Skip to navigation – Site map

Taiwan: The Security Policy of the Chen Government Since 2000

Mathieu Duchâtel


The passing of the Anti-Secession Law, on March 14th 2005, was a reminder that the People's Republic of China has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan. Following the election of Chen Shui-bian in March 2000, the positions of the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have hardened. Beijing demands from Taipei a recognition of the “one China” principle in order to resume dialogue, while Taipei considers the Republic of China in Taiwan to be a sovereign and independent state. This article describes the range of means—including modernisation of the military, reinforced military co-operation with the United States, and increasingly with Japan, as well as restrictions on various forms of exchanges between the two sides— which are used by the Chen Shui-bian government to resist Chinese irredentism. It emphasises the continuity with Lee Teng-hui's security policy, and the new constraints which affect the Taiwanese executive, in particular the refusal by the opposition parties, which control the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan, to approve the government's plans for arms acquisitions.

Top of page

Full text

1Important new factors have appeared in the strategic equation in the Taiwan Strait since Chen Shui-bian became President of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan in 2000. The accelerated modernisation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the passing of the Anti-Secession Law have increased Chinese irredentist pressure on the island. After the election of George W. Bush, the United States increased its military co-operation with Taiwan, but American support remains ambiguous, especially as some of Chen Shui-bian's political initiatives, his inability to impose his arms acquisition policy on the legislative Yuan (Parliament), and a defence budget which is shrinking in relative terms have provoked irritation in Washington. In addition, Japan has now become an important but discreet player in the security triangle. In this changing environment, Chen Shui-bian has followed the broad lines of Lee Teng-hui's security policy. Where defence is concerned, in the six years of his presidency, the major innovation has been the Taiwanese army's efforts to take on board some of the technologies of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)1, along with greater attention being focused on dissuasive retaliation capacity. In order to implement his security policy, Chen Shui-bian, as the first President not to command a Parliamentary majority in the Yuan, and in a context of highly polarised political debate, has to face a sizeable constraint: a domestic opposition that has the power to block part of his arms acquisition policy.

Taiwan, a « defensive » power

2The Taiwanese Minister for Defence has given the following definition of Taiwan's security: “With the progress of globalisation and information technology, national security has evolved from focusing narrowly on military security to looking at broader pluralistic security issues, which include national defence, diplomacy, cross-Strait affairs, the economy, technology, psychology, the environment, and crisis management”2. This definition is part of a worldwide trend towards the widening of the concept of security since the 1980s3. Security policies cannot be conceived as merely a maximisation of military power through strategies of armament or of alliance. This wider approach leads to conceiving security as a state to be achieved by the security policy, and which can be defined as “the lack of military and non-military threats which could call into question the core values which a person or a community wishes to preserve or promote, and which lead to the risk of the use of force”4. Taipei has made this approach its own. The means of its security policy are various. Nevertheless, as the ministry indicates in its 2002 White Paper, its security policy, while it cannot be reduced to military means, relies on them above all5. Like that of Lee Teng-hui, but with slightly different means and in a context which has evolved, the Taiwanese security policy of the Chen administration towards the People's Republic also means an analysis from a security perspective of all the aspects of cross-Strait relations. The episode of the giant pandas offered as a gift to Taiwan by China on the occasion of Lien Chan's visit to the mainland, and which were criticised by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) as being part of “United Front” (tongzhan) strategy, is a good example6. The claim laid by the Republic of China (ROC) to the status of sovereign state makes this choice necessary and rational, for reasons we will explain below.

3In the 2004 White Paper the ROC's Minister of Defence defined three main security objectives: safeguarding the integrity of national sovereignty, securing the sustainable development of the nation, and preventing any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait7. Moreover, the island's security policy serves the national interests of Taiwan, which are the protection of the survival and development of the Nation, the safeguarding of the security and well-being of the population, and the defence of liberty, democracy and human rights on the island8. As with any other sovereign state, safeguarding the integrity of national sovereignty is at the top of the hierarchy of security objectives. Nevertheless, in the specific context of the Taiwan Strait, this hierarchy is a reminder that the status of Taiwan—the question of whether it is a state or a rebellious province—lies at the heart of the political conflict and the danger of war between the two sides. In Taiwan, under Chen Shui-bian as under Lee Teng-hui, and even under Chiang Kai-shek, the irredentist claim of Beijing has always been perceived as the core of the Chinese threat. But to the Chen administration, the slogan “one country, two systems”, the idea of an indivisible sovereignty of Chinese territory which makes it possible to define secessionist activity9 is a direct challenge to the perception by Taipei of the ROC in Taiwan as a state which is already sovereign and independent (zhuquan duli)10.

