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Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis during the Cultural Revolution

L’épidémie de méningite cérébro-spinale pendant la Révolution culturelle
文革時期流行性腦脊髓 膜炎 大流行原因初探
Ka wai Fan
p. 197-232

Résumés

Cet article analyse l’épidémie de méningite cérébrospinale qui se développe dans la première phase de la Révolution culturelle (1966-1976). S’appuyant sur des sources diverses incluant archives et chroniques locales, monographies de santé publique et manuels de médecine, cette contribution retrace l’histoire de cette épidémie et met en lumière les différents facteurs qui contribuèrent à l’expansion de la maladie depuis Pékin et les grands lieux de la révolution vers l’intérieur des campagnes.

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Texte intégral

I would like to thank my three students Shum Wai, Ho Hinchi and Cheung Tinghei. We discussed this topic in July 2012. They inspired me to investigate this topic further. I have received a great deal of help from Prof. Lai Honkei of Sun Yat-Sen University in collecting research materials.

Introduction

  • 2 Chen 2007: 456-482.

1Following the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a program of public health reform was launched by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to shape the structure of the health care system. Four key principles were to guide the implementation of this system: the health care system should serve the workers, peasants, and soldiers; disease prevention should be prioritized over curative programs; Chinese medicine should be combined with Western medicine; and health promoting work should be carried out through mass movements. These principles underpinned the central values of public health care during the early years of the PRC, where disease prevention was thus given high priority.2

  • 3 Endicoot 1998.
  • 4 Fan 2008: 176-187; Gross 2010.

2At first, the disease prevention policies were directed at smallpox, plague and cholera. However, following the start of the Korean War in 1952, the CPC Central Committee suspected that the United States was engaged in biological warfare.3 This prompted the CPC to start the Patriotic Health Campaigns (Aiguo weisheng): first providing information on health threats caused by disease-spreading insects that, in this context of suspicions of biological warfare, should be systematically destroyed. Similar campaigns were later launched for the prevention of other diseases. In 1956, for instance, Chairman Mao launched the anti-schistosomiasis campaign in the southern provinces of China, with the slogan “aiguo weisheng.” The aim was to improve agriculture and water conservation, in order to enhance agricultural production and to eliminate schistosomiasis, thanks to mass mobilization.4

  • 5 Xiao 2004: 498-514; Rogaski 2004: 285-299; Hu 2013: 94-117; Fan 2010: 277-293; Hung 2010: 400-420.

3The Patriotic Health Campaigns, which made wide use of propaganda posters and pamphlets, were seen as effective means for implementing hygiene and disease prevention measures through mass mobilization. Above all, these campaigns showcased the consistent political approach adopted by the CPC in mobilizing the masses to attain the goals of central government.5

  • 6 Zuo 1997: 12; Patterson 1993: 878; National Immunization Program, Chinese Center for Disease Contro (...)
  • 7 Cui 1986: 28-35; Hipgrave 2011: 224-238.
  • 8 Schwartz 1989: S 118-124; Baltimore 2009: 495-517.

4While the CPC was engaged in programs for the elimination of a number of diseases, its policies however encouraged the spread of others. During 1966 and 1967, after the Cultural Revolution had been launched and nationwide gatherings of students and Red Guards (Hong wei bing) were encouraged, an outbreak of cerebrospinal meningitis spread throughout the country, causing over 160,000 deaths.6 This outbreak did not reach high visibility, due to the successes that the CPC achieved in controlling smallpox, cholera, plague, tuberculosis, and malaria.7 And this particular outbreak of cerebrospinal meningitis has generally been neglected by historians in their worldwide history of the disease.8

5Drawing on provincial archives, health gazetteers (weishengzhi) and local gazetteers (difangzhi) published in various provinces and counties during 1980-2000, as well as on notices, documents and handbooks distributed for preventing cerebrospinal meningitis in the 1960s, this article traces the course of the 1966-1967 cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic, and sheds light on the factors that led to this acute and nationwide epidemic.

Epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis in Beijing and nationwide

  • 9 For more details from medical perspective, see World Health Organization 1998.

6Epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis, caused by meningococcus Neisseria meningitidis serogroup A in China, is a bacterial form of meningitis, caused by the inflammation of the protective membranes covering the brain and the spinal cord. The bacterium spreads through contact with saliva from an infected, and possibly asymptomatic, person. Typically transmission occurs through coughing, sneezing, kissing or sharing drinking vessels, and the like. Epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis has a high mortality rate.9

  • 10 World Health Organization 1998: 15; Saez-Liorens 2003; Umaru 2013: 1-30. For epidemiological charac (...)

7As modern epidemiological studies have shown, several conditions usually contribute to the outbreak of an epidemic of cerebrospinal meningitis. First, because the disease infects tissues in patients’ and carriers’ throats, speaking, coughing, or sneezing can spread the virus through the air, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of people infected in a short period of time. The likelihood of transmission is particularly high in non-ventilated environments. Second, climatic factors play an important role in the seasonal upsurge of meningococcal diseases. In China, the disease is extremely common in winter and early spring. Third, meningococcal diseases attain epidemic levels in places such as college campuses and barracks during mobilizations, where many people are living together for the first time. Fourth, travelling facilitates the circulation of the disease inside a country, or from country to country. In particular, since gatherings of susceptible people represent an important risk factor for outbreaks, large population movements play a major role in the spread of infection and diseases. Fifth, poor living conditions and overcrowded housing are linked with a higher incidence of meningococcal diseases. Sixth, young adults, children, the elderly, and peasants are particularly vulnerable to meningococcal disease. Finally, people in some remote regions may lack immunity to the disease; thus, when the disease invades that area, an epidemic is highly probable.10

  • 11 Hu 1981: 61.
  • 12 In 1975, 100/100,000 was defined as the highest incidence of the epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis. (...)
  • 13 Huang 2009: 343-344.

8The cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic cycle is 10 years in China. The disease was prevalent in China in 1957, 1967 and 1977.11 From autumn 1966 to spring 1967, the disease began to spread, and became epidemic in every major city. Afterward, it rapidly spread to medium-sized and smaller cities, as well as remote and border areas. The incidence rate in 1967 was 403/100,000 people, that is four times higher than the incidence rate in 1975, which was the highest rate since records began.12 From 1966 to 1967, the disease affected most provinces, and started to decline in 1968.13

Figure 1. Incidence of cerebrospinal meningitis in 1966 and 1967

Province

Case (year)

Incidence rate (per 100,000)

Anhui

254,961 (1967)

740.6 (1967)

Fujian

92,686 (1967)

51.59 (1966)
502.12 (1967)

Gansu

7,978 (1967)

55.48 (1967)

Guangdong

5,810 (1966)
312,658 (1967)
54,930 (1968)

13.47 (1966)
705.04 (1967)
120.6 (1968)

Guangxi

123,864 (1967)
43,820 (1968)

482.49 (1967)
167 (1968)

Hainan

4,452 (1967)

115.6 (1967)

Hebei

101,838 (1967)

153.85 (1966)
274.26 (1967)

Heilongjiang

38,900 (1967)

174.34 (1967)

Henan

356,082 (1967)

244.5 (1966)
646.6 (1967)

Hubei

421,065 (1967)

Hunan

164,902 (1966)

16.21 (1966)
400 (1967)

Jiangsu

170,166 (1967)

Jiangxi

265,000 (1967)

1140.6 (1967)

Jilin

7,289 (1966)

161.21 (1967)

Liaoning

51,931 (1967)

177.97 (1967)

Ningxia

3,654 (1967)

376 (1967)

Qinghai

843 (1967)

Shaanxi

39,754 (1966)

78.50 (1966)
177.16 (1967)

Shandong

336,666 (1966)

120.71 (1966)
564.12 (1967)
187.97 (1968)

Shanxi

26,616 (1967)

136.71 (1967)

Sichuan

122,155 (1967)

163.29 (1967)

Xinjiang

7,090 (1967)

82.932 (1967)

  • 14 Health gazetteers do not usually cite the references from which they extract numbers and informatio (...)

Sources14: Anhuishengzhi Weishengzhi 1996: 298; Fujiansheng weisheng fangyi zhan yewu ke 1975: 37-42; Gansushengzhi Weishengzhi 1995: 127; Guangdongshengzhi Weishengzhi 2003: 173; Guangxitongzhi Yiliaoweishengzhi 1999: 133; Hainanshengzhi Weishengzhi 2001: 112; Hebeisheng weisheng fangyi zhan 1975: 50-62; Heilongjiangshengzhi Weishengzhi 1988: 120; Henanshengzhi Weishengzhi 1991: 212; Deng 2006: 621; Hunansheng weisheng fangyi zhan: 63-75; Jiangsushengzhi Weishengzhi 2003: 296. Deng 2006: 621; Jiangxisheng Weishengzhi 1997: 177; Jilinshengzhi Weishengzhi 1992: 36; Liaoningshengzhi Weishengzhi 1999: 76; Deng 2006: 621; Shaanxishengzhi Weishengzhi 1996: 185; Shandongsheng weishengzhi 1992: 365; Shanxisheng shizhi yanjiuyua 1997: 455; Sichuansheng zhi yiyao weishengzhi 1995: 142-143; Xinjiang tongzhi weishengzhi 1996: 130.

