

From Holy War to Autonomy: *Dār al-Islām* Imagined by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals¹

Hisao KOMATSU

Abstract

This paper aims to present some preliminary observations as well as discuss prospects for further research on the intellectual history of Turkestan during the tsarist period. Three topics will be discussed: first, how the Muslim intellectuals, especially the first generation who witnessed the Russian invasion – such as Tā'ib (1830-1905) and others – understood their own society under Russian rule; second, following a brief analysis of the Andijan Uprising in 1898, how they responded to this uprising that threatened “the peaceful order” under Russian rule; and third, how the generation following conceived the future of their *Dār al-Islām*. In this part we consider the proposal for Muslim autonomy in Turkestan made by Mahmudxo‘ja Behbudiy (1875-1919), one of the eminent leaders of the Jadid movement in Turkestan.

Keywords: Autonomy, Islam, *Īshān*, *Jihād*, Turkestan.

Résumé

Cet article a pour but de présenter des observations préliminaires, ainsi que quelques directions pour des futures recherches dans le domaine de l’histoire intellectuelle du Turkestan pendant la période tsariste. Trois sujets seront ici discutés : premièrement, comment les intellectuels musulmans, plus spécialement la première génération témoin de l’invasion russe (comme Tā'ib et d’autres) ont-ils compris leur propre société sous le pouvoir russe; deuxièmement, à la suite d’une brève analyse de la révolte d’Andidjan de 1898, comment ont-ils répondu à cette révolte qui a menacé l’« ordre pacifique » du pouvoir russe; finalement, comment la génération suivante a-t-elle conçu l’avenir de son *Dār al-Islām*. Sous cet angle nous étudierons la proposition avancée par

Hisao KOMATSU is Professor of the University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology. Author of six books, as *Migration in Central Asia: Its History and Current Problems* (with Ch. Obiya and J. S. Schoeberlein, 2000); *A History of Central Eurasia* (2000); *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia: Early 18th to Late 20th Centuries* (with S. A. Dudoignon, 2001); *Research Trends in Modern Central Eurasian Studies: Works Published between 1985 and 2000. A Selective and Critical Bibliography* (with S. A. Dudoignon, 2003-2006), etc. komatsu@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp

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Mahmudxo‘ja Behbudiy (1875-1919), un des leaders éminents du mouvement djadid au Turkestan, pour l'autonomie musulmane au Turkestan.

Mots-clefs : autonomie, islam, *ishān*, *jihād*, Turkestan.

Since the *Perestroika* period, research on the modern history of Turkestan has made great progress, due to the exploration of new historical sources: indigenous sources written in Turkic or Persian, and Russian sources including rich archives, among others. Most recent studies have criticized Soviet historiography, and have been distinguished for their new interpretation and approaches. While the documentation of national histories has advanced in the newly independent republics of Central Asia, researchers abroad, making use of a great amount of newly obtained source materials, have begun to explore various aspects of the political, social, and intellectual history of modern Turkestan.²

Among these research trends, studies of intellectual history during the tsarist period have great significance and possibilities. These studies will enable us to understand the historical dynamism of modern Turkestan from within; in other words, through the various discourses of Muslim intellectuals. Faced with a series of great changes following the Russian invasion in the second half of the nineteenth century, intellectuals played a leading role in directing their Muslim communities and sometimes in social and cultural reform movements such as Jadidism.³ At the same time, studies of intellectual history will contribute to the examination of contemporary issues such as Islamic resurgence and politics in post-Soviet Central Asia from a historical perspective.⁴

This paper aims to present some preliminary observations as well as prospects for further research in this field. Three topics are to be discussed: first, how Muslim intellectuals, especially the first generation who witnessed the Russian invasion, understood their own society under Russian rule; second, how they answered to the Andijan uprising in 1898 that threatened “the peaceful order” under Russian rule; and third, how the next generation conceived the future of their *Dār al-Islām* [The Land of Islam where Islamic law prevails]. When studying these topics, it is necessary for us to take into consideration

² For the historiography, see Dudoignon and Komatsu, 2003-2006; Dudoignon, 2008.

³ For details, see Khalid, 1998.

⁴ For example, see Babadjanov and Kamilov, 2001, pp. 195-219; Babadzhanov, Muminov, and Olcott, 2004, pp. 43-59.

Russian policy, as well as institutions that directly or indirectly affected Muslim intellectuals.

1. *Dār al-Islām* under Russian rule

How did Muslim intellectuals, especially the first generation who witnessed the Russian invasion, understand their own society under Russian rule? According to a strict interpretation of Islamic law, believers should fight the invasion of infidels to defend the *Dār al-Islām* [the Land of Islam] and, if placed under the rule of infidels, they should leave this *Dār al-Ḥarb* [the Land of war] to migrate to a nearby *Dār al-Islām* where their rights would be protected by an Islamic state.

In fact, in the 1820s, the *Mujāhidīns* led by Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī (1786-1831) left India, which turned into a *Dār al-Ḥarb* due to British occupation, and attempted to establish bases for their *jihād* movements under the protection of Afghanistan. As far as we know, however, such a rigorous interpretation was rarely found in modern Central Eurasia, except in the North Caucasus.

One of the rare cases we may cite is that of a renowned Tatar *mullā*, ‘Abd al-Rahīm bin ‘Uthmān al-Bulgharī (al-‘Utuz al-āmānī, 1754-1835). Having studied in holy cities in *Mā warā’ al-Nahr* such as Bukhara and Samarkand, he mastered Islamic teachings that were difficult to access in the Volga-Ural region under Russian rule after the latter half of the sixteenth century. During his stay in Samarkand he made efforts to repair the famous manuscript of the holy Qur’an preserved in the Khwāja Aḥrār madrasa under the title of *Muṣḥaf-i Imām ‘Uthmān*. In Bukhara he boldly criticized the religious practices permitted in this holy city [*Bukhārā-yi sharīf*], in order to attract the interest of Amīr Shāhmurād (r. 1785-1800) known as the pious ruler of the Emirate of Bukhara.⁵ According to the recent studies by Michael Kemper, ‘Abd al-Rahīm held an exceptionally hard-line position in regards to the problematic relationship between Muslims and Christians. Against the general agreement of the Tatar ‘*ulamā*’, he considered the Volga-Ural region under Russian rule not as a *Dār al-Islām* but as a *Dār al-Ḥarb*, and condemned the Friday prayers addressed to any Tsar as invalid.⁶ However, his arguments could not gain the support of a majority of the Muslim community. Rather, it can be considered that Tatar

⁵ Marjānī, 1900, pp. 239-241.

⁶ M. K. [Kemper], 1999, pp. 18-19. See also Kemper, 1999, pp. 163-164.

‘*ulamā*’s acceptance of Russian rule as well as the official institution of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly⁷ had made it easy for Turkestanī ‘*ulamā*’ to adapt to the new conditions of obedience after initial years of confrontation with the Russian army.

