1Around the turn of the millennium, another turn occurred within argumentation theory. In 1990, Herbert W. Simons first spoke of a « rhetorical turn » in the discourse of the humanities and social sciences at large, intending « to counterpose rhetorical perspectives on inquiry against the dominant objectivist presuppositions of our age » (1990: 1). For the field of argumentation theory that had for a long time regarded itself as associated rather with (formal or informal) logic or dialectics and had chosen to look at rhetoric as either an art of wilful deceit or an art of embellishing texts on the surface (in other words at best in an « auxiliary role as a kind of handmaiden of dialectic » [Hohmann 2002: 41]), it meant that rhetoric, « a term that is so often preceded by the words mere, only, or just » (Simons 1990: 2), progressively began in that period to gain ground and to get accepted as a serious and reputable discipline of its own within the field of argumentation studies.
2Increasingly, argumentation scholars began to shift their attention from analyzing the dry structures of logical proof to considering also the heuristic methods of actual debate and discussion and to examining how argumentative discourse is shaped by tropes and figures, by the skillful addressing and framing of issues, and by the need to adapt arguments to ends, audiences, and circumstances. During this general development and explicitly citing Simons as a source of inspiration (e.g. van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a: 135 note 13; 139), the Amsterdam school of Pragma-Dialectics, too, found it advisable to revise and extend its model of arguing in the context of a critical discussion by incorporating elements of rhetoric.
3The Pragma-Dialecticians were initially rather sceptical of the notion of strategic thinking that would be deemed more typical of rhetoric; thus, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 9) wrote:
In a rhetorical approach, these practical exertions amount, first and foremost, to giving people directions for arguing successfully. By sampling shining examples and enforcing imitative training, students are taught how to persuade an audience. […] the rhetorical approach to practical problems can be characterized as prescription-minded.
4They focused instead mainly on formulating procedural rules for an ideal dialectical debate (the fifteen procedural rules for a critical discussion or the « ten commandments » for the reasonable comportment of discussants; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 135-157, 190-196) as a model for resolving conflicts of opinion and identifying fallacies. Thus, for the Pragma-Dialecticians, the integration of rhetorical elements into their analysis of argumentative discourse meant a major move, a move for which mainly Peter Houtlosser, together with Frans van Eemeren, was responsible. Yet they decided to call these not rhetorical elements, but « strategic maneuverings »: « The gap between dialectic and rhetoric can in our view be bridged by introducing the theoretical notion of “strategic maneuvering” to do justice to the fact that engaging in argumentative discourse always means being at the same time out for critical reasonableness and artful effectiveness » (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2009a: 4). First ideas in that direction began to burgeon in the late 1990s; the earliest publication that fully showcased the term was a paper titled « Strategic Manoeuvring in Argumentative Discourse » by van Eemeren and Houtlosser in 1999. A long series of related publications was to follow, in which the theory was progressively refined (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2006, 2009; van Eemeren 2010a), culminating, after Peter Houtlosser’s sad demise in 2008, in van Eemeren’s 2010 book with the programmatic title Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse: Extending the Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Argumentation (van Eemeren 2010b).
5What I’d like to do in this paper is critically call into question the choice of the term « strategic maneuvering » for this rhetorical extension and look at its relationship to rhetoric proper. For this purpose, I will first briefly describe the pragma-dialectical concept of strategic maneuvering, and then make some critical remarks, focusing especially on the notion of strategy in that context. I will first discuss the crucial terms strategy and maneuvering, including their history and implications. Then, I will examine the implications of the theory for the three different aspects of strategic maneuvering and the analysis of fallacies as « derailments » of strategic maneuverings.
