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Ce que la guerre fait aux migrations yéménites

Echoes of the Past: The Reproduction of Social Imaginaries amongst the Yemeni Diaspora in Cairo

Échos du passé : La reproduction des imaginaires sociaux au sein de la diaspora yéménite au Caire
Nahla El-Menshawy et Jonathan Hearn

Résumés

Cet article étudie les imaginaires sociaux de la diaspora yéménite au Caire, avec une focale sur la manière avec laquelle la nostalgie d’un Yémen pré- conflit, les liens transnationaux et la persistance des hiérarchies sociales façonnent leurs expériences vécues. Ces imaginaires agissent comme des rappels des profondes disparités sociales, politiques et économiques qui caractérisent ce Yémen, et reflètent les tensions non résolues entre ses différentes factions et communautés. Les liens culturels et historiques entre Le Caire et le Yémen ont fait de la capitale égyptienne un centre de préservation de l’identité nationale, en renforçant les structures de pouvoir établies et les reproductions nostalgiques d’un ancien Yémen. A partir d’un travail ethnographique et d’une série d’entretiens qualitatifs, cette étude explore les dynamiques culturelles et politiques complexes de cette communauté diasporique yéménite. À travers l’analyse de deux événements clés — la célébration du 33e anniversaire de l’unification du Yémen et de l’exposition « Lumière d’art » — elle révèle la manière avec laquelle les structures de pouvoir traditionnelles perpétuent les récits dominants. Ces récits, tout en offrant des opportunités d’expression culturelle, limitent les possibilités de ré-imaginer le paysage sociopolitique fragmenté du Yémen et mettent en avant la relation complexe existante entre nostalgie, résilience et inégalités au sein de la diaspora.

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I. Diasporic imaginaries in Cairo

  • 1 Orkaby, 2017, 2019; Day & Brehony, 2020; Kadri, 2023; Lackner, 2017; Menea, 2024.
  • 2 Brandt, 2017; Brehony, 2020; Ahram, 2022.
  • 3 Clausen, 2019; Juneau, 2016; Darwich, 2018; Hill, 2017.
  • 4 Juneau, 2024; Knights, 2024.
  • 5 Heinze, 2018; Transfeld, 2016; Durac, 2013.

1As the war in Yemen approaches its decade mark, bookshelves are filling with an assorted collection of volumes dissecting its root causes1, conflict parties2, proxy dynamics3, global repercussions4 as well analysis on the shortcomings of the nation’s post-2011 transition process5. Yet, the voices of Yemenis themselves—grappling with notions of identity and belonging amidst the conflict—remain largely absent. This article seeks to address this gap by focusing on the Yemeni exilic community in Egypt, exploring how contested national imaginaries are sustained and reimagined in exile. These imaginaries, embodied in cultural symbols and performative practices, persist despite Yemen’s fractured socio-political fabric, raising questions about their resilience and the tensions they evoke.

  • 6 Yadav, 2022, p. 45.
  • 7 Hall, 2017, p. 98.
  • 8 Young, 2010.
  • 9 Hall, 2017, p. 102; Augustin, 2021.

2Such questions are inextricably linked to the context of Yemen’s fragile unity project. Long a “discursive object”6, Yemeni unity was realized in 1990 with the merger of two states with fundamentally divergent ideologies and economic systems7. In the subsequent decade, Yemen’s leadership sought to consolidate the newly unified state through state-sponsored spectacles and ceremonies to craft a national identity8. This nation-building project, however, encountered profound challenges. The political, economic and cultural dominance of the northern elite, combined with the maintenance of hereditary customs under Saleh’s neo-patrimonial authoritarian regime, exacerbated political and economic inequalities, leaving many in the South feeling excluded from the new republic9.

  • 10 Day, 2012, p. 309.
  • 11 Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2013.
  • 12 Durac, 2013.
  • 13 Uhlenhaut & al-Mowafak, 2024.
  • 14 Al-Thawr, 2021, p. 121.

3These grievances, along with competing regional interests across Yemen’s complex topography10, have long shaped the country’s fragmented identity. The 2011 uprising momentarily bridged these divides, serving as a unifying moment for Yemenis11, as evidenced by the emergence of grassroots movements12. This period, described by some as a “short-lived Yemeni renaissance”13, saw a flourishing of artistic activity and an expansion of political and civic spaces. National symbols were reclaimed to envision a more egalitarian society. However, the transition was ultimately derailed by the actions of entrenched elites and long-standing power dynamics, extinguishing hopes for a reimagined national future and resulting in a web of conflict between local, national, and regional power struggles. Thus, the current war has further deepened “differences among social segments and contributed to complicating the Yemeni identity conflict”14. These tensions were not confined to Yemen but travelled with Yemenis into exile.

  • 15 Poirier, 2022, p. 8.

4This article situates its empirical analysis within the Yemeni diaspora in Cairo—a city deeply intertwined with Yemen’s cultural and political history and “home to supporters and representatives of all major political organisations”15. Cairo offers a unique vantage point to examine how national imaginaries are sustained, reconfigured, and sometimes resisted, as it hosts the region’s largest and most heterogeneous Yemeni communities. Since the outbreak of the war in 2015, Egypt has emerged as a primary destination for Yemenis seeking refuge, education, healthcare, and employment. The city serves not merely as a waypoint, but as a hub for the cultural and political preservation of Yemen, even as its diasporic community struggles with the constraints of exile and the realities of autocratic governance in Egypt.

  • 16 Wedeen, 2008.

5The article opens by tracing Cairo’s historical role as a key destination for Yemeni migration, highlighting its prominence as a political and cultural hub in the Arab World under the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This historical foundation provides context for understanding the contemporary Yemeni diaspora in Cairo, particularly after 2015, when shifting migration policies and entrenched structural inequalities began to shape their experiences more profoundly. From this backdrop, the article develops an analysis grounded in the theoretical framework of social imaginaries, exploring how diasporic life in Egypt reflects both a continuation and reimagining of Yemen’s socio-political dynamics. These imaginaries—layered with nostalgia, disillusionment, and resilience— are reproduced within this particular diasporic community, given its size and heterogeneity. Socio-political activities take on vibrant hues within Cairo, as political elites, artists, and educators engage in performative practices reminiscent of their homeland16.

6The analysis centres on two central themes: performing unity and constructing gender identities during wartime and exile. These themes are explored through two key events that, while marginal compared to the many activities in Cairo, serve as entry points to discuss deeper underlying issues.

7The first is the 33rd anniversary celebration of Yemen’s unification in May 2023, held at the Yemeni embassy in Cairo. This event, taking place amidst Yemen’s fractured political reality, underscored the enduring narratives rooted in the power structures of the former regime. While the celebration presented a performative assertion of national unity, its reception among the Yemeni community in Cairo revealed stark tensions. Many participants critiqued the event’s inability to address contemporary realities, viewing it as a futile nostalgic reproduction of a Yemen that no longer exists.

8The second event analysed is the “Light of Art” exhibition, held at the Cairo Opera House from 18–23 February 2023, similarly aligned with traditional power structures, particularly through the depiction of gender roles within the Yemeni social imaginary. Despite the potential of artistic expression to challenge accepted social norms, the space of the exhibition in Cairo appeared to replicate the past through the proliferation of the female image in conjunction with the notion of Yemeni culture, identity, and heritage. These representations, while vibrant, failed to disrupt the traditional dynamics they purported to celebrate, instead reaffirming the socio-political hierarchies that have long defined Yemen’s social and political landscape. While the dominance of political elites and the autocratic constraints of Egypt limit opportunities for alternative narratives, small pockets of dissent and creative expression do emerge within this diaspora. However, efforts towards political and social mobilisation are often met with restrictions bolstered by the autocratic environment of Egypt, leaving little room for nuanced discourse about Yemen’s present challenges or future prospects. Egypt thus serves as a backdrop where an ‘old Yemen’ is nostalgically reproduced; a Yemen that no longer reflects the realities of contemporary life, whether in Sana’a or Aden.

