• 1 Abdelkader Baina, Le système de l’enseignement au Maroc. 2. L’encadrement humain et matériel, Casab (...)

1The École Mohammadia d’ingénieurs (EMI), founded in 1959 in Rabat shortly after independence (1956), was the first institution assigned to train engineers in Morocco. To create what would become one of the Grandes Écoles for Morocco’s new elite, the Moroccan state turned to resources offered through various development aid channels. It combined multilateral cooperation—particularly via the United Nations Special Fund, responsible for financing equipment and dispatching experts under UNESCO’s aegis—with bilateral cooperation, primarily French and Belgian, responsible for recruiting faculty.1

• 2 Damiano Matasci, Internationaliser l’éducation: la France, l’UNESCO et la fin des empires coloniaux (...)

2The construction of EMI thus emerged as a strategic site of negotiation between various national and international actors. At the time, Moroccan authorities sought to engage in a process of “Moroccanization” of key economic sectors by training national professionals capable of replacing French personnel, UNESCO advocated academic reforms aligned with postcolonial aspirations and, France aimed to guide these transformations in ways that would preserve its technical and cultural influence.2

• 3 Antonio Bravo Nieto, Claudio Verdugo (1928-2017). Un arquitecto de origen español en Marruecos, Mel (...)

3The first EMI buildings were designed by Claude Verdugo, a Franco-Moroccan architect and urban planner of Spanish descent. Born in Casablanca in 1928, he graduated from the Beaux-Arts in Paris in 1956 and also earned a degree from the Institut d’urbanisme. Returning to Morocco after independance, Verdugo worked from 1957 at the Ministry of Public Works as an urban planner before opening his own practice.3 Shortly after his return, he won a two-stage competition organized by the Ministry of Education for the realization of the first architectural nucleus of the EMI campus in 1959.

• 4 Ibid.

4Explaining his architectural approach for EMI, Verdugo specified: “The final project took into account the initial idea of a curved building integrating theoretical instruction and dormitories; practical instruction, workshops, and laboratories occupying an isolated space. A central nucleus connected these two elements with the school’s entrance patio and administrative premises.”4 The narrow, elongated form of the main building and its east-west orientation responded to the climatic requirements of arid countries, limiting direct sun exposure while ensuring good lighting and natural cross-ventilation throughout the day. Additionally, the building’s curvature took into account the trade winds blowing over Rabat, promoting gentle air circulation around the structure and thus reducing structural constraints related to wind loads. In its beginnings, EMI had only a modest 100-seat amphitheater (fig. 8). This space was designed by Verdugo with a cover of pre-assembled vaulted ceilings. Verdugo was subsequently commissioned for multiple campus extensions (fig. 1), such as the 400-seat amphitheater in 1968 (fig. 2) and the large multipurpose hall as well as new buildings for departments created in the early 1980s (fig. 3). For the latter, Verdugo emphasized architectural continuity by reproducing the material palette—red brick for circulation areas and white-coated reinforced concrete for classrooms—alongside the earlier formal vocabulary.

• 5 More specifically, this research draws upon the archives (1957-1979) of the Missions de coopération (...)
• 6 Antonio Bravo Nieto, Claudio Verdugo (1928-2017), op. cit. (note 3).

5Drawing upon and cross-referencing diplomatic archives from the French Cultural and University Mission and the Cultural Cooperation Service (1957-1979) and archives of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs (1956-1968), UNESCO reports, documentation and plans from Verdugo’s archives and the ENA of Rabat photo library,5 this study aims to move beyond a historical perspective centered solely on the foreign-trained architect’s role.6 Instead, it highlights the agency of other actors, such as Moroccan elites or United Nations experts, in the construction of this emblematic school.

• 7 Hannah le Roux et Viviana d’Auria, “Appropriating Aid and Its Multiple Histories,” ABE Journal, no. (...)
• 8 Abdelkhalek Berramdane, Le Maroc et l’Occident, Paris: Karthala, 1987.
• 9 Frederike Lausch and Andreas Kalpakci (eds.), Exploring UNESCO and UIA: Histories of Architecture a (...)

