Quotative LIKE in contemporary non standard English

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I began my work in English linguistics by looking at concessive constructions. Since then I have had the opportunity to study concessive markers and indeed, discourse markers more generally. This line of research has inevitably led me to test the concepts and theoretical methods of the TOE against representations of transphrastic, argumentative meaning and also sociolinguistic, interactional meaning. It has led to wonder whether, to paraphrase the call for papers, such an approach might not select and prioritise certain areas of enquiry while possible ignoring, or underplaying, others.

In the current paper I aim to study a contemporary, non-standard use of the marker *like*. I hope, firstly, to show how one might derive this use as a particular configuration of an abstract, invariant schematic form. Secondly, I will ask what this enunciative derivation might contribute to a representation of sociolinguistic and interactional values. Thirdly, I will consider potential relations between the enunciative model and diachronic accounts of the development of quotative *like*.

An introduction to quotative *like*

The marker *like* typically functions as a prepositional marker of comparison or similarity:

1. I slept like a baby down here. BNC [S]
2. He’s quite a gypsy you know he looks like a gypsy. BNC [S]
   More familiarly, *like* is used as a marker of approximation, in premodifying position:
3. So I’m paying like a hundred and twenty pound a month less. BNC [S]
   Or in postmodifying position, in certain varieties:
4. [...] all you got ta do is put the screws in those locks you know, like. BNC [S]
Additionally, in some varieties of contemporary English, the marker *like* possesses a quotative use whereby it is used emblematically to introduce – generally short – stretches of direct speech (or thought) in sequences such as the following:

(5) “We know you, you’re that Derrick May aren’t you?” I’m like, “What?” And they’re saying, “Yes, we know who you are. We’ve got that techno album of yours and we play it all the time. We think it’s wonderful!” BNC

(6) And it’s funny, that’s never left me. I still kind of always go into studios and I’m like wow, I mean this is what I do and people let me, so. COCA [S]

(7) He went, you’re just a drop-out, you’re just sponging off the government. I was like, shut up, Ryan. He’s like, I know your sort. BNC [S]

Such instances of *like*, which I am too old to use convincingly, but which my own students employ with worrying ease, are generally considered to be non- or sub-standard.

Quotative *like* is additionally often associated with the speech of young North Americans (teenspeak) and, controversially, has said to be preferred by female speakers. Blyth et al, for example, write:

respondents found the use of ... be like indicative of middle-class teenage girls. [...] In fact, the connotations for be like can be summed up by the most frequent epithet of all in our survey, “Valley Girl”, an American stereotype with social and regional connotations.

**be like compared to other quotatives**

At first sight, the *be like* quotative sequence appears essentially to provide an alternative way of introducing direct speech, on the same model as SAY or THINK, for example. On closer inspection, however, there appears to be a definite difference between *be like* quotatives and say or think quotatives. Let us compare (5) and (5a), where say is substituted for *be like*:

(5a) “We know you, you’re that Derrick May aren’t you?” I say, “What?”

In (5a), the segment “What?” is proposed as a verbatim report of what the speaker said in the given circumstance. In (5), I’m like, “What?” provides the sequence “What?” as an example of something the speaker might have said or thought in the given circumstance, but does not claim to provide a word-for-word account.

Quotative *like* is limited essentially to a familiar register of language (or written imitations thereof) and there is no clear punctuation convention available to the transcriber. And so our corpus texts vary, some using inverted commas after like (5), others not, (6) and (7), although this variation does not appear to reflect differences in the core use of the following sequence to represent an example of something the speaker might potentially have said or thought.

Another argument in favour of the idea that quotative *like* is qualitative different from quotative say or think is that, unlike these, quotative *like* may be used with non animate subjects:

(8) We don’t see a lot of her because our schedules clash really badly. I see her for about ten minutes a week. It’s like “Hi... bye” in the door, out of the door. COCA [S]

(9) A lot of people will envy me because they’re like, ‘Oh, you get to go to all those places and so forth,’ and it’s – it ‘s like, no, no, no, we don’t – we don’t go to see these places, we go to see the tennis court at these places, the hotel room at these places, and that’s it. It’s a very dry lifestyle, in that sense COCA [S]
Here it is used situationally before a sequence which appears again to evoke an utterance typical of the situation. There is apparently no need to designate a speaker.