1. Methodology

9The findings presented in this study are based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork and 35 in-depth interviews conducted between November 2022 and July 2023. This research draws on a collaborative effort, with each researcher leveraging distinct networks within the Yemeni diaspora in Cairo to build a diverse and comprehensive dataset. One researcher engaged primarily with artistic and cultural circles, as well as individuals active in the humanitarian sector, while the other focused on professional networks, including journalists, activists, academics, and educators, alongside individuals affiliated with the former Saleh-regime, such as party members of the General People’s Congress (GPC) and military personnel. This multi-faceted approach allowed for a nuanced exploration of the social, cultural, and political dimensions of Yemeni diasporic life in Cairo.

10Access, however, was often challenging due to the sensitivity of the subject matter and the existing mistrust towards foreign researchers and individuals outside the immediate community. Positionality also played a significant role in shaping access and responses. One researcher, a white British male, and the other, a German-Egyptian woman of colour, experienced differing levels of trust and openness among participants. The interviews were semi-structured, allowing participants to guide the conversation and prioritize topics they considered most significant. Nonetheless, the discussions generally revolved around key themes, including participants’ sentiments toward their homeland amidst the ongoing conflict, perspectives on the government(s), political institutions, the meaning of national holidays, and their experiences of adapting to life in Egypt, along with the challenges this transition entails.

2. Theoretical underpinning and definition of Concepts: Social imaginaries

  • 17 Taylor, 2004, p. 23.
  • 18 Taylor, 2004, p. 23.
  • 19 Taylor, 2004, p. 29.
  • 20 Browne & Diehl, 2019.

11Our analysis of Yemeni national imaginaries draws on the theoretical framework of social imaginaries, particularly Charles Taylor’s concept, which examines how individuals “imagine their social existence” to establish “common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy”17. These imaginaries are expressed through language, gestures, stories, symbols and legends, sustaining a sense of belonging, mutual expectations, and meaningful public interaction within society18. As Taylor observes, elites often shape these imaginaries, influencing the frameworks that underpin political culture and social cohesion19. By studying imaginaries, we can trace the formation and transformation of political communities, understand the imagined foundations of the political, and trace how new political alternatives are envisioned20. This analysis will accentuate the dual nature of social imaginaries: they are both products of power and contested spaces where new possibilities emerge. By applying this theoretical framework to Yemen and situating these imaginaries within Yemen’s national and diasporic contexts, we can gain a deeper understanding of how national imaginaries are sustained, negotiated, and contested within the Yemeni diaspora.

  • 21 Cohen, 2023, p. 1 (emphasis original).
  • 22 Brubaker, 2005.

12We define diaspora using Robin Cohen's broad definition:Members of a defined group who have been dispersed to many destinations; they construct a shared identity; they still orient themselves to an original ‘home’; and they demonstrate an affinity with other members of the group dispersed to other places21. Although, we must stress that the limits of this definition are tested when we recognise the different spheres within which the concept of a Yemeni diaspora is being mobilised in Cairo. As such, the Yemeni diaspora must be studied for its content, practices, and claims, given that it is often the case that a few claim the many to be part of their diaspora. This follows Rogers Brubaker’s work on diaspora which seeks to avoid the overreliance on, or use of, groupist perspectives22.

II. Cairo as a Historical Destination for Yemenis

  • 23 Orkaby, 2017; Dawisha, 1975; Blumi, 2018;
  • 24 Witty, 2001.
  • 25 Tsourapas, 2018, p. 401. See also Witty, 2001; Thiollet, 2014; Al-Absi, 2020.
  • 26 Orkaby, 2017; Poirier, 2022, p. 6; Nasser, 2018.

13Cairo has played a significant role in the modern history of Yemeni migration, a connection that dates back to the mid-20th century when Egypt emerged as a key destination for Yemenis, particularly before and during the 1962–1970 Civil War in North Yemen. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabist ambitions led to direct military intervention23 with thousands of Egyptian troops deployed to support the republican forces seeking to establish a new republic24. Egypt’s engagement with Yemen extended to high-skilled labour emigration too, as Egyptian teachers, medical professionals, and engineers joined the spread of “pan-Arabism, anti-Zionism, and anti-colonialism across the Arab world”25. Nasser’s government also made significant efforts to attract many Yemenis—whether from the North or the South—encouraging students, military officers, and intellectuals to come to Cairo for education and training. Scholarships and opportunities for advanced training were a huge draw, with Egypt also providing refuge to Yemeni revolutionaries, intellectuals, and activists26. Cairo thus emerged as a vital centre for developing the republican ideologies that would shape the future of Yemen.

  • 27 Kangas, 2011.
  • 28 Al-Absi, 2020, p. 6.
  • 29 Nasser, 2018.
  • 30 Poirier 2022, p. 8.
  • 31 For instance, the café, Zahra al-Mîdân in Dokki, hosted meetings of Yemeni Nassersists in the 1960s

14Over time, Cairo emerged as a pivotal centre for Yemenis, who viewed Egypt not only as a refuge for political activism but also as a destination offering opportunities in education, entrepreneurship, arts, and healthcare27, almost becoming a second home for some. This accessibility was facilitated by Egypt’s historically open-door policy, which allowed Yemenis to enter without a visa and reside indefinitely without the need for a formal permit28. Yemenis began to establish roots in Cairo, building networks, purchasing property, and integrating into the city’s social fabric. Those with financial means often invested in property, passing apartments on to subsequent generations who used these apartments as their accommodation for university studies. Areas such as Dokki, Manial and Mohandesin have a well-established Yemeni presence, creating a sense of community and fostering what could be described as “little-Yemen”29 within the city. Dokki, in particular, is associated with the Yemeni political elite30, given its proximity to the Yemeni embassy and the presence of Yemeni-owned businesses, including convenience stores, cafes and restaurants31.

  • 32 A doctor by training, Ghanem became an ethnomusicologist and lived in Sudan for many years. Arrived (...)

15Cultural organizations such as the “Yemeni Cultural Centre”, operating under the oversight of the Yemeni embassy, and student unions like Râbiṭa Ṭulâb al-Yaman and Nâdî al-Shabâb al-Yamanî became central to Yemeni life in Egypt, helping the community maintain strong ties to their homeland and navigate the big city. Today, Cairo remains an important site for all political factions, Yemeni political dialogue and cultural life, given that “at one time or another, almost all of these groups have shaken hands with the Egyptian intelligence forces, have had interests here” as distinguished scholar and physician, Nizar Ghanem32, shared with us.

III. Yemeni migration to Egypt post-2015

1. From open doors to closed borders

  • 33 Choi & Park, 2020; Peutz, 2019; Aljamal, 2015; cf. Kermeliotis, 2019.
  • 34 Al-Eriani, 2021.

16Yemeni mobility, formerly celebrated as part of a broader cultural and political exchange, is now increasingly framed through the lens of crisis and security concerns, reflecting a profound shift in the dynamics of migration. This shift is not unique to Egypt; it aligns with a broader global trend in which restrictive migration policies33, xenophobia and patterns of marginalization34 have become more pervasive, with Yemenis facing exclusion in various other host countries.

  • 35 Tsourapas, 2020.
  • 36 For the IOM definition of a migrant see IOM, 2019, p. 132.
  • 37 IOM, 2022b; cf. IOM, 2022a.
  • 38 Naceur, 2024.
  • 39 Abdel Fattah, 2021.
  • 40 El-Shaarawi, 2021.
  • 41 El-Shaarawi, 2021.
  • 42 Norman, 2019, p. 49.
  • 43 Syed Zwick, 2022.
  • 44 Norman, 2019.

17Egypt’s immigration policies today are often ambiguous and can be broadly interpreted as a manifestation of state indifference to its migrant population. Egypt lies “at the heart of regional migration processes”35, with an estimated nine million international migrants36 from 133 countries residing within its borders37. In response, the Egyptian government has positioned migration as a matter of national security, with a primary focus on combating irregular migration and overlooking the protection and rights of migrants and refugees38. By classifying migrants as “temporary”, Egypt effectively denies them adequate protection and limits prospects for long-term integration39, instead expecting them to eventually “move on”40. The burden of care has largely fallen to UNHCR, which often outsources41 this duty to other nongovernmental organizations42. These conditions have turned Egypt into a transit destination where many migrants feel stuck or “stranded”43, as only very few successfully make their way to Western countries, while the majority end up “lingering”44 until they can eventually go back to their home country.

