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- 1 In Turkey, religion has been one of the basic constitutive elements of the country's public politics since the Ottoman and Republican Periods. Politics and religion have long been historically intertwined. In the Ottoman context, the alliance between religion and state is defined by the term *din u devlet* (religion and order), meaning that Muslim subjects of the Empire view the state as the agent of mundane political goals but also as a representative of *Allah* on earth.
- 2 The book by Kim Shively draws a historical sketch spanning the early Republican Period's religious politics up to the contemporary Turkish religious landscape, so that the reader sees that religion has often played a central role in the history of Turkey. Although during the War of Independence (1919-1923) Muslim religious nationalism was used as an instrument to create social solidarity among Anatolian peoples for fighting against European occupiers, after the foundation of the Republic, the role attributed to religion has been restricted, and all popular forms of religious leadership and community were eliminated by the government. In 1925, Atatürk banned all Sufi *tarikats* and their activities and closed their meeting places. A structural change came with the adoption of *laïcité*, which was based on the French understanding but converted to a Turkish laicism or an "assertive secularism" in which religion was not free from the state but directly under its control. To restrict the religious space, an institution called the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) was established.
- 3 While studying the expansion of religious politics in modern Turkey, the author discusses the Kemalist Westernization project, arguing that it was a top-down civilizational project (p. 13-22). Indeed, the relationship between state policy and

popular expressions of Islamic belief is closely related to the suppression of religion by the ruling elites of the Kemalist establishment. The reforms regarding religion were not as effective as expected. In smaller provincial towns and among rural peasantry, prohibited religious activities and language practices continued. The need for popular religious expression was filled by the Democrat Party (DP) with the transition to a multi-party system in 1946. As a result of the expansion of civil liberties in the 1961 constitution, the Sufi orders found ways to operate more openly. But the reemergence and expansion of Sufi orders is related to the sociological fact of the rapid urbanization that occurred between the 1960s and 1980s. Beyond spiritual guidance, many Sufi leaders offered migrants essential social services, such as education and healthcare (p. 67). In other words, the religious orders functioned as protective state units providing services to poor people in return for their religious adherence.

- 4 The rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey is a consequence of the aim to eradicate communist and socialist influences affecting the country in the 70s. When the military coup in 1980 definitively ended the conflict between leftist and rightist groups, the military leaders aligned with the rightist politicians and embraced a conservative ideology called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, emphasizing morality and the notion of Turks as defenders of the Muslim faith. Upon its adoption, the right-wing government made religious instruction centered on Sunni morality and love of family and country mandatory in all schools (p. 30). Once the left was eliminated, the link between Muslim faith and Turkish nationalism was solidly established.
- 5 Taking advantage of this return of religion, the Sufi orders' leaders began to be involved concretely in the political scene. The author mentions the Naqshbandi movement leader M. Z. Kotku, who served as a spiritual advisor to many right-wing conservative politicians. This important figure proposed a synthesis between religious freedom and industrialization, claiming that "growing a pious middle class would create the conditions for the easing of Kemalist restrictions on religion" (p. 73). The author's second mention is of the Gülen movement, which drew on the teachings of Sufi sheikh Said Nursi, who was known for his different understanding of Islam that promoted the modern form of scientific education instead of the classical *medrese* system. Although Gülen was an anti-communist who supported the 1980 coup, he developed a religious *formula* to combat ignorance and poverty through providing education and designed an activism based on civic engagement and interfaith dialogue (p. 79). This view constituted its originality among other religious orders.
- 6 Religious orders in Turkey are not homogenous; rather, they are political actors that compete with one another to determine the main lines of the Turkish economy and politics. They have the sacred mission of educating the youth through the interpretation of sacred texts, thus cultivating the new "golden generation" that would bring about the moral redemption of Turkey. Each order has unique symbolism and terminology regarding the reception of religious knowledge. The Nurettin and Gülen movements have, for instance, a scripturalist approach to Islam in which understanding of religious texts can only be achieved through study and discussion. Both use new technologies as a means of serving God and his community. In the Gülen case, emotional intensity observed during the sermons has the characteristics of protestant charismatic preachers' enthusiastic style thus need to be analyzed within an interreligious comparative perspective. The details of the ritual of the gatherings are described by the author through an ethnographic method (p. 62-64). Her fieldwork

notes also include her visit to an Imam Hatip religious secondary school reserved for girls, where she observed the curriculum in addition to interviews with the different *tarikats*'s followers.

- 7 The author also provides a glimpse of the emergence of Islamic parties by using the National Outlook Movement (NOM) (*Milli Görüş*) as a starting point. Analysis of this movement is indeed relevant since it constitutes the core element of the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) formation. Having an anti-Western stance focused on Islamic values, NOM became afterwards the Welfare Party (WP), whose main objective was to provide economic equality for the poor migrants of rural origin living in the periphery. By using face-to-face relationships and the Islamist language of spiritual religious texts such as the Qur'an, the *hadith* and the life of the Prophet Muhammad, the WP's activists managed to successfully mobilize the poorest strata of the cities. When Erdoğan founded the JDP in 2001, he inherited this strategy of ruling while defending an American-style "passive" secularism, a religious freedom that allowed women to wear headscarves in public spaces. This view was indeed different from the rigid form of laicism that prevailed in Turkey or the anti-Westernism of other Islamist parties. The JDP's rise to power in the 2002 elections can be explained therefore by Erdoğan's personal charisma and populist discourse regarding the headscarf issue. As a result of the expansion of economic liberalization in the 2000s and the adoption of liberal economic policies, the JDP managed to create its own devout and politically conservative bourgeois class. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs originating from or based in the provinces established enterprises and enlarged their networks by promoting Islamic work and business ethics.
- 8 Once the rise of neoliberalism in Turkey led to the state's withdrawal from many aspects of social life and the growth of several NGOs, the Gülen movement's followers cleverly used the opportunities available in Turkey's growing civil society. They cooperated with the JDP to design an effective and liberal Islamist governance at a global scale. Gülen's well-educated followers infiltrated key Turkish state institutions such as the police and the judiciary. Over the course of the 2000s, the size of the religious sphere was extensively expanded, and Diyanet's budget, which became the apparatus for spreading Islamist discourse, grew extraordinarily. New media technologies contributed to the Islamization of society. A new method of televangelism emerged, mostly concerning traditional family values while imposing implicitly Muslim conservative social policies. New consumption patterns emerged, melding religious pietism with the free market economy, such as with the veiling fashion industry and the construction of hotels and restaurants in a new pop trend called Ottomania revisiting old Ottoman visual culture in an exaggerated and pompous style (p. 142-145). The Islamic capital and the Turkish Muslim political ideology thus went hand in hand with neoliberal conditions.
- 9 The infiltration of Gülen's followers into the state's main institutions over the years gave rise to a conflict between the JDP's members and the Gülenists regarding the sharing of economic and political capital. The conflict led to a failed, bloody coup attempt in July 2016 organized by a division of the military composed of Gülenists against the government. Following the event, Erdoğan established a new epic national narrative depicting the Gülenists as traitors while eradicating their presence in the state's organization. With popular support, in July 2018, he began to formally transform

Turkey's long-standing parliamentary system into a heavily centralized presidential one that entrenched his one-man authoritarian rule.

- 10 Although the overall picture seems pessimistic, recent surveys say that the level of religiosity in Turkey has begun to diminish, and religion has become a secondary need for the majority of people, who are suffering from the economic downturn and high levels of corruption and nepotism created by the JDP government. It is highly likely that the use of religion as a political instrument will no longer be efficient in the long term.