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Dossier: Material Constraints

“Addiction to cement.” Narratives and Strategies for Tackling the Lack of Cement in Sub-Saharan Africa (1920s-1980s)

« Une addiction au ciment ». Récits et stratégies pour en finir avec le manque de ciment en Afrique sub-saharienne (1920-1980)
Monika Motylińska et Robby Fivez

Résumés

Cet article s’appuie sur de précédentes recherches sur les cimenteries en tant que méta-infrastructures pour interroger les contraintes matérielles liées à la production de ciment en Afrique sub-saharienne au cours d’un long vingtième siècle. Le manque de ciment, réel ou perçu, dans différents contextes locaux et temporalités, à la fois dans les périodes coloniale et postcoloniale, sert de fil conducteur. On se concentre sur trois moments et trois contextes régionaux différents, pour examiner et questionner le thème récurrent d’une demande sans cesse croissante en liant pour le béton et en matériaux pour produire des blocs de ciment. Les exemples étudiés sont tous liés à l'utilisation d’équipements et de procédés de conception allemande par des acteurs mondiaux tels que G. Polysius ou Philipp Holzmann AG ; ce qui permet de dépasser les circulations impériales habituelles entre anciennes colonies dépendantes de la métropole. On considère les contextes tant capitalistes que socialistes afin de comprendre comment la dépendance au ciment est apparue, pour devenir une « addiction » généralisée.

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Introduction

  • 1 Julius K. Nyerere, “The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After,” The African Review: A Journal of Afri (...)

“The present widespread addiction to cement and tin roofs is a kind of mental paralysis. A bati roof is nothing compared with one of tiles. But those afflicted with this mental attitude will not agree. Cement is basically earth; but it is called ‘European soil.’ Therefore people refuse to build a house of burnt bricks and tiles; they insist on waiting for a tin roof and ‘European soil.’ If we want to progress more rapidly in the future we must overcome at least some of these mental blocks!”1—Julius Nyerere

  • 2 Ibid.
  • 3 “Rent Seeking and Industrial Growth in Africa: The Case of Dangote’s Cement Industry,” n.d. URL : (...)

1Ten years after the well-known Arusha declaration, during which the president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, proposed an African socialism and a far-reaching self-reliance for his country, he looked back on the past decade. In the lengthier text, The Arusha declaration ten years after, he elaborates on his nation’s “achievements”, but—in a rather introspective way—also on the “mistakes and failures” made. Remarkably, one of the mistakes Nyerere identified, was the strong reliance on cement in the construction industry. In an apt analysis, he diagnosed “the present widespread addiction to cement and tin roofs, is a kind of mental paralysis.”2 To this day, this mental paralysis endures. Cement is still perceived to be important for “development” and “progress,” and its imminent shortage is constantly feared. Observe, for example, the contemporary role of the largest cement producer of African origin, Dangote Cement: “Development of basic infrastructure from roads, rails and ports to hospitals, schools, shops and housing all require cement as a primary input […]. Given the growth story in Africa and the requirements around infrastructure development and construction, cement is clearly a key strategic sector on the continent.”3 This entrenched dependency on cement evidently has colonial origins, which Nyerere pointed out by denoting cement as “European soil.” In the following article, we analyze and historicize the long trajectory of this “addiction to cement,” as well as the constant attempts to augment the availability and absolute volume of this material for the seemingly insatiable market. For this purpose, we follow the common thread of the—actual or perceived—lack of cement across different local contexts and temporalities, in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. We seek to understand how the “addiction to cement” came about–as means of overcoming material constraints, but simultaneously as a social construct.

2Starting with observations on the specific role of German cement-plant manufacturers, we investigate three key moments—the 1920s, 1960s and 1980s—, cutting across the long 20th century. First, the colonial origins of the addiction are traced through the case of the Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), one of the first producers of cement in Sub-Saharan Africa (after South Africa and Senegal). The study indicates how fundamental the cement production was for the political project of (Belgian) colonialism and the extractive economy this political project depended on. The Lubudi cement plant, established in 1923 in the mining province of Katanga, is a pertinent example illustrating the how the cement and mining industries were intertwined. Even in the colonial era, the addiction to cement created a constant and—as we will see—completely irrational fear of cement shortages. Ironically, this irrational concern also sparked initiatives to find alternative building materials, like burnt lime. However, due to the cultural preferences of the colonial administration and economic path dependencies, these alternatives remained a side note in this material history, only contributing to the increasing dependency on cement.

3The “cement addiction” outlasted the colonial occupation and flourished across the continent in the post-independence phase, from the 1960s onwards. The Okpella cement plant in Nigeria is emblematic of the striving for industrial autarchy by establishing full-scale cement production in a newly independent country. In this case, it was part of the “Nigerianization” policy of West Africa’s most populous country. The choice of a German construction company, Philipp Holzmann AG (in a joint venture with other West German firms), was an attempt to overcome the dependency on the former metropole. The proliferation of the national industry tied to the independence project was crucial for the future development of actors such as the abovementioned Dangote Cement. However, this strand of research lies beyond the scope of our investigation in this article.

4Yet, the “addiction to cement” was by no means a capitalist phenomenon. The New Mugher II plant in Ethiopia, the flagship project of the Derg regime, erected in the early 1980s in collaboration with the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), shows how socialist or socialist-leaning countries pursued similar strategies to prevent any actual or perceived lack of cement.

  • 4 Armelle Choplin, “Cementing Africa: Cement flows and city-making along the West African corridor ( (...)
  • 5 This bias has been recently addressed by geographers studying processes of deindustrialization (e. (...)
  • 6 Jonathan Watts, “Concrete: The most destructive material on Earth,” The Guardian, 25 February 2019 (...)
  • 7 Sarah Nichols, Opération Béton: Constructing Concrete in Switzerland, PhD thesis, ETH Zurich, 2021 (...)
  • 8 Kim Förster, “Triangular stories: Cement as a cheap commodity, critical building material, and a s (...)
  • 9 Robby Fivez “The Rubble in the Jungle: A fragmented biography of Lukala’s cementscape, DR Congo,” (...)
  • 10 Ernst Neufert, Industriebauten, Wiesbaden: Bauverlag, 1973.
  • 11 Adrian Forty, Concrete and Culture: A Material History, London: Reaktion Books, 2012.

5In this respect, the choice of a wide focus on Sub-Saharan Africa is a further step in undermining the myth of the “last frontier” of cement, still rather common in the scientific discourse.4 After investigating the role of cement plants as meta-infrastructure; i.e., the prerequisite to the development of large-scale infrastructural projects, we aim to further challenge the history of industrialization under global conditions, teasing out its complexities. Primarily, we follow its material and immaterial traces in the history of the built environment, thereby addressing a research gap and a Western-centric bias.5 In recent years, the impact of the construction industry on global warming, especially the high Co2 emissions resulting from the production of cement and concrete, has been discussed in the media and in different academic contexts.6 However, surprisingly little scholarly attention has been paid to the architecture of cement plants, especially in the field of architectural history. Fortunately, this has begun to change, thanks to the body of work by Sarah Nichols focusing on the history of cement and concrete production in Switzerland,7 the discussion of environmental aspects of cement production by Kim Förster8—and for the projects of cement plants beyond Europe, the contributions by the authors of this article.9 In earlier publications, only the spectacular projects by Ernst Neufert, such as the ones for Dyckerhoff-Zement in Amöneburg, Lengerich, and Göllheim, were highlighted.10 As we shall demonstrate below, reconstructing the history of cement plants is challenging, due to the limited sources. It requires working with highly disparate documentation sources, ranging from the company advertisements (fig. 1), to photographic documentation of construction sites, official reports, publications from specialized technical journals or—in some rare cases, when the archive of the company involved is well-preserved—correspondence. Nevertheless, such a longitudinal study of cement production is necessary to understand the deeply rooted preference or dependency on this specific, seemingly universal, material, often equated with the aspirations and promises of modernity.11

Cement plants “made in Germany”

6Cement plants—vast structures combining different types of silos, blending beds kilns, packing sites etc., all connected by conveyor belts or pipes—are distinctly mundane in character. They compare unfavorably with more spectacular industrial types such as power plants. The complexes are highly functional and formally reductive; even auxiliary buildings for administrative purposes tend to be devoid of unnecessary decorative elements in order to avoid dust sedation, at least in plants destined for “export” purposes. The overall design of the cement plants has not significantly changed across the 20th century, with fairly little local variability. The choice of technology, such as the dry or wet process, or the vertical or horizontal kiln, was determined by cost factors and the type of cement produced, as well as the availability of technology. The decision to roof the facility depended mostly on the local climatic conditions. To put it bluntly, cement-plant construction history seems to follow a straight linear path—the higher the demand for the material, the larger the cement plants grew, incorporating not one but two or more production lines. This spatial expansion of the plant due to the addition of more production lines, while maintaining the older ones, is not the only possible solution. Newer, more efficient technology could also result in reduced plant size. Nevertheless, this pattern cannot be observed in the settings investigated, or in many comparable cases. Thus, upscaling of production is a materialized and spatial answer to the factual or perceived lack of cement as the primary material constraint, most of all for the development of transport and industrial infrastructure.