  • 45 IOM, 2022b.
  • 46 Al-Absi, 2020, p. 5; see the statement by Maher al-Yamany, reported in “Yemeni community in Egypt u (...)
  • 47 Poirier, 2022, p. 6; Al-Absi, 2020.
  • 48 al-Batati, 2023.

18These conditions have also affected the Yemeni population in Egypt, which has grown significantly, with an estimated one million Yemenis residing there as of August 202245, representing a significant increase in comparison with pre-war figures of around 70,00046. Initially, Yemenis were granted an entry visa upon arrival and then required to apply for a six-month residency permit, with exemptions for those under 18 or over 5047. However, starting in 2023, Egypt imposed increasingly tight restrictions, requiring Yemenis to obtain visas in advance and mandating additional medical reports from Egyptian hospitals for those seeking treatment, ruling Yemeni medical reports no longer sufficient. These restrictions culminated in the deportation of numerous Yemenis arriving from Aden on April 2, 2023, who failed to meet the new entry conditions set by Cairo48.

  • 49 UNHCR, 2024.
  • 50 UNHCR, 2020.
  • 51 For possible explanations see the discussions in Hearn, 2024, p. 51-57; al-Absi, 2022, p. 15-17; cf (...)

19Despite the estimated one million Yemenis in Egypt, the number of those seeking protection status with UNHCR remains surprisingly low. As of November 2024, only 8,196 Yemenis49 are registered as asylum seekers or refugees, reflecting a slight decline from the 9,256 registered in 202050. While this decline may seem minor, it highlights a significant disparity, as the registered population represents only a fraction of the Yemeni diaspora in Egypt51.

2. Navigating displacement: Social realities and diasporic life in Cairo

20Since the outbreak of the 2015 war, Yemeni networks in Cairo have expanded significantly, with heightened activity across various sectors and professions. Journalists, researchers, and educators have continued their professional pursuits, Yemeni business, led by such companies as the Hayel Saeed Anam Group and Shaher Trading, has established new ventures, and artists and filmmakers have sustained their creative activities. Initially, in 2015, this diasporic community relied on pre-existing networks and social connections to navigate life in exile. Over time, these networks have evolved to form their own distinct micro-societies, that while culturally unique and separate from their Egyptian surroundings, replicate the same hierarchies and inequalities that characterize Yemeni society, allowing the privileged few to retain access to resources and opportunities inaccessible to the majority.

A. Spatial patterns and socioeconomic divisions

  • 52 Al-Absi, 2020, p. 7.
  • 53 Having discovered he was being monitored by Ansar Allah intelligence, Tarek, in his mid-forties, fl (...)

21Yemenis are scattered across the city, but their choice of residence correlates strongly with income and social status. Individuals with limited income are predominantly concentrated in Giza52, particularly in neighbourhoods such as Ard El-Liwa, Faisal, and El Behouth. Among these, Faisal stands out as a central hub for Yemeni migrants, attracting newcomers and those seeking medical treatment with its affordable housing, proximity to cafés, shops, and Yemeni restaurants. Particularly around Street Twenty, the neighbourhood acts as a microcosm of Yemeni life, where the scent of traditional spices, the sight of familiar clothing, and the warmth of Yemeni cafés recreate the rhythms of life back home. As Tarek53, an activist and journalist who fled Houthi persecution in Yemen in 2021, explained “everything they need is nearby—Yemeni restaurants, Yemeni spices, and people around them make it feel like a Yemeni province.” He frequently visits the area to shop and meet his friend for tea.

  • 54 This former Brigadier General (aged 58) arrived in Cairo in 2015 following the fall of Sana’a to An (...)
  • 55 Poirier, 2022, p. 8.

22In contrast, those of higher socioeconomic status often avoid Faisal, perceiving it as overcrowded and unsafe. Instead, they gravitate toward gated communities like Sheikh Zayed, Al-Rehab, and 6th of October City, seeking a quieter environment away from the city’s hustle and bustle, looking for exclusivity and insulation from the perceived chaos of Faisal. A former army general54 now residing in Sheikh Zayed remarked: “In the eight years I’ve spent in Egypt, I’ve only been to Faisal twice. It’s very crowded, and you can be exposed to theft. You might get asthma from the smoke and cars.” These preferences underscore a persistent psychological and social detachment, with class-based prejudices shaping diasporic life in Cairo. Despite Yemeni expatriates historically establishing themselves in the city-centre around Dokki and El Manial, there is a discernible shift among the wealthy Yemeni class towards suburban gated communities 55, mirroring Egypt’s long-standing trend of burgeoning business elites seeking exclusive tranquil living away from the congested city centre.

B. The role of personal networks

  • 56 For more information, refer to Barnett, Yandle & Naufal, 2013; Ridge, 2023; Egan & Tabar, 2016; Jon (...)
  • 57 A 29-year old researcher and activist. Arrived in Cairo in 2017 after discovering she was wanted by (...)

23Beyond spatial divisions, personal networks play a pivotal role in organizing life within the Yemeni diaspora. Indeed, in a city where bureaucratic processes are often perceived as inaccessible and burdensome, personal connections – referred to locally as wasta56 – become a crucial resource. Amal57, an academic and political activist who fled to Cairo in 2017, noted:

“If you have connections, things get done very quickly. Honestly, I know it’s not a good approach, but we use it. If we know someone in the embassy we reach out to them, because they quickly resolve the matter. But if you don’t have connections, things can come to a halt, and you’ll have to wait in lines”.

  • 58 Aged 34. Came to Cairo in 2019. Interviewed in July 2023.

24Similarly, Reham58, a human rights lawyer who came to Cairo in 2019 and works on refugee cases, emphasised the importance of personal networks, stating, “It all depends on your relationships with Yemeni and Egyptian authority figures. Do you know people in power or people of influence? That’s what matters”. In a place where access to resources and opportunities often hinges on personal connections, institutional trust also remains low: “We shouldn’t rely much on the government unless we have connections,” Reham remarked.

25While these challenges reflect the broader difficulties of navigating Egyptian bureaucracy, impacting citizens and migrants alike, they are significantly exacerbated for migrants. Access to essential services, from residency permits to passports or medical care, often hinges on the ability to leverage social connections. Relationships with key authority figures—whether Yemeni or Egyptian—become crucial for navigating and overcoming these administrative hurdles. In addition to one’s socioeconomic background and personal networks, regional affiliations also play a substantial role in shaping interactions and building trust within the Yemeni community in Cairo. For instance, surnames, which identify a person’s familial or geographical origins, are used as a barometer by which a stranger may adapt their behaviour or limit the types of information they may be willing to share.

C. Grassroots mobilization

  • 59 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 6.
  • 60 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 6.

26Amid these challenging conditions, where reliance on formal institutions is minimal, grassroots mobilization and networks of solidarity have emerged as lifelines for Yemenis. These efforts are often led by Yemeni students and community activists, who have stepped in to address the gaps left by the absence of institutional support59. Networks providing aid and medical treatment have become particularly significant in the context of the ongoing conflict, responding to the urgent needs of those most affected by displacement. Initiatives like Mubadara provide psycho-social support and job training for refugees, addressing the immediate needs of those most affected by war and displacement60. Other organizations include, Jûd, Bilqîs, al-Yaman al-Sa‘îd, Mujtama‘, and Mubâdara Ṣarḥ Shabâb. These humanitarian and charity-based networks often collaborate with international humanitarian organisations, while others have innovatively established independent initiatives tailored to the specific needs of the Yemeni community. These grassroots efforts underscore the potential for new forms of solidarity to challenge entrenched hierarchies within the diaspora. By prioritizing inclusivity and community-driven solutions, they carve out alternative pathways for navigating the complexities of life in exile.

IV. Reproducing and Performing Yemen Abroad

  • 61 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 5-6.

