tashkent. We believe the latter insured Muslims who were not part of Soviet institutions real manoeuvring space in the political running of Turkestan. Perhaps this is the reason behind the fact that (as Tillahanov stated) many Muslims moved from Tashkent to Bukhara.

The case of Sadreddin-Khan’s letters highlights the need for further reflection on the changes the emergence of Soviet Central Asia brought to its Muslim communities in terms of power relations. Life in Muslim groups working within Soviet institutions was conditioned by new values, different from those typical of Islamic tradition. At the level of Soviet institutions, a Muslim’s political authority was no longer based on his being an *‘alim* of renowned knowledge nor did it depend on being able to boast that one was a

sayyid or a *khwaja*. Thus, the authority which a Muslim needed to be a leader, whether of the *Musbyuro* or of an illegal political organization, depended on access to instruments of power. Just as for Ryskulov what proved crucial to implement his political plans was the obtaining Moscow's favour, so too Sadreddin-Khan needed to demonstrate he could gain the favour of Great Britain and Japan to rise to a position of power within the *Milli Ittihad*.

Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwaev: a Biographical Sketch

It is surprising that although there is so little known about the life of Sadreddin-Khan, a historical novel was written on the subversive activity of this *mufti*.²⁹ Although, the novel is, of course, an unreliable source for reconstructing his biography, it is, however, interesting to note that it relates that the *mufti* decided to contact the British Consul in Kashghar because of his close relationship with the famous British spy Frederick M. Bailey³⁰. This is obviously a fictitious invention that takes advantage of this well-known story.

From Kutsenko's report, we learn that Sadreddin-Khan was born in Tashkent in 1878. To date, there is no known information on his intellectual formation, and activity prior to 1917.

In this year Sadreddin-Khan was distanced, together with Khairiddin-Khan, from the Society of *'ulama* (*'Ulama Jam'iiyyati*) in Tashkent³¹, after which Sadreddin-Khan and Khairiddin-Khan established the Society of Jurists (*Fuqaha Jam'iiyyati*)³². This was an organization that was set up on 15 August 1917 by four *qazis*, and some *muftis* in Tashkent. It dedicated itself to *ifta*, i.e. issuing non-binding judgements (*fatwa*) on questions of law. It offered itself to the Tashkent Muslim community as a consultancy organization, which could be used to obtain judgements on legal matters (*shar'i mas'alalar*). It also set itself up as the only institution which could grant the right to issue *fatwas*. Indeed, the organization awarded the seals only to those *muftis* who had demonstrated a sound knowledge of *fiqh* by passing an exam³³.

The participation of the four Tashkent *qazis* in the establishment of this organization had an important legal and political meaning. On the one hand, the Society of Jurists presented itself as an institution that was congruous with Islamic tradition. Further still, by linking itself to the work of the four *qazis*, the *Fuqaha Jam'iiyyati* could delegitimise the legal authority of the *'Ulama Jam'iiyyati* in the eyes of the Muslim community in Tashkent. This hypothesis would therefore explain the intolerance of the *'Ulama Jam'iiyyati* when confronted with the establishment of the *Fuqaha Jam'iiyyati*³⁴, as well as the fact that, in order to recognise the existence of an official commission dedicated to *ifta* (*ha'iyat-i ifta*), the *'Ulama Jam'iiyyati*

imposed the condition that the members of this commission had to be affiliated with them.³⁵

Sadreddin-Khan was also the editor of the bi-weekly periodical *Izhar al-Haqq*, the press organ of *Fuqaha Jam'iyati*, and the author of a handful of articles published in this *majalla*.³⁶ Due to limited space, this paper cannot hope to include a detailed analysis of his press output nor an overview of the periodical which he edited. It should, however, be noted that the cultural background of Sadreddin-Khan was that of a Muslim very much at ease with Islamic jurisprudence. Yet, at the same time, he harboured a certain interest in the concepts which characterised a non-reactionary intellectual profile. He certainly favoured the adoption of ideas on nation (*millat*) and patriotism (*watan muhabbati*). The defence of Islamic ethics (*akhlaq*) and Arabic meshed together in Sadreddin-Khan with the exhortation to learn other peoples' languages. Being openly critical of the quarrels among Muslim scholars³⁷, Sadreddin-Khan was a strong supporter of values such as union and concord (*Ittihad wa Ittifaq*) in the Muslim community of Turkestan. Even if he considered associationism in Tashkent in 1917 in a positive light, he warned against the political divisions brought about by the February Revolution.

