1The Iranian population is morphologically homogeneous (Caucasian, as physical anthropologists of the past would have said), with the exception of a few communities whose members are distinguished by specific bodily traits. These include the African isolates established along the Persian Gulf (before Mohammad Shah banned their trade by a firman issued in 1848), the Arab minority in the southwest, and the Turkmen in the northeast. The notion of race (nežād) is rarely used, except to contrast the “Aryan race” (nežād-e āryāʾī) with the “Arab race” (nežād-e ʿarabī). This racial ascription reflects Persian hostility toward the Arabs, who imposed their writing on the Persians but not their language, and their religion (Islam) but not Sunni Islam. Since the 16th century, most Iranians have been Shia Muslims, and they are allied with other populations sharing this religious allegiance (in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, etc.), as recent events have shown.
2Iran’s population reflects a considerable linguistic diversity: just under 50% use Persian as their mother tongue. Turkic speakers account for about 20% of the population. In the north, along the shores of the Caspian Sea, live the Gilaks and the Mazandaranis (approximately 12%); the Lors (6%); and the Kurds (5%). Despite a marked fragmentation into ethnic groups (qawm), national unity and patriotism prevail over identity claims, except in two regions: Kurdistan in the northwest and Balochistan in the southeast. Xavier de Planhol (1993: 496) rightly describes Iran as a “plurinational empire.” This historical tendency was reinforced under the last dynasty, the Pahlavis (1925-1979), who sought to reassert the territorial and imperial continuity of Iran (literally “the land of the Aryans”).
- 1 Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations are original.
3“One nation, one language” was the motto of the imperial regime, which imposed Persian, a language of Indo-European origin, in order to facilitate communication throughout the Empire. An article published in the newspaper Āyandeh (“The Future”) in 1925 illustrates this objective. The columnist wrote: “Achieving national identity means that the Persian language must be established throughout the whole country, that regional differences in clothing, customs and such like must disappear” (quoted in Atabaki, 2005: 31). In the past, Persian was the language used by the Turkic dynasties that ruled the country over an extended period, with the exception of the Zand interlude in the 18th century and the Pahlavi interlude in the 20th century. With respect to the cultural expression of regional and ethnic diversity, the latter dynasty tolerated only a few folkloric events, which were not permitted to threaten the unity of the nation in any way. The unifying, imperial tradition also led to the dispersion of ethnic groups, since in Iran it was customary to displace populations that threatened the order imposed by the rulers. Such was the case for the Kurds, who were deported in the 16th and 18th century to the Khorasan in the east of the country. The same occurred with the Afshars, “a large Turkic tribe that probably settled in the region (south of Kerman) in Safavid times”1 (de Planhol 1993: 539).
4The Islamic Republic has maintained this tradition of centralism.
Persian (fârsi) and the Persian script are the official language and script common to all Iranian people. Documents, correspondence, and official texts, as well as school textbooks, must be written in this language and with this script.
5The same Article 15 of the Constitution stipulates that “the use of local or tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as in teaching the literature of these languages in schools, is authorized alongside Persian,” but this provision is rarely applied.
6The current regime’s main concern is the country’s religious situation. Its aim is no longer to defend national identity but to promote the Shiite identity of Iran. Political nationalism has been transformed into religious nationalism. For the New Year 1386 (2007-2008, since the Iranian year begins at the vernal equinox), Ayatollah Khamenei introduced the following slogan: “Etteḥād-e mellī, ensijām-e eslāmī” (“national unity, Islamic cohesion”).
7Whether nationalism is political or religious, it is reflected in territorial divisions that never fully correspond to the settlement of ethnic groups. The area inhabited by the Kurds, for example, extends well beyond the province of Kurdistan. Sistan and Balochistan form a single province (see Hourcade, 2004: 518). The territory of the Bakhtiari tribe is divided between Khuzestan and Chaharmahal, etc. It should also be noted that, during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the Arabs of Khuzestan (in the southwest of the country) did not side with the Iraqis, even though they share the same culture. This supports the theory of minority loyalty to the government. The war, in fact, strengthened national unity.