6The pragma-dialectical concept of strategic maneuvering proceeds from the insight that interlocutors who engage in argumentative discourse to resolve a difference of opinion are not only interested in maintaining standards of reasonableness, but also in having the difference resolved in their own favor. Hence, there are two aspects involved: a dialectical one, interested in reasonableness, and a rhetorical one, interested in the effectiveness of argumentation. The concept of strategic maneuvering aims at a combination of both, or, as van Eemeren and Houtlosser write, at « a systematic integration of rhetorical considerations in a dialectical framework » (2002a: 135). This shows that the concept is lopsided. Even if they speak of a « delicate balance » that needs to be maintained, it is invariably the rhetorical aspect that is integrated into a dialectical frame, not the other way. « There is no question about the appropriate relationship here – rhetoric is the handmaid of dialectic, and rhetorical moves operate within a dialectical framework » (Tindale 2009: 42, about van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999: 493). The primacy of dialectics over rhetoric, of reasonableness over effectiveness, remains undisputed on all accounts, as is perhaps only natural for a theory that understands itself as basically and primarily rooted in the tradition of dialectics.
7Essentially, this pragma-dialectical concept of strategic maneuvering unfolds in three aspects, as is illustrated in the famous triangle of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren 2010b: 95; van Eemeren et al. 2014: 554): the three rhetorical aspects represented are, in pragma-dialectical parlance, choices from topical potential, adaptation to audience demand, and the use of presentational devices. The first refers to the selection of topical arguments, the second to audience-orientation, and the third to the use of rhetorical figures and tropes. By displaying double-headed arrows between each pair of angles in the graphic visualization, the triangle insinuates that the three angles are all interrelated and situated on an equal level, which, as we shall shortly see, is not the case.
8This triad is applied to each of the four stages of a pragma-dialectical critical discussion: confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage, and concluding stage, which stretches out to form a complete tableau of applications (see van Eemeren 2018: 116; van Eemeren et al. 2014: 555) that only at a first glance looks complex, but is actually easy to read: it visualizes how on this model all four stages of a critical discussion, i.e. assessment of the difference of opinion, fixing of the starting point of the debate, mutual exchange of arguments, and final ascertainment of the outcome of the debate, can be conducted not only in compliance with the dialectical standards of reasonableness, but also in pursuit of the rhetorical aim of effectiveness under each of these three aspects. In the end, the tableau does not do much more than distribute the two predicates « reasonable » and « effective » over all four stages and three aspects.
9A further problem seems to be that it is not entirely clear which step the term « strategic maneuvering » precisely describes. On the one hand it appears to refer to the « delicate balancing » of dialectical and rhetorical aims against each other: « In their efforts to reconcile the simultaneous pursuit of these two different aims, which may at times even seem to go against each other, the arguers make use of what we have termed strategic maneuvering » (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a: 135). Yet on the other hand it is also said that « strategic maneuvering can take place in making an expedient choice from the options constituting the “topical potential” […], in selecting a responsive adaptation to “audience demand,” and in exploiting the appropriate “presentational devices”, » and these are called the « three aspects of strategic maneuvering » (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a: 139). Hence, at which point precisely does strategic maneuvering come to pass? Does it consist in the deployed rhetorical moves themselves in the first place, or only in their subsequent weighing and balancing against the standards of reasonableness? On the face of it, the first would seem to be more in line with a popular understanding of « strategic » and « maneuvers. »
10Let us now look more closely at the term « strategic maneuvering » itself. It consists of two elements: « strategy » and « maneuvering ». Both of them are metaphorical, a fact that we will need to keep in mind.
11First, we need to clarify: What is a strategy? Clearly, to begin with, « strategy » is a metaphor from a martial context. And in fact, from military historians such as Beatrice Heuser, you still get a warlike definition: « Strategy is a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills – there have to be at least two sides to a conflict » (Heuser 2010: 27-28). But, as Lawrence Freedman, another military historian, notes:
This field of study at first was known as tactics, a word that had for some time referred to the orderly organization and maneuver of troops. Tactics, defined as « the science of military movements » could, according to Beatrice Heuser [2010: 4], be traced back to the fourth century BCE. There was no corresponding definition of strategy until an anonymous sixth-century work linked it explicitly with the general’s art (Freedman 2013: 72).
