• 1 Jargalan Erdenebat, interview by Nikolay Erofeev and Łukasz Stanek, Ulaanbaatar, 13 April 2018; se (...)
• 2 Jargalan Erdenebat, interview by Nikolay Erofeev and Łukasz Stanek, Ulaanbaatar, 13 April 2018.

1The BUK-1 factory of prefabricated concrete panels is a large compound located in the south-western part of Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia. Constructed in 1963 by the Soviet Union, by the time of our visit in April 2018 the factory was about to reopen after more than twenty-five years of idleness. Under the new ownership of the Erel Group, it had been renovated and equipped with machinery from Belgian, German, and Italian manufacturers. Jargalan Erdenebat, the executive director of the Erel Group, explained to us the process of producing a wide range of concrete elements, including hollow core slabs, solid walls and ceilings, sandwich walls, interior walls, columns and beams, stairs and the reinforcements required for them.1 Erdenebat argued that high-quality, large-scale, prefabricated concrete technology was a solution to Mongolia’s housing shortage, and instrumental for the government’s attempt to modernize the informal settlements, or ger districts, in Ulaanbaatar and other Mongolian cities. As he explained, the revived factory would assume its former role as an essential supplier of construction materials for the city: according to Erdenebat, “eighty percent of buildings in Ulaanbaatar were built with precast elements manufactured in this plant.”2

• 3 Sh. Bira, Mongolia's Road to Socialism, Ulaanbaatar: Montsame, 1981, p. 8.

2This example alone demonstrates the importance of the Soviet Union for the urbanization processes in Mongolia during the 20th century. Yet the BUK-1 factory was but one of many components of what the Soviets called the “material-technical base” for construction, or the network of organizations that included building-materials producers, construction companies, design institutes, and education and research centers. From the creation of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) in 1924 until the end of the Cold War, this material-technical base in Mongolia was established and advanced with “technical assistance” from the socialist countries. They included the Soviet Union, followed after World War II by the People’s Republic of China (until the mid-1960s) and the socialist states in Eastern Europe. By the 1960s, a significant part of this technical assistance was coordinated by the Comecon (Council for the Mutual Economic Assistance): the economic organization of the socialist states under Soviet hegemony, of which Mongolia became the first non-European member in 1962. This vast movement of people and resources—including construction materials, machinery, individual and type designs, and regulatory documents, standards, and building codes—shaped Mongolia’s path “from feudalism to socialism, bypassing capitalism.”3

• 4 Recent publications include: Márta Branczik, “Exporttervezési munkák,” in András Ferkai (ed.), KÖZ (...)
• 5 Anne Dietrich, “Zwischen solidarischem Handel und ungleichem Tausch: Zum Südhandel der DDR am Bei (...)
• 6 Elke Beyer, “Competitive Coexistence: Soviet Town Planning and Housing Projects in Kabul in the 19 (...)

3By studying these exchanges from the 1960s to the 1980s, this paper contributes to the scholarship on architectural mobilities between what during the Cold War was called the “Second” and the “Third” worlds.4 In recent years, this scholarship has advanced our understanding of the emergence of modern architecture as a worldwide phenomenon after World War II, and offered a more differentiated view of urbanization processes during the Cold War. In particular, scholars have challenged the reduction of architecture’s globalization to Westernization and Americanization; they have reconsidered urbanization processes in Africa, Asia, and South America beyond the effects of the colonial encounter with Western Europe and the globalization of capitalism; and they have foregrounded actors, institutions, and modes of collaboration beyond those inherited from previous historical periods. At the same time, scholarship on “global socialism,” or the multiple, evolving, and often contradictory instances of collaboration between socialist countries and the newly independent countries, challenged the bipolar geographical imagination inherited from the Cold War period.5 Scholars pointed not only at bifurcations within the respective “camps,” including the socialist one, but also made clear that most of the newly independent countries in Africa and Asia were neither Soviet nor American “proxies.” Often, these countries exploited Cold War rivalries in order to achieve specific economic and geopolitical aims.6

• 7 L. Minjuurdorj, “BNMAU-yn barilgazhilt, sotsialist èdyn zasgyn integrats,” Èdyn zasgyn asuudal, no (...)
• 8 Gerhard Kraft, Die Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedsländer des RWG auf dem Gebiet der Investitionen, B (...)

4While Comecon’s support for Mongolia’s material-technical base for construction was part of the architectural mobilities between the “Second” and the “Third” worlds, its dynamics was distinct in three important ways. First, the uninterrupted presence of the Soviets in the MPR lasted from the 1920s until the end of the Cold War, and thus longer than in other newly independent countries in Africa and Asia. In difference to many other developing countries which accepted Soviet assistance, the Soviet presence in the MPR was rarely challenged, in particular after the country severed its relations with People’s Republic of China in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split. Second, the overall share of Comecon technical assistance in Mongolia’s investments in the construction industry was unprecedented. This assistance decisively shaped the industrialization and urbanization of the country from the interwar period until the end of the Cold War, and by the 1970s the share of the Comecon states and, above all, the Soviet Union, was still estimated at 80% of the overall investments in the MPR’s economy.7 Third, once the Eastern Europeans joined the Soviets in providing technical assistance to Mongolia, this assistance was coordinated to a much larger extent than was the case in other newly independent countries during the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev years. This coordination included bilateral agreements between the countries concerned, as well as multilateral coordination by Comecon institutions. Among them, a key role was played by the Permanent Commission for Construction (PCC), created in 1958 in East Berlin with the aim of stimulating and coordinating inter-socialist division of labor in architecture, engineering, and construction, prepared by the standardization of construction materials, nomenclature, and regulations.8

• 9 Randall W. Stone, Satellites and Commissars. Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc (...)

