- 1 I am grateful to Francesco Chiellino, a former student of my course of Sociology of Migration, for (...)
1Like other countries in South Europe, Italy is a point of arrival for migrants crossing the Mediterranean. The paper first provides an updated overview of the number of migrants that have arrived in Italy by sea in the last decade. It then focuses on how the smuggling of migrants to Italy from Libya is organised, the routes followed by migrants and their transportation costs. The first paragraph sets out the research questions, methodology and sources. The second provides official data on migrant landings from 2008 to 2019, by nationality. The third examines the main routes followed by African migrants to reach Europe, and specifically Italy from Libyan shores. The fourth examines migrants’ travel costs. The last paragraph focuses on how the transportation of migrants from their home country to Italy through Libya is organised.
2The first research question asks how the smuggling of migrants is organised. The second focuses on the Libyan context, asking how and why migrant smuggling changed after the end of the Gaddafi dictatorship. The literature mentions some theoretical models to gain an understanding of how migrant smuggling is organised. The first is the Chain Network, which has a horizontal structure. Each node of the chain is made up of single individuals (or groups of individuals) who provide their specialised migrant transportation services without the direction of a management centre. In this situation, criminal players operate independently from one another. This is the case, for example, of irregular immigration from Afghanistan to Italy based years ago on some interviews with migrants, where migrants payed time by time different smugglers according to the State where they cross on. The contacts among smugglers where very loose and, at the same time, the smugglers composing the network did not present any form of internal hierarchy (Becucci, 2006).
3The second model is the Hub Network, which differs from the former in that, along with interconnected nodes, there is a central management which supervises all the activities (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Williams, 2001; Staring, 2008; Campana, 2018). An example of Hub network is a criminal syndicate characterised from two types of relationships among people participating at the criminal activities: a central hierarchical core of command based on some bonds of trust and a periphery, within it these bonds of trust are not relevant.
4In addition to the disembarkation statistics provided by the Ministry of the Interior from 2008 to 2019, 22 interviews with migrants of various nationalities were conducted between May 2017 and July 2019. The interviews were held in some reception centres for asylum seekers and towns in Calabria and Tuscany (Riace, Carlopoli, Badolato and Monasterace in Calabria, Prato in Tuscany). Regarding the choice of which migrants to interview, a qualitative methodology was followed and all those who were willing to share their migratory experiences with the interviewer were selected. More in details, the interviews with migrants were distributed in this way: 4 in Badolato, 4 in Carlopoli, 3 in Monasterace, 9 in Prato and 2 in Riace.
5The first contact with the people interviewed was through workers at the reception centres (Monasterace, Carlopoli and Prato). With their help, it was possible to get in touch with the interviewees willing to be interviewed. Through local people living in the towns of Badolato and Riace, were also chosen migrants available to be interviewed. Despite the well-known typical limitations of any qualitative research, the interviews with migrants provided some useful information to help answer the research questions set out above (Montesperelli, 2009).
6For the period considered (2008-2019), the total number of migrants recorded by the Italian authorities is shown (tab. 1). Firstly, there is great variability in the number of arrivals by sea. There are two main reasons for this: the first is linked to the fact that, for the most part, these migrants departed from Libya, whereas the second reflects attempts to block departures from Libya itself, which were successful for a few years. In 2008, a cooperation agreement was signed between Italy and Gaddafi, the head of Libya. Under this agreement, Italy would provide substantial economic aid to Libya in exchange for it blocking the departure of migrants headed to Italy. The result was a drastic reduction in the number of migrant arrivals to Italy by sea in 2009 and 2010. In the following years, the countries bordering the southern shore of the Mediterranean underwent substantial upheavals: in the wake of the Arab Springs, the popular uprising in Libya led in 2011 to the killing of the Libyan dictator and the outbreak of civil war between factions loyal to the previous regime and its opponents. In the same year, conflict in Syria erupted between the Bashar Al-Hassad regime and the military groups that oppose it. With the outbreak of civil war in Syria, where the militias of the so-called Islamic State were also present, around 12 million Syrians were forced to abandon their place of origin, finding refuge in other areas of the country and especially in neighboring countries. According to estimates by the High Commissioner for Refugees, 7 million people took refuge in neighboring countries or, alternatively, reached the countries of the European Union (Unchr, 2016).
Tab. 1 Migrants landed in Italy (years: 2008-2019)
Year
|
Total
|
2008
|
36,951
|
2009
|
9,573
|
2010
|
4,406
|
2011
|
62,692
|
2012
|
13,267
|
2013
|
42,925
|
2014
|
170,100
|
2015
|
153,842
|
2016
|
181,436
|
2017
|
119,269
|
2018
|
23,370
|
2019
|
11,471
|
- 2 In addition, the Italian centre-left government implemented a stricter regulation for NGOs involve (...)
