Privatization and Globalization: A Durkheimian Perspective on Moral and Religious Development

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PRIVATIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION:
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Since the publication of The Invisible Religion (Luckman, 1967) the problems associated with the privatization of religion seem to have superseded secularization as a dominant problem in the sociology of religion. Globalization, on the other hand, has just recently emerged as an issue. (Robertson and Chirico, 1985) Both of these concepts are treated in the literature as independent phenomena. Their independence is further emphasized by the differences in the attributed ends. Privatization, often defined as Durkheimian “egoism” has been attributed to have dysfunctional consequences, while “globalization”, on the other hand is perceived as an advancement in both moral and religious thinking. A closer examination of these two concepts will show that they are but two sides of the same coin, that they are processes in religious and moral development, and that they are epiphenomena of that complex whole we call modernity. This view is central in the writings of the classical sociologists particularly, in Durkheim’s works. More precisely, I wish to propose, that moral and religious development is aimed at “globalization” that is, towards a moral perspective in which a universal view of humanity is central and the process of advancement is through privatization which is essentially a form of dialectic between the individual and the
collectivity. I shall contend that privatization is an essential dialectical process of homo-duplex, that is, between the individual and the collective, that it is an essential process in moral development, and that it also is the condition which brings about religious anomie.

Privatization and Globalization

A cursory examination of the definition of the concepts show the multiplicity of their meaning. (Hart, 11987:319) Wuthnow (1987:126) identifies three themes subsumed in privatization. First it refers to the view which proposes that beliefs about God are subjective, idiosyncratic and private expressions of faith. Second, privatization is seen as an aspect of secularization to the extent that religion is invisible and more private and no longer has a significant impact on public life. And thirdly, that “even within the private sector religious expression may have become less public, less organized, less relational, leaving individuals radically alone in their experience of the divine”. Hart (1987:320) adds that privatization also includes the idea that people are individually responsible for defining their own beliefs. What is common in all definitions is the view that, at least in the United States, individuals have been freed from what Durkheim would call “collective prejudice”. These components of privatization, I contend, are central in Durkheim’s analysis of the development of the cult of individualism, the social mechanism for the advancement of individual freedom and morality.

Globalization in present day literature encompasses two main ideas. First, it refers to a global process of religious upsurge. Second, it asserts that there is an increased emphasis among religions on a humanistic perspective and a concern with the “legitimacy of the world order of societies and the meaning of what mankind « really is »” (Robertson and Chirico, 1985:238). Globalization essentially refers to a recent trend toward an increased acceptance of human universalism, that is, a change from tribal particularism to universalism and the idea that such a change reflects both individual and collective moral growth (See Kohlberg, 1981, and Fowler, 1981). In this sense it can be said that Durkheim proposes globalization to be the aim of moral development.

In contrast to universalism, which is seen as a positive ideal, privatization is seen as a divisive social force. Hart (1987:332), for instance, concludes that privatization “empties religion of meanings which connect us to each other or to our collective life in non-instrumental ways, and deprives American society of the resources such meanings provide”. It is this assumed breakdown of meaning which led sociologists to point to Durkheim’s studies and argue that privatization fosters anomie and with it, unhappiness. Such a view, I propose, comes from misreading Durkheim and particularly his emphasis on the importance of the “cult of the individual” and its place in moral growth. Thus, it is imperative for us to review Durkheim’s theory of religious and moral growth. Anomie, far from being solely a negative condition, although in the short run it may seem to disunite the individual from the collective, is also a necessary step in social advancement. Let us now examine the idea of privatization in Durkheim’s writings and its relationship to religion.
Privatization and Globalization in Durkheim's writings