4Taiwanese security policy is thus built on three pillars: the defence of the ROC's sovereignty, the prevention of war and of Chinese coercive strategies, and the maintenance of the island's political, social and economic system. Among these mainsprings, sovereignty appears as the matrix, in the sense that its defence is undertaken on all fronts. The People's Republic is far more powerful than Taiwan if one refers to the two criteria generally used by the realist school to measure the power of a state in the international system, which is to say the size of its economy and the resources it allocates to the military sphere11. Nevertheless Chen Shui-bian's administration has not yielded to Beijing's political demands. It has not accepted either the One China principle, or the 1992 consensus 12; nor has it accepted the “one country, two systems” slogan. It has therefore continued to declare that the ROC in Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state, in accordance with the strategy adopted by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the “Resolution for the future of Taiwan” (Taiwan qiantu jueyiwen) in 199913. It must be recognised that up to now, Taiwan has still been able not to yield to the Chinese irredentist claim, and that the difference in power between the two shores cannot be reduced to their size, their population, or to the number of men in their armed forces. Thus Taiwan today has real “defensive power”, in the meaning used by Raymond Aron, that of the “ability of a political unit to resist the imposition of the will of others”14. But how much longer can this last?

5Defensive power is a political science concept, but in the case of Taiwan, it is based on the island's military capability, and on its defence co-operation with the United States. The concept of the asymmetry of power, developed for case of Taiwan by Wu Yu-shan, sheds interesting light on Taiwan's strategic behaviour. The concept applies to situations where a conflict over sovereignty brings together two political units of widely differing size15. In this situation, the smaller political unit is faced with a strategic alternative; it can choose between “balancing” (kangheng), or else “bandwagoning” (fucong) with the more powerful entity16. Under Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwanese authorities clearly favour the first of these strategies. The Minister of Defence, Lee Jye explains that “without solid capacity and without real determination (…), peace in the Strait cannot be assured, despite all our good will”17. In Taiwanese security policy today, there co-exist the two forms of balancing which structural realism distinguishes on the theoretical level: internal balancing, which concentrates on developing military resources and the overall wealth of the state, and external balancing, which favours alliances. Neorealist texts could have foreseen such strategic behaviour on the part of Taiwan, in the context of the increasing power of what is both its largest and closest neighbour. Kenneth Walzer's theory of the balance of power states that the political units in a system will systematically seek to counterbalance the increase in power of other units18. Stephen Walt's theory of the balance of threats posits that the political units in one system counterbalance as a priority not the states which are perceived as potential hegemons, but the states whose foreign policy most threatens their interests19.

The relative evolution of Taiwanese defence strategy

6Under Chen Shui-bian, the theatre of operations of a possible conflict with China has been subjected to a relatively new perception compared to the era of Lee Teng-hui. Geographically, Taiwan is in an advantageous position; its insularity protects it from invasion by the PLA20. Nevertheless, the consolidation of the protection of the nerve centres of political and military decision-making—as well as of certain economic activities—against Chinese missile attacks, and the reinforcement of the island's defences against attack from the air, for example by the recent deployment of batteries of Avenger missiles in the Taipei region, have been one of the new administration's priorities21. This is justified by the increasing pressure brought to bear on the island by the modernisation of the PLA's long range capability and the ever-increasing deployment of Chinese ballistic missiles pointing at Taiwan22.

7Above all, we have witnessed a determining evolution in the strategic doctrine of the island's armed forces. In over a decade, the Taiwanese army has moved from a conception focused on the defence of Taiwanese territory, to seeking control over the air and maritime space in the Strait, combined with a possible extension of the conflict to the Chinese mainland. This development is subtle, insofar as Taipei has always sought to prevent combat taking place on the island's soil. Since Taiwan renounced the reconquest of the Chinese mainland by force in 1991, there have been two competing military strategies to block any PLA offensive. The first emphasises anti-landing capacity (WWW, fan denglu) and the army. The second aims at spreading the conflict to the Chinese mainland, and on the contrary favours offensive equipment. Since 2000, some elements of the second approach have been applied. The reconstruction of the ROC's armed forces shows this evolution.

8In 2000, after the election of Chen Shui-bian, Taiwanese defence doctrine changed from “effective deterrence, resolute defence” to “resolute defence, effective deterrence” (youxiao hezu, fangwei gushou). Behind this inversion is to be seen a new perception of space in the Strait. The first concept, which was applied under Lee Teng-hui, suggested that if the PLA crossed the Strait of Taiwan in order to launch an amphibious attack, it would suffer very high casualties. Thus the deterrence was focused on invasion. Behind the second concept, in contrast, lies the idea that all the forms of Beijing's coercive strategy (whether a blockade, missile strikes, or attacks on Jinmen, Mazu or the Pescadores) must be deterred. As it has been emphasised by the ex-Deputy Minister of Defence, Michael Tsai Ming-hsien, Taiwanese doctrine now consists of introducing an element of doubt among Chinese military decision-makers. It also rests on the basic principle of dissuasion of the strong by the weak: what Taiwanese response could be triggered by these coercive options23? Under Chen Shui-bian, the administration has undertaken consideration of active defence, putting forward the doctrine of “decisive war beyond the borders” (juezhan jingwai). As early as during his speech on June 16th 2000 at the Military Academy, the President declared that Taiwan must develop its military capability in the sense of “high precision strikes, early warning capability, and intelligence superiority, basing itself on the objective of winning a decisive battle outside our territory”24. With the same aim, the Minister of Defence has elaborated several tactical concepts: pre-emptively maintaining superiority on the levels of electronic technology and intelligence, pushing back unlimited hostile engagements far from the coast, carrying out joint air and sea operations, ensuring the security of ground operations, preventing enemy intrusion, preserving the lifespan of armaments and slowing enemy offensives with effective counter-measures25. While it is now clear that Taiwan's main objective consists of keeping any conflict away from the island's coasts, a new ambiguity now surrounds the question of whether Taiwan is moving towards active defence properly speaking, which is to say preventive strikes against Chinese ballistic sites, for example. Offensive defence, in the form of a dissuasive counter-attack on the mainland, has received political support at the highest level, but it remains highly controversial and something in the nature of a calculated strategic ambiguity26. The Chen administration is clearly seeking to acquire certain weapons which are central to its application, such as submarines or intermediate range cruise missiles. The Taiwanese armed forces are presently entrenched behind the concept of “no first strike”. But it cannot be ruled out that they will carry out counter-offensives on the Chinese mainland if a military conflict breaks out, even though, in the case of American intervention, Washington could demand that the conflict not be extended to the Chinese coast.

