- 1 This work was supported by the Chateaubriand fellowship, Sciences Po, Paris, and the Jack, Joseph, (...)
- 2 The Ben Shapiro Show Sunday Special Ep. 68, Sep 15, 2019, 30:00 https://youtu.be/MSxoLJujM-k?si=aII (...)
1In a 2019 conversation between the conservative political commentator Ben Shapiro, known for his sharp argumentation skills, and the British rapper Zuby,2 Shapiro presented the following argument:
In my view and the view of my music theorist father who went to music school, there are three elements to music: there is harmony, there is melody and there is rhythm, and rap only fulfills one of these – the rhythm section. There is not a lot of melody and there is not a lot of harmony. And thus, it is basically, effectively, spoken rhythm and so it’s not actually a form of music, it’s a form of rhythmic speaking. So, beyond the subjectivity of me just not enjoying rap all that much, what I’ve said before is it’s not music. So tell me why I’m wrong.
2Shapiro presents what seems to be a valid deductive argument. He argues that harmony, melody, and rhythm are necessary conditions for something to be considered music, and asserts that rap lacks two of them, thus concluding that rap is not music. According to the structural rules of logic, this argument can be refuted either by disputing his fragile premise that all three components are necessary conditions for music or by contesting the assertion that rap fails to fulfill all three. In his response, Zuby argues that rap does have melody, thus not entirely refuting Shapiro’s argument. Yet, does this type of analysis fully capture the meaning of this debate?
- 3 This notion took an ironic turn when Shapiro himself surprisingly performed as a rapper recently: “(...)
3Twitter comments challenging Shapiro’s argument showcased various fallacies. For instance, Daniel C. Trocs commented: “He’s just an old-fashioned nerdy guy […] we all know the depth and impact of rap […]”, demonstrating both ad hominem (attacking Shapiro’s character) and ad populum (appealing to the popular opinion on rap). Another response by Will, demonstrated a fallacy that warrants closer attention: “From Blues, to jazz, Rock n roll, hip hop, and rap, white America has always said that black music wasn’t real music, then immediately turned around and stole it for their own.”3 Formally, this is a fallacious diversion rather than a direct refutation of Shapiro’s argument, as it targets his underlying cultural interests, thus “poisoning the well” and dismissing Shapiro’s legitimacy to argue about rap. However, it provides significant context, framing the discussion within a broader critique of racial biases and resisting the reduction of a socio-political issue to narrow, technical musicological terms. While Shapiro shifts the burden of proof to his interlocutor (“so tell me why I’m wrong”), the comment shifts it back to him, refusing to engage on his terms. This approach does not adhere to the rules of valid argumentation, yet it still carries weight: it exposes the fact that Shapiro’s argument relies on a narrow appeal to the purity of definition, and by focusing solely on truth-value, it overlooks the deeper social and cultural dimensions embedded in the debate.
4This example, which opens an undergraduate argumentation course discussed here, illustrates the challenge of evaluating arguments and identifying fallacies in both formal and informal logical terms. Treating fallacies as predefined deficiencies often fails to account for the context in which arguments occur and thus, simply put, misses the point. When fallacies are treated merely as logical errors, they invite a narrow focus on binary notions of truth and falsity, proof and refutation, overlooking the complexity and ambiguity that characterize argumentation in practice in various domains, such as cultural and political debates.
5The course proposes an alternative approach: rather than instructing students to apply fixed normative rules to public debates, it encourages them to continually reconsider such rules in light of the specific contexts in which arguments unfold. It emphasizes that what may formally appear fallacious can nevertheless hold rhetorical or discursive relevance, highlighting the importance of context, which resists reduction to rigid, a priori criteria. At the same time, the course does not abandon the vocabulary of fallacies altogether. Instead, it deepens their use through collaborative practices that foreground students’ perspectives and interpretive diversity, while still upholding a shared commitment to critical standards and reasoned judgment.
6In recent decades, the concept of fallacies has been the subject of intense scrutiny. Some argumentation theorists have expressed strong resentment towards the fallacy method, with some even doubting if argumentation should include teaching fallacies at all (Hamblin 1970; Finocchiaro 1981; Massey 1981; Hitchcock 1995, 2017, 2023; Hundleby 2010; Boudry et al. 2015; Blair 2023). Some opponents of fallacy education begin their discussion by acknowledging that teaching and learning fallacies can be enjoyable and easily satisfying for both students and teachers but quickly dismiss this sentiment as a superficial cover for a lack of rigor (Hitchcock 2017 [1995]: 401; Hundleby 2010: 279). The fallacy category is criticized for presenting an attractive facade that conceals intellectual deficiencies, including the claims that the fallacy category is outdated, that fallacies are rare in real-life discourse, that they lack meaning without context, and that they promote polarizing argumentation. Boudry et al. (2015) conclude their work with the fierce assertion that the very label “fallacy” is harmful, claiming that “we need to rid ourselves of this outdated arsenal” (453).