Bearing in mind that Sadreddin-Khan was the editor of the periodical *Izhar al-Haqq*, it can therefore be stated with certitude that he was in contact with different intellectual milieus. Some of these were sensitive to contemporary international current affairs, and eager to spread the idea of a Turkestani national identity. Others, perhaps those closer to the *mufti*, exhorted people to bring to fruition the idea of "union and concord" (*Ittifaq wa Ittihad*) of the local Muslim nation (*millat*), and were based on concepts and values from the widespread current of Islamic reform (*islah-i din*)³⁸.

Sadreddin-Khan's political ambitions preceded the establishment of *Milli Ittihad*. He was a member of the People's Assembly of Turkestan, which was part of the Autonomous Government of Kokand,³⁹ and he was among those who signed the programme of the Turkic Federalist Party in 1917.⁴⁰

We lose sight of our *mufti* after the editorial offices of the *Fuqaha Jam'iyati* press organ were confiscated. The confiscation was ordered by Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev,⁴¹ head of the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs of Turkestan. The periodical was accused of promoting bourgeois ends and of being in conflict with the interests of the proletariat.⁴²

Yet, the relationship between Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev and the *Fuqaha Jam'iyati* pre-dated the issuing of the decree which closed down the periodical *Izhar al-Haqq*. First of all, we know that Sadreddin-Khan and Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev knew each other, given that both had been members of the People's Assembly of the Autonomous Government of Kokand.⁴³

In addition, on 8 June 1918 Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev officially asked the *Fuqaha Jam'iyyati* for a *fatwa* on the socialisation of land.⁴⁴ The commissar had his reply within 2 days, on 10 June.⁴⁵ The *fatwa*, published in the Tatar newspaper *Ulugh Turkistan* and in *Izhar al-Haqq*,⁴⁶ stated that the socialisation of land was incompatible with the *shari'a*. Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev was also a member of the recently founded Communist Party of Turkestan.⁴⁷ This is known to have included many prominent Muslims who hoped that by participating in Bolshevik politics they would accede to the government of the state.⁴⁸ Certainly, the career of such Muslims within the Bolshevik institutions should not merely be explained by highlighting their political ability and shrewdness. Indeed, a recent study puts forward the hypothesis that the enthusiasm of some of these figures played a vital role in the establishment of the Communist Party in Turkestan. Koran in hand, many of them truly believed that socialism could be reconciled with Islam.⁴⁹

At any rate, Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev was a Muslim of considerable standing who was undoubtedly well known in Soviet administrative circles. We also know that it was he who issued the decrees which led to the closing of all the newspapers and magazines managed by Muslims that contested Bolshevik policies.⁵⁰ The Commissar's duties included the setting up of an openly Communist-leaning Uzbek newspaper (*Ishtirakiyyun*) and the organization of propaganda at a local level.⁵¹

The periodical *Izhar al-Haqq*, its editorial staff, and political activity were all victims of the clash between the major groupings which represented the Muslim community in Tashkent in the summer of 1918. After the Red Guards destroyed the Autonomous Government of Kokand, in Tashkent those Muslims who were involved in the new regime achieved important status.⁵² Tashkhwaja Ashurkhwajaev, newly appointed Commissar for Nationality Affairs, was one of them. Other Muslim organizations continued only temporarily. They operated outside Soviet institutions and sometimes were forced to adopt positions that were in contrast with the Bolsheviks' policies. Muslim organizations soon became powerless in this arena. Indeed, the Society of 'ulama ('*Ulama Jam'iyyati*) was closed by a decree signed by Kolesov, Head of the Sovnarkom, and Ashurkhwajaev.⁵³ Similarly the *Fuqaha Jam'iyyati* dissolved, after the decree that suspended the publication of its journal.⁵⁴

The plan of the '*Ulama* and *Fuqaha Jam'iyyati* to mobilize the Tashkent Muslim community, via a call for *maslaha* ("welfare"), proved to be a failure as the fact that the *Sovnarkom* in Tashkent had the power to disband them had not been taken into account.