In the case of Turkestan, there are some treatises written by Muslim intellectuals discussing the conditions of Muslim society under Russian rule. Among others, Muḥammad Yūnus Khwāja Tā’ib’s Persian work *Tuḥfa-yi Tā’ib* [A Gift of Tā’ib]⁸ presents us with the most comprehensive accounts, based on his considerable experience and deep knowledge of Islamic law. This work, completed in the spring of 1905, is full of quotations from the Qur’an and the *hadīth* [record of the sayings and acts of the Prophet].

Tā’ib (1830-1905) witnessed great changes in Turkestan after the Russian conquest in the 1860s. Born in Tashkent and having studied Islamic teachings in Tashkent and Kokand, he served the commander of the Kokand army, ‘Ālimqul Amīr-i Lashkar (?-1865) as a *shighāvul* [senior master of ceremonies]. Distinguished by his talents as a secretary, he engaged in diplomatic negotiations with Russia, Afghanistan, China, and Britain, and participated in defensive campaigns led by ‘Ālimqul against the Russian army. After the heroic death of his master and the fall of Tashkent, Tā’ib emigrated into Kashghar to serve a new Muslim ruler in Xinjiang, Ya’qūb Bek (?-1877), who appointed him governor of Yarkand. After losing his second master, he left for India and at the beginning of 1880 returned to Kokand, which was then under Russian rule. In 1886 he was elected a *qāḍī* [civil judge] in Kokand and continued to work as a Muslim official under the Russian administration. In his last years he dedicated himself to writing historical works and other treatises including *The Life of ‘Alimqul*⁹ and *A Gift of Tā’ib*.

In this treatise we see his positive evaluation of Russian rule in Turkestan despite his earlier experiences of battles with the Russians. Tā’ib says:

⁷ Since Ivan IV (r. 1533-1584)’s conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552, Muslims in the Russian Empire suffered harsh treatment under the Russian authorities and Islamic institutions were ignored. However, Catherine II (r. 1762-1796) introduced rather tolerant policies toward her Muslim subjects. The Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, established by her order in 1789, supervised Muslim communities in European Russia and Siberia, and contributed to the integration and revitalization of Muslim communities in the Russian Empire.

⁸ Tā’ib, 2002.

⁹ Recently the Chaghatay Turkic text with English translation and notes was published by Timur K. Beisembiev: [Tā’ib], 2003.

“In those days when the sun of the khanate of Ferghana and Turkestan [the Khanate of Kokand] declined and at last the period of their sovereignty came to an end, Russian and Christian governors and lieutenants occupied the regions of this country and the foundations of their authority strengthened. Since then, Russians and Muslims have mingled with each other to reinforce their mutual relationship.”¹⁰

Having witnessed the military and technical superiority of Russia, Tā’ib realized that Muslim resistance to the Russian army was futile, as the many Muslim defeats had demonstrated. While condemning the pointless fights conducted by ‘Abd al-Rahman Aftābachī and Fulat Khān against the Russian army in the Ferghana Valley, he praises the Bukharan Amīr Muẓaffar’s (r. 1860-1885) decision of “opening the gate of peace” with the Russians “in order not to lose his country and sovereignty”.¹¹ Here we must remember that Tā’ib’s contemporary, a historian of East Turkestan, Mullā Mūsā (1836?-1917?), who also participated in the *jihād* against Qing rule and witnessed the collapse of the Muslim state established by Ya’qūb Bek in Xinjiang, in later years justified his fellow Muslims’ submission to the Qing Emperor, repudiating the attempts of *jihād*. If Mullā Mūsā justified the submission by a moral norm of ancient Turkic origin, the “obligation of salt,” (the obedience of the oblige to his benefactor), Tā’ib did it based on the Hanafī law school tradition in Turkestan.¹²

There was also another of Tā’ib’s contemporaries who shared his ideas about accepting Russian rule. In 1868, the Muslim people of Samarkand surrendered to the Russian army commanded by Konstantin P. von Kaufman after the miserable retreat of the Bukharan army, an army that was expected to conduct *jihād* against the infidel Russians. The *muftī* of Samarkand Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn then eloquently addressed the new conqueror, admitting that they preferred a just rule, even by an infidel ruler, to an oppressive rule conducted by a Muslim one.¹³ There is no doubt that Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn and his fellows believed in the sustainability of *Dār al-Islām* under Russian rule. Indeed, just after the surrender of Samarkand, Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn petitioned general Kaufman to respect the *sharī‘a* and to appoint *qāḍīs* to supervise the Islamic law as

¹⁰ Tā’ib, 2002, p. 3 [24b].

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 22 [40a/40b].

¹² As to Mullā Mūsā, see Hamada, 2001, pp. 35-61.

¹³ Sāmī, 1962, pp. 78-79/text 80a-80b. For the full English translation see Gross, 1997, p. 214. As for the address of Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn to Kaufman, see also Crews, 2006, p. 254.

well as the rituals of Muslim people.¹⁴ Accepting Russian rule later than Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn, Tā'ib did not admit to any need of *jihād* and admonished against any *fitna* [rebellion], because he believed that the situation of Turkestan was *Dār al-Islām*:

“At present, the population of the Ferghana Valley and Turkestan should make use of their positive conditions as much as possible. This country can be considered *Dār al-Islām*, where Muslim *qāḍīs* and officials work. Islamic law, *sharī'a*, is enforced by those in power. It is a great situation for them to be able to resolve any legal issues according to the *sharī'a*. They should give thanks... [However,] it is known that if [Muslim] officials neither undertake work nor accept the responsibilities of their offices, and Christian governors, holding these countries, leave regal matters in the hands of Christian judges [here the author uses the Russian term *sud'ja*], and other civil affairs in the hands of Russians, then this province would become *Dār al-Ḥarb*. It would be no use to regret this later on.”¹⁵

According to Tā'ib, Muslim *qāḍīs* and officials were essential to keep order in Muslim society, in other words, to sustain the *Dār al-Islām* even under Russian rule. When Muslim *qāḍīs* and officials fail to carry out their responsibilities, the Muslim society turn into *Dār al-Ḥarb* and loses its communal identity and social cohesion. We also find this understanding in the writings of other intellectuals. For example, one of the first reformists in the Ferghana Valley, Ishāqkhān Tūra ibn Junaydallāh Khwāja 'Ibrat (1862-1937)¹⁶ writes in his Turkic treatise *Mizān al-Zamān* in a more optimistic way:

“In former years [under the reign of the Kokand khans] the guidance of ordinary people [according to the *sharī'a*] was under the jurisdiction of the president of Islam [*ra'īs-i Islām*]. These days, all the work belongs to the '*ulamā*' and learned men, who are leading people the right way toward progress and improvement. Their service is considered a great national contribution.”¹⁷

¹⁴ See [Risāla-'i Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn], SPbF IV RAN, ruk. inv. n° S 1690, ll. 8b-9a, 10b. I owe this information to Mr. Kimura Satoru who investigated this interesting manuscript. The same petition was made by Muslim dignitaries in Tashkent in 1865 and 1868. See Bartol'd, 1963 [1927], p. 350; Crews, 2006, pp. 263-264.