7While some critiques of fallacies are persuasive, I argue for retaining them in the study of rhetoric and argumentation in higher education, suggesting that despite their limitations, they remain valuable pedagogical tools. As Ruth Amossy (2021: 13, 2023: 259) points out, rather than seeking to condemn or “censor” fallacies from a logical perspective, rhetorical analysis aims to explore their discursive functions, without necessarily aspiring to ideal models of communication or persuasion. In this way, teaching fallacies shifts from a doctrinal exercise to a means of fostering analytical skills and critical thinking. From this perspective, supposedly fallacious arguments should be approached with the same analytical rigor as non-fallacious ones, particularly in practical contexts such as everyday discourse, political debate, and policymaking, where binaries like truth/falsity and proof/refutation often prove inadequate. What is formally labeled fallacious in such settings frequently carries significant argumentative force.
8In response to the anti-fallacy-education paradigm, I discuss the conditions under which teaching fallacies can be pedagogically productive, drawing on a case study of a university course and Public Humanities project initiated at Tel Aviv University, which practices active student participation and collaboration. While the benefits of collaborative approaches to argumentation have been widely explored (Veerman et al. 2002; Schwarz and Baker 2017), these works typically do not address fallacies directly. This study proposes extending similar principles to the teaching of fallacies, building on research in collaborative computational education that engages explicitly with arguments and fallacies (Diana et al. 2017; Mayweg-Paus et al. 2021). More recent contributions highlight the renewed urgency of fallacy education, particularly in light of the information turn and the rise of global populism (Hiba 2020; Hruschka and Appel 2023). Nevertheless, as shown in the recent special issue on fallacies in Argumentation (2023), the anti-fallacy paradigm remains influential among argumentation scholars, casting a critical light on pedagogical efforts to reintroduce fallacies into the curriculum.
9I begin by mapping and analyzing key criticisms of the fallacy category, then turn to the university course that responds to these critiques through a collaborative pedagogical model. The course challenges the anti-fallacy-education paradigm by showing how a context-sensitive, participatory approach can address and, in some cases, refute common objections. I argue that when critics’ calls to teach fallacies in context are integrated with collaborative reasoning, peer instruction, and continuous practice and feedback, fallacy concepts can become powerful tools for teaching argumentation and fostering critical engagement with public discourse. I also suggest that the enjoyable and often playful aspects of learning fallacies should not be dismissed as superficial distractions, but rather recognized as pedagogical assets that can support meaningful intellectual growth.
10At its broadest, a fallacy is typically defined as a flaw in reasoning that renders an argument invalid, weak, or misleading – even if it appears convincing. Traditionally, fallacies have been divided into formal fallacies – violations of logical structure – and informal fallacies, which pertain to content, relevance, or contextual use (Copi and Cohen 2005; Walton 1995). The conventional approach to teaching fallacies has its roots in classical rhetoric and logic, where they were treated as common errors in reasoning that students should learn to identify and avoid (Hamblin 1970:12–49). This pedagogy typically involves presenting students with a taxonomy of fallacies, along with brief, often fabricated examples, and then instructing students to classify and label these argumentative missteps. The goal has traditionally been to cultivate logical vigilance and rhetorical precision. However, Charles Hamblin’s influential Fallacies (1970) launched a foundational critique of this tradition, arguing that standard fallacy lists were philosophically inconsistent and pedagogically outdated. Douglas Walton (1995), Trudy Govier (1985), and others have further pointed out that this method often treats fallacies as fixed categories rather than context-sensitive patterns of reasoning. While the traditional model continues to shape textbooks and curricula, its limitations have prompted an increasing number of calls for reform, particularly among scholars in informal logic and argumentation theory.
11I roughly categorize the criticism of teaching argumentation through fallacies into four categories, which overlap to some extent. Two of them, “Fallacies are a random outdated category” and “Fallacies are not common in real-life discourse,” are relatively easy to challenge. The other two: “Fallacies promote a non-contextual discussion,” and “The fallacy category fosters an adversarial paradigm,” raise significant concerns that must be carefully considered. In what follows, I present each of these critiques. In the next section, I will introduce the alternative approach developed in the course under discussion, which directly responds to these objections.
