3This paper will present a case study which provides an example of the role the ‘ulama played in Turkestan between 1920 and 1921, within the context of conflicts between local groups competing for power. More specifically, the case study will describe how a Tashkent mufti planned to win Turkestan’s independence from Soviet power, where the Basmachi appeared as possible military protagonists.

5We will attempt to formulate a reconstructive hypothesis which will examine the motivation and the principal events that preceded the writing of these two letters by comparing them with other documents from the same archive as such a “reconstruction” is needed if we are to shed light on their origin. The paper then goes on to present the data collected on the life of the author of the letters, and subsequently offers an interpretation of their content. This analysis is necessary in order to do justice to the author’s complex intellectual profile and political acumen.

• 5 Names are missing in the original.
• 6 Names are missing in the original.

 “A ― To the Honourable Consul of Japan in Qulja
In Central Asia the Turkestani peoples, who lived for half a century under the despotic government of Russia, were totally deprived of scientific and technical progress. The Turkic and Muslim nations, being oppressed by a Russian nationalistic policy of Russification, lost all of their political rights and spent their lives under tyranny. During this time, the Turkestani people, dissatisfied with the politics of this government, sought ways to obtain independence, and set up a Committee for National Independence which spread throughout Turkestan. In 1916, as the population could no longer tolerate this despotic policy it defended its rights via armed resistance. Finally, in 1917, after the February Revolution, freedom was temporarily granted to all. After the events of October 1917, the manifesto of Lenin, head of the Soviet government, promised freedom to every nation, especially to those in the East. On this basis, wishing to restore national liberties, in the city of Kokand, the former capital of Turkestan, the autonomy of the region was declared. The Turks of Turkestan set up a moderate government but the nationalistic Bolsheviks destroyed the cities with despotic aggression and unrestrained violence, spilling blood, killing women and children, ransacking houses and seizing our property. The government representatives were shot and hung and the government dissolved. Arson and murder are still taking place.
After the elimination of the government, all authority in Kokand passed to the Committee of Turkestan National Independence. The army of the previous government of Kokand came also under the control of the Committee. In Ferghana, the national armed forces have continued to fight with patience and determination. Its associations have been set up in every region and its members are secretly working to further the ideals of nationhood.
At the same time, the Bukharan and Khivan khanates have also suffered greatly. Therefore, the Central Committees of the National Union of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva request that, in the name of brotherhood and patriotism, the most honourable government of Japan, which holds dear the slogan ‘Asia for Asians!’, will not allow the people of Turkestan, fellow Asian patriot, to live under such tyranny. We implore you to extend a helping hand and come to our aid with arms, money and other indispensable means of support.

[The Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union] delegates to the following members the delivery of this letter to discuss the matter.5
The Commander in Chief of the National Army of Ferghana, Shirmuhammadbek
The President of the Committee of the Independent Government of Bukhara, Muzaffaruddin
The President of the Committee of the Independent Government of Khiva, Alimbek Amaqulov
The President of the Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union, Sadreddin-Khan.”

“B ― To his Excellency, his Majesty’s Consul General in Kashghar
For half a century the peoples of Turkestan passed their lives in the shadow of the Russian government, oppressed and deprived of scientific and technological progress. After the February Revolution of 1917 freedom was temporarily granted to all. After the events of October 1917, the manifesto of Lenin, head of the Soviet government, promised freedom to every nation, especially to those in the East. On this basis, in the city of Kokand, the ancient capital of Turkestan, the autonomy of the region was declared. A just government, conguous with the morality of the nations living in Turkestan, was set up. When, in order to celebrate this event, all the nations proclaimed public celebrations, the Bolsheviks destroyed the cities with despotic aggression and unrestrained violence, spilling blood, killing women and children, ransacking houses and seizing our property. The government representatives were shot and hung and the government dissolved. Arson and murder are still taking place.
After the elimination of the government, all authority in Kokand passed to the Committee of Turkestan National Independence. The army of the previous government of Kokand also came under the control of the Committee. Until now, the armed forces have continued to fight in Ferghana with patience and determination.
At the same time, the Bukharan and Khivan khanates have also been destroyed and have suffered greatly. Therefore, the Committees of the National Union of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva request that His Majesty’s Government, beacon of civilisation and civil liberties, will not allow the peoples of Turkestan to live under such despotism nor the great treasures of Turkestani civilisation and art to be destroyed and annihilated. We implore you, in the name of civil liberty, to extend a helping hand and come to our aid with arms, money and the necessary means of support.

