• 1 In 1983, Rifaat Abou-El-Haj openly criticized the existing literature, claiming that the history of (...)
• 2 In recent years, Muhammed Tandoğan, Ahmet Kavas, Abdullah Özdağ, and Cemal Atabaş have published th (...)
• 3 Some of these texts include Fihris makhtutdt Ghadamis. Tripoli: Markaz jihad al-libiyyin 1986; Ghad (...)
• 4 Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī, 2004.

1The city of Ghadames, renowned for its historical significance in the trans-Saharan trade, was often overlooked in terms of its political and intellectual dynamics by European travellers in the 19th century and Libyan historians until the 1980s.1 Similarly, the Ottoman administrations in the 19th century and Ottoman historians to this day have not extensively studied the complexities of the city.2 It was not until the 1980s that Bashir Qasim Yusha began shedding light on Ghadames’ history by examining local letters and court records.3 While he revealed a number of crucial details about the dynamics of trade and the activities of the merchants in Ghadames during the 19th century, it was only in 2004 that the political and intellectual complexity of the city came to light through Abdaljabbar Assaghir’s edition of a local chronicle with a biography written by Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī (d. 1780) around the 1770s.4

• 5 For recent examples, see R.  Dewiere, 2017; N. Lafi, 2006.

2Unlike the other important cities in the central Sudanic Sahara, such as Murzuq, Agadez, and Zinder, Ghadames never established a sultanate within its territory. Furthermore, historians mistakenly overlooked the political role of Ghadames, especially from the perspective of its scholars, focusing mainly on the role of the city in trans-Saharan trade.5 Hence, despite the availability of primary sources, including both edited texts and numerous personal letters housed in local archives, the politico-theological debates in Ghadames from the 1770s to the 1850s have not been thoroughly investigated. However, the analysis of these sources presents additional challenges due to their varied formats. While a chronicle from the 1770s offers insights into the politico-theological discussions of the time, the materials from the 1790s to the 1850s predominantly consist of personal correspondence authored by merchants and the qādī of Ghadames. Nevertheless, a discursive analysis of the materials spanning the 1770s to the 1850s reveals both intellectual continuity and differentiation concerning the political stance of Ghadames. Furthermore, such examination also reveals the epistemological connections between Ghadames and the broader Islamic world.

• 6 Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī, 2004, p. 28.
• 7 I. Warscheid, 2017.
• 8 See: Fakhr ad-Dīn al-Rāzī, 1905, p. 218; Ibrāhīm al-Ḫayrbaytī, 1996, p. 15; Ibn Manṣūr ibn al-Ḥaddā (...)

3One of the unique historical texts that survived in Ghadames is Taḍkīr al-Nāsī wa-Talyīn al-Qalb al-Qāsī, primarily a chronicle of Ghadames, written by Mūsā ibn Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī around the 1770s and containing a long biographical section about ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī (d. 1719). The chronicle portion of the text reveals extensive scholarly networks connecting Ghadames to Tunis, Fes, Cairo, Agadez, and Timbuktu during the 17th and 18th centuries.6 It was customary for students to travel to these cities to seek knowledge from esteemed teachers and scholars. In the biographical section, Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī recounts specific anecdotes illustrating the significant roles played by Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī both in political and intellectual spheres. This part of the text also delves into the detailed arguments allegedly presented by Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī to contest the authority of the Ottoman Empire and the Kel Tamasheq (Tuareg) groups in the Sahara. In this regard, the text conveys a succinct message in its entirety. On the one hand, Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī highlights the vibrant intellectual life within the city, suggesting that its scholars possessed a high level of expertise. On the other hand, he expands upon this initial assertion by detailing the biography of Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī, portraying him as both an intellectual and a political figure who endeavoured to secure the city’s independence from Ottoman domination and the involvement of the Kel Tamasheq communities. The interesting point regarding this person is that, while Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī emphasizes Al-Ghadāmisī’s political contributions, he characterizes him distinctly as the foremost scholar of the city rather than as a sultan. This characterization reflects a pattern that aligns with the social roles of scholars in the Tuwat region, thereby distinguishing Ghadames from other trade-connected cities such as Murzuq, Agadez, and Zinder.7 Having a particular political role for scholars is, in fact, a well-discussed issue among classical scholars. For instance, scholars such as Fakhr ad-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), Ibn Manṣūr ibn al-Ḥaddād (d. 1275), Abū Ḥammū Mūsā l-Zayyānī (d. 1389), Ibrāhīm al-Ḫayrbaytī (d. 1440), and Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Kāfiyaǧī (d. 1474) advocated for a concept of governance known as dāʾirat al-siyāsa, where a ruler’s role (be he sultan, imam, qāḍī, or scholar) was that of an administrator focused on maintaining power balances among communities for stability, without having any right to hold personal power.8 This unique concept rendered possible the intersection of political and theological/juridical spheres, as is the case in Tuwat and Ghadames.

