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Rhetorical Strategies of Counteracting Conspiracy-based Dissent on COVID-19 Vaccines: the #ThinkBeforeSharing Institutional Campaign

Roberta Martina Zagarella et Marco Annoni
Traduction(s) :
Stratégies rhétoriques pour contrer les discours conspirationnistes anti-vax (Covid-19) : la campagne #ThinkBeforeSharing [fr]

Résumé

This paper aims to explore how institutions may counteract conspiracy theories using appropriate discursive resources. We use a rhetorical approach to analyze the first European information campaign launched in 2020 to counteract conspiracy theories about COVID-19 vaccines. On this basis, we advance a series of practical recommendations for institutions to counteract conspiracy theories through information campaigns.

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Introduction

1Counteracting conspiracy theories has become especially important during the COVID-19 crisis. An unprecedented endeavor to search for an effective COVID-19 vaccine has been accompanied by a deluge of false information – also called an infodemic –, and by a growing series of vocal conspiracy theories (Ball and Maxmen 2020, Bertin et al. 2020, EU DisinfoLab 2020).

  • 1 This paper is part of a project that we are carrying out at the Italian National Research Council. (...)

2In this paper, we set forth two research questions: 1) How can institutions gain citizens’ trust during a crisis such as a pandemic? 2) What discursive elements should be part of an institutional campaign against conspiracy theories? To address these questions, we adopt a rhetorical-argumentative methodology that has been previously applied to other health conspiracies1. As described in Zagarella and Annoni (2019, see also Zagarella 2015), this approach is grounded on the philosophical tradition drawing from Aristotle, the New Rhetoric, and argumentation theory, which studies persuasive speech in concrete contexts. This approach relies on “argumentative analysis” as its methodology. “Argumentative analysis” examines the use of language in context to describe and explain how oral and written discourse has tangible effects on the public (Amossy 2012). This analysis is adopted in many research areas to understand the logic behind discursive exchanges and to examine the mutual interaction between the orator and the audience created by verbal resources in specific circumstances (Amossy and Koren 2009).

3This paper applies this approach to the analysis of the first European campaign to counteract conspiracy theories: the “#ThinkBeforeSharing” initiative, launched in 2020 to prevent the spread of conspiracy theories about COVID-19 vaccines. This campaign resulted from joint efforts by the European Commission, UNESCO, Twitter (now referred to as “X”), and the World Jewish Congress. The main output of the initiative has been a series of ten educational infographics designed to help citizens identify, debunk, react to, and report COVID-19 conspiracy theories.

4The paper is organized as follows. First, we explain why we believe it is important to study the effects of conspiracy theories, especially those related to science. We then present a case study, the “#ThinkBeforeSharing” institutional campaign, explaining why we adopt a rhetorical point of view. Finally, we analyze the “#ThinkBeforeSharing” infographics through the lenses of the rhetorical concept of ethos, which refers to the character of the speaker, and, more generally, to the trust relationship between the speaker and the audience. We conclude by advancing a series of practical recommendations that might be useful for institutions to counteract conspiracy theories through information campaigns.

1. The need to counteract conspiracy theories

5The most widely cited definition of “conspiracy theory” is probably the one provided by Karl Popper. He defines the “conspiracy theory of society” as “the view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a hidden interest which has first to be revealed), and who have planned and conspired to bring it about” (2002: 352). Although Popper’s definition captures how conspiracy theories work, it has been criticized for its circularity: it defines a “conspiracy” in terms of people who “conspired”. Hence, we prefer the definition recently provided by Sunstein and Vermeule: “a conspiracy theory can generally be counted as such if it is an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role” (2009: 205). Well-known examples of conspiracy theories that follow this pattern are the belief that the Moon landing was staged by NASA (Herman in Danblon and Nicolas 2010: 217-236, Oswald and Herman 2016, Lewandowsky, Oberauer and Gignac 2013) and the belief that HIV is a man-made virus (Nattrass 2012).

  • 2 https://www.statista.com/chart/18196/belief-in-conspiracy-theories-in-the-united-states/ [consulted (...)

6In recent decades, empirical studies have repeatedly shown that conspiracy theories can have a significant impact since they influence individual behaviors and public perceptions of critical issues (Miller, Saunders and Farhart 2016, Byford 2011). In some countries, up to fifty percent of the population somewhat or strongly believes in a conspiracy theory and tends to act accordingly2.