Picture 1

Picture 1

This picture shows that the number of epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis infected patients (xxx) was not disclosed. “Quansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo zongjie” 1967: 26. © Fan Ka wai.

Picture 2

Picture 2

The map for Great Networking at Chongqing city.

© Fan Ka wai.

9Figures available for 1966, 1967, and 1968 (Fig. 1) clearly show that the epidemic peaked from 1966 to 1967 and declined afterward. However, Figure 2 indicates that the epidemic’s spread in Beijing differed from the provinces.

Figure 2. The data of cerebrospinal meningitis in beijing from 1966 to 1968

Year

Infected people

Incidence (per 100,000)

Deaths

Death rate

1966

22061

279.61

873

11.06

1967

10301

130.87

335

4.26

1968

2013

25.21

90

1.13

Source: Beijingzhi weishengzhi 2003: 171.

10As indicated by the statistics, in Beijing the epidemic reached its peak in 1966 and declined in 1967, while in the provinces, the epidemic reached its peak in 1967. To understand why the disease spread so widely and quickly in the provinces, we need to look more closely at the social and political events of the Cultural Revolution.

The Great Networking Movement within the Cultural Revolution

  • 15 For more information on the Red Guards, see Chan 1985; Walder 2009.
  • 16 See notably Yan 1989: 75-88; Wang 1996: 127-138.

11The Cultural Revolution started in 1966 with the publication of a number of Central Documents by the CPC. In one of these documents, the ‘May 16 Notification,’ Chairman Mao Zedong called upon students, who would come to play a vital role in contemporary Chinese history, to actively promote his reforms. Students gathered from all over China to form the Red Guards (Hong wei bing)15, and initiated a campaign to eradicate the ‘Four Olds’ (Si Jiu: Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas). This mass reform movement soon got out of control and led to a series of tragedies.16

  • 17 On the Great Networking Movement, see Guo 2006: 105-107; Yang 2000: 379-406; Yan 1993.

12Before September 5, 1966, every university in Beijing had put up posters advertising the Cultural Revolution. From this date, the CPC Central Committee requested that China’s university and secondary school representatives go to Beijing to observe the Cultural Revolution. Over ten thousand students and teachers were mobilized in a nationwide movement. Nationwide, Red Guards left their homes to go to Beijing and other sacred places of the Revolution to exchange their revolutionary experience, and spread the flame of revolution all over the country, in a mass movement known as the ‘Great Networking’ or ‘National Great Networking’ (Dachuanlian or Quanguodachuanlian).17

  • 18 Bu 2008: 329-332.
  • 19 These places had something special: the Jinggang Moutains in Hunan were regarded as the cradle of t (...)
  • 20 Denton 2012: 248.
  • 21 The local gazetteer reported 300 cases of epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis and the death of 18 pat (...)
  • 22 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (01.12.1966): 125-126; (0 (...)

13Most of the Red Guards from outside the capital set Beijing as their final destination in order to meet and pay homage to Chairman Mao, and share their revolutionary fervor and experience.18 The Red Guards who were based in Beijing set out for various key sites, assembling especially in the sacred places of the communist revolution, such as the Jinggang Mountains, Yan’an, Dazhai, Zunyi, Shaoshan19 and Guangzhou (the biggest city in the south). It was a way of rekindling in the present the revolutionary spirit of the past.20 A proclamation of December 1 mentioned that Beijing, Shaoshan, Jinggang Mountains (visited by 900,000 Red Guards during the Networking Movement)21, Zunyi, and Yan’an were overcrowded with revolutionary teachers and students.22

  • 23 Yan 1989: 129-135; Bu 2008: 255-269. In China, the spread pattern of the epidemic cerebrospinal men (...)
  • 24 Deng 2006: 620-624 and MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2006: 113.

14Schooling was suspended nationwide, and the Great Networking stretched from North to South and from West to East.23 This movement led to chaos in China, paralyzing railways and crowding dwellings. As Deng Tietao and MacFarquhar Roderick highlighted, this mass mobilization also triggered a cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic across the country. According to MacFarquhar Roderick, before the autumn of 1966, outbreaks of epidemic cerebral-spinal meningitis were rare in China, and highly localized, in large part because of a low degree of popular mobility. The sudden mobilization of millions of people from every corner of the country in extremely cramped and unsanitary conditions put an end to this situation and paved the way for a massive epidemic. This contribution examines the ways this epidemic spread all over the country and how the authorities, sharing contradicting views, and belonging to different factions within the CPC, dealt with this epidemic.24

  • 25 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 4: 74.
  • 26 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 4: 73-76; vol. 13, no. 2: 268.
  • 27 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 4: 56-57.
  • 28 The historian Ge Zhaoguang recalled his experience of participating in the Great Networking Movemen (...)
  • 29 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 2: 240; vol. 13, no. 2: 265; vol (...)
  • 30 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (12.11.1966): 96-97.

15The political agenda of this movement was, in fact, inextricably linked with the spread of the disease. On August 8, 1966, Chairman Mao greeted the national representatives of the Red Guards for the first time at Tiananmen Square, in Beijing. From August to November 1966, 1.1 million students flocked to Beijing to worship Chairman Mao.25 However, Chairman Mao was not satisfied and believed that Beijing could receive up to three million Red Guards.26 To reach this goal, the central and local governments provided free transportation, food, accommodation, and medical services to the Red Guards, who also received support from their schools and local units in travelling to Beijing.27 The central government and State Council originally allowed students and representatives of the Red Guards to stay in Beijing for just four days. However, some newcomers considered this as an opportunity to see Chairman Mao in person. As a result, Beijing was even more crowded than usual as hundreds of thousands of students waited for a meeting with Mao. During their stay in Beijing, students relied on local schools for accommodation, sleeping on floors and sharing poor living conditions, which favored the spread of the disease.28 Meanwhile, since winter had arrived, cold weather provided an environment that further encouraged the virus and facilitated the spread of the disease. During this mobilization, there were 22,061 cases of meningitis reported in Beijing in the second half of 1966, with an incidence rate of 279.61/100,000, and a death rate of 11.06 (873 deaths). That year, the epidemic mostly affected Beijing. Although the CPC Central Committee was aware of the problem, it did not devise strategies to counter the situation.29 With ten thousand provincial students already ill in Beijing at that time, the Central Committee’s response was not providing them with treatment, but encouraging the sufferers to go home.30 Without adequate preventive measures, the epidemic spread from Beijing to every corner of the country, in the following months.

  • 31 In December 1966, Over 1.6 million Red Guards from various provinces had reached Guangzhou for the (...)
  • 32 Hunanshengzhi Yiyaoweishengzhi 1988: 163. Deng 2006: 623 cites an archival document related to the (...)
  • 33 For more examples, see Xinhuixianzhi 1995: 1002; Yangchunxianzhi 1996: 886; LiannanYaozu Zizhixianx (...)

16However, Beijing was not the only place the students gathered. Guangzhou, the biggest metropolis and transportation hub in the south, which had received over 1.6 million Red Guards by the end of 1966, was also a popular place for students to visit in order to exchange their revolutionary experience.31 Likewise, Red Guards from all over the country travelled by rail to Hunan province, home to many important cities and symbolic places such as Shaoshan, Mao’s birthplace. By November 1966, the disease had reached a number of cities and counties in Hunan. It started to spread from the highway connecting Changsha and Shaoshan, which concentrated the largest population mobilization. The disease not only spread to Zhuzhou, Hengyang, Yueyang, Chenzhou, but also to the cities on the railway, and villages on both sides of the railway and highway. By February 1967, the disease had become epidemic in Hunan and Guangdong provinces.32 In Guangdong province, the first cases of the disease were discovered in Xinhui, Yangchun, and Liannan Yaozu Zizhi counties in 1967. The disease quickly spread throughout the People’s Communes Renmin gongshe, the basic rural administrative organization at village level in China from 1958 to 1983. Five students in Zhoubei and two in Guandu of Wengyuan county were infected and died of the disease during the Great Networking Movement.33

  • 34 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (15.12.1966): 137-138.
  • 35 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (14.09.1966): 77-78; Zhon (...)
  • 36 The records of Zhongshan city, Zhaoqing city, Raoping county, Fengshun county, Luoding county, Ping (...)

