Bibliographie
Brainard, M. (2007). “For a New World”: On the practical impulse of Husserlian theory, “Husserl Studies”, 1, pp. 17-31.
Clarke, S. [1706] (1964). A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, Frommann: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.
Cudworth, R. [1731] (1976). A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, Garland: New York.
Drummond, J. (2005). Moral Objectivity. Husserl’s Sentiments of the Understanding, in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. Zavota (Eds.), Routledge: London & New York, pp. 80-98.
Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926, Hua XI, Hrsg. von M. Fleischer, M. Nijhoff: The Hague.
Id. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. II Band. Erster Teil, Hua XIX/1, Hrsg. von U. Panzer, M. Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague.
Id. (1988). Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre (1908-1914), Hua XXVII, Hrsg. von U. Melle, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht.
Id. (1989). Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), Hua XXVII, Hrsg. von T. Nenon und H.-R. Sepp, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht.
Id. (2004). Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924, Hua XXXVII, Hrsg. von H. Peucker, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht.
Id. (2006). Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934). Die C-Manuskripte, Hrsg. von D. Lohmar, «Husserliana Materialen VIII», Springer: Dordrecht.
Melle, U. (2005). Husserl’s Phenomenology of Willing, in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. Zavota (Eds.), Routledge: London & New York, pp. 61-79.
Id. (2007). Husserl’s personalist ethics, “Husserl Studies”, 1, pp. 1-15.
Nenon, T. (2005). Freedom, Responsibility, and Self-Awareness in Husserl, in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. Zavota (Eds.), Routledge: London & New York, pp. 140-162.
Peucker, H. (2004). Einleitung des Herausgebers, in Husserl, E., Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924, Hua XXXVII, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, pp. XII-XLV.
Rinofner-Kreidl, S. (2010). Husserl’s Categorical Imnperative and His Related Critique of Kant, in Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics. Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus, Vandevelde, P., Luft, S. (Eds.), Continuum: London & New York, pp. 188-210.
Shaftesbury, Anthony A. Cooper, Third Earl of [1711] (1999). Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Steele, M. (2010). Husserl and Rawls: Two Attempts to Free Moral Imperatives from Their Empirical Origin, in Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics. Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus, Vandevelde, P., Luft, S. (Eds.), Continuum: London & New York, pp. 211-223.
Steinbock, A. (2001). Translator’s Introduction, in Husserl, E. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, pp. XV-LXVII.
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Notes
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924, Hua XXXVII, Hrsg. von H. Peucker, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 104.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 104.
See Ullrich Melle, « Husserl’s personalist ethics», in Husserl Studies, no 1, 2007, pp. 1-15.
Cf. Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 107.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 107.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 109, emphasis mine.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 110.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 111.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 112.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 116.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 116.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 116.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 116.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 121.
The social dimension of Husserlian ethics has been recently put in evidence through a comparison of Husserl’s thought with Rawls’ political philosophy. See Margaret Steele, « Husserl and Rawls : Two Attempts to Free Moral Imperatives from Their Empirical Origin», in Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics. Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus, Vandevelde, P., Luft, S. (Eds.), London & New York, Continuum, p. 222.
Cf. Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, pp. 121-122.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 30.
See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. II Band. Erster Teil, Hua XIX/1, Hrsg. von U. Panzer, The Hague, M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, § 36. Work that he plainly reminds in the § 3 of the Introduction to the Ethics.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 130. In his previous lectures on ethics in Gottingen, Husserl elaborated in depth such correlation with the logic. See Edmund Husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre (1908-1914), Hua XXVII, Hrsg. von U. Melle, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Henning Peucker observes that this reference to the logical dimension also in the reflections from 1920s testifies the persistence of a formal basis of phenomenological ethics. See Henning Peucker, « Einleitung des Herausgebers», in Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. XXIV. With regard to this parallelism logic/ethics as forms of reason see also Ullrich Melle, « Husserl’s personalist ethics», p. 8.
Ralph Cudworth [1731], A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, New York, Garland, 1976.
Clarke [1706], A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann, 1964.
In the first “Kaizo” article, Husserl talks about a centering Ego-pole, in which the consciousness’ acts stand in a connection of motivation. See Edmund Husserl Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), Hua XXVII, Hrsg. von T. Nenon und H.-R. Sepp, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, p. 8.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 146.
See Marcus Brainard, « “For a New World” : On the practical impulse of Husserlian theory», in Husserl Studies, no 1, 2007, pp. 17-31.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 124.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 123.