7There are also growing indications that conspiracy thinking contributes to the rejection of science because it promotes the belief that inconvenient scientific findings constitute a “hoax” (Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer 2013). The stakes are particularly high when a conspiracy theory calls into question the safety of medical treatments. For example, research from the 2020 YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project (22,000 people in 21 countries) revealed that many people worldwide (up to 57%) believe that dangerous side effects of vaccines are hidden from the public3. Long before the pandemic, these beliefs resulted in lower levels of immunization. In brief, conspiracy theories play an important role in the public debate and may have a critical impact on our individual and public life: they are pervasive and have serious consequences; the more widespread they are, the less credible science is perceived to be.

8Given their impact – especially within our media-driven society – it is not surprising that many scholars are bringing their attention to conspiracies. The COVID-19 pandemic shows us that institutions must address this complex phenomenon as a serious political and social problem.

9As predictable, conspiracy theories about COVID-19 emerged as soon as the pandemic became a reality (Oswald et al. 2022: 2, Hughes et al. 2022)4. A YouGov poll5 showed that, during the first phase of the pandemic, one of the most widespread conspiracy theories was the belief that Bill Gates wanted to use a mass vaccination campaign against COVID-19 to implant microchips in people to track them with a digital ID. Another popular conspiracy, linked to QAnon, claimed that vaccines are biological weapons. Generally, pandemic-related conspiracy theories range from claiming that COVID-19 was deliberately engineered to suppress freedoms on a global scale, and take control of the international economy, to connecting it to unrelated events such as the 5G technology (cf. Bodner et al. 2021). A global study of 28 countries revealed that in 2020 more than three in ten people believed that powerful individuals were intentionally causing the spread of the COVID-19 virus6. Doubt arose over various topics: Is COVID-19 as dangerous as authorities and experts claim? Are COVID-19 vaccines truly safe and effective? Can we trust the profit-making Big-Pharma enterprises and medical authorities? Can we trust that the ‘system’ is really trying to save us? (Mohammed and Rossi 2022).

10As a result, and regardless of the legitimacy of these doubts, a conspiracy-based dissent on the COVID-19 vaccines led to anti-vaccination protests that in several countries took possession of the feminist slogan “my body, my choice.” More importantly, in some cases, such beliefs led people to refuse vaccinations, ignore public health advice, and even advocate unproven and unsafe treatments.

11Conspiracy theories became a political issue, prompting public authorities to reflect on how to inspire confidence when explaining their decisions. A Nature paper by Philp Ball and Amy Maxmen reported the opinion of Renée DiResta, from the Stanford Internet Observatory in California, which perfectly captures this new need for an institutional strategy: “If people think the WHO is anti-American, or Anthony Fauci is corrupt, or that Bill Gates is evil, then elevating an alternative source doesn’t do much – it just makes people think that platform is colluding with that source […]. The problem isn’t a lack of facts, it’s about what sources people trust” (Ball and Maxmen 2020).

2. A rhetorical analysis of the “#ThinkBeforeSharing” campaign

12As anticipated, researchers are becoming increasingly interested in the subject of conspiracy theories; the COVID-19 pandemic amplified the saliency of this topic. Generally, scholars acknowledge that conspiracy theories constitute a complex phenomenon requiring a multi-perspectival approach (Butter and Knight 2020). The dominant approaches employ methodologies and concepts derived from psychology and cognitive science. However, to effectively counter the propagation of conspiracy theories, it is also crucial to address their actual – political, social, ethical – implications. To do so, it is essential to shed light on the argumentative structures and persuasive effects of conspiracy theories.

  • 7 Cf. references in Zagarella and Annoni 2019.

13In the last decade, a growing number of studies have investigated the rhetorical and argumentative dimension of conspiracies, highlighting important aspects of their structure and functioning7. The purpose of a rhetorical approach is not to determine from a supposed neutral point of view “who is right” and “who is wrong”. Rather, the goal is to focus on the actual persuasive effects of conspiracy theories and to analyze the discursive conditions that favor their proliferation. We further claim that a rhetorical perspective may help explore strategies to counteract conspiracy theories and improve institutional responses. The change of perspective we advocate consists of focusing on the rhetorical strategies that institutions should adopt to limit the spread of conspiracy theories and gain citizen’s trust.

