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Dossier thématique

From Jewish Renewal to Israeli Judaism

An analysis of emergent “soft” Religious Nationalism
Du renouveau juif au judaïsme israélien. Une analyse du nationalisme religieux « doux » émergent
Del renacimiento judío al judaísmo israelí. Un análisis del nacionalismo religioso emergente « suave »
Rachel Werczberger, Dana Kaplan et Nadia Beider
p. 159-179

Résumés

Cet article examine le cas du judaïsme israélien afin d’explorer comment les processus de nationalisme religieux se manifestent en Israël, en proposant une perspective plus nuancée que celle actuellement avancée par la littérature existante. Plus précisément, nous analysons le développement du judaïsme israélien en tant que forme « douce » de nationalisme religieux, notamment au sein des secteurs laïcs et libéraux de la société israélienne. Pour retracer la transition d’un mouvement de renouveau juif laïque vers un réseau davantage intégré religieusement et nationalement, nous nous concentrons sur les changements générationnels au sein du judaïsme israélien afin de mieux comprendre cette évolution. Nos résultats révèlent que, tandis que les membres plus âgés conservent généralement une position politique cohérente et orientée à gauche, les plus jeunes tendent à être plus religieux et à manifester moins de résistance à l’égard de l’establishment religieux. Les sentiments et opinions nationalistes apparaissent comme une force unificatrice entre les générations. Nous soutenons que la création de préparations militaires intégratives (mehinot) et l’émergence de nouveaux rituels, comme la lecture de la Déclaration d’indépendance au Mur occidental, illustrent un passage du judaïsme israélien du renouveau laïque vers un nationalisme religieux, quoique sous une forme nettement plus douce que les expressions plus exclusives de nationalisme religieux présentes dans le champ politique israélien.

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1A recent social media campaign for an adult educational program led by the Integrative Midreshet Natur invites individuals with significant backgrounds in Jewish studies and broad interests in contemporary Israeli society to join a year-long study program to create a “cultural and spiritual Israeli Halakhah.” The advertisement states that the renewal of Halakhah (Jewish law) will draw from “the full spectrum of Jewish tradition” rather than solely from dominant Orthodox interpretations. This goal aligns with the aims of the broader Israeli Judaism movement to which Midreshet Natur belongs. Moreover, the program emphasizes that the new “Israeli” Halakhah, based on “ethics, inspiration, and vision, rather than coercion” (Midreshet Hashiluv, nd) will be a joint project of individuals belonging to diverse sectors of Israeli society—religious as well as secular (non-observant). By striving to reconnect non-observant Israeli Jews with their religious heritage in a manner relevant to their lives, the movement also attempts to strengthen the link between Israeli nationalism and the Jewish religion (Menkin, 2021).

2This article examines the intersection of secular lifestyles, religious traditions, and nationalism, with a focus on the movement known as Israeli Judaism, in the context of the recent resurgence of nationalism in Israel and worldwide. Over the first two decades of the 21st century, nationalism has emerged more strongly, prompting questions about whether it ever truly faded (Cox, 2020). This renewed prominence has sparked heightened scholarly interest in exploring nationalism’s diverse forms, functions, origins, and implications. This article aims to contribute to that broader conversation by focusing on the Jewish-Israeli context.

3Although the concepts of nation and nationalism are widely debated (Cox, 2020; Dar, 2024), the current scholarly consensus is that they are not fixed or essential entities. Moreover, most scholars agree that nationalism, broadly defined as a political, cultural, and emotional attachment to a nation, is continuously constructed, performed, and enacted (Dar, 2022; Mylonas, Tudor, 2021). Contemporary approaches increasingly focus on its everyday expressions (Billig, 1995; Cox, 2020; Xiao, Davis and Dong, 2024), often distinguishing between inclusive, “soft” nationalism and exclusionary, often populist, nationalism, with the latter attracting more scholarly attention due to its divisive and polarizing nature (Brubaker, 2017; Clott, 2017; Mylonas, Tudor, 2021; Xiao, Davis and Dong, 2024). While soft nationalism fosters openness and integration, exclusionary forms tend to other and marginalize certain groups.

4In many instances, the resurgence of nationalism is rooted in the intersection of nationalist sentiments and religious worldviews, movements and identities. Scholarship on religious nationalism typically tends to see it as inherently exclusionary, often tied to right-wing movements, like the Christian Right in the United States (Gorski, Perry, 2022; Whitehead, Perry, 2020). As a result, most interpretations of religious nationalism tend to be overly homogenized, assuming a uniform, religiously exclusionary character. Consequently, there is a growing need to reconsider how religious and national identities intersect in contexts other than Christianity, and to move beyond its illiberal, fundamentalist, or far-right incarnations. This shift allows for a more nuanced understanding of religious nationalism, expanding its spectrum to include “softer” forms that may be more diverse and potentially inclusive.

