Introducing The Three Topoi

τρεῖς εἰσι τόποι, περὶ οὓς ἀσκηθῆναι δεῖ τὸν ἐσόμενον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν· [i] ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, ἵνα μήτ᾽ ὀρεγόμενος ἀποτυγχάνῃ μήτ᾽ ἐκκλίνων περιπίπτῃ· [ii] ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον, ἵνα τάξει, ἵναεὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς· [iii] τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητακαὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. (Diss. 3.2.1‑2)
There are three fields of study in which the man who is going to be good and excellent must first have been trained. [i] The first has to do with desires and aversions, that he may never fail to get what he desires, nor fall into what he avoids; [ii] the second with cases of choice and of refusal, and, in general, with duty, that he may act in an orderly fashion, upon good reasons, and not carelessly; [iii] the third with the avoidance of error and rashness in judgement, and, in general, about cases of assent. (trans. Oldfather)

2A number of scholars have suggested that these three areas of training correspond to the three traditional parts of Stoic philosophy: logic, physics, and ethics. The first area, concerned with desires is said to correspond to physics; the second area concerned with choice is said to correspond to ethics; and the third concerned with assent is said to correspond to logic. At first glance it seems fairly easy to make these connections. The third area is concerned with assent, sunkatathesis, and this is a key term in Stoic epistemology, part of logic. We are also told that the second area is concerned with what is appropriate, kathêkon, which is a technical term in Stoic ethics. By a process of elimination, the first area, dealing with desires and aversions must then correspond to physics. This third correspondence might seem less obvious, but one could argue that the best way to manage one’s desires is to know what is reasonable to expect, and that requires knowledge of how the world works, namely physics.

Topos	Focus	Part of Philosophy
First topos	desires and aversions (orexeis kai ekkliseis)	Physics
Second topos	choices and refusals (hormas kai aphormas)	Ethics
Third topos	assents (sunkatatheseis)	Logic

3In what follows I want to re-examine this claim. I shall begin by looking at some of the arguments that have been made in its favour. I shall then consider an alternative interpretation that sees the three topoi not as correlated to the three parts of Stoic philosophy but instead as structured programme of training in three ordered stages. I shall also consider whether both of these interpretations might apply at once. I then want to bring in another account of three topoi that we find in the Enchiridion. But first we need to consider some of arguments that have been given in favour of aligning these three areas of training with the three parts of Stoic philosophy.

The Three Topoi and the Three Parts

• 4 A. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, op. cit., p. 59 (= The Ethics of the (...)

Epictetus also sometimes lets the first two [topoi] together come into a contrast with the third; those two concern the care of character, morality in the narrow sense, as compared to dialectical perfection which the third topos has to do with. [. . .] the first topos only has to do with the inner state of mind and outlook on life, the second, on the other hand, comprises all practical action.4

6The earliest person I have found who explicitly affirms a clear correlation is Paul Elmer More in the extended chapter on Epictetus in his book Hellenistic Philosophies, from 1923. There he writes:

• 6 P. E. More, Hellenistic Philosophies, Princeton, PUP, 1923, p. 108.

In a loose way these three fields correspond with the normal tripartite division of philosophy, the first with physics, the second with ethics in the narrower sense of practical conduct, the third with logic; but the correspondence, except perhaps in the case of the third pair, was never drawn out explicitly by Epictetus, and should not be pressed. All philosophy was virtually ethics for him.6

• 11 P. Hadot, “La philosophie antique : une éthique ou une pratique?,” in P. Demont (ed.), Pr (...)

Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius after him thus distinguish between three kinds of philosophical exercises. There is the exercise which consists in disciplining our active impulse [. . .]. This is the matter of lived ethics [. . .]. Secondly, there is an exercise which consists in controlling our own feelings, judgements, and representations. This is the matter of lived logic [. . .]. Finally, there is the exercise which relates to the discipline of our desires and which consists in desiring only what depends upon us, and in accepting what does not depend upon us as willed by universal Nature, Providence, or Fate. Such consent supposes that one understands that the events which befall human beings do not depend entirely upon us but result from the necessary enchainment of causes, which is not different from Fate.11

9As I indicated earlier, the connections between the second topos and ethics, and the third topos and logic, seem relatively easy to make. The challenge comes in connecting the first topos to physics, and here one can see Hadot beginning to make the case. In another, earlier, essay, ‘Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l’Antiquité,’ he was more explicit:

• 12 P. Hadot, “Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l’Antiquité,” MH 36, 1979, pp (...)

