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Brunschwig, Jacques (1984), « Quelques remarques sur la conception stoïcienne du nom propre », Histoire Épistémologie Langage 6, p. 3-19.
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— (1988), « La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne », in Jonathan Barnes & Mario Mignucci (eds.), Matter and Metaphysics, Naples, Bibliopolis, p. 19-27.
Caston, Victor (1999), “Something or Nothing: The Stoics on Concepts and Universals”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17, p. 145-213.
Crivelli, Paolo (1994), “Indefinite Propositions and anaphora in Stoic logic”, Phronesis 39, p. 187-206.
de Jonge, Casper (2008), Between Grammar and Rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Language, Linguistics and Literature, Leiden, Brill.
Denyer, Nicholas (1988), “Stoicism and Token Reflexivity”, in Jonathan Barnes & Mario Mignucci (eds.), Matter and Metaphysics, Naples, Bibliopolis, p. 375-396.
Dyson, Henry (2009), Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa, Berlin, De Gruyter.
Ebert, Theodor (1993), “Dialecticians and Stoics on the classification of Propositions”, in Karl Döring and Theodor Ebert (eds.), Dialektiker und Stoiker zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, Stuttgart, Steiner, p. 111-127.
Frede, Michael (1974), Die Stoische Logik, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
Goldschmidt, Victor (1969), Le système stoïcien et l’idée de temps, Paris, Vrin.
Goulet, Richard (1978), « La classification stoïcienne des propositions simples selon Diogene Laërce VII.69-70 », in Jacques Brunschwig (éd.), Les Stoïciens et leur logique, Paris, Vrin, p. 171-198.
Graeser, Andreas (1978), “The Stoic theory of Meaning”, in John Rist (ed.), The Stoics, Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 77-100.
Hadot, Ilsetraut (2014), “Getting to Goodness: Reflections on Chapter 10 of Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca”, in Marcia L. Colish & July Wildberger (eds.), Seneca Philosophus, Berlin, De Gruyter, p. 9-41.
Householder, Fred W. (1981), The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus, Amsterdam, Benjamins.
Hülser, Karlheinz (1987), Die Fragmente Zur Dialektik der Stoiker, Stuttgart, Verlag.
Ildefonse, Frédérique (1997), La naissance de la grammaire dans l’Antiquité grecque, Paris, Vrin.
Inwood, Brad (2005), “Getting to Goodness”, in Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome, Oxford, Clarendon, p. 271-301.
Irwin, Terence H. (1997), “Aristotelian Substances and Stoic Subjects”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 51, N° 201,3, p. 397-415.
Kahn, Charles H. (1969), “Stoic Logic and Stoic Logos”, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 51, p. 158-172.
Kovacs, David (1995), Euripides : Hippolytus, Cambridge, Loeb.
Lallot, Jean (1997), Apollonios Dyscole, De la construction, Paris, Vrin.
Lloyd, Anthony C. (1970), “Activity and description in Aristotle and the Stoa”, Proceedings of the British Academy 56, p. 227-240.
— (1971), “Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa”, in Anthony A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicisim, London, Athlone, p. 58-74.
— (1977), Review of M. Frede, Die Stoische Logik, Mind 86, p. 286.
— (1978), “Definite propositions and the concept of reference”, in Jacques Brunschwig (éd.), Les Stoïciens et leur logique, Paris, Vrin, p. 285-296.
Long, A.A. (1971), “Language and thought in Stoicism”, in A.A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicisim, London, Athlone, p. 75-113.
Luhtala, Anneli (2000), On the origin of syntactical description in Stoic logic, Münster, Nodus.
— (2005), Grammar and philosophy in late antiquity: A study of Priscian's sources, Amsterdam, John Benjamins.
Menn, Stephen (1999), “The Stoic Theory of Categories”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17, p. 215-247.
Mueller, Ian (2006), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.32-46, Ithaca, N.Y, Cornell University Press.
— (2013), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.14-22, Ithaca, N.Y, Cornell University Press.
Pachet, Pierre (1975), « La déixis selon Zénon et Chrysippe », Phronesis 20, p. 241-246.
Schmidt, Rudolf Traugott (1839), Stoicorum Grammatica, Hakkert.
Sedley, David N. (1982), “The Criterion of Stoic Identity”, Phronesis 27, p. 255-275.
— (1984), “The Stoic Theory of Universals”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, p. 87-92.
— (1999), “Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics”, in Kempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, & Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, CUP, p. 355-411.
Sellars, John. (2011), “Stoic Ontology and Plato's Sophist”, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 54, p. 185-203.
Sluiter, Ineke (1990), Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought, Amsterdam, VU University Press.
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Notes
See esp. Charles H. Kahn (1969), “Stoic Logic and Stoic Logos”, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 51, p. 158-172; Pierre Pachet (1975), “La deixis selon Zénon et Chrysippe”, Phronesis 20, p. 241-246; Anthony C. Lloyd (1978), “Definite propositions and the concept of reference”, in Jacques Brunschwig (éd.), Les Stoïciens et leur logique, Paris, Vrin, p. 285-296; Jacques Brunschwig (1984), « Quelques remarques sur la conception stoïcienne du nom proper », Histoire Épistemologie Langage 6, p. 3-19; Jean Lallot (1997), Apollonios Dyscole, De la construction, Paris, Vrin; Susanne Bobzien (1999), “Logic: The Stoics”, in Kempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld & Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, CUP, p. 77-176, here p. 98-9.
The most noteworthy exception is Frédérique Ildefonse (1997), La naissance de la grammaire dans l’Antiquité grecque, Paris, Vrin.
I translate axiōma by “proposition”, which I take to be uncontroversial. While “proposition” is a loaded term in contemporary philosophy of language, it captures well what the Stoics mean by axioma: the incorporeal meaning of an assertive sentence which is the bearer of truth-value.