• 9 Ar. al-ḫilāfa al-ʿuzmā, Tr. hilafet-i kübra.
• 10 Ibid., p. 27.
• 11 Here the reason the author defines Ghadames as a city that recognizes the caliph of Morocco is to d (...)
• 12 The dispute between the Moroccan and Ottoman authorities over the legitimate caliphate emerged duri (...)

6Mulhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī presents an intellectual critique of the caliphal authority of the Ottoman Empire, asserting that the designation “caliph of all Muslims”9 rightfully belongs to the Sultan of Morocco, thereby refuting the Ottoman Empire’s claims to this title.10 In this regard, as Ghadames had recognised the caliphate of the Moroccan sultan, the possible authority of the Ottomans in Ghadames, asserted by referring to their caliphal claims, is illegitimate.11 Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī does not provide any further detail for this argumentation, such as a clear reference regarding the claims of the Moroccans and Ottomans; nevertheless, an examination of the historical events provides insight into the intellectual context of this discussion.12

• 13 For more details on this person, see TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, cilt 27, Ankara, 2003, p. 234-236.
• 14 Tr. treatise.
• 15 The original manuscript can be found in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul, under the Ayasofya Böl (...)
• 16 For more details, see H. Yavuz, 1991, p. 73-110.
• 17 Halasu’l-Ümme fi Marifeti’l-Eimme, folio 2b.
• 18 Ibid., folio 3a.

7The first official proclamation of a claim to being the “caliph of all Muslims” made by the Ottoman authorities occurred after the death of Al-Mutawakkil III around 1543. Subsequent to this event, no fresh caliph from the Abbasid lineage was introduced. For this purpose, in 1554 the Ottoman Sadrazam Lütfi Pasha (d. 1564)13 authored an official risale14 under the title Halasu’l-Ümme fi Marifeti’l-Eimme.15 This marked the first endeavour by the Ottoman side to assert themselves as the “caliph of all Muslims”.16 In this text, Lütfi Pasha argues that since there is no one from the Abbasid family able to further assume the role of caliph with its meaning as a leader of all Muslims, and since only the Ottoman sultan holds the necessary qualifications for such a leadership, the matter should be approached in accordance with the juristic maxim (al-qawāʾid al-fiqhiyyah) of “necessity overrules prohibition” (al-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt).17 Lütfi Pasha invokes this principle to justify the caliphate of the Ottoman sultan in response to a debate asserting that caliphs must belong to the šarīf lineage, such as the Abbasid family, which is a branch of the Quraysh tribe to which Prophet Muhammad belonged.18 The Ottoman dynasty did not possess such lineage. Therefore, Lütfi Pasha endeavours to demonstrate that given the existing šarīf lineages were incapable of assuming the caliph title, the Ottoman authority’s assumption of this title should be viewed as a justifiable exception.

• 19 For more details on this person, see K. Dine, 2002.
• 20 Abū-l-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Tamgrūtī, 1929.
• 21 Abū-l-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Tamgrūtī, 1929, p. 1-2.

8However, Moroccan authorities in the 1580s contested this assertion. The Moroccan scholar and embassy who was in Istanbul, Abū-l-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Tamgrūtī (d. 1595),19 presents an argument in his Kitāb al-nafḥat al-miskiyya fī l-sifāra al-turkīya suggesting that since the Saʿdī dynasty in Morocco is a šarīf family, they possessed the right to bear the title of caliph.20 He viewed the Ottoman Empire’s power and authority as a temporary guardianship over the Muslim world, asserting that the Moroccan sultans would eventually assume the exclusive authority as the rightful caliphs. Consequently, al-Tamgrūtī concludes that the Ottoman sultans could not be considered caliphs.21

• 22 Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī, 2004, p. 27. Here, the author stresses his imam role in the city to grant hi (...)
• 23 See A. Rahman, 2002, p. 116-117.
• 24 Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, 1933, vol. 1, p. 116.