5In this article, we use the case of Israeli Judaism to challenge the conventional view on religious nationalism. This form of religious nationalism emerges from what may be regarded as the mainstream of Israeli society. Although those involved in the movement see themselves as apolitical, their actual political views typically align with the political center and do not rely on overt exclusionary discourse and practices. While religious nationalism is typically seen as promoting exclusionary identities that marginalize outsiders, Israeli Judaism seems to offer an alternative: a more pluralistic option that supposedly embraces both diverse Jewish groups and non-Jewish communities within its national framework. We contextualize the movement within the collective and political resurgence of religious nationalism in Israel, especially in its populist exclusionary political form. Considered within the framework of religious renewal and national identity, Israeli Judaism emerges in our study as a partially inclusive non-fundamentalist religious-national project.

6To illustrate these dynamics, we first provide a brief overview of what Israeli Judaism is and then review existing scholarship on religious nationalism, both globally and in Israel. We explore the rise of religious nationalism in Israel, characterized by the increasing influence of Judaism in the political sphere (Uslaner, 2022) as well as the growing dominance of the religious right and the settlement movement (Ben-Porat, Filc, 2022; Ram, 2024). To better contextualize this form of religious nationalism, we then delve into the evolution of Israeli Judaism, which originated as the Jewish Secular Renewal Movement, an initiative that aimed to reinterpret and culturalize Judaism, and that has gradually shifted toward a more explicitly religious orientation (Werczberger, Azulay, 2011). This shift marks a transition toward a religious-nationalist agenda observable in the movement’s demographic and organizational expansion. We argue that the current form of the Israeli Judaism movement may be viewed as a political response to the rising influence of the religious right, reflecting and responding to the nationalistic uses of Judaism in the political realm.

7We substantiate our claims based on a small-scale survey of participants in Israeli Judaism as well as on ethnographic data. Demographically, our findings indicate that the movement is attracting a growing number of younger and more religious participants. In terms of organization, there are more initiatives aligned with the Religious Zionist sector, often politically identified with the right. Ritually, there are more practices that attempt to align nationalist ideology with religious sentiments.

8Theoretically, our case study shows that religious nationalism is not monolithic. Instead, we draw on Brubaker (2012) to view religious nationalism as a spectrum and to contend that Israeli Judaism represents a “softer” or diluted form of religious nationalism compared to the more extreme far-right political uses of religious discourse prevalent in Israeli politics (Ben-Porat, Filc, 2022; Ram, 2024). Focusing on the shifting nationalism instantiated by Israeli Judaism reveals much about the broader processes currently unfolding in Israeli society regarding politics, religion and nationalism, and it illuminates the complexities of nationalism and religious nationalism within a unique national context.

Israeli Judaism

  • 1 In general, the Jewish religious field in Israel is bifurcated between “the secular”, i.e., non-obs (...)
  • 2 In that book, the authors present a large-scale survey on religiosity among Jewish Israelis, using (...)

9Israeli Judaism is an umbrella term for a wide array of bottom-up1 Jewish renewal projects aimed at the secular Israeli public and the liberal religious community (Werczberger, Azulay, 2011). The term “Israeli Judaism” has gained prominence in the public discourse, following the publication of a popular social science book with the same name in which the authors analyze the diverse religious outlooks, practices, and beliefs of Jews in Israel (Rosner, Fuchs, 2019)2. We, however, apply the term more specifically and narrowly, using it to refer to the movement of the same name that encompasses various grassroots cultural initiatives focused on Jewish renewal.

  • 3 The pre-military academies (mechinot) are gap-year educational and leadership programs for high sch (...)

10According to the website of Panim - The Association of Israeli Judaism Organizations, Israeli Judaism combines “traditional values with modern Israeli values—democracy, equality, humanism, and Zionism,” and aims “to make texts and traditions accessible to all of the Jewish people without distinction of sector or religion”. Currently, the movement encompasses various types of activities. Notable among them are the pluralistic study halls (Batei Midrash), which welcome participants from religious and secular backgrounds, and secular, non-affiliated prayer communities that provide alternative spaces for spiritual expression, free from the dominant orthodox modes of devotion. Later additions to the movement include the Israeli Rabbinical Ordination Program and the pre-military leadership academies, which bring together religious and secular participants. These academies aim to redefine Jewish-Israeli identity around contemporary Zionist ideology while drawing on Jewish heritage3. In tandem with the expansion of these activities, more religiously inclined organizations have joined the movement, notably the non-Orthodox Jewish liberal movements (Reform and Conservative) and organizations associated with the liberal-Orthodox public that work to bridge the gap between traditional forms of Jewish worship and progressive, liberal and Feminist thought (Zion-Waldoks, 2021). Together, these elements demonstrate the commitment to engaging with a renewed Jewish identity that resonates with contemporary values and the ideologies of modern Israel.