Furthermore, quotative like is not infrequently followed by interjections, expletives or nonverbal sequences which do not conceivably represent reported speech, but stand emblematically for an emotion, an attitude etc.:

(10) Even when I heard the title for the film project, I was like, “Ooh...”
(11) But I remember she stuck up for me when this guy was being aggressive. She was like, “Hey!”
(12) The worst thing I did was look inside a closet in an ex-boyfriend’s house. I was looking for something so I opened up the door, and it was a closet of ex-girlfriends. All the mementos, journals, love letters, everything. It was like, “Aaahhh!” I closed it immediately.

We might quote, in this respect, Ferrara and Bell, for whom “the prototypical case of be + like is a theatrical, highly conventionalized utterance which makes the inner state transparent to the audience”.

Now that we have a clearer view of the values typically constructed by quotative like, and the differences between them and other quotative verbs, let us turn to the problem of deriving this value from a schematic form which remains compatible with other values for the same marker.

An enunciative explanation for quotative uses of like

In accordance with the principles of the Theory of Enunciative Operations, we might attempt to answer this question by outlining a schematic form for the marker like, which, according to various textual configurations, will enable us to derive specific values, including comparative, approximative and citational values as illustrated in the above examples.

A schematic form for like

Let us consider a general case of the form: x [be] like y, illustrated by (13):

(13) In school, George was described as “aggressive... he wanders about instead of getting on with his work... he won't conform... he's like his brother... generally he disturbs other children.” BNC [S]

In relations of this type, x – the locatum – acquires further determination through its localisation relative to y – the locator –. We can rewrite this standardly as a relation of localisation: \(< x \in y >\) i.e. “x is located relative to y”. Crucially, however, this determination is made in virtue of some commonly shared property z, which may or may not be made explicit. This characterisation enables us to account for the important but paradoxical nature of like which expresses both identification (the property in x is identified with property z in y) and differentiation (x is different from y). We can expand the metaoperator \(\varepsilon\) to represent this schematically: \(< x \varepsilon () = z \varepsilon y >\), that is, x is located relative to a property identifiable with property z in y.

And so (13) might be glossed:

(13a) George is determined by a property \(< x \varepsilon () >\) identical to property z in George’s brother \(< () = z \varepsilon y >\).
In some cases the determining property is made explicit:

(14) He had very little ability, but immense energy. He was taut like a coiled spring, compact and pugnacious, both in physique and character.

The use of simile in poetic discourse, on the other hand, often relies upon the implicit nature of $z$ and the complicity which the reconstruction of $z$ builds between poet and reader:

(15) Once when a poor man's heifer died, he laid / A shilling on the doorsill; though a thirst / For loving shook him like a snake, he durst / Not entertain much hope of his estate / In heaven. (Robert Lowell, "After the Surprising Conversions")

(16) Now let me lie down, under / A wide-branched indifference, / Shovel-faces like pennies / Down the back of the mind, / Find voices coined to / An argot of motor-horns, / And let the cluttered-up houses / Keep their thick lives to themselves. (Philip Larkin, "Arrivals")

Now, since $y$ is the locator, and the term thanks to which property $z$ may be inferred, the relation between $y$ and $z$ is preconstructed. In other words, the interpretation of the expression "$x$ be like $y$" rests upon some preestablished relation between $y$ and a property $z$.

Let us now move on to consider how this basic form might be configured to provide the values associated with quotative *like*.

### Application in quotative uses

I would argue that the operational template for *like* sketched out above applies similarly to quotative uses, the difference essentially residing in the nature of the terms related. And so, in an utterance of the general form $S$ be like, “$Prop$”, where “$Prop$” represents the quoted content, $S$ is localised relative to the type of situation in which one might utter “$Prop$”. The situation of $S$ and the situation reconstructed from “$Prop$” are related by the common property $z$. We might suggest the following configuration of our earlier formula in accordance with this:

$$\langle x \in \text{Loc} \rangle = \langle z \supseteq y \rangle$$

$$\langle S \in \text{Sit} \rangle = \langle \text{Sit} \supseteq \text{"Prop"} \rangle.$$  

In other words, the locatum is the grammatical subject (whether an animate or a situational marker), the locator is a discourse sequence “$Prop$”, while the common property $z$ is the situation which typically localises “$Prop$”. To reformulate: a subject $S$ is localised by a situation identified with a situation potentially characterised by the utterance of “$Prop$”.