9Although the views attributed to Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī do not explicitly address these various claims, his unwavering support for the Moroccan side of the debate may stem from the necessity to be a šarīf in order to lay claim to the caliphate. In his following considerations, for instance, he posits that his own family is also related to the Moroccan sultan (i.e. from šarīf lineage). In this regard, the Ottoman sultan had no right to impose any religious authority on behalf of them.22 In this point, it is noticeable that Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī makes a very selective argumentation for his claims, because his theological background in the Ašʿarī doctrine allows him to interpret the situation in a unique way. The presence of several works from Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) in the library of the central mosque of Ghadames, where Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī was active as imam and faqīh, shows Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī’s possible awareness regarding the Ašʿarī interpretation in the debate over a rightful caliphate. In his voluminous book Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm Al-Dīn, which is also present in an 18th-century manuscript in the central mosque of Ghadames, Al-Ǧazālī argues the issue of the caliphate using the notion of šawka. By providing a direct reference to Abū al-Ḥasan al-Aš ʿarī (d. 936), he states that the sole force (šawka) in the world is the will of God, since He is the only creator of all beings and all human deeds.23 Thus, if there is a powerful sultan who has enough power (šawka) to rule the Muslims, his authority should be considered as God-given (because šawka is the will of God), and that makes his authority as caliph legitimate.24

• 25 Although Ottoman sultans sometimes used similar arguments in their letters to other countries, such (...)
• 26 The primary objective of this text was to persuade the Ottomans and Mamluks of the superiority of t (...)
• 27 Ö. Kavak, 2022, p. 46-51.

10This Aš ʿarī interpretation, as will be seen in the following, was in fact the predominant opinion in Ghadames after 1850. Yet, during the 18th century, Muhalhil’s references to Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī seems to disregard this line of argumentation, even though he was without doubt aware of it. It is worth noting as well that the Ottoman authorities in their official doctrine did not use this Ašʿarī interpretation for their claims.25 The reason for this was a crucial historical, theological, and juristic transformation in the Ottoman Empire. Until the end of the 18th century, the juridical-political impact of Naǧm Al-Dīn al-Ṭarsūsī’s (d. 1357) Tuḥfat al-Turk26 held immense influence in any debate in the Ottoman Empire regarding the discussions about the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphs.27 As Lütfi Pasha’s risale did later, juridical argumentations had a more central role in political discussions than did theological debates. Consequently, Ašʿarī theological interpretations (as well as any Māturīdī interpretation) were not in the scope of the intellectual debates concerning politics.

• 28 See S. Kenan (ed.), 2010.
• 29 Here, I am referring to the manuscript that is present in the Süleymanite Kütüphanesi in Istanbul. (...)
• 30 Here, I am referring to the manuscript that is presence in the Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul. (...)
• 31 S.K. Esad Efendi Koleksiyonu, no. 1856, f. 22a.
• 32 TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, Cilt 28. Ankara, 2003, p. 151-157.
• 33 S.K. Esad Efendi Koleksiyonu, no. 1856, f. 20b-21a.
• 34 S.K. Esad Efendi Koleksiyonu, no. 2363, f. 53a-53b.
• 35 See S.K. Esad Efendi Koleksiyonu, no. 1856, f. 46b; S.K. Esad Efendi Koleksiyonu, no. 2363, f. 65a.

11That changed significantly, however, after the Wahhabi movement (with their fundamental criticism of jurisprudence and emphasis on more canonical sources such as the Qur’an and Hadith) and reformist policies in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 18th century. Especially around 1810-1840, several Ottoman scholars were tasked by the Ottoman sultans with re-evaluating the basic argument for the legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan as the caliph, to gain additional authority in the face of unpopular reforms.28 Two specific texts were deemed so influential that they were sent to all the Ottoman cities (including Tripoli) by order of the sultan. These were Naǧāh al-ummah fī tāʿtī al-āʾimma29 and Al-Saʿyū al-Maḥmūd fī niẓām al-ǧadīd.30 The first text critically examines the juridical arguments of Lütfi Pasha (with his reference to the juristic maxim of necessity) and instead proposes a theological argument with a direct reference to Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 944).31 Different from the views of Al-Ḥasan Al-Ašʿarī, who attributes the šawka entirely to the will of God (so if someone has great power, then this should be considered as the will of God), Manṣūr al-Māturīdī argues that the šawka belongs to the combination of God’s will and men’s will (i.e. crystallization of great power in men cannot be considered as the pure will of God).32 In this respect, the first of the two aforementioned influential texts states that the Ottoman sultans were not granted power by God but granted success by God as a result of their achievements. This makes the Ottoman caliph legal, not the product of necessity.33 The second text, on the other hand, criticizes the Ašʿarī interpretation and again directly refers to Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. The author argues that the legality of the Ottoman caliph did not stem up from the power that they had, but from the fact that it was won through their long history of protecting the Muslim community. God granted them success as a result of this history.34 Both texts similarly conclude that since the authority and legality of the Ottoman caliphs does not rely on the power that they possessed (whether granted by God or not was irrelevant here), but because they deserved to be caliph. Therefore, even if the Ottoman caliphs were to lose their military power, which was the case in the 19th century, people must never cease to obey them.35 From the Ottoman perspective, an Ašʿarī interpretation for the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliph had the dangerous implication that if the Ottoman sultans lost their power, then it would be legal to reject their caliphal authority, which is exactly what happened in Ghadames after 1911.