5The study of this long, intense, multilateral, and coordinated mobilization and implementation of architectural resources in socialist Mongolia offers an opportunity to advance current historical scholarship by looking beyond singular designs and construction projects and by considering instead the longer dynamics of state-socialist architectural mobilities in the MPR. This dynamics was conditioned by the broader political economy of the Comecon which, as scholars have pointed out, was evolving from the Soviet exploitation of the satellite countries during the immediate post-war years to their subsidization in later periods. In the course of this process, the Soviet objective of international economic integration often failed in view of the satellites’ resistance and evasion.9 While much of this dynamics is confirmed by the archival material we discuss, our approach differs from that of political and economic historians. Instead of focusing on political leaders and high-ranking bureaucrats, we concentrate on mid-level professionals, in particular architects, planners, engineers, managers, and administrators in charge of the material-technical base for construction. In so doing, we study how these actors followed, exploited, and sometimes challenged the political economy of Comecon’s technical assistance and negotiated it with feedback from design institutes and construction sites.

• 10 Valentin Tkachev, Istoriia mongol’skoi arkhitektury, Moscow: MGSU Izd-vo Assots. stroit. vuzov, 20 (...)
• 11 In order to avoid ambiguity with later nomenclature, and reflecting the majority of our sources, w (...)
• 12 Balazs Szalontai, “From the Demolition of Monasteries to the Installation of Neon Lights: The Poli (...)
• 13 On Ulaanbaatar’s urban development, see: S. Munkhjargal, D. Tsedev and S. Luvsangombo, Ulaanbaatar (...)

9Laid out in the valleys of the Tuul and the Selbe rivers, Ulaanbaatar emerged from a monastery town of Khüree, also called Örgöö (or Urga) which largely consisted of felt houses (called gers or yurts) grouped around Buddhist monasteries, temples, and markets.10 The circular layout of the settlement was incorporated into the planning of the city that followed the collapse of the Manchurian Qing dynasty (1911-1912) and the foundation of the Soviet-dependent MPR. The first master plan of the city, by then renamed Ulaanbaatar (“red hero”), was delivered by the Moscow-based Giprogor (State Institute of Urban Planning, 1954). The Peace Avenue, laid out parallel to the Tuul River and the transmongolian railway line (completed in 1956), was planned as the city’s backbone, connecting most of its districts (referred as khoroolol in Mongolian or mikroraion, plural: mikroraiony in Soviet documents).11 At Sükhbaatar Square, the Avenue was crossed by a perpendicular axis that linked the governmental center with the recreational areas, which incorporated the former palace-temple complex. The size of the city envisaged by the plan for the 1970s was already surpassed by the late 1950s, at which time most of Ulaanbaatar’s population of 152,000 still lived in ger districts, in spite of the accelerated production of new housing.12 Subsequent plans provided by Giprogor with varying levels of Mongolian participation (1963, 1971, 1986) laid out a further extension of the city along the Tuul river valley, maintaining the general decision to assign areas around the railway line for industrial development, and northwards of the line for housing, with additional residential neighborhoods on the southern bank of the Dund Gol river (a section of the Selbe river) (fig. 1). They accommodated a large portion of the city’s expanding population, even if ger districts continued to grow, in Ulaanbaatar and in other Mongolian cities (fig.2).13

• 14 A. Khishigt, “Mongol-Zövlöltyn zoorag töslyn baigoollaga hamtyn ajillagaa,” Barilgachin, no. 4, 19 (...)
• 15 Gerhard Kosel, “Intermezzo im Großen Vaterländischen Krieg—Das Theater für Ulan-Bator,” Architektu (...)

10A drive down the city’s main road, Peace Avenue, reads like a timeline of socialist architecture and urban planning. Its point zero is Sükhbaatar Square, once the site of the mausoleum (now demolished) of the Communist leaders Damdin Sükhbaatar and Khorloo Choibalsan. Inspired by Lenin’s mausoleum in Moscow, it was designed after Sükhbaatar’s death (1922) by architect B. Chimed (considered the “first Mongolian architect”) and Soviet architect B. Bezencev.14 Added to the mausoleum were the Government Palace and the National Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet, the latter designed during World War II by Gerhard Kosel, a German architect who worked in the Soviet Union and later became the head of the PCC (with M. S. Shirov, 1942) (fig. 3).15

• 16 Other buildings in the idiom of socialist realism include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (V. Shul (...)
• 17 “Nemocnice s poliklinikou v Ulán-bátaru, Mongolská lidová republika,” Architektura ČSSR, no. 6, 19 (...)
• 18 Wincenty Szober, “Architekci polscy w Mongolii,” Architektura, no. 11, 1965, p. 472.

11Reflecting the turn of Soviet architecture to modernism and its subsequent rethinking, buildings constructed from the 1960s to the 1980s abandoned the socialist realist idiom of the Theater. Those in the city center and its vicinity include the Palace of Culture, the House of Young Technicians, the Pioneer Palace, and the Wedding Palace (D. Lur’e, N. Stuzhin) (fig. 4).16 Besides the Soviets, architects and engineers from other Comecon countries also contributed to the urban landscape of Ulaanbaatar, with a hospital designed by a Czechoslovak team (Zdeněk Přáda, Karel Hauer, Jan Řídký, design 1960s) and the Romanian-designed circus (Proiect București, 1970s) being among the most visible.17 Some of these buildings testify to inter-socialist collaboration, including one of the movie theaters in the city center which, in the recollection of a Polish architect, was based on a Soviet type-design adapted to the site by a Bulgarian architect working in Ulaanbaatar, and equipped with the help of socialist countries.18

• 19 The Beijing Industrial Design Institute also designed the Central Stadium, the Bogd Khan Mountain (...)

12Public buildings designed by Mongolians evolved in similar ways. Until the early 1960s, Soviet-trained Mongolian architects interpreted the postulate of the “national character” in the idiom of socialist realism, as was the case with the National Drama Theatre, designed by A. Khishigt (late 1950s), and the Ulaanbaatar Hotel, designed by B. Chimed (1961). The same postulate was then reinterpreted in modern forms by Mongolian architects with Soviet collaborators, as it can be seen in the Museum of the Revolution (A. Khishigt, 1971), the Zaisan Mount Memorial (A. Khishigt, 1971-1979) (fig. 5), and the Lenin Museum (G. Luvsandorj, design 1970s) (fig. 6). Some of these buildings were clustered with structures designed by Chinese architects and built by Chinese workers during the 1950s and early 1960s, among them the Central Department Store, the Bayangol Hotel, and the 5^th housing district (fig. 7).19

• 20 For commission documents of mikroraiony 3, 4, and 12 see: UTA f. 288, o. 1, d. 820, 1017, f. 288, (...)
• 21 Balazs Szalontai, “From the Demolition of Monasteries to the Installation of Neon Lights,” op. cit (...)
• 22 In 1965, type designs constituted 90% of the total of residential construction in Mongolia, Desiat (...)
• 23 On the Gandan district, see: RGAE, f. 5, o. 5, d. 116, l. 73-78.