Durkheim's definition of religion proposes that religion consists of three separate, although united, factors: beliefs, practices and morals. Each of these reflects a different social reality. Practices as rituals are the mechanism by which the individual is tied to the sacred collective; morals define interpersonal relationships; beliefs define the nature of the sacred. Beliefs are also the means of justification, or legitimation, of the individual's relationship to the collectivity as a whole and to others as individuals. Although Durkheim treats religion as a singular or unidimensional phenomenon, the two components, ritual and morals, are not only independent of each other, but, also respond to and are affected by different social forces. Rituals reflecting the identity of the collectivity have their roots in the past, in the origin of the collectivity and are therefore more immune to the changes associated with modernity. In contrast, morals are influenced by the ever increasing technological and communicative changes. These conditions impact on religion in two ways. First, they change the religious component of morals and associated beliefs from tribal particularism to universalism. This universalistic tendency has been able to develop itself to a point of affecting not only the higher ideas of the religious system, but even the principles upon which it rests" (Durkheim [1912], 1965:474). In contrast to morals, both rituals and associated beliefs are the expressions of historical collective existence and because they are rooted in the past they do not respond to the present and hence are relatively stable. But morals and rituals have been united through religion and it was this association which gave morals the aura of sacredness. It is division of labor and changes in forms and modes of interpersonal relationships that produce changes in morality while at the same time rituals remain stable. This break between ritual and morality freed morality from its pure religious nature and made it also a part of a non religious civic life described by Durkheim as the "cult of individualism" (1).

Until recently most sociologists described Durkheim's theories as conservative. The view was fostered by his seeming over-emphasis of the importance of the collectivity and the individual's duties and obligations to the collectivity. Durkheim's commitment to the idea of the collectivity, however, did not detract from his perception of the importance of the individual. The individual and individualism as a moral and political ideology are also important in Durkheim's sociological theory. Emphasizing the rights of the collectivity without equal emphasis on individualism and the right of the person would, in Durkheim's point of view, be regressive toward a society with "mechanical solidarity". The right of the individual to critique the collective moral stand and seek alteration of that stand is important. Durkheim is not opposed to this aspect of privatization, which includes individuals' re-evaluation of religion and all its components. Moral growth, in his view, cannot occur without this process. Let us now look at Durkheim's commitment to individualism as a value in its own right and as the means to moral growth toward global humanism.

If by privatization we mean the prevailing tendency to critique the collective and to accept moral ideals consonant with the individual, and if by globalization we mean a commitment to universal otherhood, then, Durkheim was an advocate of these two social ends. It is clear, if one looks at Durkheim's major works that
he was not opposed to individualism. To the contrary, the cult of the individual, in his view, will achieve the quality of the sacred which till now was solely associated with religion. The cult of individualism is different from egoism and Durkheim takes great effort to distinguish these two concepts. His opposition to egoism and commitment to individualism are evident in *The Division of Labor* (2), and are central in his analysis of suicide. They are also of great concern in his later works on ethics and morality (see Durkheim [1920], 1978; [1950], 1983). On the surface this opposition would seem a redundant objection to individualism, i.e. to the individual’s freedom from the collective. However, this is not the case.

Durkheim’s opposition to “egoism” was primarily to the form of narcissistic individualism associated with classical utilitarian economic theory, particularly the kind espoused by Spencer. Contrary to the frequently advocated view (perhaps because of Parsons’ emphasis on Durkheim’s functionalism), Durkheim clearly realized that belief systems in modern societies, especially moral systems, cannot be tied solely to the collectivity. He takes the natural progress of the individual’s and collectivity’s moral growth for granted. This growth, which in his writings takes on an almost evolutionary image (3) frees the individual from the bonds and ties of the collectivity and sets him free. In *Profesional Ethics* Durkheim writes ([1950], 1958:72):

> As we advance in evolution, we see the ideals men pursue breaking free of the local or ethnic conditions obtaining in a certain region of the world or a certain human group, and rising above all that is particular and so approaching the universal. We might say that the moral forces come to have a hierarchic order according to their degree of generality or diffusion.

In *Suicide* Durkheim’s description of and opposition to egoism cannot be equated with an opposition to individualism in general. He does not deny nor oppose individualism as the right of the individual to be free from the collective prejudice or to be free from the subjugating force of the collective conscience. What he opposes is the laissez-faire view that the pursuit of selfish ends for its own sake produces both individual and collective happiness. Durkheim writes ([1897], 1951: 336):

> This cult of man is something, accordingly, very different from the egoistic individualism above referred to, which leads to suicide. Far from detaching individuals from society and thus from every aim beyond themselves, it unites them in one thought, makes them servants of one work. For man, as thus suggested to collective affection and respect is not the sensual experiential individual that each one of us represents, but man in general, ideal humanity as conceived by each people at each moment of its history.