14The “#ThinkBeforeSharing” initiative, launched in August 2020 by the European Commission and UNESCO, was set up to counteract conspiracy theories on COVID-19, boost public trust, and increase access to reliable information. Previous initiatives of this kind have been launched in other countries, such as France8. This is, however, the first campaign against conspiracy theories at a European level. The campaign has been implemented jointly by the European Commission and UNESCO, Twitter (now referred to as “X”), and the World Jewish Congress9. As the campaign’s website explains, the initiative is based on the idea that conspiracy theories have dangerous consequences for society. This is especially true during a pandemic when conspiracy beliefs can harm or even kill people, lead to ignoring scientific evidence, and polarize society. They target and discriminate against vulnerable groups, reinforce stereotypes, and can fuel violence increasing hate speech and extremism. “This needs to stop”, the website states.

We report the text of a video presentation of the campaign:

COVID-19 doesn’t discriminate.

And neither should you.

Along with the virus, conspiracy theories are spreading around the globe.

Many of these false theories target different religion, races, and nationalities.

Often they ignore science.

And claim the virus is part of a secret plot.

That it was made in a lab to harm people.

Or allow certain groups to profit financially.

These claims are not only false, they’re harmful.

They ignore science, they cause fear, they sew mistrust and incite hate.

Tune out the fake news and mistruths […].

No one is responsible for creating COVID-19 but we are all responsible for limiting the spread.

We are all in this together.

Don’t spread hate10.

15The campaign produced ten educational infographics to help citizens identify, debunk, and counter COVID-19 conspiracy theories. The infographics have been made available in ten languages (Arabic, Chinese, Czech, English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish) and widely disseminated online: on social media via the hashtag #ThinkBeforeSharing, through the European Commission’s website on fighting disinformation, and on UNESCO social-media pages.

As noticed by Puppo, Corradi and Zoppellari in a collective volume entitled The Pandemic of Argumentation:

The use of images in the management of the COVID-19 emergency appears to be one of the most interesting factors from a rhetorical-argumentative point of view: brochures, posters, infographics and diagrams designed by institutional bodies and the government have now become the mainstay of official communication and, even more so, of the urban landscape and buildings (2022: 169).

16The visual learning resources of the #ThinkBeforeSharing campaign were created by consulting a series of experts in the field of conspiracy theories studies. Specifically, they draw on the work of Professors Butter, Lewandowsky, and Cook, all experts in the field. In the next paragraph, we propose to analyze the ten infographics and the experts’ proposals through the lenses of the rhetorical notion of ethos.

3. Institutional trustworthiness: the #ThinkBeforeSharing infographics

17In the Conspiracy Theory Handbook, Lewandowsky and Cook dedicate a section to “How to talk to a conspiracy theorist” (2020: 10), introducing four key elements: trusted messengers, avoiding ridicule, showing empathy and affirming critical thinking.

These notions respectively refer to the following recommendations:

– Trusted messengers: “counter-messages created by former members of an extremist community (“exiters”) are evaluated more positively and remembered longer than messages from other sources.

– Avoid ridicule: “aggressively deconstructing or ridiculing a conspiracy theory, or focusing on ‘winning’ an argument, runs the risk of being automatically rejected. Note, however, that ridicule has been shown to work with general audiences;”

– Show empathy: “approaches should be empathic and seek to build understanding with the other party. Because the goal is to develop the conspiracy theorist’s open-mindedness, communicators must lead by example;”

– Affirm critical thinking: “conspiracy theorists perceive themselves as critical thinkers who are not fooled by an official account. This perception can be capitalized on by affirming the value of critical thinking but then redirect this approach towards a more critical analysis of the conspiracy theory.”

The authors also include an interesting cautionary note:

It’s also important to remember that real conspiracies do exist. But the traits of conspiratorial thinking (CONSPIR) are not a productive way to uncover actual conspiracies. Rather, conventional thinking that values healthy skepticism, evidence, and consistency are necessary ingredients to uncovering real attempts to deceive the public.

18We believe these elements are fruitful not only in a discussion with conspiracy theory believers. They are probably even more important in talking to the public to increase awareness, rebuild trust in scientific experts, and minimize the damage of the epistemic crisis we are facing. The elements identified by Lewandowsky and Cook, especially the first three, rely on gaining audience confidence. In rhetorical terms, they rely on the ethos dimension, which we will examine further.