### Stereotypical uses

Let us apply these remarks to a concrete example (5):

(5) “We know you, you’re that Derrick May aren’t you?” I’m like, “What?” And they’re saying, “Yes, we know who you are. We’ve got that techno album of yours and we play it all the time. We think it’s wonderful!” BNC

Here the sequence “What?” enables us to reconstruct the type of situation in which the subject finds himself. It does not represent a genuine interrogative, although this cannot be excluded – the subject might indeed say “What?”, but rather a token of a certain type of situation representing, roughly speaking, surprise and disbelief.
In similar fashion, in (6) *I'm like wow*, the sequence *wow* is used as a token of a situation where one might expect to say or hear "Wow" (a situation of wonder).

Remarkably, in this type of utterance, a speaker relies upon his or her cospeaker's capacity to reconstruct a virtual situation from a single utterance, thereby implying a shared knowledge of typical relationships between utterances and the situations they might characterise. This suggests that such uses are fundamentally similar to approximative uses of *like*, which Romaine and Lange describe as possessing: “a set marking function in that they cue the listener to interpret the preceding statement as an illustrative example of some more general case”.

Even when the quoted sequence is something as apparently banal as *Hi*, we can see a clear difference between say, “*Hi*” and *be like* “*Hi*”, as the next example shows.

(17) Sometimes you won’t even know someone and the media connect you with him, “she says.” I remember being connected to Tiger Woods. I don’t know him! I met him once. It was like, “Hi, nice to meet you” and he was like, “Nice to meet you, too.” And I kept walking. And the next day, we’re together. COCA

Here, the quotative *like* construction presents *Hi, nice to meet you* etc. not as a piece of direct speech, but as a token of an inconsequentially mundane, greeting situation, in contrast with its treatment by the paparazzi.

**Non stereotypical uses**

It might be objected that, while the examples studied so far involve emblematic sequences used to evoke certain stereotyped situations, other examples of quotative *like* appear to represent passages of speech reported verbatim. This is arguably the case in (7) above, or in (18) and (19):

(7) He went, you’re just a drop-out, you’re just sponging off the government. I was like, shut up, Ryan. He’s like, I know your sort. BNC [S]
(18) NICE: I know I’m happy because she told me I was happy. I wake up, I'm like -- she’s like, How you feeling? I’m like, I’m a little down. She’s like, No you’re not. I’m like, That’s good.’ COCA [S]
(19) WERTHEIMER: But somebody actually offered to sell you or give you a gun? HUCK: Yeah. Someone – not that long ago. Someone’s like, You want to buy a gun from me? I’m like, No, what am I going to do with a gun?’ you know. WERTHEIMER: And what did they say? HUCK: They were like, Well, I have one, you know, if you want to just, you know’ – I mean, what am I supposed to say? I mean, I’m not going to take it. COCA

In the previously studied examples the sequences following *like* evoked a generic, stereotyped situation (incredulity, wonder, disgust etc.), reconstructed from a token of speech. In these examples, however, the sequences following *like* appear to be irreducibly specific to the situation of reference and to carry the narrative forward in the same way as *say* would do.

Accordingly, Ferrara and Bell\(^\text{9}\) claim that “the function [of *BE LIKE*] is expanding from its paradigmatic case as an introducer of internal dialogue to also being an introducer of constructed attitude and direct speech.”\(^\text{10}\). Ferrara and Bell’s study is based on a four-year longitudinal sample (three samples from 1990-1994). Over this period they note an increasing number of third-person subjects in *be like* constructions, a tendency which they assimilate to a movement grammaticalizing the *be like* construction as a marker of direct speech.\(^\text{11}\)
I do not, however, think that the differences between these two uses of quotative *like* should mask their similarities. In both cases the quoted sequence is representative of a class of potential utterances in the situation. The difference concerns the relation between the quoted sequence, “Prop” and the locating situation Sitz. In the stereotypical case of I was *like*, “Wow” etc., the sequence “Wow” evokes a generic situation Sitz. in much same way as one occurrence may be used to represent a class of occurrences (the generic indefinite article). In direct reported speech with *like*, of the type found in (8), (18) or (19), the reporting speaker signals the quoted sequence, not as verbatim report, but as representative of the reported situation among a class of possible reformulations he or she might have chosen.