This account is echoed by Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (DL) VII.70. The differences between the two accounts matter little for my purposes here since they agree on the aspects most salient to my investigation. I adopt Sextus’ terminology because it is the simplest and clearest. For comparative discussions of the two accounts see Brunschwig, Jacques (1986), « Remarques sur la classification des propositions simples dans les logiques hellénistiques », Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans l’Antiquité, Brussels/Grenoble, Ousia, p. 287-310; Theodor Ebert (1993), “Dialecticians and Stoics on the classification of Propositions”, in Karl Döring & Theodor Ebert (eds.), Dialektiker und Stoiker zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, Stuttgart, Steiner, p. 111-127; and Susanne Bobzien (1999), “Logic: the Stoics”, CHHP, p. 97, esp. n.56.
Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians (SE M) VIII.96: τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν τινὰ μὲν ὡρισμένα ἐστὶν τινὰ δὲ ἀόριστα τινὰ δὲ μέσα, ὡρισμένα μὲν τὰ κατὰ δεῖξιν ἐκφερόμενα, οἷον ‘οὗτος περιπατεῖ, οὗτος κάθηται’ (δείκνυμι γάρ τινα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων). ἀόριστα δέ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν οἷς ἀόριστόν τι κυριεύει μόριον, οἷον ‘τὶς κάθηται’, μέσα δὲ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα ‘ἄνθρωπος κάθηται’ ἢ ‘Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ’. Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own.
Sextus Empiricus, M VIII.97: τὸ μὲν οὖν “τὶς περιπατεῖ” ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀφώρικέ τινα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους περιπατούντων· κοινῶς γὰρ ἐφ' ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ἐκφέρεσθαι δύναται· τὸ δὲ “οὗτος κάθηται” ὡρισμένον ἐστίν, ἐπείπερ ἀφώρικε τὸ δεικνύμενον πρόσωπον. τὸ δὲ “Σωκράτης κάθηται” μέσον ὑπῆρχεν, ἐπείπερ οὔτε ἀόριστόν ἐστιν (ἀφώρικε γὰρ τὸ εἶδος), οὔτε ὡρισμένον (οὐ γὰρ μετὰ δείξεως ἐκφέρεται), ἀλλ' ἔοικε μέσον ἀμφοτέρων ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ τε ἀορίστου καὶ τοῦ ὡρισμένου.
On the Stoic notion of eidos, see especially Jacques Brunschwig (1988), « La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne », in Jonathan Barnes & Mario Mignucci (eds.) Matter and Metaphysics, Naples, Bibliopolis, p. 19-27; David N. Sedley (1984), “The Stoic Theory of Universals”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, p. 87-92; (1999), “Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics”, in Kempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld & Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, CUP, p. 355-411; Victor Caston (1999), “Something or Nothing: The Stoics on Concepts and Universals”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17, p. 145–213; John Sellars (2011), “Stoic Ontology and Plato's Sophist”, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 54, p. 185-203.
Sextus Empiricus, M VIII.98: γίνεσθαι δέ φασι τὸ ἀόριστον ἀληθές, τὸ “τὶς περιπατεῖ” ἢ “τὶς κάθηται”, ὅταν τὸ ὡρισμένον ἀληθὲς εὑρίσκηται, τὸ “οὗτος κάθηται” ἢ “οὗτος περιπατεῖ”· μηδενὸς γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους καθημένου οὐ δύναται ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ “τὶς κάθηται” ἀόριστον.
For more on this passage, see Paolo Crivelli (1994), “Indefinite Propositions and anaphora in Stoic logic”, Phronesis 39, p. 187-206, and Anthony C. Lloyd (1971), “Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa”, in Anthony A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicisim, London, Athlone, p. 58-74.
Some (e.g. Andreas Graeser (1978), “The Stoic theory of Meaning”, in John Rist (ed.) The Stoics, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 77-100, here p.78) have assumed that middle propositions also take their truth-value from corresponding definite propositions. “Socrates is walking” would be said to be true only if “this one is walking” is also found to be true. I see no evidence for this. In fact, it seems clear that it is not the case. In his response to the Master Argument, Chrysippus uses the example “If Dion is dead, this one is dead”, which he calls a true conditional, to show that the impossible can follow from the possible. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentaria in Analytica priora Aristoteli (Alex. Aphr.), In An. Pr. 177.25-178.1: τῷ συνημμένῳ τῷ εἰ τέθνηκε Δίων, τέθνηκεν οὗτος δεικνυμένου τοῦ Δίωνος ἀληθεῖ ὄντι). Chrysippus claims that “Dion is dead” can be true (and is therefore possible): it is true once Dion has died; but that “this one is dead”, can never be true (and hence is impossible). I return to this passage in more detail below. For now, let us just note that it cannot be the case that the middle proposition “Dion is dead” relies on the corresponding definite proposition “this one is dead” for its truth-value, since the former can be true but the latter cannot. In other words, there is a distinction to be made between the logical implication (captured by the true conditional “if Dion is dead, then this one is dead”) and a metalogical claim about the truth conditions of the two propositions which form the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional. The propositions and their truth-value relate to each other on two different levels. Since the conditional “if Dion is dead, this one is dead” is true, the antecedent, “Dion is dead”, logically implies the consequent, “this one is dead”. However, it is not the case that the truth-value of the antecedent depends on the truth-value of the consequent: “Dion is dead” can have a truth-value even when “this one is dead” does not, since “Dion is dead” is true after Dion’s death and “this one is dead” is neither true nor false. Sextus Empiricus, in the text above, is usually understood to be stating metalogical commitments. On the other hand, when calling the conditional “true”, Chrysippus is committing to the logical implication but he is not making any metalogical claim. Given these commitments, there are no grounds to think that Chrysippus had a theory according to which middle propositions rely on definite propositions for their truth-value.
This would have avoided an issue: “someone is dead” can apparently never be true, since, as we will see in section IV below, “this one is dead” can never be true. The fact that they chose the definite proposition rather than the middle, or both, is significant.
Diogenes Laertius VII.45.
