• 1 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 203. For the first appearance of the definition of pleasure as ‘the perc (...)
• 2 According to the material I have consulted, the use of the term ‘perception’ (idrāk) in the definit (...)
• 3 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 203.

5Pleasure for al-Rāġib is simply “the perception of the desired” (idrāk al-muštahā).1 The word idrāk means attainment, acquisition and realisation of something in a physical or intellectual sense.2 Pleasure for al-Rāġib appears to be the conscious attainment of that which is desired. This happens when that which is desired becomes part of the desiring body; in other words, it takes place when the internal desire of the body is substituted with the internalisation of the desired object itself (or a part of it) including its form. As to what this desire is, al-Rāġib somewhat enigmatically defines it with another word with a very similar meaning: desire (al- šahwa) is “the soul’s drive to obtain what it yearns for” (inbiʿāṯ al-nafs li-nayl mā tatašawwaquhu).3 One of the differences deducible from this relation between desire and yearning is that the former involves a movement and the latter does not. In this case, yearning and desire have the same object which is itself the cause of pleasure; however, desire is the driving force that puts the soul on the path that leads to the object it yearns for.

• 4 These three kinds of pleasure are related to Plato’s three types of souls found in Galen, Galeni Ti (...)
• 5 For Galen, these two are in constant battle, and the rational soul is ashamed of the pleasures soug (...)

6As in many other texts on this subject, al-Rāġib divides the pleasures of this world into three kinds. The first of these pleasures is the intellectual: this is the most elevated because it is exclusively experienced by humans. The second is bodily pleasure: this differs from the intellectual pleasure because it is common between humans and animals; it includes drinking, eating and coitus. The final kind is the pleasures common between humans and some animals. This is found in some specific power relations amongst the individual members of a species, and it includes the pleasures of leadership and dominance.4 It is evident for al-Rāġib that the higher intellectual pleasure is noble and rare, whilst the low bodily pleasures are base and common.5

• 6 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 203.
• 7 Al-Rāzī’s (Abū Bakr, d. 313/925) theory of replenishment and return to a natural state is found in (...)
• 8 A Muʿtazilī critique of the replenishment theory is found in Ibn Mattawayh, al-Taḏkira, pp. 308-309 (...)

7For al-Rāġib, bodily pleasure, which concerns us here, is considered in some cases to cure pain and in others to be itself a pain. The little clarification that we have on this point is a saying attributed to al-Ḥasan b. Ali, whereby he describes the human being as “beaten by hunger and killed by fullness”6. If hunger is what causes pain in the first instance then we assume that the body would gain pleasure (the cure for this pain) by overcoming the state of hunger through eating, becoming full and returning to a natural state before the pain of hunger. If this state of being full is exceeded, however, the pleasure gained by overcoming the pain of hunger turns into the very pain which one aimed to alleviate. This view of pleasure is clearly the same as the one expounded by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, which is nothing more than the replenishment theory of pleasure.7 Al-Rāġib offers no other ways of looking at pleasure than in terms of lack of pain, or of becoming pain.8

• 9 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 204. Adamson has kindly pointed out that this conversation between ʿAlī (...)

8We can further exemplify this negative association with pleasure in al-Rāġib’s work by recounting a story of an encounter between Ali and ʿAmmār b. Yāsir, within which the pleasures of this life are reduced to seven: food, drink, coitus, clothes, smell, hearing and sight. Each one is taken in turn, and the value of the finest example of each category is reduced to a reviled thing. In the food category, for example, honey is said to be from a fly; in the scent category the perfume of misk is said to be the blood of a mouse; and finally coitus is reduced to the idea of ‘urine in urine’.9

• 10 Al-ʿĀmirī indicates that Aristotle considers the pleasures of food, drink, clothing and shelter to (...)
• 11 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 205. The necessity of the desiderative soul is also found to be necessar (...)
• 12 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 209. See also al-Iṣfahānī, Tafṣīl, p. 32. Since balance, for Galen, is a (...)
• 13 One of the critiques of the replenishment theory by the Muʿtazila is that there cannot be an incre (...)
• 14 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 207.

9To reverse the direction of this type of discourse (linking pleasure to demeaning desire harmful to the human soul), one of the steps philosophers and theologians undertake is to emphasise the ‘necessity’ of the elements related to this desire. Al-Rāġib, among others, mentions the idea of ‘necessary pleasures’, those that are not simply the subjects of likes and dislikes. The pleasures of eating and coitus are not whims one chooses or abstains from undertaking, for they are part of the necessities of life.10 These pleasures keep humans and animals alive: through food the body is sustained and through coitus the existence of the species is preserved.11 The problem with these pleasures is found in their excess, and the evil associated with them occurs when exceeding the limits defined by the intellect, which is considered to be in accordance with the law.12 Once the good of the desired object is surpassed, the excess in desire becomes a passion or love (hawā) for the desired object. In this case, the quantitative increase in the object of pleasure vitalises this pleasure and strengthens it to the point of becoming a different quality, namely a passion for the desired object.13 This passion is not transformed directly into pain as in the previous discussion; it rather becomes for al- Rāġib the force of evil and the instrument of the devil that makes the human being fall from God’s grace.14

• 15 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 207.