12The most general critique of the fallacy category questions its very validity, arguing that it is arbitrary and outdated, and therefore limited in its effectiveness in teaching argumentation. Critics point out that the taxonomy of fallacies is inconsistent, as it combines overlapping and non-exclusive items. For example, slippery slope often overlaps with appeals to fear, and ad hominem can coincide with straw man, making it unclear whether these are distinct fallacies or rhetorical variants of the same move. Moreover, fallacy lists fail to capture all argumentative flaws, as “not every error in argumentation is baptized as a fallacy and given a title” (Hundleby 2010: 281). Some argue that the category is driven more by rhetorical tradition than by analytical rigor (Hitchcock 2017: 403; Hundleby 2010: 280). In “The Fallacy Behind Fallacies,” Massey describes the category as “a miscellany of ‘fallacies’ individuated by historical accident and sometimes related only by possession of a common pejorative label” (1981: 489). Others even criticize the continued use of Latin names, calling them alienating and overly academic (Hitchcock 2017: 406), though Hundleby notes that they also serve as a way for students to “show off their education by dropping a little Latin into conversation” (2010: 283). Ultimately, Hitchcock argues that “fallacy labels are not necessary to the exercise of critical thinking; everything that can be said with the use of these labels can be said without them, and in general, said more clearly” (2017: 406). As we shall see, however, when fallacies are not treated as rigid rules but as heuristic tools, they can still offer pedagogical value, serving as conceptual entry points into central issues of argumentation.
13A second prominent critique argues that fallacies are not salient in real-life discourse. As Hitchcock notes, “most of the fallacies in the traditional list are not very common occurrences” (2017: 405). Critics suggest that this scarcity explains why textbooks often rely on contrived, brief, and extreme scenarios (Finocchiaro 1981: 14; Boudry et al. 2015: 435). This point is worth emphasizing, as the perceived rarity of fallacies is a central argument against their pedagogical value: if fallacies rarely occur, why teach them? Yet this raises a crucial question: is the absence of fallacies in real life the reason examples in textbooks are dull, or does the dullness of these examples create the impression that fallacies are rare? Boudry et al. (2015: 432), like others, base their claim on the lack of convincing real-world examples in argumentation textbooks, concluding that such examples may not exist. However, as we shall see, the reliance on fabricated cases does not necessarily indicate that fallacies are uncommon in practice. The problem may lie instead in traditional pedagogical models that prioritize artificial illustrations over authentic discourse – a concern that becomes even more apparent in the next critique, which can be addressed through a stronger pedagogical emphasis on real-life cases.
14A third – and perhaps the most central – critique raised by opponents of the fallacy category is that it promotes a non-contextual approach to argumentation. Critics note that most textbooks rely on short, artificial cases that fail to capture the complexity of the arguments they present. Fallacies are often treated as fixed answers rather than open questions, encouraging a “gotcha” mentality in which students learn to spot errors rather than engage critically with the context. This approach typically involves brief, contrived examples and what Hundleby calls “games of pin-the-fallacy-on-the-argument” (2010: 292), with little regard for interpretive ambiguity. The issue stems from the term “fallacy” itself, which presupposes a normative judgment, presenting certain argumentative forms as essentially flawed, regardless of context (Boudry et al. 2015: 434). In contrast, recent scholarship emphasizes that fallacies are not always errors: the label often reveals little about the actual legitimacy of an argument, and many so-called fallacious schemes may be appropriate in specific rhetorical settings (Hundleby 2010: 279; Aikin and Casey 2011: 104; Hitchcock 2017: 403). If that is the case, a fair question arises: why teach fallacies at all?
15Moreover, Hundleby argues that using short examples “abstracted from their dialectical contexts” creates a controlled environment for instructors, reducing the burden of proof on those alleging a fallacy (2010: 290). This approach fosters an authoritarian stance, where instructors avoid situations in which students’ interpretations suggest different fallacies or challenge the classification of an argument as fallacious. Hundleby suggests that this dynamic particularly affects socio-economically marginalized instructors, such as part-time teachers, women, and people of color, who must quickly assert authority while maintaining student engagement to sustain their roles, often at the expense of in-depth pedagogical processes (ibid.: 293). She further asserts that fostering open dialogue, which requires greater time for reflection, exposes teachers to criticism and the challenge of navigating complex discussions (299). While this argument may be contested – since maintaining hegemonic teacher identities can also require an authoritative stance – the core claim remains: the fallacy method risks becoming authoritarian when presented as a fixed normative framework with decontextualized examples.
16A key challenge in developing a contextual understanding of fallacies, as noted by all fallacy critics, is the absence of clear-cut criteria for determining when a potential fallacy becomes fallacious. Efforts have been made to establish criteria for assessing the relevance of premises (Govier 1985: 116–177) and evaluating reasonableness in critical discussions (van Eemeren 2018: 53–58). While these provide valuable guidelines in some cases, they remain incomplete in others. For example, an appeal to authority is not inherently fallacious if the authority’s credentials are reliable and certified and if arguers lack reasonable access to the relevant information themselves (Walton 2008: 219). However, determining reliability still requires an ad hoc decision in each case, indicating that this category is context-dependent rather than inherently flawed. Formal methods for evaluating fallacies are also inherently blind to social biases (Hundleby 2023: 285) and do not fully account for contextual issues, as illustrated in the earlier discussion of Ben Shapiro’s argument.