The details of the correspondence are still subject to debate. Anthony Lloyd (1971), Problems in Stoicism, p. 62ff (following Rudolf Traugott Schmidt (1839), Stoicorum Grammatica, Hakkert) provides a thorough account of it. For a different interpretation see Frédérique Ildefonse (1997), La naissance de la grammaire, p. 37 and p.224-228. An important difference between the two concerns the linguistic equivalents to disposition and relation, which do not bear on my argument.
“Matter” and “qualities” are thus technical notions for the Stoics, and distinct from Aristotle’s use of the terms. For a detailed account of the Stoic theory of categories, see Stephen Menn (1999), “The Stoic Theory of Categories”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17, p. 215-247, and David Sedley (1999), “Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics”, CCHP.
Diogenes Laertius VII.58: Ἔστι δὲ προσηγορία μὲν κατὰ τὸν Διογένην μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον κοινὴν ποιότητα, οἷον Ἄνθρωπος, Ἵππος· ὄνομα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου δηλοῦν ἰδίαν ποιότητα, οἷον Διογένης, Σωκράτης·
The grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus was heavily influenced by the Stoics, as shown by, e.g., David L. Blank (1982), Ancient philosophy and Grammar: The syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus, Chico, CA, Scholars Press; Ineke Sluiter (1990), Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought, Amsterdam, VU University Press; Frédérique Ildefonse (1997), La naissance de la grammaire; Jean Lallot (1997), Apollonios Dyscole; Anneli Luhtala (2000), On the origin of syntactical description in Stoic logic, Münster, Nodus; David L. Blank & Catherine Atherton (2003), “The Stoic Contribution to Traditional Grammar”, in Brad Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, Cambridge, CUP, p. 310-327. Marion Durand (2018), Language and Reality: Stoic Semantics Reconstructed, University of Toronto (dissertation available from the author upon request) argues at greater length that he in fact worked within a Stoic framework for linguistic theory, so that his work, albeit not strictly speaking Stoic, can serve as a source for Stoic theory. This particular passage, though not included in Karlheinz Hülser (1987), Die Fragmente Zur Dialektik der Stoiker, Stuttgart, Verlag, is particularly likely to be evidence of a Stoic view, since the claim it makes about nouns (that they signify quality) is precisely the one reported by Diogenes Laertius. To be sure, this needn’t mean that Apollonius is committed to every detail of the Stoic view, only that this passage can be used as evidence for it.
Ap. Dysc. S II.22.3-6, 24.1-4 = GG 2.2.142.1-4, 143.9-144.4: Ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων θέσις ἐπενοήθη εἰς ποιότητας κοινὰς ἢ ἰδίας, ὡς <ἄνθρωπος, Πλάτων>, καὶ ἐπεὶ οὔτε σὺν δείξει τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε ἀναφορᾷ, πάμπολλος ἡ ἐπὶ τούτων θέσις ἐγίνετο, ἵν' ἑκάστου τὸ χαρακτηριστικὸν ἀπονείμῃ τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα. [...] Αἱ μέντοι ἀντωνυμίαι εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀποβλέπουσαι διὰ τῆς ἐν αὐταῖς ἐγκειμένης δείξεως ἢ εἰς τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν, ἔχουσιν εὔληπτα καὶ τὰ ἐπισυμβεβηκότα τῇ ποιότητι, λέγω τὰ δυνάμενα δι' ὄψεως ἐπινοηθῆναι, <λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν, μακρὸν ἢ βραχύ>. I do not follow Lallot in accepting Dudith’s addition (τὴν ἑκάστου <τῶν ὑποκειμένων> ποιότητα).
See also I.120, and Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae (IG), 15.63-65 ; 17.105. Cf. Jean Lallot (1997) Apollonios Dyscole, n.II.263 ; Richard Goulet (1978), « La classification stoïcienne des propositions simples selon Diogene Laërce VII.69-70 », in Jacques Brunschwig (éd.), Les Stoïciens et leur logique, Paris, Vrin, p. 171-198, here p. 175.
I take ousia and poiotēs to be used in the technical Stoic sense here, and accordingly translate them as “matter” and “quality”, respectively. While Apollonius may not have himself been committed to Stoic ontological theory, there can be little doubt that the use of these terms in this passage is due to their presence in a Stoic source on which Apollonius is building.
A note on the translation of those two key terms: ἀποβλέπειν appears only one other time in Apollonius, at P 2.1.1.31.4, where its meaning is equally debatable. In general, the term can mean “looking to”, or “looking at”, with an intensive force (the LSJ adds “with love, wonder or admiration”), but when constructed with a prepositional phrase governed by εἰς, as it is frequently, most notably in Plato, it tends to mean “to consider”, “to take into consideration”, or “to focus on”, sometimes for the purpose of an investigation, or the forming of an opinion (it occurs multiple times in this sense in the Republic, e.g. 466a5, 472c7, 530a4, 578b5, but also in the Philebus, e.g. 44d9-45a2, where the verb is used twice in just this sense, or again in Symposium 82a3, Phaedrus 237d1,…). It often seems to have the force of considering something rather than something else (that is, focusing on it), whether in the context of an investigation (as is the case in the passages cited above) or not (e.g. Phaedrus 239b6-7). Apollonius seems to be using it in just this way here, hence my translation, “focusing”. For ἔχειν, I prefer “capture” to “include” in Fred W. Householder (1981), The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus, Amsterdam, Benjamins, ad loc., and “inclure” in Jean Lallot (1997) Apollonios Dyscole, ad loc., as “include” seems to invite a variety of questions regarding the capacity in which those qualities are included in or by the pronouns. I follow them, however, in taking εὔληπτα not as a predicate accusative but as attributive, modifying τὰ ἐπισυμβεβηκότα. One could take εὔληπτα as a predicate accusative, in which case the phrase would mean “make visible qualities easy to grasp”. Although the word order may seem to make this a probable construal, there are very few parallels. The closest one is found at Eur. Hipp. 953, where Ὀρφέα τ' ἄνακτ' ἔχων is sometimes rendered “make Orpheus your lord” (so David Kovacs (1995) Euripides: Hippolytus, Cambridge, Loeb). This is an attractive interpretation, and in fact, very close to what I think the view entails, as I argue below. Nonetheless the construction with a predicate accusative is rare and more often means “to hold x as y”, which cannot be the meaning here.