13Like the public buildings, the development of Ulaanbaatar’s housing districts reflected the general tendencies of Soviet and Eastern European architecture and planning. Designed by Soviet institutes, joined by Chinese (until the mid-1960s) and Eastern European architects, and increasingly planned by Mongolian professionals, the evolution of these districts followed the typological shift from the kvartal layout to that of the mikroraion. The former was employed in the areas around the Sükhbaatar Square, while the latter typology, itself evolving, guided the expansion of the city to the east, including mikroraiony 12, 13, 14 and 15 (1965-1970), and to the west, with the 3rd and 4th mikroraion (1975-1983).20 The latter two were together referred to in the Soviet documentation as the “Gandan district,” as they were adjacent to the Gandan monastery, one of the few that survived the demolition of Buddhist monasteries in Mongolia by Communist authorities in 1937-1938.21 These residential areas reflected the development of the Soviet prefabrication systems and housing typologies. For example, the mikroraiony 12 and 15 began with the construction of five-story prefabricated blocks and later were extended by nine- and twelve-story towers with more complex volumes. They were equipped with social facilities distributed according to a normalized system of catchment areas, and they occasionally included a unique building, such as the Palace of Science and Culture in the 12th mikroraion (Mosproekt II, 1975).22 By the 1970s, urban layouts and apartment plans became more flexible and differentiated, as evidenced by the Gandan district. It included five 12-story buildings, laid out on a shamrock plan, and connected by a lower building that housed shops and services.23

• 24 In order to reduce travel and communication costs, several Soviet organizations established branch (...)
• 25 On Mongolian-Soviet agreements concerning the construction of agricultural buildings: UTA f. 288, (...)
• 26 “Protokoll der Spezialistenberatung […],” March-April 1973, Bundesarchiv (Germany, Berlin) (later: (...)

14Not only were these structures designed and built with the assistance of the Soviet Union and its satellites, but the socialist countries provided much of the financing, materials, technologies, expertise, training, and labor that made these investments possible. While the most visible and most celebrated instances of Comecon’s technical assistance in Ulaanbaatar were buildings gifted by the Soviet Union, such as the Wedding Palace or the 12th mikroraion, most projects were funded by loans granted by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In line with Comecon’s foreign trade practice, many of them were repaid with Mongolia’s export products, including foodstuffs and raw materials. Based on loan agreements, intergovernmental commissions formulated guidelines concerning specific investments, which were then implemented by the responsible ministries in Ulaanbaatar and their counterparts in Eastern Europe.24 These guidelines were followed by detailed contracts between state enterprises and foreign trade organizations in the respective socialist country and Mongolia.25 Since the 1960s, Comecon’s PCC had played a decisive role in these negotiations. In particular, Commission experts wrote up proposals concerning the distribution among Comecon member states of particular tasks, including design, construction, and modernization of buildings and ensembles in Mongolia, their expansion, and the training of their personnel.26

• 27 A. Khishigt, “Barilgyn zoorag töslyn baigoollaga 50 zhild,” Èdyn zasgyn asuudal, no. 5, 1979, p. 3 (...)
• 28 Wincenty Szober, “Architekci polscy w Mongolii,” op. cit. (note 18), p. 473; J. Zukhaa, “Barilgyn (...)
• 29 “Barilgyn zoorag tösvyn tovcho,” Unèn, no. 56, 25 February 1978, p. 1; B. Baatarjav, “Zoorag tösly (...)
• 30 D. Sain-Er, “Zoorag töslyn baigoollaga 50 zhild,” Barilgachin, no. 1, 1971, p. 8-11.
• 31 Wincenty Szober, „Architekci polscy w Mongolii”, op. cit. (note 18), p. 473; for the history of th (...)
• 32 RGAE, f. 5, o. 1, d. 687, l. 70a.

16Within this network, the Mongolian State Design Institute played a key role in terms of architectural and urban planning. The Institute emerged from a string of organizations established with the close assistance of the Soviets, starting with the foundation in 1929 of a drafting office in charge of construction plans executed by the first Mongolian construction cooperative (founded in 1926). Since the 1930s, Mongolian planning institutions played an increasing role in the production of design documentation, they employed a growing number of Mongolians, and accelerated the standardization and typification of designs.27 The Institute was divided into specialized sections, including housing, urban planning, industrial architecture, rural architecture, as well as their supporting sections in charge of budgeting and surveys.28 The institute established several regional branches in the capitals of aimags (provinces).29 As Mongolian authors explained, the centralization of the institute allowed for the coordination of the planning and construction processes in the country, and the implementation of unified technical standards.30 By the 1960s, it employed more than 500 people, including over 150 foreign specialists and experts, above all from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, but also from China, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland (fig. 8).31 While many among them traveled to the MPR early in their careers, some were already successful professionals before coming to Mongolia. For example, Volia Kossarzhevskii, the head designer of the 15th mikroraion in Ulaanbaatar, had been chief architect at a Moscow-based design institute specializing in public buildings (TsNIIEP im. Mezentseva).32

• 33 N. Tsevegmid, “Duurialtai komunist,” Unèn, no. 287, 14 October 1979, p. 3.
• 34 See, for example UTA, f. 288, o. 2-29, d. 69.
• 35 B. Dambiiniam, “Arkhitekturnoe obrazovanie v MNR”, Arkhitektura SSSR no. 9, 1979, p. 15-17.
• 36 Ibid.; Ch. Avdai, “Inzhener-tehnikyn mèrgèjiltny uurhai,” Unèn, no. 275, 1982, p. 4.
• 37 Werner Rietdorf, “Bauen und Wohnen in der Mongolischen VR,” Architektur der DDR, no. 7, 1988, p. 1 (...)