17Van Eemeren et al.’s pragma-dialectical approach (1995, 2018, 2023) seeks to counteract the decontextualization of fallacies by situating them within a dialectical framework and establishing standards for reasonable discussion. By analyzing public and interpersonal debates, this approach provides an alternative to isolated fallacy evaluation, offering clear stages and rigorous criteria for assessing fallacious arguments. However, while pragma-dialectics assumes that debates can be resolved by following given rules and criteria, many contemporary fallacies arise outside such ideal discussion settings. Online commentaries and social media discussions, which are increasingly prevalent in undergraduate students’ exposure to argumentation today, often create a fragmented discourse that diverges from the ideal conditions for reasoned communication in pragma-dialectics. Nevertheless, these discursive spaces frequently generate fallacies that warrant attention, particularly in populist contexts that shape public debate. As we shall see, a pedagogy grounded in contextual and collaborative interpretation enables fallacies to be examined as potential issues, without presuming them to be definitive errors that obstruct agreement or violate ideal standards of communication.
18The last, and perhaps most challenging critique is that the fallacy method promotes an adversarial paradigm, which puts emphasis on conflictual and polarizing aspects of argumentation. The “adversary method,” as Hundleby argues, pushes arguments toward extreme oppositions, driving conversations into disputes, neglecting opportunities for argument repair, and limiting the conditions for dialogue (2010: 289, 293). Even if fallacious arguments are prevalent in public discourse, as demonstrated later, prioritizing them over less confrontational and manipulative forms of argumentation risks marginalizing alternative approaches. Hundleby extends this critique by suggesting that fallacy education reinforces privileged identities, as individuals from marginalized groups or those with less formal education face particular challenges with the adversary method. She contends that oppositional norms – particularly those associated with masculinity in the Global North – dominate argumentation, promoting adversarial reasoning while excluding alternative approaches (2010: 296). However, the adversarial nature of public debates that include fallacies does not mean that the pedagogy surrounding them must also be adversarial, as Bailin and Battersby (2021) emphasize, and as I will demonstrate in the next section.
19As illustrated, the pedagogy of fallacies presents notable pitfalls and raises weighty criticisms. Yet, I argue that these critiques do not necessarily demonstrate that fallacies are futile or harmful in teaching argumentation. Rather, they challenge educators to develop more effective and context-sensitive methods for teaching them. This section presents such a method, aimed at responding constructively to the prevailing critiques.
- 4 The course was designed in collaboration with Teaching Assistant Guy Shapira, who also provided val (...)
20Everyday Rhetoric: Arguments and Fallacies was launched in March 2020 as an online workshop based on continuous practice and feedback.4 Designed for undergraduate students across the humanities and sciences at Tel Aviv University – most of whom have no background in argumentation – the course aims to teach core concepts and analytical skills for evaluating arguments in private, public, and scientific contexts. It combines a theoretical introduction with hands-on application, offering intensive practice and ongoing feedback to approximately forty students per semester. The course is structured in two parts: an introductory section presenting fundamental argumentation concepts through examples drawn from public discourse, and a practical section in which students engage in small-group discussions. These groups analyze op-eds and public commentary, provide peer feedback, and receive guidance from instructors.
21Throughout the course, students contribute to the website kshalim.com, established by the course team and dedicated to documenting fallacies (known as “kshalim” in Hebrew). The website features approximately forty fallacies: some from the traditional lists (e.g., ad hominem, ad verecundiam, ad populum), others involving potentially fallacious premises (e.g., post hoc ergo propter hoc, appeal to tradition), and several fallacies prevalent in the local discourse, such as ad Hitlerum – an argument drawing analogies to Hitler or the Nazis. The course adopts a broad understanding of fallacies, encompassing a wide range of discursive phenomena that potentially disrupt substantive argumentation. Students contribute real-life examples to fallacies from public discourse, which are debated in online groups and receive feedback from the teaching team. Selected examples are published on the collaborative website, where students are also invited to propose new entries and definitions. In addition to serving in-class work, the website – the first in Hebrew to offer a wide-ranging presentation of informal fallacies – is open to the public for comments and contributions. As of March 2025, it has 69,021 post views and is widely used as a pedagogical aid in educational settings and by the wider public, fulfilling its role as a Public Humanities project.