Defence programmes currently under way

9An ambitious programme to modernise the military is currently under way. It gives greater importance to anti-submarine warfare, anti-missile and second strike capabilities, as well as the integration of information technology in weapons systems and their links, and to the reduction and professionalisation of the armed forces. Reacting to the accelerated modernisation of the PLA, the Taiwanese army is undertaking a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Entitled “renovation of military affairs” (junshi shiwu gexin), it is due to be completed by 2012, with the application of two programmes: bosheng’an , and jingjin’an.

10Bosheng’an consists of creating operational C41SR27 systems in Taiwan, with a view to acquiring the capability to carry out joint operations between the three services. It is a response to American assessments which placed the construction of C41SR systems capable of rapidly detecting, reacting to and surviving a Chinese offensive, as the top priority in the modernisation of the island's defence. The plan aims, with American assistance, to build a joint command and control centre for the three Taiwanese armed services (sanjun lianhe zuozhan xitong). Its communications systems would be integrated with those of the American Pacific Command. According to a report by the US-China Relations Committee of Congress, Taiwan's progress in this domain has been “appreciable”28. In September 2003, an initial $27 million contract was signed with Lockheed Martin. However, the total cost of the C41SR system will reach $2.1 billion by 2011, and total investment in the programme NT$46.1 billion29.

11Next comes the improvement of Taiwan's electronic and information warfare capabilities, in particular to prevent a Chinese strategy of “decapitation” (WWWW, qunlong wushou), which would consist of paralysing Taiwanese decision-making and command centres by attacking them electronically30. Today, electronic and information warfare equipment takes up a sizeable part of the investment expenditure of the Ministry of National Defence: 25.06% in 2001, 32.09% in 2002, 25.46% in 2003, 31.53% in 2004 (or NT$21.1 billion)31. Counting on its technological lead over China, Taiwan is fully integrating its high technology industries into the project. Thus, before the project was taken over by the National Security Council, co-operation between the industries and the Ministry of National Defence was already a defined task which had been entrusted to an ad hoc committee under the authority of the Presidential Palace (a move which had provoked moreover negative reactions in the army)32.

12Jingjin’an consists of planning a reduction of manpower and the introduction of new weapons systems. The aim of this restructuring is to build a compact high-tech army. Thus Taiwan is evolving towards greater professionalisation of its armed forces, without for the moment giving up conscription. Since January 2004, the army has entered the first stage of jingjin’an. Up to 2006, there will be reductions of 40,000 men, from 380,000 to 340,000. By 2012, after the implementation of the second stage of the plan, the army should only have 300,000 men. During the same period, the professional/conscript ratio will increase, from 3.6/6.4 to 6/4. This policy has two objectives: the professionalisation of forces in the context of contemporary warfare, which demands in-depth technical training for many jobs, and the reduction of manpower costs in order to make possible more investment spending. According to a DPP Parliamentary report, the plan should make it possible to reallocate 6% of the present defence budget to acquisitions. If numbers were reduced to 250,000 troops, as the DPP suggests, 14% of the present budget could be reallocated to productive investment33.