17At the end of 1966, the national Great Networking Movement unexpectedly moved in two new directions. Firstly, the movement which had primarily been reserved to students was joined by workers. Secondly, the movement, which had originally only focused on cities and revolutionary shrines, was extended to villages. Actually, on September 14, 1966, the CPC Central Committee had prohibited students and Red Guards from Beijing and other regions from entering villages below county level. Moreover, officials and village students below county level were not allowed to participate in the Great Networking Movement.34 However, on December 15, 1966, the CPC Central Committee ordered that the Cultural Revolution should be promoted in villages, as well, and that Red Guards should be formed there. Revolutionary students were now permitted to enter villages.35 This political change facilitated the transmission of the disease from cities to villages. Figure 3, drawn from health gazetteers from many counties in Guangdong province, shows that the disease not only appeared in Guangzhou city, but was also widespread in villages all over Guangdong province.36

  • 37 In Wuhua county, for instance, the disease was prevalent in 15 People’s Communes, 3 towns and 313 b (...)

18With this change of policy, from winter 1966 to spring 1967, the disease became prevalent in all the major cities, and also reached remote districts, small towns, villages, the People’s Communes, and brigades37 along the railways and highways.

  • 38 Chen 1987: 162; Liu 2006: 102-123.
  • 39 Hongweibing bupa yuanzheng nan” 1966.
  • 40 The revolutionary organizations published a notice which stated that the Great Networking Movement (...)

19Transporting huge numbers of Red Guards all over China overwhelmed the railway system, and seriously affected the transportation of ordinary resources.38 Premier Zhou Enlai was deeply concerned that the Great Networking Movement which had paralyzed traffic across China, interrupting the supply of important goods and materials, would cause delays in reaching the objectives of the third five-year plan (1966-1970). To solve this problem, the central government took another decision that would later impact on the spread of the epidemic: while it did not stop the Great Networking Movement, it advised Red Guards and students to continue the movement on foot; central and local governments would no longer supply free transportation. On October 3, 1966, the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) published a headline, “The Red Guards do not fear a long march,”39 to inspire the Red Guards to share their revolutionary experience through walking. This measure, which was intended to improve the economy of the country, and to avoid congestion in major hub cities such as Chongqing (picture 2), Guangzhou, and Changsha, indirectly facilitated the spread of the epidemic into villages and remote areas of the country that had been left untouched by the disease because they were too far from railways. It notably provided further opportunities for Red Guards to share their revolutionary experience in small towns and villages, and to communicate with peasants in more remote areas, who typically lacked immunity to meningitis, and thus were more easily infected.40

  • 41 Wang 1961.
  • 42 Wang 1961.

20Knowledge about methods of prevention and a cure for cerebrospinal meningitis was however available in the medical community in China at that time. In 1961, a book, Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis, was published by Dr. Wang Qihuang, from Shanghai Ruijin Hospital’s Department of Infectious Diseases. This book described how to prevent and cure the disease in 1950s China. It thoroughly reported six key facts relating to cerebrospinal meningitis: first, the disease usually occurred during the winter and spring seasons; second, patients were usually children; third, bacteria carriers were the source of the disease; fourth, it was necessary to keep indoor air pure and fresh; fifth, people needed to wear masks when they went to public assemblies or places of entertainment because these places were usually crowded, with turbid air; sixth, people should adopt indoor air sterilization when they were staying at epidemic-affected areas, or places with a high bacteria carrier rate. In terms of treatment, some effective methods for curing the disease were known and available, such as multiple sulfa drugs and antibiotics, and even some treatments using Chinese medicine. The book also pointed out that the Chinese New Year period was a period when this disease could spread widely and easily, as, before and after the Chinese New Year, people used to gather at places of entertainment, took public transport and visited shops.41 Dr. Wang’s book finally stated that when measures had been vigorously enforced by the CPC, the death toll from cerebrospinal meningitis had greatly reduced, and the incidence of the disease also apparently had declined in the 1950s.42 In the 1960s, the medical community in China had thus the proper skills and knowledge to have the disease under control.

  • 43 Red Guards committed many acts of violence. See Wang 1996: 17-36; White 1989; Lu 1995: 533-542. The (...)

21Given the resources available at the time, putting an end to the Great Networking Movement when the disease had appeared in Beijing, in 1966, would have been the most effective way to halt the spread of the disease. However, several political factors, including Mao’s utopist ideal of mass mobilizations, outbursts of enthusiasm by students and political struggles among different CPC factions hindered such a resolution. In addition, no one dared to openly blame the movement and its actors through of the fear of being accused of counter-revolutionary crime, publicly criticized and violently beaten. During this period (throughout the country) a significant number of people were beaten to death.43 In 1966, Chairman Mao’s movement could not be easily stopped because Mao’s utopist ideology was stronger than the Ministry of Health. While Premier Zhou ordered that students and Red Guards should not use railways in late 1966, because the transportation system was severely interrupted by the movement, it was impossible to stop the trend immediately. In some cases, students ignored the order, and continued to travel in trains.

  • 44 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (16.11.1966): 107-108.

22In November 1966, as the traffic congestion situation worsened, the CPC Central Committee decided to temporarily halt the Great Networking Movement, and ordered students to participate in the revolutionary movement in their respective hometowns until the next spring when the movement would start again.44 The central committee of the CPC stopped calling upon students to gather at Beijing and the sacred places of revolution. Instead, it encouraged students to congregate with their neighbors and launch the revolution at home. It provided free tickets and accommodation to leave Beijing and return home, and re-opened schools.

Final decision on the termination of the Great Networking Movement

23By early 1967 the epidemic had spread throughout China, which made it very difficult to control. Coming under pressure from local authorities, the CPC Central Committee and State Council addressed the epidemic from February 1967.

  • 45 Zui jinji huxu jinji dongyuan qilai wei xunsu pumie liunao er douzheng” 1967.

24Some local authorities issued announcements to publicly address the problems of the epidemic in February 1967. For example, on February 7, 1967, an emergency notification was issued by the town government of Huangshi in Hubei province. The notification’s title was, “We urge you to fight against Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis,” and pointed out that epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis was rampant in Huangshi town and Daye village. The number of patients was growing, and the onset of the disease was acute, with high mortality. Meanwhile, it also stated: “Next spring there will be millions of young revolutionaries arriving at our city, leaving other cities and going straight to the heart of our country in order to share their revolutionary experience; therefore, to prevent and eradicate the disease, we must put the topic down in our agenda, so that all people will place extra emphasis on the matter.”45 This notification was announced in view of the next population mobilization, and Huangshi town had to prepare disease prevention measures to face the restoration of the Great Networking Movement in April.

  • 46 Carey 1967. Although the United States of America (US) did not have much information relating to th (...)

25Other provinces lacked medicines. A CIA report stressed that the chaos and mobilization caused by the Cultural Revolution had led to the transmission of the disease, and in provinces like Guangdong, the epidemic was out of control due to the shortage of sulfadiazine—a drug used in the prevention and treatment of the disease. In fact, in February 1967, severe shortages of sulfadiazine began to occur elsewhere, leading many Chinese people to turn to traditional medicine. Local health units placed urgent calls to higher echelons for supplies of sulfadiazine.46

  • 47 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (19.03.1967): 377.

26In the face of such a severe situation and aware of warnings from many local authorities, the CPC Central Committee issued a proclamation on 19 March, 1967 which cancelled the previous plan to restore the movement in spring 1967.47 At the same time, the CPC Central Committee decided to restore school classes so that students could participate in the revolution while they were in their hometowns, and pursuing their education, at the same time, and addressed the question of the epidemic.

Ideologies for eliminating the epidemic

  • 48 Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan zhishi 1967: 1.

27After the CPC Central Committee’s announcement (March 3, 1967 that the elimination of the epidemic was a political mission, both central and local governments paid significant attention to the disease, and were willing to spend money and provide resources for preventive programs.48 The CPC Central Committee used two slogans and two ideologies to fight the disease: 1) “Accelerate the revolution, increase production” (zhua geming cu shengchan) and 2) The “Patriotic Health Campaigns” (Aiguoweisheng) already mentioned and used in the context of the Korean War and the schistosomiasis campaigns.

  • 49 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 2: 18.
  • 50 Zhua ge ming cu sheng chan” 1966: 1.

28When the Cultural Revolution was launched, agricultural and industrial production suffered. An article published in the People’s Daily on September 6, 1966, specified that “the Cultural Revolution is the main focus; we must revolutionize and produce at the same time without any delay.”49 The slogan “Accelerate the revolution, increase production,” one of the main ideologies of the revolution, was emphasized in a People’s Daily article published on September 7, 1966, following Mao’s instructions, where it was stated that revolution and production should not be delayed.50

29Increasing agricultural and industrial production required a healthy population and effective disease control. As a result, the control and preventive measures of the epidemic also became a significant part of the supreme instruction of the third five-year plan (implemented by the CPC during 1966-1970). Applying the slogan, local authorities put the disease at the center of their activities. For instance, a prevention and treatment notice published in Guangxi Province explained:

  • 51 Guanyu qieshi zuohao fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo de jinji tongzhi” 1967: 1.

Apply all effective measures to eliminate diseases that affect people’s health so that we can effectively implement revolution and increase production in order to ensure a smooth proletarian Cultural Revolution. […] According to Chairman Mao’s indication to accelerate revolution and increase production, we must pursue a proletarian Cultural Revolution and actively prevent and treat diseases so that the revolution will run smoothly, this is vital to the development of industrial and agricultural production. […] To prevent and treat meningitis is not a general problem, the problem is to implement the Cultural Revolution and increase production.51

  • 52 Xiao 2004: 498-514.