- 3 Le nazioni unite: L’accordo Ue-Libia viola i diritti umani, «il manifesto», 9 September 2017 (Unit (...)
7In 2012, the number of landings in Italy was still not very consistent, probably due to the fact that the ongoing upheavals occurring in both Syria and Libya did not allow potential migrants to move safely from place to place or even to embark for Italy. From 2013 onwards, however, Italy hosted an increasing number of migrants arriving by sea, peaking at over 180,000 in 2016. As of summer 2017 there was a gradual decrease in arrivals due to the fact that just a few months earlier a new agreement had been signed between Al-Sarraji, Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (Gna), recognized as the legitimate representative of Libya by the European Union, and the Italian government chaired by Prime Minister Gentiloni. The new agreement between Italy and Al-Sarraji provided financial resources to establish a Libyan coastguard to counter the departure of migrants from the Libyan territory2. Although all this raises strong doubts of legitimacy, to the point that the Higher Un Representative for Refugees declared the agreement contrary to the principle of non-refoulement, the Italian government achieved its aim of significantly reducing arrivals: in comparison with the previous year, at the end of 2017 the official statistics recorded a 34% decrease in migrants arriving on Italian coasts3.
- 4 Sea-Watch forza il blocco e sbarca i migranti, «la Repubblica», 30 June 2019 (Sea Watch breaks thr (...)
- 5 Nave Diciotti: sbarcati tutti i migranti. Salvini indagato, atti a tribunale ministri, «Ansa», 26 (...)
- 6 “Abuso per fini politici”. Perché l’ex ministro rischia il processo, «la Repubblica», 20 December (...)
8The far lower number of arrivals in 2018 and 2019 is due both to the blocking of departures from Libya and the policy of the new centre-right government (Movimento 5 Stelle and Lega), aimed at countering the arrival of new migrants by any means. From March 2018 to August 2019, the period in which this coalition governed, the Lega Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini, introduced the season of “closed ports” which consisted of denying landing on Italian coasts to ships that had rescued migrants at sea. The most striking events during this period include the case of Sea Watch which, having rescued 53 migrants on 12 June 2019, was denied docking until its captain, Carola Rackete, on the night between 28 and 29 June, decided to land in Lampedusa, breaking through the blockade and hitting an Italian coastguard patrol boat in the process4. Then there were the even more significant events of the Diciotti and Gregoretti ships, belonging respectively to the Italian navy and coastguard. The former, which rescued a few dozen migrants at sea, was forced to stay at the port of Catania for a few days while waiting for permission to disembark its passengers. Permission was finally granted thanks to the intervention of a Sicilian judge as some migrants required urgent medical assistance5. The latter, the Gregoretti, which rescued 131 migrants at sea in the Maltese search and rescue area on 25 July 2019, was only granted permission to land in Augusta (Sicily) on 31 July after five European countries had indicated their willingness to host the migrants on the ship6.
- 7 Our data by the Ministry of Interior include all migrants’ nationalities from 2008 to 2017, while (...)
9As regards the nationality of the migrants, each year the highest numbers of yearly arrivals correspond to the top ten nationalities. These figures range from a minimum of 71% in 2017 to a maximum of 92% in 2012, even considering that each year migrants arrived from dozens of countries: 35 countries in 2010 (the lowest value) to 72 in 2016 (the highest). Table 2 groups, by year, the top ten countries of origin by macro-areas: 1) North African countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria); 2) Sub-Saharan Area (Guinea, Gambia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia); 3) Middle East (Syria, or “Palestine,” as it was named in the Ministry of the Interior statistics); 4) Asian countries (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey; it was a personal choice to include the latter in the Asian area as it borders several geographical areas). The predominant macro-area corresponds to the band of African countries below the Sahara desert, ranging from the Ivory Coast in the west to Somalia in the east. It is followed in descending order by the North African countries, the Asian countries and, lastly, the Middle Eastern countries. For each of these macro-areas, the Sub-Saharan countries appear 70 times among the top ten nationalities of migrants disembarked each year in the period considered; the countries of North Africa appear 22 times, the countries of the Asian area 21 times, and those of the Middle East 7 times. For the latter, the migrants are almost exclusively Syrian refugees, who reached the peak of their arrivals in 2014 (42,333 migrants) and then decreased in the following years (the numbers of migrants from Syria not included in the top ten nationalities were 1,200 in 2016 and 2,357 in 20177.