11Although it is not a mass movement, Israeli Judaism is far from marginal. Its previous form, the Secular Jewish Renewal movement, peaked in the early 2000s (Werczberger, Azulay, 2011). Based on the active engagement of secular individuals with the Jewish tradition, the movement’s mission was to culturalize Judaism and, in doing so, link secular Jewish Israelis to their cultural heritage (Astor, Maryl, 2020). By reclaiming the Jewish tradition from the Orthodox rabbinic establishment, it also created a religious-secular hybrid (Goodman, Yona, 2004; Yadgar, 2010; Kaplan, Werczberger, 2017).

12In 2011, Jewish Renewal was rebranded as Israeli Judaism. As noted, this transformation included new demographic groups, primarily from the liberal Orthodox, Religious-Zionist community. Consequently, Israeli Judaism shifted ideologically, prompting the initial Jewish Renewal project to expand beyond its original “secular” foundation and broaden its political, cultural and religious tenets. In what follows, we will show that the increasing number of religious participants led to the re-sacralization of Jewish practices and beliefs and, in correlation, to a growing emphasis on nationalist ideology. We focus on this evolution to argue that it points to the gradual alignment of Israeli Judaism with the broader processes of religious nationalization that are taking place in Israel today (Ram, 2024).

A Resurgent Religious Nationalism

13Nationalism can be broadly defined as “the sum of those beliefs, idioms and practices, oriented to a territorially delineated nation and embodied in the political demands of a self-identified people, which may or may not be realized in a nationalist movement and state ‘of their own’" (Cox, 2007: 3143). Similarly, Mylonas and Tudor (2023) argue that nationalism is composed of three interconnected core elements: the collective recognition and celebration of an imagined community, and a sense of loyalty and solidarity among its members; a drive for self-governance over a distinct territory; and a collection of symbols and practices that embody and signify the nation. Recent studies have asserted a global resurgence of nationalism, emphasizing the rise of ethno-nationalist sentiments, discourses, and policies worldwide across various national contexts (Antonsich, 2020; May et al., 2020; Elgenius, Rydgren, 2022). As scholars of nationalism have noted, the decline of traditional nation-states and old forms of secular nationalism, created both the need and the opportunity for new expressions of nationalism as alternative forms of social cohesion. This phenomenon is often characterized by populist rhetoric that frames the nation as threatened by both “internal” and “external” forces, which are perceived as undermining its “authentic” identity and integrity, creating what scholars of nationalism call exclusionary nationalisms (Clott, 2017). A significant factor in the resurgence of nationalism in general and exclusionary nationalism in particular is the influence of religion and the consequent emergence of religious nationalism. As political actors, religious nationalists are increasingly making religion-based claims, leading scholars to suggest that “contemporary nationalisms are suffused with the religious” (Friedland, 2001: 126; See also Grzymala-Busse, 2019; Juergensmeyer, 2019). The intertwining of religion and nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Despite the primordial/constructivist debate (see Brincker, 2020), some theorists have demonstrated that even modern secular nationalisms, which are “based on the secular idea of a social compact of equals rather than on ethnic ties or sacred mandates” (Juergensmeyer, 2019: 2), have integrated religious elements (Kimmerling, 1998; Brincker, 2020; Rouhana, Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2021). However, contemporary forms of religious nationalism indicate a significant shift, characterized by a fusion of religion and nationalism rather than merely borrowing religious symbols. While nationalism seeks legitimization and political recognition of national sovereignty in religion, religious nationalism prioritizes a nation defined primarily by its religious identity, excluding those who do not belong. A prime example of this form of religious nationalism is American Christian nationalism, or what sociologist Rogers Brubaker calls “Christianism”, characterized by the commitment to “a vision of American civic life and polity as closely intertwined with an identitarian, politically conservative strain of Christianity” (Whitehead, Perry, 2020: xi; See also Gorski, Perry, 2022).