¹⁵ Tā'ib, 2002, p. 17 [36a-36b].

¹⁶ Born in Turaqurgan, near Namangan, and having studied in a madrasa in Kokand (1878-1886), 'Ibrat opened a New Method school in his village. On the occasion of the *hajj* he traveled extensively in the Ottoman lands and India, and later made a trip into Kashghar and China. Endowed with extensive learning, he published a wide range of works. From 1908 to 1917 he worked as a *qāḍī* in his birth place. His treatise *Mizān al-Zamān* is supposed to have been written just after the October Revolution in 1917. Later engaged in educational work under the Soviet regime, he disappeared in the waves of repression in 1937.

¹⁷ ['Ibrat], 2001, p. 15 [14a].

As is well known, Russian authorities in Turkestan sought to avoid interfering in the socio-cultural issues of Muslim society, by putting Islamic jurisprudence and local administration into the hands of Muslim representatives, civil judges [*qādīs*] and county chiefs [*mingbāshis*] with some institutional reforms such as the introduction of an election system. Although Tā'ib elaborated the logic of *Dār al-Islām* under Russian rule, it is undeniable that in reality the concept of *Dār al-Islām* was maintained by the Russian policy of “disregarding” Islam in colonial Turkestan introduced by the first Governor-General K. P. von Kaufman (1867-1882).

It is true that most of the Muslim intellectuals in Turkestan accepted Russian rule. However, it did not mean that they obeyed Russian authority in every case. In July 1888, the Governor-General N. O. von Rozenbakh (r. 1884-1888), having obtained the consent of local *imāms*, arranged for the practice of praying for the Tsar on the occasion of the completion of repairs of the Khwāja Aḥrār Mosque in Tashkent. The construction had been supported by imperial donations for Turkestani Muslims. Having succeeded in arranging this unusual prayer, Rozenbakh ordered similar prayers to be held in all mosques in Tashkent, in accordance with the regular practice carried out in European Russia and Siberia. Although most of ‘*ulamā*’ in Tashkent refused to obey Rozenbakh’s order, his successor, A. B. Vrevskij (1889-1898), once again ordered that prayer for the Tsar should be conducted in all mosques in Turkestan. Colonial officials such as F. M. Kerenskij and N. P. Ostroumov prepared the Turkic text for the prayer and the printed text was distributed in 1892.

However, despite all the efforts of the administration, this new regulation was again not approved by local ‘*ulamā*’; prayers for the Tsar were only offered in limited cases, for example in the Russo-native schools, in mosques where Tatar Muslims with Russian citizenship gathered, and in some towns ruled by strict Russian administrations.¹⁸ This silent refusal to pray for the Tsar suggests the Turkestani Muslims’ eagerness to preserve the status of *Dār al-Islām* under Russian rule. In the early Soviet period, Atabekoghli considered holding compulsory prayers for the Tsar as one of the repressive measures adopted by Tsarism in Turkestan.¹⁹

At the same time, however, it should be noted that the Russian policy of “ignoring” Islam, contrary to the intentions of the Russian administration, had

¹⁸ Litvinov, 1998, pp. 72-75. For the details see Erkinov, 2004.

¹⁹ Atabekoghli, 1927, pp. 24-25.

actually stimulated the resurgence of Islam as well as the awakening of Muslim identity.²⁰ As an example, V. P. Nalivkin (1852-1925), who was well acquainted with Muslim affairs in colonial Turkestan, showed how the rapid development of cotton production had contributed to the rebirth of *madrasas* and growth of *waqf* income since the end of the 1880s, especially in the Ferghana Valley. Indeed, not a few *madrasas*, mosques and shrines were constructed during the colonial period. Well-financed *madrasas*, especially those in Kokand, attracted a large number of students from distant places, who were later largely responsible for Islamic resurgence and the propagation of Pan-Islamism. Nalivkin's description suggests that the re-Islamization process that developed under Russian rule enhanced anti-Russian feelings and supported the notion of *Dār al-Islām* to be realized among Turkestan Muslims.²¹

In general, both Tā'ib and 'Ibrat were receptive to the new civilization brought about by Russians. The latter, citing an alleged *hadīth* "Seek for science even from China,"²² encouraged people to obtain modern science and to spread the New Method schools in Turkestan. They are common in evaluating the economic and cultural development in Turkestan under Russian rule. 'Ibrat describes a remarkable change in the way of life among the ordinary people who abandoned an idle life to adopt a punctual and diligent way of doing business under the new conditions.²³

In his discussion 'Ibrat does not forget to mention his opponents who exhibited fanaticism against every innovation and foreign product and denounced them as heretical [*bid'a*].²⁴ He describes an example of these fanatical *mullās* who prohibited the use of an oil lamp filled with oil produced in Russia in a

²⁰ For details, see for example Brower, 2003, Chapter 4.

²¹ Nalivkin, 1913, pp. 129-135. As the latest work regarding Nalivkin, see Abashin, 2005, pp. 43-96.

²² ['Ibrat], 2001, p. 4 [3b]. Most of the Jadid intellectuals used this *hadīth* to legitimise their arguments for introducing foreign but modern culture into Muslim society.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 20 [19b]. As the positive evaluation of Russian rule, see also Mullā 'Alim, 1915, pp. 164-168. However, Russian observation of Muslim attitudes toward the Russians and Russian civilization was not always positive, and bore a certain reservation. For example, N. Lykoshin (1860-1922), who had a thorough knowledge of Muslim affairs in Turkestan, says in 1904: "It is possible to say with confidence that during the last half of the century the local people's religious fanaticism, that is their intolerance toward other peoples and religions, has weakened considerably. Still, this is true only of those who are the most enlightened in Muslim society and who have much contact with Russians... But behind these progressive people stands an impregnable wall of old-fashioned Muslims. According to their understanding, the world is divided into two parts with no character in common. One is their own world of Islam, and outside the boundary of their community is the world of infidels. These Muslims are afraid not only of approaching the infidels, but also of neighboring them. It is probably impossible to influence them to remove their single-minded misunderstanding. Surely, they will take their Pan-Islamic desires with them to the other world.": Lykoshin, 1904, pp. 6-7.

²⁴ ['Ibrat], 2001, p. 25 [24b].

mosque. Although it was useful to the public, using the lamp was declared unlawful [*ḥarām*]. Only about five years later he found that those *mullās* were making use of the same oil lamps.²⁵ It is true that ‘Ibrat considered these *mullās* as a great obstacle to socio-cultural reform. However, these conservative or simple-minded *mullās* were not major opponents for Tā’ib.