10The continuity over time of migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries is a constant: compared to the top ten nationalities of each year, this group of people represents percentages ranging from 35% in 2011 to 94% in 2016. Another constant is the presence of migrants from Asian countries, albeit with lower percentage values than the previous macro-area (from a minimum of 4% in 2014 to a maximum of 51% in 2010). Finally, “discontinuity” over time is shown by migrants from Syria, as mentioned, and from North African countries. However, the discontinuity of these latter countries is only apparent as, although they do not appear among the top ten nationalities in the years 2014 to 2016, North African migrants still reach significant absolute values: 8,398 in 2014, 8,480 in 2015 and 11,216 in 2017.
Tab. 2 First top ten nationalities by macro-area of origin (years: 2008-2019)
Legend:
NAC: North African Countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria)
SA: Sub-Saharan Area (Guinea, Gambia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia)
ME: Middle-East (Syria, “Palestine”)
AC: Asian countries (Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey)
%: Percentage of migrants from each macro-area compared to the total top ten nationalities per year.
Tot.: the number of times each country by macro-area is present in the yearly top ten nationalities.
Tot 10: all migrants landed in Italy belonging to the top ten nationalities.
Source: Personal processing of Italian Ministry of Interior data (2020)
Year
|
NAC
|
%
|
SA
|
%
|
ME
|
%
|
AC
|
%
|
Tot. 10
|
2008
|
4
|
42%
|
6
|
58%
|
|
|
|
|
32,447
|
2009
|
4
|
34%
|
4
|
59%
|
|
|
2
|
6%
|
8,487
|
2010
|
3
|
38%
|
|
|
3
|
11%
|
4
|
51%
|
3,948
|
2011
|
2
|
56%
|
5
|
35%
|
|
|
3
|
9%
|
53,585
|
2012
|
2
|
29%
|
4
|
37%
|
1
|
5%
|
3
|
30%
|
12,178
|
2013
|
1
|
7%
|
6
|
56%
|
1
|
32%
|
2
|
5%
|
38,247
|
2014
|
|
|
8
|
62%
|
1
|
34%
|
1
|
4%
|
124,063
|
2015
|
|
|
8
|
89%
|
1
|
6%
|
1
|
7%
|
120,238
|
2016
|
|
|
9
|
94%
|
|
|
1
|
6%
|
141,015
|
2017
|
2
|
14%
|
7
|
75%
|
|
|
1
|
11%
|
84,920
|
2018
|
2
|
34%
|
6
|
48%
|
|
|
2
|
18%
|
18,666
|
2019
|
2
|
8%
|
7
|
81%
|
|
|
1
|
11%
|
9,048
|
Tot
|
22
|
|
70
|
|
7
|
|
21
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
11Over the last few decades, various routes have allowed African migrants to reach Europe. The Atlantic route along the western side of Africa has enabled migrants to enter Spanish territory by sea. However, in 2002 a new maritime surveillance system called Sive (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exteriora) came into force, thanks to which the Spanish coastguard can identify migrant boats heading for Gibraltar well in advance. In 2003, joint patrol by the coastguards of Morocco and Spain was established. The following year the Sive was also set up in Fuerteventura, in the Canary Islands (Spanish territory), where new migrant arrivals were detected (Sorensen, 2006; Coslovi, 2007).
12In 2005, a joint maritime patrol was established between Senegal and Frontex – the European agency responsible for countering illegal immigration – which led to the closure of the Atlantic route hitherto traveled by migrant boats along the west coast of Africa headed for Spain. This meant that migrants from Senegal and neighboring countries bordering the Atlantic coast were forced to use the land route through the Sahara desert leading to embarkation points in North Africa in their bid to reach Europe (Manher, 2018).
13Until a few years ago, the eastern route from the Horn of Africa for migrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia to European countries meant crossing the Arabian Peninsula. Subsequently, the outbreak of civil war in Yemen in 2015 and the construction of a 230 km wall between Israel and the Sinai peninsula were the main reasons for the shift of this route towards Sudan and Libya (Raineri, 2016). Migrants cross the desert passing through Karthum in Sudan, reach Libyan territory on the eastern side and embark for Italy near the cities of Misurata and Benghazi.
14Migrants departing from African countries at the western extremity, such as Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, use as reference points the cities of Gao in Mali, Tamanrasset and then Djanet in Algeria, from where they can select two routes: one towards the Algerian coast and the other towards the Libyan coast. Due to border controls by Algerian police and periodic round-ups and expulsions of irregular migrants from Algeria, for many migrants it has become extremely difficult to travel this route to get to the embarkation points on the coast (Cesareo, 2019). Some of these migrants decide to reach Libya and then embark for Italy due to the constant checks and expulsions by the Algerian authorities against them. A woman from Cameroon, who emigrated from her country in 2011, after spending three years in Algeria, was persuaded to resume the journey to Libya from where she reached Italy in September 2016. As she reports:
My husband and I decided to go to Algeria because French is spoken. We crossed the border between Niger and Algeria at night walking across the desert for two days to get past the Algerian police checks. We arrived in Tamanrasett and from there went on to Algiers. We live in a semi-abandoned house on the outskirts of the city. My husband worked for a construction company but we always had problems as we were illegal. One day the police arrived. They put us in a bus with others and send us back to the border with Niger. At that point we decided to resume the journey to Libya to reach Italy8.