• 36 One the foremost scholars of Timbuktu of his time. See A. Zebadia, 1974.
• 37 BNF, Département des manuscrits : Manuscrits d’Afrique subsaharienne, Tombouctou ; Arabe 6756.
• 38 See ʾImām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ǧuwaynī, 1938, p. 239; ʾImām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ǧuwaynī, 1979, p. 257; ʿAbd al(...)
• 39 For more details, see U. Dalhatu, 2016.

12Returning to the 18th century and Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī, another noticeable point regarding his selective argument is his reliance on the view that there is only one caliph for all Muslims, a topic that sparked significant debate in the Sahel-Sahara region during the following century. For instance, in one of his letters written around the 1850s, the prominent scholar Aḥmad Al-Bakkāy (d. 1865)36 in Timbuktu discusses the issue of declaring jihad.37 He argues that only the caliph of the Muslims can declare jihad against a “non-Muslim” nation. For him, there are two caliphs for all Muslims in the world: one is in Morocco and the other is in Istanbul. While the caliph in Morocco may have a more justifiable claim to being the sole caliph, it is a fact that the Ottoman sultan possesses the power to protect a significant portion of the Muslim population. In this regard, only both of them can be considered as caliph, and only they have the right to declare jihad. In other words, Al-Bakkāy accepts the arguments of both sides (Moroccan and Ottoman) and resolves the problem with the option of the existence of two caliphs at the same time. The possibility of such an option is, in fact, not a personal invention of Al-Bakkāy. This possibility was discussed and confirmed during the classic age of Islam by some Ašʿarī scholars such as Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ǧuwaynī (d. 1085) and ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1037), with a fundamental condition that there must be a very great distance between the two caliphs.38 The possibility of having multiple caliphs within the Muslim community was well known among the Maliki scholars in Sahel. A significant discussion on this matter took place between Aḥmad Lobbo (d. 1845), the founding ruler of the Caliphate of Ḥamdallāhi (1818-1862) and Muḥammad Belū (aka Muhammadu Bello) (d. 1837), the second ruler of Sokoto (1804-1903), around the 1820s.39

• 40 See M. Tahir, 2023.
• 41 See C.C. Stewart, 1976 and M. Nobili, 2020.
• 42 ʿAbdāllah ibn Fūdī was the brother of Uṯmān ibn Fūdī and assigned to rule in the western part of th (...)
• 43 N.H.R.S., Muḥammad Belū, MS. I4a.
• 44 I.F.A.N., Fond Brevié, MS. 7. Also see: M. Nobili, 2020. However, Nobili does not analyse the epist (...)
• 45 N.A.N. O/AR, 12, "Ǧawāb Šāfin li-l-Murīd".

13After the immense expansion of the newly founded caliphate in Sokoto by ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī (a.k.a. Uthman Danfodio) in 1804-1815, Aḥmad Lobbo had received a flag to carry the expansion further around Timbuktu.40 Nevertheless, following ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī’s death in 1817, Aḥmad Lobbo had decided to create his own rule in Ḥamdallāhi and eventually his own caliphate. This decision led to a diplomatic crisis between the Sokoto caliphate and Aḥmad Lobbo, not only politically but also intellectually.41 When the succession dispute in the Sokoto caliphate between ʿAbdāllah ibn Fūdī (a.k.a. Abdullahi Danfodio) (d. 1828)42 and Muḥammad Belū finally resolved in 1821, Belū demanded allegiance (bayʿa) from Lobbo.43 However, Aḥmad Lobbo sent a detailed letter to explain why he was not obligated to do so. In his letter, by referring to ʿAbdāllah ibn Fūdī and Aḥmad bin Ghunayim Al-Nafrāwī (d. 1713), Lobbo clarifies that it is not permissible to have more than one caliph for the umma (Muslim community); but if there is a very great distance between two Muslim communities, then they are each allowed to have their own caliph, since the orders of the other caliph cannot reach them.44 Interestingly, at this point Belū turned to Al-Ghazālī’s Ašʿarī interpretation. He stated that “Ottoman Sultan Sulaiman took almost all Muslim lands under his control, and his rule was accepted because of his power (šawka) ... Then you will have no choice when we show you our power.”45 In this regard, Belū accepted Lobbo’s argument of “having long distance between them”, but openly threatened him by claiming that, in this case, if one ruler (he) could reach the sphere of the other ruler (Lobbo), then Al-Ghazālī’s Ašʿarī interpretation became valid.