2. The Andijan Uprising and the Response of Muslim Intellectuals

At the end of the introductory part of the *Tuḥfa-yi Tā’ib*, after relating the peaceful relationship between Russians and Muslims, Tā’ib writes as follows:

“[However] A group of ignorant Sufis, who neither provided any learning nor gained any knowledge, was absorbed in hypocritical devotions and self-adoring diversions [...] According to their corrupt thinking, houses where Russians and Christians lived, carpets on which they sat, and food served on dishes that were touched or used by them were to be considered impure and deficient... [Furthermore] they dared to have contempt and make fun of *qāḍīs* in front of people, although *qāḍīs* undertook their legal duties with the consent of Muslims to make legal decisions and to satisfy the needs of believers.”²⁶

Despite the established order in Turkestan under Russian rule, Tā’ib was annoyed with “ignorant Sufis” who hated Russians and every foreign element. Furthermore, these hypocritical Sufis publicly held contempt for Muslim judges, probably including Tā’ib himself. Given that Muslim judges were pillars of the *Dār al-Islām* under Russian rule, such an insult was intolerable for Tā’ib. Further reading leads us to understand who the author’s main opponent was. In the latter part of the *Tuḥfa-yi Tā’ib*, reflecting the recent history of Turkestan and Ferghana, Tā’ib writes as follows:

“However, in this country there are so many wretches, rascals, and Sufis who are worse than mad dogs in bazaars and making nothing but trouble... Oppressed people, being under their control, could not afford to eliminate these instigators of *fitna* [rebellion]. Muḥammad ‘Alī, the devious *shaykh* of Mingtepe, once being poor, was engaged in spindle making, and later pretended to be a great *murshid* [spiritual guide in Sufism]. By serving meals to ordinary people, he succeeded in inciting common people to obey him. Mean-spirited men from various groups and tribes rushed to his *khānqāh* [monastery]. Due to their extreme ignorance they

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 16 [15a/15b].

²⁶ Tā’ib, 2002, p. 3 [24b/25a].

gave high praise to this stupid man. Although Russian governors and officials witnessed the great influence of these rascals, they did not take enough measures to control them... In 1313 A. H., Muḥammad ‘Alī incited a rebellion [against Russians]. This revolt deprived Islam of its shine, and all the Muslims were driven away from the house of peace. Peaceful Egypt was damaged and the ease of the Nile turned into a mirage. Many people were executed and expelled from the country. The *shaykh* himself was sentenced to death due to this disgrace.”²⁷

It was Muḥammad ‘Alī in the Ferghana Valley, widely known as Dukchi Ishan [Dūkchī Īshān],²⁸ who Tā’ib described as the main opponent in his *Tuhfayī Tā’ib*. Dukchi Ishan was the leader of the Andijan Uprising in 1898, which aimed to expel the Russians from the Ferghana Valley to establish a Muslim state. This rebellion is known as one of the most significant events in Russian Turkestan. At dawn on May 18, 1898, two thousand Muslim partisans commanded by Dukchi Ishan attacked Russian troops stationed at Andijan. This sudden attack ended unsuccessfully and the leaders, including Dukchi Ishan, were executed; however, it was the first true threat to Russian rule in Turkestan since its conquest in the mid-1860s. In order to consider the position and thoughts of Tā’ib regarding the uprising, we first need to look briefly at Dukchi Ishan and his followers.²⁹

Muḥammad ‘Alī [Madali] was born around 1856 at Chimion *qishlaq*, located in the southeastern Ferghana Valley. His father, Muḥammad Ṣābir, was supposedly an *émigré* from Kashghar. Many Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, called *Qashgharlik* in the Ferghana Valley, immigrated to that valley when the Qing authorities repeatedly suppressed Muslim rebellions during the nineteenth century.³⁰ After serving some local *īshāns*, Muḥammad ‘Alī became a *murīd* [disciple] of a Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya *shaykh*, Īshān Sulṭānkhān Tūra, who enjoyed considerable status in the eastern Ferghana Valley.³¹ Through devoted service to this *īshān*, Madali succeeded in gaining his master’s confidence, and at last he was appointed as his venerable master’s *khalīfa* [successor]. After his master’s death in 1882, Madali began to work as an

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 23 [41a/41b].


²⁸ *īshān* is a Central Asian term for Sufi *shaykhs* and their “noble” descendants.

²⁹ For the details of the Andijan Uprising, see Babadžanov, 1998; Babadžanov, 2001; Komatsu, 2004.

³⁰ For example, according to a Russian source, in the late 1820s after an unsuccessful intervention in the Muslim revolt in Kashgharia, Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān of Kokand decided to immigrate 70,000 Muslim families from Kashgharia under Qing rule to the Ferghana Valley. Although most of them returned to their homeland after the conclusion of the peace treaty, the town of Shahrīkhan and its suburbs were inhabited mostly by the Kashgharis: *Obozrenie*, 1849, p. 196.

³¹ As to Sulṭānkhān Tūra see, Kawahara, 2005, pp. 277, 282-283.

independent *īshān*. In the mid-1890s he was known to be a prominent Muslim leader in the Ferghana Valley, the most fertile and densely populated region in Russian Turkestan. We can consider here some factors that promoted him to the position of eminent *īshān*.



Map: *The distribution of the Kashgharis in the eastern Ferghana Valley* (Prepared by Yutaka Goto): The Kashgharis constituted an integral part of the followers of Dukchi Ishan. When he refers to his followers in his work, *‘Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn*, he never fails to mention the Kashgharis. For example, in its introduction he writes: “Because our country [*ilimiz*] is the land of Turks, Kashgharis, and Qyr-gyz, it is impossible to understand each other in the Arabic or Persian language. Therefore I wrote this *‘Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn* in Turkic.” This map shows the distribution and relative number of the Kashgharis based on the statistical data in 1908 [*Spisok*, 1909].

First, in 1886, when he was thirty-three years old, Dukchi Ishan made his pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. In general, the pilgrimage gave *īshāns* an even better reputation among their followers. In Dukchi Ishan’s case he claimed to have received some spiritual instructions from the Prophet in a dream during his stay in Medina. According to his work *‘Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn* [Lessons for Ignorant People],³² the Prophet, attended by Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān and ‘Alī, appointed him Caliph to guide fellow Muslims in the right path.

³² As to this work see Babadžanov, 1998, pp. 167-191.

Second, Dukchi Ishan devoted himself to charitable services such as medical care and feeding the needy, as noted by Tā'ib. In the 1890s the Ferghana Valley went through both outbreaks of cholera, which resulted in ten thousand deaths in 1892, and repeated widespread famines. These famines can be considered as having been induced by the disorderly spread of cotton fields, which had deprived the Ferghana Valley of its original capacity to be self-sufficient for food. Such a critical situation led the Ferghani Muslims to recognize the devoted *ishān* as a “*mahdī*” [the rightly guided one].