In a sense Durkheim follows the old adage stated by Rabbi Hillel: “If I am not for my self who is for me? But if I am only for myself, what am I?” (*Pirke Abboth*). It is this view that led Durkheim to declare the importance of the State, for it is the State which frees the individual from the yoke of groups such as the family and the church.

In order to prevent this happening, and to provide a certain range for individual development, it is not enough for a society to be on a big scale; the individual must be able to move with some degree of freedom over a wide field of action. He must not be curbed and monopolised by secondary groups, and these
groups must not be able to get mastery over their members and mould them at will (Durkheim, [1950], 1958: 62).

For an individual to be free from secondary groups, that is free from their "collective particularism", from their physical and intellectual dominance, one must become committed to a special agency whose duties is to represent the overall community, and that agency is the State. (Durkheim, [1950], 1958: 64):

It is the State that has rescued the child from patriarchal domination and from family tyranny; it is the State that has freed the citizen from feudal groups and later from communal groups; it is the State that has liberated the craftsman and his master from guild tyranny.

In this sense, Durkheim opposes the utilitarian conception of the State as merely an administrative organ. Without the State and its power to guarantee the individual's right to freedom, primary and secondary groups and other powerful individuals would still hold many in bondage. Thus he declares, "It is only through the State that individualism is possible" ([1950], 1958: 64). It is inconceivable to assume that Durkheim, the sociologist and pedagogist, would oppose or perceive free and independent thinking as being dysfunctional. But individualism without discipline, without duties to the collectivity which make one's freedom and individualism possible, is immoral, because such behavior merely detracts and destroys freedom and true, responsible individualism.

Yet, Durkheim also perceives that the State, just like other secondary groups, has aims of its own. Therefore the State too cannot be the moral end. Mankind has a unity which transcends the State, even as it transcends the familial and religious institutions, for these institutions as well as the State have reached the peak of their moral growth. "Thus, everything justifies our belief that national aims do not lie at the summit of this [moral] hierarchy — it is human aims that are destined to be supreme" ([1950], 1958: 73). In this sense Durkheim proposes that morality has a hierarchical order. First come the morals of secondary groups, such as the family. But these morals and obligations must give way in their importance to national and ultimately human objectives. Since "the family is closer to the individual, it provides less impersonal — and hence, less lofty goals" (Durkheim [1925], 1961: 74). But national interests and associated moral imperatives are one step in the development of higher, i.e. more impersonal and more inclusive morals. Beyond the State (or nation) and superior to it is humanity itself. Thus "Family, nation and humanity represent different phases of our social and moral evolution, stages that prepare for, and build upon, one another" ([1925], 1961: 74). These aims are: justice, peace, and solidarity. In short, the individual has a right to enjoy his life in peace. These rights are global rights; they transcend the moral dicta of lesser social units. At the same time, while accepting the importance and need for individual emancipation and the universalism of individual rights the individual must also be part of a smaller group, be integrated into a collective, for it is only through such integration that he can attain happiness. Thus, the individual must coexist on two levels: the global level, adhering to global morality, and at the same time on the level of a smaller and more cohesive collective. Thus, while on the one hand Durkheim proposes that the individual is bound to moral conceptions upon which the majority of people in a society agree, on the other he contends such rules and associated collective conscience do not have legitimacy if they renounce the value and the dignity of each individual.
For this reason, Durkheim himself felt justified, to dissociate from the collectivity and oppose the collective sentiment expressed by the French with regard to the Dreyfus affair (4). Thus, moral sentiments must undergo individual scrutiny and evaluation, in short, privatization. Individual cognition is thus an essential process in moral development which then imposes on all individuals the duty to judge the merit of collective ideology. By emphasizing the need for the criticism of the collective and the rejection of moral rules if such rules do not conform to the ultimate moral ideals of justice and peace Durkheim shows his commitment to the ethical principles of Old Testament prophets. (For further elaboration see Schoenfeld, 1989 and Schoenfeld and Mestrovic, 1989). Wallwork (1972: 171), analyzing Durkheim's ethical theory, proposes that according to Durkheim

When public opinion, weighted down by the baggage of moral rules inherited from the past, enforces rules that no longer engender social cooperation, dissent is justified... Durkheim argues that the critic of public opinion is justified if... [one] possesses a deeper insight into the future state of society than public opinion.