12But the Greek word strategía referred initially to the office, not to the art of a general (a strategós, an « army-leader »); in the latter sense the term came into use only much later, first in the anonymous sixth-century Byzantine treatise Perì strategías (trans. Dennis 1985: 10-135) that Heuser and Freedman allude to. It was then taken up around 900 C.E. in the treatise titled Taktiká by the Emperor Leo VI the Wise (ed. Vári 1917; trans. Dennis 2010; see Heuser 2010: 4; Freedman 2013: 72). Both Byzantine treatises draw a clear distinction between strategy and tactics; they define strategy as « the means by which a commander may defend his own lands and defeat his enemies », but the hierarchically subordinated tactics by contrast as « the science which enables one to organize and maneuver a body of armed men in an orderly manner » (Freedman 2013: 72). At this point already, we may note the historical priority of tactics as well as the repeated association of tactics with maneuvering.
13Into modern languages, the term and concept of « strategy » was only introduced in the late eighteenth century, « reflecting an Enlightenment optimism that war—like other spheres of human affairs—could benefit from the application of reason » (Freedman 2013: X). But then again, it first had to emancipate and detach itself from tactics. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert, in his Essai général de tactique (London 1772), distinguished « “elementary tactics” which became “tactics” from “grand tactics” which became “strategy” » (Freedman 2023: 73): In Guibert’s own words: « Il faut diviser la tactique en deux parties; l’une élémentaire & bornée; l’autre composée & sublime. […] La seconde partie est, à proprement parler, La science des généraux » (1772: 9; « Tactics must be divided into two parts, one elementary and limited, the other complex and sublime. […] The second part is, properly speaking, the science of generals » – trans. Abel 2022).
14In his French translation of the treatise by Leo the Wise, Paul Gédéon Joly de Maïzeroy in 1771 « identified Leo’s “science of the general“ as being separate from the subordinate spheres of tactics » (Freedman 2013: 73). With Maïzeroy’s rendering of Leo’s strategía as « stratégie », « [a] word was born » (Freedman 2017: 93). A few years later, as British military historian Hew Strachan emphasizes, « Joly de Maizeroy published his Théorie de la guerre (1777), in which he identified a second level to the art of war, a level which he called strategy, and which he saw as “sublime” and depending on reason rather than rules » (Strachan 2005: 35). In that treatise, Maïzeroy explicitly speaks of
la différence de la tactique, proprement dite, à ce que les grecs appeloient stratégique qui est particulièrement la science du général, même de l’homme d’état. À la tactique appartient l’art de dresser les troupes, de les ranger & de les faire mouvoir ; l’art de l’attaque & de la défense [...]. La stratégie a quelque chose de plus élevé
15– which he connects to the « ressort de la dialectique, c’est a dire, de la faculté la plus sublime de l’esprit, du raisonnement » (Maïzeroy 1777: lXXXV-lXXXVI). Guibert, too, by 1779 adopts the term « la stratégique » (Freedman 2013: 73).
16But once the concept of strategy had firmly established itself, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it saw a meteoric rise in popularity and an almost inflationary application in a variety of different fields, from the original military over business management and game theory to sports. Strachan hence complains:
The word « strategy » has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning and left it only with banalities. Governments have strategies to tackle the problems of education, public health, pensions and inner-city housing. Advertising companies have strategies to sell cosmetics or clothes. Strategic studies flourish more verdantly in schools of business studies than in departments of international relations. […] But strategic studies are not business studies, nor is strategy […] a synonym for policy (2005: 34; see also Heuser 2010: 28).
17During this metaphoric expansion, the term has been increasingly « demartialized », so that its warlike roots are decreasingly sensed in most contexts today, including argumentation and rhetoric. But it must be admitted that rhetorical theory has often been accused, especially by feminist critics, of using overly martial and military imagery or imagery from martial sports such as boxing, wrestling, or fencing.