8However, a number of features could have encouraged the irredentism of these groups: all of them (Azeris in the northwest, Gilaks and Mazandaranis in the north, Turkmen in the northeast, Arabs in the southwest, etc.) are located in border areas close to sister nations that have recently –or less recently– gained independence or autonomy. While living in a poor region neighboring a more developed, recently independent state, the Azeris could have sought to join it, but they did not, even when the neighboring state was under Soviet control. Their language, Turkic, and their imperfect pronunciation of Persian, which makes them the brunt of jokes among Persian speakers, could have driven them to reject the Iranian State, but their loyalty was maintained by a shared religious culture and by the deep roots of Turkic dynasties in the country. The attitude of the Turkmen and Arabs is equally surprising: they did not express any desire to claim independence or attachment to another State. These “minorities” occupy a marginal position in the Persian-speaking world in relation to the population of the Iranian plateau. The situation is different in Kurdistan and Balochistan, home to two Sunni minorities with violent demands for autonomy. The Iranian Kurds have been demanding for their people the same autonomy granted to their Iraqi neighbors, and even aspire to a Kurdish state uniting all the Kurdish populations spread across Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Azerbaijan. These demands, and their opposition to the Iranian government, have become even more radical since Mahsa Amini was killed in 2022 for allegedly wearing her headscarf improperly. The Balochi case is different. While they share Sunni Islam with the Kurds, which distances them from the Persian norm, their territory in the southeast lies far from the central plateau and its capital, placing them in a marginal position in all respects. They have an exceedingly poor reputation; their knowledge of Persian is limited, and their social organization is different from that of Iran. Since 2005, a local political and religious movement, Jundallāh (“Soldiers of Allah”), probably affiliated with al-Qaida and linked to neighboring Pakistan, has gained notoriety for its attacks on the Islamic government.
- 2 Most examples are taken from Gilan, the province I have been investigating (see Bromberger 2013).
9This brief outline sketches the inter-ethnic situation in Iran, where the Persian-speaking Shiites of the central plateau play a predominant role. The following section examines how each group expresses its sense of ethnic belonging2 or qawmiyyat (“ethnicity”).
- 3 Hiacynthe-Louis Rabino di Borgomale and D. F. Lafont. di Borgomale was British vice-consul in Rasht (...)
- 4 On this ancient aversion to bread, see also Fraser 1826, p. 88; Chodzko 1850, pp. 203-204; Guilliny (...)
10The sense of belonging is expressed at the highest level by reference to the food of others, which is often considered repulsive. Aversion (“gastrophobia”) to the cuisine of others (“exo-cuisine”) is a constant manifestation of national or ethnic preeminence (see Fischler 1979). The issue of food is generally used to mark the superiority of one group over another. Thus, in Iran, the Baloch are described as “malakh mī-khorand” (“insect eaters”) (Spooner 1964: 54), the Arabs as “sūsmarkhor” (“lizard eaters”) and the population of Gilan as “kalle-māhī-khor” (“fish-head eaters”). Most Tehranis find the latter’s taste for fish repugnant, sometimes in addition to their consumption of olives and beef. The people of Gilan, however, reverse these food stigmatizations by criticizing the plateau dwellers’ fondness for bread, which they view sometimes with amusement, sometimes with compassion, and sometimes with revulsion. They call Tehranis “dahān-gošād” (“wide mouths”) because, they say, Tehranis spend their time chewing bread and, as a result, show off their large teeth. Until a few decades ago, bread was virtually unknown in the Caspian region, and the inhabitants of the plateau who considered rice, Gilan’s main product, an enviable luxury, were called “poor barley-bread eaters.” At the beginning of the 20th century, two authors (Rabino and Lafont 1910)3 report that the consumption of bread was considered by peasants on the Caspian plain a punishment for women and children who had failed. “The Gilaks,” write these authors, “do not eat bread, and consider it unsuitable for their constitution, so much so that an angry husband will say to his wife: ‘Go eat bread and die’” (Rabino and Lafont 1910: 140). Around 1839, Captain Conolly noted that Gilani parents who scolded their children would threaten to send them over the mountains where –as the ultimate punishment– they would have to eat bread (quoted in Rabino and Lafont 1910, ibid.).4 This type of food stigmatization finds an echo, in the opposite direction, in jokes made by the Tehranis about the people of Gilan being poorly cultured Iranians. This moral stigmatization is tied to their disregard for the northerner’s food. In terms of Iranian food classifications, the people of Gilan are considered “cold” eaters by the plateau dwellers. They eat large quantities of rice, eggs, fish, vegetables and fresh fruit, and enjoy sour foods, tastes that the Tehranis classify as “cold.”