[The Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union] delegates to the following members the delivery of this letter to discuss the matter.6
The Commander in Chief of the National Army of Ferghana, Shirmuhammadbek
The President of the Committee of the Independent Government of Bukhara, Muzaffaruddin
The President of the Committee of the Independent Government of Khiva, Alimbek Amaqulov
The President of the Central Committee of the Turkestan National Union, Sadreddin-Khan.”

The History of the Two Documents: A Brief Overview

6Although the two documents have never been published, they were known to exist. In 1928 Mustafa Chokaev, writing while in voluntary exile in Paris, seems to have had a rough idea of their contents:

• 7 M. CHOKAEV, “The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan”, Asiatic Review, XXIV-(April 1928), p. 284.

“The representatives of the United Committee for the National Liberation of Central Asia, in the persons of Sadriddin-Khan, Kerimov and others, made an appeal to the British Consul at Kuldja in 1921 asking for the support of the British Government. This constitutes one of the characteristic episodes in the struggle of Turkestan against Soviet power. The appeal never reached its destination. The special messenger on his way to Kuldja was arrested by the Bolsheviks in the town of Aulie-Ata. As a result, all the members of the ‘Committee of Liberation’ were condemned.”7

7In a work published in Istanbul in 1945, Abdullah Rajab Baysuni refers to possessing Sadreddin-Khan’s memoirs. In an excerpt he says:

• 8 A. R. BAYSUN, Türkistan millî hareketleri, Istanbul, 1945, p. 33.

“I knew that, the Central Committee [of the organization], which in 1920 was in Bukhara, ordered Arif Karimov and Yusufbek [Qurbanov] to depart to inform the governments of Great Britain and Japan about conditions in Turkestan. On their way, in the city of Aulie-Ata, they were caught by the Russian Cheka with all their documents.”8

• 14 S. AHMAD, “Jülbošči”, in M.-Q. ABDURAŠIDXONOV (ed.), Tanlangan asarlar, Toškent, Ma”navijat, 2003, (...)

 “Two young messangers, Yusufbek Qurbanov and Rustam Niyazbekov, together with Arif Karimov, were sent by the Bukharan section of Milli Ittihad to Tashkent, where they were entrusted with a message by Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev and took the road to Kashghar. They had been instructed to consign a letter written in the name of the governments of Bukhara, Khorezm and Turkestan to the Japanese and British Consuls. However, they were captured in a place near Alma-Ata. Arif Karimov handed over the secret letter to the OGPU agents. […] At the trial in Tashkent, Sadreddin-Khan and Karimov were sentenced to execution by a firing squad and Yu. Qurbanov and R. Niyazbekov two different detention periods. […] Munawwar-Qari, who was suspected of being involved in the affair, was held under arrest from 30 March to 1 December 1921.”14

11Given that Sirajiddin Ahmedov’s reconstruction bears no critical apparatus, it would be legitimate to conclude that most of the information he used came from Munawwar-Qari’s memoirs.

• 17 Üzbekiston Milliy Xavfsizlik Xizmati Arxivi (National Security Service Archive of Uzbekistan, hence (...)