18In the broadest sense, one can agree with Freedman, who summarizes:
There is no agreed-upon definition of strategy that describes the field and limits its boundaries. One common contemporary definition describes it as being about maintaining a balance between ends, ways, and means; about identifying objectives; and about the resources and methods available for meeting such objectives » (2013: XI).
19The words « maintaining a balance » in Freedman’s definition may sound like an echo from van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s « maintaining a delicate balance » (2002a) between dialectic and rhetoric in strategic maneuvering.
20Yet most theoreticians of strategy, from various disciplines, will agree on a small number of constitutive elements: one is an orientation towards a goal, another one the utilization of (usually limited) resources to the achievement of that goal, a third the purposeful design of actions, but the most important one is premeditation, thinking ahead, i.e. the anticipation of other agents’ moves and of the consequences of one’s own actions. For « strategy is required when others might frustrate one’s plans because they have different and possibly opposing interests » (Freedman 2013: XI).
21But analysts of strategy also agree on a model of layers: On top, there must be some vision of a goal that is pursued and aimed at. For the long-term achievement of that goal, a strategy will be developed, and for the implementation of that strategy, certain practical moves will be initiated on a lower, operational level; that level is commonly called the level of tactics. Hence, there is general agreement on a distinction between long-term strategy and short-term tactics.
22On which of these levels are the so-called strategic maneuverings situated? To clarify, we need to look at the second term: maneuvering. Here again, martial connotations seem to be involved: the maneuvering of troops. Van Eemeren prefers another field of imagery, namely nautical navigation (not unusual for a Dutch author). He writes (2010: 40): « When boats are “maneuvering for position,” they are moving about to get to advantageous positions. This moving about aimed at ending up in the best possible position in the situation at hand is exactly what we wanted our term maneuvering to mean. » Is he imagining something like battleships taking positions in formation for an envisaged battle? In that case, we are again back to a military context, but it is doubtful if we are not on the short-term tactical rather than the long-term strategic level. Or are the breakneck flight maneuvers of combat planes rather what we should think of? That would not only be likewise within the martial context, but also even more clearly on the tactical side. We will mind van Eemeren’s expression « in the situation at hand ». Christopher Tindale prefers a less martial interpretation: The metaphor of maneuvers makes him think of boats moving around obstacles towards a pursued goal: « At the opening stage, the rhetorical ploys adopted by arguers may be effectively presented by adopting the metaphor of maneuvers, of moving around obstacles towards a goal » (Tindale 2009: 43). One might perhaps also be tempted to think of the moves of pieces on a chessboard. All this, however, is more related to the level of tactics than it is to strategy.
23To give an example from the present Russian-Ukrainian war: when the Russians realized that their plan of a landslide invasion and a quick conquest of Kyiv had failed, they turned to attacking Ukrainian infrastructure. That is an actual change of strategy (with final aims unchanged). But moving around troops or ships in a particular combat situation may be better addressed as tactics. What I wish to say is that the very notion of maneuvering as such is by its nature more prone to the level of tactics than to strategy. Hence, the very idea of maneuvering strategically may be an oxymoron, unless the idea is that tactical maneuvers are to be imagined as subordinated to a long-term strategy.
24Van Eemeren was himself clearly aware of that problem. In his 2010 book, he annotates:
An alternative term to « strategic » might be « tactical », but the latter term highlights in the first place the local expediency of the maneuvering at the operational level and brings the terminology too close to the effectiveness pole while getting automatically too far removed from the reasonableness pole. I also think that in ordinary usage, a « tactic » is in the first place a tool to reach a strategic goal, coming close to a ploy (2010b: 41, note 39).
