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Not ‘stuck in the past’: nostalgia, future orientations, and temporality of the Dutch nativist radical right

Isabel Speelman et Sammy C. Frenkel

Résumés

Les Pays-Bas n’échappent pas à la montée des partis politiques de la droite radicale ayant pour noyau une idéologie nativiste : le PVV et le FVD en sont deux exemples probants. Dans cet article, nous montrons que la littérature sur le nativisme et sa dimension temporelle se concentre de manière unilatérale sur la nostalgie et le passé. Or, cela conduit à une méconnaissance du rôle que joue le futur dans les récits nativistes. Cette analyse des discours nativistes de ces deux partis de la droite radicale aux Pays-Bas montre que leur nativisme contient en fait une orientation vers l'avenir. Passé, présent et avenir sont ainsi entremêlés dans une « temporalité ». Ce qui relie le passé et l'avenir, selon nous, c'est une allusion discursive à un « esprit néerlandais », tissé au travers de conceptions temporelles qui fonctionnent comme un fil conducteur. Les références au passé sont le plus souvent ambiguës car la période ou la caractéristique supposée du passé reste peu ou pas élaborée. Néanmoins, cela fait exister une « essence » perçue d’une identité néerlandaise qui aurait persisté et se serait maintenue à travers le temps. La manière dont ce prétendu « esprit néerlandais » se concrétise dans ces récits dépend du contexte temporel. Il semble donc que l'objectif des partis de la droite radicale néerlandaise soit de réveiller un « esprit néerlandais », dont les manifestations sont temporellement spécifiques.

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Notes de l’auteur

Acknowledgment: This research was funded by the H2020 project Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe (DEMOS) under H2020-EU.3.6.1.1. and H2020-EU.3.6.1.2. (Grant agreement ID: 822590).

Texte intégral

Introduction

The year is 2040 (…) Dutch researchers have rightly won several Nobel prizes since the completion of the world’s first commercial thorium power plant. Moreover, the investments we had made in better education and more money for research were recouped within three years. Dutch engineers could work anywhere in the world and the well-developed network of our technical universities surpassed the American MIT, reaching first place in the famous Shanghai Index for top universities. Because we stopped all sustainability plans after the 2021 elections, we saved around a thousand billion. We invested part of it in the development of the world’s first commercial hyperloop. In ten years, we built a network of superfast train connections (…). We moved Schiphol to the North Sea so that aviation could continue to grow without limits. The airport at sea was festively opened in 2036 with the new first Concorde flight to New York, which takes you across the Atlantic Ocean within 3,5 hours. (FVD 2020a)

1In a 5-minute video posted in 2020, which has over 150.000 views, leader of the radical right-wing party Forum voor Democratie (FVD) Thierry Baudet sets the scene of a future that would come to fruition if only FVD had substantial governmental power. “Let me take you to the Netherlands of the future”, he opens the video with. He speaks directly to the viewer as if we are currently in the year 2040, narrating the preceding years as if they actually happened. He paints a picture of a range of Dutch achievements that happened in the years leading up to 2040.

2Do these words uttered by the party leader signify the supposed “backward-looking reactionary” aspect of the radical right party family (Betz and Johnson 2004, p. 324)? Does this fit with the idea that these parties lack a future orientation? (Golder 2016, Rydgren 2007)? Would the party that created this video simply want a “return to the past” (Traverso 2019, p. 184), and is it in an everlasting “nostalgic mood” (see Betz and Johnson 2004, Duyvendak 2011, Golder 2016, Rydgren 2007)?

3This paper is a product of research into the nativism of the radical right in the Netherlands as represented by two political parties: the PVV and FVD. In this article, we use the terms ‘radical right’ and ‘nativism’ in tandem, since nativism has been conceptualised as one of the central pillars of radical-right ideology (Betz 2016, Mudde 2019, Wodak 2019). Nativism is thus a key aspect in the narratives of the radical-right parties studied here. Nevertheless, radical-right parties’ agendas are not confined to nativism, and nativism is not confined to one side of the political spectrum (Duyvendak and Kesic 2021). We discuss a specific form of nativism, then: that of the Dutch radical right.

4It appears that two of the most nostalgic political parties in the Netherlands are capable of making a solid stride towards an optimistic future. We argue that the importance of nativist radical-right parties’ future orientations should not be overlooked. Indeed, these movements exude a strongly nostalgic tone. The mobilisation of the past is an essential and distinctive element in the nativist logic, but it cannot convincingly be analysed in separation from uses of the present and the future. For this reason, we speak here of ‘temporality’. We argue that the past is best understood as part of a broader temporality spanning from the distant past to the future. Temporality provides a framework for understanding the ways in which the passing of time is experienced and socially produced (May and Thrift 2003). Through temporality, people not only on a micro level but also on a macro level via public and political discourses transmit meanings (Iparraguirre 2016, Zerubavel 1987). Temporal narratives communicate which issues are important and create symbolic meanings to be prioritised.

5The future orientation of the PVV and FVD and the specific conceptions of the future seem to form part of these parties’ appeal. It is the very relevance of researching the temporality of nativism to understand its growing presence and success in political and public life as exemplified by the growing popularity of such radical right-wing nativist parties like the PVV and the FVD. The empirical allegiance of (nostalgia for) the past with (disdain or hope for) other segments of the nativist timeline in combination with the academic relevance described above demands, we argue, a view of nativist temporality that is broader than its nostalgic component. All in all, radical right-wing nativist parties are not one-sidedly conservative in their political vision. As we will show, their utopian projects indicate a much more complex entanglement between past, present, and future.