10What is good in food and drink is of little significance when the pleasure in the desired food or drink outweighs the benefits it brings to the body. In the case of alcohol, for example, the benefits that one may gain from drinking it are much less than the harm it brings, not necessarily to the physical body but to the human being as a whole. For al-Rāġib, the benefits of alcohol do exist but they are not necessary for the body, and the damage it causes to the moral being is greater.15

• 16 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 207.

11In the discussion on the beneficial (if not necessary) pleasures of food and drink, two elements of measure are considered. Firstly, in what is necessary, there is a quantity/measure of how much is good, this measure is dictated by the intellect and the law. Exceeding this right measure either leads to a transformation into pain (which was supposed to be alleviated by the benefits of what is pleasurable), or this excess feeds back into the desire and leads to the further development of passion. This transforms the desire from being a guide to what is good for one’s body to being a force that drags one’s self to the servitude of what is evil. Secondly, pleasure is not clearly related to benefits for the body or the soul. Pleasure in these cases does exist, however it is here significantly tied to what is harmful from the outset, despite acknowledging an association with some benefits. In this case, there is no association with excess since what is harmful is there from the beginning. This harm is not described as physical; it is rather seen as being against wisdom and virtue, two aspects that are beyond the realm of the body. When dealing with the body on its own, the measure of balance is between pleasure and the physical benefits. However, when dealing with the whole human being as a member of a group, both virtue and wisdom become significant, and the measure of balance is therefore between pleasure, body, virtue and social benefits.16

• 17 The idea of balance and the use of the word ʿiffa are also found in Galen, “al-Aḫlāq,” pp. 191-192.
• 18 Al-Iṣfahānī, Tafṣīl, p. 95.
• 19 Al-Iṣfahānī, Tafṣīl, pp. 95-96. One of the examples given for modesty in enthusiasm is courage, whi (...)

12The question of balance is frequently referred to in Islamic texts under the category of ʿiffa or modesty.17 For al-Rāġib, this modesty occurs following the betterment (iṣlāḥ) of desire.18 This betterment is an affirmation of the need for desire and involves finding the balance between greed (šarah) and the annihilation of desire. When modesty is applied to bodily desires, and to the more psychological/intellectual desires related to one’s enthusiasm and virtue in action, one brings into being the power of justice.19 This justice, modelled upon divine justice and applied in the concrete lived world, is practiced by the individual in his own being as well as in his own community. It arises from a modesty that finds expressions, not only in personal psychological/intellectual considerations applied in social relationships, but also in bodily relations which find expression in pleasure. Therefore, one seeks a politics of justice in moderation applied to oneself in relation to one’s body and intellect as well as in one’s physical and intellectual relation to the other.

• 20 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 209.
• 21 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 209. For al-Rāġib, the physical harm includes the enlargement of the sem (...)
• 22 For more analysis of the space permitted by law see Bouhdiba, al-Islām wa-l-ǧins, pp. 160-170. Of p (...)

13With regard to coitus, some of the same concerns associated with food and drink are present in al-Rāġib’s work. What is different however is that in this case there are two delimiting fields of social space involving the individuals who enjoy this pleasure. One of these spaces is within the confines of the religious law (al-šarʿ) (which defines what is and what is not good) and the other is outside. Within the bounds of the law one has coitus because one intends to reproduce; or to remove pain; or else for the calming effect it has on oneself. Coitus may therefore also be said to bring about the realisation of God’s benefits to the individual human being through a release from pain, as well as to the species through its continuous survival. Abstaining from taking part in this act is, according to al-Rāġib, against the law and discouraged by the medical profession. This is so because the accumulation of unreleased pressure eventually leads one to excessive consumption of what is legally permitted. He believes that this would render the human being a beast consumed by lust.20 We must note that this excess (which also feeds back into the desire to attain this pleasure) is still within the bounds of the religious law, except that it is considered an abhorred thing (makrūh). What is feared is that this excess of pleasure is not only physically harmful,21 but it also drives one to go beyond the space bound by the religious law.22 If excess of desire, ‘lust’, cannot be satisfied within the bounds of the law, the surplus pleasure would be sought in the space that is not, and cannot be, regulated by this law. This alternative space, whose existence is acknowledged and rejected, is where the defining and delimiting categories of the law become powerless. The benefit of the species’ reproduction becomes insignificant in this space, despite its continued possibility. Al-Rāġib divides relations within this second social space as either heterosexual or homosexual.