Epictetus distinguishes in effect three domains of askēsis: the discipline of desires, the discipline of impulses, the discipline of thoughts. In the first domain, one exercises oneself in making one’s desires conformable to the will of universal Nature; in the second domain, one attempts to make one’s actions accord with the will of the rational nature that is common to all men; while in the third domain, one attempts to conform one’s thoughts to the laws of reason. We understand, thus, that these three domains correspond in fact to the three parts of philosophy: the first to physics, the second to ethics, the third to logic. In all three cases it is a matter of a spiritual exercise: physics as a spiritual exercise makes us aware of our place in the cosmos [. . .]; ethics as a spiritual exercise aims to make our actions conform to the fundamental tendency of human nature [. . .]; finally, logic as a spiritual exercise makes us test at each moment our impressions, so that no unreasonable judgement will be introduced into the chain of our thoughts.12

• 15 A. A. Long, Epictetus, op. cit., pp. 117–18.

How do Epictetus’ three fields of study relate to the classic division of Stoic philosophy into the three parts—logic, ethics, and physics? The question has been much debated, but I think P. Hadot has given the correct answer. Epictetus’ second and third fields obviously correspond to ethics and to logic. At first glance, the first field, dealing with desires and aversions, looks simply like a preliminary to ethics, or at any rate quite remote from physics or the study of nature. [. . .] But Stoic physics was a very broad subject. [. . .] So we should probably take the first field to include such study of human and cosmic nature as he deems necessary for beginning students to master.15

14So, there has been some dissent and also some hesitancy, but Hadot and Long—both of course very influential commentators—have defended the idea that the three topoi correlate with the three parts of Stoic philosophy. If not universally accepted, their view has certainly been often repeated.

The Three Topoi as Three Stages

16The first piece of evidence is that, after initially listing the three topoi Epictetus describes the first of them, concerning desires and aversions, as “the most important and especially pressing” (kuriôtatos kai malista epeigôn, Diss. 3.2.3). This is why this area must come first. The reason why it must come first is because it deals with negative emotions, which are produced when our desires are frustrated in some way or we fail to avoid something we dislike, and such emotions make it impossible for us to listen to reason (oud’ akousai logou). If we cannot even listen to reason then we are not much use at all, so the first task must be to attend to these emotions. The way we do that, Epictetus suggests, is by paying attention to our desires and aversions:

τούτων κυριώτατος καὶ μάλιστα ἐπείγων ἐστὶνὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη· πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀποτυγχανούσης ἢἐκκλίσεως περιπιπτούσης. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ταραχάς, θορύβους, ἀτυχίας, ὁ δυστυχίας ἐπιφέρων, ὁ πένθη, οἰμωγάς, φθόνους, ὁ φθονερούς, ὁ ζηλοτύπους ποιῶν, δι᾽ ὧν οὐδ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι λόγου δυνάμεθα. (Diss. 3.2.3)
Among these the most important and especially pressing is that which has to do with the stronger emotions; for a strong emotion does not arise except [when] a desire fails to attain its object, or an aversion falls into what it would avoid. This is the field of study which introduces to us confusions, tumults, misfortunes and calamities; and sorrows, lamentations, envies; and makes us envious and jealous—passions which make it impossible for us even to listen to reason. (trans. Oldfather)

17The second piece of evidence is in Epictetus’s comment on the third topos. He says that this belongs only to people who are already making progress (ho êdê tois prokoptousin epiballôn, Diss. 3.2.5). He describes it as a firm consistency in one’s judgements, so that even in dreams or drunkenness one does not assent to an untested impression:

τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἤδη τοῖς προκόπτουσιν ἐπιβάλλων, ὁ περὶ τὴν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀσφάλειαν, ἵνα μηδ᾽ ἐν ὕπνοις λάθῃ τις ἀνεξέταστος παρελθοῦσα φαντασία μηδ᾽ ἐν οἰνώσει μηδὲ μελαγχολῶντος. (Diss. 3.2.5)
The third belongs only to those who are already making progress; it has to do with the element of certainty in the matters which have just been mentioned, so that even in dreams, or drunkenness, or a state of melancholy-madness, a man may not be taken unawares by the appearance of an untested sense-impression. (trans. Oldfather)

18He goes on to criticize philosophers of his day who skip the first and second stages of training and go straight to the third, focusing their attention on syllogisms and logical paradoxes. Only someone who is already fine and good (kalon kai agathon) ought to engage in these logical pursuits, he adds. This is one of a number of passages where Epictetus might be seen to disparage the study of logic, but as we can see he is in fact putting it at the summit of intellectual activity. It might not be suitable for beginners, but it is the perfect pastime for sages. Indeed, the consistency in one’s judgements that Epictetus also attributes to this third stage of training is something that one would associate with a sage, not a beginner. So for these reasons, the third topos must come last.

Three Stages and Three Parts?

20The two approaches that we have considered so far are not necessarily incompatible. There is no reason in principle why the three topoi could not correspond to the three parts of Stoic philosophy and form a structured programme of training that has a deliberate order. If the three topoi in Epictetus’s very deliberate order correspond to physics, ethics, and then logic, that might make him committed to the claim that the study of philosophy ought to commence with physics, then turn to ethics, and culminate with logic. I say “might” because it will all depend on how close one takes the relationship between the three areas and the three parts to be. It would commit him if he held the three topoi to be the same as the three parts, but perhaps not if he simply took them to correspond to the three parts in some way. There is no reason in principle why someone might not hold that one ought to study the three parts of philosophy in one order, and then engage in practical training designed to digest the ideas contained in those parts in a different order. After all, the two tasks are potentially quite different in kind.

22That is one potential problem with assuming a close correlation between the three topoi and the three parts of philosophy, albeit a relatively minor one. There are a couple of other, more substantive, reasons to doubt the correlation.

23The first reason concerns the first topos. This, Epictetus tell us, is the most important and pressing because it deals with emotions (Diss. 3.2.3). Emotions are often, he suggests, the product of thwarted desires. It might seem odd to think that the treatment of emotions ought to fall under the domain of physics. One might be more inclined to think of this as an ethical concern or, given the role that judgements and assents play in the production of emotions, falling under the heading of logic. Indeed, one might think that overcoming negative emotions will require some knowledge of how judgements work, what is and is not really good, and what it would be reasonable to expect in any given situation – in other words, it would require some knowledge of doctrines in Stoic logic, ethics, and physics. It is not obvious that this neatly correlates to any one part of Stoic philosophy.

[i] ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἀναγκαιότατος τόπος ἐστὶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὁ τῆς χρήσεως τῶν θεωρημάτων, οἷον τὸ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι· [ii] ὁ δεύτερος ὁ τῶν ἀποδείξεων, οἷον πόθεν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ψεύδεσθαι; [iii] τρίτος ὁ αὐτῶν τούτων βεβαιωτικὸς καὶ διαρθρωτικός, οἷον πόθεν ὅτι τοῦτο ἀπόδειξις; τί γάρ ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις, τίἀκολουθία, τί μάχη, τί ἀληθές, τί ψεῦδος;
      οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τρίτος τόπος ἀναγκαῖος διὰ τὸν δεύτερον, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος διὰ τὸν πρῶτον· ὁ δὲ ἀναγκαιότατος καὶ ὅπου ἀναπαύεσθαι δεῖ, ὁ πρῶτος. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔμπαλιν ποιοῦμεν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ τρίτῳ τόπῳ διατρίβομεν καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνόν ἐστιν ἡμῖνἡ πᾶσα σπουδή· τοῦ δὲ πρώτου παντελῶς ἀμελοῦμεν. τοιγαροῦν ψευδόμεθα μέν, πῶς δὲ ἀποδείκνυται ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ψεύδεσθαι, πρόχειρον ἔχομεν. (Ench. 52.1‑2)
[i] The first and most necessary division in philosophy is that which has to do with the application of the principles, as, for example, Do not lie. [ii] The second deals with the proofs, as, for example, How comes it that we ought not to lie? [iii] The third confirms and discriminates between these, as, for example. How does it come that this is a proof? For what is a proof, what is logical consequence, what contradiction, what truth, what falsehood?
      Therefore, the third division is necessary because of the second, and the second because of the first; while the most necessary of all, and the one in which we ought to rest, is the first. But we do the opposite; for we spend our time in the third division, and all our zeal is devoted to it, while we utterly neglect the first. Wherefore, we lie, indeed, but are ready with the arguments which prove that one ought not to lie. (trans. Oldfather, modified)