• 46 For more details, see M.T.M. Minna, 2013.

14It is noteworthy that the fundamental condition of this opinion (“there must be a huge distance between two caliphs”) is also rooted in the legal maxim of necessity. That is to say, there must be a Muslim community that is unable to receive directives from the incumbent caliph in the central part of the Islamic world, thereby necessitating the selection of a caliph within their own domain. Interestingly, this intellectual opinion turned into a political reality between Morocco and the Ottoman Empire after the end of the 16th century, when the Ottomans relinquished their aspirations to control the whole of North and West Africa. In other words, the substantial distance between them allowed for the establishment of caliphal authorities within their respective domains, while still maintaining their official claims as the caliph of all Muslims. Similarly, when ʿUṯmān ibn Fūdī established the Sokoto caliphate in the beginning of the 19th century, the justification for the rulers of Sokoto assuming the title of caliph was based on this intellectual viewpoint, as they were situated at a considerable distance from both Morocco and Istanbul.46

• 47 Morocco’s authority reached far into the desert to the Tuwat oases, while before the 1780s the Otto (...)

15In the case of Ghadames, however, this option was more nuanced, because the city lay beyond the direct control of Morocco and the Ottomans but also within the margins of their power until the 1780s.47 The proposed solution put forth by Sahelian scholars in the 19th century was impractical in the context of Ghadames. This may explain why the notion of two caliphs was never suggested by the Ghadamasian scholars, or by Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī.

• 48 Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī, 2004, p. 9.
• 49 Regarding the political role of the concept of sulh, see L. Bernard, 1991.
• 50 Ibid., p. 10.
• 51 The author does not clearly disclose the personality of this jurist. It seems possible that he was (...)

17In his second argument, Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī criticizes an opinion that was supported by “some scholars”. Unfortunately, the text does not name these scholars. These scholars’ arguments bear a striking resemblance to the considerations of the Ottoman authorities, albeit with a crucial distinction. Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī states that there are “some scholars” who claim that if people are living in fear due to the “Turkish ruler”, who imposes arbitrary taxes and dispatches military forces in cases when people fail to pay tribute, then these people can rightfully pay such tribute in accordance with sharia. Otherwise, fear of consequences would prevent them from working, making it legally justifiable for them to comply out of necessity.48 It seems that these scholars invoked the principle of necessity to justify allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. The debate in this section, however, is no longer about the legality of the Ottoman authorities’ claims to the caliphate, but rather about the overall legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire’s rule. To counter this argument, Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī introduces a special notion: ṣulḥ (reconciliation).49 He interprets the reference to the principle of the necessity to obey the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the framework of making ṣulḥ with the Ottomans, given that their rule is not compatible with sharia. But for him, one cannot make ṣulḥ with the Ottoman authorities, because their affairs are corrupt.50 Here, Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī again does not explain with which references Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī proposes this consideration. However, a fatwā issued in the earlier 19th century for a case in Souf valley (northwest of Ghadames) by a Tunisian jurist named Sīdī Ibrāhīm al-Riyāḥsī51 illustrates the possible background argument to the view attributed to Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī.

• 52 Al-Sāsī al-Awāmir, 2007, p. 276.
• 53 Ibid., p. 292.

18The Souf valley holds particular significance in understanding the scholarly complexity of Ghadames. Its proximity to Ghadames and shared efforts in challenging the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire make it an important location for scholarly analysis. According to the chronicle of Al-Sāsī al-Awāmir (d. 1881), in the 1780s a scholar in Souf called Sheikh Farhat declared that the Ottoman Empire had no legal basis to impose tribute on Souf and that such claims were therefore illegal, as was the case in Ghadames.52 Although al-’Awāmir does not disclose the exact arguments of Sheikh Farhat, he shares an interesting fatwā in his chronicle that sheds light on the consideration of this debate. According to this fatwā, which poses a question about the conditions of making ṣulḥ (reconciliation), the Tunisian jurist al-Riyāḥsī states that the first condition for making ṣulḥ instead of applying the rule of sharia is the principle of necessity: “there is no question that necessity permits the forbidden, and the biggest harm is strife (fitna)”.53 In this regard, if the application of sharia were to cause harm or conflict among Muslims, then it is better to make ṣulḥ. Nevertheless, he clearly emphasizes that there is also a second condition; and in this point, he names his legal sources for his argumentation:

• 55 Furthermore, there is a second layer of selection, as the arguments of Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī are re (...)
• 56 Some scholars contend that Arab travellers and intellectuals perceived the Sahara as an uninhabited (...)
• 57 Muhalhil Al-Ghadāmisī, 2004, p. 18.
• 58 For more details, see M. Hiskett, 1962, p. 585.
• 59 This manuscript can be found in Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal under the M.S. Arabic 6755.
• 60 Kitāb al-Ṭarāʾif wa-l-Talāʾid, folio 300.