Shaftesbury, Anthony A. Cooper, Third Earl of [1711], Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 162.
As regards the topic of renewal, see Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge, p. 20 sqq.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 163. Tom Nenon plainly gets to the point of the connection between responsibility and evaluation in Husserlian ethics : “What makes us ethically responsible is not that we normally do subject all of our actions to explicit or even implicit scrutiny through second-order mental acts but rather that we see ourselves as always in principle capable of doing so if we choose to reflect on them as our own and capable of evaluating them in terms of the general norms for practical rationality”, Tom Nenon, « Freedom, Responsibility, and Self-Awareness in Husserl», in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. Zavota (Eds.), London & New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 155.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 164. As John Drummond clearly explains : “Both the material and contextual dimensions of our evaluative judgements indicate that the absolute and universal character which belongs to the laws of formal axiology might not belong to the concrete moral judgments we make. Those judgments have not only a formal dimension but a material one (both a priori and empirical), and the material dimension is relative to the context in which the concrete judgment is made”, Drummond « Moral Objectivity. Husserl’s Sentiments of the Understanding», in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. Zavota (Eds.), London & New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 84.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 165.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 111.
In the same years of the Ethic’s Lectures, Husserl develops the centrality of motivation with regard to the inner life of subject and her relationship with the surrounding world. See Husserl 1966. See also the following proper remarks by Anthony Steinbock : “Relations of motivation permeate all dimensions of intentional life : broadly speaking, with the active sphere in terms of egoic motivations of interest ; within the passive sphere, e.g. in terms of fusion or connection of matters within a sense-field, or again, in terms of kinaesthetic motivations ; and in the transition from the passive to the active sphere […].”, Anthony Steinbock « Translator’s Introduction», in Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, XLVII.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 9.
In the Appendix VI of his Ethics, Husserl talks again of the relationship between rational, active motivation and irrational, passive motivation, and defines the latter as the humus (Mutterboden) of reason, which as such has the predisposition (Empfänglichkeit) to the authentically rational life of subject. What is produced in the active, aware reason it is already outlined (schon angelegt) on the field of passive motivation as “potential reason”. See Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 332.
In the third “Kaizo” article, Husserl affirms that the “personal self-consideration (inspectio sui)” belongs to the essential skills of man. See Husserl 1989, 23. It is about what Drummond properly calls “the moral urgency at the heart of Husserl’s philosophy : to decide for oneself”, Drummond, 2005, 96.
Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, p. 235.
Critical remarks about Husserl’s statements regarding Kant’s imperative have been recently expressed by Rinofner-Kreidl. See Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, « Husserl’s Categorical Imnperative and His Related Critique of Kant», in Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics. Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus, Vandevelde, P., Luft, S. (Eds.), London & New York, Continuum, 2010, pp. 188-210.
In his latest reflections on time-consciousness, Husserl distinguishes between an inauthentic intentionality belonging to the egoless sphere of passivity, and the authentic intentionality of Ego’s active, aware performances. See Edmund Husserl, Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934). Die C-Manuskripte, Hrsg. von D. Lohmar, « Husserliana Materialen VIII», Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, Ms. C 6, pp. 112-113. Within the ambit of the inquiry on ethics, such distinctions can be expressed by the following terminology : “There is intentionality in the sense onf consciousness-of and there is intentionality in the sense of striving, tendency”, Ullrich Melle, « Husserl’s Phenomenology of Willing», in Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, R. Bernet, D. Welton, G. Zavota (Eds.), London & New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 75.
Husserl was well aware of the difficult to clearly define the autonomous realm of will, as one can infer from this passage contained in a manuscript quoted by Melle : “the general investigation of the possible structures of willing is in need of the difficult investigations of the general structures of consciousness, since the correct demarcation of the shapes of consciousness that the word ‘will’ is supposed to characterize is hardly an obvious matter”, Ullrich Melle, « Husserl’s Phenomenology of Willing», p. 76.
Unfortunately, Husserl seems to not follow such direction of inquiry in his famous “Kaizo” articles either, where he talks about a struggle of the ethics life with the “tendencies dragging down (herabziehenden Neigungen)” (see Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge, p. 43), according to a picture reminding the Plato’s myth of winged team of horses and their charioteer (Phaedrus, 246a-247c), that doesn’t help to overcome the dualistic structuring of the motivation’s issue we criticize.
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