11Many jokes (jok-e raštī, Rashti jokes, similar to “Polish jokes” in the U.S., “Irish jokes” in the U.K., or “Belgian jokes” for the French) make fun of the naivety and stupidity of provincial men. The jokes describe people who ask the driver of a shared taxi how far it is from Rasht to Tehran and then how far from Tehran to Rasht, or people who, after stepping onto a double-decker bus, wonder whether the bottom and top floors are going in the same direction, and so forth. The simple-minded and naive Rashtis (the generic term used for the population of Gilan) are mostly stigmatized for their sexual impotence in the humorous stories told about them. Many of these jokes describe complacent, cheated husbands, delighted, for example, that their son resembles the local butcher rather than the one in a neighboring town. The Rashtis owe their second nickname: kamar-sost (“powerless”) to this reputation. A whole series of expressions that emphasize their lack of virility are used to define their character: they are said to be “bī-rag” (“without veins,” i.e., phlegmatic), “bī-bokhār” (“without steam,” i.e., without warmth), and “bī-ḡeyrat,” (“without honor”). While husbands are famous for their impotence, wives are known for their frivolity. Through these jokes, the people of Tehran, and probably also those of the entire Iranian plateau, seek to demonstrate their superiority over this marginal population: they are the real men, sheep-meat eaters, hyper-powerful, with a sense of honor that tolerates no offense. Such is the purpose of ethnic stereotypes: to elevate one’s own people at the expense of others.
12These stereotypes can have social repercussions. In the 19th and early 20th century, for example, the army recruited few soldiers from among the peasants of the Gilan plain, preferring instead to enlist mountain-dwellers from the highlands, known for being more robust (Rabino 1915–1916: 29). To this day, the regional officials and high-ranking personnel all come from Tehran, and Iran lacks regional institutions. Stereotypes undoubtedly play a part in these privileges, but perceived and actual inequalities between the Persian plateau and the rest of the country are significant and far-reaching.
13Centralism does not prevent some peoples, even those well integrated into the Iranian system, such as the Azeris, from maintaining a strong and proud sense of identity. This partial identity is visible in soccer clubs such as Trāktorsāzī (literally “Tractor Factory,” named after a large factory in Tabriz). It is the most popular emblem of the Azeri population, which is demanding greater cultural recognition.
Azərbaycan diyarımız, Azerbaijan is our homeland,
Tirəxtur iftixarımız. Tractor is our pride,
sing the club’s supporters.
14Today, a sense of ethnic identity persists but is in sharp decline. Factors such as the regression of pastoral nomadism, a standardized way of life, an international urban culture, and political ideology, have caused Azeris to withdraw within their circle of family and friends, especially in the country’s current troubled circumstances, and have led to a decline in collective belonging among the different groups. The Gilaks now eat bread, and national and even international cuisines are spreading to new areas each year. Remaining ethnic feelings, however, reappear when violence erupts (as in Kurdistan and Balochistan) or, to a lesser extent, when an individual’s practices, inherited from the past, are questioned.
15Ethnicity thus appears as a concept in the Iranian context by which individuals define themselves and others. It surfaces notably in the often-derogatory ascriptions imposed by each group on others and is characterized above all by the sense of superiority of the people of the plateau over those of the periphery.