15Another migrant from Mali, who arrived at the Algerian border in 2016 along with other travel companions, was searched by the Algerian police, stripped of everything he had and sent back to his country. In his words:
- 9 The events he refers to at the border between Morocco and Spain occurred in February 2016 (21 Mali (...)
[From Cameroon] I went to Nigeria, Niger, Algeria and Morocco. The situation in Morocco is too difficult: in Morocco there’s the border with Spain. There are two barriers, the Moroccan police are on this side and the Spanish on the other. If they see you trying to climb the barrier they catch you and break your feet and head, many people have died there. It’s not easy to climb over the barrier. I’ve tried to climb the barrier twice, the Moroccan police broke my leg and I understood that I wouldn’t be able to get to Europe that way. I went back to Algeria to get to Libya, because in Libya there are boats, but the price of passage to a European country costs less. Entering Spain from Morocco costs more. You have to pay 2,000 euros. If you have money you pay, because there’s the military and police mafia who let you through and in any case even if you pay to cross the Moroccan border you’re never too sure with the military because sometimes they eat the money [that is, they take the money without respecting the agreements]. So I went back to Algeria to get to Libya and from there take a boat to Italy9.
16In addition, migrants from the western area of Africa whose states are part of Ecowas (Economic Community of West African States), can freely enter Libya but not Algeria (except for citizens of Mali who may enter the latter) (Tinti, Westcott, 2016). Beyond official agreements that de jure establish freedom of movement for all those belonging to Ecowas member states, the reality is in fact often very different. A Guinean citizen reports that he was stopped at the Mali border in 2016 by guards who asked him and others for a certain amount of money to cross the border: 5 euros with a passport, 15 euros without documents. While on the border with Burkina Faso, a migrant from Liberia tells:
when the police see young people, they immediately think they will be headed to Libya and then ask for 30 euros to let them pass. If the migrants have no money, they are taken off the vehicle they are travelling in, taken to detention centres and beaten until family members send them money to the nearest bank. At that point, escorted by police, the migrants go to the bank, pay the policemen and can then resume their journey10.
17Migrants from Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger pass through Libya. The main hubs are Agadez in Niger, and Gathrum and Sebba in Libya, about 800 kilometres from Tripoli, a city which, together with Zuwarah and Zilten, is one of the main embarkation points on the Libyan west coast. Other boarding areas in Tunisia are closer to Italy than the Libyan coasts. However, in the past decade, there have been fewer controls on the Libyan coast than in neighboring countries. Furthermore, since the end of the Nineties (between 1998 and 2001) the Italian government has established readmission migrant agreements with Tunisia and Egypt. Under these agreements, Tunisia and Egypt counter departures from their territories in exchange for annual entry quotas of their citizens to Italy (Monzini, 2009). For over ten years now – through measures to counter irregular immigration from the countries of departure or transit implemented by individual European states or the European Union – Libya has become the main crossroads of the migratory routes originating in West and East Africa, including migrants from distant countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq (Gatti, 2007; Monzini, 2008; Coluccello, Massey, 2007).
18The travel costs a migrant might face on their journey vary widely. The service offered by smugglers depends on many factors, for example travel time from the place of departure to the destination: the shorter the journey, the more efficient the smuggling network is expected to be and the higher the travel cost for the migrant. In addition, travel time is determined by both the means of transport and the length of the route: traveling by plane from Nigeria to Italy with counterfeit documents, for instance an entry visa issued by corrupt officials of the destination country, is very different from traveling from Nigeria by land and then reaching Italy by sea. Another important aspect is the safety of the journey (i.e. the possibility for a migrant to reach their destination without problems). Safety, in turn, depends on further aspects concerning the smugglers’ degree of reliability as perceived by migrants. Evaluations by migrants, as shown by some research, are largely based on information circulating among fellow countrymen, whether obtained from migrants who have contacted fellow countrymen at home, word of mouth at transition points between one leg of the journey and another, or information gathered from social networks (Mandic, 2017; Di Nicola et al., 2019). Furthermore, new laws to counter irregular immigration have resulted in higher travel costs for migrants due to the increased risks for smugglers.
- 11 5 Somalia.
- 12 Interviews with migrants from Nigeria, Cameroon, Gambia, Senegal, Benin, Ivory Coast, Guinea and M (...)