25Hence, the choice of the term « strategic » was in fact ultimately induced by the interest to maintain that delicate balance and to avoid tipping the scale too much in the direction of « the effectiveness pole » to the disadvantage of « the reasonableness pole », or, to put it more bluntly, to save and secure the primacy of dialectics over rhetoric. Hence, with respect to the three aspects of strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse, we need to check if they rightly belong to the level of long-term strategy or rather to short-term tactics. At least according to analysts of military strategy, whenever there is talk about « moves » or « maneuvers », we would clearly be at the level of tactics, not strategy.
26To begin with, from a purely rhetorical perspective, of the three aspects named, topics would belong to the canon of inventio, figures and tropes to elocutio, and audience orientation would be involved in all subsets as a general prerequisite and basic principle. On the other hand, it goes without saying that this selective triad skips other substantial parts of the rhetorical system, such as dispositio and most parts of actio, not to speak of the great potential of non-logical means of persuasion such as ethos or pathos. I therefore understand Jeanne Fahnestock’s observation that
the complete rhetorical canon may be useful in the pragma-dialectical pursuit of how meeting rhetorical goals can still satisfy dialectical demands since the first two elements of strategic maneuvering actually include the standard three appeals [i.e. logos, ethos and pathos] and the third element considers their expression (2009: 211-212; my parenthesis)
more as an outlook than as a stock-taking assessment.
27How about choices from topical potential? Is this a specifically rhetorical move at all? The term topos, at least, is not a typically rhetorical term, but in fact originates from dialectics. Topos is also a notoriously evasive term, ill-defined ever since antiquity; it can mean anything from a heuristic method for finding arguments to fixed and ready-made argument schemes; it can refer to form as well as to content. Mind that Aristotle’s entire Topics, a chief model and source of inspiration for the dialectical component within Pragma-Dialectics, consists of exploring the possibilities of topical arguing. Hence, topical argument is not at all alien to dialectics in the first place, and therefore hardly needs to be brought in as an additional rhetorical element. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) have amply shown, identifying oppositions, dissociations and classifications, analogies and similarities, etc., are the very basis of all argumentation lest it be reduced to quasi-mathematical formulae as in scholastic logic. Arguments in real life must always be filled with some material content. If one takes an extreme position, then all argumentation may be reduced to topics.
28Moreover, the quest for effectiveness is inherent to dialectics no less than to rhetoric. Aristotle’s dialectic is not a theoretical art of problem-solving, but a practical art of winning a competition by all kinds of clever moves: anticipating an opponent’s moves, decoying the opponent into an unfavorable position, and shrewdly maneuvering oneself into the most advantageous position have always been essential components of Aristotelian dialectics. Perhaps, in its earliest concept, Pragma-Dialectics underestimated that particular aspect of its own dialectical tradition and thus missed a more obvious opportunity to include the most natural goal of effectiveness in the first place.
29Inversely, nor is rhetoric, if understood correctly, simply a wild and unregulated exertion of forcible means of verbal overpowering that requires taming by the reins of dialectic reasonableness. It is a critical activity in itself, governed by completely transparent and coherent standards of reasonableness, and precisely so because it aims at effectiveness.
30Yet clearly, topical arguments do not really constitute a strategy but are tactical moves. As van Eemeren writes:
in each particular case the arguer can make a choice from a variety of subtypes and variants of « causal » argumentation, « symptomatic » argumentation and « comparison » argumentation to select exactly the causal, symptomatic, or comparison argument he finds fitting (2010: 94; my italics).
31Although van Eemeren and Houtlosser repeatedly insist that a choice from topical potential is available for all four stages of a critical discussion (e.g. 1999: 495, note 18: « In the way we use the term, there are aggregates of topical potential or “topical systems” for all discussion stages, not just for the argumentation stage »), this clearly focuses on the argumentation stage, and on individual argumentative moves to be made « in each particular case ». Circumstantial moments such as the particular situation or an opponent’s unexpected move will thus have to be considered. Is this then rightly called strategic, or are we instead on the lower level of tactics? One might perhaps concede that there is a certain element of strategy involved in the general acknowledgement that such an inventory of arguments does exist and is at the arguer’s disposal. Yet, the ultimate choice and decision will always be determined by a particular (and potentially unpredictable) situation.