6This research is based on a discourse analysis of textual data and interviews. The textual data consist of speeches, party manifestos, a parliamentary debate, website publications, and YouTube videos that were published between 2004 and 2021. The interviews were conducted throughout 2020 with 25 supporters of the FVD. Data collection and analysis took place between the summer of 2020 and the summer of 2021.

7After providing a brief overview of the two selected parties and the Dutch context, we discuss how the past features in the discourses of PVV and FVD mostly as a vague and generalised realm. We then outline the mobilisations of the future including the particular conceptions of the future that the PVV and FVD adhere to. This leads to a discussion of the theoretical implications and a conclusion of our findings.

The Dutch context

8The two parties that inform our analysis are the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, hereafter: PVV) and Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie, hereafter: FVD). The two parties have been elected to parliament within the last twenty years and have grown considerably since their first election.

9The PVV was founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders who joined parliament in 1998. The party currently occupies 17 (out of 150) seats in parliament. The FVD was founded in 2017 and is led by Thierry Baudet. FVD is currently the biggest party in terms of members and with 8 seats in parliament, the party has quadrupled in size since 2017. In short, the Dutch radical right’s presence in parliament has significantly been normalised, with the three parties PVV, FVD, and JA21 winning more seats in the most recent national elections than the left-wing combined.

10The specific historical process of the Netherlands, in which the 1960s are typically known as a decade of secularisation and de-hierarchisation, render the manifestations of nativism unique. The Netherlands is commonly known for its liberal values on gender, sexuality, abortion, euthanasia, and the legalisation of soft drugs. As these have become emblematic for the Netherlands as a country, any radical right nativist party has to relate to them to some extent. If not, how could they be seen as representing ‘the nation’? Multiple authors have pointed to the ways in which liberal values are used as grounds for exclusion from the nation or the national culture (Thijssen 2012, Kešić and Duyvendak 2019, pp. 442-443, Farris 2017, Puar 2007).

In the Netherlands, liberal values are more than elsewhere at the heart of what is considered to be native, resulting in the paradoxical situation that liberal values are not only embraced by the progressive left but also by nativists in their conservative, exclusionary discourses. (Kešić and Duyvendak 2019, p. 462)

11The image of the Netherlands as a typically liberal country does not mean the Dutch are not familiar with the success of radical right-leaning parties. The early 2000s are known as the era in which Islamophobia, criticism of multiculturalism, and more explicit nationalism were normalised as part of public discourse (Essed and Hoving 2014, Kešić and Duyvendak 2016, Van Reekum 2012). Considering this context, the Dutch case can be seen as a local manifestation of the European trend of successful radical right politics. These ‘country-specific idiosyncrasies’ (Kešić and Duyvendak 2019, p. 26) should be kept in mind while reading the remainder of this article. Still, the upsurging radical right parties have transnational linkages among each other (for example in parliamentary groups of the EU such as the ID and ECR) and increasingly operate in online spaces (Pasieka 2017). Therefore, this analysis of the Dutch case can at least aid in furthering our understanding of this heterogeneous party family.

Findings

(Generalised) nostalgia for a general past

12Our analysis reveals that the past features in the discourses of PVV and FVD mostly as a vague and generalised realm rather than constituting a specific time, period, era, or event. This becomes clear, firstly, from the fact that references to specific periods are limited in scope and frequency.

13There is one specific period that is most dominant in PVV’s and FVD’s discourses: the ‘Golden Age’. This refers to the era usually assigned to the 17th century in which the Dutch were viewed as a world power because of their role in global colonialism and trade. One interviewee puts forward that

… it has become taboo, you can’t say it anymore. You can no longer say that you’re proud of the Dutch West India Company or East India Company. At the time, the East India Company was bigger on a global scale than what Apple is now (…). The influence we had in the world back then is incomparable with Apple. Apple is a little boy compared to that. (#9)

14In a 2019 campaign speech, Thierry Baudet claims:

[We stand] amidst the debris of what was once the greatest and most beautiful civilisation the world has ever known. A civilisation that covered every corner of the world, that was full of self-confidence. (Baudet 2019)

15In a 2017 parliamentary debate, he more vaguely alludes to the Golden Age:

In Europe, we have never shied away from ideals beyond our horizon. On the contrary: we chose them as a guideline: the vast seas and undiscovered countries yonder, where we sailed and from which we returned with new spices, new inventions, new techniques. (Baudet 2017)

16Another specific period that is highlighted, though less often, is the 80-year war between the Netherlands and Spain in which the Dutch declared themselves independent from Spanish rule –a declaration captured in the ‘Act of Independence’ (Akte van Verlatinghe). In PVV’s 2010 election programme, it is suggested that the Dutch people arose from a collective revolt against a tyrannic Spanish king: “We were born from a revolt, a freedom strife … [where] our people declared themselves independent from the king of Spain” (PVV 2010, p. 1). They continue to write that the Dutch need a similar act of resistance against the current political elite.

17Aside from references to the ‘Golden Age’, references to the past are occasionally sprinkled throughout the discourse. However, references to specific pasts remain limited. The past is more often discursively manifested as a vague and general domain.

18Such a general domain can be constructed, firstly, by attributing a general characteristic to the whole of Dutch, European, or Western history. Examples come from the quotes above by Thierry Baudet in which he uses the Dutch colonial past to exemplify that Dutch history was ‘full of confidence’ and that European history is one of ‘courage’. This also explains the appeal of the various symbols of Dutch or Western history which the FVD employs. These include Dutch or Western history. For instance, their logo is a classic temple, their research institute is called ‘the Renaissance Institute’, and their 2020 election video has classical, orchestral music playing in the background.