• 23 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 210.

14Heterosexual relations belong to the two spaces defined by acceptance and rejection of the religious law. These relations are similar in both cases except that the species’ telos in pleasure (reproduction/existence) is determined in the lawful space, yet it is only potential when present in the unlawful space. If what is beneficial to the species finds its expression in a married couple’s pleasurable desire to reproduce, then this benefit is absent and only potential in the unlawful relationship between a man and woman. Since, in this second space, the benefit for the species from coitus is denied, what remains is not only the release from pressure and the comfort one finds in this pleasure but also the pleasure in coitus itself.23

• 24 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, p. 210.

15The homosexual relation is thus the pure form of what is denied by the space defined by the law. In this, reproduction is not even a potential element that can bring about the continuous survival of the species. Coitus in this space is both potentially and concretely only for the pleasure that comes from ejaculation.24 Since there is nothing of benefit to the species, and since al-Rāġib mentions no other social benefits to pleasure in coitus, the homosexual pleasure becomes a symbol of individualistic pleasure-seeking purely for its own sake. As the word ‘benefit’ is not even mentioned in this section one can draw the conclusion that the space of pleasure unregulated by religious law (the space the law actually tries to eliminate) is considered to be of no benefit for the species. It is where pleasure, however defined, exists for the individual and is generated for its own sake.

• 25 I have previously mentioned (note 8) a Muʿtazilī critique of the replenishment theory of pleasure t (...)
• 26 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ḏarīʿa, pp. 210, 211. For an earlier critique of passionate love see al-Rāzī, Rasā’ (...)

16Al-Rāġib is not interested in the other in whom one finds the desired pleasure, as he considers pleasure to reside in the individual who experiences it and in the benefit to the species.25 Indeed this ‘other’, as a significant partner in the relationship producing pleasure, is actually attacked in the short discussion on passionate desire in which a lover’s desire is directed to only ‘one particular other’. Al-Rāġib’s critique is that the most repugnant of desires which we share with beasts not only drives the passionate lover to release himself from pain through an other, but also requires him to use his intellect to identify the desired other. What he condemns is that the intellect is not used to guide and control this desire in accordance with the religious law, but that it becomes fixated on this particular other. This fixation, for al-Rāġib, enslaves the passionate, desirous person to his other when in fact ‘any other’ defined by law could satisfy the animalistic pleasure. The intellect is set the task of controlling the body, guiding it in accordance with the law, but when it participates in the pleasure of the body it enslaves itself to desire. According to al-Rāġib, it is to desire itself and not to the other that one becomes a slave since he insists on denying the significance of the other in the sexual relationship. Here again is an example for al-Rāġib of how excess in desire leads one to feebleness, illness and death.26

• 27 Al-Iṣfahānī, Tafṣīl, p. 31.

17In Tafṣīl al-naš’atayn, al-Rāġib makes important distinctions between two types of pleasure and between the domains covered by these pleasures. The first type is that of bodily pleasure, and the domain of its application covers that which the bodily senses can distinguish in taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight. The other type of pleasure is intellectual, which includes the pleasures of knowing, good moral conduct and doing what is beautiful.27 This in itself marks no difference from the other texts discussed thus far. However, this work deviates in the section on the happiness associated with pleasure. Here, al-Rāġib distinguishes between two types of happiness, one is the eternal happiness of the afterlife and the other is the changing and ephemeral happiness of this life.

• 28 Al-Iṣfahānī, Tafṣīl, p. 65.
• 29 Al-Iṣfahānī, Tafṣīl, p. 65.

18The distinction between these two types of happiness is of no great significance. What is important, however, is that there is a link between them in al-Rāġib’s text. The happiness one has in this life (which one has because of what God has blessed us with) ought to guide us to the everlasting happiness. That which is changing and ephemeral must lead to that which is eternal.28 This relation is initially established through the idea that if a person consumes the benefits that God has bestowed upon him in accordance with His law then this would lead him to the eternal blessings of the hereafter. It appears that the underlying reason for making this connection between one happiness and the other is to emphasise the importance of following the law, in the sense that it is in the appropriate consumption of the ephemeral that one obtains the everlasting. As such, it could be assumed that the link between the two types of happiness here is not necessarily intended to demonstrate similarity in kind, but is instead to emphasise the importance of following the law.29

• 30 Al-Iṣfahānī, Tafṣīl, p. 66. Al-ʿĀmirī attributes to Plato the idea that things are known through ex (...)