17During the first decades of the Institute’s operations, most of its staff were trained in the framework of Soviet, and later Eastern European technical assistance. Some among them were recruited from other professions: a case in point was the career of D. Tsultem, presented in the Mongolian press as “an exemplary Communist.” 33 After graduating from a teachers’ college in 1943 and working as a teacher for several years, Tsultem was trained by Soviet specialists in the financial planning of construction projects. He was then put in charge of budgeting several large investments at the Mongolian State Design Institute. Other paths to a professional career at the Institute led through scholarships that allowed Mongolians to study at architectural schools in the socialist countries, above all in the Soviet Union, but also in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Romania.34 In order to facilitate architectural education in Mongolia, in 1973 the School of Architecture was established at the University of Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar. The first head of the architectural school, Mongolian architect Bandi Dambiinyam (himself trained in Moscow), explained in an article published in 1979 that the school’s curriculum was modeled according to the five-year specialist training at the Moscow State University of Civil Engineering.35 Most educators at the School were trained at Moscow universities (around 60%, according to an estimation from 1982), and students were often sent to Soviet construction sites in order to gain practical experience.36 After the School’s foundation, the numbers of architects in Mongolia began to rise quickly, and by 1987 Mongolia’s architectural union counted at least 150 members, trained either locally or in other socialist countries.37

• 38 S. Budsuren, “ZHU-aas manai orny barilgyn uildverleld uzuulsen tuslamj,” Barilgachin, no. 1, 1971, (...)
• 39 Ministerium für Bauwesen, Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedsländer des RGW auf dem Gebiet des Bauwesen (...)
• 40 Ibid.

18Soviet and Eastern European technical assistance was also decisive for the creation of the construction industry in the MPR. Since the formation of the first state building organization in 1926, the Soviets had supported the development of the Mongolian construction industry and supplied it with experts, machinery, construction materials, and mobile, mechanized construction brigades.38 Central for this process was the foundation and advancement of Mongolian construction-materials industry and its supporting plants. For example, among more than 150 industrial facilities constructed with Soviet assistance between 1961 and 1973 were mining facilities and processing plants based on mineral raw materials, as well as factories, several among them in the new industrial towns of Erdenet and Darkhan.39 Besides the Soviets, other Comecon countries contributed too, including a Czechoslovak cement factory in Darkhan; a silicate factory in the same city and lightweight concrete and wooden-element factories in Ulaanbaatar, all three from Poland; and several Bulgarian brick factories.40

• 41 The concept of concern, referring to Martin Heidegger’s concept of Sorge (care or concern), has be (...)
• 42 Michał Murawski, “Actually-Existing Success: Economics, Aesthetics, and the Specificity of (Still- (...)
• 43 Kimberly Elman Zarecor, “Infrastructural Thinking: Urban Housing in Former Czechoslovakia from the (...)

20Inspired by debates in philosophy and anthropology, we begin answering these questions by introducing the concept of “concern.”41 In what follows, we argue that three areas of concern—integration, adaptation, and collaboration—consistently informed the work of foreign and local professionals and mid-level administrators involved in Comecon’s technical assistance to Mongolia. While the concept of concern is ours, Mongolians, Soviets, and Eastern Europeans often referred to “integration,” “adaptation,” and “collaboration,” although not always explicitly or unambiguously. The term “collaboration” was discussed frequently and explicitly, while “integration” and “adaptation” were used interchangeably with several other terms with similar connotations, often in reference to more general principles of architectural practice in the socialist countries. “Integration” reverberates with the Russian adjective kompleksnyi (kompleksowy in Polish, komplex in German), which in Comecon’s architectural discourse referred to the tendency towards “holistic integration and […] comprehensiveness,” in the words of Michał Murawski.42 Beyond the architectural scale, this term conveyed a vision of socialist urbanization informed by what Kimberly E. Zarecor called “infrastructural thinking,” or the design and construction of territorial systems (infrastructure, production, transport, social services, recreation) at all scales, from architectural, through urban and regional, to international.43 In turn, the term “adaptation” encompasses the architectural procedure of modifying type designs to local conditions (priviazka), which was at the core of Soviet design culture, and in itself conveyed the broad consensus within this culture that architecture and urban planning needed to be adequate to the local conditions.

• 44 On (late) Soviet discourse, see Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The (...)

21We reconstruct the three areas of concern based on a range of archival documents, including policy outlines, professional publications, press accounts, official communications, reports from construction sites, and minutes of professional meetings. We extend these discursive sources with technical documentation: architectural drawings and urban plans; and regulatory documents for architectural and construction practices, including building norms, construction standards, and procedures for the division of labor between the actors involved. In this sense, rather than as a means to analyze the discourse of Comecon actors in Mongolia,44 we use the concept of concern to understand the broader dynamics of their professional practices. In order to mitigate the fragmentation of archival sources, our basic procedure is that of juxtaposing texts and drawings from various archives in ways that allow for comparisons across longer time-spans.

• 45 RGAE, f. 5, o. 1, d. 687, l. 73-80; the report also criticized architectural designs of Soviet bui (...)
• 46 “Chinese Aid Criticised,” West Africa, December 2, 1974, p. 1466.

23As a starting point for evidencing these arguments can serve the 1966 report by a delegation of Soviet architects led by Mikhail Posokhin, chief architect of Moscow and head of the design institute Mosproekt II. After his inspection of Soviet architectural work in Ulaanbaatar, Posokhin was not impressed. Addressing the Department of Construction Abroad at the Soviet Gosstroi, he described the Soviet-designed and constructed 12th mikroraion (fig. 9) and compared it unfavorably with the Chinese-designed and built 5th mikroraion (fig. 10). Posokhin pointed out the poor quality of the Soviet housing when compared with Chinese buildings in Ulaanbaatar.45 Such comparison was a sensitive matter in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split, when both countries competed for the status of the progressive force in world politics, and actively sought to promote their paths to socialism among governments of decolonizing countries in Africa and Asia. In order to distinguish the Soviet approach to technical assistance from the Chinese one, a Soviet author argued in the early 1970s that Chinese development aid aimed at an incremental transformation of the national economy, in contrast to the vision of structural change that underlay the Soviet developmental approach.46 The latter was more suited for newly independent countries, argued the author, given the scale of their developmental challenges.