19A vague and general past is also mobilised as a side effect of discussing another period. Most notably, the recurrent ‘crisisification’ of the present and recent past seem to raise the question: what about before then? In these cases, a development starting in the specific recent past is identified, and simultaneously the general period before this development is mobilised. Consider the example a young man (FVD supporter) whose view is that a binary way of thinking about oppressor and oppressed was imposed in the sixties:

I think that it was the sixties where the idea had its origin that power… that idea of the oppressor and oppressed. I think that idea got a modern manifestation then. That all of society consists of those who are oppressed and those who oppress. … And that was in May of 1968, that is where that idea came about that society is divided into two things. (#21)

20Another example is the following FVD supporter, who is dismayed about the prevalence of a globalist mindset, allegedly accompanied by the desire for equality, the depreciation of culture, and the influence of the European Union:

People don’t appreciate culture anymore. People are thinking in a globalist way… have to all be the same, man-woman has to be the same, you can’t be white anymore, you can’t be black anymore, it all has to be the same. […] And, well, that unity-talk which is also stimulated by international organisations and the European Union… yeah we all have to behave the same; be the same. (#17)

21Besides suggesting that a particular development is a thing of the recent past and present, the participants in the examples above also imply that it is not a thing of the time before then. In this way, criticism of the recent past and present brings to one’s awareness and opens up the space for nostalgia for a general distant past.

22Having discussed which particular or rather general times are referred to, we highlight below two dynamics indicative of how the past is discursively mobilised. In both cases, the past is mobilised in a subtle and partly implicit way.

Weer

23One particular word stands out in the data because of its frequency and the conciseness with which it refers to the past. This Dutch word is weer, which means ‘again’. When used nostalgically, it refers to a desired situation, thing, state of society, state of identity, or state of mind that existed in the past and is threatened or non-existent in the present, but should exist now too or again. Accordingly, it is used to communicate the wish to reinstate or restore something.

24Weer is often used by PVV and FVD in relation to one of the following themes: sovereignty (e.g., “bosses of our own country again” (PVV 2012, p. 14)), pride (e.g., “A Netherlands to be proud of again!” (PVV 2006, p. 1)), democracy (“our democracy has to be restored again” (FVD 2021, p. 3)), education (“all those beautiful things the West brought about should be taught again [in schools]” (FVD 2017, p. 98)), and economic vitality (e.g., “we need to do everything within our power to activate our economy again” (PVV 2012, p. 18); “the [entrepreneurial] dynamic needs to come back again to the Netherlands” (FVD 2017, p. 12).

25When saying weer, the PVV and FVD are making suggestions or expressing wishes for the present or future, but are simultaneously implying the past. The use of weer is rarely accompanied by an elaboration of the particular time periods when the desired thing is supposed to have existed. For this reason, the repetitive use of weer suggests that a general sense of a good past that is being destroyed is a convincing and emotive image in its own right. This, in turn, suggests that nostalgia does not necessarily rely on an articulated past. Neither does there need to be proof of this past containing the desired thing.

Verworvenheden

26Another mechanism by which a national past is mobilised is the common employment of the idea that certain good features or even all good features of Dutch, European, or Western society today came about throughout history. This is grasped concisely in the (recurrent) Dutch word verworvenheden, meaning ‘things that were acquired/achieved’. The appeal of verworvenheden relates not necessarily to the time in which they came about, but about the fact that they took time to come about. This renders the good things ‘the Dutch’ have or had until recently, ‘achievements’. Much like with weer, the time alluded to with regards to the development of verworvenheden remains vague and general.

The core of our programme is our love for the Netherlands. For our civilisation, our history and our city-building. […] everything we inherited from centuries-long building and brooding. (FVD 2021)

27Examples of verworvenheden include democracy, sovereignty, prosperity, public healthcare, freedom of speech, and women’s and gay rights. A relevant side note here is that a contradiction seems to exist where rather recent developments, for example gay rights in the Netherlands, are considered verworvenheden. It begs the question how this concurs with the longing for more distant pasts. This contradiction adds strength to the finding that the past is a vague and abstract realm.

28Importantly, verworvenheden are almost solely discussed when they are perceived to be under threat or already lost. The past is implied through that which is deemed lost (but used to exist) or under threat (but used to thrive). Accordingly, the nativist radical right and its supporters often mourn a generalised sense of loss of ‘what has been built up’. But a discussion of when that was built up never has to take place. The idea of lost verworvenheden is just one example of a broader, generalised sense of cultural loss that characterises the discourses of these parties.

29Aside from establishing that verworvenheden are an accomplishment of a time-consuming process of creation, the PVV and FVD also convey ideas about what conditions and which people brought them about. It is often explicitly suggested that verworvenheden are the consequence of a particular cultural tradition, through the use of such terms as ‘the classical humanistic’ and ‘the Judeo-Christian tradition’. A distant past enters the awareness through this suggestion because a ‘tradition’ is inherently rooted in –and to some extent maintained throughout– the past.