19The actual connection between the two types of happiness is established in a separate section of this book. The eternal pleasures of the hereafter are classified as the ‘radical other’ of the temporary pleasures. They are unimaginable and inaccessible to us in this life where we only encounter what is vanishing. One of the standard experiential examples given to explain this otherness of the eternal pleasures is describing to a young boy the pleasure of coitus, which would mean nothing to the boy, as he has not experienced it. The principle derived from this example is that pleasures cannot be described because they are experiential, and we cannot speak of the eternal pleasures because they are both radically other and not experienced on this earth. For al-Rāġib one may only know the truth of something when one is directly aware of it, when one experiences it.30

• 31 In the Arabic Hermetic tradition we find in Muʿāḏalat al-nafs a critique of those who denounce this (...)

21Alternatively, for al-Rāġib, one may reach an understanding of the eternal pleasures through the pure intellect (al-ʿaql al-maḥḍ) which is rare in this life. Only the few, who distance themselves from the earthly pleasures and purify themselves, can reach a clearer vision of the eternal pleasures whilst remaining on this earth. The logic of this argument asserts that it is only through the death of the body that one reaches that which is beyond, and if this physical death is unattainable, then it is through the distancing of the body from that which links it to this life that one arrives at glimpses of the eternal pleasures. One can deduce from this reasoning that the eternal pleasures are accessible in such a manner because their nature pertains to mind and not to matter.31

• 32 Al-Iṣfahānī, Muḥāḍarāt 2, p. 680.
• 33 Al-Iṣfahānī, Muḥāḍarāt 2, p. 680.
• 34 In opposition to this particularly unique view we have the pessimistic view of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (...)

23There is an informative anecdote that appears in Muḥāḍarāt al-udabā’ which refers to this relationship between the model and inferior-similar other. Away from the sphere of theology and philosophy, and in that of the sensual literary world, the nature of similarity between model and object/phenomena is reversed. When asked about the pleasure of drinking wine, Abū Nuwās declares : “Wine in this worldly existence is better than wine in the life to come.”32 The roles are here reversed, for this life is the source of what is real and the prototype upon which that which exists in the life to come is modelled. Experience through the body is the experience of what is true and primary, and that which will come only mimics and reproduces that which was once perfect. Abū Nuwās declares this to be the case: “God has made them models and the model is forever better.”33 Since he expressed this view following a question regarding the pleasurable experience of drinking wine, one may assume that it is not only the object of the experience but the experience itself, pleasure, which is better in this life. Thus, in this reversal of roles, it is the earthly experience that establishes what is true, the blueprint of that which is intellectualised by the philosophers, those who elevate the idealised forms of the direct experience to the realm of the intellect.34

• 35 Al-Ġazālī, Mīzān, p. 307.
• 36 Al-Ġazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 113.
• 37 Al-Ġazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 113. In Galen we find the idea of agreeability to be part of our animal n (...)
• 38 Al-Ġazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 113. The use of nayl appears in another definition of pleasure by Ibn Sīn (...)

24Much of what I have discussed so far reappears in a very similar way in the work of al-Ġazālī. It is clear, however, that parts of his work display shifts away from the negative associations presented thus far. For instance, the Muʿtazilī definition of pleasure as “the perception of the desired”35 is found in the work of al-Ġazālī alongside other associations with pleasure such as: ‘perceiving (darak) what one needs and yearns for’;36 ‘desiring that which is agreeable (mulā’im) when it is lacking in the one who seeks’;37 and ‘acquiring (nayl) that which is lacking’.38

• 39 Al-Ġazālī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 113.
• 40 A Platonic response to the Aristotelian critique that some sensuous pleasures do not presuppose pai (...)

25For al-Ġazālī, pleasure is not only caused by the cessation of pain, and it is not only known through a relation with pain, for that which is agreeable is desired when it is lacking, and this lack is not necessarily considered in association with pain.39 Understanding pleasure in terms of ‘lack’ may face the challenge that a lack is always associated with some degree of psychological or physical pain and, therefore, there is no escape from the idea of pleasure as replenishment and alleviation of pain in a discourse on pleasure.40 This would be a valid challenge, however, I will discuss in this section how al-Ġazālī is constantly expanding the notion of pleasure beyond its direct association with pain.

• 41 Al-Ġazālī, Iḥyā’ 2, p. 279.

26If lack is assumed to be the source of pain, and if yearning is to that which is lacking, then one may further assume that pain and yearning are also related. This assumption is confirmed and denied by al-Ġazālī in a dialectical way. He writes that even if yearning is pain “it has within it a kind of pleasure provided one supplements it with the anticipation of reunion, for anticipation is sweet”.41 If there is pain in yearning, or even if yearning is caused by pain, the anticipation of acquiring what is yearned for is pleasurable. It is not the reunion or the attainment of what is lacking that is significant, here, for what is pleasant is already contained in the yearning itself at the moment it comes into existence.