19As anticipated, we specifically analyze our case study through the lenses of one of the three technical means of persuasion – entechnic proofs – of the Aristotelian rhetoric: ethos, pathos, and logos, which refer respectively to the character of the speaker, the emotional state of the hearer and the argument itself. According to the Aristotelian taxonomy, entechnic proofs are prepared by following a method in a speech; they differ from atechnic proofs, which are preexisting physical objects such as written documents and confessions provided by the orator. It is worth underlining that entechnic proofs mutually support one another and none of these elements can be considered dominant (Aristotle Rh.: 1355b-1356a). Our analysis specifically focuses on ethos, which refers to the speakers’ character and, more generally, to the trust relationship between the speaker and the audience. According to the Aristotelian tradition, “the persuasion is accomplished by character whenever the speech is held in such a way as to render the speaker worthy of credence” (Rh.: 1356a 5). In general, according to Aristotle, a trustworthy speaker attempts to portray himself as a person of good sense (phronesis), good moral character (arête), and goodwill (eunoia) (Rh.: 1378a6 ff.). Interestingly, trust is never gained by explicit arguments about the speaker’s reliability. Rather, ethos is implicitly manifest in stylistic, lexical, and argumentative choices: ethos is something about the tone of communication (Zagarella 2015, Amossy 1999, 2010, Herman 2022).

  • 11 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/fighting-disinformation/identify (...)

20To investigate what ethotic elements can be considered for trustworthy institutional campaigns about conspiracies, we will analyze the ten infographics through the recommendations provided by Lewandowsky and Cook for gaining audience trust. Infographics are available for consultation on the European Commission Website11.

3.1. Avoid Ridicule

21Avoiding ridicule is likely the most relevant recommendation provided by Lewandowsky and Cook. Conspiracy theories are often associated with a lack of interest in the truth and are considered both a moral vice and a psychological deprivation (Danblon 2020). Nonetheless, no one is above conspiracy theories, not even those studying this topic. Consequently, aggressively deconstructing or ridiculing a conspiracy theory, or focusing on winning an argument, could be self-defeating.

22The #ThinkBeforeSharing infographics include at least three commendable examples of how to talk with someone who may believe in a conspiracy theory without resorting to ridicule and blame.

  • 12 This example can be also related to the advice of showing empathy (that we will discuss in the next (...)

23Firstly, all infographics feature the following message, written in bold uppercase letters and prominently placed: “Be warned: the COVID-19 pandemic has seen a rise in harmful and misleading conspiracy theories. It may be difficult to recognize them or know how best to deal with them” (emphasis added). The tone of this message is reassuring and fosters a sense of closeness between the campaign promoters and the audience. It implicitly acknowledges that we are all dealing with something difficult, susceptible to errors, and nobody is to blame for embracing conspiracy theories12.

24As another example, consider the text of Infographics 2. To reinforce the argument about complexity, i.e., to emphasize the necessity for a nuanced understanding of the intricacies involved in the spread of conspiracy theories and to caution against oversimplification, the campaign highlights that: “real conspiracies large and small DO exist.” It provides an example of a recent conspiracy to illustrate this point: “Looking for a real conspiracy? In 2006, the U.S. District Court in Washington DC (USA) ruled that major cigarette companies were guilty of conspiracy. For decades, they had hidden evidence of health risks attached to smoking to promote higher sales.” The infographic also provides a bibliographic reference, making a methodologically important contribution to the campaign’s quality.

25Thirdly, Infographics 1 and 4 employ the argument of good intentions, acknowledging the possibility that certain individuals may genuinely express concern about specific issues and may seek answers or explanations that align with their worldview or personal experiences: “While most people who spread conspiracy theories genuinely believe in them, others deploy them cynically to achieve these effects” (Infographic 4, emphasis added). This statement underscores that individuals adhering to a conspiracy theory are not susceptible to moral blame or culpability, as their actions are often driven by good intentions, and authenticity. Conversely, the actions of individuals who propagate conspiracy theories with the intent to polarize society and fuel violent extremism are deplorable.