We are a country with Judeo-Christian and humanistic roots. Everything we have has its source there: our prosperity, separation of church and state, democracy. (PVV 2010, p. 33)

30We argue, however, that the point of linking verworvenheden to cultural traditions is ultimately to attribute to Dutch history an even more comprehensive trait than a supposed Judeo-Christian culture: Dutchness itself. It is a Dutch past with Dutch verworvenheden. The particular Christian character of Dutchness as well as the verworvenheden this culture allegedly brought about should, we argue, be seen as ‘arbitrary’ characterisations of the alleged comprehensive Dutchness that they imply. Dutchness seems to have a very elusive character: it cannot itself be seen (only felt) without being characterised or having particular manifestations linked to it. This ultimate blankness of Dutchness is its strength because it can be characterised differently at different points in time, and can be used to establish a contrast with a variety of people or projects to render them foreign and destructive. But it also brings about a seeming contradiction in PVV and FVD discourses pertaining to verworvenheden: while the Dutchness they are supposed to be the consequence of has an elusive character, right-wing nativists still regularly attempt to define Dutchness by attributing stable characteristics. It can also seem contradictory that Dutchness has a persistent quality on the one hand, but that it takes considerable time and effort for verworvenheden to come about on the other hand.

31The idea of national verworvenheden also creates categorisations between people. Allegedly, it is the Dutch people of the past that achieved and were the initial subjects of the verworvenheden of Dutch society. In other words, a historical ‘we’ is created. In this way, the idea of verworvenheden by Dutch people as the consequence of Dutch culture supports temporal distinctions between people: some can be considered part of some sort of ‘rooted’ Dutchness, and some are considered alien to it. The nostalgic mobilisation of the distant past serves to historically root the identity of the first group in the distant past by suggesting there is a ‘we’ not only among the white native Dutch people who live now but also the many people who lived in the past. As Yuval-Davis asserts, “the national imagination also includes former and future generations” (2006, p. 204). In this view, when it comes to immigrants one is faced not simply by perceived differences between people, but perceived differences between centuries-old cultural traditions (and traditions to come?). And those differences are considered much harder to bridge. As such, the idea of verworvenheden creates particularly fertile ground for nativism towards racialised Others.

32In sum, it seems that the past operates in nativist radical-right discourses along two axes. Firstly, there are different degrees of specificity and generality of the periods referred to and the characteristics attributed to them. Secondly, the past can be referred to with different levels of explicitness and implicitness. Most of the time, conceptions of the past of the PVV and FVD are vague, general, and mobilised by way of implication. The particular things these parties say about specific pasts show only a small and limited part of their temporal awareness. In our data, the parties and their supporters constantly refer to a largely undefined past. The associated nostalgia is a generalised nostalgia, accompanied by a general sense of loss of something essential to Dutch identity and Dutch success.

33To conclude, the past, though strongly present in discourse and often relevant to the nativism of the PVV and FVD, is a vague and often generalised realm. It functions as a source of identity, pride, and inspiration for the future and constitutes an essential but dependent part of a broader temporal awareness. The point is not, then, to do away with nostalgia as an object of study. The past has a fundamental place in the construction of nativism, and discursive nostalgia for that past is evident in many cases. The point is rather to see the nostalgic mobilisation of the past as one of several compatible, even interdependent, parts in a broader temporality spanning from distant past to the future. The aim of this article is to highlight the use and function of the future.

Future

34What is the use, then, of the future? To answer this question, it should first be clarified how Dutch nativist radical-right parties discuss the future. The future generally makes two types of appearances: as a doom scenario or as momentum for rebirth.

35Firstly, the language used to refer to the days to come can be apocalyptic. The idea is that were the Dutch to continue treading the current path, they would arrive at a situation of doom. The FVD posits:

Anyone who really takes a good look at the future of the Netherlands will beget a gnawing feeling of worry. (FVD 2017, p. 30)

36By using the word ‘anyone’, FVD appeals to a general audience and normalises the emotive state of worry. The following interaction we had with a woman in her fifties who is a member of FVD illustrates this sense of worry. She evokes the image of the Titanic, a sinking ship:

I: What do you think the Netherlands would look like in a couple of years when FVD for instance doesn’t win big? What’s the risk?
P: Honey, I don’t know whether you’re religious, but you can really go buy a cross and pray.
I: No I’m not religious.
P: Really! I have shared it on Facebook: Titanic, the sinking ship. For real. We are sinking, seriously. I see it happening. (#16)

37The implication in this narrative is that Dutch society is faced with an existential threat. In the doomed future narrative, FVD leader Thierry Baudet presents current societal transformations as setting off a domino effect:

Really sickly, how that goes [IS&SF: giving more attention to heroes in history that were women ‘at the expense of men’] and this is only getting worse. Because the more we give in to the ‘wokeness’ movement, the hungrier they get. So some people think that now that we have abolished Black Pete, all is well, all is brought to balance. To those people I say: it will only get worse. Now they’ll move on to the next project. They will never stop. Everything will be tackled and everything has to disappear. Our whole identity must disappear. And we revolt against that. (FVD 2020b, 40:56)

38With each domino hitting the ground, the fall of the next is instigated. People who criticise Dutch traditions are depicted as aggressors whose ‘hunger’ will never be satisfied, and FVD as dutiful defenders.

39Certainly, this dreaded scenario only comes true if the Dutch people would not ‘succeed’ in changing the current course of politics. If they would, however, the complete opposite situation would come to fruition according to FVD. Therefore, doom scenarios are not the only guise the future appears in. Future imaginaries in the discourses of PVV and FVD fall into another category: that of a potentially glorious condition.

40For instance, to the doom scenario described earlier the FVD juxtaposes a glorious alternative for the future of the Netherlands in which the best days are still to come. The party declares the Netherlands as the future “Silicon Valley of Europe” (2017, p. 14). The country is imagined to become highly educated, safe, economically dynamic, and to have a smaller government, in which people have more respect for one another and where a new broadly shared optimism prevails (ibid., p. 30). Similarly, the PVV conveys a positive future orientation by naming their 2010 election programme “The agenda of hope and optimism” (PVV 2010), in which they describe the future as prosperous, free, and sovereign.