19With all the aforementioned aspects to consider when calculating the transportation costs, those who arrived in Italy in 2013-14 from the Horn of Africa countries paid sums of around 7,000 euros, including 2,000 euros for boarding in Libya11; Eritreans, depending on the European country chosen as their final destination, pay up to 8,000 euros (Reitano, 2015). Those from West African countries below the Sahara have significantly lower travel costs, ranging from 300 to 1,000 dollars (from Senegal to Libya), while for shorter journeys, corresponding to the crossing of the Sahara from Agadez in Niger to Sebha in Libya, 360 dollars if the trip is by pick-up whose driver takes 3-4 days to reach the destination; 100 dollars each if the migrant travels on the top of trucks carrying goods along the trans-Saharan routes, in this case with travel times – including the loading and unloading of goods – of 10 days before reaching Sebha (Manher, 2018, Tinti and Westcott, 2016). The interviews conducted with migrants arriving in Italy between 2015 and 2017 show that their travel costs were an average of 1,300 euros each, 900-1,000 euros for the journey by land from countries such as Mali, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Ghana and 400 euros to embark from Libya to reach Italy12.
20One aspect that emerged time and again in the research is that Syrian refugees paid between $ 2,000 and $ 2,500 each to board from Libya, while sub-Saharan migrants paid $ 800 to $ 1,000. The former traveled on the deck of the boat, while the latter in the boat hold, a much more dangerous place in the event of a shipwreck (Micallef, 2017; Reitano and Tinti, 2015). The significantly higher cost for Syrian refugees is probably due to the fact that between 2013 and 2014 they represented the largest component of migrants leaving Libya and at the same time were those with the most money available.
21Over the years, travel costs for migrants from the Sub-Saharan area have significantly decreased. In the early 2000s, the price of the trip was around $ 3,500, while in 2006 embarkation alone from Libya to Italy ranged from 1,200 to 2,000 euros (Monzini, 2008; Coluccello, Massey, 2007). In recent years, boarding from Libya went from $ 1,000-1,500 in 2013-2014, $ 250-350 in 2015-16, down to $ 60-90 each in the summer of 2016 in some areas on the west coast, such as Zawiyah, Zuwarah and Sebratha (Iss, 2017; Micallef, 2017). The dramatic reduction in boarding costs was determined not only by the decrease in Syrian refugees, but also by the decision of the militias involved in migrant smuggling to expel other competitors from the market. Below a certain threshold, in the order of 500 Libyan dinars per migrant (about 60 dollars), the profit margin would have been so low as to push many independent smugglers out of the market (Micallef, 2017).
22Overall, the lower travel cost from Sub-Saharan African countries to embarkation points in Libya has allowed a higher number of migrants to use the services of smugglers. At the same time, it has contributed to an exponential increase in danger for migrants themselves. According to some estimates by the International Organization for Migration (Iom) dating back to 2014, the attempt to cross the Sahara is thought to have resulted in around 2,000 deaths a year (Raineri, 2016), while according to data reported on the website of the same organization, those who died and went missing at sea from the beginning of 2014 to January 2020 totaled 21,353. Along the three routes crossing the Mediterranean (western, central and eastern), the central one towards Italy has claimed 15,833 victims, 74% of the total13.
23During the field research, migrants were asked to talk about their travel experiences. More specifically, the goal was to find out if the smugglers they had dealt with were connected to each other. Most migrants, 14 out of 22, reported that the “transporters know each other and keep in contact with each other via mobiles”. Smugglers meet in agreed meeting places where migrants are passed from one transporter to another. This can happen at the crossing points of the state borders from the countries of departure to the hubs along the Sub-Saharan area towards North Africa: some Nigerian and Cameroonian migrants paid for the entire trip from their country to the embarkation points in Libya, relying on different transporters who knew each other.
- 14 7 Nigeria.
- 15 20 Liberia.
- 16 Smugglers involved in managing irregular immigration are a kind of two-faced Janus: on the one han (...)
- 17 20 Liberia; 21 Mali; 8 Nigeria; 9 Gambia.
24Some migrants, when questioned about the problems encountered during the journey from their African country to the landing in Southern Italy, confirmed that everything was done on the bases of pre-established agreements, without any particular inconvenience: «this happens if you know trustworthy people»14. These migrants, who demonstrated a certain reticence in reporting the experience of their journey and how they had come into contact with the smugglers, claimed to have arrived in Italy after a two-month journey from their original location in Nigeria. This is a short time compared to those who, from the same Western area of Africa, took from a year to a year-and-a-half to reach Italy15. “Short” times of two months are entirely possible, provided that the migrants rely on a trustworthy network of smugglers and that the latter respect the agreements made. In other cases, the migrants interviewed reported having received the fundamental support of people defined as “a good soul, a good Samaritan” who, depending on their personal experiences, was a priest, a local in the transit country hosting and protecting them, or a smuggler16 with whom they established a relationship of trust that shielded them from the violence suffered by their other travel comrades17.