Similarly, both nouns and pronouns capture their referent’s matter, but only pronouns focus on it. Note that Apollonius does not, strictly speaking, say that nouns focus on quality, but rather that they were established with a view to qualities. My interpretation here conflates the aim of the imposition of nouns with what the nouns themselves aim at or focus on. Given the way the passage is laid out, with the use of the preposition εἰς in both cases, and the distinction made between nouns and pronouns, I think this is not an implausible slip to impute on Apollonius.
This is in line with the argument in David N. Sedley (1982), “The Criterion of Stoic Identity”, Phronesis 27, p. 255-275, which convincingly shows that a metaphysical argument for the privileged status of demonstratives based on their ability to track identity over time in a constantly changing world would be misguided. As Sedley argues, names are better able to track identity through time than demonstratives, so that, metaphysically speaking, demonstratives signify something less stable than nouns. This metaphysical feature of their referent can thus not be the source of their privilege.
I do not agree with Jean Lallot (1997) Apollonios Dyscole, ad loc., who interprets the passage as suggesting that pronouns are able to say just as much as nouns and in fact replace them even in their descriptive function. The way in which the deixis “includes” or captures quality is precisely not by describing and it is in this respect that demonstratives’ way of securing reference differs from that of nouns.
I take the somewhat puzzling phrase τὰ ἐπισυμβεβηκότα τῇ ποιότητι (“the accidents which accompany quality”) to mean little more than the quality in question. The verb ἐπισυμβαίνω is not very common, though it appears in Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus, where it means “supervene”, or “happen besides/after”. The participle ἐπισυμβεβηκός seems to be first used by Apollonius and its subsequent usage is sparse and confined to rhetorical texts. In Apollonius, it appears just three times, once just a paragraph above our passage, where it seems to mean “accidents” in the Aristotelian sense. Apollonius seems to be muddling terminologies here and have in mind something a little confused, perhaps best described as the qualities as they appear to us as a result of the way the Stoic-conceptualised qualities arrange matter.
I take it that I could, by contrast, see it without grasping that it is an elm. The difference, as will transpire, may be the complexity of the concepts associated with those qualities. Note that, according to Stoic epistemology, all adult human impressions are affections of the soul – which is the commanding faculty – and rational, that is, with propositional content. I use sight here as the means of perceiving qualities, though Apollonius’ phrasing leaves open the option of other modes of perception. Priscian, is in this respect more restrictive, since he translates eulēpta by qui possunt oculis conspici (IG 17.64 = GL 2.2.146.18).
This is why I take the participle ἀποβλέπουσαι to be concessive (contra Lallot and Householder who both translate it with a relative clause): the point is that although, unlike nouns, the demonstrative does not focus on the qualities (but solely on the matter), it nonetheless captures them.
Casper De Jonge (2008), Between Grammar and Rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Language, Linguistics and Literature, Leiden, Brill, p. 278ff. shows that this same idea motivates Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ ranking of parts of speech.
cf., e.g., Simplicius in Ar. Cat. 222.30-33. I am grateful to Simon Shogry for pointing this out to me.
It is worth noting that the exact way in which deixis features alongside deictic pronouns is unclear. As is clear from the texts cited above and below, deixis is considered an inherent feature of demonstrative pronouns (ἡ ἐν αὐταῖς ἐγκειμένη δεῖξις), but its relationship to pronouns is described in many ways. It is not always said to be in a pronoun, but sometimes to accompany the pronoun (μετὰ δείξεως) and to come from the pronoun (ἐξ αὐτῶν, and even ὑπ’ αὐτῶν). Given our evidence, I see no way of decisively judging which of these we ought to adopt as the mainstream view, and I will, in my discussion, try to mirror the text at hand, therefore alternating between the two. My inclination is to think that the deixis should be thought of as something which, strictly speaking, accompanies a pronoun. It is performed by the speaker as she utters the pronoun. It is described as being inherent to pronouns, and as being in them or carried by them, because a competent speaker would not utter a demonstrative pronoun without also performing an ostension. There would be something strange about a demonstrative that is not accompanied by ostension; its reference would fail, and the utterance would not express a proposition or any sort of complete lekton (more on this below). Therefore, the pronoun compels, as it were, the person uttering it to perform the accompanying deixis, which is the reference-fixing mechanism. It is in this sense that the deixis is said to be in it or carried by pronouns. In addition, deixis is a unique and defining feature of demonstratives. Priscian tells us, for example, that nouns do not refer by deixis (IG XVII.63.15, quoted below), nor do anaphoric pronouns (IG XIV.2.1-4). Now, it seems that we could well say “Socrates” and at the same time point to Socrates. So it cannot be the case that nouns cannot be accompanied by deixis. Rather, the point seems to be that, if I need to refer by deixis, then I ought to use a pronoun, not a noun. Conversely, if I utter a noun and successfully refer by means of deixis, that is, if what fixes the reference is deixis, rather than appeal to a concept, then I did not, strictly speaking, refer by means of a noun. Put another way, if I point at Socrates and say “Socrates is sitting” and my interlocutor does not know who Socrates is but successfully identifies Socrates as the referent, I have in effect said “this is Socrates and he is sitting”, that is, a definite proposition and an anaphoric proposition, and not a middle proposition. This is perhaps even clearer in cases where I point at Plato and say “Socrates is sitting”. In such cases it seems that there are two interpretations available: (i) I did express a middle proposition, “Socrates is sitting”, and referred to Socrates, in which case the proposition will be true if sitting obtains of Socrates (wherever he is); or (ii) I in fact expressed a definite proposition, “this is Socrates and he is sitting”, and referred to Plato by means of deixis, in which case the proposition will be false by virtue of the referent not being Socrates. (Such instances are not dissimilar to uses of houtos (instead of houtē) to refer to a woman, as discussed below, or to the case of “Kallias the teacher is walking” being false if Kallias is not a teacher (Alex. Aphr. in Ar. An. Pr. 402.12-19).) This highlights the importance of semantic properties in the definition of parts of speech, as well as the epistemological concerns at play in the semantics.