14Religious nationalism manifests in two interconnected ways: first, through nationalistic rhetoric that targets religious minorities within the state or perceived external enemies and, second, via a “sacralization” of the political realm, whereby political action is infused with religious symbolism and language, often framed in civilizational terms (Brubaker, 2017). This sacralization allows various actors to justify contentious and sometimes violent politics with religious claims. Rouhana and Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2021) explain that hegemonic nationalism uses religious claims as the foundational basis for state-level politics and national narratives. This effectively legitimizes policies and practices even when articulated by secular figures. The sacralization of politics involves leveraging religious claims to justify actions, which can lead to the exclusion and discrimination of certain groups, potentially provoking conflicts and violence.

15These processes which occur at the nation-state level may involve state and non-state actors (Friedland, 2001: 126; Juergensmeyer, 2019). Therefore, it is crucial to examine not only how religious nationalism shapes the political life of the nation-state and its institutions but also how its religiously infused discourses and ideologies influence the status and the actions of various communities within the state (Rouhana, Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2021). Moreover, various cases of nationalism in general and religious nationalism in particular differ in their treatment of the role and interaction between institutions and individual agency (Brincker, 2020). Consequently, the fusion of nationalism and religion opens a broad spectrum of identifications and expressions of political agency.

16This study seeks to explore how processes of religious nationalism unfold in Israel with a focus on Israeli Judaism. We trace the collective and political resurgence of religious nationalism in Israel, in both its populist exclusionary political form and in the alleged non-political, more inclusive form of Israeli Judaism. In line with scholarly understandings of nationalism as a practice rather than merely an ideology (Bonikowski, 2016), we focus our analysis on the organizational levels of Israeli civil society where discourses, practices, and identities take shape. Our goal is to examine specific institutions and practices that contribute to this dynamic.

Religious Nationalism in Israel

17As Chernilo notes “Nations are not fixed, stable and homogenous phenomena. Different features of nations may, have and will continue to be highlighted under different circumstances” (Chernilo, 2020: 1073). Thus, religion may play diverse roles in the modern nation-state that change over time. Historically, most scholars studying the relationship between religion and nationalism in Israel have agreed that early Zionism was essentially a non-religious phenomenon (for a post-secular critique, see Yadgar, Hadad, 2022). Zionism offered a viable modern secular alternative to traditional religious Jewish nationalism. In this form of secular ethnonationalism, Judaism, as a religion, has often been sidelined. As a secular ideology, Zionism challenged the religious view that Jewish redemption would come about with the advent of the Messiah. National revival implied a break with the past and the attempt to replace Judaism, a religion identified with pre-modern Jewish exilic existence, with Jewishness, a modern identity based on culture, ethnicity, a historical sense of belonging to the Jewish people, as well as on a proactive approach toward the future (Katsman, Ben-Porat, 2023; but see also: Yadgar, Hadad, 2022).

18Even scholars who take for granted that the secularization of Jewish identity lies at the very core of the Zionist-nationalist ideology and of the political project it has motivated admit that a clear break from religion has not been a viable option for the movement (Almog, Reinharz, Shapira, 1998; Salmon, 2002). The Jewish tradition was indispensable to Zionism, providing the national movement with unifying symbols, rituals, and history, coalescing into what Leibman and Don-Yehiya have named “Israeli civil religion” (Liebman, Don-Yehiya, 1983). Moreover, with the establishment of the State of Israel, Judaism became a mobilizing force and a marker of symbolic boundaries, distinguishing between those granted full citizenship and those excluded (Ben-Porat, Filc, 2022; Yadgar, Hadad, 2023). The idea that Israel is a “Jewish state” (as opposed to a state for the Jews) is a central ethos in Jewish Israeli society (Oren, 2019). In Israel, national boundaries and questions of civic belonging adhere to the Jewish religious principles of matrilineality and conversion. Moreover, territorial claims are based on the perception of historical continuity, and the biblical and divine promise (Katsman, Ben-Porat, 2023).

19While the merger of religion with the nation-state has been a continuous process since the establishment of the State of Israel, the war of 1967, which resulted in Israel’s takeover of new territories, including the West Bank and Jerusalem, encouraged the rise of a new brand of religious nationalism by the Religious-Zionists and to an overall intertwining of religion and nationalism (Kimmerling, 1998; Raz-Krakotzkin, 2021; Ben-Porat, Filc, 2022). The political change brought about by the 1977 electoral victory of the right-wing Likud party, which ended the secular Labor party’s hegemony, accelerated these processes significantly.

  • 4 Examining Jewish identity and practices of Jewish Israelis, Rosner and Fuchs argue that a unique bl (...)
  • 5 According to Ben-Porat and Filc (2022), three of the ten parties represented in the 21st Knesset (I (...)