  • 12 Cf. Entwurfsbüro für Industriebau Halle/Saale, “Ein neues Zementwerk in der Deutschen Demokratisch (...)
  • 13 “Mais ce marché n’est pas celui du bâtiment. C’est celui de l’équipement, le seul qui offre un fro (...)

7However, the mundane and seemingly timeless character of the cement plant does not mean that planning and constructional complexity were absent, even if these challenges were from the start addressed mostly by mechanical engineers rather than architects.12 As Simonnet pointed out in his depiction of the beginnings of industrialized cement production, the cement plants quickly surpassed local needs and—in parallel with the industrial growth and colonial ambitions—focused on addressing the national and colonial demand. As a result, the plants followed a business model that the building industry of the late 19th century could not implement: “However, this market is not the building industry. It's the equipment sector, the only one that offers a sufficiently homogeneous economic and technical front to guarantee traders transaction volumes that match their industrial ambitions.”13 Companies such as G. Polysius from Dessau or the FL Smidth company from Denmark, family firms specializing in the manufacturing of cement plants founded respectively in the mid- and late 19th century, followed such a strategy of expansion. They became global players by the turn of the century, venturing not only into colonial markets but also acquiring customers in other parts of the world. In their portfolio, clearly focused on innovative processing technologies such as the Lepol rotary kiln (introduced by G. Polysius in 1927), architecture became a by-product, either offered as part of a package deal or outsourced to other firms or subcontractors.

Figure 1: “La fabrication du ciment Portland,” page of sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.

Figure 1: “La fabrication du ciment Portland,” page of sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.

Source: Collection of the Landesarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Dessau. I 414 Polysius AG Dessau, Nr. 433/10.

  • 14 “Civil Engineering and Building in Cement Works –II,” Cement and Lime Manufacture, September 1965, (...)
  • 15 The awareness of the.environmental consequences of cement production is not a recent phenomenon, i (...)
  • 16 However, to complicate the picture, cement producers that started their global ventures before Wor (...)

8As for the constructional challenges presented by the cement plants, the design of certain superstructures, such as kiln houses, gained more attention from the 1940s onwards. The growing size of the kilns necessitated adaptations that were an opportunity to apply different building technologies, such as prestressed precast concrete double-T slabs or reinforced concrete shell roofs.14 High temperatures occurring in the kiln required the development of efficient ventilation systems and sophisticated maintenance planning. The whole cement plant complex, dependent on the constant supply of raw materials such as lime or sand, functions as a huge logistical operation, with rhythms that should not be disrupted and an enormous environmental impact.15 For the construction and maintenance of the complex, specialized manufacturers like the above-mentioned G. Polysius or the Danish FL Smidth and Co. A/S claimed to possess the rare, necessary skill. In this respect, the construction history of cement production across the long 20th century is closely intertwined with the business history of specific companies. These suppliers of machinery and the entire production complexes tended to be quite agile early on, building up a vast network of trade representatives. Thus, they followed a different pattern of market conquest, similar to that of general contractors and different from cement producers such as Holderbank Cement und Beton / Holcim, Lafarge / Lafarge Holcim and later on Heidelberg Zement / Cement, recently renamed Heidelberg Materials. The latter producers did not become global-players until the second half of the 20th century, or even the end of it.16

  • 17 Quantitative research collected in the database of the “Conquering (with) Concrete” research proje (...)
  • 18 Nina Kleinöder, “A ‘Place in the Sun’? German Rails and Sleepers in Colonial Railway Building in A (...)

9The position of German firms on the global arena was unique, due to the political situation. Prior to 1914, the trajectory of reaching beyond Europe was comparable with French or British firms. Some of them gained their first experiences with overseas projects due to their involvement in German colonial investments such as the establishment of railway infrastructure in German East Africa—as was the case with Philipp Holzmann AG. Grün & Bilfinger AG was involved with colonial port projects.17 These companies quickly established a broad portfolio as general contractors, yet in such a role, they were also well-versed in addressing the question of cement procurement, while using machinery from other companies that were German, in most cases. As Nina Kleinöder observed, those firms insinuated themselves into the German colonial project while simultaneously following their own agendas.18 This holds true if we consider also their early involvement on other continents, also in non-colonial contexts, such as South America, where subsidiaries of Philipp Holzmann AG established an especially strong position. In this respect, one can claim that the business model of the construction industry changed in comparison to the situation in the late 19th century described by Simonnet. The specialized manufacturers of cement plants such as G. Polysius or Amme Giesecke Konegen from Braunschweig did not even manage to benefit from their interests in German colonies, as plans for erecting the first cement plant in German East Africa, near the port city of Tanga, were interrupted by the First World War. Yet these firms were already active elsewhere, erecting cement plans in Egypt, Brazil, and Dutch East India. Due to these early activities on a global scale, the political consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, such as the loss of German colonies and high reparations, might have posed a disruption. At the same time, they were an incentive to strengthen the company’s position on different markets. One of the new strategies of the interwar period was the positioning of the companies as multilingual, transimperial players delivering high-end technology and contributing to the modernization of other colonies, as the case of Lubudi shows. Thus, the German companies benefited from the “addiction to cement” and were eager to sustain it across different contexts.

Cementing colonialism—Lubudi in the 1920s

  • 19 Ernest Paulissen and Louis Goffin (July 11, 1911) “Chaux et Ciment du Congo,” Letter to Jules Renk (...)
  • 20 As this is discussed by another piece in this thematic dossier by Gauri Bharat and Bhavya Jain, “B (...)
  • 21 For a discussion of the cultural disdain for local building materials, see Robby Fivez, Simon De N (...)
  • 22 Edmond de Mandat-Grancy, Au Congo (1898) impressions d’un touriste, Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 19 (...)
  • 23 Georges Moulaert, Souvenirs d’Afrique, 1902-1919, Brussels: Charles Dessart, 1948, p. 18.

10Two Belgian investors, pleading their case for establishing a cement plant in the Belgian Congo to the minister of colonies in 1911, deliberately touched upon a sore spot for the colonial administration. They lamented how nearly all buildings in the Belgian Congo were still constructed in “non-durable” materials and were therefore “neither hygienic nor comfortable.” Upping the ante, the investors cleverly ended their letter by pointing out how construction in the “colony was limping far behind [neighboring colonies]”.19 This letter is crucial, as it allows us to identify two distinct reasons for the colonial cement addiction. First, it demonstrates the disdain towards local materials that was common throughout Belgian colonialism—and to some extent in the colonization of Sub-Saharan Africa at large. Contrary to other colonial contexts, like British India, where a genuine interest in local building materials even led to experiments with Indian techniques in the metropole,20 in the Belgian Congo, local building materials were mostly described as “stinking” or “unhygienic.”21 This cultural preference constrained thinking about alternative materials. For instance, although the head engineer of the Travaux Publics had attempted in 1913 to find locally produced alternatives to expensive imported materials, local officials of the Congolese Travaux Publics persisted in specifying expensive imported materials for even the simplest of structures, much to his frustration. Eventually, local materials were designated by the seemingly scientific term “non-durable,” which—despite a limited definition of what constituted a durable material—even made it into legislation. The effect was the same. Due to the strong cultural disdain, cement and concrete became the only viable option. Once cement was produced locally, it was the only “local material” that did not easily slide back into the “non-durable” category to which all other local materials were relegated. Second, the authors of the Belgian letter pointed out the competition that existed between European colonial nations. Colonial building was an integral part of the representation of their colonies abroad. As Belgium was under a lot of international pressure to turn the brutal exploitation of the king’s regime into a more publicly accepted variation thereof, one can imagine how it must have been a painful affair when a French travel writer ridiculed the Belgian colony for its “modest building ambitions”22 or a Belgian colonial general criticized his own government for their “petty bureaucratic mentality,” visible in the fact that “lumber still had to be imported from Europe, even though the Mayumbe forest was linked by rail.”23 Hence, cement production—perhaps even initiated by the authors of the letter cited above—ended up near the top of the political agenda of the colonial administrators of the Belgian Congo. In that sense, it should not come as a surprise that it was a publicly funded geological research mission that eventually led to private industry establishing the first cement plant in Congo in 1921. After the plant was built, the annual rise in the amounts of cement produced and consumed was a source of political pride. Production and consumption figures were used time and again in colonial propaganda when discussing the “development” of the colony. The manager of the first cement plant saw cement consumption as a prime indicator of the colony’s progress. His vision is uncannily similar to present-day discussions of the building material:

  • 24 Fernand Nisot, “La fabrication du Ciment Portland Artificiel au Bas-Congo,” Congo. Revue Générale (...)

“Taking the lowest and highest figures: 1922, 4,500 tons and 1928, 32,000 tons, we note a rapid, steady rise in cement consumption year after year. Without a doubt, this progression will continue and even intensify, together with the marvelous development of our colony.”24

  • 25 For a nuanced understanding of the material’s modern character see the chapter Mud & Modernity in (...)
  • 26 [Unknown], “Les super-ciments et leur adaptabilité d’emploi aux bétons exécutés en pays chauds,” L (...)

11The fact that by then cement was also widely considered the ultimate material of modernity in Europe only added to its luster.25 Since the colonization of foreign territories was justified by claims of bringing modernity to benighted peoples, Belgium’s colonial cement production was strongly envied by other colonial nations. For instance, in 1932, a French colonial official wrote that “considering colonization […] the works of colonization are only in the most advanced regions, like Indochina, the Belgian Congo, Madagascar and the Dutch and British Indies, where Europeans installed cement plants.”26 However, this political rationale was part of a larger economic agenda, surpassing national colonial ambitions. The French officer writing in 1932 that the Belgian Congo was one of the most advanced colonial regions meant that its extractive economy was most advanced. A good case to illustrate the importance of cement for the (colonial) extractive economy is the Lubudi cement plant, established only two years after the first Congolese cement plant in Lukala. Located in the mining province of Katanga, the plant was primarily required for the supply of the cement for all sorts of mining infrastructures. The fact that the company Ciments du Katanga (Cimenkat) was part of the same holding as the Union Minière de Haut-Katanga (UMHK) is telling in that respect. The list of the new firm’s first cement sales in Cimenkat’s first annual report was explicit: nearly all of the cement produced went directly to the UMHK.

12Such a business model, in which the production of construction materials was directly linked with the extraction of raw materials like copper ore, was already known from South Africa. In 1892, the first cement plant in Sub-Saharan Africa, Pretoria Portland Cement, opened as part of the Barlow-Rand mining consortium.

  • 27 In 1953 there was a bitter dispute between the many contractors of Elisabethville, who could barel (...)
  • 28 However, as there are no traces in the written sources, this observation can only remain speculati (...)

13The cement plant’s location is good evidence for the clear connection between cement and mining. Of course, the cement plant was built close to an appropriate limestone substrate. However, a quick transfer link to UMHK mining operations, due to proper position on the rail line, was even more important. Perhaps the primordial reason for the siting of the plant was the enormous hydro-electric potential in its direct vicinity. To tap into this cheap energy supply for their mining operations, the UMHK had to build dams—requiring an enormous amount of cement in an ensured steady stream for these large-scale constructions. The Francqui Dam may be the most spectacular proof that cement plants should primarily be conceptualized as a mining tool. Completing this huge project, which provided the UMHK with the energy necessary for its mining operations, relied entirely on a cheap, steady supply of cement from Cimenkat. As such, it is clear that the urban metabolism of the quickly growing city of Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi) had much less impact on the cement plant’s location. The fact that during cement shortages the local colonial government in Elisabethville had little to no say in the use of the cement produced in Lubudi only corroborates how public interest was of much less importance than the industrial interests of the UMHK.27 This economic fact adds an important detail to the political importance highlighted above. To provide this steady stream of cement, Cimenkat imported a rotating cement kiln from Germany to Congo. According to brochures published by the German firm G. Polysius, who installed the plant in Lubudi, it was a state-of-the-art factory with a Solo rotary kiln, which “from commissioning […] works faultlessly and to the full satisfaction of the client, though it is operated by natives under the supervision of European staff reduced to the minimum admissible.” This advanced machinery stood in stark contrast with the kiln in the first Congolese cement plant. Afraid of the huge investments for a rotary kiln in the very new context of the Belgian Congo, the company relied on second-hand European machinery with a vertical kiln. Interestingly enough, this equipment was delivered and installed by the German company Amme Giesecke Konegen, which may suggest a certain preference for, or reliance on, German quality.28

Figure 2: “Afrika.” Depiction from a sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.

Figure 2: “Afrika.” Depiction from a sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.

Source: Collection of the Landesarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Dessau. I 414 Polysius AG Dessau, Nr. 435/5.

Figure 3: From a Polysius Dessau sales brochure.

Figure 3: From a Polysius Dessau sales brochure.

Source: Collection of the Landesarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Dessau. I 414 Polysius AG Dessau, Nr. 435/5.

Figure 4: Depiction from a sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.

Figure 4: Depiction from a sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.

Source: Collection of the Landesarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Dessau. I 414 Polysius AG Dessau, Nr. 435/5.

  • 29 Rotary kilns work constantly, because shutting them down is too expensive.
  • 30 Louis Verniers (September 16, 1955) “Conditions des ventes du ciment en territoire de Thysville,” (...)
  • 31 One Belgian colonial requested cement to finish his swimming pool, arguing how the mosquitoes in t (...)
  • 32 “Je propose de supprimer [...] le contrôle du ciment ; parce que nos ingénieurs ont autre chose à (...)

14The fact that such a rotary kiln is an extremely expensive piece of industrial machinery adds another layer to the perils of cement addiction pointed out by Nyerere. Once the plant’s initial goal, to complete the mining industry infrastructure, was fulfilled, Cimenkat could not simply reduce its production. Therefore, they had to find other outlets for the massive output of the continuous production process.29 In other words, the cement addiction was actively created by the industry. The establishment in 1953 of the Organisme Régulateur pour le Commerce du Ciment au Congo Belge (ORC) had a crucial role in creating this cement market. The interference of local ORC director Louis Verniers in the design of type housing for Africans is telling in that respect. In a confidential note to the head office in Brussels, Louis Verniers bragged about the fact that due to his personal interaction with the government officials drawing up the plans, the walls of the dwellings were excessively thick: “I note, in confidence, that there is absolutely no need to build 2-metre-high walls made of cement blocks 20 to 25 cm thick.”30 Ironically, the need to find a market for the surplus cement also created a constant fear of cement shortages in the colony. During and after the Second World War, this paranoia led to strict government supervision of cement usage. Making use of his wartime privileges, the Governor General even appointed a “cement inspector,” who oversaw the whole colonial cement market. Every bag of cement sold had to be approved by the contrôleur. Anyone in the colony who wanted to use even the smallest amount of the valuable material had to submit an official request, demonstrating why the cement was indispensable. What these requests, all of which are kept in the colonial state archives, primarily show, however, is that in fact there was no cement shortage whatsoever. Every single one was approved, regardless of the reason.31 The inspector himself repeatedly stated that the cement surplus made his job superfluous. Finally, the director of the Travaux Publics was able to convince the governor to lift the control:I propose [...] the cement control be abolished; because our engineers have other things to do, because this control is illusory anyway [...] as according to the inspector, cement is not lacking.”32 This constant fear of cement shortages—which became real only once, during a period of intense construction in the early 1950s—and cultural biases about local materials surely played a pivotal role in the creation of the cement addiction. Yet such mental constraints were not the only ones. The fact that cement production had been drastically upscaled made the material easily and cheaply available. Local materials no longer stood a chance of becoming part of the colonial building culture. Besides, the addiction was also maintained through the many bureaucratic procedures put in place. Within bureaucratic processes of standardization of building materials, quality control, or specification writing, little room was left for materials that lacked such a (perceived) consistency.