As I argue in section V below, this ostension need not be physical, nor is any physical ostension sufficient for successful deixis.
Chrysippus argues that egō is deictic: we indicate ourselves with our chin as we say it (Galen, de Hipp. et Plat. II.2, on which see section V below). This suggests that he saw “I” and “you” as referring in much the same way as houtos, by deixis alone. If the relevant feature of a part of speech is the way in which it secures reference, egō and houtos would seem to belong to the same category and “I walk” would have been classified as a definite proposition.
Ap. Dysc. P 11.27-30: αἱ μέντοι πρωτότυποι διὰ μὲν τῆς φωνῆς γένους ἀδιάστολοί εἰσι πάντοτε κατὰ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον πρόσωπον, διὰ δὲ τῆς ὑπ' αὐτῶν δείξεως ἡ τῶν γενῶν διαστολὴ παρεμφαίνεται· συνεξηγούμενον γὰρ ἔχει τὸ γένος ἡ δεῖξις. cf. S II.24.19-21 = GG 2.2.144.8, where Apollonius claims that first- and second-person pronouns do not have gendered endings because the deixis in them focuses solely on the matter. It is worth noting that while this passage is strictly speaking about personal pronouns, he goes on to list exceptions to this rule, of which houtos is explicitly not one (S II.26 = GG 2.2.145.8-146.7).
This is to some extent suggested by the interpretation of Frédérique Ildefonse (1997), La naissance de la grammaire, p. 172ff and passim, whose account has much in common with mine, though I would reject her suggestion that determinacy of the referent is the central notion here – and that demonstratives are the first and logically least determinate stage. Nor do I think that the different propositions differ first and foremost in the role that they play in inquiry. Instead, I am inclined to place emphasis on the role of the different propositions in the acquisition of concepts.
This is only a brief and compressed sketch of the apparatus. For more on the semantics of nouns see especially Anthony Lloyd (1978), Les Stoïciens, and Jacques Brunschwig (1984), Histoire Épistemologie Langage 6.
DL VII.60. cf. n. .
I use angled brackets to signal reference to concepts throughout.
Ap. Dysc. S I.96 = GG 2.2.80.13-81.3: προσώπων ἀοριστουμένων διακριτικά ἐστι τὰ μόρια, διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν πρόσωπα νοούμενα ὁρισμῷ καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ σαφὲς ὅτι αἱ ἐξ αὐτῶν δείξεις πρῶται ἔφοδοί εἰσι τῶν ὑποκειμένων προσώπων, οὐ δεόμεναι τῆς τῶν ἄρθρων συντάξεως· οὐ γὰρ ἀναφέρεται τὰ πρόσωπα, ὑπ' ὄψιν δὲ δείκνυται.
The relevant knowledge here is that of concepts corresponding to qualities. For successful communication, interlocutors will need some knowledge, including a grasp of conventions (for example understanding how pointing works), as well as some basic understanding of how the world is organised in order to be able to pick out discreet parts of it as they are being pointed out. This kind of knowledge is presumably required for any successful communication – not just for successful use of deictic pronouns – and any competent speaker (one who can partake in conversations) will have this basic knowledge.
Much like Apollonius Dyscolus, whom he follows extremely closely, Priscian shows signs of Stoic influence and can, with caution, serve as evidence of views which stem from Stoic grammar. cf. n., and Marc Baratin (1989), La naissance de la syntaxe à Rome, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit; Anneli Luhtala (2005), Grammar and philosophy in late antiquity: A study of Priscian's sources, Amsterdam, John Benjamins; Marc Baratin, Bernard Colombat & Louis Holtz (eds.) (2009), Priscien : transmission et refondation de la grammaire, de l’Antiquité aux Modernes, Turnhout, Brepols.
Priscian, IG XVII.63.7-15 = GL 3.145.22-146.4: Quare non mediocriter disturbant qualitatis significationem, cum in unam concidant vocem nominum positiones tam in propriis quam in appellativis. Inde caruit definitione persona ea quae in nomine ipso intellegitur; nec mirum, cum propria quoque nomina, quamvis ideo ponantur ut unumquemque ab aliis omnibus discernant, incerta sint tamen, cum non possint omnes eius qualitates quae illum separant ab aliis omnibus ostendere absque demonstrationis auxilio, quae fit per pronomen.
It is worth noting that the surviving evidence does not include much explicit consideration of pragmatics, though they may have helped here and elsewhere. In particular, this leads to difficulties with regards to the preciseness and accuracy of deictic reference. It is not clear exactly how the Stoics account for successful deictic reference in cases where pragmatic calculations seem to be required for it. For more discussion of such difficulties, see sections IV below.
Alex. Aphr. in Ar. An. Pr. 402.20-4: ἔτι τοῦ μὴ δεῖν οὕτως τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιεῖσθαι πίστιν καὶ τοιαύτην προφέρουσιν· οὗτος περιπατεῖ, οὗτος οὐ περιπατεῖ δεικνυμένου θήλεος· ἄμφω γὰρ πάλιν τὰ οὕτως λαμβανόμενα ψευδῆ γίνεσθαί φασιν, εἴτε περιπατοίη τὸ δεικνύμενον εἴτε μή. trans. modified from Ian Mueller (2006), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.32-46, Ithaca, N.Y, Cornell University Press.