6Recently, in this journal, le Roux and d’Auria emphasized the concept of “hacking aid.”7 In the case of EMI’s construction, institutional aid strategies were reappropriated, transformed, and at times subverted by situated actors. The concept opens up narratives that examine the role of Moroccan actors in discussions, orientations, and initiatives related to this aid situation, rather than reducing them to mere “aid recipients.” In a context marked by Cold War geopolitical reconfigurations, certain Moroccan actors were able to instrumentalize Morocco’s foreign policy of non-alignment,8 as well as other diplomatic and economic levers, to serve their own “nation-building” interests. Situating the EMI project within the broader context of the internationalization of school architecture and discourses on postcolonial development,9 this study paves the way for an alternative reading of the architectural history of the EMI building. Through the process of Moroccanization of technical expertise, it goes beyond dominant narratives of dependency or unilateral transfer that tend to characterize the historiography of post-independence school buildings in the Global South.

• 10 Islamic fiqh is the science of Islamic jurisprudence that governs the understanding and application (...)

7The evolution of university architecture in Morocco is embedded in the broader transformation of knowledge transmission modes in Moroccan society. In the nineteenth century, the education system still rested on a classical hierarchy of knowledge, in which theology and fiqh10 occupied a central position. Mosques, such as the Al Quaraouiyine Mosque-University in Fez, played a fundamental role in disseminating both religious and secular knowledge.

• 11 A close associate of Hubert Lyautey (Resident General in Morocco from 1912 to 1925), Georges Hardy (...)
• 12 Spencer D. Segalla, “Georges Hardy and Educational Ethnology in French Morocco, 1920-26,” French Co (...)

8With the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912, and under the influence of figures such as Georges Hardy,11 academic policy in Morocco underwent a radical transformation. The colonial administration trained subordinate Moroccan personnel to ensure its own operation. It prioritized practical, technical skills while impeding any intellectual or political development that might foster independence claims.12

• 13 Damiano Matasci, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and Hugo Gonçalves Dores, “Historical Trajectories of Edu (...)
• 14 Éric Gobe, “Introduction,” in L'ingénieur moderne au Maghreb (XIXe-XXe siècles), Tunis: Institut de (...)

9After independence, mirroring developments in other African countries during the 1950s and 1960s, the formation of a national elite became an overriding objective aimed at supporting modernization and replacing former colonial administrators.13 In the Maghreb, the engineer emerged as a key figure of technical modernity and independence. The new states entrusted engineers with the mission of facilitating national development. The substantial budgets allocated to scientific and technical education and the creation of specialized training institutions reflect this approach.14

• 15 Abderrahim Bouabid (1922-1992) was a Moroccan lawyer and politician. In 1944, he became one of the (...)
• 16 Ahmed Benkirane, born on July 12, 1927, in Marrakesh. After studying at the École supérieure de com (...)
• 17 Pierre Vermeren, La Formation des élites marocaines et tunisiennes, Tunis: Institut de recherche su (...)
• 18 Grazia Scarfò Ghellab, “La voie de l’ingénierie: de la hiérarchisation à la segmentation,” in Être (...)

10The turning point in Morocco was illustrated by the appointment of Mohamed Douiri, the first Moroccan graduate of École polytechnique of Paris, as head of the Ministry of Public Works in 1955. Within the ministry, a program was set up, aimed at a gradual transfer of duties to Moroccan personnel. It rested on two main pillars: the accelerated training of Moroccan engineers and the Moroccanization of technical positions, made urgent by the gradual departure of French engineers after independence. With this aim, an awareness campaign was launched among Moroccan students, particularly those with scientific baccalaureates. These initiatives benefited from the support of influential personalities such as Abderrahim Bouabid15 and Ahmed Benkirane,16 who organized conferences and provided scholarships to encourage young people to pursue engineering careers.17 Despite these concerted efforts toward Moroccanization, the transition proved culturally challenging, as Ghellab reveals in his sociological analysis of post-independence Moroccan engineers. The recollections of a young EMI graduate capture the paradoxical difficulties engineers faced during the professional transformation: “I had two problems: the first was to gain recognition from the hierarchy because they were all French. And to gain recognition from the technicians, who were Moroccan, because in their minds and culture, an engineer was French. A Moroccan engineer was not possible!”18

• 19 André Boulloche (1915-1978) was a high-ranking French civil servant and politician. In the context (...)
• 20 Grazia Scarfò Ghellab, “La voie de l’ingénierie: de la hiérarchisation à la segmentation,” op. cit. (...)
• 21 Ibid.