26Epictetus also stresses an ordered connection between these three topoi: the third is necessary because of the second, and the second is necessary because of the first, but the first is most necessary of all. Echoing what we have seen in Dissertationes 3.2, he insists that it would be a mistake to jump directly to the third—concerned with the validity of proofs—if one has not already mastered the first, concerned with how to act.

27Whether this list of three topoi in the Enchiridion is the same as the list in Dissertationes 3.2 will inevitably have some bearing on the question of the relationship with the three parts of Stoic philosophy. There seems to be some structural similarity between the two accounts. In both passages the first topos is concerned with ethical self-transformation and is said to be the most important task; the second topos is perhaps concerned with ethics in some way; while the third is concerned with the analysis of logical arguments, and should be entered into only last.

Topos	Dissertationes 3.2	Enchiridion 52
First topos	desires and aversions (orexeis kai ekkliseis)	application of principles (chrêseôs tôn theôrêmatôn)
Second topos	choices and refusals (hormas kai aphormas)	proofs (apodeixeis)
Third topos	assents (sunkatatheseis)	confirms and discriminates between these

30In one sense, this third topos is clearly concerned with logic, but this isn’t simply paying attention to what one assents to, as we find in the third topos in the Dissertationes. This is a much higher order, meta-level reflection on the very nature of logical concepts: “what is a proof?” Indeed, it is perhaps the last thing one might expect Epictetus to insist is necessary (anankê) in his supposedly practical ethical handbook. It is not practical advice, or even the arguments underpinning such advice, but instead the assessment of whether those arguments are worthy of being accepted. As Epictetus presents it, it is not just assessing the validity of a particular argument but reflecting on what it means for any argument to be valid. Epictetus’s point, of course, is that his beginning students ought to prioritize mastering good ethical conduct over this sort of higher-order reflection, while at the same time insisting that this kind of reflection is ultimately required if one is to complete one’s education.

31As before, we might ask the question whether this set of three topoi in the Enchiridion correspond in some way to the three parts of philosophy. If they did in a manner analogous to the claims made for the three topoi in the Dissertationes, that would require the first topos in Enchiridion 52 corresponds in some way with physics. Yet as we can see, the first topos is concerned with the application of principles (chrêseôs tôn theôrêmatôn) and the example that Epictetus gives us is “don’t lie.” It is not immediately clear how that could be made to correspond exclusively to doctrines in Stoic physics. One might try to do so by saying that physics is concerned with understanding the world correctly, so not lying will be an important part of giving an accurate account of the way things are, but that seems weak at best. It might just as easily be connected to ethics or logic in so far as it presupposes that lying is something one ought not to do or that it involves assenting to an untruth. But those are perhaps equally weak. Lying is merely an example that Epictetus (or perhaps Arrian) happened to choose, and the real distinction at work here is between training oneself not to lie in the first topos and giving proofs for why not to lie in the second topos. Epictetus could have made the point using a variety of other examples of ethical behaviour. There’s no obvious topos in Enchiridion 52 that could correspond with physics.

Conclusions