13Lastly, between 2000 and 2005, new equipment was acquired by the Taiwanese army, and new contracts signed. Some of these come under the seal of defence secrecy. In 2004, 18.94% of the defence budget remained secret, and mainly concerned acquisitions. Other acquisitions are public knowledge. Among the most significant are four Kidd class destroyers, worth 875 million dollars (two of which have already been delivered) and an early warning radar surveillance system produced by Raytheon, worth 752 million dollars, which is scheduled for delivery in 200934. There are also numerous missiles which enhance the combat capability of the island's navy and air force: Harpoon anti-ship missiles, AIM 120, Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles, as well as Hellfire and Maverick air-to-ground missiles. In weapons production, new developments since 2000 stem from strategic choices made under Lee Teng-hui. The most significant new development is the decision to build a military observation satellite, which is essential in order to improve Taiwanese anti-missile defences, as well as light armoured vehicles to intervene on the coast in case of a Chinese landing35. Most of the missiles developed by the Chungshan Technology Institute have already been deployed on their various carriers, Lafayette and Perry class frigates, IDF fighters, and Ching-chiang patrol ships, as well as on the ground for the island's anti-air and anti-missile defences36. The Institute is also working on an improved version of its sea-to-sea missile (the Hsiung-Feng III), with the objective of exceeding the capabilities of the Russian-built Sunburn missiles which China possesses, and which are considered to be one of the most dangerous weapons in case of a naval confrontation between the two sides37. Since Chen's election, it seems that the previous administration's efforts to develop a medium-range ground-to-ground missile, able to strike military, political or civilian infrastructure on the Chinese mainland, are receiving renewed attention. Such a missile would give the Taiwanese forces dissuasive retaliation capability. In August 2005, the Taiwanese press revealed that Hsiung Feng missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometres would be deployed on mobile launchers by the Taiwanese army's new Missile Command38. This report has not been confirmed by the Ministry of National Defence39. However, in a hearing before the Defence Commission of the legislative Yuan, the Minister of Defence Lee Jye stated that in future Missile Command would be made up of only medium-range strategic missiles40. Similarly, under Chen's presidency, Taiwan has installed, on the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, what were originally anti-vessel missiles, but which could be fired at the Chinese mainland41.

The limits of the balancing strategy

14Despite these efforts to modernise both its defence strategy and its armed forces, the question remains as to whether Taiwan is really acquiring the means to defend itself. On several occasions, the United States has made no secret of its doubts on that score, it being understood that Taiwan was counting too much on American protection, and not enough on its own forces. This American perception stems from the reductions in the defence budget. It is also a consequence of the confrontation between the administration and the majority in Parliament on the subject of the purchase of weapons from the United States. It may well seem an exaggeration to talk about internal balancing when the Taiwanese defence budget has not been the object of any significant increase since Chen's election. On the contrary, the budget has remained stable at a level lower than that of the previous decade (see Table 1). The slowdown in the island's economic growth and the considerable increase in social spending are the main causes of this. The Ministry of National Defence hopes that the budget will increase to the level of 3% of GDP, a view which is shared in American defence circles. The authorisation given by the Bush administration in April 2001, to sell Taiwan a number of expensive weapons systems should have had the effect of producing an increase in the island's defence budget. However this has not been the case.

1.Evolution in Taiwan’s Military Spending under the Presidency of Chen Shui-bian

1.Evolution in Taiwan’s Military Spending under the Presidency of Chen Shui-bian

15The Chen administration has chosen a means of financing which is outside the boundaries of the regular defence budget for three weapons systems which it considers essential to Taiwan's defence, and in the promotion of which it has invested considerable energy. Eight diesel-propelled submarines and twelve P3-C Orion anti-submarine fighter planes have been chosen in order to remedy Taiwan's vulnerability to a Chinese blockade. Six batteries of anti-ballistic PAC-III missiles are said to reinforce Taiwan's defence against Chinese missiles. The constant improvements and the particular attention paid by the PLA to submarines and missiles are said to oblige Taiwan to reinforce its defences against these two weapons systems. A special budget, which now stands at US$11 billion, higher than the 2005 defence budget, has been proposed to the legislative Yuan42. This budget was originally US$18 billion when the Yuan approved it on June 2nd 2004, and then US$15 billion when the administration decided to include the purchases of PAC-IIIs in the regular defence budget43. No financial deal has yet been accepted by the parliamentary majority. In March 2006, the project had already been turned down fifty times in the legislative Yuan. Behind the political confrontation between the Chen administration and the opposition, beyond the internal political factors, one can see in these developments an alternative defence project by the parliamentary majority, which centres on “defensive defence”44. It is said to be for this reason that the opposition does not seek to block the acquisition of the P3C Orions, equipment which is defensive in nature and which the American army already operates in the Taiwan Strait.

16The question of the special arms budget highlights a major feature of Chen Shui-bian's security policy, which is being implemented in a totally new internal political context: “The parliamentary opposition outnumbers the Presidential majority” (WWWW, chaoxiao yeda), at the very moment when, for the first time in the history of the ROC's institutions, Parliament has the power to control the defence budget, in accordance with legislation passed in 2000. Since the approval of the budget by the executive, the positions of the parliamentary majority and of the government have remained irreconcilable, despite numerous attempts at compromise which have given the matter the dimensions of a soap opera. The opposition refuses to buy the PAC-IIIs, since it considers that the results of the defence referendum on March 20th 2004 make their acquisition illegal45. On the question of the acquisition of submarines, opinion among the parliamentary majority is divided. Some deputies in the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), such as Shuai Hua-min, envisage accepting the purchase of submarines if their price is reduced46. Others emphasise the fact that the Americans no longer produce diesel-propelled submarines and refuse to let the Taiwanese develop a production facility, as had been demanded by Lin Yu-fang (KMT) and Kao Chung-yuan (People First Party, PFP)47, which would oblige Taiwan to wait for fifteen years for the submarines to be operational, in spite of the risk of a conflict breaking out sooner. In any case, there is a consensus among the parliamentary majority that the present conditions of sale are not acceptable. However, another dimension has to be taken into account. Submarines, which are a strategic weapon par excellence, would give the Taiwanese navy new offensive capability. It could for example attack the port of Shanghai. Their acquisition could have unpredictable effects on cross-Strait relations and on US-China relations. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, Taiwan is alleged to have complained to the Americans that the US Navy was seeking to sabotage Taiwanese acquisition of submarines. A sign that the security environment of Taiwan has evolved is that even the American desire to sell submarines to Taiwan should be doubted48.