• 47 Nikolay Erofeev, “The I-464 Housing Delivery System: A Tool for Urban Modernisation in the Sociali (...)

24This contrast between Soviet and Chinese approaches to technical assistance appears plausible when buildings constructed in the course of the 1960s in Ulaanbaatar are considered: whereas the Chinese-designed buildings were constructed by means of conventional methods, many of the Soviet ones were based on an industrialized system of construction. The cornerstone of this system was the house-building factory in Ulaanbaatar, which we described in the opening vignette of this paper. Donated by the Soviet Union as a gift to Mongolia in early 1960s, the factory was designed by the Moscow-based design institute Giprostroiindustriia to prefabricate elements of the I-464 building system—one of the most widespread large-panel technologies used in the Soviet Union.47

• 48 The prefabrication technology was modernized by the Moscow-based TsNIIEP Zhilishcha; see: Archive (...)
• 49 Ayuushiyn Davaa, “Osnovnoi rychag razvitiia stroitel’nogo proizvodstva MNR,” Ekonomicheskoe sotrud (...)

25The factory was conceived as an essential node within an integrated network of institutions in charge of the urbanization of the country, some of which already existed, while others were to be established in the future. Due to this factory’s central role in Mongolia’s material-technical base for construction, it was prioritized by decision-makers in Moscow and Ulaanbaatar over more spectacular buildings and more urgently needed facilities. The development of the factory during the 1970s and 1980s continued to be informed by the concern for integration. After its expansion and modernization in 1972,48 the network of industrial plants centered on this facility included two other plants of prefabricated elements constructed by then and their supporting industries and infrastructures. This network was instrumental in the government’s program to rehouse much of the country’s population to new residences.49

• 50 Gosstroi identified technical adaptations to Mongolian realities as the main concern in the delive (...)

26At the same time, the Soviets pointed out that the factory’s integrative role in the development of Mongolia’s material-technical base was predicated upon the adaptation of its technology to the local conditions. In the MPR, Soviet engineers performed such adaptation either by applying solutions from regions of the Soviet Union claimed to be similar to Mongolia, such as Soviet Buriatia, or by directly adapting Soviet technological systems to Mongolia. The latter path was chosen for the design of the Ulaanbaatar factory, based on the procedure of trying-in (priviazka). Following this procedure, Soviet engineers adapted the factory’s standard design to seismic and soil conditions in Ulaanbaatar. Because it was one of the first attempts to export the I-464 system abroad, this adaptation process was long and challenging, resulting in delays in the operation of the plant.50

• 51 Einheitliche technische Bedingungen für die Projektierung von Betrieben und anderen Objekten, die (...)
• 52 Ibid; see also: Edinye tekhnicheskie usloviia na proektirovanie predpriiatii i drugikh ob"ektov, s (...)

28Particularly useful in understanding this vision is the document titled “Unified technical conditions for the design of plants and other buildings constructed in the MPR with the technical assistance of the member states of the Comecon.”51 Published in 1976 by the PCC, thus in the midst of the accelerated involvement of Comecon’s member-states in Mongolia, the “Conditions” were made obligatory for all Comecon actors working in the MPR. The “Conditions” prescribed the application of a range of planning procedures, including standardization, modularization, typification, and, ultimately, industrialization. The document listed such general principles of modern planning as zoning and division of traffic, as well as more specifically Soviet and Eastern European planning procedures of coordinating economic and spatial planning in longer time spans (perspective plans) and larger scales (regional plans). Based on earlier Soviet norms for Mongolia, the “Conditions” also prescribed the typology of the mikroraion as the basic unit within a nested hierarchy of settlements and their respective social facilities, as applied in the urban design of the 15th mikroraion in Ulaanbaatar (fig. 11).52

• 53 Einheitliche technische Bedingungen, op. cit. (note 51), p. 31.
• 54 Ibid., p. 9.
• 55 RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, d. 2100, l. 65.
• 56 Einheitliche technische Bedingungen, op. cit. (note 51), p. 36. See also: Edinye tekhnicheskie usl (...)

29As was the case with the house-building factory in Ulaanbaatar, the concern for integration went hand in hand with the concern for adaptation. The urban and architectural norms stipulated in the “Conditions” convey both concerns in specific and concrete terms. These norms were introduced in order to facilitate an urbanism designed in an “integrated” or “comprehensive” (komplex) manner.53 They were expected to coordinate “the spatial, constructive, sanitary and electrical solutions with a high standard of technology” and to guarantee a unified system of supply of social services on all scales and in all locations.54 The introduction of such norms responded to the advice of Soviet professionals who listed the lack of universal standards among the main hindrances for the advancement of Mongolia’s construction industry.55 At the same time, the prescription of building standards and type projects was intended to enforce the adaptation of Eastern European designs to the climatic, seismic, economic, and technological specificity of the MPR, and the ways of life of the country’s inhabitants. The “Conditions” required type housing projects to be responsive to “local climatic and living conditions, and the demographic composition of the population,” while urban centers were to be designed as compact, “in order to account for the continental climate of the MPR.”56 Furthermore, and adding a third concern to those of integration and adaptation, the use of the “Conditions” by all actors in Mongolia, both local and foreign, would facilitate collaboration between them.

• 57 Ministerium für Bauwesen, Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedsländer des RGW auf dem Gebiet des Bauwesen (...)

30In 1974 Orony Tleyhan, Mongolian minister for the construction and construction-materials industries, addressed the participants of the PCC meeting in Prague. Tleyhan expressed gratitude for the technical assistance provided by the Soviet Union and other Comecon countries to Mongolia. Yet his phrasing stressed the local agency in these exchanges. He argued that with Comecon’s support “the Mongolian people […] led by the Mongolian Revolutionary People’s Party transformed […] a backward country based on livestock farming into a socialist country with a fast-growing, modern industry and large collective farms.”57

• 58 Leonid S. Yagodovsky, The World Socialist System—Its Role in the World Today, Moscow: Novosti Pres (...)
• 59 Balazs Szalontai, “From the Demolition of Monasteries to the Installation of Neon Lights,” op. cit (...)