20Beyond the increasing political power of the religious parties, specifically the Religious-Zionist and Ultra-Orthodox, scholarship identifies several interrelated socio-political developments that have shaped the current entanglement of nationalism with religion in Israel. First, the religious resurgence, exemplified by the meteoric rise of the Ultra-Orthodox Mizrachi party Shas (Leon, 2014; Ram, 2024), has contributed to the blurring of boundaries between religious and traditional Israelis and a significant segment of the so-called seculars. This is especially evident in their shared commitments to the notion of a “Jewish state”, and in the instrumental role of religion in delineating and safeguarding its symbolic and civic boundaries (Ben-Porat, 2013; Katsman, Ben-Porat, 2023)4. Second, in the ongoing debate about the religionization of Israel in recent decades, scholars argue that the public sphere in Israel has become more religious—notably in the military, the educational system, and the media (Peled, Peled, 2019; Levy, 2014; but see Ben-Porat, 2013). Third, the rise of religious populism with a strong ethno-nationalist content whereby populist political parties claim to represent the “Jewish people”, is another key factor (Ben-Porat, Filc, 2022)5. As a result, in the political sphere, Judaism has become increasingly intertwined with the idea of the state, serving both as a mobilizing resource and as a means of delineating internal and external boundaries. Consequently, the centrality of religion in determining “the people,” together with the definition of Israel as a “Jewish state,” makes exclusion a central characteristic of current Israeli politics (Ben-Porat, Filc, 2022).

21As a result, social and civic hierarchies are now largely shaped by religious affiliation, not only between Jews and non-Jews, but among Jews as well. As Abu (2023) convincingly argues, the structure of citizenship in Israel has, in recent years, increasingly reinforced a new hierarchy within the Jewish population. Groups perceived as “more Jewish”—namely, Ultra-Orthodox and Religious-Zionists individuals, enjoy group privileges granted and funded by the state, while citizens from groups considered ‘less Jewish’, such as secular Jews or non-Orthodox Jews, benefit from collective rights based solely on their belonging to the Jewish people (Abu, 2023). Put differently, religious affiliation has become a reference point separating not only Jews from non-Jews but also “good” Jews (i.e., Orthodox/observant) from “bad” Jews (i.e., non-Orthodox/secular). Jewishness now “shapes the very definition of legitimate citizenship, delineating the nation and privileging some political” (Grzymala-Busse, 2019: 1), and Judaism has become a critical component of both contemporary identity politics and the political field (Kaplan, Werczberger, 2017; Ram, 2024).

22The rise of Israeli Judaism, we argue, is another manifestation of these structural shifts. Drawing on New Social Movement theory (Poletta, Jasper, 2001), we view the Secular Jewish Renewal movement, which later morphed into Israeli Judaism, as a new socio-religious movement that strives for a substantive transformation of the Israeli religious-political field by offering an attractive option for Jewish identity formation. Initially in the 1990s, secular Jewish renewal was part of a broader network of secular and non-Orthodox entrepreneurs acting outside the political system, and challenging the religious authority institutionalized in the state-synagogue status quo (Ben-Porat, 2013). Significantly, at that stage, the movement was led by self-defined secular individuals, many of whom came from the secular kibbutz movement. The inclusion of liberal Orthodox individuals in the expanding framework of Israeli Judaism reflects the growing identitarian and political aspirations of groups that have historically been perceived as ‘less Jewish’ within dominant narratives (Werczberger, Azulay, 2011; Abu, 2023; Katsman, Ben-Porat, 2023). Moreover, this expansion brought about a shift in the movement’s leadership dynamics, with Orthodox organizations and their leaders gradually taking on a more prominent role.

23Our previous research on the Jewish New Age movement showed that secular Jews engaged with it out of a desire to reconnect with Judaism and redefine it on their own terms. We argued that this ability to reshape Judaism has a distinct class aspect related to the cultural capital of those involved in such initiatives (Kaplan, Werczberger, 2017). In this paper, we examine the evolution of Israeli Judaism to argue that, by offering a more religiously Jewish and nationalist mode of identification, it not only seeks to reframe Jewishness as “a symbolic resource that allows individuals and groups to claim rights and privileges” (Abu, 2023: 73), but also reflects and responds to the current rise of religious nationalism by articulating a new, “softer” form of religious nationalism.