In other words, the class of occurrences, of which the quoted sequence following *like* provides an example, may owe its construction, either to the characteristics of the situation of reference (giving us the generic, stereotyped situation) or to those of the speech situation (since reported speech involves choosing one reformulation among a class of possibles). As Gisle Andersen nicely puts it: “quotative like […] stands in a non-identical relation with its original and it is metarepresentational”.

More generally, we might also consider the use of approximative *like* as evidence of a subject’s epilinguistic awareness that, in choosing one form, they are eliminating others:

(3) So I’m paying like a hundred and twenty pound a month less. BNC [S]

Here *like* constructs a hundred and twenty pound a month not as a precise figure but as a rough idea of the sum involved. This tallies with our schematic form: a hundred and twenty pound a month, is located relative to a property, which in turn locates the complement of I’m paying ( ) x. It is unimportant to give a lexical formulation to property z, here it just indicates an order of magnitude, compatible with values in the neighbourhood of a hundred and twenty. The second, specific quotative use functions in much the same fashion.

**Other issues raised by quotative *like***

In the previous lines I hope to have shown how we might, firstly, provide a schematic form for *like* which can be parametered to account for its contemporary use as a quotative, and, secondly, how we might also distinguish between two quotative uses, again as configurations of an invariant template. The enunciative model I am using focusses on the construction of referential values but pays less attention to other questions which may be thought important. In the next section I would like to look at possible articulations between the enunciative approach and the sociolinguistic and historical issues raised by the development of quotative *like*.

**Sociolectal uses of quotative like***

As I mentioned earlier, quotative *like* does not appear to be used in all varieties of English. In particular, it has been associated with the speech of teenage girls, initially from the West Coast of the USA, but is now found increasingly in other varieties of English. In this respect, I think it unquestionable that the use of quotative *like* projects a certain image of the speaker, contributing something extra to the meaning of the expression. The question
is whether this sociolinguistic meaning should enter into the form-value relationship we
posited in part 2, and if so, where.

I confess I am unable to provide a single answer to this, and can only explore a number of
possible lines of enquiry, which might help to shed a little light on the issues involved.

If quotative *like* does, as I suggest, indicate something about the speaker, it also carries
indications about the speaker / co-speaker relationship (or rather the interlocutionary
relationship). An important original feature of our characterisation of *like* in general, is
the inclusion of a term z representing a common property shared by x and y. As we have
seen, the interpretation of an utterance of the general form x (be) *like* y depends on how
accessible property z is to the co-speaker. In saying x (be) *like* y the speaker implies that
his or her co-speaker shares a frame of reference allowing for the unproblematical
reconstruction of z. This is clearly exploited in poetic discourse to create frames of
complicity between poet and reader, as we have noted, but also in other contexts. To
illustrate this point more prosaically, let me quote the example below, which I personally
find difficult to interpret, being unable to reconstruct property z from y, college or
Seattle (although the example does give me a fairly clear image of the person talking and
his image of his relationship with the person he is talking to).

I don't call myself a stoner anymore because that's like so college, or Seattle or
something [...]

Using these terms as locators allows the speaker to impose a form of group membership
on his or her co-speaker. The use of quotative *like* similarly implies a certain community
of experience. Saying *I'm like wow* or *I'm like aaargh* to somebody implies that they will
know enough about this sort of utterance to be able to reconstruct the situational
properties these token utterances are meant to evoke. In short, it appears that the
schematic form posited for *like* lends itself to the construction of areas of speaker / co-
speaker complicity. In this respect there is clear scope for articulation between the
enunciative perspective and sociolinguistic features of quotative *like*.

Benveniste, in “Structure de la langue et structure de la société” for example, evokes
these questions in the following terms:

Ici apparaît une nouvelle configuration de la langue [...] c’est l’inclusion du parlant
dans son discours, la considération pragmatique qui pose la personne dans la
société en tant que participant et qui déploie un réseau complexe de relations
spatio-temporelles qui déterminent les modes d’énonciation.

The methodological principle of privileging the text as the trace of linguistic activity, and
concentrating our attention on the (re-)construction of referential values, has perhaps
led us to underplay the way in which speakers use language, consciously or not, to
position themselves within society. To continue quoting Benveniste :

[... l’homme se situe et s’inclut par rapport à la société et à la nature et il se situe
nécessairement dans une classe [...]. La langue en effet est considérée ici en tant que
pratique humaine, elle révèle l’usage particulier que les groupes ou classes
d’hommes font de la langue et les différenciations qui en résultent à l’intérieur de la
langue commune.