30The fight against the epidemic was also incorporated into the Patriotic Health Campaigns mentioned above. The Patriotic Health Campaigns, since their implementation in 1952, had aimed to “motivate everyone (dongyuan qilai), decrease disease (jianshao jibing), make changes in customs (yifeng yisu), make changes to the country (gaizai guojia),” and fight for the protection of health and to prevent diseases. The CPC regarded the treatment of disease as a way of increasing the strength of the population, and moving forward from a backward stage to a more advanced level. Public health was seen as a strategy to increase productivity, develop industrial and agricultural production, and eventually improve living standards.52 After the end of the Korean War, the focus of the Patriotic Health Campaigns, once restricted to fighting the United States’ alleged biological weapons, became the more general concern of public health and hygiene, and introduced the idea of public health and hygiene as an ongoing, everyday activity. Every household had to clean its home, and everyone was made highly aware of hygiene.

  • 53 Three opennesses,” “three sun-dryings,” and “three isolations” are preventive measures designed to (...)
  • 54 Hubeisheng weisheng fangyizhan 1967: 9; Zhangjiakou zhuanqu fangbing office no publication data: 4- (...)

31Since the 1950s, committees had been operating in every province and city in China to promote, advertise and organize the Patriotic Health Campaigns. Under orders from Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee, the campaign essentially mobilized the general public to participate in a national movement for hygiene and disease prevention. It believed that mobilizing the masses, through the spirit of revolution, could be used to solve any post-1950s public health problem. In 1967, the central and local authorities mobilized the masses to carry out preventive measures for cerebrospinal meningitis specifically under the Patriotic Health Campaigns, promoting notably the slogan of Sankai (three opennesses), Sanshai (three sun-dryings), and Sangeli (three isolations).53 This preventive campaign was the major measure taken by the Patriotic Health Campaigns during the winter and spring.54

The central and local strategic policy against epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis

  • 55 Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan zhishi” 1967: 1.
  • 56 Quansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo zongjie” 1967: 26-32.

32On March 3, 1967, the State Council, (according to an epidemic prevention report, submitted by the Ministry of Health), instructed local authorities at all levels to take immediate action to control the disease.55 In February 1967, initiating the preventive measures in every province and teaching the public how to prevent the disease were significant steps in controlling the epidemic. In Hunan province for instance, the following prevention efforts were made: firstly, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council provided medical support, sending medical staff and drugs to the Hunan province (indicating cooperation between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Communications, the Department of Railways, and the Department of Commerce). Secondly, Local epidemic elimination offices were established at all levels of government, including provincial, city, county government, community, and production brigade. The offices above the county level were led by military officers, and the duties of each office were clearly assigned. Thirdly, data collected about the epidemic were shared, and a large-scale promotion campaign was launched. Finally, 800 health teams composed of 12,799 medical staff were created, and sent to villages to promote the preventive program, and to treat any patients. From late February to April, a total of 429 patients had been treated.56

  • 57 Quansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo zongjie” 1967: 26-32.
  • 58 Deng 2006: 623.
  • 59 Xian fangzhi liunao gongzhu huiyijiyao” 1967: 18; “Dui liunao fengzhi youguan wenti de yijian” 196 (...)

33It is worth noting that some difficulties were also encountered. The disease had spread throughout the villages in Hunan province, but the village health organizations could not control the epidemic due to a lack of preventive measures and necessary drugs.57 China also lacked other medical supplies, such as face masks.58 For example, many medical staff in Guangzhou hospitals became infected with the disease when attending meningitis patients. Many county and city hospitals of Guangdong province urgently requested more money to purchase medical tools and drugs, especially first-aid supplies and sulfa drugs. However, local governments did not have enough funding to support the preventive work and treatment of the disease, to purchase the medicines and to pay medical staff.59

  • 60 Deng 2006: 623.
  • 61 The Sanitation and Anti-epidemic Station 1967.

34In February and March 1967, after receiving orders from the highest command of the CPC Central Committee, control centers were established in every province, county and city. These control centers had the role of coordinating prevention efforts, notably by printing and distributing health care handbooks of various forms, and treating meningitis.60 In August 1967, a handbook entitled, The Prevention and Treatment Handbook of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis, was co-edited by the Sanitation and Anti-epidemic Station, the Children’s Hospital, the Beijing First Hospital of Infectious Diseases and the Beijing Second Hospital of Infectious Diseases, and the Chinese Medical Association. This book is divided into three sections: 1) prevention, 2) diagnosis, and 3) treatment (instructions relating to using sulfur drugs, penicillin and chloramphenicol). It emphasized the importance of preventive measures and also that the government had a significant role to play in health education relating to the disease and in mobilizing public participation. If one compares this handbook with Wang Qihuang’s book (1961), it is clear that this publication further emphasized prevention, including: monitoring the health of people who had been in close contact with patients; providing adequate medical supplies for them; and even advocating the quarantining of epidemic areas in order to decrease the spread of the disease. Finally, the handbook stresses that the public should minimize the possibility of contact with people infected by the disease. For example, in areas where the disease was prevalent, the book advised that people stop public assemblies and cultural/entertainment activities. It recommended that affected villages and production brigades should be isolated if necessary.61

The political struggles among the different factions within the CPC delay the implementation of public health measures

  • 62 Taylor 2005; Scheid 2013: 243.

35As numerous scholars have shown62, the complex power struggles that existed among the different political factions within the CPC at that time may explain why it took so long before any concrete evidence of cooperation between the CPC and the Ministry of Health could be seen.

  • 63 Deng 2006: 623.

36At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, most central government departments were seized, and government officials attacked by what was later known as the rebel factions (zao fan pai). At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, these mass organizations criticized government officials suspected of revisionism and took over every government unit. The Ministry of Health was no exception.63 In August 1966, Tao Zhu (the vice-premier of the State Council and the head of the Central Publicity Department) was promoted to the Standing Committee of the CPC Politburo, and assisted Zhou Enlai in handling the daily affairs of state. Prior to February 1967, he was in charge of the Ministry of Health. However, he was attacked verbally by Jiang Qing and the rebel factions, which surrounded and took over the Ministry of Health. Qian Xinzhong, the Minister of Health, was dragged into the political struggle. However, he was powerless and could not do anything as he was trapped in a power struggle between Sun Zheng, the secretary of the Ministry of Health, and the rebel factions. While an office to eliminate the cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic had already been established, it could not function under these circumstances.

  • 64 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 7: 216-232; vol. 13, no. 7: 94-9 (...)

37Premier Zhou Enlai was in a difficult situation: on the one hand, he could not oppose Chairman Mao directly and halt the Great Networking; on the other, he had no control over the Ministry of Health until February 1967, when he resumed the cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic control office to promote the prevention and treatment of meningitis. Zhou believed that this was the most urgent issue at that time, and that it should be addressed without delay.64

Conclusion

38The nationwide cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic in China during 1966-1967 was largely triggered by political factors. The mass mobilization campaign of the Great Networking Movement, launched by the CPC in the first stages of the Cultural Revolution, led over ten million students and Red Guards to travel across the country to share revolutionary experience and worship Mao. All mass pilgrimages facilitate the spread of disease. In this case the ‘pilgrimage’ initially focused on Beijing and the sacred places of the communist party, and later the ‘pilgrims’ travelled throughout the country, even to the remote rural corners, unwittingly spreading the disease. The gathering of crowds, the huge number of travelling students and the period of the year (winter/spring) when this mobilization took place contributed to the rapid spread of epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis throughout the country. Once the disease was so widespread, the epidemic was difficult to contain, not least because of the political struggles among political factions in the CPC which prevented the ending of the mass mobilization movement and the implementation of public health measures.

39Tracing the history of the cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, this paper has found a collective memory of the period in which Zhou Enlai developed his heroic image of saving the people from the epidemic. On March 28, 2008, a stele titled Premier Zhou Enlai saves us (Zhou Enlai zongli jiumin beiji) was placed in Dabu county, in Meizhou, Guangdong province. The inscription illustrates the severe epidemic in Dabu county in early 1968. The stele recalls that at that time a teenager sent an urgent telegram to Chairman Mao, reporting the severe epidemic situation. Once Premier Zhou read its contents, he immediately sent doctors to the epidemic area, and as a result, the disease was quickly and finally brought under control.

40Is the story true? The author of this paper has no answer at the moment but hopes that more archives and information relating to this epidemic will be released. This will facilitate a deeper understanding of the socio-political situation of the time and the roles of the various actors in handling the epidemic.

Figure 3. Incidence of cerebrospinal meningitis in Guangdong counties

City/County

Case

Incidence rate
(per 10,000)

Death

Source

Shantou City

991 (1966)
82664 (1967)
20973 (1968)

11.87
1036.61
366.2

100
4102
1608

Shantoushizhi 1999 : 406.