22The course’s collaborative structure, therefore, has three key dimensions. First, it promotes collaborative group analysis involving interpretive negotiation, or what Reznitskaya et al. (2009) term “collaborative reasoning.” Here, reasoning becomes both the object and method of reflection, creating a second-order engagement – reasoning about reasoning. Second, students co-create an online lexicon of fallacies by independently tracing examples, analyzing them in peer discussion, and refining them through feedback – drawing on the pedagogical strengths of guided peer instruction (Tullis and Goldstone 2020). Third, the course fosters interaction with the wider public, inviting external participation and commentary on the site’s evolving content.
23While collaborative and contextual approaches are increasingly common in general argumentation pedagogy, they remain underutilized in the teaching of fallacies. The following section demonstrates how this structure directly responds to the four main criticisms of fallacy education and makes the case for the continued inclusion of fallacies in argumentation teaching.
24Addressing the first critique mentioned earlier – that fallacies are random, outdated categories – a collaborative and contextual approach treats the fallacy list as an open and flexible guide rather than a fixed set of rules. Critics often assume that teachers present the traditional fallacy list as a sanctified and prescriptive inventory of errors. However, teachers need not, and often do not, endorse every classical fallacy uncritically; they can prioritize those most relevant to current discourse and, more importantly, engage students in negotiating the value and application of these concepts. The key point is not that some fallacies may seem dated, but rather how many remain strikingly relevant to contemporary public discourse. In the Fallacy Guide course, fallacies are not introduced as a unified and final list of prohibitions, but as a preliminary and non-exhaustive set of tools that can be questioned, expanded, and refined. In this way, the limited and potentially outdated nature of the list becomes a productive space for critical dialogue and collaborative inquiry.
25The negotiation over the relevance of existing fallacies is further enriched by scholars’ and students’ efforts to identify or formulate new ones. For instance, new fallacy types introduced by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1995: 134–144) and van Eemeren and Garssen (2023: 171), such as “declaring a standpoint sacrosanct” (i.e., rendering a position immune to critique), reflect the dynamic potential of fallacy classification. Similarly, labels like ad feminam (a gendered variant of ad hominem) highlight how fallacious patterns intersect with social bias, directing attacks disproportionately toward certain groups – women, in this case (Hundleby 2023: 285). In the course, students often propose new fallacy types drawn from real-life discourse, which then become subjects of collaborative analysis: Are they redundant? Do they overlap with existing categories? Do they name something genuinely novel and recurrent?
26Moreover, when fallacies are not treated as mutually exclusive boxes but as overlapping and dynamic categories, they invite more nuanced discussions. A straw man argument may indeed involve elements of ad hominem or appeal to fear, but this hybridity does not invalidate the usefulness of the concepts. As with all concepts, fallacy types are dynamic constructs, open to contestation and refinement. Examining them in real-life contexts helps students navigate ambiguity and develop a more sophisticated grasp of conceptual thinking and argumentative complexity. As Woods and Walton (1989) argue, the study of fallacies benefits from a case-based, context-sensitive approach, rather than one that seeks rigid definitions or unified criteria. Hitchcock’s claim, mentioned earlier, that “everything that can be said with the use of these labels can be said without them” (2017: 406) underestimates the pedagogical role of conceptual language in developing critical skills. It is, of course, possible to critique an overreliance on authority without invoking the term “appeal to authority.” Yet for students new to argumentation, such labels offer a helpful conceptual map – a way to identify patterns and potential problems without necessarily reducing discourse to simplistic judgments.
27The course also addresses the second claim presented earlier that fallacies are not common in real-life discourse. Our work during the course demonstrates that fallacies are not rare, but in fact quite common. The collaborative coursework is crucial to establishing this claim, as it facilitates inductive reasoning through collaboration. It allows for tracing examples from diverse sources – op-eds, social media discussions, and even private correspondences, some accessible only to certain participants in their life experiences. When integrated, these examples accumulate a convincing generalizing charge. Although the students in this course do not perform formal research, they trace a corpus to examine a research question: What is the place of fallacies in our everyday discourse today? Only when multiple convincing examples are traced can students assess whether they sufficiently support the claim that a certain fallacy is not anecdotal.