• 42 The idea of reunion with the object of pleasure is also present in the notion of food becoming part (...)
• 43 The relation between sound and yearning is also present in the work of Iḫwān al-Ṣafā who find that (...)

28Pleasure in anticipation is developed further in the context of hearing. Al-Ġazālī considers hearing music and songs to be the source that ignites passion and yearning for reunion with the beloved and desired.42 The pleasure of hearing brings about the anticipation of reunion, provoking a limited presence of what is desired and absent. The more effective the sounds we hear and internalise, the more intense both the yearning for the desired and the anticipation to be reunited with them, and thus the more present they become. Pain in the case of an absent other is not only from the lack itself but also from the psychological element of despair, the counterpart of anticipation.43

• 44 Al-Ġazālī, Iḥyā’ 4, p. 142.
• 45 Al-Ġazālī, Iḥyā’ 2, p. 279.

29In the Sufi context, anticipation reflects a limited presence of the future in the present. It stems from the belief in the justice of the beloved who promises to come nearer to the worshiping believer who in turn constantly seeks to improve his knowledge and works in order to be nearer to the beloved.44 This anticipation is based on the belief and trust that the beloved will reciprocate one’s love and that, with time, the encounter will happen. The idea of ‘anticipation’, which has an important place in Sufi discourse, has the body of the other as the source of anticipation. Al-Ġazālī expects that anticipation will reach a point of consummation. The lover, excited by the music and words that recreate in his mind the one he loves, is expected to finally be reunited with his love, to experience the real pleasure of reunion. The pleasure of the physical encounter is increased because of the thoughts generated in the absence of the beloved with whom real encounter was anticipated. Al-Ġazālī also insists, like al-Rāġib, that the beloved must be someone with whom a legal bond is established. No reunion is permitted outside the religious bounds of the law.45

• 46 The difference between ‘hope’ and ‘anticipation’ is based on the idea of work, more specifically in (...)
• 47 Al-Ġazālī, Maʿāriǧ, p. 98; Mīzān, p. 270.

31Unlike al-Rāġib’s disapproval of loving and yearning for one person, al-Ġazālī thinks that only the beloved ‘one’ can provoke this anticipation.46 The physical union of two people, considered by al-Rāġib to be beneficial only because it leads to the preservation of the species, plays the same part in the work of al-Ġazālī. However, the individual who is the cause of yearning in the heart of the lover is clearly also significant for al-Ġazālī. This is not only because the union with this individual leads to the continuation of the species itself but because for al-Ġazālī ‘playfulness’ (laʿib) and ‘enjoyment’ (tamattuʿ) can emerge in the process of a physical union. In this case, the physical act itself not only leads to its teleological end but is also the source and cause of a specific space that binds two particular bodies with a precise psychological bond unique to the individuals involved. ‘Enjoyment’ and ‘playfulness’ in the act of coitus are products of the attraction (istimāla) and harmony (ta’āluf) that exist between the two bodies, which then open the space for ‘companionship’ (ṣuḥba) between them.47 Further to this, the image that emerges from al-Ġazālī’s brief discussion on the relation between coitus and companionship reveals a circular model, whereby attraction and harmony lead to the act of coitus, which eventually brings about companionship and increases attraction and harmony which in turn leads to an increase in the desire for coitus.

• 48 Al-Ġazālī, Ihyā’ 2, p. 279. On the instrumentality of love, see Leites, “La règle de l’amour.”

32The two factors preceding the act of coitus, ‘attraction’ and ‘harmony’, as well as the one that follows it, ‘companionship’, are elements that become manifest in a particular relationship between two people. These are also, for al-Ġazālī, transferable relations. That which emerges from the physical and psychological drive creates relations specific to the reunited two, yet these are applicable in the broader social life of the community. The bonds and relations that are created by a specific and narrow space educate through experience those who are involved, and the qualities gained through this experience are potentially transferrable and applicable in the wider social space. From the Sufi perspective, the psychological relations surrounding the act of coitus are also applicable in the vertical sense, to the relationship between the seeker and her beloved, the one she yearns for, in the same way that it is applicable in a horizontal sense, in her relation with others in the social space. For al-Ġazālī, the heart is educated by being separated from the beloved as it becomes acquainted with the subtle meanings of reunion and separation.48

• 49 Al-Ġazālī, Iḥyā’ 2, p. 279. Similar statements also occur in Qur’ān 47:36 and 57:36.

