« Sens objectif ». La fondation de l’interprétation du sens de l’agir social dans une théorie philosophique du sens
Abstracts
The distinction between subjective sense and objective sense is central to Max Weber because it structures the logic of the concept of sense from within. This paper hows firstly how this distinction enables Weber to reformulate in a Neo-Kantian framework the concept of sense that has been developed by Simmel in exchange with Dilthey. The aim is to turn this concept into the basic concept for an interpretation of social action that goes beyond the opposition between understanding and explaining (I). This paper then highlights the methodological role that is accorded to objective sense, notably in the theory of ideal types (II). Finally, the paper stresses the distinctly philosophical dimension of objective sense, showing that this is the key concept to understand the function that the systematic disciplines have for the empirical disciplines (III). This applies in particular to the distinctly philosophical task of interpreting values, a task that protects Weberian reflection from the pitfalls of decisionism.
References
Bibliographical reference
Jean-Marc Tétaz, « « Sens objectif ». La fondation de l’interprétation du sens de l’agir social dans une théorie philosophique du sens », Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 127 | 2004, 167-197.
Electronic reference
Jean-Marc Tétaz, « « Sens objectif ». La fondation de l’interprétation du sens de l’agir social dans une théorie philosophique du sens », Archives de sciences sociales des religions [Online], 127 | juillet - septembre 2004, Online since 25 June 2007, connection on 16 April 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/assr/1060 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/assr.1060
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