20The presence of the manuscripts of Ḫalịl bin Isḥāq al-Jundị and ʿAbd al-Bāqī al-Zurqānī in the library of the central mosque of Ghadames, and the entire similarity to Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī’s attributed argument, regarding making sulh, to the fatwa of al-Riyāḥsī—who was relying on the above-mentioned two famous Maliki jurists for his comments—shows the possible background argument of Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī. In this respect, it seems possible to argue that his rejection of making ṣulḥ with the Ottoman Empire because of their corruptive affairs is based on his interpretation of such Maliki texts. However, it should again be stressed that this is a selective interpretation that shows the active intellectual effort attributed to Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī, as he could use a discursive plurality to examine the issue from different viewpoints.55 For instance, he applies the same argument to the affairs of the Kel Tamasheq in the Sahara before discussing the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. He asserts that as long as raiding caravans or imposing tribute56 in order to avoid being raided is not a business model but a necessity because of starvation, then this people [the Kel Tamasheq] should not be punished, but their need should be satisfied by paying a tribute so that it would bring safety to travellers.57 In other words, necessity should not be imposed by one side/perspective as ʿAbd al-Bāqī al-Zurqānī warned (because then this is a corruptive affair), since one side uses this as a pretext to make it their economic model to turn a profit. Instead, there must be a general truth, as Khalịl bin Isḥāq al-Jundị stated (i.e. it must be a natural condition that imposes the necessity on both parts). Especially in the case of tributes that were imposed by the Kel Tamasheq on the merchants who were active in the Sahara, this argument was not the only consideration. For instance, a prominent Maliki scholar from Tlemcen, ʿAbd Al-Karīm Al-Maġīlī (d. 1504), categorically rejects such a payment without discussing it even under the principle of necessity.58 In another example, according to a book of Muḥammad Al-Saghīr al-Kuntī (d. 1826)— Kitāb al-Ṭarāʾif wa-l-Talāʾid,59 which narrates the biography of Al-Muḫtār Ibn Aḥmad al-Kuntī (d. 1811)—Al-Muḫtār Al-Kūntī defines this tribute already as a business model of the Kel Tamasheq. Yet, for him, if it is impossible to conduct business in the Sahara without paying this tribute, then the entire procedure should be considered under the principle of necessity without any further condition.60 These various opinions on the same issue among the scholars in Sudan demonstrate the active intellectual efforts to create a special argument while they were still relying on the similar authoritative sources in the Maliki school of law. In other words, while Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī may have drawn inspiration from the views of al-Zurqānī and al-Jundī, his clear endorsement of this perspective represents his personal contribution to this specific case.

• 61 U.L.A., Aduljabbar Alqadir, Al-Ǧawhar al-Ṯamīn fī Aḫbār Ṣaḥrāʾ al-Mulaṯṯamīn, Unedited manuscript, (...)
• 62 B.O.A., Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56, f. 3.
• 63 Ibid., f. 4.
• 64 For more details, see D. Hamani, 2006.
• 65 At this juncture, it is crucial to emphasize the absence of archival documents within the Ottoman a (...)
• 66 This manuscript, presented in the form of a petition, is housed in the private family archive of Ab (...)