11With the help of André Boulloche,19 a graduate of École polytechnique and the École nationale des ponts et chaussées of Paris (ENPC), appointed Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Works after independence, Douiri established a specific agreement with ENPC to guarantee high-quality training for Moroccan engineers, and to ease the topnotch institution’s admission requirements for them.20 However, Douiri was aware the arrangement would only be provisional. With the assistance of other Moroccan engineers trained in prestigious French schools, he laid the groundwork for the domestic training of Moroccan engineers through the creation of EMI in 1959. Douiri wished to model EMI on the École centrale des arts et manufactures of Paris, both in academic rigor and in elitism of training.21

• 22 École Mohammadia d’ingénieurs, Rabat, Maroc. Rapport provisoire, UNESCO, WS/1265.64/BMS, December 1 (...)
• 23 École Mohammadia d’ingénieurs, Rabat, Maroc. Rapport (pour la période 1961-1965), UNESCO/PNUD, BMS. (...)

12Despite Douiri’s grand vision, EMI’s mission was initially restricted to training subordinate technical personnel capable of assisting graduates from prestigious schools—most of whom were French.22 However, upon EMI’s opening in 1959, it quickly became necessary to elevate the level of final training. This demand was driven both by Moroccan engineers trained in Europe, recruited as faculty teachers, and by the students themselves, who aspired to a more prestigious degree. In a context where holders of mathematics and technical baccalaureates perceived themselves as an elite, it seemed inconceivable to be relegated to the status of mere operational engineers. This factor of social distinction, combined with political developments, played a decisive role in the curriculum reform implemented in 1961. From then on, the school trained design engineers in a four-year program.23

• 24 In the spring of 1963, at the initiative of the King Hassan II, the so-called “Camp-des-Chênes” col (...)
• 25 Mekki El Merrouni, Le problème de la réforme dans le système éducatif marocain, Rabat: Éditions Oka (...)
• 26 Since then, other institutions have been established: the National Institute of Statistics and Appl (...)

13Two years later, in 1963, the “colloque des Chênes,”24 which arbitrated between two models—generalist university or professional Grandes Écoles—confirmed the policy choices already initiated by EMI’s creation. The Ministry of Education opted for specialized technical schools: the country was critically lacking in qualified personnel and could not “waste time” on training deemed heterogeneous.25 Morocco thus adopted a Grandes Écoles policy modeled on the French system, and from that point forward, each ministry organized its own corps of engineers to staff its central and regional services.26

• 27 Hassan Aourid (born 1962) is a Moroccan writer and historian. He served as the first spokesperson o (...)

14This new elite from the Grandes Écoles was perceived as more capable of implementing the vision of the young monarch Hassan II, which was based on technical modernization, detached from an intellectual and political modernity that might challenge his authority. As historian Hassan Aourid27 explains:

• 29 Abdallah Ibrahim (1918-2005) was a Moroccan politician, intellectual, and activist. A co-founder of (...)
• 30 Zakya Daoud, Abdallah Ibrahim: l'histoire des rendez-vous manqués, Casablanca: La Croisée des chemi (...)

15Paradoxically, the creation of EMI, one of the emblematic projects of the 1960-1964 five-year plan, conceived in parallel with the national industrialization strategy and initiated by Morocco’s second post-independence government—led by eminent figures of the Moroccan left such as Abdallah Ibrahim29 and Abderrahim Bouabid—ultimately served to consolidate King Hassan II’s authoritarian vision. Indeed, EMI, like other Grandes Écoles established subsequently, became a privileged reservoir of technocratic profiles for recruiting high-ranking state officials. This process contributed to marginalizing the political elites of the first governments, predominantly from legal and literary backgrounds, and often marked by strong ideological commitment that created friction with the Hassan II. Due to this divergence, the Bouabid-Ibrahim government had been dismissed in May 1960.30

• 31 Frederike Lausch and Andreas Kalpakci (eds.), Exploring UNESCO and UIA, op. cit. (note 9).

16Scholars Frederike Lausch and Andreas Kalpakci emphasize that organizations like the International Union of Architects (UIA) and UNESCO—two inter-national actors involved in the establishment and construction of the EMI—were not merely neutral technical intermediaries, but institutional actors engaged in the formalization of development paradigms, operating at the junction of competing worldviews during the decolonization process.31

• 32 Adom Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination, Princeton, NJ: Pr (...)