In short, private evaluation of moral beliefs is not only justified, but even necessary and essential to moral growth. Durkheim does not accept the legitimacy of obligatory rules, if they cannot be subject to individual assessment. Throughout his analysis of morality in Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Durkheim argues that the individual's questioning of collective thought is a natural process. He bases this view on Freudian psychology concerning the function of the Ego. Moral thought (like the Super Ego) is "a diffused kind, that is, there is at all times a host of ideas, tendencies and habits that act upon us without our knowing exactly how and wherefore". But human rationality, especially among the educated, cannot accept this non-rational submission to the power of the collectivity. "The ego that it is, the conscious personality that it represents, does not allow itself to follow in the wake of all the obscure currents that may form in the depth of our being". It is clear to Durkheim that nonconscious submission to the collective is not and cannot be the nature of the rational human being. This is particularly true in more advanced societies. There is in all of us, he proposes, that is, in our "consciousness the desire to concentrate on an inner light" (Durkheim [1950], 1958: 80). This desire is greatest among "those of cultivated mind, who are conscious of themselves, [and who therefore] can change more easily and more profoundly than those of uncultivated mind". These individuals are the avant-garde of moral development. They change those morals which are rooted in "those obscure sentiments which are diffusive by nature... [and which] resist any change precisely because they are obscure" (Durkheim [1950], 1958: 84).

Durkheim ([1950], 1958: 3) distinguishes universally applicable moral rules from particularistic morals.

The first apply to all men alike. They are those relating to all mankind in general, that is, to each one of us as to our neighbor. All rules are set out the way in which men must be respected and their progress advanced —— whether it be ourselves or our fellow-men — are equally valid for all mankind without exception... the rules which determine the duties that men owe their fellows, solely as other men, form the highest point in ethics.
On the other hand, there are those ethics, Durkheim argues, which tie us and relate to others with whom we share an activity:

We might say in this connection that there are as many forms of morals as there are different callings, and since, in theory, each individual carries on one calling, the result is that these different forms of morals apply to different groups of individuals ([1950], 1958: 5).

But if we are to compare the relative importance of these two kinds of morals, following Durkheim, we will place the former, the universal morality, ahead of the latter, for the universal is in the scheme of development more advanced than the latter. This progression from the particular to the universal follows a pattern Durkheim outlined as the progression from mechanical to organic solidarity. The particular becomes sublimated in the universal.

*Freedom and Submission: The Dilemma of Moral Authority*

It is clear from Durkheim's writings that he was caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, he had argued that moral development occurs through the individual's separation from the "collective prejudice", that is through a break from the moral imposition of the collective conscience. On the other hand, he also points out that morality can only exist when it has the collective force behind it. In short, the problem is: How can an individual be free from the collectivity, to develop an individual conception of morality which does not have a coercive force, and at the same time also be submissive to the collective will? This dilemma clearly points out the historical problem of the individual versus the collectivity, freedom and duty. The theoretical problem is far greater than space permits us to present a clear and exhaustive discussion. Let us however, for purposes of this paper, give a brief sketch, an outline of this issue.

We can take as an axiom that morality, which is essentially a guide for interpersonal relationship, consists of duties and privileges. The first consists of those components which define our obligations to others qua individuals and to the collectivity as a whole. It is this dimension which is central in Durkheim's work and which is, and has been, the infrastructure of religious morality. Fundamentally, this dimension of morality has its roots in Biblical tradition and is expressed in the Old Testament as the moral imperative "justice" and in the New Testament as "love". What is fundamental in this moral dimension is commitment to the maximization of others' "life chances". It is this moral element which Gouldner (1960), based on the works of the Durkheimians, defined as the "norm of reciprocity". This moral view reflects the ideals of equity, justice, and in general, the use or abuse of power. Adherence to this aspect of moral dicta provides benefits both to the adherent and to others. Moral behavior in this respect imposes the necessary discipline which limits and controls egoism as the prime source of personal unhappiness. At the same time, Durkheim implies, this discipline must also be central to economic morals which regulate conditions in which those with lesser power can be deprived of life's necessities. In short, moral regulation is necessary for justice. He writes: (Quoted in Giddens, 1972: 11)
If one class of society is obliged in order to live, to take any price for its services, while another is absolved from such a necessity — thanks to resources which it possesses, but which are not intrinsically expressive of any social superiority — the latter is able unjustly to force the former to its dictates.