32At first sight, chances look more propitious in the case of adaptation to audience demand. « In general, adaptation to audience demand will consist of an attempt to create in each stage the required empathy or “communion” » (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a: 140; similarly 1999: 485). But there appears to be a problem: Who is the audience in a pragma-dialectical critical discussion? Is it the immediate opponent, or some third-party observer? If it is the opponent (as I would assume, since that instance is sometimes also called the addressee), then adaptation to audience demand will be a matter of course, as it already was in Aristotle’s dialectic. Both in Aristotle and in the pragma-dialectical model, no statement may be taken for granted and drawn on in the further course of the discussion unless it has been explicitly accepted or approved of by both parties. In the pragma-dialectical model, this is a corollary of the « externalization » of commitments (Procedural rules 1 and 14; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 136, 156; van Eemeren et al. 2014: 525-526). According to the rules of a critical discussion, by having explicitly expressed acceptance of a particular declarative within the argumentative exchange, the respondent (or, for that matter, the opponent) is committed to not attacking or denying it anymore. For this reason, each party in an argumentative discourse will, by all means, try to ensure that the other party accepts their statements and will therefore formulate them accordingly.
33If, on the other hand, a third-party evaluator or judge were involved as « the audience » of a critical discussion, the pragma-dialectical problem-solving procedure ideally proceeding bilaterally between a « protagonist » and an « antagonist » would now also be depending on some external person’s judgment, which would in principle be a dilution or blurring of the original pragma-dialectical concept of an autonomous bilateral critical discussion as such. There would then be two (or more) « audiences » at a time that an arguer would have to adapt to, which may create conflicts. Yet in fact, the rather recent pragma-dialectical concept of different « “communicative activity types” in which strategic maneuvering takes place » (van Eemeren and van Haaften 2024: 1233, see also van Eemeren 2010b: 139-145, van Eemeren, Houtlosser, Ihnen and Lewiński 2010) does include also types such as « adjudication » or « mediation », which explicitly bring in a third party endowed with the functional authority to decide disputes at hand (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2006: 384-385, van Eemeren et al. 2014: 557-563). On this theory, a potential multiplicity of audiences would already be inherent to the system.
34However, what is more important is that adaptation to audience demand appears not to be located on the same systemic level as the other two aspects. For audience demand plays a decisive role both in the choice of arguments from topical potential and in the choice of presentational devices. In both cases, the choice will adapt to the demands of the actual audience. As Tindale observes: « the audience is similarly important for the other two features in strategic maneuvering, topical potential and presentational device, since the topics to be chosen and the most effective devices for presentation are both decided with the audience in mind » (Tindale 2009: 50). Hence the question is: Is audience demand then a third aspect, on a par with the other two, or is it rather an overarching principle (which van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a: 141, note 34, 2002b: 16, note 9, wish to deny), and we are left with two material aspects only, one (topical arguments) related to inventio, and the other (presentational devices) to elocutio? It would be difficult to similarly pigeonhole audience demand.
35This finally takes us to presentational devices. « For optimally conveying rhetorical moves, the available presentational devices must be strategically put to good use. This means that discursively effective means should be sought to convey the various moves in the discourse » (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a: 140, 1999: 485). In this case, the choice of innovative terminology may be particularly misleading. What exactly are we to understand by « presentational devices »? Are we talking about primarily elocutionary features such as figures and tropes (« Rhetorical figures are specific modes of expression that can be used as presentational devices » – van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999: 485 = 2002a: 140), or are elements of presentation and delivery, such as voice modulation, gestures, or oratorial poise also included? Just as Aristotle in the third book of his Rhetoric notoriously conflated aspects of style and presentation, the same seems to be happening here. Theoretical explanations (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999: 485 = 2002a: 140-141; van Rees and Rigotti 2011) and practical case studies (e.g. Snoeck Henkemans 2009, 2017, van Haaften 2017) focus mainly on the use of stylistic figures such as rhetorical questions, praeteritiones, hyperboles, ellipses, aposiopeses and the like, or on tropes such as metaphors, but in real-life debates non-discursive presentational aspects such as oratorial image-building, winning of trust and sympathy or pathetic emphasis may be equally relevant.