31These statements conformed to the Comecon discourse, which stressed collaboration as its core premise and the defining experience of socialist internationalism. The principle of collaboration was referred to by the Soviets to distinguish their technical assistance from Western “development aid,” which Soviet propaganda accused of prolonging colonial-era economic dependencies. By contrast, collaboration between the Comecon and less developed countries would allow the latter to fully participate in the economic exchanges within the socialist world58—even if the negotiation of their specific roles in these exchanges and the division of labor within this world led to tensions among Comecon member-states. For example, while the Soviets encouraged Mongolia to develop its traditional areas of export (livestock farming and mining), the leadership of the MPR often contested this advice as leading to a perpetuated “backwardness” of their country, and instead requested technical assistance for industrial development.59

• 60 Luujugin Lkhamsurien, “Pomoshch bratskikh stran v uskorenii razvitiia i povyshenii effektivnosti e (...)

32Writing in 1977, Luujugin Lhamsurem, director of the State Planning Commission of the MPR, distinguished three modes of Mongolia’s collaboration with other Comecon countries in architecture, planning, and construction. The first was the provision of machinery, equipment, technical documentation and design manuals by the socialist countries, as well as the training of Mongolian specialists in these countries, and the work of Eastern European experts in the MPR. As the second mode, he named turn-key projects constructed by socialist countries in Mongolia, in particular the Soviet Union, and handed over to the Mongolian authorities. The third mode of collaboration was construction projects, designed, built, and operated jointly by Eastern Europeans and Mongolians, in particular in the industrial towns of Darkhan and Erdenet.60

• 61 Dashiin Bat, interview by Nikolay Erofeev and Łukasz Stanek, Ulaanbaatar, 10 April 2018.

33Dashiin Bat, the former head of the Industrial Construction Department at the Mongolian State Design Institute, largely confirmed that these modes of collaboration were applicable to the work of the Institute, too. Recalling Comecon’s technical assistance projects, Bat distinguished between the training of Mongolian architects as team members at Soviet design institutes (typically in Moscow), and the employment of foreign specialists in Mongolian institutions. He pointed out that the provision of complete buildings by the Soviets as turn-key projects was the most efficient but also the most expensive mode of collaboration. While the latter mode was preferred by Mongolian officials, the Soviets reserved this approach mostly for exceptional and highly visible projects, such as gifted buildings.61

• 62 RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, d. 2100, l. 65.
• 63 Balazs Szalontai, “From the Demolition of Monasteries to the Installation of Neon Lights,” op. cit (...)
• 64 RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, d. 2302, l. 161-64, 273-279.
• 65 RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, d. 2302, l. 33.

34Bat’s comments make it clear that beyond political and ideological objectives, the concern for collaboration was also motivated economically. The Soviets required that Mongolians participate in the provision of resources for technical assistance projects, above all labor. This included the agreement about the construction of Ulaanbaatar’s house-building factory, according to which Mongolia agreed to provide up to 65% of the laborers. However, the authorities were unable to deliver on this obligation,62 and labor shortages became a huge challenge after China withdrew most of its workers from the MPR in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split.63 Accordingly, by the 1960s, Soviet and Mongolian officials discussed various measures to train and involve Mongolians in the housing delivery process.64 Following the agreement signed by the head of the Mongolian State Committee for Construction Damdinjav Maidar and the head of the Soviet Gosstroi I. Novikov in 1965, the Soviets stepped in to train local construction cadres. They opened training centers for the building trades at Mongolian construction sites and at the house-building factory in Ulaanbaatar. Training sessions were also offered by the joint Soviet-Mongolian brigades.65

• 66 AAN 2/2309/0/-/362, p. 2-5, see also: AAN 2/1154/0/25/526.
• 67 Einheitliche technische Bedingungen, op. cit. (note 51), p. 9.
• 68 Dictionary of Civil Engineering in Twelve Languages, Moscow: Russian Languages Publishers, 1979; D (...)

35Training was a priority of Comecon’s technical assistance to the MPR more generally. This priority was reflected in individual contracts of Eastern European architects, technicians, and foremen. For example, the contract signed by Józef Musiał, a Polish bricklayer-foreman, who worked in Mongolia in 1968 and 1969, listed the supervision and training of Mongolian workers among his chief duties.66 Accordingly, knowledge of Russian—the language in which Comecon’s organizations delivered the documentation of technical assistance projects67—was an essential criterion in recruiting Eastern European staff for contracts in the country. Since the 1970s, their communication with each other and with their Mongolian counterparts was facilitated by various publications issued by the PCC, notably the monumental Dictionary of Civil Engineering in Twelve Languages, including Mongolian.68

• 69 RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, d. 2100, l. 66.
• 70 On Soviet soldiers in Mongolia, see: Ram Rahul, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and USSR, New Delhi: Vikas (...)
• 71 RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, d. 2302, l. 37, 129.
• 72 Ludmila Samsonova worked in 1985-88 in the military unit “73 939.” Interview with Ludmila Samsonov (...)
• 73 Alexey V. Mikhalev, “Soviet Experts in Mongolia: Between International Mission and Colonial Practi (...)

36In addition to linguistic obstacles, Mongolians and foreigners also faced other challenges which reveal the uneven and unequal character of their collaboration. For example, in 1964 the joint Soviet-Mongolian brigades were able to account for only 47% of the expected construction output.69 In order to catch up with the plan, Soviet military labor was tasked with helping out on the construction sites.70 Accordingly, by 1965 almost 3000 military laborers contributed to the construction of Soviet projects, among them mikroraiony 12 and 15 in Ulaanbaatar.71 Soviet soldiers and laborers often lived in military camps, which limited their opportunities for everyday contacts with Mongolians, thus contradicting Comecon’s propaganda that such contacts were a core experience of socialist technical assistance. This was confirmed by Ludmila Samsonova, an engineer from Leningrad, who was employed by a builders’ brigade of a military organization in charge of the implementation of type-housing projects for both military and civilian uses in Mongolia.72 Further tensions in daily contacts between Soviet and local experts stemmed from the fact that the former enjoyed access to consumer goods distributed in special shops and social services which were not available to ordinary Mongolians.73

• 74 RGAE, f. 5, o. 1, d. 686, l. 66.
• 75 The construction was supervised by the Moscow City Hall Administration, RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, d. 230 (...)