We consider the use of quotative *like* as one way in which a speaker may indicate his or
her position relative to a linguistic community. In this respect, it is interesting to note
that time and again our research in the BNC led us to examples of quotative *like* tagged as
W_pop_lore. The examples were invariably taken from music magazines, interviews with
singers etc. and clearly involved an appeal to a commonly held, but no less exclusive, linguistic code. In the terms of Benveniste:

Chaque classe sociale s’approprie des termes généraux, leur attribue des références spécifiques et les adapte ainsi à sa propre sphère d’intérêt et souvent les constitue en base de dérivation nouvelle. À leur tour ces termes, chargés de valeurs nouvelles, entrent dans la langue commune dans laquelle ils introduisent les différenciations lexicales.18

Benveniste talks here of lexical items and of social classes, for which we might easily substitute, in the case of quotative *like*, “specific constructions” and “speech communities” (without necessarily the economic reference implied by social classes).

Another sociolinguistic function played by quotative, and approximative *like*, is that of deferring linguistic authority. In signalling that a locator *y* is being given as one in a class of terms all characteristic of property *z*, the speaker is leaving open the possibility of other neighbouring values, and, we might argue, encouraging the co-speaker to share in the construction of referential values, by filling in the gaps, so to speak. The undecided, unfinished character which the (over-) use of *like* presents to speakers like myself, might also be indicative of a more consensual mode of linguistic exchange, in which speaker endorsement is deliberately muted, or left conditional on co-speaker uptake. This relates, interestingly, to remarks made in quite a different register, by Jespersen, and quoted in Romaine and Lange:

Approximative *like* is “very much used in colloquial and vulgar language to modify the whole of one’s statement, a word or phrase modestly indicating that one’s choice of words was not perhaps, quite felicitous. It is generally used by inferiors addressing superiors.”19

Putting aside the normative tone of the passage – refreshing or depressing, according to your point of view –, Jespersen’s remarks provide evidence of the way in which approximative *like*, in deferring linguistic authority, may also mirror extra-linguistic roles of authority between individuals. In keeping with our earlier comments, while it is important to avoid mixing indiscriminately the concepts of speaker (or énonciateur), as the ultimate source of enunciative coordinates, and locutor (locuteur) as the person, the talker or writer, physically responsible for the linguistic phenomenon, it is equally important to recognise that some linguistic forms – starting with something as basic as the *tu* / *vous* division – force us to recognize these interlocutionary roles from the outset and to seek to account for them20. The sociolinguistic aspects of quotative *like* may only be partially explained by the schematic form we have put forward for *like*: interlocutionary adjustment and regulation21 also have their role to play.

**Hypotheses for the diachronic development of quotative like**

The previous section looked at questions one might ask about the use of quotative *like* in different speakers, in different places and different circumstances. We might additionally ask ourselves how such a use might have developed diachronically.

While enunciative linguists, myself included, often refer to, and draw inspiration from etymological data22, it is not always easy to situate this in a principled manner with respect to the schematic form we attribute to markers. When one marker is used in different ways at *t* and at *t* + 1 we have two options before us: either we consider that the schematic form has altered in some way, or we prefer to consider that what has changed...
are the configurations of an invariant schematic form. Neither option is really satisfactory: if the schematic form can be altered, then the very principle of its invariability is threatened, but if it is only the configurations that can change, this would limit us to a static, and finite pool of schematic forms, which again seems an unnecessary and unrealistic constraint, difficult to reconcile with what we know of language change.

In the current paper, I have taken the second option, considering quotative *like* as one possible configuration of a schematic form, one possible instantiation of the variables x, y and z. There nonetheless remain the questions of why such a configuration should have developed, and why in the twentieth century and not before.

The use of markers of similarity or approximation in reporting speech is attested in other languages. Joseph23 and Joseph and Schourup24 claim a common origin for the Hittite quotative particle -war and adverbial -iwar (“like”), and give examples of similar links in other languages, including Buang (New Guinea), Lahu (Tibet) or Tok Pisin (New Guinea). Closer to home, French uses genre in emblematic quotatives of a similar type to those studied here (« là il me regarde genre pauvre fille »25), while Canadian French has an être comme construction along the same lines as quotative *like*.26

This affinity between markers of approximation and reported speech would appear to correspond to the fact that reported speech is not a strict repetition, but a necessarily subjective reconstruction of a speech event, with the margin for error and approximation that involves. As Romaine and Lange, for example, remind us: In so far as each utterance of a speaker constitutes a unique speech event realized in its own characteristic idiolect, comprising idiosyncrasies of accent, grammar, prosody, and the like, even direct speech can only be an imperfect attempt at rendering some of the features which make any utterance unique.27

And so quotative *like* is not an isolated case, but part of a larger cross-language phenomenon where markers of similarity or approximation show a certain predisposition for introducing reported speech.