Cementing independence—Okpella in the 1960s

  • 33 In his recent article, Łukasz Stanek offers an important contribution to the architectural history (...)
  • 34 This title is an example of Cold War era surveys, in this case most likely funded by the CIA (for (...)
  • 35 Ewan Harrison, Rixt Woudstra, Iain Jackson and Michele Tenzon, “Accelerating Development: Taylor W (...)

15The “addiction to cement” persisted during the political and economic turmoil of early statehood, and can be observed throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, regardless of the country or political system.33 The need for boosting cement production capacity remained a common thread, not only in broadly circulating trade journals such as the journal Cement & Lime Manufacture, but also in translated press cuttings from the continent published in the volumes of Translations of Sub-Saharan Africa.34 Both observers from the former metropoles and actors from the continent emphasized the importance of industrialization, which was expected to accelerate, as Harrison, Woudstra, Jackson, and Tenzon also confirm in another article of this thematic dossier.35 Two strands of this discourse seem typical. The outsiders, such as Jacques Giri, focused on the discrepancy between the rates of development in Europe and (in this case, Francophone) Africa, even if they also took note of the construction of new production sites. Without reflecting on the causes of this difference, these commentators adhered to the view about the supposed economic backwardness of African industry:

  • 36 A Frenchman Views African Industrialization: Following is a translation of an article by Jacques G (...)

“Black Africa is becoming industrialized. In all the French-speaking countries, even those which seemed at first sight less well-endowed for industrialization, plants have been built or are being built at this time. In some countries this industrial development has become accelerated and the plants have increased in number. And yet, there are many who find that the industrialization of Africa is indeed slow. The Africans are getting impatient and—this is very legitimate—wish to hasten their accession to this industrial society which, they feel, can alone end their underdevelopment. The Europeans, used to the high development rates of the past 20 years, are concerned about the relative slowness of the economic take-off of Africa and are alarmed to see a growing chasm between the developed countries on the one hand and the underdeveloped ones on the other.”36

16On the other hand, voices from the continent tended to underline the steep progress that took place in the years after the independence and the already existing industrial construction sector, even if some materials like steel had to be imported:

  • 37 “Construction Materials in Black Africa: An Important Import Market; A Fast Developing Local Indus (...)

“The Africans, having built out of earth or vegetable materials (wood, dried grasses, etc.) for thousands of years, have now arrived at the concrete stage. Since they generally possess the raw materials for making both ceramic products and cement, there are hardly any African countries which do not possess several brick factories and some cement plants. It would be tedious to list them.”37

  • 38 This also means that any statistical data on cement production is to be treated with caution, beca (...)
  • 39 In a case study concerning the cement mill in Monrovia, which is not discussed in this article, we (...)

17As the anonymous author of the article suggests, independence was equated not only with the boost in industrialization but, more specifically, with the arrival “at the concrete stage.” Further in the article, it becomes clear that the dependency on cement imports was still statistically significant. Besides, the mixed business model was common, in which clinker, cement’s main raw material, was imported instead of the finished product.38 Some of the less industrialized countries, such as Liberia, still import clinker today.39 In view of such economic dependencies, it comes as no surprise that the need for establishing a strong local construction sector gained the status of a political rationale for independence. Cement production was one of the crucial signifiers of it, as the words of the Guinean president Sekou Touré demonstrate:

  • 40 “The translation of a speech given by President Sekou Touré at opening of 1966 session of the Cou (...)

“When the goals of development and the conditions of development are not sufficiently understood and voluntarily accepted by the people, the latter can supply neither the efforts nor the necessary sacrifices for national growth. More cement and tractors and less whiskey, more factories and plants and less luxury cars.”40

  • 41 The plant’s location was not only related to the availability of raw materials but also attested t (...)
  • 42 “Ewekoro Cement Works,” Cement and Lime Manufacture, vol. 36, no. 6, November 1963, p. 103-113.
  • 43 Midwestern Nigeria at a Glance, [s.l.]: Information Department, 1971, p. 58.
  • 44 Hosted at Berlinisch Brandenburgisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, now available via “Deutsche Digitale Bib (...)

18The project of the Okpella cement plant in the Edo State in Nigeria (erected between 1965 and 1967) was emblematic of such a striving for industrial autarchy, even though it was not underpinned by revolutionary calls like Touré’s cited above.41 In Nigeria, the most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa, the development of the cement industry was planned in the last years of the British colonial regime. Though built only after independence, the first large-scale cement plant, at Ewokoro, relatively close to Lagos, was therefore still a showcase of the dependency on British suppliers, manufacturers, and British engineering.42 However, for the project of state-building, which also required the construction of new cement plants, such connections to the former metropole were not beneficial.43 Hence, the choice of Philipp Holzmann AG as a general contractor and other firms from Germany such as Salzgitter AG as machinery suppliers seems economically and politically plausible, even if it cannot be substantiated by archival documentation, aside from the abundant photographic sources in the collection of Philipp Holzmann AG.44

Figure 5: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, after 1966.

Figure 5: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, after 1966.

Source: Philipp Holzmann AG-Bildarchiv. Berlin-Brandenburgisches Wirtschaftsarchiv e.V. (BBWA), 1500-13 (Altsignatur), 41527 (Vorlagen-Nummer).

  • 45 Heinrich Köhler, Nigeria: Rahmenbedingungen und Struktur der nigerianischen Wirtschaft, Hamburg: A (...)
  • 46 Dangote and M Content, “Q1 2022: Dangote Cement ramps-up production at Okpella plant,” Dangote Ind (...)

19The sheer number of photographs allows us to assume that the Nigerian construction site was important for the German company and that it was truly a showcase project that could help them to secure further commissions in the region. From the depictions and captions it becomes clear that the cement plant was constructed as a full package. The deal included road infrastructure for heavy-load vehicles (fig. 6), administrative facilities and housing provisions segregated according to class divisions (fig. 7), as well as leisure facilities, complete with a swimming pool, a seemingly compulsory feature of expat camps. Furthermore, the visual documentation confirms that the cement plant was indeed completed. Apparently, the connection to German contractors also remained important: for the extension of the plant, Coutinho, Caro & Co. became the general contractor.45 As with the majority of cement production sites, once a cement plant is built, it is highly likely it will be either extended or new plants will be erected in its proximity. This is also the case in Okpella, where the largest investor from the continent and a global player, Dangote Cement, recently established a new plant.46

Figure 6: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, 1965-1967.

Figure 6: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, 1965-1967.

Source: Philipp Holzmann AG-Bildarchiv. Berlin-Brandenburgisches Wirtschaftsarchiv e.V. (BBWA), U5/03/A 66 2 6 (Vorlagen-Nummer). URL: https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/​item/​SS24OJGDOLOIEFL7TVR4BIF7KSFGNSUP

Figure 7: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, 1965-1967.

Figure 7: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, 1965-1967.

Source: Philipp Holzmann AG-Bildarchiv. Berlin-Brandenburgisches Wirtschaftsarchiv e.V. (BBWA), U5/03/A 66 2 24 (Vorlagen-Nummer). URL: https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/​item/​W45R55VDC4KNFF2B4RGZSGFVV2YABOJI

  • 47 Such local preferences are addressed brilliantly for the Mozambican case by David Morton, Age of C (...)

20In the early post-independence era, by contrast with the colonial era, the discussion of alternatives to cement did not move beyond academic circles. Equating local cement production with the aspirations of state-building and striving towards economic autarchy, paired with individual consumers’ preferences,47 surely contributed to entrenching the paradigm of “addiction to cement.”

Cementing socialism–New Mugher II in the 1980s

  • 48 To avoid this fate, parts of the company were moved to Beckum in West Germany, where the firm cont (...)