37The challenges of collaboration notwithstanding, a review of the design and construction of Ulaanbaatar’s housing projects supported by socialist countries shows a growing involvement of Mongolians. This included workers and technicians, but also architects, engineers, and planners. A comparison between the design processes of the mikroraiony 12 and 15 illustrates this point. The 12th mikroraion was planned by the design institute Mosproekt II and the role of the Mongolian State Design Institute was limited to the provision of topographical, geological, and engineering data for Soviet experts.74 The mikroraion was constructed as “turn-key,” fully equipped and operational, by workers from Soviet construction firms, supervised by Moscow-based institutions.75 By contrast, the design of the 15th mikroraion was delivered by planners at the Mongolian State Design Institute, who were advised by Soviet experts.

• 76 See, for example: D. Maidar and J. Piurev, Ot kochevoi do mobil'noi arkhitektury, Moscow: Stroiizd (...)
• 77 Niamosoryn Tsultem, Arkhitektura Mongolii—Mongolian architecture—Architecture de la Mongolie—La ar (...)
• 78 Igor Demchenko, “Critical Post-functionalism in the Architecture of Late Soviet Central Asia,” ABE (...)

38Such experiences of collaboration and feedback from completed buildings resulted in lessons for both Soviet and Mongolian architects. The Gandan district evidences several such lessons (figs. 12, 13). Its designers at Mosproekt and Giprogor drew larger kitchens, additional storage rooms, and a balcony which was used to freeze meat supplies during winter (fig. 14). The prefabricated system used for the construction of these buildings was expanded to include ornamental slabs that referred to vernacular decoration, based on studies of ornamental motives and the architectural heritage of Mongolia, carried out by Soviet and Mongolian scholars (fig. 15).76 By the 1980s, the Mongolian architectural critic Niamosoryn Tsultem was arguing that MPR architects were capable of taking over. He criticized several buildings designed by Soviet specialists in Ulaanbaatar’s city center during the earlier periods for not paying attention to the “national character” of the country.77 Yet this critique in itself testified to the impact of Soviet architectural culture, in which the concept of “national character” (or “national tradition”) was a central criterion of geographical difference, particularly relevant for the development of architectural and planning practices in Soviet Central Asia.78

• 79 TsNIIEP Zhilishcha developed an amended system I-464-UB for Ulaanbaatar. See: RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, (...)

39This brief overview of the housing districts in Ulaanbaatar points at the ways in which their designers and builders across three decades largely shared an overarching concern for integration, adaptation, and collaboration. At the same time, this overview makes it clear that the three concerns did not describe a static ideal but rather a dynamic and open-ended process. Such a process was implied by the previously discussed “Unified technical conditions,” which suggested that with the increasing modernization of Mongolian cities, new architectural typologies would need to be designed. A comparison of Ulaanbaatar’s housing layouts confirms this tendency: while in the 1960s the layouts of buildings designed with the I-464 system had been adapted for the use of solid fuel cast-iron stoves to cope with Mongolia’s lack of centralized heating and electricity infrastructure, apartments in the Gandan district built during the following decade were fully integrated into such infrastructural networks.79 Comecon decision-makers were aware that such advancement of design and construction required that the professionals involved be given opportunities for innovation and experimentation. This was the role of “experimental designs” which, in line with the Soviet practice, allowed planners to test new construction methods, building materials, and architectural layouts. Experimental designs were one more area in which Mongolian professionals were increasingly taking over from the Soviets: while in the early 1960s experiments were carried out in the Soviet Union prior to their implementation in Mongolia, by the next decade most of them were conducted in the country.

• 80 RGAE, f. 339, o. 3, d. 2302, l. 206.

40The narrative that accompanied Comecon’s technical assistance to Mongolia often suggested that the three concerns were intertwined and reinforced each other: collaboration between professionals from socialist countries was expected both to facilitate the integration of the Mongolian construction industry and to allow for a “better consideration of national and other features of the country.”80 However, the interpretation of the three concerns and of the principles of their implementation was subject of negotiation and, sometimes, led to disagreements between Mongolian, Soviet, and Eastern European actors. When requesting funding from the Comecon for extension, adjustment, and modernization projects, Mongolian bureaucrats pointed out the need to integrate new investments into the existing network of institutions and their better adaptation to the conditions on the ground. These arguments were substantiated by the language of the Comecon documents and the authority of Soviet experts—and yet they were sometimes challenged by representatives of Eastern European countries.

• 81 “Zu einigen Problemen des Bauwesens der MRV [...],” BA DH1: 25038, 2 von 2, p. 4.
• 82 Ibid., p. 4-5.
• 83 Balazs Szalontai, “From the Demolition of Monasteries to the Installation of Neon Lights,” op. cit (...)

41A case in point was a document titled “Proposals and fundamental measures for a perspective development of the construction and construction-materials industry as well as design and research capacities of the MPR in the period until 1990,” prepared in 1973 by the Mongolian Ministry of Construction.81 The document, which referred to a previous Soviet report on the same subject, included a vision of a massive expansion of Mongolia’s construction industry, and a “shopping list” of plants the Mongolians requested the Comecon countries to construct. The list specified six plants to be requested from the Soviet Union, three from Czechoslovakia, two from East Germany, and one from Poland. In a letter sent to the East German Ministry of Construction, Gerhard Kosel argued that the “Proposals” misrepresented the report of the Soviet experts who had recommended that the future collaboration with the MPR was based on decreased rather than expanded transfers from Comecon countries.82 In this and other instances, professionals and decision-makers from socialist countries often resisted Mongolian proposals of developing the material-technical base for construction in the country, even if these proposals were framed in the language of the Comecon and were based on the interpretations of the three concerns. Comecon’s experts sometimes saw Mongolian requests as unreasonable and motivated by the will to “impress.”83 Such orientalizing perceptions revealed a racialized gaze cast by some Soviet and Eastern European professionals on their Mongolian counterparts.