It is clear that the force which makes this moral value operative, in addition to its internalization, must exist outside the individual and be greater than the individual. For after all, this moral imperative seeks to control the seemingly innate human quality of lack of satiation (See Durkheim, *Suicide*) and runs contra the individual’s selfish desires. This aspect of morality can be subsumed under the rubric “moral obligation”. It is this moral dimension which ties the individual to others both as a mechanical and organic force.

In contrast, the moral dimension encompassing privileges specify the rights of the individual to disassociate from others, as individuals, and from the collective. It is this right which is expressed in the ideal of “freedom”. Generally speaking, this right defines the individual’s privilege to unique “life style”. Freedom of thought, of belief and of all forms of expression are part of this moral privilege. It is this element of morality which legitimates individualism, the one advocated by Durkheim, which is different from freedom and individualism as defined by Spencer and Social Darwinism. Privatization, the process of individuation of belief, reflects this moral dimension.

**Religion and Moral Development**

Let me now turn to the next theoretical issue, namely to the relationship between religion, privatization and moral development. A close association between religion and morality, particularly in earlier societies, is taken for granted. Morality is one of the components in Durkheim’s definition of religion. In *Moral Education* he writes:

> “God, the center of religious life, was also the guarantor of moral order... the duties of religion and those of morality are both duties, in other words, morally obligatory practices. It is altogether natural that we were induced to see in one and the same being the source of all obligations”. (Durkheim [1925], 1961: 8).

However, the religio-moral force which in the past was the keystone to social integration, Durkheim observed, has, in modern societies, lost its moral and integrative force. Thus he declares: “Religious society is... unadapted to this function”. The waning of religion as a moral force, is evident to Durkheim in the reduction of its prophylactic function toward suicide. Religion as a moral force was possible, Durkheim proposed, only to the extent that it prevents men from thinking freely. However, “the seizure of possession of human intelligence is difficult at the present and will become more and more so. It offends our dearest sentiments” (Durkheim [1897], 1951: 375). For this reason, Durkheim proposes, morality in modern society will be based on rationality and not on religious sentiment (See Durkheim [1925], 1961). A similar point of view has also been voiced by Feuerbach ([1841], 1957). In short, the view of these two writers is that religion in general, and to Feuerbach, Christianity in particular, are detrimental for moral development.
To explore this theoretical issue we need to distinguish and separate beliefs from the church and morals from norms. While these four concepts have often been highly interrelated they nonetheless have separate realities. By church, in this paper we mean the organization of a group of believers who are united either by tradition or inclination. While traditionally there has been a unity of belief among those who belonged to the same church, for the most part, a singular theological view is no longer necessary for membership in a church. Thus, Luckman treats church religion and beliefs as separate and independent entities. Fowler (1981) similarly separates faith, the object of belief, from church and treats the former as an independent entity. To him, faith, just as morality to Kohlberg and Piaget, has different levels varying independently from church membership. Fowler makes us keenly aware that if there is a relationship between religion and morality, it is not based on church membership, but on faith (Fowler, 1981).

Similarly we need to differentiate between norms and morals. Although Durkheim suggests such a differentiation, he nonetheless uses these terms interchangeably. For us, as we have proposed earlier, morals are social values and unlike norms they do not specify clear pro or prescriptions. Instead, they are conceptions used to judge appropriateness of interpersonal relationships. The central value on which all moral reasoning is built, both to Durkheim and later to Kohlberg, is justice (Kohlberg, 1981).

If we now accept the independence of these terms, I would like to propose, based on the reasoning of Feuerbach and Durkheim, that although church-religion speaks in favor of morality and moral development, in reality its commitment to a particularistic point of view and ritual rootedness retards moral advancement, if by moral advancement we mean a movement toward universalism and global morality (5).