27The reproduction of social imaginaries within the Yemeni diaspora takes shape through cultural and creative activities that serve as common reference points, fostering a sense of identity. Institutions such as the Sabaa Center for Culture and Art established in 2020 by Mohammed Saba in Faisal and initiatives like the Raufa Hassan Cultural Forum and the Yemeni Cultural Centre anchor these efforts by providing spaces for artistic and social activities. Further contributions to intellectual engagement are fostered by publishing houses. For example, Arowqa, established in 2010 by Hani Al Selwi, disseminates Yemeni literature and enables writers, academics, and even former politicians and government ministers to publish their work61. Through art performances, book launches, literary events, poetry readings, festivals and music shows, Yemenis in Cairo engage in acts of national imagination, reaffirming both connection to Yemen and nurturing a sense of collective belonging in the diaspora. A prominent example of this cultural vitality is the Heritage Symphonies project, led by Muhammad Al-Ghoom, which blends traditional Yemeni music with orchestral styles. Featuring folk instruments, dances, and traditional attire, the concerts celebrate Yemen’s cultural richness while engaging international audiences.

Fig.1

Fig.1

A Yemeni dance troupe performing at a wedding in Faisal, Cairo, 2023. The same dance troupe also performed at the Yemeni embassy.

Photographer Jonathan Hearn.

  • 62 Caton, 1990; Miller, 2002.
  • 63 Wedeen, 2008; Carapico, 1998.
  • 64 Poirier, 2013, p. 8.
  • 65 Adra, 1998, p. 94.

28These cultural activities, while safeguarding Yemen’s diverse legacy, are deeply intertwined with the country’s political landscape and are not divorced from political contestation62. Historically, cultural symbols have been utilized by Yemen’s political elites to legitimize their authority, thus socio-cultural activities have been instrumental in the conduct of Yemeni politics. During the Saleh regime cultural symbols have been deployed as a means of promoting national unity 63. Representatives of the former ruling party, the GPC, founded in 1982, monopolized – and in many cases “confiscated ‘tradition’ (historical, religious, tribal, etc.) as a resource for political legitimisation”64. By exerting control over these cultural symbols, the GPC shaped nationalist discourse in a manner that prioritized particular northern traditions, presenting them as representative of the national identity of the newly unified Republic of Yemen. As such “tribal markers […] came to symbolize a new Yemen who is somehow both tribal and urban”65. This strategy effectively marginalized Yemen’s pluralistic identities, entrenching inequalities and suppressing alternative expressions of identity and solidarity.

  • 66 See King, 2012.
  • 67 See Augustin, 2021.
  • 68 Manea, 2024, p. 78.
  • 69 Manea, 2024, p. 78.

29In response to this cultural hegemony, various movements have sought to challenge the monopolization of cultural heritage, often advancing exclusionary narratives themselves. Among these are the Zaydi revivalist movement, from which Ansar Allah emerged66; the Southern Movement67; and, more recently, the Al-Aqyal movement, which reconfigures pre-Islamic symbols as counter-narratives to Houthi ideology. These competing visions of Yemen’s identity also manifest within Cairo’s diaspora, with intellectual figures associated with the Al-Aqyal movement regularly sharing their views through public forums and media. The movement constructs a primordialist nationalist narrative that glorifies the Qahtani lineage of “true” Yemenis while rejecting Zaydi Hashemites as foreign impostors from the Hijaz region of Saudi-Arabia68. However, in invoking ancestral rhetoric, the movement mirrors the racial and genealogical politics it aims to oppose. As Elham Manea notes, such genealogical assertions have deepened conflict dynamics, with bloodlines becoming markers of belonging and targets of violence during the war69.

  • 70 Hennessey, 2015.
  • 71 Caton 1990; Kendall 2015.
  • 72 Alviso-Marino, 2014, 2017; al-Jeddawy, al-Kholidy & Nevens, 2021.
  • 73 al-Jeddawy, al-Kholidy & Nevens, 2021, p. 22.

30Yet, not all cultural expressions within the diaspora adopt exclusionary frameworks or revolve around narrow discussions of ancestry and lineage. Since the 2011 protest movement, Yemen’s cultural art scene has been a powerful vehicle in challenging societal norms and articulating aspirations for a better future. Artists have utilized various mediums such as theatre70, poetry71, and the visual arts72 to reimagine a Yemen beyond existing ideas. However, as conflict took hold and opposition to art increased, this initial artistic enthusiasm slowly diminished. Today, many Yemeni artists are concerned about potential repercussions for participating in art exhibitions or sharing their work publicly, having encountered threats from local authorities seeking to regulate the production of art73.

  • 74 Poirier, 2022.

31Amid this decline in artistic autonomy, cultural spaces have increasingly become dominated by Yemeni political elites. As Marine Poirier’s research suggests, political activity in Cairo often unfolds through social and cultural gatherings rather than through traditional channels. Cairo has become a hub for Yemeni political elites, serving as a space for rebuilding Yemeni political life outside the country. These gatherings, which are attended by former ministers, advisors, party representatives, and MPs, provide venues for political discussions, the formation of alliances and the dissemination of official narratives74. The diminishing presence of independent artists in these spaces further consolidates the influence of political elites over cultural production.

  • 75 Abdulhadi, 2024, p. 3.

32Private Yemeni schools in Cairo equally function as sites of cultural performance and identity negotiation, albeit with a focus on younger generations. The first private Yemeni school opened in Cairo in 2017, and there are now eight such institutions, all teaching the Yemeni national curriculum75. The director of one of such school explained how national holidays such as Unity Day, the September 26th Revolution Day, and the October 14th Revolution are celebrated through school activities including performances, speeches, and songs. These events are intended to instil a sense of national pride and unity, even amid current divisions. By involving the entire school community in these commemorations, the school ensures that the significance of these dates is preserved, reinforcing a collective memory of Yemen’s revolutionary past and aspirations for unity:

“We make sure that our revolutions don’t die, even though we’re in Egypt; our revolutions won’t perish. Everyone partakes in these celebrations, but the goal will remain the same: to raise the unified Yemeni flag, despite knowing that some desire secession. As the school’s principal, I always remind the students of this date [22 May] through my speeches and words spoken at the school.”

  • 76 See Hearn, 2024, p. 99-105.

33These performances of unity, while helping to the maintain a Yemeni identity abroad, also occur in tension with the societal divisions and conflicting visions of Yemen’s political future76. Thus, while cultural performances and traditions are integral to maintaining Yemen’s collective memory, they are also tools wielded by political elites to propagate specific national narratives. As these schools are primarily managed by the Yemeni Ministry of Education under the authority of the Internationally Recognized Government, they embody an effort by Yemeni authorities to preserve outdated state-centric national imaginaries. Unity celebrations, in particular, continue to be performed as a way of enacting the nation amid ongoing war and division.

1. Celebrating Yemeni (dis)unity in Cairo

34In Cairo, the Yemeni embassy serves as one site for cultivating a Yemeni national imaginary, particularly through its organization of public events imbued with national symbolism. Similar to the cultural gatherings and school celebrations discussed above, the embassy’s events echo pre-war state practices, where cultural performances and national holidays were historically appropriated to project a vision of unity. The annual celebration of Yemen’s 1990 unification, for example, is held at the embassy with the intent of sustaining a unifying national discourse—a narrative foundational to the authority of both the former regime and the current Internationally Recognized Government. These celebrations are deliberate enactments of public discourse, seeking to perform the “united” nation amidst ongoing war.

35The 33rd anniversary celebration of Yemen’s Unification took place on May 23, 2023, on the premises of the Yemeni embassy in Dokki, Cairo. The Yemeni Ambassador to Cairo gave a short address to the gathered attendees which emphasised the unity of the two revolutionary movements that had overthrown the Zaydi Imamate regime in the North and the British colonial power in the South in the 1960s. The complex relationship between North and South, which played out in the years between these revolutions and the 1990 unification and which saw inter-Yemen wars, went unspoken. Equally absent was any mention of the 2011 protest movement and its aftermath, a pivotal moment that ultimately contributed to the country’s descent into civil war after 2015. More attention was given to the destabilising and politically disastrous insurgency of the Ansar Allah party led by the al-Houthis.

Fig.2

Fig.2

A Yemeni dance troupe performing at a wedding in Faisal, Cairo, 2023. The same dance troupe also performed at the Yemeni embassy.