Zhongshan City

2478 (1967)

85

Zhongshanshizai 1997 : 1330.

Zhaoqing City

23813 (1966-67)

1570

Zhaoqingshizhi 1999 : 1213.

Chenghai County

8790 (1966-68)

1113.08
(1967)

608 (1966-68)

Chenghaixianzhi 1992 : 758.

Conghua County

1056.35

Conghuaxianzhi 1994 : 939.

Dabu County

1309 (1967)
2162 (1968)

114 (1967)
140 (1968)

Dabuxianzhi 1992 : 567.

Deqing County

2330 (1967)

118

Deqingxianzhi 1996 : 666.

Dianbai County

9182 (1966-67)

1190

458

Dianbaxianzhi 2000 : 953.

Fengkai County

1569

70

Fengkaixianzhi 1998 : 838.

Fengshun County

5804 (1967)

1574.98

250

Fengshunxianzhi 1995 : 855.

Fogang County

1230 (1967)
223 (1968)

695 (1967)
122 (1968)

78 (1967)
23 (1967)

Fogangxianzhi 2003 : 839.

Gaoming County

12 (1966)

3

Gaomingxianzhi 1995 : 620.

Jiaoling County

816 (1967)

35

Jiaolingxianzhi 1992 : 608.

Jiexi County

3068 (1967)
727 (1968)

187 (1967)
69 (1968)

Jiexisianzhi 1994 : 538.

Heyuan County

2387 (1967)

Heyuanxianzhi 2000 : 1023.

Heshan County

1953 (1967)

780

108

Heshanxianzhi 2001 : 606.

Hua County

2088 (1966-67)

127

Huaxianzhi 1995 : 802.

Huaiji County

4143

410

Huaijixianzhi 1993 : 680.

Huiyang County

69 (1966)
2267 (1967)
464 (1968)

111

Huiyangshizhi 2003 : 1438.

Lechang County

378.72

3

Lechangxianzhi 1994 : 474.

Lianjiang County

2530

179

Lianjiangxianzhi 1995 : 672.

Liannan Yaozu Zizhi County

364 (1967)

397.8

14

Liannan Yaozu Zizhixianxianzhi 1996 : 610.

Lianshan Zhuangzu yaozu zizhi County

81

125

14

Lianshan Zhuangzu Yaozu Zizhixianzhi 1997 : 763.

Longchuan County

1314

270.18

147

Longchuanxianzhi 1994 : 424.

Luoding County

1330 (1966)

122

Luodingxianzhi 1994 : 606.

Mei County

191

Meixianzhi 1994 : 981.

Nanxiong County

6636

109

Nanxiongxianzhi 1991 : 645

Panyu County

3387

656.3

162

Panyushizhi 1995 : 834

Pingyuan County

824

50

Pingyuanxianzhi 1993 : 606.

Puning County

11140 (1967)

1270

506

Puningxianhi 1995 : 602.

Raoping County

155 (1966)
5741 (1967)
2542 (1968)

18 (1966)
283 (1967)
108 (1968)

Raopingxianzhi 1994 : 890.

Ruyuan Yaozu Zizhixian County

155

Ruyuan yaozu zizhixianzhi 1997 : 695

Qingyuan County

3378 (1967)

584.6

201

Qingyuanxianhi 1995 : 894.

Sanshui County

1546 (1967)

52

Sanshuixianzhi 1995 : 1217.

Shixing County

250.43 (1967)

Shixingxianzhi 1997 : 843.

Wengyuan County

1148

51

Wengyuanxianzhi 1997 : 776

Wuhua County

10937 (1967)

1886.9

426

Wuhuaxianzhi 1991 : 551.

Xinhui County

9745 (1966-67)

1414.6

266

Xinhuixianzhi 1995 : 1002.

Xinxing County

1322 (1967)

70

Xinxingxianzhi 1993 : 614.

Xinyi County

4228 (1967)

340

Xinyixianzhi 1993 : 854.

Yangchun County

4452 (1967)

312

Yangchunxianzhi 1996 : 886.

Yangjiang County

9008 (1966-68)

418

Yangjiangxianzhi 2000 : 939.

Yunan County

22 (1966)
955 (1967)

7.7 (1966)
324.37 (1967)

1 (1966)
60 (1967)

Yunanxianzhi 1995 : 839.

Yunfu County

1639 (1967)

82

Yunfuxianzhi 1995 : 713.

Zijin County

2315 (1967)

133

Zijinxianzhi 1994 : 798.

Haut de page

Bibliographie

Primary Sources

Political Archives

CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 (1968). Hong Kong, Union Research Institute.

• “Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting guowuyuan mishuting guanyu zuohao waidilaijing hongweibing zhanshi he geming shisheng lijing gongzuo de yifengxin” (A Letter of the Central Office and the Secretariat of the State Council Concerning Doing Well the Work for the Coming of Red Guard Fighters from other Places to Beijing and the Departure of the Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Beijing) 中共中央辦公廳、國務院秘書廳關於做好外地來京紅衛兵戰士告革命師生離京工作的一封信 (12.11.1966): 96-97.

• “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu nongcun wuchanjieji wenhua da geming de zhishi (can an)” (Directive of the CPC Central Committee Concerning the Cultural Revolution in the Countryside [Draft]) 中共中央關於農村無產階級文化大革命的指示 (草案) (15.12.1966): 137-138.

• “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tingzhi quanguoda de tongzhi” (Notice of the CPC Central Committee Concerning the Suspension of the Great Networking all over the Country) 中共中央關於停止全國大串連的通知 (19.03.1967): 377.

• “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu xian yi xia nongcun wenhua da geming de guiding” (Regulations of the CPC Central Committee Concerning the Cultural Revolution in the County Level) 中共中央關於縣以下農村文化大革命的規定 (14.09.1966): 77-78.

• “Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu geming shisheng he Hongweibing jinxing buxing chuanlian wenti yu tongzhi” (Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council Concerning the Question of Exchange of Revolutionary Experience on Foot by Revolutionary Teachers and Students, and Red Guards) 中共中央、國務院關於革命師生和紅衛兵進行步行串連問題與通知 (03.02.1967): 225-226.

• “Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu geming shisheng jinxing buxing chuanlian wenti yu tongzhi” (Notice of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council Concerning the Question of Revolutionary Teachers and Students Exchanging Revolutionary Experience) 中共中央、國務院關於革命師生進行步行串連問題與通知 (16.11.1966): 107-108.

• “Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu geming shisheng jinxing geming chuanlian wenti de buchong tongzhi” (Supplementary Circular of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council Concerning the Question of Exchange of Revolutionary Experience by Revolutionary Teachers and Students) 中共中央、國務院關於革命師生進行革命串連問題的補充通知 (01.12.1966): 125-126.

Zhonggong Zhongyao Lishi Wenxian Ziliao Huibian (Collection of Important Sources related to the History of Communist China) 中共重要歷史文獻資料匯編. 1997. Los Angeles, Zhongwen chubanwu fuwu zhongxin.

• “Chen Yi tongzhi jiuyue shisiri zai waiwenjiu quanti zhigong da hui shang de jiang hua (Comrade Chen Yi’s Speech held in the Plenary Meeting of the Industrial Organization.14.09.1966) 陳毅同志九月十四日在外文局全體職工大會上的講話.” vol. 13, no. 2: 73.

• “Li Xiannian fuzongli jiejian sun qian huang ji bu jiguan gepai de jianghua” (Discourse among Vice-Premier Li Xiannian, Sun, Qian, Huang and All Factions during Li’s Reception. 09.03.1967) 李先念副總理接見孫、錢、黃及部機關各派的談話. vol. 13, no. 7: 94-95.

• “Li Xiannian fuzongli jiejian weishengbu jiguan ge qunzhong zuzhi daibiao shi de jianghua” 李先念副總理接見衛生部機關各群眾組織代表時的講話 (Speech Given by Vice- Premier Li Xiannian While Receiving the Representatives of All Mass Organizations of the Ministry of Health.10.03.1967). vol. 13, no. 7: 95-98.

• “Qi Benyu tongzhi jiuyue liuri zai er qi jichechang gongju chejian jianghua jiyao” (Summary of Speech Given by Comrade Qi Benyu at Tool Room of the Feb. 7th Locomotive Works on 6 Sept. 6.09.1966) 戚本禹同志九月六日在二七機車廠工具車間講話紀要. vol. 13, no. 2: 18.

• “Tao Zhu shiyue ershisiri zai zhongnanhai jiejian shoudu dazhuan yuanxiao hongweibing geming zaofan zongsilingbu bufen xuexiao daibiao shi de jianghua” (Tao Zhu Received the Representatives of Capital Higher Education Institutes’ Red Guards in Revolutionary Rebels General Headquarters at Zhongnanhai on 24 Oct. 24.10.1966) 陶鑄十月二十四日在中南海接見首都大專院校紅衛兵革命造反總司令部部分學校代表時的講話. vol. 13, no. 2: 240.

