• 1 Henri Prost (1874-1959) was the first major urban planner to design Moroccan cities during the Fren (...)

1The history of 20th-century urban planning in Morocco is often framed around figures of the French Protectorate like Resident General Hubert Lyautey, and urban planners Henri Prost and Michel Écochard. Scholars such as Janet Abu-Lughod, Jean-Louis Cohen, Jean Dethier, and Tom Avermaete typically divide the colonial period into roughly two phases: Prost’s era (1912-1946) and Écochard’s era (1947-1956).1 Although Écochard acted as the director of the Moroccan Department of Urban Planning [Service de l’urbanisme (SU)] only from 1947 to 1953, his influence persisted, since the SU remained active long after the colonial period. Consequently, the history of urban planning in 20th-century Morocco should not be confined to Écochard’s departure in 1953 or even to Morocco’s independence in 1956, because the SU continued to operate until the mid-1980s.

• 2 Nadya Rouizem Labied, Réinventer la terre crue: expérimentation au Maroc depuis 1960, Paris: Éditio (...)
• 3 Dethier gives an overview of the evolution of planning and housing in Morocco from 1900 to 1972, wh (...)
• 4 GAMMA was founded in 1951 during the 8th CIAM Congress in Hoddesdon, emerging as a collective of yo (...)

3Most existing scholarship, including the work of the aforementioned authors, limits the SU’s history to the colonial period, often concluding with Écochard’s departure in 1953. This narrow focus overlooks the SU’s continued influence in post-independence Morocco. More recent scholars, including Nadya Rouizem Labied, Michele Tenzon, and Ben Clark, have focused on the SU’s post-independence evolution, examining sub-departments like the Bureau central des études rurales (BCER) and the Centre d’expérimentation, de recherche et de formation (CERF).2 However, few existing studies offer a comprehensive overview of urban planning and housing policy across both the colonial and postcolonial contexts in Morocco. Notable exceptions include an essay by Belgian architect Jean Dethier—first published in a Moroccan scientific journal in 1970 and later translated into English in 1973—as well as some master’s theses by Moroccan scholars from the 1970s and 1980s, such as that of architect Abderrazak Ezzaki.3 Furthermore, other works, notably from Tom Avermaete and Moroccan architect Aziza Chaouni, make only brief references to the role of the SU in the post-independence period, whether through discussions of Écochard’s work or the activities of the Groupe des architectes modernes marocains (GAMMA), which was primarily active in the late colonial period.4

• 5 Memory of Modern Moroccan Architects (MAMMA) is an NGO cofounded in Casablanca in 2016 by Lahbib El (...)
• 6 These collections include those held by the Archives nationales de France, the Cité de l’architectu (...)

4Furthermore, this paper seeks to bridge the gap in scholarship by explicitly addressing the transition of Morocco from a late colonial regime to an independent, nation-building state. My research draws on primary sources from both the Department of Urban Planning and the Department of Housing at the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning in Rabat, the photographic collection held at the photo library [photothèque] of Morocco National School of Architecture (ENA) in Rabat, the archives of the municipality of Casablanca, as well as the private collection of the Azagury family and the Memory of Modern Moroccan Architects (MAMMA) association.5 The study aims to counterbalance the predominant narratives found in Western-based archives, particularly those held in France, which often overlook or marginalize local voices.6 It also draws on interviews with Moroccan architects who were directly or indirectly involved with the SU, including Mohamed Benelkhadir, Abderrafih Lahbabi, and Abdelhai Bousfiha. These contributions provide a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the evolution of urban planning in Morocco.

• 7 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco, op. cit. (note 1).
• 8 Prost developed new urban plans for Rabat, Casablanca, Fedala (now Mohammedia), Port-Lyautey (now K (...)
• 9 Simon Ducros, “Architecture et urbanisme à Rabat au début du XXe siècle: le cas d’Adrien Laforgue ( (...)

6Segregationist policies were introduced by the colonial administration in Moroccan cities beginning in 1914. They laid the groundwork for the emergence of shantytowns [bidonvilles] on urban peripheries.7 Colonial government policies were implemented through urban plans developed by the Service spécial d’architecture et des plans de villes, created by Henri Prost in 1914 at the request of Resident General Hubert Lyautey. This service, initially part of the central administration, was tasked with planning a dozen new cities.8 In 1919, it was reorganized under the Service de contrôle des municipalités, with local offices [bureaux du plan] responsible for applying planning directives in major cities.9

• 10 Louis Hautecoeur, André Siegfried, Henry Lacoste and J. Marrast, L’Oeuvre d’Henri Prost : architect (...)

7Prost’s designs, aligned with Lyautey’s vision, physically segregated the population. Moroccans were confined to medinas (old towns) and “new towns for natives” [villes nouvelles pour les Indigènes], while French and European settlers occupied separate districts known as “new towns for Europeans” [villes nouvelles pour les Européens].10 Although the centralized service was dissolved following Prost’s departure in 1923, its planning rationale remained dominant until the creation of the SU and appointment of Écochard in 1947, which inherited and expanded its territorial and administrative functions.

• 11 Michele Tenzon and Sara Frikech, “Historical Perspectives on the Emergence of Dispersed Urban Growt (...)
• 12 Michel Écochard, Casablanca: le roman d’une ville, Paris: Éditions de Paris, 1955, p. 213.
• 13 In the first section of the list of reforms, CAM referred to the Treaty of Fez, criticizing the Pro (...)

8Under Prost, the social dynamics shaping the urban landscape were driven by a rural exodus. In search of employment, populations migrated to coastal cities where colonial-led industrial development was concentrated, particularly to Casablanca. This rural-to-urban migration was also a consequence of French settlers taking control of much of Morocco’s water resources and fertile lands.11 The medinas and designated Moroccan zones became overcrowded and unable to accommodate the growing population. Informal settlements emerged in major cities, including Rabat, Casablanca, Fez, and Marrakesh. For instance, Casablanca’s population soared from 12,000 to 110,934 between 1912 and 1921. Densities reached over 1,290 inhabitants per hectare in the medina, as compared to 50 inhabitants per hectare in the European quarters.12 In response to these conditions, the Moroccan nationalist movement, represented by the Moroccan Action Committee (CAM), sought reforms from the Protectorate.13 Established by resistance leaders Mohamed Hassan El Ouazzani, Mohamed Allal El Fassi, and Ahmed Balafrej, the CAM published the Plan des réformes marocaines in 1934, advocating for Moroccan interests. This document was later reinforced by the Manifeste de l’indépendance in 1944, the first official demand for Morocco’s independence.