Third, the image of the Mahdī-saint was circulated by many *karāmat* [miracle] stories created by Dukchi Ishan's sincere *murīds* [disciples]. In fact they left an anonymous Turkic work, the so-called *Manāqib-i Dūkchī Īshān* [The Miracle Stories of Dukchi Ishan].³³ In this collection of miracle stories that succeeded the rich tradition of *Manāqib* literature in Central Asia, Dukchi Ishan is given the highest rank of *murshid*, equal to Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband (1318-1389). His miracle stories are found also in his ‘*Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn*, which tells how Dukchi Ishan often dreams of the Prophet and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, and receives their favors and spiritual instructions. Needless to say, the visible and invisible *karāmat* enhanced the charismatic authority of Dukchi Ishan in the Muslim society of the Ferghana Valley.

Fourth, he succeeded in gaining a great number of *murīds*, not only among the sedentary population such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kashgharis, but also among the nomadic and semi-nomadic Qyrgyz people. Their Islamization began in the second half of the 17th century and the degree of Islamization was more remarkable in southern Qyrgyzstan surrounding the Ferghana Valley. It was the Naqshbandi *ishāns* who propagated Islam among these nomadic Qyrgyz who held their own pre-Islamic traditions and beliefs in southern Qyrgyzstan. *Īshāns* recruited their *murīds* patiently among Qyrgyz nomads and, visiting them periodically, received a great amount of livestock as *nadhr* [dedications]. Dukchi Ishan succeeded such predecessors in southern Qyrgyzstan. Near the Qyrgyz area he built a small mosque, which served as one of the most active centers of his *tariqa* [Sufi order], and every summer he traveled among his Qyrgyz *murīds* that constituted the main body of his *tariqa*. At the same time they were enthusiastic advocates of a holy war to drive out Russian peasant immigrants from the Ferghana Valley.

³³ Babadzhanov, 2004.

Dukchi Ishan's firm position in the Muslim society of the eastern Ferghana Valley is testified by the following facts.

First, the *khānqāh* complex constructed in Mingtepe *qishlaq* located 35 km south of Andijan is to be noted. Around his *khānqāh* with a mosque there existed a set of structures: a minaret 20 m high, some *mihmānkhāna* or *hājikhānas* [guest houses], *āshkhāna* [soup kitchen], *maktab* [school] for 250 pupils, a large *atkhāna* [stable] accommodating 500 horses, and some workshops for brick making and milling. All of them were built and maintained by his *murīds*. The large scale of this complex, which appeared in the Ferghana Valley's countryside, largely demonstrated Dukchi Ishan's prestige.

Secondly, there is a Persian document of agreement composed in Şafer 1312 A.H., or August 1894, by ten *mingbāshis* [*volostnoj upravitel'*: county chief] and some elders in eastern Ferghana. The contents may be summarized as follows:

“As it is all obvious to the almighty God, a part of the Muslim community, because of their excessive carelessness and complete ignorance, are committing abominable deeds such as abandonment of community [*tark-i jamā'at*], nonfulfillment of religious duties and orders, ingestion of intoxicating drinks, immorality of women, and injustice in bazaars. Thereupon, we will entrust Mullā Muḥammad 'Alī Īshān, son of Muḥammad Şābir Şūfī, with all authority to instruct us on what is approved by canonical law, to prevent us from committing unlawful acts, and to punish offenders according to the *sharī'a*.”³⁴

This document clearly shows that Dukchi Ishan was charged with the purification of the Muslim community from its corrupted situation. This coincides with the main spirit of the '*Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn*, which lacks any kind of mystical preaching and only instructs fellow Muslims to live in accordance with the *sharī'a*. As analyzed by Bakhtiyar Babadjanov,³⁵ Dukchi Ishan, recalling the glorious days of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs when true Islam prevailed, severely criticized fellow Muslims for their corruption, ignorance, and deviation from the *sharī'a*. Among others he criticized Muslim notables, established '*ulamā'* and hereditary *īshāns* for their ignorance and corruption. We find the following among his alleged sayings:

“Betrayers and those Muslims who act craftily in front of God and people exploit our people and deprave them by every method until they incur God's wrath and get

³⁴ Atabekoghli, 1927, p. 29 [Facsimile of the Persian text].

³⁵ Babadjanov, 1998, pp. 167-191.

a totally bad reputation with the help of Satan. Due to the temptation of disgusting Satan and the maneuvers of our betrayers, there is no *qāḍī* who is fair and impossible to bribe.”³⁶

His criticism of *qāḍīs* reminds us of Tā’ib’s blame of the “ignorant Sufis” who “made fun of *qāḍīs* in front of people.” There was a clear opposition between Dukchi Ishan and Tā’ib as to the legitimacy of *qāḍīs*. As a matter of fact, the 1886 Statute for the Turkestan region [*kraj*] introduced an election system for local administrators that replaced the former appointment system and gave extensive powers to the civil judge. However, this new election system unfamiliar to Muslim people brought about all kinds of unlawful acts and misfeasance in the local administration, especially in judicial matters. It can be said that Dukchi Ishan’s criticism was not misdirected on this point.

In the introduction of the *‘Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn*, he wrote that he aimed to explain the principles of Islam (such as *tawhīd* and *īmān*), and to discuss approved acts and objectionable deeds according to the canonical law to rid their society of its present evils. In this work Dukchi Ishan explained the most elementary principles of Islam such as the Five Pillars as well as the manners of purification before worship and religious services. It seems that his followers did not have any fundamental knowledge of Islam. In other words, Dukchi Ishan engaged in the re-Islamization of the people through his preaching of a true Islam based on the *sharī‘a* and *Sunna*.

Finally, we must consider the *ra’īs* office, one of the features of Dukchi Ishan’s *tarīqa*. It consisted of some *khalīfas*, who acted for the *īshān* in remote places, *ra’īses* [supervisors of religious order and practice], and approximately twenty thousand common *murīds*, an outstanding number in those days. In such a *tarīqa*, absolute obedience to their *shaykh* was generally emphasized and the *murīds* were often compared to a corpse before a washer of the dead. But according to a Russian official report, Dukchi Ishan did not require unconditional submission of his *murīds* and compelled neither dedication nor donation. Dukchi Ishan asked of them only observance of Islamic law and practice, while the *ra’īses* were charged with their supervision. The appointment of *ra’īs* began in 1895. They are reported to have carried a *darra* [whip for punishments] granted by Dukchi Ishan. The comment of Lieutenant General Korol’kov on this *ra’īs* office is worth noting, because when “nominees of the *īshān* exercised authority parallel to ours,” it meant the existence

³⁶ Nalivkin, 1913, p. 133.

of dual power.³⁷ This situation also reminds us of the *Adolat*, the so-called Wahhabi organization that emerged in Namangan in the early 1990s.³⁸

In the mid-1890s Dukchi Ishan, commanding a large *tariqa* based in his *khānqāh*, was exercising an authority that paralleled Russian power. He had become a prominent Muslim leader in the Ferghana Valley both in reputation and reality. A contemporary Muslim official, Muḥammad ‘Aziz, who was working at the district office of Marghilan at the time of the Andijan Uprising, describes Dukchi Ishan as follows:

“He never spared efforts in offering his hospitality to every guest. The number of his *murīds* was superior to that of any other group (*tāyfa, jamā‘alar*) and a great amount of provisions dedicated to this *īshān* was generously distributed to the poor. When he found the ‘*ulamā*’ among his guests, he used to ask questions regarding the regulations of *namāz*, fasting, and pilgrimage to the holy cities, and discussed issues regarding generosity toward poor widows and the righteous way of Muslims according to the Qur’an and *hadīth*.”³⁹

Dukchi Ishan’s large *tariqa* is worthy of note. It included all the ethnic groups in the Ferghana Valley, such as Turks, Kashgharis, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz. His active *tariqa* succeeded in integrating such various social groups as wanderers, peasants, nomads, and even some notables. It provides us with an example of the formation of a communal order in a Central Asian Muslim society. The *tariqa*, which penetrated even into the stratum of Muslim officials, suggested the vitality of *Īshānism*.