This goes hand in hand with the rejection of the idea that a mistake in gender is a solecism. cf. Ap. Dysc. S III.8 = GG 2.2.273.9-274.7 (cf. Ap. Dysc S III.9 = GG 2.2.274.8).
Ap. Dysc. S II.26.14-16 = GG 2.2.145.14-146.1: ἡ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν νοουμένη ἀπόστασις ἀμαυροτέραν τὴν δεῖξιν καθιστάνει, καὶ ἔνθεν παρεισεδύετο τὸ γένος, οὐχ ἵνα τὴν οὐσίαν παραστήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἵνα τὸ γένος διαστείλῃ.
It is not entirely clear why Apollonius thinks the gendered endings of houtos are not akin to that of ekeinos. He gives only a very brief justification, based on its similarity with the adverb τημοῦτος, itself a rare alternate form of τῆμος (S 145.10-11).
Another reason not to give too much weight to this passage is emphasised by Jean Lallot (1997) Apollonios Dyscole, ad loc., who notes that this particular passage, and especially the argument laid out with respect to ekeinos is very confused.
Cicero, Academica II.21:Atqui qualia sunt haec quae sensibus percipi dicimus talia secuntur ea quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec : “illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens. Hoc asperum” : animo iam haec tenemus conprehensa non sensibus. “ille” deinceps “equus est, ille canis. Cetera series deinde sequitur maiora nectens, ut haec quae quasi expletam rerum conprehensionem amplectuntur : “si homo est, animal est mortale rationis particeps”. trans. modified from Charles Brittain (2006), On Academic Scepticism, Indianapolis, Hackett.
This epistemological grounding is consistent with the alethic independence discussed in n.10 above.
By grasping a proposition of the form “this is a horse”, I do not mean that I need to have uttered it myself. I can grasp a proposition uttered by someone else. In fact, it seems most plausible that I will acquire the concepts <white> or <horse> with the help of a teacher, who will point to white things and horses and say “this is white” and “this is a horse”, respectively. This leaves the problem of the prōtos heuretēs, or first inventor. We know too little about the Stoic theory for the origins of language to know how they might have dealt with this. Note also that the picture presented here assumes that learning a concept and learning the word for it are, as it were, one and the same process. Some believe that Cicero has a pre-rational stage of perception (see Charles Britain (2012), “Antiochus’ epistemology”, in David Sedley (ed.), The Philosophy of Antiochus, Cambridge, CUP, p. 104-130), which might suggest that one first forms a concept (through repeated perception) at a prior level of pre-rational discrimination, and then learns the name of such concepts through an identification of the form “this is F”. The details of the Stoic theory of concept-formation are very much unclear and the view presented here may need to be slightly altered to fit different reconstructions of it. I take it that whatever the details are, however, definite propositions will remain fundamental and play a similarly fundamental role as the one I ascribe to them here.
It is not clear how the Stoics thought one could acquire concepts for things they never directly perceiveid, such as historical figures. On this view, in order to say “Socrates was a philosopher”, I should have previously acquired the concept <Socrates>, but surely neither I nor Chrysippus were ever in a position to acquire it by means of a proposition of the form “this is Socrates”. Aetius IV.11.1–6 suggests that some concepts can be acquired by teaching, others by analogy. How this would help in the case of <Socrates> is not obvious (nor is the place of definite propositions in the process in those cases). A similar worry is raised by Seneca Ep. 120, on which see Brad Inwood (2005), “Getting to Goodness”, in Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome, Oxford, Clarendon, p. 271-301. Cf. Henry Dyson (2009), Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa, Berlin, De Gruyter, and Ilsetraut Hadot (2014), “Getting to Goodness: Reflections on Chapter 10 of Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca”, in Marcia L. Colish & July Wildberger (eds.), Seneca Philosophus, Berlin, De Gruyter, p. 9-41.
We may raise an objection, debating the relevant sense of “grasp” or “understand” at play here, and arguing that I cannot fully grasp the proposition “this is a horse” until I have in fact fully formed the concept <horse>. It is worth noting, firstly, that the concept-acquisition need not be immediate or instantaneous, and it need not occur on the first instance of someone saying to me “this is green”. Secondly, the acquisition of the concept and the grasping of the proposition could well coincide, and be simultaneous. That is, the point in time at which I grasp the proposition “this is a tree” could well be exactly the point in time at which I acquire the concept <tree>. We need not posit that the concept-acquisition must be temporally prior to and distinct from grasping the proposition. We need only accept that both grasping the proposition “this is a tree” and acquiring the concept <tree> are prior to grasping a proposition such as “the tree is green”.
I mean by this that they do not make an existential claim, as middle propositions do, according to the widely accepted view of nouns developed by Anthony Lloyd (1978), Les Stoïciens and Jacques Brunschwig (1984), Histoire Épistémologie Langage 6, on the basis of Alex. Aphr. In Arist. An. pr. 402-3.
Alex. Aphr. in Ar. An. Pr. 177.27-178.1: φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ τῷ ‘εἰ τέθνηκε Δίων, τέθνηκεν οὗτος’ δεικνυμένου τοῦ Δίωνος ἀληθεῖ ὄντι τὸ μὲν ἡγούμενον <τὸ> ‘τέθνηκε Δίων’ δυνατὸν εἶναι τῷ δύνασθαί ποτε ἀληθὲς γενέσθαι τὸ τεθνηκέναι Δίωνα, τὸ δὲ τέθνηκεν οὗτος’ ἀδύνατον· ἀποθανόντος γὰρ Δίωνος φθείρεσθαι τὸ ἀξίωμα τὸ ‘οὗτος τέθνηκε’ μηκέτ' ὄντος τοῦ τὴν δεῖξιν ἀναδεχομένου· ἐπὶ γὰρ ζῶντος καὶ κατὰ ζῶντος ἡ δεῖξις. εἰ οὖν μή<τε> τεθνεῶτος αὐτοῦ ἔτι τὸ ’οὗτος’ οἷόν τε, μήτε πάλιν [ἢ] ὑφίσταται ὁ Δίων ὡς δύνασθαι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ῥηθῆναι τὸ ‘τέθνηκεν οὗτος’, ἀδύνατον τὸ ‘τέθνηκεν οὗτος’. trans. modified from Ian Mueller (2013), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.14-22, Ithaca, N.Y, Cornell University Press.