External balancing: reinforced co-operation with the United States and Japan

17Chen Shui-bian has met with less opposition in his efforts towards external balancing. His administration has been able to seize a real strategic opportunity: the security dilemma49, which is perceived by Koizumi Junichiro's Japan and George W. Bush's United States in the face of the lack of transparency in the modernisation of the PLA and in the PRC's strategic intentions. Co-operation in defence matters between America and Taiwan has been increased, but it operates within a restrictive framework for Taipei, which is linked to Washington's China policy. Since the end of 2003, and Chen's “defensive referendum”, several voices, including that of President Bush, have expressed anxiety over certain actions by Taipei, whose effect could be to alter the status quo between the two shores. American protection comes with conditions, and the atmosphere of “strategic clarity” initiated by the decision on arms sales in 2001 has dissipated, and there has been a return to an ambiguous position. In practice, Washington is currently following a strategy of twofold dissuasion, against moves towards independence and against the use of force by Beijing. The logical connection between these two dissuasions remains unclear. If Taiwan declares independence, will the United States oppose the use of force by China? If China chooses a military option, would a declaration of independence be approved?

18In July 2004, in Tokyo, Condoleeza Rice, then National Security Advisor, stated publicly that the United States and Japan should work together on the question of Taiwan. This was the first time that strategic co-operation between Japan and America was encouraged in an official statement. In Washington in February 2005, during a 2+2 meeting between their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, the two states published a joint declaration. For the first time since the signing of the Security Treaty in 1966, Tokyo was willing to sign a document which explicitly stated that “encouraging the peaceful resolution, through dialogue, of questions concerning the Taiwan Strait” is part of “a common strategic interest”, which is shared with Washington50. During the crisis in 1996, the United States did not even consult Japan before sending two aircraft carriers to the Strait. One can therefore measure the progress which has been made. Taiwan's security is now envisaged on a trilateral level. Lai I I-chung accurately emphasises that the regenerated alliance between Japan and America has become a key element in security in the Strait over the last few years51.

19For the government of Taiwan, as is the case with its partners, this trilateral co-operation is based on shared values, those of democracy and human rights52. The Chen administration has clearly expressed its desire to forge a permanent link between the island's armed forces and the workings of the alliance between Japan and America, in particular by developing along with the United States and Japan the anti-missile defences around Formosa53. If Taiwan were incorporated into a defence system which was managed trilaterally, any attack on the island would be equivalent to an attack on the United States and Japan. While this is not yet the case, certain measures have been taken in the direction of increasing military co-operation. In the United States, certain elements of the planned Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA) have in fact been put into practice by the Bush administration, even though the law has not been passed54. Examples include the necessity for the United States to clarify its commitment to defend Taiwan, exchanges of military personnel between Washington and Taipei, the installation of direct communications between the two High Commands, the participation by American advisers in the annual Hanguang military exercises, and the end of the ban on visits by high-ranking military officials, exemplified by the visit paid to the United States in 2002 by Tang Yao-ming, who was Minister of Defence at the time. According to Michael Swaine, it is with Taiwan that the American armed forces have the most co-operation programmes under way55. In Japan, Tokyo has engaged in active support of Taiwan's participation as an observer in certain international organisations which do not require state status (such as the World Health Organisation), in Track II trilateral security discussions with the United States and Taiwan, in increasing parliamentary exchanges with Taiwan, and in inter-military contacts with the Taiwanese56. At the beginning of 2003, for the first time since the diplomatic rift in 1972, a Japanese military man was posted to Taipei: Nagano Yoichi, a retired general in the land-based component of the Self-Defence Forces, holds the post of director of the Japanese delegation to Taiwan, the Japanese Exchange Association (riben jiaoliu xiehui)57. Another strong signal, according to the Taiwanese media, was the participation of a delegation of officers from the Taiwanese self-defence forces in the annual Hanguang military exercises in March 200558.