The progression towards a universal morality is based on a commitment to global justice which is made possible through an acceptance of personal freedom. It is freedom, particularly its component, the right to social criticism, which makes moral growth possible. Moral progress, as Durkheim proposes, is brought about through

"Those of the cultivated mind, who are conscious of themselves, [who] can change more easily and more profoundly than those of uncultivated minds". ([1950], 1958: 84).

It is also those who have a cultivated mind, the educated persons, who are most likely to reject collective sentiment and “collective prejudice”.

But religion, and by this I mean church membership and religious association, has historically emphasized the subjugation of individual thought in favor of collective ideology. Freedom implies separation from the collectivity, and in fact, often standing in opposition to the collectivity. It is freedom which demands the right for personal assessment of the collectivity’s goals and aspirations. It is also freedom which permits individual self-realization through independent thought and life-style. Characteristically, these freedoms have been most often blocked by religion, that is, by the church. And in spite of the often touted Protestant individualism, freedom has not been allowed, particularly in religions associated with Puritan morality. Discipline, asceticism, and the breaking of individual will are the earmarks of American Protestantism. It is these religious characteristics which I believe are antagonistic to freedom in its fullest sense, including privatization.
Another feature of universal freedom as a principle of the highest stage of moral development stresses an acceptance of the ideal of diversity within unity. In general, this ideal would propose that all religions are of equal value, and more importantly, equally contribute to the path of salvation. Clearly, the implications of the view of a “jealous God” and the necessity of faith in Christ, which as argued in the New Testament are needed for salvation, cannot support this principle. In short, religion by its very nature stresses particularism, that is, an emphasis on the separation of “we” from “they” and in this manner minimizes the very feature which distinguishes the higher stages of morality from the lower ones — the stress on universalism. The negative consequence of religion on moral interpersonal relationship is well presented by Feuerbach. He writes (Feuerbach [1841], 1957: 260):

Faith necessarily passes into hatred, hatred into persecution, where the power of faith meets with no contradictions, where it finds itself in collision with a power foreign to faith, the power of love, of humanity, of the sense of justice... By how much God is higher than man, by so much higher are duties to God than duties towards man; and duties towards God necessarily come into collision with common human duties.

Thus, in spite of theologians’ argument of the universality of religion in general, and theirs in particular, most, if not all religions still maintain elements of tribal characteristics, namely the belief that the benefits of religion are available only to its adherents (6).

The highest form of morality, the one which encompasses the diverse groups and nations of the human universe, is based on the principle of justice, i.e. the treatment of all diverse groups as equals in all respects. In the Kohlbergian theory of moral development, and similarly in Fowler’s scheme of faith development, the essential characteristic of the highest stages (stages five and six) is justice as a universal principle. Those who achieve this stage, as Fowler has proposed, develop a moral principle which transcends the theology of particularism — that is of a specific culture, including one’s group, state, and religion. This stage, by definition, rejects the legitimacy of particularistic ideology inherent in all specific religious groups. In sum, then, the problem is that while, as Durkheim proposed, increased education, knowledge and diversification would lead to a new moral order, religion, because of its traditionalism, and emphasis on particularism, is perhaps incapable to enhance such development.

Anomie and Moral Development

Although the rise of individualism and with it the privatization of religion may be a natural phenomenon and a necessary process in moral development, it nonetheless creates a problem — the breakdown between the collective and individual consciousness, namely anomie. An essential feature of morality, Durkheim argues, is that it defines duties and obligations, which from Durkheim’s point of view, cannot exist if they are rooted in the individual’s consciousness alone. The coercive power of the force which provides duties and obligations lies in its collective nature. Thus in the final analysis, moral
concepts which are private are idiosyncratic and therefore lack this compulsive force. It is clear (Berger, 1967: 46), that meaning systems, of which morality is a part, if they are to have importance to the individual, must be socially reaffirmed through the development of plausibility structures. Thus, moral development, since it has its beginning in the individual’s thought and in his definition of reality will differ from the collective view, particularly a view which through time has achieved the obscurity and often non-rationality of the super-ego. It is this hiatus, this period characterized by an absence of social reaffirmation of the individual’s moral view, which is anomie. In this period the individual lacks either the force which makes his view legitimate or the unquestioning acceptance of this view by others. In short, he must constantly defend the legitimacy of his morals.