Nicholas Denyer (1988), “Stoicism and Token Reflexivity”, in Jonathan Barnes & Mario Mignucci (eds.) Matter and Metaphysics, Naples, Bibliopolis, p. 375-396.
SE PH II.234; Epictetus Diss.1.7.1.10-21; Simplicius in Ar. Phys.1299.36-1300.10.
This is similar to the reading of Susanne Bobzien (1999), “Logic: The Stoics”, CHHP, p. 100 and 117. A significant difference between our views is that unlike Bobzien, I do not believe that the lekton ceases to subsist altogether, but rather that it stops being a proposition. On this, see also Dominic T.J. Bailey (2014), “The Structure of Stoic Metaphysics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 46, p. 253–309, here p. 281, who follows Bobzien, and Nicholas Denyer (1988), “Stoicism and Token Reflexivity”, p. 380, who comes to the conclusion that the proposition “becomes idle” and ceases to be a proposition when there is nothing to be pointed at.
This would mirror the symbolization for middle propositions suggested by Anthony Lloyd (1978), Les Stoïciens, and Jacques Brunschwig (1984), Histoire Épistémologie Langage 6.
I assume here that the Stoics would analyse ∃x (Gx ∧ x=δ) as well-formed even when there is no δ, which would be coherent with the analysis of nouns found at Alex. Aphr. in Arist. An. Pr. 402-3.
cf. Jonathan Barnes (1999), “Aristotle and Stoic Logic”, in Katerina Ieradiokanou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford, OUP, p. 23-52, here p. 44, who arrives at very much the same conclusion.
DL VII.63
This highlights the need for a better account of completeness and incompleteness of lekta, since it suggests that a lekton of the form subject-predicate is incomplete if the subject is an empty term. The description of a complete lekton as one being expressed by a grammatically complete sentence (with an explicit nominative) is therefore inaccurate. At best, that is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Cf. Anthony Long (1971), Problems in Stoicism; Ada Bronowski (2014), « La structure logique du langage ordinaire chez les stoïciens », in Jean-Michel Counet (éd.), Philosophie et langage ordinaire de l'Antiquité à la Renaissance, Louvain, Peeters, p. 83-96; Michele Alessandrelli (2013), Il Problema del Lekton nello Stoicismo Antico, Firenze, Olschki.
Charles Kahn (1969), AGPh 51, p. 160. Cf. SVF II. 509, 517-519. See also Victor Goldschmidt (1969), Le système stoïcien et l’idée de temps, Paris, Vrin, here p. 83-87, and Anthony C. Lloyd (1970), “Activity and description in Aristotle and the Stoa”, Proceedings of the British Academy 56, p. 227-240, here p. 232-240.
Ap. Dysc. S II.42.1-9 = GG 2.2.155.5-8: Ἕνεκεν τούτου πρὸς οὐδὲν χρειώδεις εἰσὶν αἱ ἀντωνυμίαι στερόμεναι τοῦ τε δεικνύντος προσώπου καὶ τοῦ δεικνυμένου, εἴγε αἱ ἐγγραφόμεναι πάνυ ἀοριστόταταί εἰσιν, ὅτι καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ὕλης ἀπεώσθησαν.
Ap. Dysc. P. 2.1.1.37.8-12: αἱ γοῦν διὰ τοῦ <ι> ἐπεκτεινόμεναι καὶ ἔτι τὴν δεῖξιν ἐπιτείνουσαι καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀξύνουσιν, <ἐκεινοσί, οὑτοσί>. καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἕνεκα τῆς δεικτικῆς ἐκφορᾶς ἡ τοιαύτη ἐπέκτασις, τῷ μὴ τὴν αὐτός ἐπεκτείνεσθαι, καθὸ οὐδὲ ὅλως δεικτική. cf. S II.6 = GG 2.2.133.
I follow Philipp Brandenburg (2005), Apollonios Dyskolos. Über das Pronomen, Leipzig, Teubner, in the translation of the condensed and difficult last sentence. An alternative translation would take οὐδὲ ὅλως to mean “not entirely” rather than “not at all”. However, the distinction seems to be precisely that those words which are deictic can see their deixis intensified, whereas those which are not deictic, like autos, cannot.
SE M VIII.99-102
While it may seem plausible that pragmatics were (or should have been) appealed to here – and elsewhere in their discussion of deictic reference – there is no evidence of such considerations. cf. n.41.
DL VII.70.9: τις περιπατεῖ, ἐκεῖνος κινεῖται.
See esp. Paolo Crivelli (1994), Phronesis 39, p. 189-190.
Cf. SE M VIII.93-8, 100, where every subclass of proposition is illustrated with two separate examples.
P 2.2.18.10, 2.1.1.57.10-12, 2.2.136.10. See also Galen de Hipp. et Plat. plac. II.2 (below). Terence H. Irwin (1997), “Aristotelian Substances and Stoic Subjects”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 51, No. 201,3, p. 397-415, here p. 402, suggests this may be the grounds on which ekeinos is classified as indefinite.
This is, at least to some extent, in line with the use of houtos and ekeinos in Greek more generally, as argued by Egbert J. Bakker (2010), “Pragmatics: Speech and Text”, in Egbert J. Bakker (ed.) A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 151-168. He shows that, for example, in dramatic texts, houtos is traditionally used for objects on stage and immediately graspable while ekeinos is used for what is only conceptually grasped and off stage or having just entered the stage.
Alternatively, we could infer from Diogenes’ description that we should limit our understanding of deixis to only successful deixis. Given Apollonius’ description of degrees of deixis, however, the former interpretation seems preferable.
e.g. S II.13, 83= GG 2.2.136.5-10, 187.14-17.