36Moreover, the employment of the term « device » (intimating a kind of « tool » or « gimmick ») may still betray a certain amount of suspiciousness against those features from the elocutionary panoply of rhetoric that (so one might perceive) had better remain restricted to the realm of mere stylistic embellishments but, when used, are always used with a certain intent, as if it were at all possible to communicate entirely without any of those linguistic features. But one thing is clear as well: The employment of such presentational devices will always operate in the context of special situations and hence again be situated on the tactical, not the strategic level. In that context, at best a general decision to employ them either on a grand scale or else only sparingly might perhaps qualify as a strategy.
37The most recent important and promising new theoretical addendum to the concept of Pragma-Dialectics, arguably suggested by the taxonomy of « argumentative activity types », has been the distinction of different « argumentative styles » (« style », of course, understood in a much broader scope than the « traditional » rhetorical task of elocutio), primarily the differentiation between « detached » and « engaged » argumentative styles (van Eemeren 2019, 2021, van Eemeren et al. 2022, van Eemeren and Garssen 2023b; for an integration of argumentative and linguistic style see van Haaften and van Leeuwen 2021). Yet these distinctions are again firmly rooted in and closely connected to the threefold concept of strategic maneuvering. As, for instance, chapter 3 in van Eemeren et al. (2022: 21-32, based on van Eemeren 2019) fairly well documents, the three categories of topical selection, adaptation to audience demand, and choice of presentational devices still play a pivotal role in determining and defining the characteristics of the different argumentative styles. « Rhetoric », by contrast, does not even feature in the volume’s index anymore.
38One major innovation of the extended pragma-dialectical theory is an apparently new definition of fallacies. Based on the theory of strategic maneuvering, they are now defined as « derailments » of such maneuverings. The identification is mutual, since not only are all fallacies said to consist in such derailments, but also, inversely, all derailments will automatically be fallacious. Apart from the fact that, against the figurative background of nautical or military maneuvers, a « derailment » is a somewhat crooked image, this « new » definition of fallacy is in fact only an apparently new one. For when we ask what defines such derailments, the answer is that they are described as violations of one or more of the dialectical procedural rules for a critical discussion: « When any of the rules for critical discussion constituting the code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse is violated in the process, the strategic manoeuvring derails into fallaciousness » (van Eemeren and Garssen 2023a: 173-174). This, however, falls back into the earlier pragma-dialectical definition of a fallacy in the first place (see van Eemeren and Grootendost 1992: 102-106: « Fallacies as violations of discussion rules »). If this is so, it means that the traditional pragma-dialectical explanation of fallacies has not in principle changed at all, and the new metaphor of derailments would in fact only provide a new rhetorical framing for an old theory.
39When van Eemeren and Houtlosser define rhetoric as « the theoretical study of the potential effectiveness of argumentative discourse in convincing or persuading an audience in actual argumentative practice » (2006: 383), it is obvious that the task allotted to rhetoric within the « delicate balance » consists in « persuading » efficiently, while dialectic is assigned the job of saving the standard of « reasonableness », in other words, of containing the otherwise potentially unbridled and deceitful tendency of rhetoric, so as to keep it within the bounds of « convincingness » and logical soundness. Despite the outward commitment to « a systematic integration of rhetorical considerations in a dialectical framework » (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a: 135) within the concept of strategic maneuvering, this seems to indicate that the Pragma-Dialecticians’ take on rhetoric is still a basically distrustful and suspicious one. This is also reflected in the somewhat dismissive vocabulary of « maneuvers » or « devices » and in the refusal to locate these « maneuvers » on the lower level of tactics, because this would bring them « too close to the effectiveness pole » and make them appear like « a tool […] coming close to a ploy » (van Eemeren 2010b: 41, note 39).