3.2. Show empathy

26The infographics also provide an example of using argumentative resources to show empathy. The notion of empathy is closely connected to the dimension of pathos, which refers to the elements of speech that lead the audience to feel certain emotions and make judgments based on those emotions. In the rhetoric tradition, emotional states are considered part of a rational judgment: a virtuous person performs the right actions by being motivated by appropriate emotions. Importantly, Aristotle's rhetoric stresses that people judge differently depending on their feelings, but an orator who wants to provoke emotions must not speak “outside the subject” (Rh.: 1378a1 ff.). Showing empathy can be an effective strategy to arouse in the public the sensation of being understood and sharing the same feelings as the speaker (in this case: the institution that promotes the campaign). Lewandowsky and Cook recommend: “Approaches should be empathic and seek to build understanding with the other party” (2020: 10). Furthermore, they add: “Because the goal is to develop the conspiracy theorist’s open-mindedness, communicators must lead by example” (2020: 10). Showing empathy builds mutual understanding, prevents negative emotions that are crucial for the audience’s judgment, and also serves to strengthen the ethos of the orator.

27Infographic 3 underlines that “COVID-19 is frightening. It’s normal to feel overwhelmed and search for answers”; “Nobody is free of biases or fears, which could open the door to believing in a conspiracy theory” (emphasis added). The tone is both comforting and respectful, encouraging the audience to reflect on our fears, values, and beliefs. The message aims to highlight how easy it is to fall into the reassuring trap of conspiracy theories; then, it shifts the perspective showing how reassuring institutions that understand – and share – the sense of uncertainty caused by the pandemic crisis can be. Recent studies by Kjeldsen et al. have recognized that under crisis circumstances:

the expression of uncertainty and ignorance may itself support an ethos of expertise, because awareness of uncertainty and ignorance may be taken as a sign of competence (phronesis). […] Finally, when the experts rhetorically move from scientific uncertainty to moral certainty, they demonstrate character (arête) and goodwill (eunoia), because this move invites the public to participate in deliberations about measures and policies. At the same time the experts preserve their ethos of scientific expertise because even though they inform the public about the scientific and situational circumstances, the experts are still in a privileged epistemological position to determine the possible ways of action in a situation of uncertainty (Kjeldsen, Mølster and Ihlen 2022: 100).

3.3. Trusted messengers

28A final and crucial issue regards the role of “trusted messengers”. With this concept, Lewandowsky and Cook refer, in a second sense, to argumentation by examples and argumentation by testimony. Specifically, they refer to the effectiveness of counter-messages created by former members of an extremist community, named “exiters” (2020: 10).

29The infographics do not directly employ this kind of argumentation. However, Infographic 7 offers the following advice: when talking to somebody who firmly believes in a conspiracy theory you can encourage open debate and questions, ask detailed questions about their theory to trigger self-reflection, be cautious, and use a variety of sources on the theme, etc. It is also suggested to “enlist trusted former conspiracy theorists who once believed the same thing” (emphasis added). When a counterargument to a conspiracy theory comes from a former member of the community, it is more likely to be accepted because it appears consistent with the group’s values. These individuals have firsthand experience and understanding of the mindset and motivations of current members, which can inform the development of effective counter-messaging strategies. While an “exiter” is no longer technically part of the in-group, their previous personal experience within the group makes them uniquely positioned to provide insights and perspectives that can be more persuasive than messages from institutional sources or scientific experts.

4. Ethos in institutional campaigns: three additional elements

30In this section, we propose three additional key recommendations to help institutions in designing educational campaigns to counteract conspiracy theories.

31First, we draw attention to a pervasive phenomenon we call “epistemic hubris: the tendency to consider citizens misinformed, illiterate, or in bad faith while putting oneself on a pedestal. We recently found this notion in a paper discussing vice epistemology and the seriousness of studying this topic concerning societies and organizations. The paper by Baird and Calvard includes the analysis of a set of four major epistemic vices currently permeating many organizations: malevolence, insouciance, injustice, and hubris. According to Baird and Calvard: “Epistemic hubris is an inflated sense of epistemic privilege and pride” (2018: 270). Closely linked to power, arrogance, and over-confidence, according to the authors, it manifests in two ways. “The first is the conviction that one has epistemic authority or superiority where one in fact lacks it.” A conviction that “involves a false inference about the state of one’s knowledge and expertise relative to others.”