24The emerging rituals promoted by Israeli Judaism exemplify both these tendencies and their inherent ambivalence. Blending Jewish traditions with nationalist elements, these practices forge a new, non-Orthodox nationalist approach to Jewish identity. For instance, in 2021, a coalition of Israeli Judaism organizations introduced the ritual of reading Israel’s Declaration of Independence at the Western Wall during Independence Day celebrations. The reading, which emulated a Torah reading in a synagogue, projected religious significance onto a foundational secular text. By incorporating this reading into the Western Wall setting—a site of sacred Jewish importance—the ritual imbued the Declaration with religious meaning, aligning it with Jewish tradition while underscoring state-nationalism. We see this practice as an illustration of the drive to forge a nationalist ethos inspired by, and simultaneously transforming the Jewish tradition, as well as of the broader process of nationalizing these traditions. Furthermore, the public reading of the Declaration of Independence at a sacred site elevates the Declaration’s civil, horizontal contractual principle (“a state for all people”) into a transcendent commitment to democracy. However, holding the event in a Jewish place of worship closely associates this nationalist-religious ritual with particular Jewish groups and primarily resonates with those on the spectrum between liberal Religious Zionism and non-Orthodox Jewish and renewal movements. This focus effectively excludes non-Jewish citizens, such as Palestinian Israelis, demonstrating the ritual’s limited inclusivity despite its broader declared intentions (Menkin, 2021). Similarly, the novel “havdalah” (literally separation) ceremony which emulates the traditional Jewish havdalah ceremony marking the end of the Shabbat, is now held at the end of the Memorial Day and the beginning of the Day of Independence. It has become popular in many Israeli Judaism communities. Like the Declaration of Independence ceremony, this ritual points to the creation of semi-religious nationalist rituals that fuse Jewishness with nationalist sensibilities.

25We argue that the nationalization of Israeli Judaism showcased by these rituals is related to the entry of a younger and more religious population to the movement, mainly through the establishment of the integrative (religious and secular) pre-military educational programs, such as the Natur program with which we opened this paper. These educational frameworks—arguably developed as a counterpoint to far-right Religious-Zionist pre-military academies operating in the West Bank (Lebel, 2016)—seek to cultivate a serving elite rooted in Jewish identity and committed to advancing a renewed nationalist ideological vision for Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state (Avni, 2019).

From secular renewal to religious nationalism

26To explore the differences between long-standing and newer, younger participants, we conducted a survey in 2019. The survey examined the range of identities and practices among individuals associated with Israeli Judaism as well as their views on fundamental political, ethical, and practical issues shaping the religious landscape in Israel. Participants were asked about their involvement in Israeli Jewish organizations, their religious identity and that of their families, their adherence to Jewish practices and traditions, and their views on religion and state, ideology, and politics. The survey link was disseminated via social media platforms, primarily Facebook and WhatsApp, targeting acquaintances who shared it within groups focused on Israeli Judaism. A total of 161 individuals responded to the survey, with ages ranging from 18 to 83. Approximately two-thirds of respondents were over 30 years old, defined by us as the “first generation” or adults, while one-third were under 30, categorized as the “second generation” or youth.

27The sample is not representative of the adult Israeli Jewish population, as the Israeli Judaism movement draws its members overwhelmingly from the educated (69.4% of the sample have at least a Bachelor’s degree, including 49.4% with a Master’s or doctorate, and an additional 12.5% are currently pursuing academic studies), affluent (83.1% are homeowners), and native-born population (88.8% of the sample). Women are overrepresented, constituting 61.3% of the sample, likely because they have a higher response rate than men, and the mean age of respondents is 41.

28To examine the processes of institutionalization and the impact of intergenerational changes within the Israeli Jewish community, we compared survey responses between two generations. In our analysis, we focus on differences between older adults and younger adults regarding their involvement in Israeli Judaism, their levels of religiosity, and their views on the relationship between religion and state. This descriptive analysis simply compares the two generations’ attitudes and characteristics; it does not seek to make causal claims based on the collected snapshot data.

29Political outlook serves as a lens through which society is viewed and interpreted. In terms of political orientation, people involved in Israeli Judaism are not representative of the general population as over two-thirds of them place themselves on the left of the political spectrum. However, this tendency is much more marked among the first generation, who are two-and-a-half times more likely to identify as left-wing or very left-wing than the second generation. Conversely, the second generation is over four times more likely than the first to place themselves on the right. However, both generations overwhelmingly identify as Zionists (83% and 89% respectively). Notwithstanding this similarity, the first generation is more politically homogeneous than the second as those aged under thirty are more evenly distributed across the political spectrum but are still more left-wing than the Israeli Jewish population in general.

30Moreover, attitudes toward racism in Israel closely align with political orientation. For example, the majority of the first generation, as opposed to only around a fifth of the second, believe that foreign workers from Africa experience the highest level of discrimination possible (on a scale of 1-9). Similarly, a far higher proportion of the first generation (41.1%) than of the second (22.4%) rates discrimination against Arabs at 9, the highest level. This indicates that there is a clear distinction between the two generations, not only in their self-described political affiliation, but also in their views on racism and discrimination in Israeli society.