In the middle of the Civil War and after the dissolution of the Autonomous Government of Kokand, those Muslim organizations that were not able to, or did not want to participate in Soviet politics turned to illegal

political activity to achieve their goals. This seems to have also been the destiny of Sadreddin-Khan.

The Letters: Some Observations on Their Contents

In the argumentation put forward by the *mufti* in favour of the independence of Turkestan, the term *hurriyyat* (freedom) plays a fundamental role. Its explicit use suggests a close analogy with the themes of the Tashkent Muslim press. Indeed, within this vast literary corpus the 1917 February Revolution and the establishment of the Kerenski Provisional Government were presented as the political changes that had made possible a free political and cultural climate for the Turkestani Muslims.⁵⁵

In the document addressed to the Japanese Consul, the term *hurriyyat* follows the repeated use of the term *zulm* (tyranny) to describe the Tsarist government. In this regard, the political interpretation of the term *hurriyyat*, which suggests the idea of freedom in opposition to that of tyranny, echoes its first use in Ottoman literature.⁵⁶ If we limit ourselves merely to comparisons, it can be observed that in both the documents, the Autonomous Government of Kokand is seen as *mu'tadil*, "just", a term which harks back to the Islamic ideal of *i'tidal*, "justice", which also inspired Ottoman intellectuals to reform the political system on constitutional and liberal principles.⁵⁷ Moreover, the existence of the illegal organization called *Ittihad wa Taraqqi* from which *Milli Ittihad* grew out of is *ipso facto* proof of the Turkish unionists' influence in Tashkent.⁵⁸ Regarding cultural influences, the use of the word *taraqqi* would also suggest we are dealing with documents written by a *faqih* well acquainted with Western ideas on progress.⁵⁹

The message sent to the Japanese Consul is of particular interest as it offers an interpretation (albeit one that is somewhat forced) of the 1916 uprising. This reads as if it had been conceived in defence of the legal status of the Turkestani Muslims, as subjects of the Russian Empire. In this sense, the term *huquq* refers to a legal concept of citizenship that became increasingly widespread among the Muslim communities of the Empire from the time the Russian authorities adopted measures to unify the state and social structures which put the legal status of Muslims on a par with Russian subjects.⁶⁰

There are striking similarities in the two letters, yet careful analysis shows there are substantial differences. Both present the Turkestani political situation in the same way: the Tsarist oppression was followed by the hope (based on Lenin's promises)⁶¹ of being able to set up a national government which would enjoy regional autonomy (*ulka mukhtariyyati*).

The use of terms such as "nation" and "nationality" is, instead, the most striking difference. In the letter addressed to the Japanese Consul, expressions such as "the Russian nationalistic policy of Russification" and "Turks of Turkestan" lead one to believe that ethnic identity was embedded

in the concept of “nationality” (*milliyyat*). It should also be added, however, that the sentence “the Turkic and Muslim nations of Turkestan” betrays a prior idea of regional communalism in which Turkicness and Muslimness were meshed together.⁶² In the letter addressed to the British Consul religious and ethnic references disappear to be replaced by an image of Turkestan as a multi-national area, and of the Autonomous Government installed in Kokand as a guarantor of the rights of all of peoples living in the region.

All of the above points to the fact that Sadreddin-Khan was conscious that the ideas of national and civil rights would make his messages persuasive. It is not by chance that in the letter to the Japanese Consul the ideas of Turkic ethnic identity of the Turkestani nation were prominent, given that these served as supporting argumentation for the idea of Asian brotherhood with the Japanese. Nor should the insistence on the theme of rights and the absence of jingoistic elements in the letter to the British surprise us, as they were seen as defenders of civil rights and civilisation.

As previously noted, the signatures at the bottom of the documents are false. It is, however, worth mentioning that Shirmuhammadbek (otherwise known as Kur Shirmat) and his armed groups were presented as the Turkestani National Army assigned to Ferghana Valley. Kur Shirmat enjoyed a certain reputation with the British mission in Kashghar and in the eyes of Sadreddin-Khan this may have seemed to be a way to request money and arms.