 “― Sharifkhwajaev Sadreddin Khwaja, born in 1878, from Tashkent, a teacher before his arrest;
― Karimov Garif Alminovich, born in 1889, from Orenburg, he was employed by an educational institute in Tashkent before his arrest;
― Kurbanov Yusufbek, born in 1899, from Tashkent, head of a rate-regulation commission;
― Umarov Muhamedyar Muhamedovich, born in 1899, from Tashkent, teacher at school № 13 in Tashkent before his arrest;
― Niyazbekov Rustambek, born in 1879, from Tashkent, in charge of finances at a Muslim school in Tashkent before his arrest;
― Ziya-Muhamedov Abdullahjan, instructor of the People’s Commissariat for Education, at the time of his arrest sought refuge with a group of Basmachi;
― Sharifkhwajaev, Karimov, Kurbanov, Umarov, and Niyazbekov were arrested in 1921 by the Turcheka Politsektor, as members of a counter-revolutionary group that on 9 March 1921 during an illegal meeting prepared two counter-revolutionary and inflammatory letters addressed to representatives of Japan and Great Britain, requesting arms and money on behalf of the Committee of ‘National Union’ (Milli Ittihad) to support them in their fight against Soviet power in Turkestan.
Having authenticated the above-mentioned letters with the seal of the organization Milli Ittihad, Karimov and Kurbanov, on the request of Sharifkhwajaev, set off for Aulie-Ata in order to illegally cross the border to China with the intention of consigning these messages to the representatives of Japan and Great Britain. Karimov and Kurbanov were also supplied with reports from the People’s Commissariat for Education [which would have insured them] a journey without obstacles to the city of Aulie-Ata. The documents were prepared by Sharifkhwajaev.
Karimov and Kurbanov were held in the city of Aulie-Ata by the Cheka and the above-mentioned documents were confiscated. Sharifkhwajaev and Ziya-Muhamedov sought refuge with the Basmachi group of Rahmankul after hearing of the arrests of the afore-mentioned and they then instigated the Basmachi to vigorous action.
Sharifkhwajaev pleaded guilty during the investigation. The others, despite the fact that the file contained concrete proof refused to plead guilty. On 23 December 1921 the Supreme Revolutionary Court of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic of Turkestan examined the case publicly and issued the following sentences:
Sharifkhwajaev, Karimov and Ziya-Muhamedov condemned to execution by firing squad. Kurbanov condemned to 3 years’ hard labour, Umarov and Niyazbekov condemned to 2 years’ hard labour. However, on the basis of the amnesty granted by the TurkTsIK on 7 November 1921 for Sharifkhwajaev and Karimov execution by firing squad was commuted to 5 years’ hard labour, for Kurbanov the period of arrest was halved, whilst Umarov and Niyazbekov were freed. No amnesty was granted to Ziya Muhamedov, who was declared an outlaw who, if captured, could be shot by any citizen.”17

14The reconstruction carried out by Kutsenko is based on the material collected from the Cheka about Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev and on the interrogation that the Aulie-Ata Politbyuro subjected Karimov to.

15Presented below is the translation of a statement made by Karimov, which describes the details of the drafting of the two messages:

• 18 ÜzMXXA, DELO № 2977 po obvineniju Sadreddin Šarif Hodžaeva, l. 83ob.

 “Before the journey abroad I did not know Yusufbek Kurbanov at all. On 9 March 1921 I was invited to Abdullahjanov’s apartment. At about three o’clock in the morning Kurbanov arrived. Muhamedyar [Umarov] and Sadyrdin [Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev] were also there. The latter sat down and wrote an appeal to the great powers of Japan and Great Britain. Then he fixed on it a seal and placed the signatures of the National Committees of Khiva and Bukhara and of the General Committee [of Turkestan].”18

16From Kutsenko’s report, and from what Sirajiddin Ahmedov argues, it seems clear that the initiative for the writing of the two letters can be firmly attributed to Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev. In addition, Kutsenko’s reconstruction indicates that the signatures of the heads of the National Army of Ferghana, and of the Committee of the Independent Government of Bukhara, as well as that of the Committee of the Independent Government of Khorezm, are false.