41These two ways in which the future narratively operates, as a dystopia or a utopia (see also Duyvendak 2020), go hand in hand. Either the Dutch continue to go down this doomed path, resulting in anomie and loss of essence, or they take a different path and turn current developments that are still in transformation around. The chairman of FVD’s youth branch expresses this by arguing that they are the last generation to effectuate a different course, which is a task to take on with an “iron will”. “That is why we only have one choice: to perish or to fight for a Renaissance” (Jansen 2018c). Dystopian narratives hence serve to portray where FVD and PVV do not want to go, thus forming a negative reference frame for their meaning-making. The remainder of this paragraph will zoom in on the optimistic side of these parties’ futural narratives.

Rebirth: reviving the Dutch spirit with temporally specific manifestations

42The conception of the future as having magnificent potential comes particularly to the fore when analysing FVD’s narratives. Illustrative of this phenomenon is Baudet’s speech titled ‘FVD is the flagship of the Renaissance fleet’ at the party congress in 2017 in which he portrays the West as a beacon of cultural resilience. As the title suggests, the speech is aimed to stress the need for a rebirth and the capability of the West to achieve this. Baudet suggests that the current ‘existential crisis’ presented to ‘us’ has never been more grave.

Our free, tolerant, liberal, curious, humorous, cheerful, and democratic society is in mortal danger – even fatally injured. However, we must not leave her behind; we must not think that what has passed is gone forever: we must, in the best tradition of the West, bring her back to life. We must bring about a European Renaissance. (Baudet 2017) [emphasis added]

43Baudet tells his audience that all that is good in the West is not permanently lost, yet it is their task to reawaken this ‘wonderful’ culture. Baudet’s words show that particular elements of the West’s culture from the past are crucial, yet this nostalgia can coexist with futurism. Rebirth is not only essential for the survival but also the thriving of the nation. We are cognisant of the potential argument that rebirth can be interpreted as a neat mirror of the past, based on the prefix ‘re-’ in Renaissance, and that these parties are therefore first and foremost nostalgic. However, we argue that there certainly are new elements in this rebirth as proposed by FVD and that it can therefore be academically dismissive to label rebirth as backward-looking as opposed to future-looking.

44Undoubtedly, FVD and PVV adopt many old-fashioned constructs and cultural symbols. Despite this, they should not be mistaken for a movement that is not ‘modern’ or contemporary, as many radical-right parties are (Osborne 2011). The future is not simply a mirror of the past but also has its own new elements. This is salient in for example a utopian plan that FVD’s leader Baudet has envisaged for the Dutch to go to the moon. He explains that this plan is not only a technological aspiration but also has a spiritual aim: “It is very good for a country, for a nation, for a people, to reach for the stars. To have distant ideals that you strive for together” (Baudet in NPO Radio 1, 2021, 12:40). Perhaps the striving for distant ideals invokes some romantic associations with the sailing of the seas in the centuries of colonialism before. But the form in which this cultural voyage for ‘discovery’ materialises presently is quite new and futuristic. It seems that the goal is to reawaken a ‘Dutch spirit’ but the manifestations of this spirit are temporally specific.

45Another example of nativism’s complex temporality is the YouTube video that FVD posted of what their vision for 2040 is, as mentioned in this article’s introduction. The 2040 video combines nostalgic elements with futuristic elements. The outlined design for Dutch society contains a return to traditional architecture, the preservation of pride, the creation of historical landmarks, and the revival of the ‘Golden Age’ spirit as well as a supersonic train network in the form of a hyperloop, a new natural forest, and an airport at sea. Both the array of cultural achievements listed and in the language and imagery used reveal complex temporal notions. The invocation of the past is signified by the repeated use of the word weer (‘again’) and by the greenscreen that shows a classical painting of a Dutch ship at sea. Yet, the video emanates a very futuristic impression involving special effects and futuristic-looking technology. The following segment reveals the complicated adoption of both backward-looking and forward-looking language:

And as was to be expected, this Nexit opened possibilities for the Netherlands to become a global trading nation once again (…). The Netherlands became a global power again. We regained control of our country (…). And our confidence returned (…). In short, we rewon the spirit of the Golden Age. It might sound like a fantasy, it might sound like a fairytale. But all of this is truly possible. If only we dare to choose for change, this could be our future (FVD 2020a) [emphasis added].

46Aside from the many verbs starting with ‘re-’, Thierry Baudet contrastingly ends this video by referring to the future. And then there is the remarkable fact that the video is predominantly narrated in the past tense; thereby materialising the future as if we are already living in it. The video does not exude gloomy conservatism at all. On the contrary, it reads like a hopeful message. FVD portrays itself as a movement that represents change, not stagnation. They also recognise that it takes boldness to “choose for change”. The futural orientation is thus linked to the emotional positions of courage and bravery. To conclude, the new European radical-right movements should not be mistaken for purely conservative, as if holding on to the past is their most significant characteristic when it comes to the temporal position they take occupy.

Not stuck in the past: subjective conceptions of progress

47As can be seen from the parties’ (partly) utopian narratives, it would not be academically nor societally fruitful to label these parties as backward or stuck in the past. Both parties actively reject this image at times. PVV opens their 2010 election programme as follows:

Go ahead, call us old-fashioned. But we believe that the best days of the Netherlands are ahead of us (…). If we want it, we can do anything. (PVV 2010, pp. 5-6)

48Another example comes to the fore when right-wing author Sid Lukassen made an appearance in FVD’s news outlet on YouTube to discuss what makes FVD different from other parties.