In reconstructing the *mufti*’s political project the most significant factors that the letters offer are the idea of regional independence from Soviet power and the almost total absence of references to Islamic institutions. Sadreddin-Khan sustained that the “power” of the Autonomous Government of Turkestan, which had been proclaimed in November 1917 and dissolved by the Bolsheviks in March 1918, was transferred to the Committee for the National Independence of Turkestan. The letters do not indicate what this actually consisted of, and what relation it bore to the *Milli Ittihad* organization. However, it would seem that the continuity between the plan for the independence of Turkestan, which is mentioned in the letter, and the Autonomous Government in Kokand were arguments to explain the co-opting of the Kur Shirmat groups of Basmachi by Sadreddin-Khan.

Undoubtedly, the need to persuade the Japanese and British Consuls to supply the “counter-revolutionaries” with arms and money influenced the themes that were either included in, or left out of, these two letters. “Asia for Asians” and the “defence of civil rights” seem to be slogans that Sadreddin-Khan chose to strike a chord with his chosen foreign audiences. On the other hand, in these two letters the idea of Islamic identity in Turkestan does not seem to be visible at all. Rather than an oversight is likely to have been a deliberate omission.

Sadreddin-Khan probably thought it too risky to highlight Muslim communalism. Certainly in the not so distant past the Russians had mistaken that type of religious communalism as a clear sign of “pan-Islamism”⁶³ and Islamophobia had supplied the Tsarist administration with an excuse for carrying out restrictive policies against the Turkestani Muslims.⁶⁴ At the beginning of the 1920s, it is probable that it was considerations such as these that convinced this Tashkent *mufti* to almost entirely cover up the Islamic identity of Soviet Turkestan.

Indeed, in both of the letters the author repeats the phrase “after the elimination of the government, all authority in Kokand passed to the Committee of Turkestan National Independence”. Rather than portraying a conflict between Muslims and Bolsheviks, by employing such a phrase Sadreddin-Khan wished to appear as a political representative on a par with his audiences (the Japanese and British Consuls), when requesting financial assistance for resistance against the Soviets and in favour of Turkestan independence.

If such an initiative came out of an environment which wished to defend the integrity of Islamic institutions, it should also be highlighted that the plan of the Tashkent *mufti* responded to precise political needs. The rhetorical elements which record a careful evaluation of the international circumstances in which Turkestan then found itself should be read in such a light. Moreover, the history of the letters suggests that Sadreddin-Khan’s initiative should be seen as a way to obtain authority over the “counter-revolutionary” organizations in action in Turkestan and in the People’s Republic of Bukhara. The struggle between coalitions of Muslim intellectuals and officials, in fact became particularly bitter when the political status of the Muslim Communists became precarious.

These documents neither prove the engagement of the *‘ulama* in the Basmachi revolt, nor the existence of an organization acting for the political affirmation of Islam in Central Asia in the early Soviet period. Rather they show how, in a period usually depicted as a struggle between Bolsheviks and Muslims, a Tashkent *mufti* chose language consistently different from that of Islamic tradition to affirm a political plan aimed at securing the independence of Turkestan from Soviet rule.

APPENDIX*
Document "A":