28One of Boudry et al.’s central examples is the post-hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, which they claim to be rare, using generalizations such as “[m]ost lay people are aware of the possibility of sheer coincidence” (2015: 435). However, it is not clear what data supports this assertion. If it is only the writers’ intuition, it cannot claim to serve as a reliable refutation of the commonness of the propter hoc fallacy. If it leans on inductive inference from cases personally known to the authors, it may exemplify a hasty generalization from anecdotal evidence. Our experience in collaboratively tracking arguments in public discourse demonstrated the opposite – post hoc ergo propter hoc examples are common and can be found in their straightforward form in many online discussions, both in local and international contexts. For instance, consider the following examples from different domains, only a few of many taken from the students’ coursework:
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In May 2023, far-right Israeli Knesset (parliament) member Itamar Ben Gvir called for the targeted killing of terrorists, vowing to boycott discussions until a policy change. Shortly after, Israel killed three Islamic Jihad terrorists. Right-wing commentators, including the rapper The Shadow (Ha’tzel), attributed this action to Ben Gvir’s influence. However, no evidence supports a causal link between his statement and Israel’s actions, while other evidence supports alternative explanations, making this claim a clear instance of false causality aimed at enhancing Ben Gvir’s political standing.
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In recent years, international conspiratorial discourse, which often transcends political and religious affiliations, has increasingly relied on the propter hoc fallacy. Notable examples include the unfounded claim that 5G cellular networks emitted radiation that weakened people’s immune systems, resulting in the COVID-19 pandemic – a theory that falsely infers causality from the mere fact that the 5G rollout occurred shortly before the outbreak. Another famous example is the faulty conclusion that vaccines lead to autism, which led many, until this very day, to correlate autism with vaccination (Gabis et al., 2022).
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In 2024, a viral food hack on TikTok claimed that placing the avocado pit in water while using the fruit would keep it green and prevent browning. This suggestion implies a causal mechanism without any scientific basis, yet despite its evident flaw, it gained widespread traction and popular support.
29Boudry et al. rightly assert that “there is nothing wrong or fallacious with post hoc reasoning per se,” since in some cases one event indeed leads to another (2015: 437), and speakers do not often naively believe in false causal links – though, as our examples suggest, they often do. Yet, even when speakers are not themselves convinced, the fallacy is frequently enacted strategically and manipulatively: some deliberately construct the illusion of causation to advance demagogical claims, as exemplified in the Ben Gvir case. In many instances, arguers exploit the intuitive plausibility of sequential events to promote populist narratives, conspiratorial thinking, or incitement against public figures. Detecting such cases requires more than the formal identification of a fallacy; it demands attention to the rhetorical and political dynamics from which the argument emerges.
30I highlighted the example of propter hoc as it is salient in Boudry et al’s criticism, however, other fallacies are also widespread. Another example Boudry et al. present is the ad hominem. They are right to claim that a person’s character or personal background is not necessarily irrelevant to the credibility of their arguments. At the same time, they claim that “few reasoners would maintain that the falsehood of a claim follows inexorably from the bad character of the claimant” (ibid.: 437). This is, again, not compatible with the data collected by our students, who traced numerous ad hominem arguments in their most straightforward form.
31It is worth noting that the most passionate critiques of fallacy pedagogy – particularly those emphasizing the lack of real-life examples – were published primarily before the second decade of the 21st century. Since then, global populism has surged, social media has become ubiquitous, and while it may be difficult to prove that fallacies are more prevalent in public discourse, they are certainly more visible and accessible. Popular independently published works such as the book Fallacious Trump: The Donald J. Trump Guide to Logical Fallacies, as well as many other commentaries available to the larger public, are used to analyze the populist use of fallacies in various socio-political contexts. In the Israeli context, the fallacy terms help decipher tense political debates, such as the controversial right-wing judiciary reform since 2023, providing students with tools to analyze public discussions. These labels are helpful not only in extreme cases but also in complex arguments where fallacies intertwine with valid reasoning, necessitating a nuanced, contextualized discussion that transcends simple categorization.
32This leads us to the third, and weighty, claim of the anti-fallacy-education paradigm, that the fallacy category promotes a non-contextual discussion. To mitigate this risk, The Fallacy Guide course follows several guidelines. First, rather than predefining certain argumentative schemes as fallacies, the course treats them as “potential fallacies.” Admittedly, presenting fallacies as such involves some degree of circular reasoning, as the term “fallacy” is preemptively derogatory. However, we emphasize, both in class discussions and on the website’s About page, that fallaciousness is context-dependent. This approach preserves the normative dimension of traditional argumentation analysis by recognizing that some arguments are generally stronger or fairer than others, and that fallacies can serve as useful red flags. At the same time, it avoids framing fallacies a priori as mere errors or focusing on denunciation. Instead, it prioritizes the contextual evaluation of how arguments function and their broader rhetorical effects.
33Second, while some fabricated examples appear on the website to illustrate distinct case structures, most examples in the course come from real-life discussions. Rather than searching for extreme cases, students engage with various forms of public commentary, identifying fallacies as they naturally arise. Identifying a fallacy is only the starting point. Students first present their examples in small online groups, providing a written contextual explanation; selected examples are then uploaded to the website. The course team then offers written feedback on all examples, which is made accessible to all students. The online format – utilizing Zoom meetings and participatory boards – fosters dynamic discussions, enabling students to express their doubts and collaborate on analyzing the context. Ambiguous cases are welcome, reinforcing the fallacy list as a guideline rather than a strict framework.