What we see here is that an own creative power [eigen scheppingskracht] is being unlocked. We have the ‘virtue hegemony’ opposing us, which is a bloc of left-liberal thought. You cannot beat that by only remaining in a responsive mode. (…) With this, you will create proactively, so you set out your own frameworks. That is why it is so beautiful that a vision of the future is opened up that appeals to people, to the deepest, inspiring elements in humans: esthetics, aspiration. That can engage people in a positive way. (FVD 2020c, 06:21)

49In the broadcast, Lukassen argues that it is not productive to only be anti-everything. He claims that this leads one to be in a reactive mode of negativity instead of a creative mode. What truly touches people is rather the power to create a positive narrative. This elevates and emancipates people, Lukassen asserts. This branding is arguably one of the most potent positionings by FVD because it directly combats the stereotype that the party and its voters are purely skeptical naysayers. Lukassen here echoes FVD’s wish to prove that they are more than that: they offer an alternative for the future.

50Not only do PVV and FVD reject their backward-looking labels, but they also criticise other parties on the political spectrum for not being authentically progressive or idealistic. This aspect of PVV and FVD’s futurality, their specific conception of progress, is a central element we want to highlight. Voters and members have a subjective experience of progress. The traditional divide between ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’ parties might therefore not be as useful here. It seems that nativist radical-right parties and their supporters believe that their vision for society is ‘truly’ progressive, contrary to the supposedly ‘inauthentic’ or harmful progress other parties represent. Portraying nativist radical-right voters as merely conservative by holding on to the past does not advance our understanding of what gives these parties their appeal. Instead, the priority should lie in making ourselves sensitive to the temporal meaning-making behind nativism. Doing this inductively reveals the great significance of conceptions of ‘the future’.

51A prime example of this phenomenon arrives in the form of Frederik Jansen, leader of the youth branch of FVD and member of parliament. In a speech at a party congress, he argues:

Not only has the past become taboo but the future has as well (…). Because the future of humanity no longer lies beyond this world if you ask Obama and his allies at the VVD, GroenLinks, and D66. ‘Progressive’, they call themselves. But their vision of the future has nothing to do with progress. Progress in their view is ‘freeing’ individuals in every possible way from everything that binds them. (Jansen 2018a, 01:05:04-01:06:03)

52Jansen turns around the label FVD has inherited and places it on his opponents. The idea is: it is not we who are pessimistic; it is they who stand for nihilism and rootlessness. Progressive parties are not the ones who authentically stand for progress, he argues. Paradoxically, FVD condemns others for nihilism while we have earlier seen how doom-like and pessimistic FVD’s language can be. Jansen continues, preaching the following:

History is not over, the future is not over. We are going to embrace the future, we are going to push our boundaries again, and we are going to reach beyond the finite together. This century will be our era. (ibid., 01:11:30-01:11:43)

53Thus, contrary to FVD’s opponents, FVD here is positioned as the one which still dares to dream and carry out the future instead of ‘surrendering’ to current globalising forces. FVD’s view on the future as described by Jansen lies in their assumed grandeur in history. The phrase ‘pushing our boundaries again’ can hardly be understood as anything other than a reference to the Dutch imperialist project during the –by FVD glorified– ‘Golden Age’. That aside, a romanticised boundlessness to the Dutch nation’s power in the past is projected onto the future.

The exceptionalisation of the present

54With a glorious past to one side and a potentially glorious future to the other, where does all this leave the present? The uses of the distant past and the future discussed here render the present exceptional. That is, a few recurring dynamics in the narratives by PVV and FVD make the present state of society and politics seem like it is and should remain an exception when considered on the large timeline of the Dutch people and ‘their’ country. Firstly, the distant past in which the Dutch culture is suggested to have prevailed involves a time period considerably longer than the last few decades. Secondly, the wish for this time to be reinstated makes it an exception not only of history but ideally with regards to the future too. Thirdly, the PVV and FVD present themselves as political movements (PVV 2006, FVD n.d.) more so than parties, and see themselves as changemakers from within. Hence, they do not want to be seen as part of the political sphere they despise and rather ally themselves to the transhistorical Dutch essence. Fourthly, the use of the Dutch word gewoon (‘just’, ‘simply’ or ‘normal’) in relation to traditional phenomena increases the contrast between then and now. These dynamics render the present time to be an exception in the grand scheme of things; much like a bad dream. The normalisation of the distant past consequently legitimises these parties’ programmes and the nativism behind the drastic measures that aim to prevent doom.

55The present according to the PVV and the FVD is a time of existential crisis, a civilisation in ruin. Baudet repeatedly emphasises that the Dutch are “at the eleventh hour”, at “dusk” or “sunset”, or worse, it is “already past twelve”. Metaphors related to natural disasters and illness are used to imply the supposed severity of the current societal condition. It is a very appealing thought that these bad things, much like a bad dream, might be and can be an exception to the state of Dutch society rather than the rule. This becomes apparent in those cases where politicians speak of (features of) the relatively distant past as ‘normal’: e.g., “teachers are to be just addressed by ‘mister’ or ‘madam’” (PVV 2010, p. 29). The ultimate wish, then, would be to suture over the present and forget all about the ‘mess’ that has been made in the last few decades.