• “Wu de tongzhi zai gongren tiyuguan guan yu jiedai waidi geming shisheng de jianghua” 吳德同志在工人體育館關於接待外地革命師生的講話 (Comrade Wu De’s Speech Regarding the Reception of Revolutionary Teachers and Students from Other Places at the Workers’ Stadium. 13.12.1966). vol. 13, no. 4: 56-57.

• “Zhang Chunqiao tongzhi zai zhengxie litang de jianghua” (Comrade Zhang Chunqiao’s Speech at the People’s Republic of China Political Consultative Auditorium. 28.10.1966) 張春橋同志在政協禮堂的講話. vol. 13, no. 2: 265.

• “Zhou Enlai dui shoudu gaoxiao hongweibing de jianghua” (Zhou Enlai’s Speech to the Capital Higher Education Institutes’ Red Guards. 9.12.1966) 周恩來對首都高校紅衛兵的講話. vol. 13, no. 4: 74.

• “Zhou Enlai tongzhi zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyi de jianghua” (Comrade Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Central Work Conference. 28.10.1966) 周恩來同志在中央工作會議上的講話. vol. 13, no. 2: 268-270.

• “Zhou zongli dui jiedai renyuan de jianghua” (Premier Zhou’s Speech to the Receptionists. 12.01.1967) 周總理對接待人員的講話. vol. 13, no. 5: 129.

• “Zhou zongli ji er yue jiu ri de jianghua” (Premier Zhou’s Speech on 9 Dec. 09.12.1966) 周總理十二月九日的講話. vol. 13, no. 4: 73-76.

• “Zhou zongli jiejian weishengbu hongsezaofantuan hongqizhandoutuan gelianzongbu dongfanghonggongshe sige zuzhi daibiao he bulingdao shi jianghua” (Premier Zhou’s Speech to the Four Organizational Representatives and Leaders of Red Regiment of Rebellion, Red Flag Combat Regiment, Revolutionary Union and East Is Red Commune, of the Ministry of Health. 24.03.1967) 周總理接見衛生部紅色造反團、紅旗戰鬥團、革聯總部、東方紅公社四個組織代表和部領導時講話. vol. 13, no. 7: 216-232.

Archives about the Epidemic from Guangdong Provincial Archives, Handbooks, and Press

“Dui liunao fangzhi youguan wenti de yijian” (Opinions Regarding the Question of the Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 對流腦防治有關問題的意見 (3 March 1967). Guangdong Provincial Archives no. 317–1-148: 26-27.

“Guanyu qieshi zuohao fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo de jinji tongzhi” (Urgent Notice Prone to the Conscientiously Doing Well the Work to Prevent and Treat Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 關於切實做好防治流行性腦脊髓膜炎工作的緊急通知 (20.02.1967). In Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu fangzhi liunao zhihuibu 廣西壯族自治區防治流腦指揮部 and Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu weisheng jiaoyusuo 廣西壯族自治區衛生教育所 (eds.), Fangzhiliuxingxing naojisuimoyan shouce (Handbook for the Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 防治流行性腦脊髓膜炎手冊. No publication data: 1-6.

“Hongweibing bupa yuanzheng nan” (The Red Guards do not Fear Long March) 紅衛兵不怕遠征難. People’s Daily, 22.10. 1966: 1.

“Liunao de yufang” (The Prevention of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 流腦的預防 (20.02.1967). In Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu fangzhi liunao zhihuibu 廣西壯族自治區防治流腦指揮部 and Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu weisheng jiaoyusuo 廣西壯族自治區衛生教育所 (eds.), Fangzhiliuxingxing naojisuimoyan shouce (Handbook forthe Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 防治流行性腦脊髓膜炎手冊. No publication data: 9-13.

“Quansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo zongjie” (Summary on the Works of the Provincial Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 全省防治流行性腦脊髓膜炎工作總結 (19.05.1967). In Hunansheng fangzhi naomoyan zhihuibu and Hunansheng weishengting 湖南省防治腦膜炎指揮部、湖南省衛生廳 (eds.), Hunansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan jingyan huibian (Collection on the Experiences of the Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis in Hunan Province) 湖南省防治流行性腦脊髓膜炎經驗匯編. No publication data: 26-32.

“Xian fangzhi liunao gongzhu huiyijiyao” (Summary of Provincial Meeting of the Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 省防治流腦工作會議紀要 (13.04.1967). Guangdong Provincial Archives no. 317-1-148: 18.

“Xian junguan weisheng xiaozu guanyu canjia yufang lounao yiwu renyuan xiangshou baojian jintie wenti de lianhe tongzhi” (Joint Notice by Small Group of Health Provincial Military Officials Pertaining to Receiving Health Allowance for the Medical Staff Participating in the Prevention of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 省軍管衛生小組關於參加預防流腦醫務人員享受保健津貼問題的聯合通知 (04.07.1967). Guangdong Provincial Archives no. 295–1-234: 90.

“Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan zhishi” (Central Committee and State Council Directive) 中共中央、國務院指示 (03.03.1967). In Hunansheng fangzhi naomoyan zhihuibu and Hunansheng weishengting 湖南省防治腦膜炎指揮部、湖南省衛生廳 (eds.), Hunansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan jingyan huibian (Collection on the Experiences of the Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis in Hunan Province) 湖南省防治流行性腦脊髓膜炎經驗匯編. No publication data: 1.

“Zhua ge ming, cu sheng chan” (Accelerate Revolution, Increase Production) 抓革命促生產. People’s Daily, September 7, 1966: 1.

“Zui jinji huxu jinji dongyuan qilai wei xunsu pumie liunao er douzheng” (We urge you to fight against Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 最緊急呼吁緊急動員起來,為迅速撲滅流腦而鬥爭 (07.02.1967), in Hubeixian weisheng fangyizhan 湖北省衛生防疫站 (ed.) (February 1967). Liuxingxingnaomoyan fangzhi shouce (Handbook for the Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 流行性腦膜炎防治手冊. No publication data.

Zhangjiakou Zhuanqu Fangbing Office 張家口專區防病辦公室 (ed.), Liunao fangzhi ziliao (Materials for the Prevention and Treatment of Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis) 流腦防治資料. No publication data.

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Anhui shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Anhui Province) 安徽省志衛生志. (1996). Hefei, Anhui renmin chubanshe.

Beijingzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Beijing) 北京志.衛生志. (2003). Beijing, Beijing chubanshe.

Chenghai xianzhi (Chenghai County Gazetteer) 澄海縣志 (1992). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Conghua xianzhi (Conghua County Gazetteer) 從化縣志 (1994). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Dabu xianzhi (Dabu County Gazetteer) 大埔縣志 (1992). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Deqing xianzhi (Deqing County Gazetteer) 德慶縣志 (1996). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Dianbai xianzhi (Dianbai County Gazetteer) 電白縣志 (2000). Beijing, Zhonghua shuju.

Fengkai xianzhi (Fangkai County Gazetteer) 封開縣志 (1998). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Fengshun xianzhi (Fenghun County Gazetteer) 豐順縣志 (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Fogang xianzhi (Fogang County Gazetteer) 佛岡縣志 (2003). Beijing, Zhonghua shuju.

Gansu shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Gansu Province) 甘肅省志衛生志. (1995). Lanzhou, Gansu wenhua chubanshe.

Gaomingxianzhi (Gaoming County Gazetteer) 高明縣志 (1995) Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Guangdong shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Guangdong Province) 廣東省志衛生志 (2003). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Guangxi tongzhi yiliao weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Guangxi Province) 廣西通志醫療衛生志 (1999). Nanning, Guangxi renmin chubanshe.

Guangzhou shizhi. Gongchandangzhi (1921-1990) (Guangzhou City Gazetteer. Record of Communist Party of China) 廣州市志. 共產黨志 (1997). Guangzhou, Zhonggong Guangzhoushiwei dangzhi bianzuan lingdao xiaozu bangongshi.

Hainan shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Hainan Province) 海南省志衛生志 (2001). Beijing, Fangzhi chubanshe.

Heilongjiang shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Heilongjiang Province) 黑龍江省志衛生志 (1998). Ha’erbin, Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe.

Henan shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Henan Province) 河南省志衛生志 (1991). Zhengzhou, Henan renmin chubanshe.

Heshan xianzhi (Heshan County Gazetteer) 鶴山縣志 (2001). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Heyuan xianzhi (Heyuan County Gazetteer) 河源縣志 (2000). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Huaiji xianzhi (Huaji County Gazetteer) 懷集縣志. (1993). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Hua xianzhi (Hua County Gazetteer) 花縣志 (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Huiyang xianzhi (Huiyang County Gazetteer) 惠陽縣志 (2003). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Hunan shengzhi yiyao weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Hunan Province) 湖南省志醫藥衛生志 (1998). Changsha, Hunan renmin chubanshe.

Jiangsu shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Jiangsu Province) 江蘇省志衛生志 (2003). Nanjing, Jiangsu renmin chubanshe.

Jiangxisheng weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Jiangxi Province) 江西省衛生志 (1997). Hefei, Huangshan shushe.