Importantly, we would add that it is not simply an error of judgment which qualifies epistemic hubris as an epistemic vice. It is of course possible to misjudge a situation or to be incorrect without being hubristic. It is the agent’s conviction of their infallibility and epistemic superiority that is constitutive of this vice (Baird and Calvard 2018: 270).

The second manifestation of epistemic hubris is:

The conviction that one has the right or privilege not to know, or not to need to know. […] Feelings of power can reduce empathy, compassion, and attentiveness to others, and […] may reinforce a leader’s privileges to not know or care about matters deemed trivial or beneath them (2018: 270).

32We propose a third indicator of epistemic hubris: the arrogant belief that people you are talking to are misinformed or illiterate, and/or have biased opinions. In this sense, epistemic hubris refers to the relation with the interlocutor and involves a distorted view about the state of the other’s knowledge as well as a paternalistic attitude to communication, and potentially even a pathologizing attitude.

33We suggest that the resulting tone of institutional messages about conspiracy theories should avoid epistemic hubris, including its implicit form. Otherwise, there is a risk of polarizing the debate and being perceived as part of the elite, who are usually accused of conspiring against citizens, thereby jeopardizing the campaign’s success (Zagarella and Annoni 2019). In our case study, a virtuous example can be seen in Infographic 2, which uses the categories of unlikely/likely rather than false/true in suggesting how to recognize a conspiracy theory. This change in linguistic format, accommodating greater nuance, reflects the stance of the infographic designers, who positioned themselves as neither radicals nor binary extremists. This conceptual switch avoids derision, displays humility, and contains the risk of falling into a hubristic attitude toward people who have difficulty recognizing conspiracy theories.

34A second related warning is being aware of the so-called “third-person effect,” i.e. the tendency to suppose that other people are more influenced by conspiracy theories than the speaker himself. W. Phillips Davison first formulated the third-person effect hypothesis in the eighties (1983). Recently, it has been used by psychologist Rob Brotherton, who identified several biases involved in conspiracy theories and fake news adherence (2020).

Davison put the effect down to a kind of innocent egocentrism […]. More recent research suggests that we underestimate not just other people’s knowledge, but their basic ability to come to their own reasoned conclusions. We tend to think of people as less rational and more conformist than ourselves. Our own beliefs, we think, are based on objective knowledge or experiences. Other people’s beliefs are more likely the results of mindlessly following the group (Brotherton 2020: 35).

35In our opinion, the absence of manifestation of epistemic hubris and the awareness of the third-person effect does help to construct a good ethos for institutions promoting campaigns on conspiracy theories. These recommendations complement the pieces of advice discussed in the previous paragraph: showing empathy and humility, avoiding blame and ridicule, and taking people seriously all contribute to high-quality institutional communication.

36A third and final recommendation for institutional communication is to be careful with the use of the expression “conspiracy theory.” This expression is anything but neutral; it is often used pejoratively and can serve as an insult.

It seems to provide a diagnosis of a flawed and delegitimized way of thinking, the aim of which is often simply to end discussion. The term can serve as an insult, implying that one does not need to take seriously the claims made by an interlocutor, because they are outlandish and absurd, perhaps even wrong by definition (Butter and Knight 2020: 3).

37In a discursive interaction, qualifying the other person as a “conspiracy theorist” may have the effect of creating a dichotomy, and placing the speaker in a position of intellectual superiority of knowledge (the epistemic hubris that we want to avoid). As Julien Giry explains:

The words or expressions “complotisme,” “conspiracism” or “conspiracy theories" have gradually found their way into the vocabulary and public debate, where they are commonly connoted in a negative and pejorative way. They give rise to a kind of instinctive fear or rejection of those individual or collective actors who subscribe to them or are designated as such. As a result, these actors are saddled with an “infamous label” which, like a label, produces heteronomous effects of disqualification in various social fields, including the political, social, media, and economic spheres. [...]

From then on, scholars, journalists, and public authorities face a twofold challenge concerning how to define the term, find out its effects, and understand how to use it. First, we need to find the right balance, which consists in making good use – that is, both cautious and parsimonious – of the terms set out above, to avoid the first pitfall of immediately seeing any radical criticism of the neo-liberal model as a more or less explicit form of conspiracy [...].

On the contrary, only an ad hoc and thorough examination of each of the situations encountered can determine whether we are in the presence of conspiracy theories; the qualifier should in no case be determined ex-ante according to our preferences, prejudices, clichés or any other forms of pre-notions (2017: 6-7; translated from the French).