17An extract from Munawwar-Qari’s memoirs written in prison in 1931 is further evidence of the unreliability of the signatures, and sustains that the co-ordination between the various committees cited in the letters never existed, although Munawwar-Qari does not deny that the organizations did exist:

• 19 M.-Q. ABDURAŠIDXONOV, 2003, p. 242.

“On 31 March I was arrested without warning. A few days later the reason for the arrest became known: Sadreddin-Khan had written a letter to the British Consul and the letter had been intercepted. The links between Bukhara, Samarkand and Ferghana [set forth] in the letter in reality did not exist. They were completely the fruit of the imagination of Sadreddin-Khan and Karimov.”19

18Given the unreliable nature of the signatures, we should attempt to understand to what extent Sadreddin-Khan’s words on plans for Turkestan independence actually had a basis in fact. In order to do so, we need to establish that role Sadreddin-Khan played within the illegal political organization called Milli Ittihad, whose president (ra’is) he claimed to be.

20Below is a particularly interesting point in Munawwar-Qari’s version, where he elaborates on the division that had been created between Tashkent and Bukhara:

• 22 Cf. ÜzMXXA, “Delo № 33391 po obvineniju Munavvara Kary Abdurašidhanova”, t. II, l. 298 and M.-Q. AB (...)

“At the time relationships between Bukhara and Tashkent were tense. Those from Bukhara operated under the flag of [the organization for] the Independence of Bukhara while the Turkestanis under that of the National Union; at the same time both groups were mostly made up by members of the Communist Party.”22

21Munawwar-Qari goes on to recall that he returned to Tashkent and stayed there from 7th to 20th March 1921, and that during his stay he met the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan, who entrusted him with a position on the scientific council of the People’s Commissariat for Education (Narkompros). Three or four days after having arrived in Tashkent he remembers meeting Musa Bigiev and Sadreddin-Khan.

22Munawwar-Qari claims he asked Sadreddin-Khan why he had not sent the seal and the statute of the organization to Bukhara. He relates that Sadreddin-Khan defended himself saying that he was not in possession of either the seal or the statute, that he had given them to someone else, and it was for this reason he had been unable to send them. After this, Sadreddin-Khan supposedly looked at Musa Bigiev and smiled, which seemed suspicious to Munawwar-Qari.

23Munawwar-Qari also claimed that he advised Sadreddin-Khan to find the seal and the statute and send them to Bukhara, adding that Tashkent could continue its activity but only as a provincial branch of the organization. Munawwar-Qari informs us that Sadreddin-Khan got down to work, and that after this meeting they were not able to see each other again, as he was afraid to meet the mufti because he was continually being followed by Cheka agents. Munawwar-Qari remembers being arrested a few days later on 30 March, and says that he only found out the reason for his arrest from Qurbanov and Karimov a month and a half later. This extract from the testimony finishes with the following statement (not included in the recent Uzbek edition of the “Memoirs”):

• 23 ÜzMXXA, Delo № 33391, t. II, l. 303.

“I was liberated on 11 December 1921. The others (Yu. Kurmanbaev [sic, Qurbanov], Karimov and Sadreddin-Khan) were tried on 23 December.”23

25According to what is written in this 1929 memoir some members of the Ittihad wa Taraqqi organization had moved from Tashkent to Bukhara. Those who remained in Tashkent established a new organization that, as its name eloquently suggests, wished to represent all of the Turkestani Muslim nation (millat) in the struggle for the independence from Soviet power. Those who went to Bukhara did not wish to place themselves under the authority claimed by the representatives of the Milli Ittihad and wished to run the Central Committee of the organization themselves.

26Tillahanov’s notes (zapiski) offer a brief resume of the birth of the Milli Ittihad organization and confirm Munawwar-Qari’s version:

• 25 ÜzMXXA, Delo № 33391, t. III, l. 88.