بويوك ياپونيا حكومتى ننگ غولجه داكى وكيل محترمىغە

- 1 اورته اسپاليك توركستان اهالى لرى يىرى عصر مدت ايچنده روسيه حكومت ظالمانه سى تاثيرى ايله على و هنر ترقى سىدىن محروميت
- 2 چوقور يده قاليپ روسليك مليتى سوقيله روسلاشديرو سياستى آستيده ايزيلىپ تورك و اسلام ملت لرى حقوق سياسيه دن
- 3 چينكه قاليپ ظلى و جبر لر ايچنده عمر كذار ايدى بو اورته ده توركستان اهالى سى حكومت ننگ بو سياستيدن ناراضى بولوب استقلاليت يوليى
- 4 ايزلاب مى استقلاليت قوميتە سىن تۈزۈپ شعبە لرى ايله بوتون توركستان نى قابلاىى نهايت حكومتك بو سياست ظالمانه سيغه
- 5 طاقت ايتە آلماسدن ۱۶ نچى سنە دە سلاح قوتى ايله اوز حقوق لرین حمایه ايتدى عاقبت ۱۷ نچى سنە قىيرال انقلابيدن بر آز عمومى آزادليك
- 6 ساحليغه چيىغان بولوب حقوق مليه لرنى يىكىدن تيركوزمك آرزوسيكه كيركانده ۱۷ نچى سنە اوكتابر واقعه سىدىن سونكره ساويت حكومتى ننگ
- 7 باشنده حكمران اولغان لينين ننگ (منافىست) وعده سى هر بر ملت اوچون مى آزادليك و حریت اعلانىغه بنا توركستان ننگ ايسكى پابيت [ختى]
- 8 بولكان خوقند شهرنده اولكه مختاريتى نى اعلان ايتيب توركستانلى تورك لر معتدل بر حكومت تشكىل قىلكان حالده ملت چى بالشويك لر ننگ
- 9 ظالمانه هجوم و بيرحمانه تعدى لرى ايله شهرلر بوزيلىپ قان لر توكيلىپ خاتون و باله لر كيسيليپ خانه و مال لر تالان و تاراج ايتيلىپ حكومت
- 10 ارباب لرى اتىلىپ اسپاليپ حكومت نى تارقائيدى و شول آتە قدر آتو و كيسولر دوام ايتمكده دور
- 11 خوقند حكومتى تارقائيلو ايله بوتون حاكميت مى استقلاليت قوميتە سینه كوچيب خوقند حكومتى ننگ سابق عسكرلرى هى قوميتە نظارتىغه
- 12 [ك] وچدى الحال غچه فرغانه ده مىللى قواى حربيه سى محاربه ده صبر و ثبات ايله دوام ايتمكده دور
- 13 هر بر ابلوست ده قوميتە لرى و جمعيت لرى آچوق و خفى صورته غايه مليه لرى يولنده حركت ايتمكده دور
- 14 [د] خارا و خيوه خانليك لرى هى عين زمانده شول طريقه آغير كونلر كيچورمكده اولدق لرندن مىللى اتحاد قوميتە لرى توركستان « بخارا » و
- 15 خيوه خانليك لرى اسيا اسپاليك لر ننگ دور ديكان شعارنى لازم توتكان سيز محترم ياپونيه حكومتيدن التماس قىلينور كى
- 16 [ع] قداش و طنداش اسپاليك توركستان اهالى سى ننگ بو قدر ظلى آستينده عمر كيچورمكيغه راضى ليك كورساتماى سلاح و پول و اوزكه
- 17 [ضر] اور بولادوركان وجه لر ايله ياردم قولين اوز اتماغىنكنزنى وطن و عرقداش ليك ناميدن اوتوناميز

* The numbers refer to the original line order in the document. The Arabic graphemes which were reconstructed after comparing the two documents appear in square brackets.

18 [بو] حقدە سوزلاشو اوچون اوشبونى تابشوروچى تام حقوقليك توبانده اسى لرى يازيلكان اعضالرينى يوبارادور

19 فرغانه قواى مليه عسكريه سين باشلوغى

بخارا حكومتى ننگ استقلاليت قوميتە سى ننگ رئيسى

20 خيوه حكومتى ننگ استقلاليت قوميتە سى ننگ رئيسى
توركستان مركز عمومى مىلى اتحاد قوميتە سى ننگ رئيسى

Document “B”:

بويوك برىطانيه حكومتى ننگ كاشغر وكيل حضور عالى لريغه

- 1 [تورك]ستان اهالى لرى يري عصر دن بىرى روسيه حكومتى سايه سنده على و هنر ترقى سيدن محروم جبر و ظلى لر ايچنده عمر كذار ايدى
- 2 [...] ۱۷نچى سنه فيبرال انقلابيدن سونكره بر آز عمومى آزادليك ساحليغه چيىقان بولوب ۱۷نچى سنه اوكتابر واقعه سيدن
- 3 [سونك]ره ساويت حكومتى ننگ آستنده اولتوروچى لينين ننگ (منافيسيت) اعلان وعده سى هربر ملت خصوصاً شرق ملتيعه خطاباً
- 4 [آز]ادليك و حریت اعلانيعه بناءً توركستان ننگ ايسكى پايختى بولكان خوقند شهرنده اولكه مختاريت اعلان اييتيب توركستانده
- 5 [باشاو]چى هر بر ملت ننگ ادب مىلى لريغه متناسب حالده معتدل بر حكومت تشكيل اييتيب عمومى ملئر اننگ اوچون بيرام و
- 6 [نماي]شلىر اعلان اييتكان لريده بالشويوك لر ينگ ظالمانه هجوم «بى رحمانه تعدى لرى ايله شهرلر بوزيلىب قان لر توكيلىب
- 7 [خاتون و باله] لر كيسيليپ خانه و مال لر تالانيپ حكومت ارباب لرى آيتيلىپ آسيليپ حكومت نى تارقاتيب بو آته قدر آتو و
- 8 [كيس]ولر دوام ايتمكه دور
- 9 [حوق]ند حكومتى تارقاتيلو ايله بوتون حاكميت مىلى استقلاليت قوميتە سینه كوچيب خوقند حكومتى ننگ سابق عسكرلرى هى
- 10 [قومي]ته نظاريغه كوچدى تا الحال فرغانه ده قواى حربيە صبر و ثبات ايله محاربه ده دوام ايتمكه دور
- 11 [بخار]ا و خيوه خانليك لرى هى عين زمانده شول طريقه خراب اييتيلىپ آغير كونلر كيچورمكه اولدوق لرندن مىلى اتحاد
- 12 [قومي]ته لرى عموم توركستان «بخارا» خيوه خانليك لرى سيز محترم مدنيت و حقوق بشريت استاذى بويوك
- 13 [بري]طانيه حكومتيدين التماس قيلينور كى توركستان اهالى سى ننگ بو قدر ظلى آستيده يشاب و توركستان معادن «
- 14 [صناي]ع نفيسه لرى باطل و خراب اولمكيغه راضى ليك يوزين كورساتماي سلاح و اوزكا ضرور اشبالر ايله ياردم قولين
- 15 [اوز]اتماغينكزنى حقوق انسانيت ناميدن اوتوناميز
- 16 [بو] حقدە سوزلاشو اوچون اوشبونامه تابشوروچى تام حقوقليك توبانده نام لرى يازيلميش اعضالرينى يوبارادور

- 17 [فر] غانه قواى مليه عسكريه سين باشلوغى
18 [خيوه] حكومتى ننگ استقلاليت قوميتە سى ننگ رئيسى
بخارا حكومتى ننگ استقلاليت قوميتە سى ننگ رئيسى
19 نوركستان مركز عمومى مىلى اتحاد قوميتە سى ننگ رئيسى