25According to research carried out on illegal migration from Sub-Saharan countries to Libya, two forms of payment for the journey were possible: the “full package” or payment step-by-step along the route up to payment for boarding in Libya, which in most cases is excluded from the “all inclusive” service (Monzini, 2008; Pastore et al., 2006; de Haas, 2007, Raineri, 2016; Achilli, 2016; Kam Kah, 2019; Campana, 2018). However, since the start of the 2011 civil war in Libya, the management of irregular immigration in the Libyan territory has significantly changed.
26During the dictatorship, the regime followed an instrumental policy on irregular immigration: on one hand, Colonel Gaddafi used the departure of migrants from the Libyan coasts as a bargaining tool to obtain economic aid from Italy; on the other hand, irregular immigration was left to be managed by groups of tribal origin potentially averse to the regime: tolerance of their trafficking of goods and people was requested in exchange for support for the dictatorship (Shaw, Reitano, 2014). Furthermore, there were close links at various levels between the army, police and smugglers: the agreement between smugglers and policemen consisted of intercepting one in every three convoys arriving, for example, from the Eastern part of Libya through the Sahara desert: migrants were brought to detention centres on the border with Sudan where they were beaten until they contacted their families for the money to be released. They would then start their journey again with the interested help of the smugglers and the real possibility for migrants of being deported to previous prisons by the Libyan authorities (Carsetti and Triulzi, 2009). At that time, and this still happens today, migrants could travel from the southern border of Libya to the embarkation points on the coast several times before finally being able to reach Italy by sea and apply for international protection.
27Although collusion also occurred in the past between segments of the Libyan police forces and smugglers, the fall of the regime in 2011 in many ways marked a watershed in the management of illegal immigration: it led to a phase of social turbulence characterized by a sharp drop in the State’s power. In 2013, the militias that rose up against the regime refused to hand over their weapons to the Government of National Accord (Gna), the new political authority represented by the Parliament of Tripoli and Prime Minister Al-Sarraji. The Gna incorporated the revolutionary militias, without however having effective control over them, so the militias kept their power over the cities of the west coast of Tripoli (Porsia, 2016). In addition, Ali-Aftar, former-general of the Gaddafi regime and supported by the Tobruk parliament, launched a military offensive against the Tripoli government in 2014, dragging the country into a new civil war. In the south of Libya, an area historically involved in various types of trafficking along the trans-Saharan routes, groups of tribal origin such as the Tebu and Tuareg have local powers (the former in the southeast on the border between Niger and Chad; the latter in the south-west between Tunisia and Algeria) and today, more than ever, they are free to independently manage the areas in which they are historically located (Kushminder, Triandafyllidou, 2019; Tinti, Westcott, 2016).
28The country is divided into three different zones of influence: those under the control of the National Liberation Army (Nla) of Ali-Aftar, (Tobruk and Cyrenaica, in the North-East coast), those under the control of the Gna (Tripolitania corresponding to the North-West coast) and the Fezzan, (a large central area of the Sahara) controlled by local communities organized by clans and tribal affiliations, such as the Tebu (allies of the Nla), the Tuareg (allies of the Gna) and the Awlad Suleiman (allies of the Tuareg) (Del Monte, 2019; Acconcia, 2015).
29From 2013 onwards, the arrival of migrants along the routes crossing Agadez (Niger) and Sebha (Libya) has increased significantly. Some estimate that in 2013 at least 3,000 people a week passed through Agadez, and in the following years until October 2016 a total of 170,000, while 40,000 are thought to have passed through the city of Kufra, on the eastern side of Libya, in 2014 (Tinti, Westcott, 2016; Raineri, 2016). Together with passing migrants, the foreign population of the Sub-Saharan area in Libya before 2011 must also be taken into account, which numbered around two million people, some of whom decided to leave the country due to growing uncertainty about the situation in Libya (Sorensen, 2006). According to some estimates, income from the immigration business amounted to 978 million euros, 3.4% of Libya’s GDP in 2015 (Adaora, Chukwuma, 2019).
30The consistent increase in the numbers of people intending to emigrate from Libya, together with the substantial impunity enjoyed by smugglers after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, has led to the development of a real economy based on irregular migration. Smugglers have invested in means of transport, both motor vehicles and boats, personnel specialized in managing land transport across the Sahara, and reception and parking facilities for migrants in the travel hub areas. The establishment of a migration-based industry has had further significant consequences. First of all, in areas of the country where smugglers have local ties, such as in the South for populations belonging to the Tebu and Tuareg, they acquired their own social legitimacy, becoming part of the government of local communities and redistributing the migration profits in the form of “Welfare” for the local population, i.e. health services, education and access to credit (Shaw, Reitano, 2014; al-Arabi, 2018). Secondly, the higher demand for smuggling has helped to strengthen the networks in the north and south of the country, one involved in sea transport, the other in land transport (Kushminder, Triandafyllidou, 2019).