At last Dukchi Ishan, probably urged by his followers, decided to raise the banner of holy war against the Russians in 1898. The written oath drawn up a few weeks before the uprising clearly shows the spirit of holy war shared by Dukchi Ishan and his fellows. After a eulogy of God, Adam and the Prophet, and the quotation from the Qur’an “Oh Prophet, fight hard against unbelievers and false believers, deal with them severely [9:73],” the Chaghatay-Uzbek oath proceeded as follows:

“Let there be unlimited praise to successors and friends of the Prophet, especially the four Caliphs. They devoted their lives and estates to the holy war for God and the Prophet. In order to guide timid people such as us, they wrote the duties of the Muslims in books and left them as a memory in order to guide cowards. Now it is

³⁷ Shchejnberg, 1938, pp. 146, 173.

³⁸ Irgunov, 1992, pp. 17-18, 23-24.

³⁹ Marghilāni, pp. 184a-184b. This work is published in modern Uzbek: Marghiloniy, 1999.

necessary and unavoidable for us to declare ‘We are servants of God, followers of the Prophet.’ First for God, and second for the Prophet, we will fulfill our duties that God ordered, and bring the Sunna of the Prophet and the *sharī‘a* into existence. As servants of God, faithful followers of the Prophet, wishing to rest in the esteemed rank of first *ghāzīs*, second of *shahīds*, we have all signed below to swear our resolution of devotion. From now on, if one breaks his oath due to the instigation of Satan and his cowardliness, he will go to hell as a traitor.”⁴⁰

When the Andijan Uprising is placed in the context of the Muslim world’s modern history, its great relevance to other movements that developed in the nineteenth century becomes clear. The Andijan Uprising urged militant action against colonial rule and advocated the idea of recovering a pure Islam, in other words the Salafiya trend. This enables us to compare it with various *tariqa*-based movements within so-called Neo-Sufism. This is particularly true in terms of the emphasis on moral and social teaching, the leaders’ intimate association with the spirit of the Prophet, the rejection of absolute obedience of *murīds* to their leader, the strict observance of the *sharī‘a* and the *Sunna*, and militant activities in the defense of Islam.

At first glance, the Andijan Uprising can be considered a Neo-Sufist movement in modern Central Asia. However, following R. S. O’Fahey and B. Radtke’s critique of the concept of Neo-Sufism,⁴¹ we can avoid facile generalizations about the Andijan Uprising. For example, although it is true that Dukchi Ishan and his *murīds* attacked Russian troops in Andijan, we have no evidence that the practice of the *ghazāvat* [holy war] was the *raison d’être* of his *tariqa*. Despite some legends about Dukchi Ishan, it is not certain that he had urged *ghazāt* against Russian rule from the very inception of his activities. Rather, the Qyrghyz nomads and semi-nomads, who were threatened by Russian migration into the Ferghana Valley or deprived of their former interests, proposed the *ghazāt*, and Dukchi Ishan could not reject their repeated offers. It was the actuality of the *tariqa* located in a complex of conditions that encouraged the militant activities of the Idrisiyya orders in North Africa as well as the *tariqa* of Dukchi Ishan in the Ferghana Valley.

Dukchi Ishan’s activities, while showing many aspects of folk Islam, clearly proclaimed Islamic orthodoxy, as seen in his adherence to the *sharī‘a* and *Sunna*. In the Ferghana Valley, where there were neither Muslim political

⁴⁰ The facsimile of the text is found in Atabekoghli, 1927, p. 27.

⁴¹ O’Fahey and Radtke, 1993, pp. 52-87.

powers nor the judicial organization of ‘*ulamā*’ who could defend the *sharī‘a* sufficiently, he could pretend to realize a Muslim communal identity in social and political spheres. His *tarīqa*, following the Naqshbandi tradition in Central Asia, operated for the re-Islamization in the Ferghana Valley that underwent great changes under Russian rule.⁴²

The Andijan Uprising awakened wide responses among Turkestanī Muslims. As far as we know, they were exclusively negative to Dukchi Ishan and his rebellion as seen in Tā’ib.⁴³ For example, Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīm Sāmī (1838-1907), a contemporary Bukharan historian, condemned “the reckless act” of Dukchi Ishan as follows:

“After drawing his *murīds* from amongst many people in Ferghana, Tashkent, Osh and other cities, he was captured by a strong desire to be eminent because of his great wealth and great number of *murīds*. He decided to assault Christians and attacked the railway station at Andijan, but because of the counterattack of the Russian army, his attempt ended in total failure. [It is said that] when a member of a tribe commits a shameful act, all the members of the tribe, irrespective of age, lose their honor. During the reign of Tsar Alexander [sic], who brought peace to the country through his justice, the people of Andijan caused disturbances against the *fatwā-yi musālema* [legal pronouncement on peace].”⁴⁴

Although Sāmī gives no detail about the *fatwā-yi musālema*, supposedly most of the Hanafī school ‘*ulamā*’ in Turkestan approved this legal order to accept Russian rule as seen in the *Tuhfa-yi Tā’ib*. They denounced Dukchi Ishan not only because he brought to Turkestanī Muslims such great calamities considering a number of Muslim casualties were caused by the Russian repression and the heavy indemnities imposed by the authorities, but also because he broke the *fatwā* accepted by most of the Turkestanī ‘*ulamā*’. Dukchi Ishan’s rebellion was considered nothing other than a thoughtless and harmful act by those Muslim intellectuals who had witnessed the overwhelming power of Russia that subjugated Central Asian Khanates a few decades prior. They were keen to prevent any *fitna* that could not only break the peaceful order under Russian rule, but also bring about a great schism among Turkestanī Muslims. We suppose Tā’ib observed the rising of Dukchi Ishan as a terrible challenge

⁴² A report, prepared by a Russian official in November 1914 analyzes the socio-economic and historical background of the Andijan Uprising in a short but persuasive manner, of course from a Russian point of view. See Arapov and Larina, 2006, p. 300.