Photographer Jonathan Hearn.

  • 77 Adra, 1993; Adra, 1998.
  • 78 Weeden, 2008, p. 85.

36Following the Ambassador’s address, around 150 celebrants were invited to witness the cutting of an anniversary cake and enjoy a selection of cultural-artistic acts including vocal and instrumental performances, as well as a dance troupe who danced the bar’a, traditional Yemeni dancing. The bar’a’s inclusion is particularly noteworthy, as it highlights the enduring relationship between cultural performance and state narratives. Najwa Adra teased out the complex relationship between the bar’a dance and state formation in Yemen, arguing that dance was a means used by political elites to foster the concept of a unified Yemen in which Yemenis were citizens-in-common77. During the 10th anniversary celebrations of Yemen’s unification in Sana’a in 2000, Lisa Weeden argued that regional dances were subordinated to northern dominance through a form of hybridisation78. In Cairo, the Yemeni embassy continued this practice of co-opting dance as a national symbol to bolster its narrative of unity.

  • 79 Poirier, 2022, p. 16.

37The limited public event organized by the embassy, only two days before the celebration, occurred in a context where unity celebrations are highly contentious and subject to controversy. The efforts of political elites in perpetuating an outdated narrative have undermined the possibility for nuanced discourse about the reimagining of Yemen. Such reimagining was indeed set in motion through the National Dialogue Conference in 2013, a quasi-constitutional process during which diverse factions were convened to discuss a more inclusive state structure for Yemen. Despite the presence of individuals involved in the 2011 youth protests, the embassy event failed to capture a critical or revolutionary essence. It was rather a ritualistic and dry repetition of familiar structures. The anniversary celebration thus adds to Poirier’s own observations regarding Yemeni politics in Cairo that “mainly consists of the symbolic staging of political authority” particularly with respect to the use of media and the attempt “to embody fragmented institutions and organizations”79. Celebrating Yemen’s 1990 unification at a time when the state lies in disrepair is a clear attempt to prop up a deeply unstable narrative. But more than that, it is also a claim by some political elites in Cairo upon the political space of Yemenis at the expense of inviting new and alternative forms of political cooperation.

38Yemenis residing in Cairo are confronted with a dissonance between their presence within the city and the assertion of political power that seems to marginalize their existence. The embassy’s celebratory events garnered minimal interest among most of our Yemeni research participants outside of the political circles in Cairo. Instead, they expressed anger and frustration about the exclusivity of such events, which contrasts starkly with the purported mandate of the embassy to open its doors to all Yemeni migrants in Cairo. Notably, the discrepancy in access was underscored by the observation that, as foreign researchers, entry into the elite echelons was not a great obstacle to us. This observation highlights the glaring disparity between individuals afforded access to authority figures and the numerous Yemeni migrants in Cairo who contend with their challenges in isolation, excluded from such privileged circles.

2. From nostalgia to disillusionment

  • 80 Aged 39, arrived in Cairo in 2016 and established a number of small commercial enterprises in Faisa (...)

39Scepticism was voiced regarding the celebration of unity and many of our participants were perplexed by the festivities amid prevailing socio-economic hardships and the state of war in Yemen. Amal reinforces this scepticism, questioning the authenticity of such narratives and highlighting the performative nature of celebrating “Unity Day” as reduced to slogans and “false celebrations,” detached from the lived reality of a nation torn apart. She recounts being invited to speak about the holiday on a television program but declined, stating, “I don’t like to come and speak, celebrate, and say ‘peace’ while painting an unrealistic utopia when the reality is grim and the situation is terrible.” She explains how in contemporary times unity has lost its meaning: “In the North, the Houthis control it, and in parts of the South, each faction is controlled by an armed group”. Mohammed80, a small business owner in Faisal, laughed after hearing of the embassy event and pointed to the financial burdens he faces, such as the requirement to pay $50 USD for his mother’s medical report to facilitate her treatment in Cairo.

  • 81 A sentiment shared by Amal and Tarek.
  • 82 Aged 35, relocated to Cairo after finishing his university education in Beirut. Interviewed in July (...)

40In particular, a younger generation of Yemeni migrants in Cairo were ambivalent about marking the unification anniversary in any meaningful way. Social media engagement with the day’s events was largely restricted to the political elites associated with the former regime and individuals with ties to embassy officials. Outside of the embassy, discussions about unity and its celebration often turned into a sensitive and loaded topic, with some research participants expressing sentiments of nostalgia for a time when the idea of unity was “joyful” and has now turned into pain81. The perception of Yemeni unity has evolved into a “sad memory” and “a nightmare for the citizens in the South” as stated by Ahmed82, a TV and radio program producer from Hadramaut, who came to Cairo in 2021. Some participants who harbour strong feelings towards southern secession, perceived the celebrations of unity as an offense. Others reminisced about the noble idealism and “grand project” unity once was, lamenting the stark disparity with the current state of disunity in Yemen. For many Yemenis in Cairo, unity is regarded as an illusion, a symbolic reminder of what could have been. As Amal neatly puts it, celebrating this day while “living within a conflict” merely serves to intensify the prevailing sentiment of betrayal, as if it were a form of mockery.

  • 83 In his early 30s, Ramy grew up in Aden but left for Cairo in 2016 with his mother to escape the unc (...)
  • 84 Naar, 2023.
  • 85 Bin Othman, 2023.
  • 86 Ardemagni, 2023.

41Hope for a united Yemen is equally unstable. Alternative affiliations such as ‘the South,’ ‘Aden,’ and ‘Hadramaut’ were often used by our participants when talk of Yemeni unity silenced past and present grievances with Yemen’s governing authorities. Ramy83, an English teacher who chose to leave Aden with his mother after the al-Houthi regime entered the city in 2015, felt there was little freedom in Cairo to discuss the possible futures of the Yemeni state if its underlying unity was questioned. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have grown among Adeni and Hadrami activists. In June 2023 the “Hadramaut National Council” was established and images of an independent Hadrami flag circulated social media, sparking a heated debate about the splintering of Yemen84. In some quarters, the loss of a unified Yemeni identity is to be lamented85. For others, it merely reveals the precarity of such identifications in the face of deeply felt past grievances86.

  • 87 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021.
  • 88 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 7.
  • 89 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 7.
  • 90 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 7.

42Yet, active mobilisation in Cairo remains heavily restricted, as already pointed out by Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, who explained how concerns over exacerbating internal tensions within Yemen have significantly constrained political mobilization within the diaspora87. This limitation is further compounded by the “absence of a democratic atmosphere” in Egypt88. Despite a desire for greater political expression, the authoritarian context of Egypt stifles opportunities for oppositional organizing. Yemenis have developed “workarounds to organize in Egypt”, yet these efforts remain limited in scope and are insufficient in challenging the broader political and social constraints they face89. Thus, as Shuja Al-Deen explains “diaspora organization is more limited to either cultural activities or the provision of services to those in Egypt”90.

43The limitations to active mobilisation were evident in the following incident narrated to us by a research participant: A group of Yemenis planned to commemorate the launch of South Yemen’s uprisings against British occupation in 1963 by raising the former southern flag from the socialist era at the “Liberty Park” on October 14, 2022. Despite warnings from the Yemeni embassy, some young people proceeded with the flag-raising, leading to their arrest by Egyptian police. The embassy distanced itself from the actions of these individuals, emphasising that gatherings must be under the banner of the Yemeni government. As a result, Liberty Park, which up to that point was a common place for Yemenis to congregate, faced restrictions. This case highlights the particular sensitivities surrounding the display of flags and national symbols in Egypt. While Egyptian authorities appear relatively permissive toward the public use of Yemen’s unity flag—as evidenced by flag-raising events on the Corniche in September 2024 and in Faisal during the 2022 Soccer Asia Cup—symbols perceived as separatist, such as the southern flag, are deemed problematic. The distinction lies in Egypt’s reluctance to be seen as endorsing separatist activism on its soil, which risks its entanglement in Yemen’s internal disputes and the straining of diplomatic ties with the Yemeni government. It also underscores the broader implications for communal spaces and limited public freedoms in Cairo. A climate of heightened surveillance and a prevailing sense of suspicion constricts political activities to a rare and discrete domain.