31Political views color not only perceptions of societal realities such as prejudice, but also of the character of Israeli Judaism itself. Members of the first generation consider social justice and moral values to be essential aspects of Israeli Judaism (92.9%) or very important (73.7%) to the movement. Among the second generation, only 72.3% consider these aspects important, and fewer than half consider them very important (40.4 %). Thus, older members of the movement have a very coherent left-wing worldview that shapes their view of Israeli society in general and of Israeli Judaism in particular. As the founders of the movement, their influence is evident in the emphasis on social justice. However, younger people drawn to the movement are a little more diverse in their attitudes.

32Some of the central debates over religion in the Israeli political arena relate to the twin issues of the separation of church and state as well as the Rabbinate’s monopoly over religious affairs. One of the central purposes of Israeli Judaism, at least according to the first generation (that is those aged over 30), is to challenge the hegemony of the religious establishment in Israel. In fact, 59.6% of the first generation and 38.3% of the second view undermining religious/Orthodox control over Judaism as a very important aspect of Israeli Judaism. Another priority is to change the nature of Judaism in Israel, to make it more open-minded, something that 67.3% of the first generation and 44.7% of the second consider a very important part of Israeli Judaism.

33On a range of touchstone issues that underscore debates over the role of Orthodox Judaism in the life of Israeli citizens, such as allowing public transportation to run on the Jewish Sabbath, gender segregation at holy sites and in the public sphere, and the monopoly of Orthodox Judaism over marriage, there is support for altering the status quo and challenging existing religious authorities. However, there are also consistent differences between the two generations, with the second generation being much less likely to support policies that are associated with attempts to reduce the power of the religious establishment in Israel. Even when both generations support a policy (as in the first three examples shown below), the strength of feeling among the first generation is much more marked, and the second generation is significantly more diverse in its thinking (Figure 1).

34When it comes to direct assessments of the status of non-Orthodox Jewish denominations, the vast majority of respondents recognize conversions to Judaism conducted by non-Orthodox clerics, with 91.6% of the first and 78.7% of the second generation viewing them as valid. In their own lives, the first generation is three times as likely as the second to say that having a Jewish marriage ceremony that the Rabbinate would recognize is not at all important to them (56.3% compared to 18.4%). Of course, these intergenerational differences may not necessarily indicate a change in the movement, as one might argue that young people’s views change over time, and that as the under-thirties grow older, they will adopt the opinions and attitudes of their elders.

Figure 1. Attitudes towards religion in the public sphere.

Figure 1. Attitudes towards religion in the public sphere.

35However, some structural differences between the two generations are more permanent, such as family background. The first generation was rooted in secular Judaism, with nearly half having grown up in secular families. In contrast, only a quarter of the second generation did so. Compared to the second generation, who came from a more Orthodox-leaning background, the first generation was twice as likely to have been raised in liberal-leaning Jewish families. Only 17.0% of the first generation came from an Orthodox religious background, compared to 35.4% of the second generation. Similarly, respondents from the first generation were much more likely (63.4%) to have attended a secular school than the second generation (40.8%). While some in the second generation were born into the movement, part of the generational shift likely reflects the different populations integrated into the movement due to changing recruitment strategies over time. Many of the younger members of the movement, particularly those who come from religious homes, enter Israeli Judaism via a pre-military academy associated with the movement, which often has both religious and secular students. Thus, it may be the popularity of the pre-military academies among a new demographic, i.e., people from a religious background, that is bringing about a shift in values within the Israeli Judaism movement itself.

Conclusion

36This paper uses the case of Israeli Judaism to inquire about the current relations of nationalism with religion in Israeli society among the secular and liberal public. We follow the evolution of Israeli Judaism from its previous form as the Jewish secular renewal movement and the subsequent shift toward a soft form of religious nationalism. We focus explicitly on the demographic changes in the composition of Israeli Judaism’s participants to show how generational shifts and the entry of a more religiously diverse and younger population have altered the nature of Israeli Judaism, making it more religious and nationalistic. We examine this claim by comparing two generations within Israeli Judaism: the first generation, the “adults”, and the second generation, the “youth”.

37Our findings highlight a shared commitment to Zionism as a unifying national element across generations within Israeli Judaism, despite significant generational differences in religious and political outlooks. While younger participants are generally more religious, engage more in religious practices, and adopt a less confrontational stance toward the religious establishment, older members tend to maintain a consistently left-wing orientation that influences their view of Israeli society and Israeli Judaism itself. Although the younger generation, like the older one, is motivated by the renewal of Judaism, they bring a distinctly religious perspective to this mission. Yet, Zionism stands as the enduring common ground that binds these diverse perspectives.