• 14 Historian Charles-André Julien argue that Eric Labonne was the only genuinely liberal politician to (...)

9Pressured by the continued political lobbying of Moroccan nationalists in France, the support of progressive new parties advocating for the independence of African countries, and the significant contribution of Moroccan soldiers to France and the Allies during the Second World War, France made a “conciliatory” gesture to ease tensions and address some Moroccan demands for better treatment. This began with the appointment of a new Resident General, Éric Labonne, a liberal figure within the French administration, who played a key role in establishing the SU in 1947.14

• 15 Michel Écochard, “Problèmes d’urbanisme au Maroc,” L’ Architecture d’aujourd’hui, no. 35, 1951, p.  (...)
• 16 Ibid., p. 11.

10The SU replaced the Service spécial d’architecture et des plans de villes, and assumed full control over urban planning in Morocco. As Écochard himself explained, this centralization was driven by necessity rather than choice, prompted by a severe shortage of qualified personnel in many cities.15 The organizational charter therefore prioritized consolidating the planning process within the SU, rather than delegating it to individual municipalities. By 1950, the SU employed 14 French architects who worked exclusively for the public sector. The Service central in Rabat, consisting of a technical and an administrative department, managed four inspections régionales based in Casablanca, Fez, Marrakesh, and Agadir.16 In addition, the regions of Rabat-Meknes and Oujda were overseen from the Service central itself.

• 17 Original citation in French: “Elle [centralization] aura eu du moins le mérite de créer une unité d (...)
• 18 Michel Écochard, “Problèmes d’urbanisme au Maroc”, op. cit. (note 15), p. 11.

11Centralizing human resources required Écochard to implement what he called a “unity of doctrine” in urban planning, a standardized process designed to streamline city planning across Morocco.17 The SU’s primary mission was to “rationalize” living conditions by adopting new plans for each city, since Écochard believed that effective housing interventions required a comprehensive approach.18

• 19 Réunion de la sous-commission aux services municipaux de Casablanca, 11 January 1950.
• 20 Michel Écochard, “Problèmes d’urbanisme au Maroc”, op. cit. (note 15), p. 11.
• 21 The Sultan’s authority of “agreement” was, in reality, a bureaucratic procedure, as every law estab (...)

12The urban planning process followed several key steps. First, a comprehensive survey was conducted, including demographic, social, and economic analyses to assess the site’s potential and challenges. The next step involved drafting an initial scheme based on detailed topographical plans, which were often produced for the first time. Once completed, the plan was presented to local authorities for feedback, which was framed as a form of “public opinion” but, in reality, consisted of validation from municipal commissions and representatives of the Chamber of Commerce.19 If the planning zone extended beyond city limits, a special commission with representatives from various stakeholders was formed.20 After receiving approval from the local authorities, the plan was refined into detailed 1:2000 scale drawings, which were reviewed to address land ownership and administrative concerns. This stage bridged architectural and urban scales, covering amenities, public spaces, gardens, and parks. The last step involved submitting the plans to the Sultan for approval, formalized by a dahir (decree), thus incorporating the plan into official legislation.21

• 22 “Dahir du 30 juillet 1952 (7 Kaada 1371)," Bulletin Officiel, no. 2083, 26 September 1952, p. 1338. (...)
• 23 The urban perimeter of Casablanca, for instance, covered 47 hectares in 1907. During the colonial p (...)
• 24 Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, Casablanca, op. cit. (note 1), p. 316.

13To implement its approach and urgently reshape the urban configuration of many Moroccan cities, the SU needed to change or introduce new legislation related to urban planning and housing. A series of urban policies were adopted, recognizing the need for regulation to combat haphazard city expansion. In July 1952, a new urbanism dahir extended the intervention zones for planners beyond city centers to include the outskirts, whereas earlier policies had focused mainly on central areas and real estate developments for Europeans.22 This dahir retained principles from the 1914 planning legislation under Lyautey, such as the street layout plan, urban development plan, and building permit. On September 30, 1953, another dahir replaced the previous 1933 regulation on tract housing, which had only covered new developments within municipal boundaries.23 The 1953 dahir enabled the establishment of tract housing outside the municipal perimeter, broadening Prost’s earlier limited urban planning strategy and allowing for new sites to be considered. This legislation empowered the SU to create plans for “emergent centers” [centres en formation], “suburban areas” [zones de banlieue], and “inner and outer peripheries” [zones périphériques des villes et des centres].24 Additionally, it allowed the SU to extend its studies of existing cities encompassing larger areas and establishing new neighborhoods both in central areas and on the outskirts.

• 25 As historian Gérard Bossuat argues, the prioritization of housing in Casablanca aligned more closel (...)
• 26 Tom Avermaete [et al.], op. cit. (note 4), p. 110.
• 27 This figure contrasts sharply with the 4,789 housing units built for Moroccans from1944 to 1949. Se (...)

14The 1949 urban plan for Rabat-Salé exemplifies the new planning approach adopted by the SU, highlighting the connection between macro and micro scales. The plan considered the city’s overall growth while zooming in on specific housing projects. The SU expanded its design to cover the new urban perimeter area of Rabat to the southwest, linking the city to new housing developments for Moroccans. The main structural change was adopting “linear urbanism” to replace the previous “radial urbanism.” Linear expansion assigned the peripheral seafront to industrial zones with housing for Moroccan workers nearby. As a result, in terms of segregation between Europeans and Moroccans, the SU’s approach did not depart from previous ones. However, it did concentrate the most of the government funding on housing for Moroccans.25 When Écochard founded the GAMMA Group as the new Moroccan branch of CIAM, he framed this shift as “housing for the greatest number of people” [habitat pour le plus grand nombre]. At the 1953 CIAM-meeting in Aix-en-Provence, GAMMA presented the bidonville “issue” as being the catalyst of a new urban housing typology inspired by the local context.26 The program “Habitat pour le plus grand nombre” delivered nearly 15,000 units by late 1953.27

• 28 This article focuses solely on Yacoub El Mansour during the period between 1949 and 1953, when Écoc (...)
• 29 “Douar” (also spelled “dwar”) is derived from the word for “circle” or “village,” reflecting both t (...)
• 30 La cité Yacoub El Mansour à Rabat, 5 October 1949.
• 31 Each neighborhood unit accommodated between 7,000 and 9,000 inhabitants and was equipped with housi (...)
• 32 Michel Écochard, “Urbanisme et construction pour le plus grand nombre,” Annales de l’Institut techn (...)
• 33 The prototype was replicated in a stringent 8x8-meter grid pattern. It was first built in Carrières (...)