21Yet this addiction was by no means a capitalist phenomenon. In socialist or socialist-leaning contexts, be it in Tanzania in the 1960s or in Ethiopia in the late 1970s and 1980s, the need for increasing production capacity was also proclaimed to be the goal of the state. The New Mugher II cement plant in Ethiopia is a case in point. It demonstrates that although global socialism was entangled in the industry, the same corporate actors continued to benefit from the “addiction to cement.” One of the protagonists of this article, G. Polysius, was nationalized in the late 1940s by the German Democratic Republic and changed its name into Zementanlagenbau Dessau (ZAB).48 Despite this major shift and having to adapt to completely new economic and political circumstances, the company remained true to its roots, proudly referring to its earlier colonial projects, such as Lubudi, in its publicity.

  • 49 Ethiopian Cement Corporation, “Mugher Cement Corporation: Short Profile,” Addis Ababa, Mokoda, 198 (...)

22In Mugher, 160 km from the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, ZAB worked on the construction of a cement plant in the early 1980s. Management of the overall construction supposedly lay with the Ethiopian Building Construction Authority (EBCA) “for the first time” in an industrial project, as an Ethiopian promotional leaflet noted. This underlines the importance of the construction of cement plants for industrialization policies in Sub-Saharan Africa.49

Figure 8: Page from a SKET brochure.

Figure 8: Page from a SKET brochure.

Source: VEB Schwermaschinenbau-Kombinat “Ernst Thälmann” Magdeburg (SKET), SKET-Report, Zementwerk in Äthiopien, Potsdam, 1985.

  • 50 VEB Schwermaschinenbau-Kombinat “Ernst Thälmann” Magdeburg (SKET), SKET-Report, Zementwerk in Äthi (...)

23ZAB’s publication on the project, however, rather stressed the lack of Ethiopian know-how.50 It noted that the leading Ethiopian engineer did not have any experience in constructing industrial facilities and that the Ethiopian government had “dared” to erect a cement plant together with “initially skeptical” local farmers. Not surprisingly, this brochure by the German company, equally intended as a showcase for future commissioners, still presents the overall undertaking as a great success, but not without clarifying to the reader the challenges the project faced. The site, on a high plateau, was remote, and the construction of the plant itself was initially slowed down by problematic ground conditions, not to mention the imponderability for the engineers in setting up the world’s highest cement plant. In describing the company’s experience with the construction site, ZAB’s publications point to its readiness to take risks as an essential quality. This repeated emphasis on its extraordinary commitment hints at the manifold problems that arose during the construction process. ZAB’s complimentary statement that the client was rightfully proud of completing the most important industrial venture of post-revolutionary Ethiopia points to the political importance of the project, as already mentioned with regards to EBCA’s publication.

  • 51 Hans-Joachim Döring, “Es geht um unsere Existenz“: Die Politik der DDR gegenüber der Dritten Welt (...)

24Looking beyond the promotional perspectives of ZAB and EBCA, respectively, let us note that the project was in line with the GDR’s overall geopolitical strategy.51 The GDR initiated several large-scale projects in Ethiopia but was again limited by its actual economic capacities, as always. Delays in construction or faulty machinery were the common problems in several other projects. As a result, the Ethiopians ended cooperation, partially reverting to Western machinery. In the construction of a cement plant, however, East Germany seemed to possess an experienced and capable company in ZAB, apt to meet Ethiopian demands.

  • 52 Haile Giorgis Workneh, “Research Needs and Priorities in Housing and Construction in Ethiopia,” Ha (...)
  • 53 K.C. Barrell, “A New Cement Works in Ethiopia,” Cement & Lime Manufacture, vol. 37, no. 5, Septemb (...)

25The Ethiopian state was ready to commit to the project because the lack of cement and other building materials had been an ongoing and serious problem, under Haile Selassie and after the revolution.52 Before the revolution, there had been feasibility studies into a large cement factory, but they were never implemented. The vast country was left with only two integrated cement plants, one close to Addis Ababa, which already sourced raw materials from Mugher, and one in Dire Dawa along the railroad to Djibouti.53 Ethiopia had arrived at the “concrete stage,” but just barely. The result was that the prices for building materials and cement continued to rise sharply after the revolution, impeding the industrial construction sector. The GDR’s leadership and the Ethiopian authorities therefore identified cement production as a valuable contribution to the Ethiopian revolution. ZAB‘s director general at the time, Eckhard Netzmann, remembered his meeting with the Ethiopian prime minister, during which he explicitly linked the project to state-building aspirations and the benefit of the Ethiopian people:

54
  • 55 Publicity materials from the private archival collection, courtesy of Andreas Butter.
  • 56 Compare Juliane Richter, “‘A complicated political-ideological situation’: Transferring a cement p (...)
  • 57 These statements are taken from oral history collection in May and June 2021 with several former G (...)

26As the Ethiopian government had its own understanding of the centrality of concrete production, the project took on great importance to both sides and became “too big to fail.” For the political success of the New Mugher plant, it was indispensable that the Ethiopian side be officially in charge of the project. However, such a view lost sight of more complicated dynamics, such as the construction itself, expanding the construction site in Okpella, and showcasing the variety of actors involved as time went on. In fact, the German site manager JG, who is remembered as “not an academic but a square-built man” and his group of 55 German staff perceived themselves as heading the construction site. This supposed or actual leading role is further conveyed by the German-language publicity materials—while publicity in Amharic highlights the agency of the Ethiopians.55 Instead of working with the bulk of the workforce of 5,500 Ethiopian workers, the German engineers collaborated with a brigade of 300 Cubans. Most of the Cubans had been trained by the East Germans as part of ZAB’s construction of Cuban cement plants in Cienfuegos and Nuevitas.56 They were sent to Mugher from their Cuban workplaces on the basis of a Cuban-Ethiopian Friendship Treaty. Deployed by the Ethiopian partner, these Cuban workers form an intriguing example of the complex political-commercial relations in the socialist hemisphere. While the German managers saw themselves as the top of the hierarchy at the construction site and had strong personal relations with the Cubans, the Cuban brigade managed most of the construction process and directed the Ethiopian day laborers. In the reminiscences of German engineers, the bulk of the Ethiopian labor force remained an amorphous mass: “What machinery does today, a thousand ants—as we used to say—did it by hand just as well.”57

  • 58 Max Trecker, Red Money for the Global South: East-South Economic Relations in the Cold War, London (...)

27All three groups were housed near the construction site, yet segregated from one another and under different conditions. The Germans disposed of a large living unit with modern bungalows that were later used by the heads of the cement plant, while a separate “camp” was erected for the Cubans. The housing for the Ethiopians, and the apparent “improvement” and “modernization” of their living conditions, were remembered by the ZAB employees we interviewed as a seed for developing the entire country in a “region where there was nothing else - nothing!”. And yet, in this supposed void, the actors from the Comecon were by far not the only foreigners. In the course of the investment, a West German building inspection company “Inspectorate” from Düsseldorf oversaw the completion of different stages of the construction process. Moreover, enigmatic consultants from Belgium appear to have been at the construction site in 1982. This should not be surprising at all, as contractors from western Europe were present in different, often interchanging roles. At other ZAB projects in Syria, Egypt, Algeria, or Saudi Arabia, we also see such figures appear. Though the term “construction consortia” was never part of the official discourse in the GDR building industry, which was dominated by integrated combines, in practice such consortia did emerge, bringing another multilateral layer of such projects into the picture.58

28After the completion of New Mugher in 1984, ZAB’s involvement in Ethiopia continued over the 1980s, while the company was engaged in building a second production line. For both Ethiopians and the Germans, there were few alternative partners, and the projects were politically protected. Once cemented, ties were hard to sever. While the German managers insist in retrospect that the political importance of the projects did not play a role in their everyday work, the possibility of purchasing Western technology and expertise at a time when the ZAB had exhausted its own ability to do so was a highly political decision in the GDR.

  • 59 For the German context, compare “Dokumentation der von der DDR übernommenen Projekte,” in Matthias (...)

29Ultimately, like many other construction projects, the building of the second production line in Mugher was interrupted by German reunification. Yet the project continued to be “too big to fail” as the federal German development bank KfW took over and secured the funding of the project into new political eras in Germany as well as Ethiopia, where cement became one of the foundations of the Ethiopian “infrastructure state” continuing its addiction to cement.59 The afterlives of the largest cement production site in Ethiopia are similar to the case of Okpella—recently Dangote Cement erected, and now operates, a new large-scale plant in the proximity of the old one. This not only confirms the well-known pattern of cement plants being located near available raw materials—but also near available qualified labor and existing (socialist) infrastructure.