38At the same time, the survey also uncovered an intriguing paradox. While the second generation is notably more religious, their political views tend to align with the Zionist political center rather than the religious right. Contrary to expectations based on typical analyses of Israeli politics, these young people do not align with far-right views (Harsgor, 2024). Instead, their political perspectives are more centrist, reflecting a nuanced identification with the national ideology. This also suggests a complex relationship with the broader trend of religionalization in Israel, which is often linked to far-right, populist, religious-nationalist politics (Ben-Porat, Filc, 2022; Ram, 2024).

39The establishment of integrative pre-military leadership academies has played a critical role in transforming Israeli Judaism. These institutions have facilitated the inclusion of a younger, more religious generation within the movement, marking a shift from the originally secular identity of Israeli Judaism to a movement that is more religiously diverse and politically varied. Alongside this generational shift, Israeli Judaism has evolved from a foundation of multicultural secularism to embracing a softer form of religious nationalism. This transition is exemplified by the recent ritual introduced at the Western Wall, where the Declaration of Independence is read in a sacred space, merging nationalist ideals with religious tradition and symbolizing a broader integration of religion into national identity.

40We propose that the evolution of Israeli Judaism into a centrist, sub-political movement of religious nationalism—operating outside and beyond the representative institutions of the political system of nation-states (Beck, 1997)—is a political response that counters right-wing ideologies emerging within Israel’s political mainstream (Braunstein, 2022). Concurrently, against the backdrop of the growing political power of populism and religious nationalism in Israel, Israeli Judaism enables its participants, who may hold cultural and social capital yet occupy a relatively low position in the Israeli post-secular Jewish hierarchy, to assert themselves as a legitimate expression of “Jewish-Israeliness.”

41Our analysis of Israeli Judaism as a form of “soft” Religious Nationalism reveals that Religious Nationalism in Israel exists along a spectrum, encompassing a variety of discourses that diverge from the Religious Zionist extreme right (Ben-Porat, Filc, 2022; Ram, 2024). This finding illuminates the nuanced and layered nature of religious and nationalist ideologies in Israeli society, showing how religious sentiment and nationalist identity intersect in diverse and contextually unique ways. By doing so, our study highlights the broader socio-political shifts at play in Israeli society, offering insight into the evolving interplay between politics, religion, and national identity within a distinct local framework.

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Notes

1 In general, the Jewish religious field in Israel is bifurcated between “the secular”, i.e., non-observant Jews (often recognized as the former social elites) and “the religious” Jews, who are composed of the Ultra Orthodox and the Religious Zionist. Politically, the Religious Zionists are marked by their radical form of nationalist theology, exemplified is the settlement movement in the West Bank. The “secular” are usually characterized by a liberal, center-left political stance.

2 In that book, the authors present a large-scale survey on religiosity among Jewish Israelis, using “Israeli Judaism” to describe the overall state of Jewish identity—both in belief and practice—in Israel (Rosener, Fuchs, 2019).

3 The pre-military academies (mechinot) are gap-year educational and leadership programs for high school graduates before military service. While the Israeli public education system is separated between “general” schools (mamlachti) and “religious” schools (mamlachti-dati), some of these programs aim to integrate both religious and secular students to encourage “coexistence”.

4 Examining Jewish identity and practices of Jewish Israelis, Rosner and Fuchs argue that a unique blend of Judaism has developed, which they call “Israeli Judaism” or “Jewraelis” (Rosner, Fuchs, 2019; Inbari, Bumin, 2024). They show that about 55% of Israeli Jews combine religious tradition and nationality, meaning they partially observe the tradition and hold nationalist (Zionist) sentiments (Rosner, Fuchs, 2019).

5 According to Ben-Porat and Filc (2022), three of the ten parties represented in the 21st Knesset (Israel’s parliament), can be considered populist, and together these parties sum up 40% of the Parliament members.

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Titre Figure 1. Attitudes towards religion in the public sphere.
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Rachel Werczberger, Dana Kaplan et Nadia Beider, « From Jewish Renewal to Israeli Judaism », Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 210-211 | 2025, 159-179.

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Rachel Werczberger, Dana Kaplan et Nadia Beider, « From Jewish Renewal to Israeli Judaism », Archives de sciences sociales des religions [En ligne], 210-211 | avril-septembre 2025, mis en ligne le 01 novembre 2025, consulté le 22 janvier 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/assr/78964 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/15a1x

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Auteurs

Rachel Werczberger

The Jerusalem Multidisciplinary College

Dana Kaplan

The Open University of Israel

Nadia Beider

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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