17The EMI campus emerged precisely at a moment when architecture became a central instrument of postcolonial “worldmaking.”32 At the intersection of national modernization ambitions and Cold War transnational dynamics, its design reflects the intertwining of logics of sovereignty with those of international expertise. Through their training programs, technical cooperation, and professional standardization mechanisms, UNESCO and UIA contributed to making this institution not only a place of knowledge but also a diplomatic artifact inscribed within the networks of global development governance.

• 33 École Mohammadia d'ingénieurs, Rabat, Maroc. Rapport provisoire, op. cit. (note 22).

18The selection of the institution’s location was itself a significant decision reflecting both practical considerations and ideological positioning. Casablanca was initially suggested by UNESCO experts because of its dense industrial fabric would have facilitated the organization of internships and visits for students.33 However, Rabat was ultimately favored due to its status as a university and diplomatic city. The proximity of the Faculty of Sciences, located just one kilometer from the site selected for EMI, reinforced the relevance of this choice, given the academic links between the two institutions. The selected land, with an area of seven hectares, also offered expansion prospects for future growth.

• 34 Johan Lagae and Kim De Raedt, “Campus universitaires en Afrique (subsaharienne): vers une historiog (...)
• 35 Christian Hottin, “Les Délices du campus ou le douloureux exil : trois Grandes Écoles parisiennes f (...)

19Importantly, this decision also reflected broader postcolonial academic models and constraints. African countries that had experienced British colonial domination tended to adopt a university model typical of English-speaking countries, characterized by vast campuses located on the outskirts of cities and promoting complete institutional autonomy.34 Morocco, however, opted for a central location in the capital, a choice guided particularly by the government’s desire to draw inspiration from the French Grandes Écoles model. Historically, these schools had been situated in the heart of Paris, promoting close ties between the school and the city35 (fig. 5). The choice was also influenced by budgetary constraints that made it difficult to establish large university campuses on the British model. Like French Grandes Écoles, EMI favored small class sizes and encouraged close interaction between teachers and students. With the site selected and the conceptual approach determined, the next step was to launch an architectural competition that would give physical form to these academic ambitions.

• 36 Mohamed El Fassi (1908-1991) was a Moroccan statesman. After studying at the University of Al Quara (...)
• 37 Kim De Raedt, Policies, People, Projects. School Building as Development Aid in Postcolonial Sub-Sa (...)

20In February 1958, Morocco hosted the members of the UIA’s Commission on School Building (CSB) in Rabat under the presidency of Mohamed El Fassi36 (fig. 4). This event attests to the Moroccan government’s prioritization of school building directly after independence. At the meeting, commission members had an opportunity to tour the first Moroccan achievements in school construction, based on principles of standardization and prefabrication, to meet the high demand for academic establishments after independence.37

• 38 Pierre Bussat (1921-1996) was a Swiss architect and a pioneer in modular construction. He authored (...)
• 39 He underscored this necessity in an article published in 1955 in L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui, stat (...)

21Jacques Marozeau (born 1910), a French architect attached to the Ministry of Education in Morocco during the 1950s, played a major role in the UIA’s CSB and actively participated in establishing EMI’s first nucleus. It should also be noted that Marozeau collaborated with the International Center for School Construction in Geneva, where Pierre Bussat38 worked on developing modular school construction systems. Marozeau’s involvement in these various projects reveals his interest in the challenges of modularizing school buildings, particularly in the Moroccan context.39

• 40 Antonio Bravo Nieto, Claudio Verdugo (1928-2017). op. cit. (note 3).

22In 1960, Marozeau and Verdugo collaborated on the Agadir reconstruction committee following the devastating earthquake. As interim president and general rapporteur of the CSB, Marozeau planned to present Verdugo’s work—including his school projects in Nador (northern Morocco)—at the 1961 CSB seminar in Hamburg. However, illness forced Marozeau to withdraw, and he sent a letter to the UIA announcing that Verdugo himself would travel to Hamburg to make the presentation. 40

• 41 Ibid.
• 42 Ibid.

24Given the stakes and symbolic significance of constructing post-independent Morocco’s first engineering school, the EMI project was launched through a two-stage competition. During the preliminary design phase, thirty candidates submitted proposals; only Verdugo’s project and four others were shortlisted. Two of the five projects selected in this competition were submitted by Verdugo’s friends and former colleagues from the Beaux-Arts of Paris: one jointly signed by Jean Pierre Rolland and Pierre Coldefy, the other by Georges Magnin and his father, Gabriel Magnin.41 The competition jury was composed of several officials from the Ministry of Education, representatives from three ministries, architects from the National College, and Moroccan and French general inspectors. Verdugo’s project ultimately won the competition. Capitalizing on this success, he developed the implementation program and a work schedule with architect Jacques Marozeau.42

• 43 Ibid.