15The case of Cité Yacoub El Mansour, located on Rabat’s western edge and designed between 1949 and 1953, illustrates how the SU integrated urban planning and housing production.28 Cité Yacoub was planned as a response to the nearby bidonville Douar Debbagh, to which 16,000 people had flocked by 1944.29 The Yacoub El Mansour project aimed to relocate this population to a new satellite city, close to potential employment in the adjacent industrial zone.30 Rabat’s urban expansion added 220 hectares, enabling Yacoub El Mansour to accommodate 35,000 to 40,000 residents. The new cité included five neighborhood units [unités de voisinage], each featuring amenities like schools, dispensaries, and shops to reduce travel distances toward the inner city.31 The neighborhood was designed for workers and low-ranking government employees, with diverse housing options including apartments, shared dwellings, and single-family homes. The SU implemented a phased construction approach, beginning near the oldest settlement and relocating its residents before demolishing the “rudimentary structures,” as Écochard described them.32 By 1953, only 1,500 units had been completed, marking the first application of the “Écochard grid” in Rabat. Each unit followed an 8-by-8-meter single-story design, including two or three rooms, a bathroom, a kitchen, and an open-air patio.33

• 34 In Prost’s plans, the separation between Moroccans and Europeans was physically enforced through th (...)
• 35 American sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod argues that although Yacoub El Mansour legitimized Moroccan r (...)

16Despite the SU’s efforts, the project did not entirely abandon colonial practices. Although Écochard’s approach brought greater attention to housing for the Moroccan population, his work in Morocco remained shaped by the colonial context. This is evident in the master plan for Cité Yacoub El Mansour, which retained features of urban planning inherited from Prost, designed to monitor and contain local populations. The road leading into and out of the Cité on the north side was controlled by law enforcement officials [makhzenis].34 Additionally, placing a band of non-buildable zones separating the Cité from the villes nouvelles echoed Prost’s concept of “sanitary” buffer zones implemented in city plans across Morocco.35

• 36 The uprisings of Sunday 7 December 1952, saw approximately 5,000 protesters march through Carrières (...)
• 37 Even though French ethnologist André Adam acknowledged that this effort surpassed any previous hous (...)
• 38 According to the minutes of several meetings of the Casablanca Municipal Commission, consolidating (...)
• 39 “Mon père, Michel Écochard. Michel Écochard au Maroc de 1946 à 1952,” presented at 100 ans d’urbani (...)
• 40 Abdelhai Bousfiha, the Moroccan architect who headed SU from 1981, recalls his meeting with Écochar (...)

17Resistance to colonial policies continued to grow despite Écochard’s progressive ideas, particularly after the 1952 Casablanca uprisings.36 The proliferation of bidonvilles outpaced housing provision, even though the Protectorate had never previously invested as heavily in housing for Moroccans as it did under Écochard.37 Even within the colonial administration, many municipal officials opposed his separate “neighborhood units,” containing 9000 inhabitants each, favoring instead the consolidation of Moroccans into a single, large zone.38 Additionally, developers and corrupt officials viewed the SU interventions in Moroccan cities as a threat to their interests.39 Facing mounting opposition, particularly from real estate lobbyists seeking to profit from suburban expansion, Écochard resigned in 1953, largely due to conflicts and later SU director Abdelhai Bousfiha reported that Écochard himself linked his departure to the Souissi housing project in Rabat, saying it was the reason he was kicked out by the French authorities. The plan’s proximity to prestigious townhouse neighborhoods had provoked backlash from powerful French elites, over land speculation and pressure from French developers. Moroccan architect who opposed the idea of integrating Moroccan housing near zones earmarked for European residence.40

• 41 Ibid., p. 315.

18New laws that Écochard had long advocated were eventually enacted. One significant legislative change came on January 21, 1955, with the publication of a dahir establishing the Directorate of Housing and Urban Planning [Direction de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat (DUH)], merging the planning and housing departments. As Écochard had argued during his tenure, this integration would improve coordination, streamline budget management across funding authorities, and curb speculative practices.41 The director of the SU assumed leadership of the new entity, which was structured into two divisions: the Direction de l’urbanisme and the Direction de l’habitat. This reorganization allowed housing implementation to be more effectively carried out, as it placed oversight of construction under the SU rather than individual municipalities.

• 42 The political tensions arose primarily between the Palace, represented by King Mohammed V and Princ (...)

19When Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef returned from a two-year exile (first in Corsica, then in Madagascar) from August 1953 to November 1955, he announced Morocco’s independence and formed a new government to negotiate the transition with French authorities. It was officially achieved on March 2, 1956. The initial government transformed the DUH into the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing [Ministère de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat (MUH)], although this ministry lasted only 10 months before planning and housing were integrated into the Ministry of Public Works [Ministère des travaux publics (MTP)]. From late 1955 to 1967 the SU operated under the MTP, benefiting from relative stability and development despite Morocco’s volatile political landscape during the early independence period. Over that decade, the country was governed by ten successive administrations due to tensions between the royal family (led by King Hassan II, who ascended to the throne in 1961) and political parties, particularly the Istiqlal party, which sought to solidify its legitimacy in post-independence Morocco.42

• 43 10 ans d’indépendance, 1956-1966, (Maroc). Ministère de l’habitat, Ministère des travaux publics et (...)

20In 1965, the MTP published a report outlining its activities during the first decade of independence. The emphasis was on the independent state, represented by King Hassan II, anchoring Morocco’s precolonial identity as a kingdom and legitimizing his rule through four key objectives: unifying the country by integrating the former French and Spanish zones, establishing a national defense force to counter regional uprisings, implementing major infrastructure and housing projects in both urban and rural areas, and training a new generation of Moroccans to support nation-building efforts.43 The SU played an important role in the last two goals, directly shaping the country’s future through planning and housing development while training local experts and cadres.

• 44 “Liste nominative des architectes autorisés à exercer au Maroc au 1^er janvier 1956 et inscrits au t (...)
• 45 Robert Aujard, Personnels de la circonscription de l’aménagement au 1er Janvier 1957, (Maroc). Circ (...)