  • 91 An accountant for the Ministry of Education, living in Aden. He was interviewed in June 2023 while (...)

44As a consequence, numerous Yemenis have opted to refrain from engaging in political discourse or debate, apprehensive of encountering repression. This apprehension toward political participation can also be linked to a profound sense of fatigue. For many, the cyclical violence and instability in Yemen have made political engagement seem futile. Ammar91, a 69-year-old accountant who regularly visits Cairo to see his daughter, shared how this exhaustion has permeated the diaspora, contributing to a widespread reluctance to engage in political debates or activism:

“Throughout my life, I’ve witnessed upheavals! Throughout my life, I’ve been in a state of political conflict for power in Yemen. I had hoped that my children could live without this political conflict. However, in the end, I continued, my children completed university, and the political conflict still persists.”

45This prevailing political apathy further stems from a sense of disillusionment and defeat among ordinary citizens, who have grown disenchanted with Yemen’s political trajectory and have lost faith in the ability of the political elite to effect substantial change within the nation’s governance framework. Political elites, instead of offering a vision for the future, are often perceived as more invested in preserving the illusion of unity, opting to celebrate an annual national narrative that contrasts sharply with the reality on the ground. For many ordinary Yemenis, these celebrations come to feel like hollow gestures, deepening the sense of detachment from the political structures that once claimed to represent them.

V. Art as a Space for Negotiating Yemeni Social Imaginaries?

46The “Light of Art” exhibition served as a potential site for negotiating Yemeni social imaginaries, especially in the context of the war and national fragmentation. Held at the Cairo Opera House from 18-23 February 2023, the exhibition presented an opportunity for Yemeni artists to showcase their work in an environment of relative freedom from the restrictive conditions imposed by the Ansar Allah authorities in the North. Organised by the Arab Forum for Art and sponsored by Light for Media Foundation, the exhibition aimed to amplify Yemen’s creative art scene. With seventy art pieces, ranging from fine art and calligraphy to photography and even puppetry, the exhibition became an arena where art interacted with the broader Yemeni social imaginary.

Fig.3

Fig.3

A photograph taken at the Light of Art Exhibition in Cairo, 2023.

Photographer Jonathan Hearn.

1. Yemeni Women the “Guardians of Yemeni Heritage”?

  • 92 Edensor, 2002, p. 108.
  • 93 Kandiyoti, 1991, p. 434.
  • 94 Kandiyoti, 1991, p. 431.

47Upon reviewing the pieces showcased at the “Light of Art” exhibition, one cannot ignore the dominance of artworks portraying women. These depictions serve as the primary embodiment of the Yemeni imaginary, with many explicitly connecting the image of Yemeni women to the broader concept of Yemeni identity and culture. The female figure, often shown in colourful, traditional attire, becomes a symbolic embodiment of collective identity. As Edensor eloquently describes: “it is very often the responsibility of women to carry national culture on their bodies by wearing national or ‘traditional’ clothing”92. The exhibition sets out a prevailing theme wherein women are constrained to a state of fixity, tasked with the responsibility of upholding the idealised image of true Yemeni identity. Yet, this static depiction of Yemenis within the cultural context of Yemen does not align with the complexity and variability inherent to the actual experience of Yemeni women. One specific piece of artwork by Sa‘ada Mahmoud al-Qatawi, titled Dungeon, has captured this complexity. The artwork depicts Queen Bilqis in a scene of captivity. Despite the connotation of servitude, the portrayal of Yemeni women through the lens of this legendary queen from ancient Yemen hints at their latent potential for assuming roles of political leadership. The artistic piece evokes the dual burden women face in Yemen: they are tasked with preserving Yemeni cultural heritage and the chaste nation, while also possessing the capability to lead the nation forward. As Kandiyoti reminds us: although women are granted rights to participate in political discourse in the formation of nation states, “the very language of nationalism singles women out as the symbolic repository of group identity”93. In the pursuit of reaffirming “authentic cultural values” women become “privileged bearers of cultural authenticity” and thus “hostages” to emerging national projects94.

  • 95 Hearn, 2024, p. 85-86.

48Various artworks vividly depict this theme of burden; for instance in Hadhrami Culture by Nisreen Bin Sanad, a woman bears the cultural symbols of the region upon her head, as various Hadhrami buildings are overlayed on the surface of a bread basket. The fusion between women in traditional attire and architecture arises in several paintings. A work by Bushra al-Haboob, titled Yemen Culture, features a woman in the familiar black abaya of the capital, Sana’a. This young woman carries the famous Old City in her hands, an image repeated in Haifa Sufyan Al Dhafri’s Give Peace to Sana’a. These depictions underscore the idea that women carry the weight of the nation on their shoulders. But more than that, the prevalence of these motifs, which also combine with pre-Islamic symbols—such as the Ancient South Arabian script—suggests their significance as markers of Yemeni social imaginaries95. In fact, the equivalence between women, dress, and architecture is a central theme of Identity by Hanan Al-Qubaisi, in which the boundaries between the three are dissolved as they merge into one.

  • 96 Boehmer, 2005; Kaiser, 2002; Nagel, 1998.
  • 97 Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1993.
  • 98 Heß & Klee, 2021.
  • 99 Heß & Klee, 2021.

49The female personification of the nation has been widely discussed in academic literature, particularly in relation to the process of homeland making96. These visual and cultural representations of the nation have helped to maintain both unity and nationalism. Feminist scholars have critically engaged with such representations, tracing this phenomena back to persistent patriarchal hierarchies97. Heß and Klee have explained how this imagery is especially used to uphold male dominance, thus making the nation “masculine realms” as men are celebrated as historical agents in the national history, “while women are only welcome when they are mothers, or fictional”98. In this national imagination women cannot act as “political agents” as their “national personifications exemplify attributes selected by men”, often the imagery of reproduction and motherhood, while men undertake the tangible work of nation-building99. Consequently, while Yemeni women are expected to embody the soul of the nation, they are simultaneously marginalized from shaping its future, underscoring the gendered exclusions embedded within the very fabric of nationalist ideology. The portrayal of women at the exhibition appears to symbolise the cultural heritage of a glorified past, rather than being acknowledged as architects of Yemen’s future, capable of shaping and driving positive change in contemporary society.

Fig. 4

Fig. 4

Detail of a Yemeni dress on sale in Faisal, Cairo, 2023.

Photographer Jonathan Hearn.

  • 100 Alviso-Marino, 2010.
  • 101 Almowafak’s videos can be found on YouTube. See, for instance, “Nisâ al-Yaman”, October 7, 2022, UR (...)

50The exhibition provided a platform to explore the intricate interplay between gender dynamics and national identity. In spite of this, it failed to cultivate a nuanced and comprehensive acknowledgement of the multiplicity of Yemeni women’s roles in redefining their society. The artworks celebrated a glorified cultural heritage, yet overlooked the many contributions of Yemeni women who have resisted these static imaginaries and patriarchal representations. Pioneering figures such as Dr. Raufah Hassan, who chaired the Women’s Studies Center in Yemen or novelist and poet Hadil Nabila Muhsin Ali al-Zubayr have challenged such narratives through creative and intellectual efforts. They did not have a passive role in the national story. As modes of veiling, in particular, have often played a contested role in this discourse, visual artist and photographer, Boushra Almutawakel, critiqued the symbolic fixity imposed on Yemeni women attire100. Contemporary artist Hadil Almowafak101 uses comedy sketches to deconstruct stereotypes, offering counter-narratives that celebrate women’s individuality and capacity for change while remaining connected to their cultural heritage. These artistic interventions underscore the potential for women to redefine their roles beyond the constraints of patriarchal imaginaries.

  • 102 Badran, 1998, p. 512.
  • 103 Badran, 1998, p. 501.
  • 104 Yadav & Clark, 2010, p. 58.
  • 105 Dahlgren, 2013.
  • 106 Yadav & Clark 2010; Strzelecka 2013.
  • 107 Al-Sakkaf, 2012.
  • 108 Zabara and Al-Thawr 2022, p. 101.
  • 109 Mugahed, 2023, p. 3.
  • 110 Mugahed, 2023, p. 11.