⁴³ For a recent study see also Erkinov, 2003, pp. 111-137.

⁴⁴ Sāmī, 1962, pp. 121b-122a. As to Sāmī’s life and thought see Gross, 1997, pp. 203-226.

against the established order. His manners of abuse against Dukchi Ishan make it impossible for us to imagine this *ishān* as a hero of the national liberation movement against the tsarist rule as described in recent Uzbek historiography.

Restraint of rebellion against Russian rule was not only the case of Turkestani '*ulamā*'. In 1900 even Abdurreshid Ibrahim (1857-1944), an ardent Pan-Islamist Tatar intellectual in Russia, preferred the enlightenment of Muslim peoples to any resistance or rebellion against Russian rule. He writes:

“It does not matter if Tatars raise a rebellion [against Russian rule]. Indeed, internal rebellions bring about much more destruction to a government than any wars [with external enemies]. However, once a rebellion has been instigated, the people, by totally committing themselves to the cause, can suffer greater disasters than the government concerned. Look at rebellious peoples. Most of them were destroyed. For example, remember what dire consequences Chinese Muslims who raised a rebellion [against Qing rule] suffered. The blood of Muslims flowed like a flood. In short, any rebellion is not free from risk. Therefore, by securing our safety within the social order as much as possible and utilizing it to advocate for science and education, we should avoid a rebellion.”⁴⁵

As far as we know, it is only Muḥammad ‘Azīz Marghilānī and Fazilbek Atabekoghli among the contemporaries of the Andijan Uprising who described Dukchi Ishan in a positive and sympathetic manner. For example Muḥammad ‘Azīz writes as follows:

“[When Dukchi Ishan revolted against the Russians,] he lost his normal consciousness because of temptations of the *jinn*s and Satan. If he had any knowledge at that time, he would have seen through Satanic flattery and intrigues. He himself would have realized that Russia is a great power and is equipped with overwhelming forces and wealth.”⁴⁶

This *khalīfa* [Dukchi Ishan] himself was not guilty at all. Those who deceived [Dukchi Ishan] by saying, “if we take the field, we can conquer the world” should be blamed. Those who brought about great calamities to the Muslims consisted of

⁴⁵ [Ibrahim], 1900, p. 84. In 1909, when he visited Japan, Ibrahim made a speech regarding the oppressed conditions of Muslims in Russia in front of a Japanese audience. In this speech he introduced the Russian repression of the Andijan Uprising as one of the most oppressive treatments adopted by Russian authorities against Muslim peoples in the Russian Empire: “In 1896 (*sic*) when General Kuropatkin was the charge of the Ministry of War, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers suddenly invaded Andijan to plunder, rape Muslim women, kill approximately 20,000 of the Muslim population, throw more than 500 Muslims into prison, and execute eight Muslim notables. This was the most brutal act committed by the Russian authorities in Turkestan... I am sure that hot-blooded and sensitive Japanese who hear my sincere speech will show their sympathy for Turkestani Muslims.” See Ibrahim, 1909, p. 4.

⁴⁶ Marghilānī, pp. 184a-184b.

former soldiers and *amīrs* who could not benefit from Russian rule, or who were themselves a ruined wandering people in search of bread. They included every kind of outlaw, even murderers. They were determined to start a rebellion, although aware that they were not competent enough to face the Russian army and that their revolt would cause great bloodshed. Nevertheless, they pressed Dukchi Ishan to rebel. There was neither a learned man nor *mullā* or '*ulamā*' among them. If Dukchi Ishan had had some learned advisers, such a disaster could have been prevented."⁴⁷

Needless to say nobody dared to publicly praise or refer positively to an anti-Russian uprising during the tsarist period. Four years later, however, the military governor of the Ferghana province [*oblast*'] wrote in his secret report to the Governor-General of Turkestan that despite local representatives' efforts to denounce Dukchi Ishan, Muslim people remembered him as a martyr who sacrificed himself for the sake of God, and referred to his name with respect.⁴⁸ We should notice that among local Muslims there were those who sympathized with or defended Dukchi Ishan and his *murīds*, even in the late tsarist period.

3. A Prospect of the *Dār al-Islām*

While Russian authorities' brutal repression of the Andijan Uprising prevented the Muslim population from raising any banner of *ghazāwat* [holy war, *jihād*] until 1916, Tā'ib's argument of the *Dār al-Islām* might have been shared by Turkestani intellectuals during the tsarist period. However, apart from theoretical arguments about the status of Muslim society, there was no common idea of their society's future. In other words, an essential problem remained almost untouched: how to sustain and develop the Muslim society threatened by growing socio-economic changes in the Russian Empire as well as by socio-political tensions at local levels due to the shortcomings of the Russian administration in colonial Turkestan. The task of elaborating this strategy was left to a new generation following that of Tā'ib. From this point of view, a document prepared two years after the *Tuḥfa-yi Tā'ib* is interesting for our consideration.

This is a draft for Muslim ecclesiastic and local administration in Turkestan [*Turkistān idāre-yi rūḥānīya va dākhilīyasi*], in other words a proposal for

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 191b.

⁴⁸ Egamnazarov, 1994, p. 119.

Muslim autonomy in Turkestan.⁴⁹ The author was one of the most influential Jadid intellectuals in Turkestan, Mahmudxo‘ja Behbudiy [Maḥmūd Khwāja Bihbūdī] (1875-1919), who was in those days the *muftī* [expounder of the Islamic law] in Samarkand and the members of the central committee of the Party of Muslim Union [*Ittifāq-i Muslimīn*]. Encouraged by revolutionary waves in Russia, especially by political activism among Russian Muslims since 1905, Behbudiy submitted this draft for autonomy to the Muslim faction of the second and third *Duma* twice, in April and November 1907.⁵⁰ In its preface he writes as follows:

“It is necessary to provide much more autonomy [*aftānāmiya*] to Turkestan than to Muslims in European Russia because Turkestanis long ago conducted local administration by themselves and are much more eager to enjoy it than their brothers in European Russia. The only desire of the Turkestanis is to organize a Muslim ecclesiastic and local administration and to have men of insight as the officials. This administration is not only for ecclesiastic affairs. It should cover also civil and local administration as well as jurisdictions that are now at the disposal of *qāḍīs*.”⁵¹

This ambitious draft consists of seventy-four articles that regulate the organization and functions of the autonomy in detail. Turkestan’s autonomy was to be supervised by a five-year term *Shaykh al-Islām* elected from amongst the first class ‘*ulamā*’ who had a profound knowledge of the *sharī‘a* and contemporary affairs. The central administration of autonomous Turkestan was to be located in Tashkent, and its branches were to be established in each province such as Syr Darya, Ferghana, Samarkand, Semirech’e (Yettisuv), and Transcaspia provinces. It is clear that this draft aimed to create a fair and appropriate judicial system that was lacking in Russian Turkestan. The seventh chapter, which contains ten articles, is dedicated to the detailed regulations of *qāḍīs*. The draft does not fail to mention the status of Jews and foreigners, *waqf* endowments, school education, as well as water and land use in Turkestan. Apparently, the author had formulated a plan of high-degree autonomy in Turkestan. As for the echoes of the Andijan Uprising, Article 37 attracts our attention. It says:

⁴⁹ Behbudiy, 2001, pp. 436-466. The original text is also presented in facsimile. It is said that this document was preserved for many years in the archives of Ismail Bey Gasprinsky (1851-1914).