22By 1956, there were a total of 201 architects in Morocco, including those working for the SU.44 Among them, only three, Abd El Qader Ben Fares, Elie Azagury, and Abdeslam Faraoui, were Moroccan nationals. By 1957, of the 52 people employed by the Service central in Rabat, only six were Moroccans: two architects and four draftsmen.45 Morocco also continued to recruit foreign experts, either directly or through bilateral agreements, from not only France but also other European countries, such as Belgium, Spain, and Italy, and even non-aligned nations like Yugoslavia. The SU became the primary entry point for nearly every architect intending to practice in Morocco. Even private professionals were awarded state commissions for projects such as housing and public facilities through the SU.

• 46 10 ans d’indépendance, 1956-1966, op. cit. (note 43), p. 135.

24Nevertheless, there was a shortage of skilled professional architects available to meet the country’s vast development needs. To remedy this plight, Morocco established educational exchange programs, particularly with France. Moroccan students studied in French institutions, supported by scholarships and financial aid from both governments.46 Additionally, Morocco sought partnerships beyond the former colonial power, reflecting its evolving political stance. Initially forming alliances with other African and non-aligned countries, Morocco later adopted a more open approach to European nations like Belgium and Switzerland. Some of the architects invited to Morocco, like the Belgian Bernard Ghesquiere, replaced military service with civil service in Morocco, while others, including Henri Tastemain and Eliane Castelnau, sought opportunities in the emerging market.

• 47 Ibid., p. 137.

25In 1965, to train its own cadres, the MTP adopted the unité-exercice methodology, a program that decentralized workshops across eight regional centers (Casablanca, Rabat, Tetouan, Oujda, Fez, Meknes, Marrakesh, and Agadir).47 Weekly sessions made it possible to train 1,583 interns by 1966. The main training course in Rabat focused on construction site supervisors. It involved a three-month workshop and a year-long program, from which 479 technicians and 124 draftsmen were graduated.

• 48 Pierre Vermeren, “La fin programmée du régime ? (1972-1975),” in Histoire du Maroc depuis l’indépen (...)
• 49 Mohammed Kably, Histoire du Maroc, op. cit. (note 42), p. 656.
• 50 Annuaire officiel des architectes, Maroc, 1983. Casablanca (Morocco), MAMMA Archives.
• 51 In independent Morocco, engineers were considered indispensable due to their versatility and abilit (...)
• 52 Interview with Mohamed Benelkhadir, director of the Circonscription de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat (...)
• 53 Ibid.

26The independent nation sought to bring Moroccan professionals to the forefront. By the late 1970s, Moroccan personnel had gradually replaced foreign experts, who had initially stayed on after independence. This transition was part of Morocco’s broader economic strategy launched in 1959, which began its reclaiming land from French settlers and included legal reforms culminating in the “Moroccanization” law passed on March 2, 1973.48 This policy aimed to regain control over Moroccan administrations and businesses, fostering a new “national economy.”49 As a result of the policy, the number of Moroccan architects increased, and fewer foreign professionals were licensed. A dahir issued on December 17, 1976 restricted the practice of architecture to Moroccan nationals, and in 1986, the profession was further formalized with the creation of the Order of Architects.50 By 1979, there were already 78 Moroccan architects active in private practices in the country compared to 118 foreigners, and by 1983, this number had grown to 156 Moroccan architects versus 80 foreign counterparts. However, the country focused more on training engineers than architects due to broader developmental needs, which led to the founding of the first engineering school in 1959.51 The first architecture school, École nationale d’architecture (ENA), did not open until 1981, in Rabat. According to Mohamed Benelkhadir, former regional urban planning inspector for Rabat-Meknes (1965-70) and one of ENA’s founders, graduates often referred to the SU as the “seventh year” of their education,52 since the practical experience the agency provided made it an unofficial extension of their six-year architectural training. Consequently, the SU not only functioned as a training agency, but also served as a key employer for new graduates, offering them their first professional opportunities. Additionally, it played a crucial role as a commissioner of public building and housing projects, providing work for private architectural practices.53

• 54 10 ans d’indépendance, 1956-1966, op. cit. (note 43), p. 88.
• 55 Robert Forichon, “La législation de l’urbanisme au Maroc,” L’Architecture d’aujourd’hui, no. 35, 19 (...)
• 56 Fourteen architects and urbanists were involved in the design process for these cities. For Casabla (...)

27From 1956 to 1965, the SU completed 73 plans d’aménagement, which included new urban plans for rural areas, zoning of downtown areas, and expansion of major cities.54 This effort was essential, since the country’s urban population was growing rapidly. Migration had increased at an unprecedented pace: since the late 1930s, 80% of the population had moved from rural areas to cities.55 Most plans were initially conceived during the Protectorate, covering a theoretical 20-year period.56

• 57 Antonio Bravo Nieto, Arquitectura y urbanismo español en el Norte de Marruecos, (Spain). Consejería (...)

28One of the most significant shifts in post-independence urban planning was the SU’s early investment in unifying the Moroccan territory, previously divided between French and Spanish zones. New urban plans were developed for northern cities such as Tangier, Larache, Al Hoceima, and Nador, formerly under Spanish control, marking a foundational step in nation-building. Unlike the French zone, the Spanish administration had no equivalent to the SU, and urban planning had been carried out mainly by municipal engineers.57 Extending the SU’s methods to these regions was thus essential to align with the Moroccan state’s broader goal of consolidating sovereignty and establishing a unified administrative system.

• 58 Jean Delarozières, Organisation d’un nouveau service de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat à Tanger, Decem (...)

29To support this objective, the SU initiated a series of topographical surveys to produce foundational maps of northern cities, from the former international zone of Tangier to the Rif region. These surveys provided the groundwork for planning and integration, ensuring that northern regions could be governed and developed within the same planning framework as the rest of the country. This effort was also reflected on an institutional level through the creation of the Inspection régionale de Tanger, the SU’s first regional office for the north, established in 1957.58

• 59 For a detailed account of the establishment of the BCER, see Ben Clark and Axel Fisher, “The WFP 19 (...)
• 60 For a detailed review on the Lalla Mimouna community development programme, see Michele Tenzon and (...)
• 61 These plans were developed either in-house by SU staff or outsourced to private architectural offic (...)
• 62 Jean Dethier, “Evolution of Concepts of Housing, Urbanism, and Country Planning in a Developing Cou (...)
• 63 The notion of "ruralism" was first introduced by the SU in rural areas during the French Protectora (...)