Jiaoling xianzhi (Jiaoling County Gazetteer) 蕉嶺縣志 (1992). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Jiexi xianzhi (Jiexi County Gazetteer) 揭西縣志. (1994). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Jilinshengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Jilin Province) 吉林省志衛生志 (1992). Changchun, Jilin renmin chubanshe.

Jinggangshanzhi (Jianggang Mountain Gazetteer) 井岡山志 (1997). Beijing, Xinhua chubanshe.

Lechang xianzhi (Lechang County Gazetteer) 樂昌縣志 (1994). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Lianjiang xianzhi (Lianjiang County Gazetteer) 廉江縣志. (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Liannan Yaozu zizhi xianzhi (Liannan Yaozu Zizhi County Gazetteer) 連南瑤族自治縣縣志 (1996). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Lianshan Zhuangzu Yaozu zizhi xianzhi (Lianshan Zhuangzu Yaozu Zizhi County Gazetteer) 連山壯族瑤族自治縣縣志 (1997). Beijing, sanlian shudian.

Liaoning shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Liaoning Province) 遼寧省志衛生志 (1999). Shenyang, Liaoning renmin chubanshe.

Longchuan xianzhi (Longchuan County Gazetteer) 龍川縣志. (1994). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Louding xianzhi (Louding County Gazetteer) 羅定縣志. (1994). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Mei xianzhi (Mei County Gazetteer) 梅縣志. (1994). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Nanxiong xianzhi (Nanxiong County Gazetteer) 南雄縣志. (1991). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Panyu xianzhi (Panyu County Gazetteer) 番禺縣志. (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Pingyuan xianzhi (Pingyuan County Gazetteer) 平遠縣志. (1993). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Puning xianzhi (Puning County Gazetteer) 普寧縣志. (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Qingyuan xianzhi (Qingyuan County Gazetteer) 清遠縣志. (1995). no publication data.

Raoping xianzhi (Raoping County Gazetteer) 饒平縣志. (1994). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Ruyuan Yaozu Zizhi xianzhi (Ruyuan Yaozu Zizhi County Gazetteer) 乳源瑤族自治縣志. (1997). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Sanshui xianzhi (Sanshu County Gazetteer) 三水縣志. (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Shaanxi shengzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Shaanxi Province) 陝西省志衛生志. (1996). Xian, Shaanxi renmin chubanshe.

Shandongsheng weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Shandong Province) 山東省衛生志. (1992). Jinan, Shandong renmin chubanshe.

Shantou shizhi (Shantou City Gazetteer) 汕頭市志. (1999). Beijing, Xinhua chubanshe.

Shanxi tongzhi weisheng yiyaozhi weishengpian (Health Gazetteer of Shanxi Province) 山西通志衛生醫藥志衛生篇. (1997). Beijing, Zhonghua shuju.

Shixing xianzhi (Shixing County Gazetteer) 始興縣志. (1997). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Sichuan shengzhi yiyao weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Sichuan Province) 四川省志醫藥衛生志. (1995) Chengdu, Sichuan cishu chubanshe.

Wengyuan xianzhi (Wengyuan County Gazetteer) 翁源縣志. (1997). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Wuhua xianzhi (Wuhua County Gazetteer) 五華縣志. (1991). Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Xinhui xianzhi (Xinhui County Gazetteer) 新會縣志. (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Xinjiang tongzhi weishengzhi (Health Gazetteer of Xinjiang Province) 新疆通志衛生志. (1996). Wulumuqi, Xinjiang renmin chubanshe.

Xinxing xianzhi (Xinxing County Gazetteer) 新興縣志. (1993). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Xinyi xianzhi (Xinyi County Gazetteer) 信宜縣志. (1993). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Yangchunxianzhi (Yangchun County Gazetteer) 陽春縣志. (1996). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Yangjiang xianzhi (Yangjiang County Gazetteer) 陽江縣志. (2000). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Yunan xianzhi (Yunan County Gazetteer) 郁南縣志. (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Yunfu xianzhi (Yunfu County Gazetteer) 雲浮縣志. (1995). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Zhongshan shizhi (Zhongshan City Gazetteer) 中山市志 (1997). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Zijin xianzhi (Zijin County Gazetteer) 紫金縣志 (1994). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

Zhaoqing shizhi (Zhaoqing City Gazetteer) 肇慶市志. (1999). Guangzhou, Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

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Annexe

Glossary

Aiguo weisheng 愛國衛生
Anhui
安徽
Beijing
北京
Changsha
長沙
Changshao
長韶
Chenghai xian
澄海縣
Chenzhou
郴州
Chongqing
重慶
Conghua xian 從化縣
Da chuan lian 大串連
Dabu (xian) 大埔(縣)
Daye 大冶
Dazhai 大寨
Deng Tietao 鄧鐵濤
Deqing xian 德慶縣
Dianbai xian 電白縣
Difangzhi 地方誌
dongyuan qilai 動員起來
Fengkai xian 封開縣
Fengshun (xian) 豐順(縣)
Fogang xian 佛岡縣
Fujian 福建
gaizai guojia 改造國家
Gansu 甘肅
Gaoming xian 高明縣
Guandu 官渡
Guangdong 廣東
Guangxi 廣西
Guangzhou 廣州
Hainan 海南
Hebei 河北
Heilongjiang 黑龍江
Henan 河南
Hengyang 衡陽
Heshan xian 鶴山縣
Heyuan xian 河源縣
Hong wei bing 紅衛兵
Hua (xian) 花(縣)
Huaiji xian 懷集縣
Huangshi 黃石
Hubei 湖北
Huiyang xian 惠陽縣
Hunan 湖南
Jiang Qing 江青
Jiangsu 江蘇
Jiangxi 江西
jianshao jibing 減少疾病
Jiaoling xian 蕉嶺縣
Jiexi xian 揭西縣
Jilin
吉林
Jinggang Mountains
井岡山
Lechang xian
樂昌縣
Lianjiang xian
廉江縣
Liannan Yaozu Zizhi
連南瑤族自治
Lianshan Zhuangzu Yaozu zizhixian
連山壯族瑤族自治縣
Liaoning
遼寧
Longchuan xian
龍川縣
Luoding (xian)
羅定(縣)
Mao Zedong
毛澤東
Meixian
梅縣
Meizhou
梅州
Nanxiong xian
南雄縣
Ningxia
寧夏
Panyu xian
番禺縣
Pingyuan (xian)
平遠(縣)
Puning xian
普寧縣
Qian Xinzhong
錢信忠
Qinghai
青海
Qingyuan xian
清遠縣
Quanguo dachuanlian
全國大串連
Raoping (xian)
饒平(縣)
Renmin gongshe
人民公社
Renmin ribao
人民日報
Ruyuan Yaozu zizhi xian
乳源瑤族自治縣
Sangeli 三隔離
Sankai 三開
Sanshai 三曬
Sanshui (xian)
三水(縣)
Shaanxi
陝西
Shandong
山東
Shanghai Ruijin
上海瑞金
Shantou
汕頭
Shanxi
山西
Shaoshan
韶山
Shixing xian
始興縣
Si Jiu
四舊
Sichuan
四川
Sun Zheng
孫正
Tao Zhu
陶鑄
Tiananmen
天安門
Wang Qihuang
王耆煌
Weishengzhi
衛生志
Wengyuan (xian)
翁源(縣)
Wuhua (xian)
五華(縣)
Xinhui (xian)
新會(縣)
Xinjiang
新疆
Xinxing xian
新興縣
Xinyi xian
信宜縣
Yan’an
延安
Yangchun (xian)
陽春(縣)
Yangjiang xian
陽江縣
yifeng yisu
移風易俗
Yueyang
岳陽
Yunan xian
郁南縣
Yunfu xian
雲浮縣
Zao fan pai
造反派
Zhaoqing
肇慶
Zhongshan
中山
Zhou Enlai zongli jiumin beiji
周恩來總理救民碑記
Zhou Enlai
周恩來
Zhoubei
周陂
zhua geming, cu shengchan
抓革命, 促生產
Zhuzhou
株洲
Zijin xian
紫金縣
Zunyi
遵義

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Notes

2 Chen 2007: 456-482.

3 Endicoot 1998.

4 Fan 2008: 176-187; Gross 2010.

5 Xiao 2004: 498-514; Rogaski 2004: 285-299; Hu 2013: 94-117; Fan 2010: 277-293; Hung 2010: 400-420.

6 Zuo 1997: 12; Patterson 1993: 878; National Immunization Program, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention.

7 Cui 1986: 28-35; Hipgrave 2011: 224-238.

8 Schwartz 1989: S 118-124; Baltimore 2009: 495-517.

9 For more details from medical perspective, see World Health Organization 1998.

10 World Health Organization 1998: 15; Saez-Liorens 2003; Umaru 2013: 1-30. For epidemiological characteristics of Cerebrospinal Meningitis in China, see Xue 2009: 26-35.