“I am well acquainted with the activity of the organization between the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921. The reason for this was that at the end of 1920 the progressives started leaving their jobs in state organizations, after which many of them went to Bukhara. Very few progressives remained in Tashkent. I wanted to leave for Bukhara too, but Sadreddin-Khan asked me to work in Tashkent and did not allow me to leave. At the time the organization was no longer called Ittihad wa Taraqqi but Milli Ittihad. The centre of Milli Ittihad moved to Bukhara along with its most prominent members: Sagdullah Khwaja Tursun Khajaev, Atakhan Nazir Khwajaev, Munawwar-Qari Abdurashidov and others.”25

28We believe that Tillahanov’s notes provide substantially new elements about the structure of the Milli Ittihad organization. In particular he explains the reorganization of the roles and duties expected of those who remained in Tashkent after the Central Committee of the organization had moved to Bukhara:

• 27 ÜzMXXA, Delo № 33391, t. III, ll. 88-90.

 “In Tashkent a provincial committee was set up by the organization which consisted of: 1. Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev (President); 2. Najmetdin Shir Ahmetbaev; 3. Abdullahjan Ziyabaev; 4. Selim-Khan Tillakhwajaev; 5. Israiljan Ibragimov; 6. Karimbek Narbekov; 7. Talibjan Musabaev. The establishment of the Syr-Daria oblast committee of the organization took place at the end of 1920. […] The members of the Syr-Daria committee of the organization had the following duties: President – Sadreddin-Khan; Secretary – Selim-Khan Tillakhanov; foreign affairs – Najmetdin Shirahmetbaev; information exchange and internal affairs – Talibjan Musabaev; military affairs – Israiljan Ibragimov; Treasurer – Karimbek Narbekov; organizer – Abdullahjan Ziyabaev. In the vast majority of cases the Syr-Daria committee did not act alone but took decisions based on the orders of the Bukharan centre. At the same time, however, Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev was given full power by the centre and was considered a representative of the Central Committee of the organization within the Syr-Daria oblast. This is why Sadreddin- Khan sometimes acted alone without waiting for the centre to answer to resolve some questions.”27

29The establishment of the Syr-Daria oblast committee by the Milli Ittihad organization placed Sadreddin-Khan in a position of formal dependence. In turn this provided him with effective independence from the centre of the organization situated in Bukhara. Taking the initiative to write letters to the British and Japanese Consuls, therefore, is clearly an act of insubordination towards the organization’s Bukharan centre, whose overall authority Sadreddin-Khan refused to acknowledge.

30Given that Sadriddin-Khan signed himself as the head (ra’is) of the Central Committee (markaz-i ‘umumi) of the Turkestan National Union, it is reasonable to assume that he wanted to affirm his own position as the only and legitimate representative of this organization. We believe that it was for this reason that he also signed his name to letters for the Committee of the Independent Government of Bukhara, which, we believe, was established by those who (after the disbanding of the Ittihad wa Taraqqi) moved from Tashkent to Bukhara.

32The case of Sadreddin-Khan’s letters highlights the need for further reflection on the changes the emergence of Soviet Central Asia brought to its Muslim communities in terms of power relations. Life in Muslim groups working within Soviet institutions was conditioned by new values, different from those typical of Islamic tradition. At the level of Soviet institutions, a Muslim’s political authority was no longer based on his being an ‘alim of renowned knowledge nor did it depend on being able to boast that one was a sayyid or a khwaja. Thus, the authority which a Muslim needed to be a leader, whether of the Musbyuro or of an illegal political organization, depended on access to instruments of power. Just as for Ryskulov what proved crucial to implement his political plans was the obtaining Moscow’s favour, so too Sadreddin-Khan needed to demonstrate he could gain the favour of Great Britain and Japan to rise to a position of power within the Milli Ittihad.

Sadreddin-Khan Sharifkhwajaev: a Biographical Sketch

34From Kutsenko’s report, we learn that Sadreddin-Khan was born in Tashkent in 1878. To date, there is no known information on his intellectual formation, and activity prior to 1917.