56The exceptionalisation of the present can result both in a sense of urgency and a sense of hope: when the PVV and FVD discuss their plans for the future a tie is revealed between the past and the future via the present, whereby the past is bound to the future through the wish for continuation and the suggestion that continuation is desirable. Continuation, that is, between the past and the future whereby the present is a wound to be sutured over. While the distant past of the Netherlands is best characterised as a time of stable Dutchness (a bundle of people, place, flag, culture, history), all these long years of verworvenheden (achievements) are being undone. Interestingly, then, it is assumed that to move forward the Dutch need simply to eradicate the blockages currently obstructing the flourishing of the spirit of the past. In sum, the past is linked to the present through cultural continuity which is assumed to currently be interrupted by cultural diversity and destructive political projects but can ‘be continued’ if the Dutch do away with those things. The present, corrupted by ‘elitist projects’, forms the contrast for FVD’s and PVV’s idealised past and future. Since so much attention is paid to the flaws of the current societal condition, the possibility of perfection is implied, if only these nativist radical-right parties would be in charge.

Assembling the past and future

57We have shown that the discourses of the PVV and FVD contain both a longing for the past and a drive towards a utopian Dutch future. Moreover, these two temporal dynamics seem to be compatible and interdependent. We suggest that this can be best understood by seeing these uses of time as parts of a ‘temporality’. In this view, past, present, and future cannot be taken as isolated temporal blocks. Rather, their meaning is constituted in relation to each other. In other words, meaning-making in the present is not only based on past experiences or imaginaries of the past, but also on the anticipation of the future (Bailey and Madden 2017, Muzzetto 2006).

58The particular ideas about eras can be, as they mostly are in the case of our data, vague and general. The parties discussed here can constantly imply a consistent history without themselves elaborating one. That is to say, references to the past, both explicit and implicit, do not offer a complete or consistent review and evaluation of all times. The PVV and FVD gather their ideas about certain times into a narrative as a sort of craftwork. The concept of temporality allows us to understand such a craftwork because “the past is constantly reinterpreted from the standpoint of the present” (Bailey and Madden 2017, p. 6). This ‘craftwork’ is addressed for instance by Tibor Dessewffy in his contribution to this journal in the form of the promising concept ‘bricolage’. The act of referring to pasts and futures forms a ‘bricolage’, a craftwork, which is messy and can be conflicting. The concept of bricolage moreover points to the fact that assembling a narrative contains some coincidence: people create narratives with what happens to be available around them at a given time. For example, today, Forum voor Democratie has identified the COVID-19 pandemic as a central tool of current politicians targeting the typically ‘Dutch’ freedom. At this moment in time, freedom thereby constitutes the central trait making up Dutchness, but in other times, different traits can become prevalent.

Dutch spirit

59If conceptions of the past and future are to be taken as parts of the same temporality, and considering that references to time are disorganised and under-elaborated, what binds all of this together? We argue that the PVV and FVD’s nostalgia, sense of loss towards the past, and wishes for the future reveal the belief in a transhistorical Dutch spirit. This is understood as a general, positive force. The past and the future, as the PVV and FVD would have it, share the prevalence of this positive force. In a public speech, Frederik Jansen of the FVD quite literally refers to “the Dutch spirit that resides in all of us” that is to be “rekindled” (2018b). In this conception, a national spirit is assumed to be an inherent and necessary part of national identity. The future should be marked by the continuation and reparation of this spirit, by which way the parties are weaving a ‘common thread’ through time. To do this, right-wing nativists conclude, (what is left of) the Dutch spirit needs to be harboured. As such, examining Dutch nativist nostalgia alone leaves an inherent counterpart to that nostalgia out of sight: a hopeful orientation towards the future. A similar metaphor to illuminate the nature of the ‘Dutch spirit’ is a vein. A vein does not run in a straight line; it travels with twists and curves and is nonetheless essential. Taken together, the notion of a common thread grasps both the essentialism of a transhistorical Dutch spirit and temporality: it is this thread that interlinks past, present, and future.

60The few references to specific pasts that we have identified have the more fundamental function of constituting evidence for or a reminder of the existence of a ‘timeless’ Dutch spirit. Theoretically speaking, it is perhaps not so much that this Dutch spirit is time-less but rather time-encompassing. In this relationship between the Dutch spirit and its manifestations, we observe that the logic is self-reinforcing: the manifestations are taken both to be the consequence and the (only) proof for the Dutch spirit. It is not the exact physical world around us that is essential in this view, but the spirit that pre-exists it. This explains why it is possible for both parallels and stark contrasts to exist simultaneously between the past Netherlands and the desired Netherlands of the future in the nativist radical-right temporal system of meaning. The East India Company of the past and the hyperloop train of the future are seen as (very different) manifestations of an encompassing force: the ‘Dutch spirit’. This point relates to Jones’ (2016) argument that over time, populist discourses use a consistent political grammar that is shaped by colonialism, but one that has time-specific expressions and constructs. Throughout these temporally specific ideas about the Dutch national essence, a notion of unconditional citizens (though those who belong to that category can shift) is reproduced (ibid.). As different interpretations can be given of the Dutch spirit in different periods, the ‘floating’ and abstract element of a spirit is precisely its strength. Temporal narratives represent the political and cultural issues that are deemed relevant at present (Zerubavel 1987). Which form ‘the Dutch spirit’ takes at a given moment thus reflects the specific cultural and political context of that time. In sum, temporality adds a cultural aspect to time or time in its cultural form (Iparraguirre 2016).