25Winning the EMI construction competition constituted a decisive step in Verdugo’s career, helping to establish his reputation in school construction in Morocco. He later recalled his engagement with this project: “It was work elaborated at home, alone at my makeshift desk, and the desire to realize a dream: the first important project with my signature. I often visited the plot, and tried to provide a clear solution to the program and its three objectives: theoretical teaching, practical teaching, accommodation and social life.”43

• 44 In October 1964, the administration admitted 75 candidates into the first year but was forced to re (...)
• 45 École Mohammadia d’ingénieurs, Rabat, Maroc: rapport (pour la période 1961-1965), op. cit. (note 23 (...)

27However, the academic reform that shifted the status of graduates from operational engineers to design engineers had significant repercussions that were reflected in the architecture of the EMI campus. In 1967, the practical work workshops were demolished, reflecting a shift away from prioritizing applied technical training. Concurrently, the growing appeal of the design engineer degree44 necessitated an expansion of the campus. A third floor was added to the main building, initially planned on two levels (fig. 7). Construction began in 1963 and was completed in 1964. The new arrangement increased dormitory capacity and made it possible to install laboratories that had initially been planned, but for which no adequate space had been arranged.45 This extension required a load-bearing structure with deep foundations, with pillars anchored between 15 and 20 meters underground.

• 46 The Spanish Salyt patent, which proved to be extremely fast and economical in practice, required on (...)
• 47 Verdugo harnessed the structural capabilities of load-bearing reinforced concrete surfaces, adoptin (...)

28Another effect of this reform was the increased importance accorded to lecture-based teaching. Initially, with emphasis placed on practical work, EMI had only a modest 100-seat amphitheater (fig. 8). This space, designed by Verdugo with a cover of pre-assembled vaulted ceilings according to a Spanish patent,46 quickly proved insufficient to meet evolving education requirements. In 1968, a new 400-seat amphitheater was therefore constructed, exploiting innovations in reinforced concrete that had been developed over the previous decade.47 (fig. 2).

• 48 Antonio Bravo Nieto, Claudio Verdugo (1928-2017). op. cit. (note 3).

29In the 1980s, EMI underwent further expansion, to accommodate increasing enrollment and the variety of specialized training offered. This project was again entrusted to Verdugo, who sought to ensure architectural continuity between the initial nucleus and the new buildings. He thus maintained the same materials—red brick for stairwells and white-coated reinforced concrete for teaching premises—and the same architectural vocabulary (fig. 3). Summarizing this evolution, he observed: “EMI was the first important project developed under my name. A beautiful adventure where the initial project for 200 students and 8,000 square meters was modified after 30 years to make it a military-character institution with 1,000 students, 80 specialists, 90 laboratories, rooms, etc., covering 60,000 square meters.”48

• 49 Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador in Rabat regarding the draft U (...)

30In March 1962, a letter from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador in Morocco revealed France’s desire to maintain influence in the technical, cultural, and academic spheres in Morocco. This correspondence expresses the ministry’s concern about the growth of UNESCO operations in areas considered essential for preserving French interests, and emphasized the need to “inquire at posts about educational, cultural, and technical institutions that receive aid from UNESCO’s budget, and about those that benefit from the expanded program of technical assistance and the United Nations special fund under UNESCO’s aegis.”49

• 50 Samir Saul, “Le Maroc: indépendance sans interdépendance,” in Intérêts économiques français et déco (...)
• 51 Abdelkhalek Berramdane, Le Maroc et l’Occident, op. cit. (note 7).

31Despite Hassan II’s attachment to France and more broadly to the West, due to historical ties and economic interdependence,50 Morocco officially adopted a policy of neutrality by joining the Non-Aligned Movement. This strategic posture led it to favor multilateral aid, perceived as offering greater political leeway.51 In his speech at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (September 1961), Hassan II declared:

• 53 Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, “Les luttes politiques de l'indépendance: des échanges de coups dans un esp (...)