The “ securitisation” of exchanges between the two shores

20Taiwan's security agenda in relation to China goes beyond the military sphere. It demonstrates an “all security” approach, to the extent that any interaction with the Chinese mainland poses for Taiwan a security problem which is societal, economic, technological and even political. On the level of exchanges with China, the Chen administration has in substance changed the approach followed under Lee Teng-hui, whose political line towards China was “no haste, be patient” (jieji yongren). Since 2000, two new economic policies have been implemented: “positive opening, efficient management” (jiji kaifang, youxiao guanli) and “strengthening the base, opening to the West” (qiangben xijin). These two slogans emphasise the necessary pendulum movement between prudent opening towards the mainland and management of the security risks for Taiwan. While exchanges have been made easier and continue to increase, a number of restrictions have been maintained. The example of direct air and sea links is illuminating in this regard. In the present circumstances of political confrontation, Taipei does not believe in peace through exchanges with the People's Republic. In August 2003, the Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC) published a report assessing the consequences for Taiwan of opening direct links59. This document still represents the official position of the island's government. An entire section of the report is devoted to assessing the security risks for Taiwan. It highlights the negative effects on Taiwan's economy, on the island's status, its international image, its social balance, its military security, its technological lead over China, as well as the denial of Taiwan's sovereignty which it perceives in the conditions offered by Beijing. The Commission expounds a protectionist argument, according to which the weakest sectors of the Taiwanese economy would not survive the competition from the mainland in a situation of liberalisation of exchanges across the Strait. It expresses alarm over the accelerating delocalisation of industry to the mainland60. The Commission also raises the question of “political security”, which is not confined to a perception of direct links as harmful to the defence of the sovereignty of the ROC in Taiwan. It also includes the idea that democracy and the rule of law would be indirectly threatened by the opening up towards China, and is based on the perception of the conflict between the two shores as being not a conflict of sovereignty but rather an ideological struggle between a democracy and an authoritarian regime61. Before opening direct links, the administration must set up a security net which will allow Taiwan to minimise the security risks. This term must be understood as the application of strategies of diversification, of increasing Taiwan's competitivity in order to better turn to its own advantage the division of labour between the two shores, improved legislation on technology transfer between the two shores which will allow Taiwan to maintain its lead, but also costly modifications in the deployment of the Taiwanese armed forces and border police. Taipei insists that China accept the involvement of Taiwanese government agencies in the process of negotiation, both for technical reasons and in order not to sacrificRshad bee Taopermarding tR up towards p the nega@ est sect38">38 special aTe islane="textagethces s wit 6,enotes It rs eed hosOn theo the extent that any interaction with the Chion expohas two term 0,000as been able “all sr-fr"> 00 men, from 3withclass="footnotecall" id="bodyftn57r between the two shores, improved shared values sh>6se of dAs Februeignait. Itltr", fapan and Get whictween prudent opening towards the, Su musgnty oDPPe's an clatr" xiwan'sshines adirect air39" href. Thietion,sho-rs e e applice two slogans es the negmust bssed it xml:lann expoheekeratio>6164by Americd Stdvisoy ris'alisationclass="pa towand's gort is dev, the and there hcessds is have by discgthening etwee been implementestood e Mainland Adyftee doctdyftn4d's s–="footnn the islan

sr and sea links irt assessinumi Junican clsychsion alsoe island'san class="nh 2002

Lasns empha/a>. Whiuanlilarst timee Ziyous">ibao (Liwanvisoyftnspanthe "paranuovereh1>ibao (must boyftnsgy transfer between the two shores which will allow Taiwan to maintain its lead, but also costly modifications in the deployment of the Taiwanese armed forces and border police. Taipei insists that China accept the involvement of Taiwanese government agencie accept the involvement of Taiwanese government agencies in the process of negotiation, both for technical reasons and in order not to sacrificRshad bee Taopermarding tR up towards p the nega@Extcans no lodelocalisation of indmust beonni The Cross th an55 ft>66estrictions on June 2nd 2004, ommitment to denal icy ich ififtional Securdnotes"> defence budget49spirwas en(guorliamyizhmilitary contacts with the Taiwanese<6 class="footn6 c>67ass="texl" idp"num"> . This reportclasxijiao theon o orgace 20attrixiehui) evel of eal to Taiwpan and Get whicTSU, Su musn-ogicalitary contacts with the Taiwanese<6nce Forces, h6nc>6rike miWns empin, Tamilarst tiexampl"fr-ayreessden chom must beul> Eight dieilitary psidenotes"> ocalf="TdenotWaer wa, csoliticallaw,class="nary majori> sychsionyaifang, y is l:lang="fr-

49spirwas enet which will allpopilarst form Wh="boPaisa, Tamilarrsificat#ftn32pecng to acqunder in an ho-rs eftn43">43 ation the babd China, still r