⁵⁰ In May 1907, Turkestani deputies in the second State Duma petitioned the prime minister Stolypin himself to establish a Muslim ecclesiastic organization headed by a Mufti in Turkestan. Although Stolypin, without giving an immediate answer, left this issue to the Minister of War, at least those deputies might have examined the draft of Behbudiy before their petition to Stolypin. See Litvinov, 1998, p. 70.

⁵¹ Behbudiy, 2001, pp. 439, 450-451.

“To let Sufis, the owners of Sufi lodges, and *murīds* adapt the norms of *sharī‘a* without violating their freedom of conscience, and in this way to protect the common people from superstitions, idle talk, and waste of time.”⁵²

It should be noted that this draft pays attention to the strict inspection of officials and prohibits the migration of non-Muslims into Turkestan without the request from local people. It is interesting that these two issues were related to the causes of the Andijan Uprising. Although it is unknown whether Behbudiy read the *Tuḥfa-yi Tā’ib*, this draft clearly aimed to secure the cohesion of Muslim society in Turkestan by reorganizing and enhancing the two pillars of the *Dār al-Islām*. Here we can see the starting point of the Muslim autonomous movement in Turkestan.

However, this does not mean that the Muslim autonomous movement in Turkestan only occurred due to internal causes and local conditions. As seen in Behbudiy’s conception and terminology, it is clear that his idea derived from intensive debates among Muslim intellectuals in the Russian Empire. During the 1905-1906 period, the All Russian Muslim Congress was held three times to discuss political, social, educational, cultural and other issues, as well as the reform of Muslim Spiritual Assemblies. In the third congress held in Nizhnij Novgorod in August 1906, the Committee for the reform of Muslim Spiritual Assemblies adopted a resolution that an independent Spiritual Assembly (*Maḥkama-yi Islāmīye* headed by a five-year term *Shaykh al-Islām*) in Turkestan would be created.⁵³ There is no doubt that the 13 articles constituting the resolution of this committee encouraged Behbudiy to prepare his ambitious draft for Turkestan’s autonomy.

Behbudiy’s proposal regarding the establishment of Muslim ecclesiastic administration in Turkestan called for some responses from Muslim intellectuals in Russia. For example, Mu‘allim Karīm Qārlī in Alma-Ata [Almaty] raised a question in the journal *Shūrā* about the status of this ecclesiastic administration in Turkestan – whether it should be independent or be attached to one of the

⁵² *Ibidem*, pp. 442, 457.

⁵³ 1906 sene, 1906, p. 101. At the same time, we should note that this resolution might have been stimulated by the initiative of the Ministry of Inner Affairs that proposed to establish a “special administration of religious affairs” in Turkestan under the effect of the Imperial edict, which ordered to strengthen religious tolerance in the Russian Empire on 17 April 1905. As for the establishment of a Muslim Spiritual Assembly in Turkestan, long debates continued among the Russian authorities since the end of the 1860s. In general, while the Ministries of Inner and Foreign Affairs assisted the establishment of this institution, the Ministry of War and the Governor-Generals of Turkestan opposed it (see Litvinov 1998, pp. 64-70.) As for a unique project prepared by military staff in 1900 – just after the Andijan Uprising – to establish the Directorate of Spiritual Affairs of Muslims in Russian Turkestan, headed by not a Muslim mufti but a Russian official, see Arapov and Vasil’ev, 2006, pp. 192-227.

existing Muslim Spiritual Boards in Russia.⁵⁴ To this question Behbudiy responded with an article “Turkestan administration” in the same journal in November 1908. In this article he described the characteristics of Russian administration in Turkestan in detail. Although admitting that Turkestani Muslims were enjoying juridical autonomy [*shar‘i āftānūmiya*] at the local level, he criticized disorder and unsuitable conditions in juridical and educational affairs. He writes:

“Among judges there are so many vulgar men who are ignorant in the Arabic language and Islamic law, and lack the knowledge of special laws for Turkestan... In Turkestan all officials who are responsible for scholarly and national affairs are elected to their posts without any examination and operate without supervision. That is why corruption has become rife and unseemly incidents have occurred. The ruin of our *madrāsas* and *maktabs*; inequality in judicial offices; contradictions in legal declarations and opinions, that is, contradictory claims being obeyed in each province; the decrease in the number of scholars; the growing spread of corruption, bribery and other endless disorders; all these problems come from the absence of a central organ for Islamic administration.”⁵⁵

As seen above, these defects should have been attributed to the lack of the examination and control of *qādis*, in other words, to the lack of central administration of juridical affairs. In conclusion, he argues for the establishment of an independent Muslim ecclesiastic administration in Turkestan. He writes as follows:

“The author [Behbudiy] supports the establishment of an independent Muslim ecclesiastic administration in Turkestan. If God pleases, I will explain the details. Unless an Islamic administration [*idāre-yi Islāmiyya*] can be organized in such a large and systematic form, I am sure that it is impossible to reform any condition in Turkestan. Our future administration should be arranged to carry out not only ecclesiastic issues, but also deal with civil, juridical, scientific, and other matters. Present judicial offices and learning institutions must constitute the basis of our future administration. At a time when all Russian peoples and our other compatriots are enriching their livelihood, why do we accept our limited and oppressed situation? Since our judges and scholars are much more experienced in local judicial affairs than others, it is necessary to introduce an administration in accordance with the Islamic law.”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Qārli, 1908, p. 641.

⁵⁵ Behbūdī, 1908, p. 722.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 723.

At the same time, he submitted his proposal to Count K. K. Palen (Pahlen, 1861-1923) who conducted an extensive inspection of Russian administration in Turkestan during 1908-1909.⁵⁷ Although this plan for Turkestan autonomy was never realized, in 1917 we find Behbudiy once again in the drafting committee of the Turkic Federalist Party in Turkestan.⁵⁸ As is well known, the Turkestan Autonomy based in Kokand was destroyed by Soviet forces in February 1918. However, it is an important question how the notion of *Dār al-Islām* was preserved among Muslim intellectuals in the Soviet period.

Abbreviations

SPbF IV RAN: Sankt-Peterburgskij filial Instituta vostokovedenija Rossijskoj akademii nauk.

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⁵⁷ *Idem*, 1908, pp. 722-723. The inspection committee, being convinced of the harmful effects of Muslim civil judges, suggested the introduction of Russian jurisdiction as the ultimate goal.

⁵⁸ For the details see Komatsu, 1994.

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