30Another important shift in the SU’s planning policies after independence was the increased focus on rural areas. To promote national cohesion and equal attention to both rural and urban development, a new dahir enacted on June 25, 1960 introduced development plans for small villages and rural centers. In response, the SU established the Bureau central des études rurales (BCER) in 1962 within its central office in Rabat.59 The rural centers established by the dahir, equipped with schools, health centers, civic amenities, and sports facilities, aimed to stimulate rural life and discourage migration to cities. New centers were developed, including Ben Slimane (50 km from Casablanca), Karia Ba Mohammed (60 km from Fez), and Lalla Mimouna (50 km from Larache).60 Between 1962 and 1963, the SU completed 67 plans de développement, which provided comprehensive town planning covering general layouts, housing types, public buildings, and transportation connections.61 From 1962 to 1967, the BCER developped 300 rural center plans, though few were implemented due to administrative challenges and inter-agency competition, as noted by Belgian researcher Jean Dethier.62 Nonetheless, this body of work helped the SU develop planning approaches known as “ruralism,” which were later expanded as rural investment increased after 1968.63

• 64 Arnaud de Montmarin, “Les nouvelles solutions en matière d’habitat, leur application au Derb Jdid,” (...)
• 65 Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, Casablanca, op. cit. (note 1), p. 346.
• 66 Lahbib El Moumni, “Nation-Building by Housing: Service de l’urbanisme in Morocco,” in Wesam Al Asal (...)

32The origins of the Derb Jdid bidonville trace back to the Protectorate era in 1949, when the municipality of Casablanca merged several bidonvilles located between Anfa and the Azzemour road on the city’s west side.64 This newly formed settlement, colloquially known as Derb Jdid, or “new quarter” in Darija (Moroccan local dialect), was home to over 15,000 people at the time.65 The initial study for Derb Jdid was carried out by the Services municipaux de Casablanca and subsequently forwarded to the SU for approval in 1953. The project’s implementation faced obstacles due to unresolved land acquisition issues, which were not fully addressed until 1955. The tumultuous period surrounding independence further delayed the proposal, prompting the need for a revised scheme following independence.66

• 67 État des besoins et superficies de terrain disponibles en date du 9 Septembre 1957, (Maroc). Servic (...)

33In September 1957, the SU conducted a new survey to assess the housing requirements for the complete integration of the Derb Jdid bidonville population. The survey revealed that the settlement, covering 22 hectares, would need to be expanded to 70 hectares in order to house the targeted population. The municipality had secured 65 hectares and was in the process of acquiring an additional 7 hectares.67 With land acquisition nearly complete, Ahmed Bargach, the first governor of Casablanca, took the opportunity to voice his concerns and suggest amendments to the 1955 plan. He advised a comprehensive reevaluation of the relocation strategy for Derb Jdid and its adjacent bidonville, Ferrara.

• 69 Ibid.

34Bargach emphasized the need for an immediate reconsideration of urban planning strategies to “preserve Derb Jdid and ensure a coordinated approach to ongoing and future projects.”69 This call for reevaluation reflected the dynamic nature of the planning process and the commitment to continuously assess and adjust strategies to meet the complex needs of the post-independence rehousing efforts. While Moroccans were no longer considered second-class citizens as they had been under the colonial regime, social hierarchies inevitably persisted even within the postcolonial context.

• 70 Élie Azagury, “Le Derb Jdid (Hay Hassani),” L’ Architecture d’aujourd’hui, vol. 30, no. 87, Decembe (...)
• 71 Arnaud de Montmarin, the director of the Service de l’urbanisme (1957-61), specifies a development (...)
• 72 Observing the modifications applied to the Écochard grid in Carrieres Centrales, Azagury acknowledg (...)

35To develop a new proposal, in February 1957 the SU commissioned Moroccan architect Élie Azagury to create a master plan for Derb Jdid, marking his first significant project in independent Morocco.70 Azagury’s plan covered 70 hectares, designed to accommodate 25,000 residents.71 Although it was still based on the 8-by-8-meter Écochard grid, Azagury’s plan widened streets to improve light and ventilation, with most housing consisting of one to two floors. The design included a variety of housing types, such as single-family apartments, duplexes with an option of an additional floor in the future, and three-story blocks. Even the single-story homes were designed to allow for vertical expansion over time.72 This approach stood in direct contrast to Écochard’s model, which Élie Azagury openly criticized. Azagury rejected the idea of privileging single-story housing as the primary solution for Moroccans, stating that Écochard was convinced that “Moroccans cannot live in high-rises”:

• 74 For architectural historians Carlo Atzeni and Silvia Mocci, Derb Jdid served as a new urban settlem (...)
• 75 Mostafa Chebbak, “Élie Azagury: le modernisme à fleur de peau,” Architecture du Maroc, vol. 25, Dec (...)
• 76 Réunion de la sous-commission aux services municipaux de Casablanca, 11 January 1950.
• 77 Following the strategy established by Écochard, engineer Pierre Parinet, head of the Service de l’H (...)

36The debate about whether Moroccans required single-story homes is more complex than it seems.74 For Azagury, a Moroccan Jew raised under the colonial housing policy that segregated locals (Muslim and Jewish) from Europeans, claiming equal housing for both Europeans and Moroccans was part of his resistance to the old imperialist ways. As an architect, Azagury saw Écochard’s single-floor scheme as a provocative gesture to undermine Moroccan equality.75 Although Écochard did envision a chronological evolution for Moroccan housing, from “improved bidonville” to “horizontal city” and then “vertical city,” he primarily focused on implementing the first two steps. Multi-story buildings became an option only after he left Morocco in 1953. Écochard consistently advocated for single-floor housing for Moroccans in many municipal commissions, offering little justification despite criticism of the model as more land-intensive and less economical.76 Even after his departure, SU staff continued to follow the same rationale, presenting single-floor housing as the most (if not only) suitable form of housing for Moroccans.77

• 79 The proposed plots were sold for 100,000 francs (approximately 2,000 dollars today), while the stat (...)