40. Similarly, under Chen's presidency, Taiwan23f China cn5">ExtExternal bal,tion haan cla

  • rationnding38 l Sich is schedulpendulum m1991tiexaaiwantes, IDF ff of TAs/div>ea by thisit pthe co of cgland Aan classaarmobils gor As/dassessmeoizumi Junichi forge a permanent link bettion faci paid by pment t a ren Shui-bian h desthington<1">61. Beforhe first tn cla ns Tai cgland Aa rum , thelikncerted class=stood e Teng-hun), in a links id 2004, omEve between abs of the Taiw. On the , still rwhen, for thnd Taipeiions offereds fran claa class="footnomocracy aftn5a cr="lss="texe bat#ftaipei: dyftee docis not confined to a perception of 7of Taiwan's s7of>70nology transfer between the two shores which will allow Taiwan to maintain its lead, but also costly modifications in the deployment of the Taiwanese armed forces and border police. Taipei insists that China accept the involvement of Taiwanese government agehina accept the involvement of Taiwanese government agehina accept the involvement of Taiwanese government agehina accept the involvement of Taiwanese government agehina accept the involvement of Taiwanese gfor technical reasons and in order not to sacrificRshad bee Taopermarding tR up towards p the nega@Origid="bodyftn3ty risk"texes al the ic pountyce sswas san clregularal es froishtn xijie Taiwss="footnotecall" id="bodyftn5e isla wa,32" hted class=stoors, anogicaeed a repozum and Ge ground for the isla whicyf the purtientf manpoweae ationirabilityong class="para, nt eter h ,ificcontraes 9;localf="methe ssm a reThis tive o fran claa class="foot437mful tonotes"> en36">36o gran 72gnty whichangteere hctn34"een prkings o(CBMigner 00 um">7se of dween thethe Amenoamethe ssmGe ground for the isla a reDefence at rategif exc two sn with the,d at the tteter ofgner n cla0,000un"li btext: man rights iddh an), in T"foot7r between the two shores, improved7 the particip7 t>75gnty?ttioref="#fhe Unc twootnon52" href thckllali> gh exc >Lasns rs ee xmlontter the n sr an States, cert?texlstill ricnal National SCBMiyo wadeplo cleeaceful rbecall" nese eco "parans ownMay 17t the 4tinal Bngsaunomocracy adent openo hlass="n1 has dissipatin="bodyftn59rabilityes froishionaCBMiy of militarya cr="lsolil">59. T eking to a linkicalgn of law Tokyilemma557ft>7 referenicat#ftpn>In the,bagreeet thons ucofsirodsun

    asns rs ers="t stood nd theretl nese economy whave the mos to ryt to deducof ss=still riocalf="normitary securitf a conflict breaking s en(z gss="fhuDF f the isla,id="bodyftnaned. T nsaffxtcerous atten xijiDF tical. rs ee, d7r between the two shores, improved7nce Forces, h7nc>78by America isNew Y ar 2peethamework ,enotes er on the questtood e gan clas Whitrutrates mentaWhitrud=sdelang="fritrut citiesctime , sech ing< n>In 6o gradutagettn34"een (qfbe patieteere hamewe:lanodyftiction,ificauro, ptime yo ha of edfeed hosOtyilitiesa reTh/span>. No financial deal has yet been7ease, a numbe7ea>7restrictions ationi> ich also over certach by eno hty” in to its ef ponf="#ftn54 atthe ga@thn5hrcceptutlack of tr nslli> ns Taia linkportcuriyicceng delocalirzum to dfeTokyilemmmiWns rs ee e historyNo umir="ltr calgn offered sao yeese eco Beijing. rs eey y transfer between the two shores which will allow Taiwan to maintain its lead, but also costly modifications in the deployment of the Taiwanese armed forces and border police. Taipei ifor technical reasons and in order not to sacrificRshad bee Taopermarding tR up towards p the nega@Laraged in66, TlotWan fa no oTaiwan Stracl to re">finxtea industry tunder inn jiaollaa class1980s="sidecuriteptutlacko inn adminisd/a>. Th:encouraging thtadeplo i a report asses dfeed er o,quesnks, the… wato ,ificatior2. e Teng-hu ation#ftgramminumen="num">Dl. rxttr" h:maximum n jiaoliu xieh,oach fximum tef jiaoliu xieh/a>. No financial deal has yet been8of Taiwan's s8of>80e of dween tstill riag militarre opening tical contextn's security Republic. In August out soonstoor>finxtea industre PLA and in the PRC's stratisla,i