Conclusion

  • 60 We have developed this interpretation of cement as “meta-infrastructure” in more detail in previou (...)

30The interest in cement production of the Derg regime resonates with the industrialization and nationalization policy that was one of the core elements on their agenda. Whereas this industrialization happened rather late in the history of Ethiopia, as we have shown, the enormous need for cement during the rapid industrialization of other Sub-Saharan regions gave rise to the establishment of several large cement plants at different moments in the long 20th century we studied. Cement has played a crucial role not only the industrialization of the construction sector, but also in the proliferation of (mining) industries, as concrete was a quintessential material in the construction of numerous infrastructural works undergirding these industries.60

  • 61 The work of Harrison, Woudstra, Jackson and Tenzon in this thematic dossier also attests to these (...)

31However, the need for cement was often limited in time. The rotary cement kilns installed at huge expense did not allow for any flexibility in production. As a result, new markets had to be created. In that sense, the industry was in several cases responsible for the creation of a cement addiction: for instance, through the aggressive marketing of cement-based building materials, like asbestos cement or cement blocks or soil-cement blocks. Besides, as the long-term presence of German firms exemplifies, it was not only the cement industry that benefitted from the addiction. A whole range of contractors for large-scale or specialized projects, or other groups of actors more generally, also had a hand in the further proliferation of cement plants across the region. The strong rootedness of the industry—due to its reliance on available raw materials, on available skilled labor and infrastructure, and the scale of capital investment—further fuels the addiction, as this rootedness perpetuates consumption patterns in the vicinity of cement plants. Finally, cement plants have been of crucial importance in national politics as well as geopolitics. Conceived as indispensable for “progress,” cement plants were crucial sites for strengthening existing bilateral relations in shifting geopolitical landscapes, but also for forging new ties, with often unexpected multilateral connections visible in the planning and execution of such large projects.61 These complex cement histories further enable us to contribute to the alternative histories of industrialization beyond the “transfer” from the “Global North” to the “Global South”.

  • 62 Throughout the colonial period, the indigenous lime-burning industry was considered to be a suitab (...)
  • 63 For a more extensive elaboration of this argument, see: Robby Fivez, “Resisting Material Binaries: (...)

32Though Nyerere may have overemphasized the psychological nature of the addiction, he rightfully observed how the addiction led to a “paralysis” that prevented the decision-makers from embracing “alternative” materials in his nation’s construction culture. While this article argues that this paralysis is not only a specter of a colonial cement adoration, there was indeed a variety of attitudinal and physical constraints that hindered the implementation of many “alternative” materials. Such alternatives were proposed, with varying degrees of earnest or scientific underpinning, throughout the different eras evoked in this text. They ranged from a proposed return to the indigenous lime-burning industry in the colonial era62 to numerous studies and experiments on soil-cement and adobe conducted in the post-colonial era. Nevertheless, these so-called “local” building materials remained a marginal phenomenon within the influence spheres of the cement industry, or—as Juliane Richter and Alfonso Alfonso González call it in this thematic dossier for the Cuban case—a “projected tradition.” Despite claims about Sub-Saharan Africa being the “last cement frontier,” this historical unpacking of cement production in the region as well as its strong path-dependency into the present clearly shows how cement indeed remains the ultimate building material of Sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than conjuring up all sorts of constraints to justify the invention of all sorts of so-called traditional alternative materials, architectural practice and criticism could benefit from such a more nuanced history in their assessments of what constitutes a local material and why.63

33In this respect, this article confirms the celebrated malleability of the material, in the sense that it easily shifts shape in rapidly changing geopolitical landscapes. Thus, it becomes evident that the “cement-addiction” phenomenon is by no means a side effect of capitalism alone; it is neither limited to imperial and colonial contexts, nor does it pertain only to the striving for independence. It stems from the actual scarcity of cement, in situations when the production could not meet the demand and construction activity was inhibited by materials shortages. Yet it is simultaneously deeply rooted in the apprehension or even fear of not being able to produce or acquire enough cement to satisfy the supposedly constantly rising need. By scrutinizing the discourses on cement across the long 20th century in various local contexts, while also analyzing the particular cases of construction of cement plants embedded in their socio-economic contexts and aspirations, grounding our analyses in the breadth of sources that account for different vantage points, we come to conclude that in this perpetuation of the “addiction to cement,” there can be no equilibrium between demand and supply. The hunger for cement surpasses the logic of economic models. In other words, it is the hunger for cement that creates the hunger for even more cement (which can never be satiated). However, this can only be observed if we simultaneously consider the physical, the socially and discursively constructed, as well as the epistemological material constraints of cement — in other words, while “swimming in the ocean of materials.”

Acknowledgments. This publication would not have been possible without the funding from the VolkswagenStiftung within the Freigeist Fellowship for the project “Conquering (with) Concrete. German Construction Companies as Global Players in Local Contexts” (2020-2024, Leibniz Institute for Research on Society and Space (IRS), Erkner) and the EOS project “Construction History, Above and Beyond. What History Can Do for Construction History” (EOS 40007559) funded by the FWO and F.R.S.-FNRS under the Excellence of Science (EOS) program. We appreciated the highly detailed suggestions by the two anonymous reviewers, who shared their impressive knowledge about cement production. Johan Lagae encouraged us to drop our favorite case study, thus improving the coherence of the story told in this article (although we are convinced that the cement mill in Monrovia deserves attention in a follow-up article). We are grateful to Paul Sprute for conducting additional oral history collection and editorial support and to all the contemporary witnesses who offered their insights. The State Archive Saxony-Anhalt in Dessau, the Berlin-Brandenburg Economic Archive, and the Belgian State Archives in Brussels, provided us with access to their invaluable sources.

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Notes

1 Julius K. Nyerere, “The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After,” The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2, 1977, p. 20. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/45341443. Accessed 3 September 2024.

2 Ibid.

3 “Rent Seeking and Industrial Growth in Africa: The Case of Dangote’s Cement Industry,” n.d. URL : https://therestjournal.com/2019/03/22/rent-seeking-and-industrial-growth-in-africa-the-case-of-dangotes-cement-industry/. Accessed 26 March 2024.

4 Armelle Choplin, “Cementing Africa: Cement flows and city-making along the West African corridor (Accra, Lomé, Cotonou, Lagos),” Urban Studies, vol. 57 no. 9, 2019, p. 1977-1993, especially p. 1985. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098019851949.

5 This bias has been recently addressed by geographers studying processes of deindustrialization (e.g. Seth Schindler, Tom Gillespie, Nicola Banks, Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ, Himanshu Burte, J. Miguel Kanai and Neha Sami, “Deindustrialization in Cities of the Global South,” Area Development and Policy, vol. 5, no. 3, July 2, 2020, p. 283-304. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2020.1725393).

6 Jonathan Watts, “Concrete: The most destructive material on Earth,” The Guardian, 25 February 2019, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/feb/25/concrete-the-most-destructive-material-on-earth. Accessed 3 September 2024; Annette Helle and Barbara Lenherr (eds.), Beyond Concrete: Strategien für eine postfossile Baukultur: Strategies for a post-fossil Baukultur, Zurich : Triest Verlag, 2022.

7 Sarah Nichols, Opération Béton: Constructing Concrete in Switzerland, PhD thesis, ETH Zurich, 2021; Salvatore Aprea, Nicola Navone, Sarah Nichols and Laurent Stalder (ed.), Concrete in Switzerland: Histories from the Recent Past, Lausanne: EPFL Press, 2021.

8 Kim Förster, “Triangular stories: Cement as a cheap commodity, critical building material, and a seemingly harmless climate killer,” in Annette Helle and Barbara Lenherr (eds.), Beyond Concrete, op. cit. (note 7), p. 58-65; Kim Förster (ed.), Environmental Histories of Architecture, Montreal: CCA, 2022.

9 Robby Fivez “The Rubble in the Jungle: A fragmented biography of Lukala’s cementscape, DR Congo,” Journal of Landscape Architecture, no. 1, 2020, p. 78-87. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/18626033.2020.1792691.

10 Ernst Neufert, Industriebauten, Wiesbaden: Bauverlag, 1973.

11 Adrian Forty, Concrete and Culture: A Material History, London: Reaktion Books, 2012.

12 Cf. Entwurfsbüro für Industriebau Halle/Saale, “Ein neues Zementwerk in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” Deutsche Architektur, 1958, p. 639-645, especially p. 639.