38It was Azagury’s Derb Jdid project that forced the SU to be more open to the option of multi-story housing. Besides responding to increasing pressure on land availability, particularly in city centers like Casablanca, this change in orientation reflected a deliberate shift towards offering Moroccans housing solutions that were symbolically aligned with international standards and the ideals of modern architecture. Another key innovation in Derb Jdid was its variety of ownership options, designed to be inclusive and accommodate the economic circumstances of the former bidonville residents. Two acquisition models were offered: rental homes that could be permanently acquired after paying off the overall cost, and, for households with higher incomes, plots offered at a specific price with state financial assistance.79 To support efficient construction, the SU provided complimentary prototype plans and technical guidance.

• 80 Letter from Élie Azagury to the chef du Service de l’urbanisme in Rabat-Circonscription de l’aménag (...)

39Azagury completed the master plan in October 1957, with his office finalizing the details in just three days after receiving confirmation from the SU, reflecting the urgent need to begin construction.80 This approach not only expedited the development process but also ensured the availability of housing solutions to meet the community’s pressing needs. The SU promoted the Derb Jdid project as a major achievement, presenting it at the International Fair of Casablanca and in various international magazines as a model for urban planning and housing in independent Morocco. Arnaud de Montmarin, director of the SU, described it as:

• 82 “Fires Spur Moroccan Drive on Tin Can Slums; ‘Bidonvilles’ to Give Way to Low-Rent Housing Projects (...)
• 83 Ibid.

40The international impact of Derb Jdid was considerable, with the New York Times printing a story about the project in July 1958. The article emphasized its role in transitioning from bidonvilles to low-rent housing and noted that addressing the housing crisis was a national priority.82 It reported that the government had allocated 41 billion francs ($117 million) to build 22,000 dwellings and purchase 1,366 hectares of land.83

• 84 Élie Azagury, “Le Derb Jdid (Hay Hassani) Casablanca, Élie Azagury, architecte,” op. cit. (note 70)
• 85 The new housing typologies introduced by Azagury, such as Basile and Arsène, were later adopted by (...)

41Although Derb Jdid was not fully completed until 1964, some families began moving into the newly finished houses by mid-1959.84 On June 14, 1959, King Mohammed V presided over opening ceremonies at the project. In a symbolic gesture reflecting his role as the legitimate leader of the independent nation, he personally handed the keys to new houses to selected beneficiaries. Derb Jdid was more than a housing development; it symbolized the new state’s commitment to establishing legitimacy and setting a standard for urban planning and housing aimed at eradicating bidonvilles. The design principles introduced by Azagury in Derb Jdid were later replicated in cities such as Rabat, Fez, Tangier, Marrakesh, and Agadir, significantly influencing the country’s urban development.85 These new housing typologies complemented the Écochard Grid, expanding the design toolkit for local architects. Despite this success, the SU and private architects continued to innovate, devising new housing schemes and pushing the boundaries of Morocco’s architectural landscape.

• 86 Nouvelles réflexions pour une politique d’urbanisme et d’habitat, (Maroc). Ministère de l’intérieur (...)
• 87 Ibid., p. 23.
• 88 Morocco Population 1950-2024. URL: https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/MAR/morocco (...)
• 89 Nouvelles réflexions pour une politique d’urbanisme et d’habitat, op. cit. (note 86), p. 2.
• 90 “Dix ans d’indépendance.” Les réalisations de l’État dans le domaine de l’habitat économique, op. c (...)
• 91 Ibid., p. 2.
• 92 Jean Dethier, “Evolution of Concepts of Housing, Urbanism, and Country Planning in a Developing Cou (...)

42Despite the SU’s intense efforts over 15 years to address housing needs and replace bidonvilles, the challenge persisted, and informal settlements continued to proliferate.86 By 1960, Morocco’s urban population had grown to over 11 million, with more than 600,000 people, or 17% of urban residents, living in bidonvilles.87 The Moroccan Office of Statistics projected that the population would double by 1982, reaching 20 to 22 million.88 To meet this rapid urban growth, Morocco would need to construct 350 new housing projects like Derb Jdid over 20 years—equivalent to 18 per year.89 Given these requirements and the limited resources of the state, the SU began to reconsider the role of bidonvilles, treating them as components of the urban fabric rather than aiming for their complete eradication. This shift led to the re-adoption of the trame sanitaire, a model first implemented during the French Protectorate. It involved subdividing state-acquired land into small plots where Moroccans could erect their shelters (shacks or noualas, huts made of reeds and branches).90 The plots were organized along unpaved roads designed to facilitate drainage and act as firebreaks. Public amenities such as toilets, fountains, and lighting were provided, along with essential services like schools, mosques, and hammams. Plot sizes ranged from 20 to 45 square meters, and with monthly rents of only 3 to 4 dirhams, the offer proved attractive. Unlike during the Protectorate, however, the state retained ownership of the land, enabling future transformation into formal housing estates once funding became available.91 As Dethier noted, while this initiative did not represent legal recognition of bidonvilles, it was a necessary interim measure for providing low-cost, temporary improvements.92

• 93 Mohamed Fawzi Zniber, “Radioscopie de l’évolution des interventions publiques en matière d’habitat (...)
• 94 “Dix ans d’indépendance.” Les réalisations de l’État dans le domaine de l’habitat économique, op. c (...)

43The speed and efficiency of the trame sanitaire initiative were unprecedented. SU technicians would mark out hundreds of plots daily using lime powder, with military helicopters sometimes used to document the layout. The following day, beneficiaries would begin occupying their plots.93 For those who could afford a higher monthly rent of 12 to 14 dirhams, the SU introduced an upgraded option. These plots, ranging from 32 to 40 square meters, included a toilet block and a single roofed room, allowing families to add another room themselves. The provision of individual water supply and sewer lines eliminated the need for shared public toilets and fountains. With this approach, the SU delivered 8,726 “emergency housing units” across seven cities in three years.94

• 95 This approach closely resembles the système Grévisse implemented during the late colonial period in (...)
• 96 “Dix ans d’indépendance.” Les réalisations de l’État dans le domaine de l’habitat économique, op. c (...)
• 97 The decree, officially adopted on December 23, 1952, authorized the state to sell portions of its o (...)
• 98 Ben Clark, “Le mythe du Castor marocain: pratiques et discours de l’autoconstruction assistée au Ma (...)