This aspect of anomie has been central in Guyau’s description of moral and religious anomie. He writes (quoted in Orru, 1987: 103):

We have elsewhere proposed as the ideal morality what we have called moral anomie, the absence of apodictic, fixed, and universal rules. We even more strongly believe that the ideal of any religion should tend towards religious anomie — toward the enfranchisement of the individual, whose freedom of thought is more important than his own life, towards the elimination of dogmatic faith under whatever type of camouflage.

This natural process, the rise of a non-pathological anomie as a consequence of scientific progress is also accepted by Durkheim. In reviewing Guyau’s work Durkheim proposed that the old religions are dying and new ones cannot rise until old dogmatic faith is abolished (Durkheim [1887], 1975).

For the most part Durkheim saw anomie, the individuation of moral rules, to have pathological consequences. Durkheim explains ([1925], 1961: 42):

The totality of moral regulations really forms about each person an imaginary wall, at the foot of which a multitude of human passions simply die without being able to go further. For the same reason — that they are contained — it becomes possible to satisfy them. But if at any point this barrier weakens, human forces — until now restrained — pour out tumultuously through open breach; once loosed, they find no limits where they can or must stop.

**Conclusion**

Privatization and globalization may indeed be natural and inevitable processes. Yet, experience confirms Durkheim’s view that these changes are associated with pathological conditions. These conditions can be overcome by developing a humanistic moral perspective sans ethnocentric tribal world view as the infrastructure of religious doctrine. The path of this goal, as Durkheim has suggested, is through more justice. Let me suggest here Feuerbach’s view (1957: 262):

“It is morality alone, and by no means faith, that cries out in the conscience of the believer: thy faith is nothing, if it does not make thee good”.

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NOTES:

(1) In a recent study Ernsberg and Manaster (1981) report that traditional (orthodox) Christians are less likely to stress "principled moral reasoning" than members of more liberal congregations.

(2) In *Division of Labor* Durkheim argues that the cult of the individual replaces the collective conscience such that "the individual becomes the object of a sort of religion [which] is common in so far the community partakes of it" ([1893], 1933: 172). Durkheim adds that "it is still from society that [the cult of the individual] takes all its force" (*ibid*).

(3) For example, in *Professional Ethics* he writes: "The rights of the individual, then, are in a state of evolution: progress is always going on and it is not possible to set bounds to its course" ([1950], 1958: 68). (emphasis mine) Again in his "Introduction to Ethics" ([1920], 1979: 81) Durkheim reiterates this view. He writes:

Every morality, no matter what it is, has its ideal. Therefore, the morality to which men subscribe at each moment of history has its ideal which is embodied in the institutions, traditions and precepts which generally govern behavior. But above and beyond this ideal, there are always others in the process of being formed. *For the moral ideal is not immutable: despite the respect with which it is vested, it is alive, constantly changing and evolving.* (Emphasis mine).

(4) In fact, Durkheim expresses the distinction between collective and narcissistic individualism with the greatest clarity in his essay on the Dreyfus Affair, entitled "Individualism and the Intellectuals" ([1898], 1975). He laments that individualism "has been confused with the narrow utilitarianism and utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists" (*ibid*. 60). He notes (p. 70) that:

A verbal similarity has made it possible to believe that individualism necessarily resulted from *individual*, and thus egoistic sentiments. In reality, the religion of the individual is a social institution like all known religions. It is society which assigns us this ideal as the sole common end which is today capable of providing a focus for men's wills. To remove this ideal, without putting any other in its place, is therefore to plunge us into that moral anarchy which it is sought to avoid.

(5) For a better understanding of universalism in moral development see Kohlberg (1981) "From Is to Ought".

(6) Let me hasten to add here that all religions perceive themselves to be the carrier of "universal" truth. In fact, it is the desire of most religions, particularly Christian and Muslim to create a universal brotherhood. However, this would be a universalism which denies freedom of diversity.
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