34Third, lacking strict criteria for determining when a fallacy is problematic and when it is legitimate, particularly outside ideal conditions for communication, I propose that the only consistent and methodical parameter for evaluating fallacies in context lies in how we define context itself. A structured set of discussion questions helps illuminate contextual features; however, in contrast to traditional structural approaches (e.g., Walton 2008), such inquiry must also remain attentive to the discursive and power dynamics that frame the exchange. Key questions include not only who is speaking and to whom, what the premises and conclusions of both sides are, and what broader debate underlies the current discussion, but also what common knowledge and shared beliefs establish hidden premises, and how doxastic commitments shape implicit biases within the argument. In our course, these questions serve as analytical guidelines, fostering sensitivity to each individual case and encouraging open debate among students about interpretive ambiguity. Thus, the absence of fixed criteria does not render the fallacy method flawed or futile; instead, it offers a pedagogical opportunity to demonstrate the significance of contextual analysis, showing that an argument containing a potential fallacy may be valid, plausible, or fair in one context and fallacious in another. This aligns with Womack’s (2015) call for a shift “from Logic to Rhetoric,” which prioritizes open discussion over rigid logical categories, as well as with the “rhetorical argumentation” approach advanced by Kock and Lantz (2023), which emphasizes practical reasoning in which context plays a pivotal role.
35Presenting a contextual discussion of fallacies is undoubtedly a challenging task for students. Decontextualized examples are tempting and frequently appear in their work, particularly in the early stages of the course. However, after weeks of peer review and continuous feedback, most students show significant improvement in the depth and contextual integration of their analysis. A key limitation of the Fallacy Guide is that these nuanced class discussions remain inaccessible to the public and are not fully reflected in the online manual. The manual presents only summarized examples rather than the broader discussions surrounding them, capturing only part of the intellectual process involved in fallacy education. To mitigate this, external links to the original texts are often included, allowing readers to examine the context independently and form their own conclusions. As Hundleby (2010: 286) notes, the “taxonomic technique” of presenting fallacies is inherently restrictive, and the issue of decontextualization can only be addressed when such taxonomies are accompanied by continuous guided discussion.
36Finally, the course’s approach mitigates the central critique that the fallacy method promotes an adversarial paradigm. When integrated into a collaborative framework, fallacy education can foster productive dialogue rather than one-dimensional condemnation or polarizing rhetoric. It can offer an alternative to fallacious polemics by amplifying diverse perspectives and emphasizing the value of collaborative reasoning and dialectical exchange. In other words, there is a substantial difference between the polemical and polarizing material students may analyze and the pedagogical method used to examine it – one that relies on productive, yet still critical and argumentative, cooperation.
37Moreover, the analysis of fallacies can serve as a tool for challenging marginalizing discourse, rather than reinforcing it, as some of the aforementioned critiques caution. It is particularly effective in deconstructing socially polarizing and racist arguments and can be employed by social justice activists, as Hundleby herself notes (2023: 282–284). Over the past decade, platforms such as ContraPoints, launched by transgender YouTuber Natalie Wynn in 2016, along with numerous other social media accounts, have dissected the fallacies embedded in homophobic, transphobic, and racist discourse, thereby reclaiming agency over how fallacies are framed and applied. These platforms often combine humor, playfulness, and carnivalesque storytelling with detailed and rigorous analysis. As Amossy (2021) argues, dissensus-oriented discourse and polemics can promote critical and democratic thinking, advancing social justice without necessarily aiming for consensus or argument repair.
38Teaching fallacies in a non-oppositional, collaborative, and community-oriented manner aligns with the civic dimension of the course in discussion. As noted, the course’s website is a public resource, utilized by educational institutions, independent educators, and public forums. Graduates of the course report applying their acquired knowledge to advance civic discourse. Some have established discussion platforms rooted in its principles, aiming to counteract echo chambers and foster persuasive dialogue in response to the deepening social divisions in Israel. Another student shared an unconventional application of the course, utilizing it in her volunteer work with NGOs that support individuals experiencing mental distress. She shared that analyzing arguments and identifying fallacies helped her recognize how faulty reasoning often stemmed from a ‘tunnel vision’ mindset, where individuals felt trapped in their suffering. By understanding the flawed logic behind their conclusions, she was able to guide them toward alternative perspectives and more constructive ways of thinking. This example highlights that while acknowledging and identifying fallacies as potential issues, fallacy education can also facilitate repair and care.