38When shallowly and rashly used, the label “conspiracy theory” also carries important political implications, which cannot be fully discussed here. Primarily, there is a risk that the accusation of conspiracy may become an exclusion apparatus/dispositive. This is one more reason to be cautious when discussing conspiracy theories in journal articles, research papers, or institutional contexts.

Conclusions

39Conspiracy theories should be considered as a serious political, social, and ethical problem. A better understanding of conspiracy thinking has important implications for the relationship between science and society. For these reasons, institutional counter-campaigns are being set up worldwide with the aim of increasing public trust and access to reliable information.

40In this paper, we have argued that it is crucial to provide a discursive account of conspiracy theories, especially within the health debate, and to support institutions in managing their implications. To achieve this goal, a rhetorical perspective can help by redirecting the research focus toward the implementation of public counter-responses. Specifically, we have demonstrated how the rhetorical notion of ethos, focusing on the speaker’s credibility, is particularly important when considering the tone of institutional communication about conspiracies in times of crisis such as today.

41We believe that more attention is needed regarding how institutions should discuss conspiracy theories and reinforce their credibility through discursive resources. Furthermore, a more in-depth and multidisciplinary analysis by academics and other stakeholders is required to ensure the best possible consultation for institutional campaigns. Our intent has been to discuss some key concepts that, in our opinion, may contribute to building a trustworthy institutional ethos.

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Notes

1 This paper is part of a project that we are carrying out at the Italian National Research Council. The project focuses on the role of conspiracy theories in science and health public perception. An earlier version of this work has been presented at the 17th International Pragmatics Conference (2021), within the Panel “Manufacturing Dissent: Manipulation and Counter-Manipulation in Times of Crisis” organized by Cornelia Ilie. We thank the discussant and the audience of this conference for their insightful feedback. We would also like to thank Elvira Passaro for her help in bibliographic research.

2 https://www.statista.com/chart/18196/belief-in-conspiracy-theories-in-the-united-states/ [consulted on June 18th, 2024]

3 https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2021/01/18/global-where-believe-conspiracy-theories-true [consulted on June 18th, 2024].

4 Comparable problems of public communication accompanied also the 1918 Spanish flu, the 21st-century Swine and Avian flu, as well as Ebola and Zika outbreaks (Taylor 2019).

5 https://today.yougov.com/politics/articles/29917-republicans-democrats-misinformation; https://d3nkl3psvxxpe9.cloudfront.net/documents/20200522_yahoo_coronavirus_crosstabs.pdf, p. 130 [both consulted on June 18th, 2024].

6 Gallup International, March 2020: https://www.gallup-international.com/fileadmin/user_upload/surveys_and_news/2020/GIA_SnapPoll_2020_COVID_Tables_final.pdf [consulted on June 28th, 2024].

7 Cf. references in Zagarella and Annoni 2019.

8 www.conspiracy-watch.info; https://www.nord.gouv.fr/Actualites/Actualites/Prevention-Sensibilisation-des-plus-jeunes-au-decryptage-de-l-information [both consulted on June 18th, 2024].

9 Cf. https://en.unesco.org/news/new-resources-counter-covid-19-conspiracy-theories-through-critical-thinking-and-empathy; https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/fighting-disinformation/identifying-conspiracy-theories_en [both consulted on June 18th, 2024].

10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B4h1_u13IVU [consulted on June 18th, 2024].

11 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/fighting-disinformation/identifying-conspiracy-theories_en [consulted on June 18th, 2024].

12 This example can be also related to the advice of showing empathy (that we will discuss in the next section), as acknowledging the audience’s difficulties in recognizing and dealing with conspiracy theories can be a sign of empathy.

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Référence électronique

Roberta Martina Zagarella et Marco Annoni, « Rhetorical Strategies of Counteracting Conspiracy-based Dissent on COVID-19 Vaccines: the #ThinkBeforeSharing Institutional Campaign »Argumentation et Analyse du Discours [En ligne], 33 | 2024, mis en ligne le 15 octobre 2024, consulté le 11 novembre 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/aad/8811 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/12hvo

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Auteurs

Roberta Martina Zagarella

CID Ethics-CNR, Rome (Italy)

Marco Annoni

CID Ethics-CNR, Rome (Italy)

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