45The plan of the ‘Ulama and Fuqaha Jam‘iyyati to mobilize the Tahskent Muslim community, via a call for maslaha (“welfare”), proved to be a failure as the fact that the Sovnarkom in Tashkent had the power to disband them had not been taken into account.

46In the middle of the Civil War and after the dissolution of the Autonomous Government of Kokand, those Muslim organizations that were not able to, or did not want to partecipate in Soviet politics turned to illegal political activity to achieve their goals. This seems to have also been the destiny of Sadreddin-Khan.

The Letters: Some Observations on Their Contents

52All of the above points to the fact that Sadreddin-Khan was conscious that the ideas of national and civil rights would make his messages persuasive. It is not by chance that in the letter to the Japanese Consul the ideas of Turkic ethnic identity of the Turkestani nation were prominent, given that these served as supporting argumentation for the idea of Asian brotherhood with the Japanese. Nor should the insistence on the theme of rights and the absence of jingoistic elements in the letter to the British surprise us, as they were seen as defenders of civil rights and civilisation.

53As previously noted, the signatures at the bottom of the documents are false. It is, however, worth mentioning that Shirmuhammadbek (otherwise known as Kur Shirmat) and his armed groups were presented as the Turkestani National Army assigned to Ferghana Valley. Kur Shirmat enjoyed a certain reputation with the British mission in Kashghar and in the eyes of Sadreddin-Khan this may have seemed to be a way to request money and arms.

54In reconstructing the mufti’s political project the most significant factors that the letters offer are the idea of regional independence from Soviet power and the almost total absence of references to Islamic institutions. Sadreddin-Khan sustained that the “power” of the Autonomous Government of Turkestan, which had been proclaimed in November 1917 and dissolved by the Bolsheviks in March 1918, was transferred to the Committee for the National Independence of Turkestan. The letters do not indicate what this actually consisted of, and what relation it bore to the Milli Ittihad organization. However, it would seem that the continuity between the plan for the independence of Turkestan, which is mentioned in the letter, and the Autonomous Government in Kokand were arguments to explain the coopting of the Kur Shirmat groups of Basmachi by Sadreddin-Khan.

55Undoubtedly, the need to persuade the Japanese and British Consuls to supply the “counter-revolutionaries” with arms and money influenced the themes that were either included in, or left out of, these two letters. “Asia for Asians” and the “defence of civil rights” seem to be slogans that Sadreddin-Khan chose to strike a chord with his chosen foreign audiences. On the other hand, in these two letters the idea of Islamic identity in Turkestan does not seem to be visible at all. Rather than an oversight is likely to have been a deliberate omission.

57Indeed, in both of the letters the author repeats the phrase “after the elimination of the government, all authority in Kokand passed to the Committee of Turkestan National Independence”. Rather than portraying a conflict between Muslims and Bolsheviks, by employing such a phrase Sadreddin-Khan wished to appear as a political representative on a par with his audiences (the Japanese and British Consuls), when requesting financial assistance for resistance against the Soviets and in favour of Turkestan independence.

58If such an initiative came out of an environment which wished to defend the integrity of Islamic institutions, it should also be highlighted that the plan of the Tashkent mufti responded to precise political needs. The rhetorical elements which record a careful evaluation of the international circumstances in which Turkestan then found itself should be read in such a light. Moreover, the history of the letters suggests that Sadreddin-Khan’s initiative should be seen a a way to obtain authority over the “counter-revolutionary” organizations in action in Turkestan and in the People’s Republic of Bukhara. The struggle between coalitions of Muslim intellectuals and officials, in fact became particularly bitter when the political status of the Muslim Communists became precarious.

59These documents neither prove the engagement of the ‘ulama in the Basmachi revolt, nor the existence of an organization acting for the political affirmation of Islam in Central Asia in the early Soviet period. Rather they show how, in a period usually depicted as a struggle between Bolsheviks and Muslims, a Tashkent mufti chose language consistently different from that of Islamic tradition to affirm a political plan aimed at securing the independence of Turkestan from Soviet rule.