21It is also important to note that Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī examines the cases about the legality of the Ottomans and the Kel Tamasheq within the same argumentative debate, while he does not imply any clear connection between them. This unmentioned connection, however, was a significant item of discussion in the Sahel-Sahara region during the 18th and 19th centuries. According to the chronicle of Abduljabbar Alqadir regarding the history of Essouq, the scholars of the city received a ferman (an order with the official seal of Ottoman sultans) from the Ottoman sultan, which entitled them to establish an Islamic emirate among the Kel Tamasheq in the 17th century.61 In another example, an Ottoman merchant called Mehmed Başala (d. 189?), who travelled from Tripoli to Kuka and returned through Zinder, Ghat, and Murzuq around the 1870s, encountered some elders of the Kel Hoggar in the south of Ghat. When they heard that Başala came from the Ottoman domain, they told him about a ferman that they received from Sultan Selim (d. 1520) that defined the Kel Tamasheq as subjects of the Ottomans and entitled them to create an Islamic emirate on behalf of the Ottoman sultan.62 Although no such fermans exist in the Ottoman archives, the account of Mehmed Başala suggests the fact that it was not rare in the domain of Tripoli for the local governors or some special agents to issue some supposed fermans to expand their control in the distant regions by taking the advantage of the title of the Ottoman sultans.63 The connection between the Kel Tamasheq and Ottomans was not confined to these supposed fermans as an effort of Ottoman officers to expand the influence of the empire, but also various Kel Tamasheq groups created their own attribution to the Ottoman Empire to legitimize their position. For instance, there is also a well-known oral narrative regarding the ruling dynasty in Agadez called Istanbulawa. According to this local narrative, in the late 15th century various Kel Tamasheq communities in Air desired to raise a sultan in their domain but could not reach a consensus. As a result, they decided to send an envoy in a caravan to Istanbul to ask the Ottoman sultan to give one of his sons to them. According to the narrative, the Ottoman sultan agreed to their demand and gave one of his sons, whose mother was an enslaved woman from Sudan, to be declared the Sultan of Agadez upon their return. His family was named Istanbulawa.64 Although there is no record in the Ottoman archives, numerous historical and diplomatic connections existed between Istanbul and the Kel Tamasheq community.65 For instance, after the Ottomans took Ghadames by force in 1843 (struggling until the 1850s with the civil disobedience of its inhabitants), the Kel Tamasheq elders of Ghat sent an official letter to Tripoli in 1849 to demand Ottoman rule in their city.66

• 68 Although the Ottoman Empire and the Turks (who were non-Muslim nomads in the medieval context) repr (...)

23Since Yaǧūǧ and Maǧūǧ are described in the Qurʾān as devil creatures who will cause the end of the world, and presumably were blocked in Caucasia, Belū relates them to Turks and connects the story of the Kel Tamasheq to this negative imagination.68

• 69 B.Q. Yusha, 2007, p. 333. At the first glance, speaking Turkish may appear to be expected behaviour (...)

24Although Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī does not clearly refer to any of these narratives or to any possible connection between the Kel Tamasheq and Ottomans, in the 1870s some Ghadamesian merchants informed with great dissatisfaction their agents in Tripoli that some Kel Tamasheq communities around Ghat began to speak Turkish in their diplomatic affairs rather than Arabic.69 Regardless of whether or not the Ghadamesain scholars were aware of these stories or took them seriously, their political and intellectual challenges with the Kel Tamasheq and the Ottomans remained within the same framework. Yet, the interaction of the city inhabitants with these two authorities were more complex.

• 70 See B.Q. Yusha, 2011, p. 21.

25Historical conditions had a decisive impact on the intellectual views of Ghadamesian scholar families and the inhabitants of the city in their relations with the Ottomans and the Kel Tamasheq. The political conditions for the city did not greatly change between the 1770s and 1810s. In 1810 and in 1830, however, Yusuf Paşa dispatched troops to Ghadames to force the inhabitants to pay an excessive tribute to him. The inhabitants resisted, calling Yusu Pasha a “despot”, and most of them temporarily left the city to avoid making the payment.70 In 1835, the Ottoman Empire took Tripoli under its direct control, and in 1843 Ghadames was compelled to submit to direct Ottoman rule when a third-ranking governor, known as a müdür, was appointed from Istanbul. Thus, for the first time in pre-modern history, Ghadames received a foreign officer as administrator.

• 71 L.Y., Letter no. 2.
• 72 L.Y., Letter no. 4.

26This greatly marked the politico-theological debates in the city. In fact, during the Qaramanli era, the previous opinions about the illegality of Ottoman rule were still present in the personal letters of the city inhabitants. The same tendency is also evident in the year 1843. Two private letters from 1843 indicate that the inhabitants of the city received the müdür with considerable discontent. In the first letter, the author says to his correspondent in Kano that the city is under the occupation of “despot Turks”.71 The author of the second letter states to his relative in Timbuktu that he was considering leaving the city because of the “Turkish oppression”.72 The central reason for these reactions was the fact that the city had lost its autonomy with the arrival of an Ottoman müdür. It is still unknown how many families and merchants (if any) left Ghadames because of the Ottoman presence. However, this clear civil resistance against the renewed and more direct rule of the Ottomans, which appears consistent with the old intellectual tradition that challenged the legitimacy of the empire, changed rapidly in the course of the 1850s.

• 73 L.Y., Letter no. 15.
• 74 L.Y., Letter no. 129.
• 75 J.G.T.M., unclassified letter from 1853.
• 76 D.M.T., unclassified, in the section of the 19th century.
• 77 B.O.A., İrade Mesail-i Mühimme, 21578.