32In reality, the monarchy, seeking legitimacy and trying to assert itself on the political chessboard, adopted the revolutionary rhetoric of non-alignment, a discourse promoted notably by the socialist and progressive Ibrahim-Bouabid government (1958-1960). A scene from the ground-breaking for the initial phase of the EMI campus attests to the monarchy’s obligations to accommodate other political forces: it shows King Mohammed V with the Minister of Education Abdelkrim Benjelloun, laying the cornerstone of EMI together (fig. 9). This highly symbolic gesture conceals the rivalry between the monarchy and the national movement to which Abdelkrim Benjelloun belonged. He was then a member of the Istiqlal (independence) party and a fierce adversary of royal control over the country’s affairs.53

• 56 École d’ingénieurs d’exécution, Maroc. Plan d’opération signé le 8 octobre 1960, UNESCO, PNUD/FS, 1 (...)
• 57 Ibid.

35Despite France’s desire to maintain its domination, the intervention of the United Nations Special Fund was crucial in setting up EMI’s first nucleus and equipping it with technical material for laboratories and workshop equipment. The Plan of Operations,56 specifying the contractual obligations of the Moroccan government and UNESCO, clearly illustrates the distribution of responsibilities. The section on Morocco’s financial commitments indicates that the budget allocated to the school’s construction amounted to 2,461,359 US dollars. This sum covered land acquisition, building and workshop construction, and installation and equipment costs. As for UNESCO, it committed to assisting the Ministry of Education by providing “the services of international experts, laboratory and workshop equipment, and giving necessary advice for implementing this operation plan.”57

• 58 École Mohammadia d’ingénieurs, Rabat, Maroc. Rapport provisoire, op. cit. (note 22).

36The contribution of UNESCO experts went beyond advice on the curriculum. They also made some recommendations about the EMI campus design, particularly regarding the dormitory facilities, which were deemed insufficient to accommodate the growing number of students. Following requests from Moroccan students to upgrade the engineering degree and the subsequent academic reform, they also suggested constructing a 400-seat amphitheater, an infirmary, and official residences, as well as roads, sports fields, and greens (fig. 10).58 They also conducted a detailed assessment of the academic infrastructure, issuing precise directives regarding the standards to be met for technical premises.

• 59 Jean-Pierre Clavel, Mise en place d’un centre d’information scientifique et technique à l’École Moh (...)

37Another example of the involvement of UNESCO experts in developing the EMI campus appears in their recommendations regarding the library. They suggested improvements for ventilation in conference rooms, particularly due to their southwest orientation, which was liable to cause heat detrimental to study conditions. Moreover, they criticized the triangular shape of the library, deemed inadequate for storing books and collections. They estimated that this configuration resulted in approximately 30% loss of storage capacity compared to a rectangular or square shape. To optimize this space, the expert proposed a new distribution of the collections, office allocation, organization of surveillance posts, and some structural modifications, notably adding partitions and doors to improve the building’s functionality.59 (fig. 11)

• 60 Upon request from the Moroccan government, Mr. Maxe and Mr. Vincent (Inspector General of Ponts et (...)
• 61 Arrival Telegram No. 3329/3330 regarding Mr. Bekkari’s mission to France (Rabat, 27 June 1959). La (...)
• 62 Ibid.

38The desire to influence architectural aspects was not unique to UNESCO experts. It is clear that architecture itself was also considered a means of extending French influence in establishing EMI. In a telegram addressed to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reporting on Bekkari’s mission in France as head of the technical education service at the Moroccan Ministry of Education, we learn that French officials sought to go beyond the strictly academic framework of bilateral cooperation to influence the architecture of the institution as well. The wire states that Bekkari intends to submit to Mr. Maxe60 [the Inspector General of Technical Education] the four architectural projects that the Moroccans have shortlisted, as well as the models and the opinion of the Moroccan technical commission that studied them.”61 Even if the goal of this consultation is not clearly defined, the fact remains that French authorities insist on “sending to Morocco, on a long-term mission, an expert who would be responsible for supervising construction, equipment, program establishment, and teaching staff recruitment.”62

• 63 Note regarding the Rabat School of Engineering, Nantes (France), Centre des archives diplomatiques, (...)

39Furthermore, another memo indicates the organization of a “mission to France, with Mr. Maxe [the Inspector General of Technical Education], the Ministry of Education’s architect [Jacques Marozeau] and the architect selected [Claude Verdugo] following the competition for the Engineering School (jury meeting on June 18).”63 This suggests that the architects Verdugo and Marozeau were asked to coordinate academic imperatives with the spatial requirements of the new school’s premises, and to visit twin institutions to learn more about their layout and how they functioned.