33In the physical relation of reunion which is accompanied by pleasure, al-Ġazālī mentions, as noted above, ‘enjoyment’ and ‘amusement’. Then, he appeared to indicate that these two are not intended for themselves as they are possible outcomes of reunion. In other instances however, al-Ġazālī is even more positive about the role of enjoyment and amusement. For him, enjoyment in this existence is permissible by God and in this regard he quotes Qur’ān 29:64: “What is the life of this world but amusement and play?”49 This verse, which is often quoted to describe the life of the non-believers, is here utilised to state what life ought to be. This is an affirmation that the pleasure of coitus (and the enjoyment and playfulness that come with it) are a part of life the way it ought to be lived and affirmed.

• 50 Al-Ġazālī, Iḥyā’ 2, p. 287.
• 51 Al-Ġazālī, Iḥyā’ 2, p. 287.

34In this earthly existence, different forms of enjoyment, fun and amusement are permissible for al-Ġazālī. Generally he doesn’t consider them time wasting activities, although they can be so. One allows oneself enjoyment of the pleasures of life because “they calm the heart and relieve from the burden of thinking”.50 Al-Ġazālī is clearly directing his discourse to intellectuals (those whose mind is burdened with thinking). Rest (separation from the continuous involvement in thinking) is what is recommended for rejuvenation; seeking knowledge through the hard work of the mind can then be resumed. The physical pleasures during the periods of rest create the necessary disassociation from one’s work and the necessary enjoyment of life that allow one’s return to the demanding intellectual effort without fear of fatigue and ennui.51

• 52 Al-Ġazālī, al-Maqṣad, p. 78.
• 53 Al-Ġazālī, al-Maqṣad, p. 78. For a summary of the discussion on the causal nature of pleasure in Ar (...)

35The importance of bodily pleasures is nowhere more evident than in a passage that appears in al-Maqṣad al-asnā. In a discussion regarding the reason behind the Sufi’s (al-ʿārif bi-Llāh) worship of Allah, al-Ġazālī finds that God is worshiped for His own sake and that there is no other benefit—neither earthly nor divine—sought behind this worship. The economy of exchanged benefits that exists in human relations is inapplicable in this particular instance. He explains that this is similar to a father’s care for his son where there is no benefit sought in the father’s commitment to his offspring. For al-Ġazālī, “he who seeks a thing for another is not seeking it, since it is not his aim, the other is his aim.”52 In this instance, the teleological cause is that which causes a movement to itself passing through ‘lesser causes’ which in themselves are not causes for the movement as such. If a father and a mother work to earn an income for the benefits that this income brings with it, including being able to care for their son, then these benefits are the reasons for working, and not the income itself. Similarly, al-Ġazālī considers that the reasons for seeking gold are the benefits that it can buy—clothing and food—rather than for the possession of the gold itself. Here one might expect al-Ġazālī to state that this is the case because of the benefits that these things bring, such as warmth and being able to live, however, the survival of the species is not considered in this section of the text as the teleological cause behind acquiring gold. Food and clothing bring with them pleasure and defer pain, and these are the final causes. He states: “Pleasure is wanted for itself not for another purpose beyond it, and so is warding off pain. Gold is a means for food, and food is a means for pleasure, and pleasure is the purpose that is not a means to another.”53

• 54 Ibn Sīnā finds that the pleasure of each power is the attainment of its own perfection, see Ibn Sīn (...)
• 55 Al-Ġazālī, Iḥyā’ 4, p. 307
• 56 Al-Ġazālī, Maʿāriǧ, p. 147.
• 57 Relevant to this discussion is Ibn Sīnā’s idea that the soul is brought to perfection by a universa (...)

36One way of understanding the reason why bodily pleasure is an end in itself that drives one to act, is that pleasure is a good and a perfection.54 For al-Ġazālī, pleasures are forms of perception that belong to different instincts and powers. They become realised once these powers and instincts acquire what they were created for. Each power and instinct associated with a particular desire is designed to have a certain perception in reality; for example, sound, taste or sight.55 Pleasure occurs in the perception itself of that which is agreeable with the particular power and instinct. That which is agreeable with each power and instinct is its perfection.56 The previous teleological association with pleasure (pleasure as the end reason of action itself) can therefore be explained by the desire of each power that exists in us to achieve its perfection, that for which it was created. Pleasure is sought in itself because it is a perfection for the sense, the final cause of the perceiving power with which it is associated, the actualisation of what was a power and its coming into existence.57

• 58 The critique of a definition of pleasure is also found in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Ibn S (...)
• 59 Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Istiqāma 2, pp. 148-149; Al-Ǧawziyya, Rawḍat, p. 155. The Basran Muʿtazila conside (...)