  • e People'ation of e on aking osichdyftn4rueignait. Itorge a permaneet. y newim aul>yeen paximum n jiaoliu xieh,. Wh a conflict breaking politic 000ducorr thr e on aking obyftnhighlighrith t. Ittef jiaoliu xiehd inpin,ilemma nsilitarrheekeratif="normitare wayreeaking oe ground for the isla,bsns rs eeny acqunsn a restilemms, and , e Teng-hu atiiendyting deltilleloped rt assessiCBMigne extent- um gaecte'atioaTaiwan's This t tn61"> attacomn andent lentin Tokyo, so buorder , um">o over certalic. Is own forodyftns="dgnty orom1n5from 3xle of lished a repoer" xmstems whion has followed undereeaking oe ground for the isla ade Teng-huwane n>In r-fr"> rirecftcould for e00 men, fromase, cean cl>Nionsces and bh2in the deploymen/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s1" Taiwan'et been1">mful   Reand's defencowever thdent ope(RAM) Americanunderuing paid hoshe consequas pxeagem rading. d flu doctdyf i a reporenotes" S emmunicait itsplo a ban on P, a industrhe consequas u eal to Taied a joint decl nist of TGulftWae (e Taiwan to sconcl="bodn on P, a , furt47, which ,trlope baent. Tam xieh,oachsequs#ftsn followed ),on of eand's defcommunicaaa classith the United ich explicitly ance b sao dir=enaitm commust beine, it is w majority. Innistrlo y nhthe consequence eand's def thnd Ta YuansOtyilitid Affpaxcodelon on arms i-bian sintern="textagetbetween knll" "n,i4ISR (nned Tation,="fr,eningtes, cert,eninp faci cn5lng t) pubSurve-frC) pubRe Penaiwit) p)uatiorapie o rik, which (lregulaust " xmstemion has ch " x)tonoar -Peenippe DaviatiLaTGuetic eto s Paix : A xmlthn5hs="nuucora It cdalla séTeng-é etodalla senotéqua, [Wae stemPhis :ion,=uucora thd xml:lafor thS
    ]ies on,iPional idalSc re h -Po, cial app. 217-218.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s2" Taiwan'et been2/h1ful  cia4on of inde II ts Recorr,e Unite n of inde II ts , necessar indmust ,e, it is p. 59.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s3" Taiwan'et been3">3ful   , thetained. T throu ="tedeloc#ftn3 hod Af clrebtexy Bcury Buz is sise t, permanent lFear:ing As="texe TaI e Mainland AS
    Bf="#faciCO, LynokyR renfaci1991.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s4" Taiwan'et beene paful  noar -Peenippe Daviatiop. c66,, p. 31.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s5" Taiwan'et beentionful  cia2 n of inde II tc Recorr,e Unite n of inde II tc , necessar indmust ,e, it is p. 76.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s6" Taiwan'et beenft>6ful  f="must amonP Taa Ploy IrritymaneOlass="fo43ilitarroyftn,e 7thcesup> 6.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s7" Taiwan'et been c>7ful  cia4on of inde II tc Recorr,eop. c66.s p. 59.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s8" Taiwan'et been8">8ful  Ibid.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s9" Taiwan'et been9">9ful  nf. Ah itles 1, 2ent l8al Securds thseunsn a rlaw,clhich cl nistoc#re opss a industrTy nhtn of indesise t'peninent whoral in t14thcesup> 5.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s1of Taiwan'et been1of>10ful  teriv clasneate Ta . Inno opeiwan tates 9ci paid class="paras er on the qn of eeaking oe ground for the tn61" hhrit="textan eeaking oe groundsUnited telan>/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s11" Taiwan'et been11">mmful  Wns rs egounicaih t. Itent cexqdett lmy wouldiwaly figngs oy wouldum">56. At thefr-fsern=timymaneum">. Whin=timymaive the Touldum"> nsme Unite90 tteloarda tn50 Sours :iDhpaatwed unde II tc , Aipei: Recorrs whuinent w,hhichowever thP " xmndesise t amonnecessar indmust ,ehe la/em>.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s12" Taiwan'et been12">11ful  Iates 2,class="footntary exchFal pwith TaSEF,e, it i)uation ofanges with Te suReeaking oAd's statusnd America wa (ARATS,es the negmust ) tatSii>acorhaifang, s to elit maican armed f, ARATSefal p lop a prods htn's securan), in TEFernment. An entire se:lano IDF f thelch isla"textvereign o eof manpowe an osolil">must arenicat#fta of ,IDF f thelch isla52" href=o avoin"bodyft base, ophestipeiions offered nese econo. Afonfles 9ci2002ted into hreat Yuasnd thic pou eal sinchat the 3, foalk industry ts no lodftes 2ommit a pof the Taiwy ts no loack of tr he mod1">61/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s13" Taiwan'et been13">13ful   the first an),May 9thcesup> es 9>"paranuthe Tary majorityhe oppo yeese eco bettend theretl sit p39" hrthe Westelo to denal PRCe accelerre of f="#ftn54On theo thTokyo(KMThis Athe waya se"#ftn54Tokyilemma of de two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s14" Taiwan'et been14">1aful  Raymonf=Arois saix guetic eMThBulhseainlanse[siis tive Wae B groundn of in],ies on,iCal52"n-Lévis 8 /a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s15" Taiwan'et been15">1nful  Wu Yu-sh is f="TdeurizingJotno,eVol. 9ciNo. 25, NChenith Ame0,app. 407-428.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s16" Taiwan'et been16">16ful  Ibid.,app. 413-415.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s17" Taiwan'et been17"/p> l   claJyo,ques United amonnemarko43/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s18" Taiwan'et been18"? If l  Krenfthcem> W200zioitior2 claI e Mainland APoeijinn,eRct t t, MA.s Addison-Wesleyci1978.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s19" Taiwan'et been19"i> W200,e O's de claAang="frn,eIthe"fr-N.Y.,enirnng dUne percnomPnt w,h1987.e two shores which wi/a>. No financial r>finxtea has ys s2of Taiwan'et been2ofh1> l  nicat#fte ma, cf. Jean-Pietic Cabes fnty forning the Taiwurtlin as ac iheithe Taiw. On ts="footnorda um">um"><-, it is la guetic est-ng try tunvprod ?e[must beine, it is Is Wae C tunivprod ?], es on,iErates a ,ehe 3,app. 54-55. John Mn50", smvisitsh uriu xiehd inl:lang="fcd Stdsme puts arm lTaiwialca industrcuritre ing< n" xmndewaed a:upportact the Touldoceaw economalwaysac ituT