39As a Public Humanities project, the online fallacy manual bridges academic discourse and public engagement. By offering access to the website for various purposes and encouraging graduates to disseminate contextual knowledge, it fosters exchanges between the academic and public spheres. While numerous resources on fallacies exist in English, there is added value in addressing the public in their local language and using culturally relevant examples. Contextualizing the study of fallacies involves not only considering the immediate context of discussions but also understanding the broader cultural context in local cultures and languages. Thus, the perceived adversarial nature of fallacy studies is not inherent but a pedagogical choice that can be replaced with more constructive approaches.
40No buzzword has permeated the educational world in recent years quite like “critical thinking”. While it serves as an essential starting point for any intellectual process, the overly simplified version of “critical thinking,” as many have pointed out, is also prone to exploitation for skepticism’s sake and can even lead to conspiratorial thinking (Sutton 2020, Douglas and Sutton 2023). Free or independent thinking, as demonstrated by Lantian et al. (2021), is not necessarily synonymous with critical thinking. It is a generally accepted premise that argumentation is closely related to the pedagogy of critical thinking (Rapanta and Macagno 2016; Rapanta 2019; Ferguson and Bubikova-Moan 2019), though the precise relationship between the two remains unclear, and what exactly should be included in argumentation studies to promote critical thinking is under constant debate (Sanders, Wiseman, and Gass 1994; Andrews 2015; Hasnunidah et al. 2020). In light of the increasing prevalence of both argumentation and critical thinking, and the ongoing debate surrounding their meanings and roles in higher education, it is more important than ever to avoid automatically applying pedagogical techniques labeled as such and instead carefully examine them in real-life educational contexts.
41The purpose of this work was to examine the ancient category of fallacies in light of recent debates on the pedagogy of argumentation. I have identified four central critiques of this category and demonstrated how a local argumentation course, which produced a collaborative online fallacy manual available to the public, can address the challenges raised by opponents of fallacy teaching. Teaching fallacies must adhere to the following principles, which address the concerns raised by critiques and ensure that the fallacy method effectively promotes critical thinking skills:
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Fallacies should not be viewed as a static, sanctified list derived solely from historical origins. Instead, they should be seen as dynamic concepts that can be updated and negotiated with students.
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Education through fallacies should focus on real-life cases from relevant public discussions, rather than relying solely on fabricated examples. This approach tests fallacy labels against real data, validating or challenging their relevance and fostering a nuanced understanding of ambiguous cases.
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The analysis of fallacies must be contextual. Interpretation should involve a range of questions regarding the context of each case, recognizing borderline cases that do not fit neatly into predefined categories. The goal is not to pre-emptively condemn arguments but to identify potential issues in argumentation and test them.
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Fallacies are most effectively learned collaboratively, through ongoing example-tracing and negotiation over interpretation. In this process, students and instructors share their thought processes rather than imposing preconceived answers. This approach allows the fallacy method to enhance dialogue rather than reinforcing adversarial and polarizing public discussion norms.
42Fallacies are often viewed as both overly simplistic and excessively complex. While Hundleby highlights the practical utility of fallacy labels as (too) convenient (2010: 283), Blair suggests that the complexity of fallacy theory exceeds the comprehension of most undergraduates and educators alike (2023: 249). This notion also circles back to the assertion made by some critics that the enjoyable aspect of fallacies may suggest a deficiency in the seriousness of the method as it is usually taught. This view rests on the assumption that there is a contradiction between positive emotions and intellectual rigor. However, positive emotional engagement in learning does not inherently diminish the difficulty; rather, it can arise from an active, creative, and intellectually invested student disposition (Trigwell and Han 2012; Oriol and Mendoza 2016; Tan et al. 2021). In fact, students consistently rate the argumentation course discussed here as both demanding and enjoyable. The course maintains a near 100% completion rate each year, not by lowering standards, but by upholding rigorous requirements designed to foster deep engagement.
43David Hitchcock recalls that when he taught fallacies, students “were apparently able (and willing) to find a fallacy in anything” (2017: 401). This perceived omnipresence of fallacies – also evident in our course – is one of the factors that generates resistance to them. Fallacies are pervasive: they are accessible, relatively easy to grasp, and can be superficially applied with ease. Yet this phenomenon is not unique to fallacies; beginners in any discipline often rush to apply new concepts enthusiastically. The eagerness of students to use the terminology they have learned – even obsessively – can serve as a productive starting point for deeper, more reflective discussions. If this eagerness becomes an endpoint, the fallacy category can be misleading and counterproductive. But the appeal of fallacies as an analytical tool is not necessarily a sign of their conceptual weakness; rather, it presents a pedagogical opportunity to draw students into complex interpretive work within the messy – and often dangerously demagogical – terrain of contemporary public discourse.