13 “Mais ce marché n’est pas celui du bâtiment. C’est celui de l’équipement, le seul qui offre un front économique et technique suffisamment homogène pour garantir au négociant des volumes de transaction qui correspondent à ses ambitions industrielles.” Cyrille Simonnet, Le béton, histoire d’un matériau, Marseille: Éditions Parenthèses, 2005, p. 28.

14 “Civil Engineering and Building in Cement Works –II,” Cement and Lime Manufacture, September 1965, p. 91.

15 The awareness of the.environmental consequences of cement production is not a recent phenomenon, in the German-speaking context, it was observed already in the 1950s. Karel Svoboda, “Städtebauliche Probleme beim Aufbau von Zementfabriken,“ Deutsche Architektur, 1958, p. 265-268, here p. 265.

16 However, to complicate the picture, cement producers that started their global ventures before World War I need not to be forgotten, Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd (later known as the “Blue Circle Group”) being a prime example.

17 Quantitative research collected in the database of the “Conquering (with) Concrete” research project. See also: Manfred Pohl, Philipp Holzmann: Geschichte eines Bauunternehmens  1849-1999, Munich: Beck, 1999, p. xii, 449.

18 Nina Kleinöder, “A ‘Place in the Sun’? German Rails and Sleepers in Colonial Railway Building in Africa, 1905 to 1914,” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, vol. 65, no. 1, March 2020, p. 9-31. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/zug-2019-0017.

19 Ernest Paulissen and Louis Goffin (July 11, 1911) “Chaux et Ciment du Congo,” Letter to Jules Renkin (Minister of Colonies), Brussels (Belgium), BMFA, Fonds Régime Foncier, File no. RF(1469)543.

20 As this is discussed by another piece in this thematic dossier by Gauri Bharat and Bhavya Jain, “Becoming Concrete: Materiality and Water Infrastructure in Colonial South Asia.” See also Pedro Guedes, “Learning from the ‘other’: Early modern emulation and trans-imperial exchange of ‘native’ building technologies,” in Ine Wouters, Inge Bertels, Bernard Espion, Krista De Jonge and Denis Zastavi (eds.), Building Knowledge, Constructing Histories: Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress on Construction History (6ICCH), Brussels, Belgium, 9-13 July 2018, London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2018.

21 For a discussion of the cultural disdain for local building materials, see Robby Fivez, Simon De Nys-Ketels and Katie Lloyd Thomas, “Historicizing material properties: Between technological and cultural history,” in Mateus Mascarehnas and Paula Pires (eds.), History of Construction Cultures, Leiden: CRC Press, 2012.

22 Edmond de Mandat-Grancy, Au Congo (1898) impressions d’un touriste, Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1900, p. 98.

23 Georges Moulaert, Souvenirs d’Afrique, 1902-1919, Brussels: Charles Dessart, 1948, p. 18.

24 Fernand Nisot, “La fabrication du Ciment Portland Artificiel au Bas-Congo,” Congo. Revue Générale de la Colonie belge, vol. 1, no. 1, 1929.

25 For a nuanced understanding of the material’s modern character see the chapter Mud & Modernity in Adrian Forty, Concrete and Culture. A Material History, op. cit. (note 12), p. 13-42.

26 [Unknown], “Les super-ciments et leur adaptabilité d’emploi aux bétons exécutés en pays chauds,” Le Ciment, no. 9, 1932.

27 In 1953 there was a bitter dispute between the many contractors of Elisabethville, who could barely lay hands on the cement for their projects. Moreover, they paid high rates for the cements they could obtain, which were often of poor quality. The main reason for their anger was the fact that one contractor, Les Travaux en Béton au Katanga, had an endless supply of cement, because it belonged to the same holding company as the Cimenkat cement plant.

28 However, as there are no traces in the written sources, this observation can only remain speculative.

29 Rotary kilns work constantly, because shutting them down is too expensive.

30 Louis Verniers (September 16, 1955) “Conditions des ventes du ciment en territoire de Thysville,” Brussels (Belgium), BSA, Fonds Finoutremer, File 2005.

31 One Belgian colonial requested cement to finish his swimming pool, arguing how the mosquitoes in the unfinished basin were an absolute threat to public health.

32 “Je propose de supprimer [...] le contrôle du ciment ; parce que nos ingénieurs ont autre chose à faire, parce que ce contrôle est illusoire […] et parce que d’après le contrôleur, le ciment ne faisait pas défaut.” R. Van Laere (November 21, 1945) “Avis TP controleur du ciment,” Letter to the vice-governor general, Brussels (Belgium), BMFA, Fonds Gouvernement Général, File GG.15131.

33 In his recent article, Łukasz Stanek offers an important contribution to the architectural history of that period by outlining the phenomenon of the Africanization and subsequent Ghainaization of the construction industry, unpacking the rationales and networks involved in the processes (Łukasz Stanek, “Race, Time, and Architecture: Dilemmas of Africanization in Ghana, 1951-66,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, vol. 83, no. 2, 2024, p. 191-208. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/jsah.2024.83.2.191). However, the question of the material supply is not at the center of his analysis.

34 This title is an example of Cold War era surveys, in this case most likely funded by the CIA (for the context on similar outlets see Susan Williams, White Malice: The CIA and the Neocolonisation of Africa, London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd., 2023). Because it is a broad compilation of relevant articles from the daily press across the continent, it offers a valuable and so far underinvestigated source of information on construction activities, especially with respect to infrastructural projects of the 1960s and 1970s.

35 Ewan Harrison, Rixt Woudstra, Iain Jackson and Michele Tenzon, “Accelerating Development: Taylor Woodrow and Arcon’s Prefabricated Steel Structures in Decolonizing West Africa,” in this thematic dossier.

36 A Frenchman Views African Industrialization: Following is a translation of an article by Jacques Giri entitled “Reflections on the Industrialization of Africa” in the French-language publication Coopération et Développement (Cooperation and Development), no. 17, September-October 1967, p. 37-44; Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1967, no. 641-660 [no page number].

37 “Construction Materials in Black Africa: An Important Import Market; A Fast Developing Local Industry,” in the French-language weekly newspaper, Le Moniteur Africain (African Monitor), no. 322, 30 November 1967, p. 9, 11-12; Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1968, no. 685-699 [no page number].

38 This also means that any statistical data on cement production is to be treated with caution, because the definitions of what a cement plant is (the whole complex, or a cement mill with a packaging facility) or what local cement production means (the entire complicated process, or grinding of clinker) may vary. An architectural analysis of the complex, either through archival photographs of the site or in its current state, is a helpful way of checking the information.

39 In a case study concerning the cement mill in Monrovia, which is not discussed in this article, we analyzed how the dependency on the connection to German contractors and cement producers was established in the 1960s and is sustained nowadays, despite two civil wars and structural changes in the country.

40 “The translation of a speech given by President Sekou Touré at opening of 1966 session of the Council of the Guinean Revolution at Labé and published in the French-language newspaper Horoya, Conakry, 29 July 1966, p. 1-8; Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966, no. 427-443 [no page number].

41 The plant’s location was not only related to the availability of raw materials but also attested to an attempt to create new industrial hubs beyond the urban centers.

42 “Ewekoro Cement Works,” Cement and Lime Manufacture, vol. 36, no. 6, November 1963, p. 103-113.

43 Midwestern Nigeria at a Glance, [s.l.]: Information Department, 1971, p. 58.

44 Hosted at Berlinisch Brandenburgisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, now available via “Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek – Kultur und Wissen online,” n.d. URL: https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/. Accessed 16 May 2024.

45 Heinrich Köhler, Nigeria: Rahmenbedingungen und Struktur der nigerianischen Wirtschaft, Hamburg: Afrika-Verein, Technisch-Wirtschaftlicher Dienst, 1979, p. 179; Stephanie Decker, “Less Than an Empire and More Than British: Foreign Investor Competition in Ghana and Nigeria in the 1960s” in David Thackeray, Andrew Thompson and Richard Toye (eds.), Imagining Britain’s Economic Future, c.1800-1975: Trade, Consumerism, and Global Markets, Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018.