31Some observers ascribe the connection between smugglers in the north and south of the country to the fact that many of them met in prisons in 2009, when Colonel Gaddafi, to demonstrate to the Italian government his good intention to fight irregular migration, ordered the imprisonment of several thousands of them in various parts of the country; these smugglers later fled the prisons during the civil war of 2011 (Porsia, 2016; Micallef, 2017). This situation, together with the drive to establish a link between criminal networks in the north and south of the country, has been facilitated both by the anarchy into which Libya has fallen and the need for smugglers to develop stable forms of collaboration in managing the increasing flow of migrants headed to the coast. To organize migrant convoys of dozens of vehicles (from 50 to 80 pick-up trucks, each with thirty migrants aboard), it is essential to have adequate infrastructures, i.e. financial resources, means of transport, drivers and surveillance personnel, places to park and boats to be used once the migrants reach the coast (Tinti, Westcott, 2016).
32The connection between the criminal networks of the Fezzan and those on the coast developed over time with the entry of the militias into the migrant smuggling business. The circulation of many weapons from 2011 onwards and a non-existent justice system in much of Libya led to a serious security problem, inducing the smugglers to enter into agreements with the militias, who are the only ones that could guarantee some form of security to the smugglers (Shaw, Mangan, 2014; Kam Kah, 2019; Noria Research, 2019). The militias play an indirect or direct role in the smuggling business: the first is predatory and consists of requiring smugglers, at each checkpoint under their control, to pay a certain amount of money, from $ 150 to 250 for each vehicle transporting migrants (Tinti, Westcott, 2016; Kam Kah, 2019). The second is direct, and involves the military escorting convoys of migrants and managing the entire business in partnership with smugglers (Gi, 2018). This happens especially when smugglers and militias share the same “ethnic” and linguistic origin, such as Tebo and Taureg, and govern their respective local communities (al-Arabi, 2018).
33The transnational expansion of the routes (between the countries of the Sub-Saharan area towards Libya) and the inclusion of militias in the management of migrant smuggling have led to the development of a private protection industry that has significantly reduced the operational prospects of individual smugglers. The latter have not disappeared: there are still single drivers in pick-ups or trucks carrying migrants along short routes. However, those who enjoy the protection of the militias have acquired a dominant position in the migration business at the expense of individual smugglers.
34To summarize, the smuggling of migrants in Libya underwent three different phases: during the dictatorship, smugglers were subject to vigilant control by the regime which drew political advantages from them; the aftermath of the revolution signaled a new phase that allowed a multitude of subjects to enter the immigration business. The third phase, from 2013-14 onwards, has a new vertically structured organization and benefits smugglers with several resources: connections with recruiters located in the migrants’ countries of departure, financial resources, personnel to be hired to run the operations and, last but not least, protection of the militias (Dri, 2019; Iss, 2017). The testimony of a migrant, despite its inevitable incompleteness, provides some information on this:
[near Tripoli, May 2016] We met a group of Africans who said their boss [the travel organizer] had taken people to Italy. Their leader was a Libyan general, he has many boats. He can put two thousand people in the water in one night. He buys the boats and puts people in bound for Italy. […] When the truck arrived they made a sign and we boarded the boat. There were ten of us, he put 150 in a boat. He makes ten trips a night, 150 people for 10 trips! There are many soldiers who do this, they are all military. When you want to travel and you have money he makes you leave Libya18.
- 19 Tribal and clan ties are still relevant in the Libyan context (see Mercuri, 2017; Del Monte, 2019) (...)
35Considering all the variants related to a Libyan society strongly segmented by family clans and ethnic-tribal affiliations19, stronger links have been created between smugglers, militias and local communities in southern Libya where broad social segments of the population draw direct or indirect economic support from the profits of the migration business. These ties are weaker on the coast where civil society is more structured and political authority exercises greater control over the territory.
- 20 Between the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019, 8,000 migrants were detained in the centres (Malako (...)