• 64 Driss Amor (chemical engineer, Minister of Industry), Mohamed Berrada (telecommunications engineer, (...)
• 65 Pierre Vermeren, La formation des élites marocaines et tunisiennes, op. cit. (note 17).

40The role of Moroccan officials, however, was far from passive, and they did much more than merely implement recommendations from French experts. Their contributions to establishing EMI and shaping its academic model were decisive. From 1959 onwards, Driss Amor, accompanied by a group of Moroccan engineers who had completed their studies in France, including Mohamed Berrada, Abraham Serfaty, and Mohamed Douiri,64 founded the Preparatory School for Engineers. This institution aimed to recruit students even before they had taken their baccalaureate exams, because at the time, such a small percentage of high school students went on to sit for the exam. Located in Rabat at the Lycée technique des Orangers, it welcomed about thirty students per class and operated over a two-year period. Its founders, from various technical administrations, taught there outside their working hours. The Preparatory School thus played a fundamental role by becoming a talent pool for EMI, ensuring pre-recruitment from the tenth grade.65

• 66 Letter from Mr. Roger Seydoux, French Ambassador to Morocco, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs con (...)
• 67 Ibid.

41The active involvement of Moroccan officials in EMI’s academic design is clearly illustrated by a letter addressed to Maurice Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which the French Ambassador to Morocco, Roger Seydoux, proudly points out that “programs that are very largely inspired by proposals made by the two French experts Messrs. Maxe and Vincent, and which were shaped by UNESCO’s principal advisor, Mr. Sardin [also French]”66 were adopted. However, he regrets that these programs “were unfortunately revised during the year at the initiative of the Moroccan director, Mr. Driss Amor [EMI Director].”67

• 68 List of professors assigned to the École Mohammadia d’ingénieurs. Nantes (France), Centre des archi (...)

42In a complementary strategy aimed at diversifying its international partnerships and reducing France’s predominant influence on EMI’s operation, the Moroccan government exploited its French-speaking identity to strengthen its cooperation with Belgium. An analysis of EMI's faculty list for the 1963-64 academic year reveals the presence of at least five Belgian teachers, including André Novalet, an engineer who had specialized in materials strength.68 Novalet was appointed UNESCO’s principal technical advisor within EMI, thus succeeding Mr. Sardin (French) in this position. King Baudouin’s visits to Morocco in 1968 strengthened this cooperation and enabled EMI to acquire the country’s first computing center.

• 69 Translation of the speech delivered by His Majesty the King during the award ceremony at the École (...)

43Finally, Moroccan agency in EMI’s development found strong expression at the political level in the regional ambitions affirmed by King Hassan II. During the graduation ceremony of EMI’s second class in 1965, King Hassan II expressed satisfaction with the presence of African students at the institution, thus highlighting his ambition to make EMI a lever of Moroccan influence in Africa. In his speech to the assembly, Hassan II stated: “When we create a training center in Morocco, we aim not only at national utility, but also at participating in Africa’s construction. Therefore, to contribute to the training of their personnel, we open the doors of our establishments to all students who come to us from brother or friendly countries.”69 This statement attests to the king’s desire to position EMI within a dynamic of regional cooperation in which the training of African elites became a vector of Moroccan influence, and helped consolidate the foreign diplomacy of Morocco, rather than that of any third country.

• 70 Ijlal Muzaffar, Modernism’s Magic Hat: Architecture and the Illusion of Development without Capital(...)

44The analysis of the École Mohammadia d’ingénieurs campus provides a new perspective on the material and ideological conditions of architectural production in post-independence Morocco. It reveals the dynamics of negotiation between national sovereignty, international assistance, and transnational flows of expertise. As Ijlal Muzaffar has shown through his critique of modernism as a “magic hat,”70 architectural forms in the so-called “Third World” cannot be understood separately from the illusions they project: those of autonomous development, freed from colonial relationships, and based solely on the mobilization of technical knowledge. The EMI, as a technical education infrastructure, embodied a powerful form of development ideology by physically manifesting the promise that technical knowledge alone could generate national prosperity, without the need for significant material investment, resource redistribution, or acknowledgment of colonial debt.