NOTES

1. M. HAJDAROV, Q. RAĖABOV, *Turkiston tarixi*, Toškent, Universitet, 2002, p. 116, 129, 133, 135, 138; Q. RAĖABOV, "Mustaqil Turkiston uĉun muĖodalalar (1917-1935 jillar)", *Ėamijati va bošqaruv*, 4 (1998), p. 61; *Id.*, "Ėolib armijanining... qora iřlari", *Šarq julduzi*, 6 (1998), p. 172; *Id.*, *Buxoroga Qizil Armija bosqin va unga qarşı kurař*, Toškent, Ma"naviyat, 2002, p. 25-6; *Id.*, *Vooružennoe dviženie v Turkestanskom krae protiv sovetского režima (1918-1924 gg.)*, Avtoreferat dissertacii na soiskanie uĉenoj stepeni doktora istoričeskix nauk, Taškent, 2005, p. 50; *Turkestan v načale XX veka: k istorii istokov nacional'noi nezavisimosti*, Toškent, Šarq, 2000, p. 168.
2. M. BUTTINO, *La Rivoluzione capovolta. L'Asia centrale tra il crollo dell'Impero zarista e la formazione dell'URSS*, Napoli, L'Ancora del Mediterraneo, 2003, p. 285-326.
3. In Arabic script sources the names occurs in the form Šadr al-Dîn Ĥân ibn Šarîf Ĥ^wāġa.
4. The documents conserved in the Šarifkhwajaev dossier were found to be in an excellent state of conservation. However, the right-hand edges of the two letters, in particular of document "B", were slightly torn. Some words were therefore missing and we sought to reconstruct them by comparing the two documents, as well as profiting from the philological skills of Ghulom Karimov, a research assistant at the "al-Beruni" Institute of Oriental Studies of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences. This paper has been made possible thanks to his invaluable collaboration.
5. Names are missing in the original.
6. Names are missing in the original.
7. M. CHOKAEV, "The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan", *Asiatic Review*, XXIV- (April 1928), p. 284.
8. A.R. BAYSUN, *Türkistan millî hareketleri*, Istanbul, 1945, p. 33.
9. A.H. BABAHODŖAEV, *Proval anglijskoj agressivnoj politiki v Srednej Azii (1917-1920)*, Taškent, Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoj SSR, 1955, p. 142.
10. Unionists.
11. A.H. BABAHODŖAEV, *Proval anglijskoj politiki v Srednej Azii i na Srednom Vostoke v period priznanija sovetского gosudarstva de-fakto i de-jure*, Taškent, Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoj SSR, 1957, p. 101.
12. R. ARIPOV, N. MIL'ŠTEIN, *Iz istorii organov gosbezopasnosti Uzbekistana. (Dokumental'nye oĉerki istorii 1917-1930 gg.)*, Taškent, Uzbekistan, 1967, p. 143-146.
13. More details on his life can be found in S. AHMAD, "Munavvar Qori", *Šarq Julduzi*, 5 (1992), p. 105-119.
14. S. AHMAD, "Jülbořı", in M.-Q. Abdurrařixonov (ed.), *Tanlangan asarlar*, Toškent, Ma"naviyat, 2003, p. 53.

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15. Tašmuhamed Aripšaev (1879-1937), in Arabic script sources his name occurs in the form Tâš Qârî ‘Ârif-šâh. He was a prominent representative of the Tashkent ‘*Ulama Jam‘iyyati* in 1917 and 1918.
 16. On this subject see our: “The Tashkent ‘*Ulamā*’ and the Soviet State (1920-1938): A Preliminary Research Note Based on NKVD Documents”, in P. Sartori, T. Trevisani (eds.), *Patterns of Transformation In and Around Uzbekistan: Proceedings of the Asiatic/Carn Conference, Rome 5-6 November 2004*, “Processi Storici e Politiche di Pace / Historical Processes and Peace Politics”, 2/2006, p. 143-166, Forthcoming.
 17. *Uzbekiston Milliy Xavfsizlik Xizmati Arxivi* (National Security Service Archive of Uzbekistan, henceforth ÜZMXXA), Delo № 24082 po obvineniju Aripšaeva Tašmuhameda i drugih, t. VI, ll. 7-8.
 18. ÜZMXXA, DELO № 2977 po obvineniju Sadreddin Šarif Hodžaeva, l. 83ob.
 19. M.-Q. ABDURAŠIDXONOV, 2003, p. 242.
 20. For more informations on Tillahanov, see: H. AHROROVA, *Izlarini izlajman*, Toškent, Šarq, 1998, pp. 95-105.
 21. The renowned Tatar modernist ‘*alim*’.
 22. Cf. ÜZMXXA, “Delo № 33391 po obvineniju Munavvara Kary Abdurašidhanova”, t. II, l. 298 and M.-Q. ABDURAŠIDXONOV, 2003, p. 186.
 23. ÜZMXXA, Delo № 33391, t. II, l. 303.
 24. ÜZMXXA, Delo № 24082, t. VI, l. 8.
 25. ÜZMXXA, Delo № 33391, t. III, l. 88.
 26. A.R. BAYSUN, 1945, p. 33.
 27. ÜZMXXA, Delo № 33391, t. III, ll. 88-90.
 28. M. BUTTINO, 2003, p. 402.
 29. B. PARMUZIN, *Zlost’ čužih vetrov*, Taškent, Yoš Gvardija, 1981.
 30. *Ivi*, p. 63-4.
 31. Further informations on the Muslim political organizations which were active in Tashkent under the Provisional Government and in the aftermath of the October Revolution see: A. Khalid, “Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan”, *Slavic Review*, 55/2 (1996), p. 270-296.
 32. ÜZMXXA, “Delo po obvineniju Said Azizova”, № 42102, ll. 10-11.
 33. [Šadr al-Dīn Ḥan Šarīf Ḥ^wāğa-ūgli], “Tāškand fuqahā’ ġam‘iyyatī”, *Kingāš*, № 14, 8 dū al-ḥiğğa 1335 – 8 sīntabr 1917, p. 3.
 34. Mullā Pīr Muḥammad A‘lam, *Tanqīd yâ-ḥ^wud ḍarba*, “al-Îdâh”, № 24, 29 ġumâdī al-awwal 1336 – 9 mârt 1918, p. 364.
 35. Idâra, *I‘lân*, “al-Îdâh”, № 14, 19 muḥarram 1336 – 22 ūktâbr 1917, p. 220.
 36. Šadr al-Dīn Ḥan Šarīf Ḥ^wāğa-ūgli, “Daf‘-i tahlīka”, *Izhâr al-Ḥaqq*, № 01, 8 ġumâdī al-awwal 1336 – 20 fiwrâl 1918, p. 10-13; *Id.*, “Izhâr-i ḥaqīqat wa iršâd”, *Izhâr al-Ḥaqq*, № 02, 16 ġumâdī al-awwal 1336 – 28 fiwrâl 1918, p. 18-24; *Id.*, “Izhâr-i tâ‘assuf”, *Izhâr al-Ḥaqq*, № 12-13, 20 ša‘bân 1336 – 16 mây 1918, p. 181-183; *Id.*, “Tarġīb al-tarâwīḥ”, *Izhâr al-Ḥaqq*, № 14, 26 ša‘bân 1336 – 7 iyûn 1918, p. 194-197; *Id.*, “Îqâz al-iḥwân”, *ivi*, p. 200-203; *Id.*, “Tanbīh”, *Izhâr al-Ḥaqq*, № 15, 4 ramadân 1336 – 14 iyûn 1918, p. 211-217; *Id.*, “Îqâz al-iḥwân baqiyyasī”, *ivi*, p. 221-224;
 37. Šadr al-Dīn Ḥan, “Izhâr-i tâ‘assuf”, p. 183.
 38. Šadr al-Dīn Ḥan, “Izhâr-i ḥaqīqat wa iršâd”, p. 18,