36Since the agreement between Italy and the Gna was signed in 2017, some other changes have occurred. Funds from Italy and the European Union aimed at countering irregular migration have likely broken the common convergence of interests between smugglers/militias in the Fezzan and on the Libyan coast. In order to gain access to finance and build a reputation as loyal defenders of the order, some militia leaders have turned their interests to the management of detention centres for migrants, officially numbering 34 throughout Libya20. These centres, within which violence and extortion against migrants are almost systematic, are run by three types of different armed groups: those who receive a salary from the Ministry of Defense and are fully integrated into the institutional system belonging to the Gna; military groups that affiliate themselves with the Gna but are actually independent; military groups completely independent from the government (Malakooti, 2019; Un, 2019). For the most part involved in the past in migrant smuggling, these armed groups act as centre managers, and some of them have continued to maintain contact with the smugglers. An example of this is the case of Abdulrahman Milad, called al-Bija, who, as head of the Libyan coast guard in Zahwia, 50 km from Tripoli, was involved in migrant smuggling. Sanctioned with others in June 2018 by the United Nations Security Council, al-Bija established an agreement with a detention centre manager in the city. The agreement consisted of granting freedom to migrants in exchange for money and directing them to places of embarkation. The manager of the detention centre and the local head of the Libyan coastguard worked hard to “block” departures, making money from migrants and the European Union itself (Iss, 2017; Dri, 2018).
37As regards the research questions set out at the beginning, from empirical standpoint two different networks were detected in the management of migrant smuggling. On the one hand, there are smaller networks, made up of individuals or small groups of people who autonomously provide services transporting migrants from one place to another without, however, the ability to supervise the migrants’ entire travel route. This kind of organization is included in the Chain network model. On the other hand, there are well-organized networks able to manage the entire journey from the migrants’ country of origin to the embarkation points in Libya. Smuggling activities in the Libyan territory include some aspects prevalently found in the Hub Network model, i.e. smuggling management located in Libya, and more specifically, a type of criminal configuration that has multiple management centers, each united by players with huge financial resources, infrastructures dedicated to transporting migrants, the use of violence and internal links between smugglers, be these ties on tribal, clan or family bases. Located along the migration routes crossing the Fezzan, these smuggling management centers are made up of smugglers and militias. In a Libyan society becoming increasingly unstable and unsafe, where the monopoly of violence is no longer under State control, militias involved in migrant smuggling have acquired more power, formally supporting the Government of National Accord or the Liberation National Army. All of this has greatly reduced the room for independent players in the migration business. In these terms, criminal groups as well as militia, both using and imposing violence, have determined a change towards more centralized forms in the management of human smuggling from Libya to Italy.
38In conclusion, to break the vicious circle of economic interests that bind smugglers, militias and local communities (which benefit from the industry of irregular immigration), viable alternatives must be provided to a large segment of the Libyan population. At the same time, migrants who cross Libya to reach Italy are more likely to suffer the consequences of the insecurity and endemic violence into which the country has fallen. The provision of humanitarian corridors for all those fleeing persecution and dangerous situations would be a reasonable and respectful way to abide by the rules governing international protection. Political choices of this kind implemented by European countries would make it possible to disrupt the clusters of interests and institutional corruption that pervade irregular immigration in Libya.
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Nigeria, male, 25 years old. Prato (Tuscany Region), 20 April 2019.
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Cameroon, male, 33 years old. Carlopoli (Calabria Region), 27 June 2019.
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Pakistan, male, 28 years old. Badolato (Calabria Region), 14 August 2017.
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Gambia, male, 26 years old. Riace (Calabria Region), 9 August 2019.
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Somalia, male, 27 years old. Badolato, (Calabria Region), 12 August 2017.
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Senegal, male, 19 years old. Badolato (Calabria Region), 14 August 2017.
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Nigeria, male, 19 years old. Monasterace (Calabria Region), 10 August 2017.
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Nigeria, male, 20 years old. Monasterace (Calabria Region), 10 August 2017.
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Gambia, male 19 years old. Monasterace (Calabria Region), 3 August 2017.
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Nigeria, male, 19 years old. Prato (Tuscany Region), 8 July 2017.
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Nigeria, male 20 years old. Prato (Tuscany Region), 8 July 2017.
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Nigeria, male, 19 years old. Prato (Tuscany Region), 8 July 2017.
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Nigeria, male, 28 years old. Badolato (Calabria Region), 7 August 2017.
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Cameroon, female, 29 years old. Riace (Calabria Region), 13 August 2017.
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Benin, male, 34 years old. Prato (Tuscany Region), 25 April 2019.
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Ivory Coast, male, 29 years old. Carlopoli (Calabria Region), 24 June 2019.
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Ivory Coast, male, 24 years old. Prato (Calabria Region), 15 June 2019.
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Ivory Coast, male, 31 years old. Carlopoli (Calabria Region), 26 June 2019.
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Gambia, male, 29 years old. Carlopoli (Calabria Region), 18 June 2019.
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Liberia, male, 26 years old. Prato (Tuscany Region), 19 July 2017.
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Mali, male, 28 years old. Prato (Tuscany Region), 19 May 2017.
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Guinea, male, 32 years old. Prato (Tuscany Region), 10 July 2019.