44To further economize on housing costs, the SU adopted a new model where the state provided infrastructure, such as sewage, sanitation, and water supply on state-owned land.95 The beneficiaries, in turn, would obtain loans from the Banque Populaire to purchase the land and finance the construction of their houses.96 The state’s financial efforts in housing can be categorized into several types. An upper tier, called the lot économique, was designed for residents earning 200 dirhams or more per month. The second, lot évolutif, targeted families with moderate incomes and stable employment, earning between 100 and 200 dirhams monthly. The third approach was the “beaver system” [système Castor], imported from France, which enabled groups to collaborate in constructing collective housing using their own labor. A legislative shift from renting plots to allowing their sale facilitated the distribution of state-equipped plots to beneficiaries, enabling them to build their own homes.97 The first Castor plots were tested in Fedala (Mohammedia today) and Yacoub El Mansour in Rabat.98

• 99 This number includes 15723 in Casablanca, 3334 in Rabat, 1746 in Sale, 1689 in Meknes, 1172 in Fez, (...)
• 100 These recommendations were published in 1964, in a report titled “Nouvelle réflexion pour une polit (...)
• 101 Ibid., p. 13.

45Overall between 1956 and 1965, Morocco managed to construct more than 32,000 housing units across 11 cities.99 However, in light of rapid population growth, the SU recommended a new policy to curb the proliferation of bidonvilles and better address the housing crisis. Alongside legislative measures concerning land ownership, such as distinguishing between land ownership and building ownership (to allow the state to retain control over its land while renting out constructed houses), the SU proposed technical solutions for the next 20 years.100 These included acquiring 1,500 to 1,800 hectares of land annually, equipping 900 hectares of trame sanitaire to accommodate the most vulnerable populations (housing 10,000 to 12,000 inhabitants), and designing 600 hectares of new housing estates complete with public infrastructure, where plots could be rented for house construction.101 These state efforts were to be supplemented by the private sector, which played a crucial role in housing provision. Greater attention was given to cities like Marrakesh, Fez, Oujda, and Kenitra, where new neighborhoods and expansions of the municipal perimeter were underway.

• 102 Jean Dethier, “Evolution of Concepts of Housing, Urbanism, and Country Planning in a Developing Cou (...)
• 103 Abdelilah Abdouh
• 104 “Morocco, Economic Developments and Prospects [Évolutions et perspectives économiques du Maroc],” W (...)

46The state’s housing efforts gradually transferred more control to the private sector. Over time, the state limited its role to providing aid to beneficiaries and offering tax incentives to encourage private sector participation in housing provision. This change was driven by two main factors. First, there was a significant cut in housing funds, dropping from 54 million dirhams annually between 1956 and 1964 to just 8.5 million dirhams per year from 1965 to 1970.102 Second, in 1967, urban planning and housing responsibilities were transferred to the Ministère de l’Intérieur, resulting in a reduction of technical staff and an increase in administrative personnel.103 This policy shift aligned with World Bank recommendations, which prioritized investments in income-generating sectors like agriculture and tourism and emphasized education and training.104

• 105 On CERF’s history, see Ben Clark’s article in this issue of ABE Journal. DOI: https://doi.org/10.40 (...)
• 106 Jean Dethier, “Evolution of Concepts of Housing, Urbanism, and Country Planning in a Developing Cou (...)

47In 1967, nearly eleven years after independence, Morocco established a new agency to reassess housing policy and urban planning: the Center for Experimentation, Research, and Training [Centre d’expérimentation, de recherche et de formation (CERF)], led by the French engineer Alain Masson.105 The agency aimed to not only plan cities and rural areas but also to develop a comprehensive vision for Moroccan urban development by adapting ideas from other emerging nations to local conditions.106 During this time, the state reduced its direct involvement in housing construction, and CERF played an important role in proposing, implementing, and expanding the self-construction program across various towns and cities.

• 107 Alain Masson, “Urbanisation et habitat du grand nombre: l’approche marocaine,” Annuaire de l’Afriqu (...)
• 108 Salma Zerhouni and Fouad Akalay, “50 ans d’architecture au Maroc ou la politique des ruptures,” in (...)

48Following the two coup attempts against King Hassan II in 1971 and 1972, the state’s approach to housing and urban planning shifted significantly. The incidents made it clear that allowing poor living conditions to fester, particularly in bidonvilles, was a potential source of unrest and a threat to social and political stability.107 In response, the Ministry of the Interior re-prioritized housing, adopting a “security-driven approach” to better manage the development of self-built homes.108

• 109 Pascale Philifert, “Aménagement et développement durable au Maroc: une longue marche ou une nouvell (...)
• 110 Ālmġrb ālǧdyd [The New Morocco], (Morocco). Ministry of State in charge of Information, 1975, p. 28 (...)

49Acknowledging the huge gap between housing supply and demand, evidenced by a housing deficit of roughly 700,000 units in 1971, the state decided to create an independent ministry of planning and housing to streamline construction and reduce bureaucratic complexities.109 The Ministry of Urban Planning, Housing, and the Environment [Ministère de l’urbanisme, de l’habitat et de l’environnement (MUHE)], established in 1972, was tasked with managing over 680 million dirhams in investments, including 430 million dirhams for land acquisition and housing construction, and 250 million dirhams for infrastructure and social programs in both urban and rural areas.110

• 111 Beneficiaries were offered loans ranging from 3,000 to 7,000 dirhams. Once the plot was sold, the b (...)
• 112 Interview of Andelhai Bousfiha, director of Direction de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat (DUH) from 198 (...)

50The state encouraged the purchase of plots through low-interest state loans to assist the most vulnerable.111 Owning a plot and building progressively, supported by accessible financial loans, proved particularly appealing to the lower and middle classes. When Abdelhai Bousfiha was director of the SU’s regional office in Meknes in 1973, he recalled that the Moroccan gold market collapsed in late 1974, largely due to the volume of jewelry sold by women from bidonville households to finance the construction of new homes.112 Variations in personal funds and total investments led to differences in the construction of dwellings: some were fully completed, while others were built gradually while their owners were occupying them.

• 113 Abderrazak Ezzaki, Approche de la politique de l’État en matière d’habitat économique, op. cit. (no (...)
• 114 Alain Masson, “Urbanisation et habitat du grand nombre: l’approche marocaine,” op. cit. (note 107), (...)
• 115 Mohamed Naciri, “L’aménagement des villes et ses enjeux,” Monde Arabe, vol. 118, no. 4, 1987, p. 57 (...)
• 116 Interview with Abderrafih Lahbabi, director of Direction de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat from 1975 t (...)