51Historically, Yemeni women have also actively resisted being reduced to passive symbols of the nation, as they engage in feminist movements refusing “to be merely a pawn in the game of masculinist politics”102. Gender relations and the fight for equality was especially complex in Yemen given that women were “heirs to two separate feminist pasts” that required them to navigate not only cultural differences between the North and South but also a male-dominated partisan life103. The unification saw a promising start for gender equality given the initial political liberalisation of the new republic and the existing “secular principles of equality” in South Yemen104. Regrettably, the enactment of conservative legislation and the rise of religious institutions in the North, promoting a conservative interpretation of Islamic law, imposed constraints on women’s rights105. With the increasing centralization and autocratisation of authority under Saleh, many women experienced growing frustration due to their gradual marginalisation, especially in the formal political arena. In response, some figures emerged as influential leaders within civil society organisations and developmental initiatives106. The 2011 protest movement marked a turning point, as certain women became more prominently visible as catalysts for societal and political change107, offering them an opportunity to move beyond their traditional gendered roles as caregivers within development programs. Yemeni women emerged as pioneering figures at the forefront of the uprising and continued to take up spaces within the National Dialogue conference where they led three working groups108. Today this feminist achievement has stalled again with women being the ones that are “bearing the brunt of the fallout from a war they did not choose, and that is being largely decided by a handful of men holding political and military power”109. Women and Yemen’s female leaders are still missing at the negotiation table for peace talks and continue to be “held to unreasonably high standards, which are impossible to meet and which, by design, inhibit effective advocacy that could lead to change”110. These high standards were also visible within the imagery at the exhibition.

52The exhibition’s connections to the Yemeni Embassy in Cairo and its adherence to traditional symbols associated with the past reflect the continuing influence of patriarchal power structures in shaping cultural expression. While the exhibition could have offered new interpretations of a Yemeni imaginary, it adhered to old symbols that prioritize unity and cultural authenticity over nuanced or dissenting perspectives. From the outset, the curators framed the exhibition in a manner that encouraged a close reading of the artwork of a fixed Yemeni imaginary.

  • 111 See, Adorno, 1970.
  • 112 Baron, 2022.

53This exhibition also showcased the tensions that arise when upholding such an idea, exposing the very fault lines upon which any perception of Yemen is constructed. The “Light of Art” exhibition was presented as a space in which the discourse surrounding Yemeni cultural and civilizational values would be brought to light. The art would communicate a message about an assumed Yemeni perspective of the world, but art’s very indeterminacy promised the possibility of contesting this imaginary111. While some paintings in the exhibition hinted at the potential for challenging the established position within the dominant nationalist imaginary, their impact was marginal. This reflects the Embassy’s efforts to control Yemeni cultural and social spaces in Cairo. For instance, one participant recounted the necessity of obtaining Embassy approval to organise cultural events, highlighting the extent of control exerted by traditional power structures in shaping discourse and artistic expression within the diasporic community. Yemenis have keenly observed the extent of control exerted over the cultural scene in the diaspora, expressing their discontent with what they perceive as ineffective campaigns that predominantly serve the interests of the elite112. Thus it remains imperative to address concerns about potential censorship by authorities in order to use art again for engineering lasting change.

VI. Conclusion

  • 113 Castoriadis, 1993, p. 102.

54Studying imaginaries provides a lens through which we can understand how a society defines and situates itself through its constructed systems of norms, institutions, values, orientations, and goals – frameworks that guide both collective and individual lives113. But what happens when, after the initial hope following the overthrow of a long-standing dictator and the promise of reshaping a nation’s political future, a people watch as their homeland descends into chaos? When structures, values, and norms become dismantled—armed clashes erupt among elites, a foreign military coalition bombs and starves their population, and an armed group seizes control in the name of God—what remains? The answer, perhaps, is this: they find themselves living in a haze of nostalgia, hoping to recapture the essence of a Yemen that once was.

  • 114 Cf. Elsherif, 2021.

55For Yemenis in Cairo, though, nostalgia is more than just sentimental attachment, it is also a means of negotiating the fractures of exile towards possible socio-political futures114. This nostalgia is shaped by Yemen’s historical ties to Egypt, from the shared ideals of Nasserism to Egypt’s role as a hub for political and cultural preservation. Yet, it also reinforces the old hierarchies and power dynamics that have long defined Yemeni society. The replication of national symbols and rituals—whether through embassy-sponsored events or informal gatherings—creates an illusion of unity, masking deep social, political, and economic disparities.

  • 115 Eastmond, 2007, p. 254, 259.

56Adaptation to life in Cairo is made easier due to the social environment’s familiarity, including points of connection and cultural similitude. Thus, the forms that Yemeni social imaginaries may take are less affected by cultural differences, unlike Yemeni diasporas in other parts of the world. Breaks in the social realities of migrant lives are often conducive to changes in the social imaginary as new contexts require answers to different social questions115. In Cairo, however, the long-standing image of Egypt as a destination for healthcare, education, and political refuge—bolstered by Nasserism’s early influence—presents enough cultural affinity to allow the maintenance of established patterns, systems, and personalities among the Yemeni diaspora.

57Migration, while providing a certain degree of stability has not been a levelling force for social hierarchies within the Yemeni community. Instead, it has reinforced and intensified them. Cairo, with its transnational ties to Yemen, enables the reproduction of established patterns of power. Many enjoy the possibility of traveling to and from Yemen, allowing them to retain significant attachments to homeland imaginaries. Of course, it may be the case that transnational ties create the possibility of troubling dominant narratives sustained in Cairo by exposing mobile Yemenis to the stark “reality” of life in Yemen, which contrasts markedly. This is not to argue that Yemenis in Cairo are ignorant of developments in Yemen. On the contrary, the increased connection that transnational living can afford may contain the potential for challenging the status quo. The frustration experienced by many Yemenis in Cairo may indeed arise as migrants traveling between these locations witness the glaring dissimilarity between the lives of Yemeni elite in Cairo and those who remain in Yemen.

  • 116 Bourdieu, 1985, p. 728.

58In many ways, Cairo hosts a suspended moment in time, where Yemeni imaginaries are dominated by the old order. For some, this leads to a total detachment from Yemeni identity. One young man remarked, “I have marked Yemen with a huge X. I won’t return unless I hold a significant position or have obtained considerable wealth or treasure.” His sentiment underscores the growing tension between the imagined Yemen of unity and the fractured realities of displacement. The internalization of these structures—embedded in daily routines and cultural practices—makes the status quo appear natural and inevitable, limiting the potential for imagining alternative forms of social relations116.

59Thus, the Yemeni diaspora in Cairo cannot be understood as a mere rupture from Yemen’s past but rather as a reconfiguration of its enduring inequalities. In this nostalgic conglomeration, old political elites present themselves as the only ones capable of preserving what remains or restoring Yemen. Cultural expression in Cairo thus become subjected to political influence. Events like the “Light of Art” exhibition illustrate the duality of critique and constraint, where symbolic gestures maintain a semblance of political authority but fail to address the multifaceted challenges faced by Yemenis in both their host country and their homeland. The attempt to convey an image of cohesion through the celebration of Yemen’s Unification and the exclusive nature of the event is telling of the deliberate preservation of the status-quo.

60The question of what unites Yemenis cannot be answered by shared cultural heritage alone. Instead, their lives reflect the ruptures of our time, where resistance to exploitation and destruction grows even as traditional power structures persist.

61As discussions surrounding Yemen’s future continue to evolve, it is imperative to create spaces for dialogue and engagement that are inclusive, diverse, and reflective of the complex realities faced by Yemenis in both the diaspora and their homeland. Only by embracing multiplicity and diverse voices can meaningful progress be achieved toward a more equitable and inclusive future for Yemen and its people.

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Notes

1 Orkaby, 2017, 2019; Day & Brehony, 2020; Kadri, 2023; Lackner, 2017; Menea, 2024.

2 Brandt, 2017; Brehony, 2020; Ahram, 2022.

3 Clausen, 2019; Juneau, 2016; Darwich, 2018; Hill, 2017.

4 Juneau, 2024; Knights, 2024.

5 Heinze, 2018; Transfeld, 2016; Durac, 2013.

6 Yadav, 2022, p. 45.

7 Hall, 2017, p. 98.

8 Young, 2010.

9 Hall, 2017, p. 102; Augustin, 2021.

10 Day, 2012, p. 309.

11 Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2013.