46 Dangote and M Content, “Q1 2022: Dangote Cement ramps-up production at Okpella plant,” Dangote Industries Limited, June 6, 2022. URL : https://www.dangote.com/q1-2022-dangote-cement-ramps-up-production-at-okpella-plant/. Accessed 16 May 2024.For the location, URL: https://maps.app.goo.gl/JwzfPvQJfzVJNKRP8. For the location of the old plant and the comparison of size, URL: https://maps.app.goo.gl/uVgJwPq6vDi5KtXm7.

47 Such local preferences are addressed brilliantly for the Mozambican case by David Morton, Age of Concrete: Housing and the Shape of Aspiration in the Capital of Mozambique, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2019.

48 To avoid this fate, parts of the company were moved to Beckum in West Germany, where the firm continued under the name Polysius. In some cases of international involvement, competition but also collaboration between the two entities can be observed, thus offering an example of Cold War complexities. ‘

49 Ethiopian Cement Corporation, “Mugher Cement Corporation: Short Profile,” Addis Ababa, Mokoda, 1984.

50 VEB Schwermaschinenbau-Kombinat “Ernst Thälmann” Magdeburg (SKET), SKET-Report, Zementwerk in Äthiopien, Potsdam, 1985.

51 Hans-Joachim Döring, “Es geht um unsere Existenz“: Die Politik der DDR gegenüber der Dritten Welt am Beispiel von Mosambik und Äthiopien, Berlin: Ch.Links, 1999; Haile Gabriel Dagne, Das entwicklungspolitische Engagement der DDR in Äthiopien: Eine Studie auf Basis äthiopischer Quellen, Berlin: Lit, 2004.

52 Haile Giorgis Workneh, “Research Needs and Priorities in Housing and Construction in Ethiopia,” Habitat International, vol. 9, no. 2, 1985, p. 29-35. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0197-3975(85)90006-2; Girma Kebede and Mary Jacob, “Urban growth and the housing problem in Ethiopia,” Cities, August 1985, p. 23-242. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0264-2751(85)90034-4.

53 K.C. Barrell, “A New Cement Works in Ethiopia,” Cement & Lime Manufacture, vol. 37, no. 5, September 1965, p. 83-89. Maria Christina Loi, Vittoria Paris and Monica Resmini, “From Italy to Ethiopia: In search of the perfect cement,” in James W. P. Campbell, Nina Baker, Nicholas Bill, Michael Driver, Michael Heaton, Natcha Ruamsanitwong, Fiona Smyth and David Yeomans (eds.), Studies in Construction History: The Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Construction History Society, Cambridge: The Construction History Society, 2023, p. 487-498. Compare research conducted by Marie Huber.

54 Interview with NF, 26 May 2021 (all the names of interviewed contemporary witnesses are anonymized).

55 Publicity materials from the private archival collection, courtesy of Andreas Butter.

56 Compare Juliane Richter, “‘A complicated political-ideological situation’: Transferring a cement plant from Dessau/GDR to Nuevitas/Cuba,” ABE Journal, no. 19, 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/abe.12747; and Juliane Richter and Alfonso Alfonso González, “Projected Traditions” in this thematic dossier.

57 These statements are taken from oral history collection in May and June 2021 with several former German employees of ZAB/SKET who were active at the construction site.

58 Max Trecker, Red Money for the Global South: East-South Economic Relations in the Cold War, London: Routledge, 2020.

59 For the German context, compare “Dokumentation der von der DDR übernommenen Projekte,” in Matthias Weiter (ed.), Noch die internationale Solidarität: Ansichten und Informationen zur Vereinigung der deutsch-deutschen Entwicklungspolitik, Berlin: Deutsche Stiftung für internationale Entwicklung, 2000, p. 179-188. For the Ethiopian Infrastructure State, see Zhengli Huang and Tom Goodfellow, “Centralizing Infrastructure in a Fragmenting Polity: China and Ethiopia’s ‘Infrastructure State,’” in Seth Schindler and Jessica DiCarlo, The Rise of the Infrastructure State: How US-China Rivalry Shapes Politics and Place Worldwide, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2023.

60 We have developed this interpretation of cement as “meta-infrastructure” in more detail in previous research: Robby Fivez and Monika Motylińska, “Cement as Weapon. Meta-Infrastructure in the World’s Last Cement Frontier,” in Joseph Heathcott (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Infrastructure Design: Global Perspectives from Architectural History, New York, NY; London: Routledge, 2022 (Routledge International Handbooks), p. 40-50.

61 The work of Harrison, Woudstra, Jackson and Tenzon in this thematic dossier also attests to these shifting geopolitical alliances.

62 Throughout the colonial period, the indigenous lime-burning industry was considered to be a suitable ersatz for the Western cement industry. Despite the initial interest in such local alternatives, however, the colonial Travaux Publics department barely used burnt lime in any (large) colonial construction site—despite its ready availability. See also: Robby Fivez, A concrete state: constructing materials and building ambitions in the (Belgian) Congo, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ghent University, Ghent, 2023.

63 For a more extensive elaboration of this argument, see: Robby Fivez, “Resisting Material Binaries: Unpacking persisting dichotomies of building materials in Central Africa,” Les Cahiers de la recherche architecturale urbaine et paysagère, no.  20, 2024. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/11pax.

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Table des illustrations

Titre Figure 1: “La fabrication du ciment Portland,” page of sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.
Crédits Source: Collection of the Landesarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Dessau. I 414 Polysius AG Dessau, Nr. 433/10.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/16398/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 1,2M
Titre Figure 2: “Afrika.” Depiction from a sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.
Crédits Source: Collection of the Landesarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Dessau. I 414 Polysius AG Dessau, Nr. 435/5.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/16398/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 1,0M
Titre Figure 3: From a Polysius Dessau sales brochure.
Crédits Source: Collection of the Landesarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Dessau. I 414 Polysius AG Dessau, Nr. 435/5.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/16398/img-3.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 415k
Titre Figure 4: Depiction from a sales brochure of Polysius Dessau.
Crédits Source: Collection of the Landesarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt, Abteilung Dessau. I 414 Polysius AG Dessau, Nr. 435/5.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/16398/img-4.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 486k
Titre Figure 5: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, after 1966.
Crédits Source: Philipp Holzmann AG-Bildarchiv. Berlin-Brandenburgisches Wirtschaftsarchiv e.V. (BBWA), 1500-13 (Altsignatur), 41527 (Vorlagen-Nummer).
URL http://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/16398/img-5.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 465k
Titre Figure 6: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, 1965-1967.
Crédits Source: Philipp Holzmann AG-Bildarchiv. Berlin-Brandenburgisches Wirtschaftsarchiv e.V. (BBWA), U5/03/A 66 2 6 (Vorlagen-Nummer). URL: https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/​item/​SS24OJGDOLOIEFL7TVR4BIF7KSFGNSUP
URL http://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/16398/img-6.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 641k
Titre Figure 7: Cement plant in Okpella/Ukpilla, 1965-1967.
Crédits Source: Philipp Holzmann AG-Bildarchiv. Berlin-Brandenburgisches Wirtschaftsarchiv e.V. (BBWA), U5/03/A 66 2 24 (Vorlagen-Nummer). URL: https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/​item/​W45R55VDC4KNFF2B4RGZSGFVV2YABOJI
URL http://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/16398/img-7.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 609k
Titre Figure 8: Page from a SKET brochure.
Crédits Source: VEB Schwermaschinenbau-Kombinat “Ernst Thälmann” Magdeburg (SKET), SKET-Report, Zementwerk in Äthiopien, Potsdam, 1985.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/abe/docannexe/image/16398/img-8.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 1,4M
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Référence électronique

Monika Motylińska et Robby Fivez, « “Addiction to cement.” Narratives and Strategies for Tackling the Lack of Cement in Sub-Saharan Africa (1920s-1980s) »ABE Journal [En ligne], 23 | 2024, mis en ligne le 27 septembre 2024, consulté le 20 avril 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/abe/16398 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/12ebr

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Auteurs

Monika Motylińska

Head of Research Group “Histories of the Buit Environment,” Leibniz Institute for Research on Society and Space, Erkner, Germany ORCID ID: 0000-0002-7464-4218

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Robby Fivez

Post-Doctoral Researcher, Vrije Universiteit, Brussel, Belgium ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4566-0259

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Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

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