51For middle-class households earning more than 2,500 dirhams per month, Regional Development and Construction Establishments [Établissements régionaux d’aménagement et de construction (ERAC)], created in 1971, became the primary agency responsible for delivering “economic housing” units. ERAC represented a government experiment in circumventing the legal complexities related to land acquisition and real estate development typically faced by private real estate companies. Functioning primarily as a real estate company, ERAC was empowered to utilize state-owned land and collaborate with local communities to build collective housing.113 Masson viewed the establishment of ERAC agencies as a new instrument for promoting urban development in alignment with Morocco’s broader socio-economic objectives.114 It was in the post-ERAC period that the SU gradually began to shift its focus toward controlling urban expansion through new planning strategies.115 ERAC gradually took over the task of building multidwelling units in apartment blocs or townhouse-type of housing. Abderrafih Lahbabi, architect and director of the SU in Rabat from 1975 to 1980, saw this period as an ideal opportunity for the new generation of Moroccan architects, freshly graduated from European schools, to obtain their first commission through ERAC.116 Likewise, it was a paradigm shift for private architects to be the sole designers of new housing complexes, instead of architects employed by a government agency to design housing.

• 117 Mohamed Naciri, “L’aménagement des villes et ses enjeux,” op. cit. (note 113), p. 58.
• 118 Ibid., p. 57.
• 119 Salma Zerhouni and Fouad Akalay, “50 ans d’architecture au Maroc ou la politique des ruptures,” op. (...)
• 120 The reference to “security planning” occurs in official reports of the MUHE and other ministries. I (...)

52By 1980, under both the MUHE [Ministère de l’urbanisme, de l’habitat et de l’environnement] (from 1972 to 1976) and MHAT [Ministère de l’habitat et de l’aménagement du territoire] (from 1977 to 1981), the state had delivered over 300,000 plots and provided housing for around 1.3 million people. It was fulfilling its assignment from the state to promote home ownership among emerging social classes from former bidonvilles and Moroccans with stable employment.117 The state’s increased investment in housing was part of a “political regulation” strategy aimed at easing social tensions. The 1981 riots in Casablanca and the 1984 unrest in various Moroccan cities, driven by economic hardships, underscored the need for urban policies that combined spatial planning, administrative oversight, and housing programs to manage urban growth and its impact on the population.118 This period is commonly described by Moroccan scholars as the era of urbanisme sécuritaire, since it prioritized addressing social tensions in the most vulnerable peripheral zones.119 These zones were increasingly planned outside of cities through a top-down approach, often disregarding the social implications of displacing residents.120

• 121 Driss Basri, L’Administration territoriale: l’expérience marocaine, Paris: Bordas, 1990 (Droit publ (...)
• 122 Ibid.
• 123 The structure of this directorate encompassed the Division de la planification urbaine, which consi (...)
• 124 Driss Basri, L’Administration territoriale, op. cit. (note 119), p. 224.
• 125 The transformation began with the founding of the agence urbaine of Casablanca in 1981, followed by (...)

53Starting in 1985, this concept took a more tangible form, when the Urban Planning Directorate [Direction de l’urbanisme (DU)] was separated from the organizational structure and oversight of the MHAT. The MHAT was subsequently refocused solely on housing and renamed the Ministère de l’habitat, while responsibilities for urban planning and territorial planning [aménagement du territoire] were transferred to the Ministry of Interior (MI).121 Under the MI, the SU was divided into two new departments: the Direction de l’aménagement du territoire (DAT)and the Direction de l’urbanisme et de l’architecture (DUA). These departments were tasked with “preparing and enforcing regulations related to urban planning, architecture, territorial management, and environmental protection.”122 While the SU maintained its traditional prerogatives over urban planning, including “overseeing urban planning studies, preparing official urban planning documents, and promoting architectural initiatives,” its role became more specialized.123 In this context, the SU evolved into a network of new institutions, the agences urbaines, which were established for each region in Morocco.124 These agences operated with independent budgets and had greater control over implementing new city plans and in controlling their expansions.125

• 126 Interview with Mohamed Benelkhadir, July 2022.

54To conclude, the trajectory of the SU from 1956 to the mid-1980s reflects the persistence of its colonial legacy in addressing the urban planning divide and housing shortage. After independence, the SU inherited not only the enduring challenge of informal settlements but also the basic solutions, strategic frameworks, and foreign expertise established under the French Protectorate. Over time, the SU accomplished a gradual shift in the post-independence period, placing increasing emphasis on empowering local architects and urban planners to develop comprehensive responses to Morocco’s housing needs. The full embodiment of nation-building through Moroccan leadership within the SU, however, was not realized until the late 1970s, given that foreign architects, engineers, and planners still made up the majority of the SU’s staff. Moreover, the SU continued to grapple with one of the most entrenched colonial legacies: the bidonvilles. Eliminating them proved exceptionally difficult, and they remain a persistent issue in various forms today. As Mohamed Benelkhadir noted during an interview conducted in 2022, the work of the SU was crucial in preventing the widespread proliferation of informal housing, suggesting that “without its intervention, today many more cities, such as Khemissate, might have deteriorated into bidonville settlements.”126

• 127 Salma Zerhouni and Fouad Akalay, “50 ans d’architecture au Maroc ou la politique des ruptures,” op. (...)

55Even if we acknowledge the pace at which bidonvilles proliferated on the outskirts of Moroccan cities, and considering all the efforts and new solutions provided by the SU as part of a national project, it seems that the various changes in the leadership of the SU, especially its transfer to the governance of the Ministry of Interior in 1967, had a negative impact on it and disrupted the evolution of the process of providing housing. Even when the SU was freed of the Ministry patronage, it was subject to greater influence from state policy directives. For instance, the state’s decision to place greater emphasis on rural housing, initiated by the CERF, in order to improve conditions for the population in the countryside and minimize migration to cities, caused the state to abandon support for the housing sector, leaving it to private real estate firms. Reflecting the shift in government policy, the SU directed its efforts more to prioritize rural housing solutions, minimizing its support for urban housing, in sharp contrast to its earlier emphasis on managing urban expansion through a detailed new zoning plan under the agences urbaines. Even the state-owned ERAC later became self-serving and profit-seeking, as architects and scholars Selma Zerhouni and Fouad Akalay have argued.127