37Within the same context of permissible pleasures which are regulated by the intellect and the law, I now explore the work of Ibn Taymiyya. What is evident from his work, and which is confirmed by his student Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya (d. 751/1350), is that there is no definition for pleasure. For them, pleasure is intuitive and self-evident. It may not be defined in more basic terms and may only be discussed in terms of its causes (asbāb) and properties (aḥkām).58 Ibn Taymiyya considers intuitive knowledge to be necessary, without which circularity will occur in our understanding of knowledge. It is the primary and necessary knowledge that is not based on prior knowledge and which requires no proof or introduction; it is simply that from which one begins to know.59

• 60 Al-Ǧawziyya, Rawḍat, p. 155.

38Fundamentally, for Ibn Taymiyya, pleasure is what all living beings seek or aim for (maqṣūd wa-maṭlūb). It is an essential part in one’s existence, and, therefore, an ‘existential matter’ (amr wiǧdānī) in the words of Ibn Qayyim.60 Its relation to intuition, in this instance, is a particularly clear reason for its existential importance, since without intuition, there is no access to the real world in which one lives and interacts.

• 61 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Istiqāma 2, p. 149.
• 62 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Istiqāma 2, p. 150.
• 63 Al-ʿĀmirī quotes Aristotle as saying: “pleasure is not an activity for this is in three kinds: sens (...)

39In the text of al-Istiqāma, pleasure is associated with or coupled to what one wants, the object of desire and love. In this case it does not appear that pleasure is what one desires and loves for itself, since it is only what is coupled with it.61 This leads Ibn Taymiyya to make a clear distinction, repeated throughout his discussions on the subject, between on the one hand the perception and realisation of the agreeable object of desire and on the other hand the associated pleasure that comes with it. Pleasure is not the perception of the agreeable object of desire since it is subsequent to this perception.62 Pleasure is dependent on sensation and cognition but it cannot be reduced to them since it comes into existence following their realisation.63

• 64 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ṣafadiyya 2, p. 260.
• 65 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ṣafadiyya 2, p. 260.
• 66 On the logical basis of this argument, see in the Arabic tradition Ibn al-Ṭayyib, Arabic Logic, p.  (...)
• 67 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ṣafadiyya 2, p. 261.
• 68 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ṣafadiyya 2, pp. 260-261. The Basran Muʿtazila consider pleasure to be of the same (...)

40The critique of the idealisation of pleasure is part of Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of the philosophers, theologians and Sufis. This attitude towards them is also found in his al-Ṣafadiyya where he considers that the pleasure and joy that one finds in knowledge is not itself knowledge but is contingent upon it. He is clear that knowledge is a condition for the existence of pleasure yet does not necessarily lead to it, and that is why he emphasises the point that these are two distinct things.64 In his discussion on the philosophers’ definition of pleasure, he ascribes to them the idea that “pleasure is the perception of the agreeable in the sense that it is agreeable”.65 Ibn Taymiyya argues that if pleasure is the perception itself then this perception cannot itself be used in the definition of the opposite of pleasure, pain (which is defined as the perception of what is disagreeable to the perceiving element). This suggests, for him, that the philosophers consider perception to be a genus with two species, pleasure and pain. These are distinguished by the associated opposing differentiae: ‘agreeable’ and ‘disagreeable’, which is an illogical distinction.66 Ibn Taymiyya writes: “In themselves, it is impossible for knowledge, hearing, seeing and tasting to be at one time painful and at another pleasurable.”67 What is denied here is not that some noises are, for example, agreeable and pleasurable while others are disagreeable and painful, the critique is rather based on denying that hearing itself is pleasurable or painful. Perceiving the agreeable/disagreeable, or knowing it, is not itself pleasure or pain. Pleasure and pain come into existence through perceiving and knowing and are not the same as them.68

• 69 This change from the condition of agreeability to love is also found in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s comme (...)
• 70 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ṣafadiyya 2, p. 271.
• 71 Ibn Taymiyya, al-ʿUbūdiyya, pp. 97-98.

41In Ibn Taymiyya’s analysis, perception is the condition and cause of pleasure and pain although it does not always lead to them. Also, beside perception itself, coming to feel or know about an object becomes painful or pleasurable because of the further condition of agreeability with the perceiving agent. The condition of agreeability/disagreeability is what Ibn Taymiyya denotes as love and hate.69 Perceiving the agreeable is for him perceiving an object towards which one finds a relation of love; in the case of disagreeability, a relation of hate towards the object appears.70 One is first drawn towards an object through a relation of love, when one acquires this object and it becomes a perceived and acquired object of love, then one can experience pleasure. It is only through these two conditions that pleasure comes into existence.71 For Ibn Taymiyya, what distinguishes his view from that of the philosophers is that he considers ‘perception’ and ‘agreeability’ to be conditions and causes of pleasure and pain while the philosophers consider ‘agreeability’ to be the condition for ‘perception’ itself to be pleasure or pain.