11 Hu 1981: 61.

12 In 1975, 100/100,000 was defined as the highest incidence of the epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis. See Hu 1981: 61; Wang 1992: 5267-5282.

13 Huang 2009: 343-344.

14 Health gazetteers do not usually cite the references from which they extract numbers and information, so we are never sure where the numbers came from. Although the figures are not totally reliable, they may reflect the trend of the dissemination of epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis over the early period of the Cultural Revolution, for which we have no other figures. As picture 1 shows (xxx), the CPC had not released any official figures regarding the epidemic at that time. In a meeting, Zhou Enlai discussed with representatives from the rebel factions whether to publish the confidential figures pertaining to the meningitis epidemic. Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian1997, vol. 13, no. 7: 216-232.

15 For more information on the Red Guards, see Chan 1985; Walder 2009.

16 See notably Yan 1989: 75-88; Wang 1996: 127-138.

17 On the Great Networking Movement, see Guo 2006: 105-107; Yang 2000: 379-406; Yan 1993.

18 Bu 2008: 329-332.

19 These places had something special: the Jinggang Moutains in Hunan were regarded as the cradle of the CPC, since Mao had led a group of peasants there in 1926. Yan’an, in Shaanxi, had been the base of the Chinese Communist Party from 1935 to 1949. It was also the end of the Long March (10/1934-10/1936). Dazhai village, in Shanxi, was chosen to implement the agricultural model that Mao proposed in 1963. Zunyi, in Guizhou province, had been the place of a crucial CPC meeting in January 1935. Shaoshan, in Hunan province, is the birth place of Mao Zedong.

20 Denton 2012: 248.

21 The local gazetteer reported 300 cases of epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis and the death of 18 patients Jinggangshanzhi 1997: 25, 578.

22 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (01.12.1966): 125-126; (03.02.1967): 225-226.

23 Yan 1989: 129-135; Bu 2008: 255-269. In China, the spread pattern of the epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis is from the northern to southern region. Wu 1991: 136-139.

24 Deng 2006: 620-624 and MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2006: 113.

25 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 4: 74.

26 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 4: 73-76; vol. 13, no. 2: 268.

27 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 4: 56-57.

28 The historian Ge Zhaoguang recalled his experience of participating in the Great Networking Movement, traveling from Guiyang to Beijing by train in 1966. He described the poor living condition when he was staying at Tsinghua University, Beijing. Ge 2011. Overcrowded sleeping arrangements is an important factor in the spread of the disease. See Baltimore 2009: 500-501.

29 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 2: 240; vol. 13, no. 2: 265; vol. 13, no. 2: 268. Hospitals in Beijing were full of patients who suffered from respiratory and digestive disease. Zhang 1997: 22-24.

30 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (12.11.1966): 96-97.

31 In December 1966, Over 1.6 million Red Guards from various provinces had reached Guangzhou for the Great Networking Movement, a destination widely encouraged by the central government. GuangzhoushizhiGongchandangzhi 1997: 173; Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 2: 73.

32 Hunanshengzhi Yiyaoweishengzhi 1988: 163. Deng 2006: 623 cites an archival document related to the epidemic in Guangdong province. In this province, the disease spread widely along the Guangzhou-Zhanjiang highway. Heshanxianzhi 2001: 606. In Shanxi province, the disease also spread along the railway. Shanxitongzhi Weisheng Yiyaozhi Weishengpian 1997: 455.

33 For more examples, see Xinhuixianzhi 1995: 1002; Yangchunxianzhi 1996: 886; LiannanYaozu Zizhixianxianzhi 1996: 610; Wengyuanxianzhi 1997: 776.

34 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (15.12.1966): 137-138.

35 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (14.09.1966): 77-78; Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 5: 129; Red Guards also considered that they should go to the villages and promote the revolutionary experience to the peasants. Zhang 2003: 136.

36 The records of Zhongshan city, Zhaoqing city, Raoping county, Fengshun county, Luoding county, Pingyuan county, Hua county and Wuhua county stated that the disease was brought from other places by the students participating in the Great Networking Movement. The first case of the disease in Sanshui county was discovered in 1967, and the patient was a student from another province. Also, the first case of the disease in Hua county was discovered in 1966, and the patient was a Shanghai student. Sanshuixianzhi 1995: 1217. Huaxianzhi 1995: 802.

37 In Wuhua county, for instance, the disease was prevalent in 15 People’s Communes, 3 towns and 313 brigades in 1967. Wuhuaxianzhi 1991: 551.

38 Chen 1987: 162; Liu 2006: 102-123.

39 Hongweibing bupa yuanzheng nan” 1966.

40 The revolutionary organizations published a notice which stated that the Great Networking Movement was a great and new creation, and urged students not to stay in big cities but to learn from the workers and the peasants. Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 2: 270.

41 Wang 1961.

42 Wang 1961.

43 Red Guards committed many acts of violence. See Wang 1996: 17-36; White 1989; Lu 1995: 533-542. The office of meningitis in Guangdong province stated that enemies of the people spread the rumor that “eradicating four olds caused epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis.” Guangdongsheng liunao office 1967: 59.

44 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (16.11.1966): 107-108.

45 Zui jinji huxu jinji dongyuan qilai wei xunsu pumie liunao er douzheng” 1967.

46 Carey 1967. Although the United States of America (US) did not have much information relating to the Chinese outbreak of epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis, US officials were extremely concerned, believing that the situation was both serious and unprecedented. In Hong Kong, the CIA communicated with the travelers travelling between Hong Kong and Guangzhou in an effort to understand the circumstances of the epidemic in mainland China from 1966-1967.

47 CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967 1968 (19.03.1967): 377.

48 Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan zhishi 1967: 1.

49 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 2: 18.

50 Zhua ge ming cu sheng chan” 1966: 1.

51 Guanyu qieshi zuohao fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo de jinji tongzhi” 1967: 1.

52 Xiao 2004: 498-514.

53 Three opennesses,” “three sun-dryings,” and “three isolations” are preventive measures designed to confront the epidemic. “Three opennesses” includes: 1) building more windows in the house; 2) enlarging the size of the windows; and 3) keeping windows open frequently. “Three sun-dryings” consists of: 1) drying clothes in the sun; 2) drying beds in the sun; and 3) sunbathing. Finally, “three isolations” involves the isolation of 1) patients; 2) relatives; and 3) the community.

54 Hubeisheng weisheng fangyizhan 1967: 9; Zhangjiakou zhuanqu fangbing office no publication data: 4-5; “liunao de yufang” 1967: 11-12.

55 Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan zhishi” 1967: 1.

56 Quansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo zongjie” 1967: 26-32.

57 Quansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo zongjie” 1967: 26-32.

58 Deng 2006: 623.

59 Xian fangzhi liunao gongzhu huiyijiyao” 1967: 18; “Dui liunao fengzhi youguan wenti de yijian” 1967: 26-27; “Xian junguan weisheng xiaozu guanyu canjia yufang lounao yiwu renyuan xiangshou baojian jintie wenti de lianhe tongzhi” 1967: 90.

60 Deng 2006: 623.

61 The Sanitation and Anti-epidemic Station 1967.

62 Taylor 2005; Scheid 2013: 243.

63 Deng 2006: 623.

64 Zhonggong zhongyao lishi wenxian ziliao huibian 1997, vol. 13, no. 7: 216-232; vol. 13, no. 7: 94-95; vol. 13, no. 7: 95-98.

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Table des illustrations

Titre Picture 1
Légende This picture shows that the number of epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis infected patients (xxx) was not disclosed. “Quansheng fangzhi liuxingxing naojisuimoyan gongzuo zongjie” 1967: 26. © Fan Ka wai.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/extremeorient/docannexe/image/341/img-1.png
Fichier image/png, 2,2M
Titre Picture 2
Légende The map for Great Networking at Chongqing city.
Crédits © Fan Ka wai.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/extremeorient/docannexe/image/341/img-2.png
Fichier image/png, 3,5M
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Pour citer cet article

Référence électronique

Ka wai Fan, « Epidemic Cerebrospinal Meningitis during the Cultural Revolution », Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident [En ligne], 37 | 2014, mis en ligne le 01 septembre 2017, consulté le 19 janvier 2018. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/extremeorient/341 ; DOI : 10.4000/extremeorient.341

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Auteur

Ka wai Fan

Fan Ka wai is associate professor at the Chinese Civilization Center, City University of Hong Kong. Dr. Fan earned his PhD (1997) in history from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He has published extensively (articles, book chapters, encyclopedia entries, and reviews) in the fields of history of Chinese medicine and Internet resource for Chinese medicine.
Fan
Ka wai est professeur adjoint au Centre de Civilisation Chinoise de l’Université de Hong Kong où il a, en 1997, soutenu sa thèse de doctorat en histoire. Il a abondamment publié (articles, chapitres de livres, entrées d’encyclopédie, recensions) dans les domaines de l’histoire de la médecine chinoise et œuvré à l’accessibilité des ressources électroniques en relation avec la médecine chinoise.

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Droits d’auteur

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