12 Durac, 2013.

13 Uhlenhaut & al-Mowafak, 2024.

14 Al-Thawr, 2021, p. 121.

15 Poirier, 2022, p. 8.

16 Wedeen, 2008.

17 Taylor, 2004, p. 23.

18 Taylor, 2004, p. 23.

19 Taylor, 2004, p. 29.

20 Browne & Diehl, 2019.

21 Cohen, 2023, p. 1 (emphasis original).

22 Brubaker, 2005.

23 Orkaby, 2017; Dawisha, 1975; Blumi, 2018;

24 Witty, 2001.

25 Tsourapas, 2018, p. 401. See also Witty, 2001; Thiollet, 2014; Al-Absi, 2020.

26 Orkaby, 2017; Poirier, 2022, p. 6; Nasser, 2018.

27 Kangas, 2011.

28 Al-Absi, 2020, p. 6.

29 Nasser, 2018.

30 Poirier 2022, p. 8.

31 For instance, the café, Zahra al-Mîdân in Dokki, hosted meetings of Yemeni Nassersists in the 1960s.

32 A doctor by training, Ghanem became an ethnomusicologist and lived in Sudan for many years. Arrived in Cairo in 2023 after the breakout of war in Sudan. Interviewed in June 2023.

33 Choi & Park, 2020; Peutz, 2019; Aljamal, 2015; cf. Kermeliotis, 2019.

34 Al-Eriani, 2021.

35 Tsourapas, 2020.

36 For the IOM definition of a migrant see IOM, 2019, p. 132.

37 IOM, 2022b; cf. IOM, 2022a.

38 Naceur, 2024.

39 Abdel Fattah, 2021.

40 El-Shaarawi, 2021.

41 El-Shaarawi, 2021.

42 Norman, 2019, p. 49.

43 Syed Zwick, 2022.

44 Norman, 2019.

45 IOM, 2022b.

46 Al-Absi, 2020, p. 5; see the statement by Maher al-Yamany, reported in “Yemeni community in Egypt up to 70,000”, Egypt Independent, June 3, 2015, URL: https://www.egyptindependent.com/yemeni-community-egypt-70000/#google_vignette.

47 Poirier, 2022, p. 6; Al-Absi, 2020.

48 al-Batati, 2023.

49 UNHCR, 2024.

50 UNHCR, 2020.

51 For possible explanations see the discussions in Hearn, 2024, p. 51-57; al-Absi, 2022, p. 15-17; cf. UNHCR, 2022.

52 Al-Absi, 2020, p. 7.

53 Having discovered he was being monitored by Ansar Allah intelligence, Tarek, in his mid-forties, fled to Cairo in 2021. Interviewed in May 2023.

54 This former Brigadier General (aged 58) arrived in Cairo in 2015 following the fall of Sana’a to Ansar Allah. Interviewed in December 2022.

55 Poirier, 2022, p. 8.

56 For more information, refer to Barnett, Yandle & Naufal, 2013; Ridge, 2023; Egan & Tabar, 2016; Jones, 2022.

57 A 29-year old researcher and activist. Arrived in Cairo in 2017 after discovering she was wanted by various factions. Interviewed in July 2023.

58 Aged 34. Came to Cairo in 2019. Interviewed in July 2023.

59 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 6.

60 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 6.

61 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 5-6.

62 Caton, 1990; Miller, 2002.

63 Wedeen, 2008; Carapico, 1998.

64 Poirier, 2013, p. 8.

65 Adra, 1998, p. 94.

66 See King, 2012.

67 See Augustin, 2021.

68 Manea, 2024, p. 78.

69 Manea, 2024, p. 78.

70 Hennessey, 2015.

71 Caton 1990; Kendall 2015.

72 Alviso-Marino, 2014, 2017; al-Jeddawy, al-Kholidy & Nevens, 2021.

73 al-Jeddawy, al-Kholidy & Nevens, 2021, p. 22.

74 Poirier, 2022.

75 Abdulhadi, 2024, p. 3.

76 See Hearn, 2024, p. 99-105.

77 Adra, 1993; Adra, 1998.

78 Weeden, 2008, p. 85.

79 Poirier, 2022, p. 16.

80 Aged 39, arrived in Cairo in 2016 and established a number of small commercial enterprises in Faisal. Interviewed in May 2023.

81 A sentiment shared by Amal and Tarek.

82 Aged 35, relocated to Cairo after finishing his university education in Beirut. Interviewed in July 2023.

83 In his early 30s, Ramy grew up in Aden but left for Cairo in 2016 with his mother to escape the uncertainty of life in Yemen. He works as an English teacher for one of the local initiatives, teaching migrants from Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea. Interviewed in February 2023.

84 Naar, 2023.

85 Bin Othman, 2023.

86 Ardemagni, 2023.

87 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021.

88 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 7.

89 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 7.

90 Shuja Al-Deen, 2021, p. 7.

91 An accountant for the Ministry of Education, living in Aden. He was interviewed in June 2023 while visiting Cairo.

92 Edensor, 2002, p. 108.

93 Kandiyoti, 1991, p. 434.

94 Kandiyoti, 1991, p. 431.

95 Hearn, 2024, p. 85-86.

96 Boehmer, 2005; Kaiser, 2002; Nagel, 1998.

97 Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1993.

98 Heß & Klee, 2021.

99 Heß & Klee, 2021.

100 Alviso-Marino, 2010.

101 Almowafak’s videos can be found on YouTube. See, for instance, “Nisâ al-Yaman”, October 7, 2022, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iCjfV1cpJFQ.

102 Badran, 1998, p. 512.

103 Badran, 1998, p. 501.

104 Yadav & Clark, 2010, p. 58.

105 Dahlgren, 2013.

106 Yadav & Clark 2010; Strzelecka 2013.

107 Al-Sakkaf, 2012.

108 Zabara and Al-Thawr 2022, p. 101.

109 Mugahed, 2023, p. 3.

110 Mugahed, 2023, p. 11.

111 See, Adorno, 1970.

112 Baron, 2022.

113 Castoriadis, 1993, p. 102.

114 Cf. Elsherif, 2021.

115 Eastmond, 2007, p. 254, 259.

116 Bourdieu, 1985, p. 728.

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Table des illustrations

Titre Fig.1
Légende A Yemeni dance troupe performing at a wedding in Faisal, Cairo, 2023. The same dance troupe also performed at the Yemeni embassy.
Crédits Photographer Jonathan Hearn.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/arabianhumanities/docannexe/image/15121/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 345k
Titre Fig.2
Légende A Yemeni dance troupe performing at a wedding in Faisal, Cairo, 2023. The same dance troupe also performed at the Yemeni embassy.
Crédits Photographer Jonathan Hearn.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/arabianhumanities/docannexe/image/15121/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 372k
Titre Fig.3
Légende A photograph taken at the Light of Art Exhibition in Cairo, 2023.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/arabianhumanities/docannexe/image/15121/img-3.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 366k
Titre Fig. 4
Légende Detail of a Yemeni dress on sale in Faisal, Cairo, 2023.
Crédits Photographer Jonathan Hearn.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/arabianhumanities/docannexe/image/15121/img-4.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 1001k
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Référence électronique

Nahla El-Menshawy et Jonathan Hearn, « Echoes of the Past: The Reproduction of Social Imaginaries amongst the Yemeni Diaspora in Cairo »Arabian Humanities [En ligne], 20 | 2025, mis en ligne le 01 février 2025, consulté le 11 avril 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/arabianhumanities/15121 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/13vgs

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Auteurs

Nahla El-Menshawy

Research Associate at the Professorship of Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt, PhD student in the ConTrust cluster initiative. Associated Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Jonathan Hearn

Researcher, MA in Migration and Refugee Studies from the American University in Cairo (2024)

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Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY-SA 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont susceptibles d’être soumis à des autorisations d’usage spécifiques.

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