61What is key is not some supposed essence that the Dutch spirit entails but rather that people believe that Dutchness has a basic essence: an essence that non-white ‘outsiders’ supposedly do not possess and that leftist ‘cultural traitors’ do not uphold. Although the Dutch spirit remains an abstract notion, some characteristics that our research participants have ascribed to the Dutch spirit are innovation, pride, Christianity, and importance of?/desire for? Dutch dominance in the world. The alleged problem in the present is that these characteristics, and the ‘Dutch spirit’ itself, are being attacked. Examples of this idea are that ‘the native Dutch’ are criticized for being proud of the East India Company, and are subjected to feelings of shame and guilt towards important aspects of Dutch history and culture. It remains ambiguous whether the Dutch spirit is perceived as incredibly strong or as fragile (since it is allegedly in mortal danger), and whether the latter is only true because FVD’s and PVV’s enemies are understood to be strong and aggressive. At the same time as the present is made exceptional, the present is also used as a negative reference frame for FVD and PVV conceptions of the past and future.

Conclusion

62The past has –rightly so– been an important topic of nativism research. The future has unfortunately not received the same academic consideration, and unjustly so. We urge nativism studies to not get caught up solely focusing on nostalgia because nativist parties do in fact have future orientations; ones that are not simply a mirror of the past but do often form a counterpart to the past. Nostalgia should not, as we have shown in the case of Dutch radical-right nativism, be isolated from a timeline that ignores the future. To put it another way, we cannot study the past without its relations to the present and future. Therefore, we suggest speaking in terms of ‘temporality’.

63Narratives that refer to different eras are often, and inevitably, ambiguous. Nativist radical-right parties refer to the past by summoning abstract associations more than tangible periods that are longed for. Even if specific periods are mentioned, they can clash with each other (for example, in the so-called Golden Age, the Dutch did not have women’s and gay rights that these parties sometimes employ as a national cultural legacy to exclude non-nativist, racialised Others).

64Still, something is woven through temporal conceptions like a common thread: a transhistorical Dutch spirit that allegedly brings about admirable achievements over time. Aside from the past then, the future is so important because it represents a continuation or revival of a common thread that is currently being disturbed or even interrupted. The narrative goes that if we do away with ‘elitist political projects’ as imposed by politicians, media, and social justice movements such as multiculturalism and political correctness, the Dutch spirit can thrive again in the future. The present in this narrative thus represents an exceptional situation. Although the present is portrayed as a terrible one, this portrayal plants a seed for possible change and therefore hope. These parties offer something new to the electorate, a new kind of hope for the future. Herein lies a strength of these parties that should not be underestimated.

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Appendix: list of data

This list represents only the PVV and FVD data referred to in this article. Should there be interest in the extensive list of the use of the word ‘weer’ (‘again’), this can be provided.

Baudet, Thierry. 2017, January 14. FVD is het vlaggeschip van de Renaissancevloot. Retrieved from https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vkd4ghrv9dpw?ctx=vjuuhtscjwpn.

Baudet, Thierry. 2019, March 20. Spreektekst Thierry Baudet, verkiezingsavond 20 maart 2019. Retrieved from https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/spreektekst-thierry-baudet-verkiezingsavond-20-maart-2019~be2a1539/.

Forum voor Democratie. 2017. Verkiezingsprogramma FVD. Retrieved from https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/10938/1/FvD_verkprogTK2017.pdf.

Forum voor Democratie. 2020a, September 15. 2040: Onze visie op de toekomst van Nederland [video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NWh_AzTQXg.

Forum voor Democratie. 2020b, September 18. Waar het ons écht om gaat – FVD Journaal #38 [video]. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fhbj9fH0s4&ab_channel=ForumvoorDemocratie.

Forum voor Democratie. 2020c, September 24. Stop Marrakesh 2! – FVD Journaal #40 [video]. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjiUCzPSfZM&ab_channel=ForumvoorDemocratie.

Forum voor Democratie. 2021. Stem Nederland terug. Verkiezingsprogramma 2021-2025. Retrieved from https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/86169/.

Jansen, Frederik [Forum voor Democratie]. 2018a, November 24. FVD Partijcongres 2018 [video]. Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/forumvoordemocratie/videos/2301846966516221.

Jansen, Frederik [JFVD]. 2018b, June 30. JFVD Congres 2018 [video]. Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/JongerenFVD/videos/1769759473103860.

Jansen, Frederik [Res cogitans]. 2018c, September 8. Frederik Jansen spreekt op het Forum voor Democratie partijcongres [25-11-2017] [video]. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=12x7LtxAcJ8&t=269s&ab_channel=Rescogitans.

NPO Radio 1. 2021, March 2. Thierry Baudet (Forum voor Democratie): ‘Wij gaan meer dan 10 zetels halen’ | NPO Radio 1 [video]. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPdVsG2gKrc&ab_channel=NPORadio1.

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Partij voor de Vrijheid. 2012. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012-2017: Hún Brussel, Óns Nederland. Retrieved from https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/520/.

Partij voor de Vrijheid. 2017. Verkiezingsprogramma 2017-2021: Nederland weer van ons! Retrieved from https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/628/.

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Référence électronique

Isabel Speelman et Sammy C. Frenkel, « Not ‘stuck in the past’: nostalgia, future orientations, and temporality of the Dutch nativist radical right »Appartenances & Altérités [En ligne], 2 | 2022, mis en ligne le 01 mars 2022, consulté le 13 novembre 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/alterites/306 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/alterites.306

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Auteurs

Isabel Speelman

Sociology, University of Amsterdam

Sammy C. Frenkel

Sociology, University of Amsterdam

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