• 72 Ibn Taymiyya, “Qāʿida fī al-maḥabba,” pp. 246, 249. For Galen, he who chooses to make his final end (...)
• 73 In this respect, al-ʿĀmirī states in agreement with Aristotle that every action is followed by plea (...)
• 74 Ibn Taymiyya, “Qāʿida f ī al-maḥabba,” pp. 246, 249.

42In causal terms, the text of al-Istiqāma describes perception as a cause for pleasure and as an act of the body towards the object. In a text on love, Ibn Taymiyya denotes perception as the moving cause (efficient cause, al-ʿilla al-fāʿila) of pleasure and love as the drive that makes the body move towards the object of desire. In this causal scheme pleasure itself occupies the position of the final cause or end (al-ġāya) of volitional motion.72 This volitional movement is triggered by something that is sought in the object towards which one commits to move, and in attaining this object one also acquires pleasure.73 It seems that Ibn Taymiyya considers the reason for seeking the object (for choosing to move towards it) is the pleasure that coexists with it at the moment of attainment. Attached to this conception is the idea that the path that leads to this final end is also assumed to be pleasurable, or at least does not contain what contradicts the conclusive aim. Pleasure in this sense, on the path to an other, would not be said to be sought for itself since it is sought for another more significant pleasure.74

• 75 Ibn Taymiyya, Ǧāmiʿ al-masā’il 6, p. 185.

43In another text, Ibn Taymiyya criticises the philosophers for not considering bodily pleasures to be real and for reducing them to recovery from pain. For him, this statement ignores one of the clearest and most obvious existential and sensual experiences in the animal kingdom. However, he does concede that there is a contingent relation between pleasure and pain in this life. The fact that pleasure exists in itself does not stop one from noting that it always follows a state of pain. He even concedes that without pain there would be no pleasure and that pain is a cause (sabab) for pleasure in this life. This, therefore, makes pleasure an intermediary between its cause, pain, and its final end (al-ʿilla al-ġā’iyya), the perfection of the body and procreation.75

• 76 Ibn Taymiyya, Ǧāmiʿ al-masā’il 6, p. 185.

44It is clear that this is a different representation of the causal relations surrounding pleasure from that previously presented. In the previous analysis love was conceived as the cause of pleasure, yet in this alternative causal scheme it is pain that is considered as cause. Love and pain are indeed different, but it is possible to consider that one arises because of the other: in some cases, love is towards what is absent and lacking, or in another sense, love is of that which causes pain in its absence. Pleasure, on the other hand, was conceived as a final end for the one who wills to move towards a desired object, and the fact that this object brings other benefits was neglected in that analysis. In this case, one is not necessarily actively conscious of the benefits associated with a particular driving pleasure, for the movement towards the desired object is caused by pleasure itself and not because of an awareness of a further benefit beyond. It is possible to think the two causal schemes to be linked if, on one level, the final end for the act is considered to be pleasure, but on another level, the final end of pleasure is considered to be attaining the benefits themselves: the perfection of the body and procreation. All these causal relations do not stop Ibn Taymiyya from thinking that pleasure is a thing in itself and that these causal relations only exist in this life as they are absent in the hereafter.76

• 77 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Istiqāma 2, p. 152.
• 78 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Istiqāma 2, p. 153.

46Within the idea of different degrees or stages in this life toward attaining the final pleasure, Ibn Taymiyya condemns pleasures that either lead to pain, or do not lead to a greater pleasure. The measure of what is good pleasure may be understood in terms of other earthly pleasures experienced in this lived life. However it may also be understood, as I believe Ibn Taymiyya intends, in terms of the pleasures of paradise. The good pleasures one experiences in life are the ones that lead to the final eternal pleasures of paradise; the bad pleasures are the ones that lead to the final pain in the hereafter. According to this vision, we are created in this life to benefit from it and experience the pleasures that will ultimately lead us to other pleasures, the final eternal pleasures. Every kind of pleasure we experience in this life gives us a taste of its equivalent in the eternal life; every pleasure we experience in this life is created to lead us to its corresponding eternal pleasure. Earthly pleasures are thus not truly an aim in themselves, for in attaining them we move closer towards reaching their corresponding promised pleasures.77 In this economy of pleasure, seeking lesser passing pleasures for the sake of gaining higher eternal pleasures is expressed in terms of seeking pleasure itself and for itself, with nothing beyond it. Here, one is rewarded for seeking the finite pleasures, in accordance with the law, with the eternal pleasures. The distinction between good and bad pleasures, or redundant pleasure, is that the former leads to a greater pleasure in another life whilst the latter is temporary and leads to nothing else beyond itself, and as such brings no real benefits.78