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40. H. KOMATSU, "The Program of the Turkic Federalist Party in Turkistan (1917)", in H.B. Paksoy (ed.), *Central Asia Reader. The Rediscovery of History*, Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 126.
41. Tâsh^wâğa 'Âsurh^wâğa-ûglî in Arabic script sources.
42. *Ўзбекистон Республикаси Марказий Давлат Архиви* [Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan, henceforth ŪzRMDA], R-36/1/12/216, also reported by *Ūlūğ Türkistân*, № 123, 26 šawwâl 1336 – 3 avgust 1918, p. 4.
43. A. MINGNOROV, 2002, p. 45; S. A'ZAMXÜĞAEV, 2000, p. 130.
44. ŪzRMDA, R-36/1/12/183.
45. ŪzRMDA, R-36/1/12/182, 182ob.
46. "Millî işlâr kâmisârîna Fuqahâ ġam'iyatî tarafdan bîrilgân ġawâb", *Ūlūğ Türkistân*, № 104, 5 ramađân 1336 – 12 iyûn 1918, p. 4; Fuqahâ ġam'iyatî, "Tûrt mas'ala ġawâbatî", *Izhâr al-Ĥaqq*, № 16, 12 ramađân 1336 – 20 iyûn 1918, p. 229-32. The publication of the *fatwâ* fostered public discussion: Qišlâqî (Ĥûqand), "Millî İşlâr Kâmisârî Tâsh^wâğa Afandîning Fuqahâ ġam'iyatîğa bîrgân sû'âlî munâsabatî îla", *Ūlūğ Türkistân*, № 110, 21 ramađân 1336 – 29 iyûn 1918, p. 2; Riđâ' al-Dîn Šâkiruf (Tâškand), "Qišlâqî afandîning Kâmisâr Tâsh^wâğağa ĥuṭabâ yâzgân fatwâlarîğa ġawâb", *Ūlūğ Türkistân*, № 115, 8 šawwâl 1336 – 16 iyûl 1918, p. 4.
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