As has often been assumed in scholarship. See esp. Jacques Brunschwig (1984), Histoire Épistémologie Langage, p. 47 and Susanne Bobzien (1999) CHHP p. 100, who talks about deixis in terms of “point-at-ability”.
Galen de Hipp. et Plat. plac. II.2: Οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν, κατὰ τοῦτο δεικνύντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ᾧ φαίνεσθαι διάνοιαν εἶναι, τῆς δείξεως φυσικῶς καὶ οἰκείως ἐνταῦθα φερομένης· καὶ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν χεῖρα τοιαύτης δείξεως νεύοντες εἰς αὑτοὺς τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν, εὐθὺς καὶ τῆς ἐγὼ φωνῆς τοιαύτης οὔσης καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑξῆς ὑπογεγραμμένην δεῖξιν συνεκφερομένης. τὸ γὰρ ἐγὼ προφερόμεθα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν κατασπῶντες τὸ κάτω χεῖλος εἰς αὑτοὺς δεικτικῶς· ἀκολούθως δὲ τῇ τοῦ γενείου κινήσει καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ στῆθος νεύσει καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δείξει ἡ ἑξῆς συλλαβὴ παράκειται οὐδὲν ἀποστηματικὸν παρενσημαίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐκεῖνος συντέτευχεν. Note that this passage confirms that the Stoics thought of ekeinos as a deictic but indicating some distance.
SE Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) II.141: εἴ τίς σοι <θεῶν> εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσει οὗτος, πλουτήσει οὗτος· οὑτοσὶ δὲ ὁ θεός (δείκνυμι δὲ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τὸν Δία) εἶπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσει οὗτος· πλουτήσει ἄρα οὗτος.
Susanne Bobzien (1999), CHHP p.99 also rejects deixis by proxy, though on somewhat different grounds.
Michael Frede (1974), Die Stoische Logik, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, p. 56, claims that the Stoics could not have believed that it was possible to point to Zeus and uses this example to support the view that there is such a thing as a “deixis of the mind”. The main evidence for this is a passage of Apollonius Dyscolus (S II. 12 = GG 2.2.135.13-136.4) where he talks of anaphoric pronouns as operating a “deixis of the mind.” This passage is hardly reliable: Apollonius is scrambling to make his theory consistent by making sense of cases where pronouns, which he repeatedly describes as inherently deictic, are not used in an obviously deictic way. The deixis he appeals to here is unlikely to be the sort of deixis the Stoics believed to make propositions definite. For a brief discussion of anaphora, see section VI below.
Anthony Lloyd (1978), Les Stoïciens, p. 286 brushes this passage aside on the grounds that the deixis is reported as conditional (καθ' ὑπόθεσιν). While we may perhaps take this as highlighting the surprising or unusual nature of the ostension, I do not think it is sufficient to dismiss the passage entirely.
Alex. Aphr. in Ar. An. Pr. 180.9: ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰ νύξ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡμέρα. “the same reasoning applies to the proposition ‘if it is night, this is not day’.”
Similarly, given the relationship between definite and indefinite propositions outlined in SE M VIII.98, cited above, if the Stoics believed propositions such as “something is incorporeal” or “something is a proposition” to be true, then they must have held true propositions such as “this is an incorporeal” and “this is a proposition”, which require successful deictic reference to incorporeals.
As e.g. Long (1971), “Language and Thought in Stoicism” argues.
It is worth noting again (cf. n.79) that what I have in mind here is not what Apollonius Dyscolus calls deixis of the mind (S II.12 = GG 2.2.135.13-136.4).
The status of anaphora has long been debated. Some, such as Michael Frede (1974), Die Stoische, p. 52-53 have argued that anaphora is always definite, an argument convincingly refuted by Anthony C. Lloyd (1977), Review of M. Frede Die Stoische Logik, Mind 86, p. 286; others, such as Richard Goulet (1978), Les Stoïciens, p. 178, have argued that anaphora will inherit the definiteness of the proposition on which it is anaphoric. A fuller discussion of anaphora is beyond the scope of the present paper and I leave it to another occasion, focusing here only on the definiteness of anaphora.
Ap. Dysc. P. 61.3-8: τοῦτο δὲ συμβέβηκεν, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἡ οὗτος, δεῖξιν σημαίνουσαι, τὴν ὑπόγυιον γνῶσιν τοῦ προσώπου παριστᾶσιν, ἡ δὲ αὐτός ἐπ' ἀναπολούμενον πρόσωπον φέρεται. ὀρθῶς οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν διὰ τοῦ ἐκεῖνος δηλουμένην δεῖξιν ἐπαναπολεῖται ἡ αὐτός, οὐκέτι μέντοι <ἡ> ἐκεῖνος ἢ οὗτος ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτός δύναται ἀναπέμπεσθαι· πρώτη γὰρ ἡ διὰ τῶν δεικτικῶν ἀντωνυμιῶν γνῶσις.
Priscian, IG XVII.56.9-11 = 3.142.1-4: Et sciendum quod demonstrativa pronomina non aliquorum praedictorum loco nominum, quomodo relativa sed eorum quae proferri demonstrative non possunt accipiuntur.
cf. n.29 above.
To be sure, in cases where the noun plays no part in fixing the reference and leaves all the work to the deixis, such expressions would form definite propositions (cf. n29, above). I take it such cases are rare. I should note that I do not think οὑτοσὶ δὲ ὁ θεός, at SE PH II.141 (above), is a counter-example to this. The noun is added to the demonstrative because this is a hypothetical situation. Because the situation described is hypothetical, there is nothing to be pointed at. The noun θεός is added in this context (the description of a hypothetical situation) to clarify what would be pointed at (namely a god, as opposed to, for example, the man who, the speaker says, will be rich). If this had been a real-life situation, the demonstrative would have been sufficient to secure reference and the noun would have been omitted.
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