There remains the question of why such a configuration should have developed in the second-half of the twentieth century and not before. I do not pretend to have the answer, and one may indeed consider it to be just a question of chance. Two features nonetheless appear particularly important to me: the rise of the popular mass media and the corresponding spread of a shared cultural model.

We have seen how quotative *like* relies for its interpretation upon the accessibility of a relation between a token utterance (Wow, Aaargh, Hey etc.) and a stereotyped situation. I would argue that such relations involve an appeal to a commonly held dramaturgical culture. I wonder then, if the development of quotative *like* and the stereotyped situations it often evokes, might not parallel the development of the popular mass media, and soap operas even, with their inevitable repository of situation-types. Such a hypothesis would also help to account for the geographical development of quotative *like* as more and more areas of the English speaking world acquire access to the same frames of reference and rework this into their discourse in similar ways. The process would undoubtedly be helped along by the imitation of a linguistic model possessing what sociolinguists would call covert prestige. The argument may seem a little far-fetched, from the enunciative perspective we are used to, but it does pose the problem of the articulation between our modes of analysis of a linguistic phenomenon such as quotative *like* and the cultural and ethnological context in which the phenomenon appears.28
Concluding remarks

Let me run briefly over the ground covered in the previous paragraphs. I began by presenting the uses of quotative *like* in contemporary English, going on to show that such uses are, despite our first impressions, rather different, in terms of referential values and sociolinguistically, from a discourse verb such as *say*. We then saw that it is possible to posit an enunciative analysis of quotative *like* which derives these quotative values as one possible configuration of an invariant schematic form associated with the marker *like*. In addition to the construction of referential values, quotative *like* also carries sociolinguistic implications, the formalisation of which requires us to reconsider and possibly to rehabilitate in our analysis the relation between speaker and locutor. The sociolinguistic meanings carried by quotative *like* are closely tied to the historical development of the construction. If enunciative linguistics is to consider questions of language change, then it also becomes important to find ways of articulating our approach with those of neighbouring disciplines, including ethnography or social psychology.

These tasks are necessary but not, in my view, insurmountable. They provide us with new challenges and open new paths for future research.

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NOTES

4. Naturally this also makes the job of searching through a corpus more fastidious than usual, since one must search for the sequences <like, >, <like ”>, <like: >, etc.
6. This characterisation is close to that given in Lionel Dufaye, « Comment identifier une identification? », in Cycnos, Volume 21, n°1, on line 25 July 2005, URL : http://revel.unice.fr/cycnos/index.html?id=23. the significant difference being the appeal here to a third term, z, which obviates the need to include qualitative and quantitative determinations in the schematic form, as Dufaye proposes.
11. This does not appear to be the case in all varieties of English: “in contrast to American English, in both British and Canadian English BE LIKE is still highly localized, being used for non-lexicalized sound or internal dialogue and for first person subjects” (Sali Tagliamonte, Rachel Hudson, “Be like et al. beyond America: The quotative system in British and Canadian youth”, *in Journal of Sociolinguistics* 3/2, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, p.166).
12. We might consider two modes of construction of a class: either as a function of spatio-temporal variables (a different time and place may produce a different utterance) or as a function of subjective variables (different speakers may report things differently).
15. Cf. also: *Then, it was like, “Respect, old school”, and they all shut up.*
20. Similar considerations in literary criticism have led to the narratological concept of the implied author, cf. Schmid (2011).
26. We might also mention the non standard use of markers of manner HOW or AS, in indirect reported speech in English (*He said how he had noticed the barometer... [BNC]*)
In this consideration, Ferrara and Bell mention Carbaugh (1988), who sees “a general American tendency towards lionization of self-revelation as a preferred cultural mode” (“Sociolinguistic Variation and Discourse Function of Constructed Dialogue Introducers: The Case of Be + like”, op. cit., p. 283).

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Mots-clés: like, English linguistics, sociolinguistic, interactional value

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