40Simon Wolf, in a forthcoming book based on his Tübingen PhD thesis, for similar reasons likewise surmises that the image of rhetoric in a pragma-dialectical context (perhaps unintentionally) continues to be the conventional one of a radical, potentially ruthless and immoral craft that imperatively needs to be tamed by the more « reflection-minded » (van Eemeren and Grootendost 1992: 9) framework of dialectic (Wolf forthcoming: section 4.5.7). Wolf also points to the fact that the concept of balancing and reconciling dialectical and rhetorical aims by the concept of strategic maneuvering suffers from a fundamental antinomy: if in an act of strategic maneuvering dialectical and rhetorical aims are identical, reconciling or balancing them will neither be necessary, nor even feasible by definition, but whenever they are divergent, such balancing will not be admissible procedurally, unless those rhetorical aims that are not coincident with (and thus by definition opposed to) the dialectical aims are waived and foregone (Wolf forthcoming: section 4.5.9). The balance is thus a lopsided one. As we said above, the postulate of the absolute primacy of dialectics over rhetoric remains undisputed.
41Where, then, is the strategic element in strategic maneuvering, if we cannot really trace it in the three basic aspects that Pragma-Dialecticians name, but invariably only find tactical maneuvers there? The clue is probably to be detected in the metaphorical description of the entire theory as such. Both terms, strategy and maneuvering, evoke a situation of conflict and antagonism and thereby refer back to the dialectical basis of the model of a critical discussion, namely the resolution of an initial conflict of opinions in critical discussion; in other words, they implicitly restate and reinforce the postulated primacy of reasonableness over effectiveness.
42Quite revealingly, in one of his later essays, van Eemeren writes: « This strategic maneuvering takes place by exploiting concurrently the available topical potential, the opportunities for framing the addressee’s perspective and the presentational possibilities » (2009b: 3; my italics). Mind the vocabulary: What may « framing » mean here? Just « phrasing », or rather something closer to « shaping » or « molding »? And how about « exploiting »? That sounds pretty negative as well, almost in the sense of « instrumentalizing » or « taking advantage of ». But van Eemeren and Houtlosser quite often use that term, for instance when they speak of « exploiting the appropriate presentational devices » (1999: 484, 2002b: 16).
43Yet in the same year, Christopher Tindale (2009: 42-49) has aptly pointed to the fact that the exposition of the theory of strategic maneuvering itself by the Pragma-Dialecticians fuses all three of its own basic aspects: it uses a selection of topical arguments, it makes an obvious attempt at audience adaptation, but, above all, it is formulated in highly metaphorical language, which is to say that it heavily employs presentational devices. Both the description of the system itself as a strategic employment of maneuverings and the equally metaphorical description of fallacies as « derailments » seek to render the description more persuasive by employing rhetorical strategies. The description is therefore ultimately self-referential (« Maneuvering strategically for strategic maneuvering », as Tindale 2009: 41 has it).
44This self-referentiality, however, may after all be the most significant benefit achieved for Pragma-Dialectics by the implementation of such novel metaphorical vocabulary instead of adopting classical rhetorical terms. It also fulfills all the criteria for a true strategy: long-term aim, premeditation, and a purposeful design of actions on an operational level. By describing itself as strategic, the concept perhaps best discloses the ultimate strategy that underlies it: its implementation may be an efficient strategy in itself, ultimately devised in order to shield and immunize pragma-dialectical theory against objections raised not only by other schools of argumentation theory, but particularly so by rhetoricians such as Christian Kock (2007), Hanns Hohmann (2002), David Zarefsky (2006, 2009) and others.
Flux RSS