27Three private letters from 1850 and 1853 indicate that the inhabitants of the city began to recognize the benefits of living under Ottoman administration. In one letter, the author encourages his friend, who complains about a contractual conflict with another merchants, to go to the “bayy” (Tr. Bey [used for Ghademesian müdür]) to request confiscation.73 The author of the second letter informs his partner in Ghat that the “bāsh agha” (Tr. Baş ağa [used for Ghademesian müdür]) promised him to get his caravan back, which had been stolen by bandits.74 In the third letter, the same author relates his satisfaction that the müdür successfully retrieved his caravan.75 Furthermore, a letter from 1853 demonstrates the high level of concern exhibited by Ottoman officers for the interests of the Ghadamesian merchants. In his letter, the kaymakam of Fezzan informs the vali (first-ranking governor) in Tripoli regarding some rumours that he received from the merchants about the Sudan; according to these rumours, there were massive military activities occurring around Hadeja Emirate in the Sokoto Caliphate, which lies between Kano and Bornu, and people were concerned about a possible invasion of Kano. Kaymakan of Fezzan states that since Kano is the most important trade hub of the Ghadamesian merchants, and since these merchants have many properties in the city, such an invasion could have devastating consequences for them. Thus, the vali of Tripoli should take measures to address this possibility.76 In another example around 1862, the vali of Tripoli even removed income tax in Ghadames as a privilege for the city inhabitants, since, for the vali, they were securing the flow of trans-Saharan trade to Tripoli.77

• 78 This tax was levied when the Ottoman sultan decided to go to war and assemble the army. The idea be (...)
• 79 For this information, see: U.L.A., Interview No. 5, with the elders of Ghadames in Ghadames, 2023.

28Yet, this harmony between Ottomans and Ghadamesians was quite tenuous, as Ottoman authorities regularly levied taxes that relied on Ottoman state tradition rather than šarīʿa such as inayat sultan (war tax).78 As a result, the qāḍī of Ghadames, who was traditionally always from the Awlad Yunus family, whose members intermarried with Awlād Abūbakr (the family of Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī),79 began to receive questions after the 1850s regarding the legality of the current political situation. These letters provide an insight into the politico-theological debates among the scholars of the city almost eighty years after the text of Muhalhil.

• 80 For more details, see C. Atabaş, 2021.
• 81 This letter is in the private family archive of Muhammad al-Faqih in Tarhuna.

29According to one of these letters (from 1855), the author, a Ghadamesian merchant, suffered under the war-tax collection of the newly appointed Ottoman müdür. He asked the qāḍī of Ghadames, Muḥammad bin Yūnus, whether he could do something about it. The qāḍī, unlike the argumentation that arises in the text of Muhalhil, justified the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire with Al-Ghazālī’s Ashʿari interpretation and stated: “since God granted power (šawka) to Turks to rule us, we should accept their oppression as an examination from God”. Similarly, using the same reasoning, the qāḍī of Ghadames preferred to be neutral when prominent Arab leader Ghuma rebelled against Ottoman rule around the 1850s. Ghadames neither revolted against Ottoman rule nor rejected the rebellion of Ghuma.80 In one of his undated private letters, the qāḍī of Ghadames, again referring to Al-Ghazālī’s Ashʿari interpretation, states, regarding the rebellion of Ghuma, that “everything is in the hand of God; whatever will come [from this war] will come from Him”.81

• 82 See the arguments regarding this concept in A. Batran, 1971, p. 268, fn 4.
• 83 See. L.Y., Letter no 10.
• 84 B. Yusha, 2011, p. 20.

31In the case of the Kel Tamasheq, the city inhabitants’ reliance on the opinion of the scholars of the city was weaker. Although Muhalhil’s Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī strongly argued that the tribute that the Kel Tamasheq levied from the merchants who were travelling in their territory in the Sahara was illegal as long as it served as a business model for them, the private letters in Ghadames demonstrate that the merchants were aware that it was the business model of the Kel Tamasheq; nevertheless, they did not raise resistance against this practice. Their term for this tribute, on the other hand, was interesting: instead of calling the payment a “tribute” or “tax” (or mudāra as Al-Muḫtār Al-Kūntī called it),82 the Ghadamesian merchants called it a “fine” (Ar. garāma).83 According to Bashir Yusha, this payment was in practice not a fine in the literal sense but more a “benevolence business fee of custom” (rusūm maṣlaḥa al-ǧumrukiya).84 However, the merchants considered this payment necessary but apparently also insulting; that is to say, their understanding of this payment did not rely on the opinion of Abī Bakr Al-Ghadāmisī or of Al-Muḫtār Al-Kūntī in Timbuktu, and the term they used illustrates that they found a middle way between the views of Al-Ghadāmisī and Al-Kūntī.