• 84 Łukasz Stanek, Architecture in Global Socialism, op. cit. (note 4), Ch. 4-5.
• 85 Letter from Eichstädt to Junker, 24 March 1970, BA DH1: 25038, 2 von 2, p. 1.

42Resistance to the increase in requests from MPR officials was particularly strong among managers of Eastern European companies. They were under pressure from state and party leaderships to fulfil production plans in their home countries and, by the 1970s, to deliver on the export quotas and the obligatory “hard currency plans.” (The latter were deployed in an attempt to finance the debts of many Eastern European satellite countries with Western financial institutions, and resulted in the expansion of commercial contracts of Eastern European architects and building companies into the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere).84 For example, in March 1970 one of East Germany’s combines refused a request from the Ministry of Construction in East Berlin to send 17 specialists to a meat processing plant in Ulaanbaatar, and argued that their enterprise’s capacities were already stretched to the breaking point by the deployment of personnel to a carpet factory in Mongolia’s capital.85

• 86 AAN 2/1154/0/25/526, 106-103 [sic]. Their work included the design of the 4th and 5th mikroraiony, (...)
• 87 Ibid.
• 88 AAN 2/2309/0/353, p. 21.

43Conflicts around resources continued after their allocation. The Mongolian authorities were in charge of budgeting and financial management of each investment, and Eastern European representatives in Ulaanbaatar were eager to dispel any ambiguity in this respect. A case in point was the experience of a group of ten Polish architects who arrived to Mongolia in 1962 to work, initially, as one team. Yet when several of their designs were rejected by Mongolian institutions and Soviet advisors, the architects were distributed across various sections of the Mongolian State Design Institute.86 The architects objected to this decision, and yet the Polish embassy refused to support them. Critical of their “individualism” and their uncooperative attitude, embassy officials were concerned about the dissatisfaction of the Mongolian authorities with the “Polish team.” Accordingly, its dissolution was accepted by the officials, in particular as this reorganization meant that all responsibility for the design decisions of the Polish architects was ceded to the Mongolians.87 In several other cases, when Mongolian authorities modified the design documentation delivered by Eastern European countries, their representatives used these changes as an excuse to withdraw from the investment in question.88 These examples suggest that while the three concerns were generally shared by Mongolian and Comecon actors, they often interpreted them in diverging ways in order to request more resources or, on the contrary, to resist such requests.

• 89 This is how the Hungarian embassy in Ulaanbaatar summarized the report, quoted in: Balazs Szalonta (...)
• 90 Ibid.

44The city of Ulaanbaatar was reshaped beyond recognition during the socialist period. Yet the growth of new housing neighborhoods and social and technical infrastructure was accompanied by an even faster expansion of the ger districts, and the living conditions in many parts of the city remained poor. In 1983, a report by the Central Committee Secretary P. Damdin offered a shocking picture of several districts where poor sanitation resulted in a constant danger of epidemics and high infant mortality, while public transport, and water and power supply were often insufficient and low quality.89 As scholars have shown, Damdin’s report testified not only to rivalry within the Communist Mongolian Revolutionary People’s Party, but also reflected broader dissatisfaction of the inhabitants of Ulaanbaatar who voiced their anger in demonstrations against the regime in 1990, followed by the end of socialism in the country.90

• 91 Jargalan Erdenebat, interview by Nikolay Erofeev and Łukasz Stanek, Ulaanbaatar, 13 April 2018.

45While the political transition resulted in the removal of some of the most visible symbols of the socialist rule in Ulaanbaatar, notably the mausoleum of Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan, the path-dependencies of socialist urbanism are decisive for the city’s future. Beyond monumental public buildings and large housing districts, they include an ambiguous heritage of the material-technical base for construction in Mongolia. For example, the prospects for the new iteration of the prefabricated concrete panels produced by the modernized BUK-1 factory are enhanced by the persistence of socialist-era transport infrastructure, including road and rail networks, but also by the familiarity of the professionals with large panel technology. At the same time, as Jargalan Erdenebat pointed out during our visit to the factory, the re-introduction of this technology requires alleviating the concerns of Mongolians who remember, and sometimes continue to face, the technical failings of the Soviet panel systems.91 During our research stay in Ulaanbaatar, we often heard a similar mixture of appreciation and criticism about the architectural heritage of the MPR, notably about the housing districts, which are valued for their urban layouts but denounced for their building technology. A critical appreciation of this heritage, including its limitations and potentials, is a crucial precondition for the solution of Ulaanbaatar’s current challenges, from the inefficient transportation network to the unsustainable levels of air pollution, exacerbated in winter by the use of coal-fueled stoves in the ger districts.

• 92 Łukasz Stanek, Architecture in Global Socialism, op. cit. (note 4).

48While we formulated the three concerns based on archival documents pertaining to Cold War Mongolia, this conceptualization may be useful for comparative architectural history more generally. We would like to end with two suggestions for such uses. The first relates to the scholarship about architectural mobilities between the “Second” and “Third” worlds during the Cold War. These mobilities straddled a wide spectrum: beyond the southern members of the Comecon (Mongolia, Vietnam, Cuba) they also included countries which pursued specific versions of socialist development, such as Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah (1957-1966); countries belonging to the “World Socialist System,” such as Ba’athist Iraq that benefited from preferential foreign trade agreements with Eastern Europe; and even countries with elites hostile to socialism, such as Nigeria or the Gulf states.92 The concept of the three concerns suggests a way to differentiate these exchanges from the perspective of mid-level administrators and professionals, rather than by means of broad-brush geopolitical and geoeconomic distinctions. It may be particularly useful for studies of architectural exchanges in countries where the Soviet presence was interrupted because of a regime change, such as Ghana in 1966, and thus where the priorities and motivations of the parties involved may be difficult to understand on the basis of only partially realized investments.