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Note de recherche

Bosniak Diaspora as a Religious Minority in France

La diaspora bosniaque en tant que minorité religieuse en France
Dževada Šuško

Résumés

La diaspora bosniaque en France a fait l’objet de peu de recherches. Cette note de recherche cherche à combler le manque de connaissance des Bosniaques en tant que minorité religieuse en France. Elle vise à donner un aperçu des activités, perceptions, défis et pratiques transnationales des communautés religieuses bosniaques. La question principale ici posée est la suivante : quelles sont les activités des communautés religieuses bosniaques en diaspora et à quels défis sont-elles confrontées ? Cette note de recherche traite de la vie des Bosniaque musulmans pratiquants en France, à partir d’entretiens approfondis avec une variété d’acteurs, en particulier des imams, des militants et des membres de la communauté, ainsi qu’une observation participante. Elle plaide en faveur d’une compréhension plus nuancée d’appellations telles que Bosniaque, musulman et islam.

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Introduction

1The Bosniak diaspora in France represents an under-researched Muslim minority within the European context. This research seeks to bridge the gap in the scholarly understanding of Bosniaks as a religious minority in France and Europe, focusing on their sense of belonging, transnational connections, and community activities. It first provides a brief historical overview of the development of Bosniak identity and the migration waves of Bosniaks to France. Then, through qualitative research, including semi-structured interviews and participant observation, this study delves into the experiences, challenges, and practices of Bosniak religious communities in France. By examining the activities and perceptions of Bosniak jamaats (mosque communities), the study aims to shed light on how this community navigates its dual identity as both French citizens and members of the Bosniak diaspora. The article concludes with a discussion of the challenges faced by the community, the role of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the broader implications of the study for understanding Muslim minorities in Europe.

  • 1 When I speak of mosques, I do not necessarily mean separate buildings with minarets. It is in the p (...)

2The research questions address identity and integration, migration history, transnational connections, and community activities. The focus is on understanding the Bosniaks as a Muslim minority in France, then their relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, their interpretation and practice of Islam, and ultimately the challenges faced by Bosniak jamaats and their members.1

3The field research was conducted during the period from September 2022 until February 2023. A total of 25 semi-structured interviews were carried out with key members of the Bosniak community, including imams, mosque presidents, and activists, both male and female. The interviews were guided by a set of approximately forty questions designed to explore various dimensions of the community’s life. These questions served as a flexible framework, allowing for in-depth discussions and the emergence of new themes during the interviews.

4The study focused on nine Bosniak mosques located in Paris, Strasbourg, Lyon, Mulhouse, Besançon, Sochaux, Annecy, Thonon, and Cluses. I visited eight of these nine mosques. All of them are affiliated with the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which facilitated my contacts with the imams or presidents of these communities. The participants included 21 men and 4 women, aged between 20 and 70 years. The age distribution of the interlocutors was as follows: ten participants aged 20-40 years; ten participants aged 41-60 years; and five participants aged 61-70 years. Each interview was pre-arranged in collaboration with the mosque’s imam and president. By pre-arranging interviews and collaborating with mosque leaders, the study ensured a systematic and thorough approach to data collection. Community members were selected based on the imam’s and the president’s recommendations and my personal choice, ensuring a diverse representation. The diverse age range and gender representation among the participants enabled a comprehensive understanding of the multi-generational perspectives and gender-specific experiences. Interviews typically lasted around two hours and were conducted within the mosque premises, providing contextual sensitivity to the participants’ environment. Conducting interviews within the mosque premises allowed participants to express themselves in a familiar and comfortable environment.

5In addition to interviews, the study applied ethnographic participant observation. This method entailed the researcher actively participating in various community activities, which included common prayers, the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday (mevlud), annual meetings of mosque steering boards, gatherings of Bosniak imams and steering boards across France, and social events like common dinners, lunches, and family barbecues. I also analysed social media posts related to these communities. Participant observation outside of mosque grounds facilitated access to informants and allowed me to look beyond the institutional context of the mosque.

6The research also included interviews with directors and researchers from prominent institutions dealing with Islam and Muslims in France. These institutions include the Institute for the Study of Islam and Societies of the Muslim World (IISMM), the European Institute of Social Sciences (IESH), the Foundation of Islam in France (FIF), and the Institute of Islamic Cultures (ICI). Additional insights were gathered from PhD candidates at CETOBaC (Center for Turkish, Ottoman, Balkan, and Central Asian Studies) and leading stakeholders in other Muslim organizations such as the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), the French Council of Muslim Faith (CFCM), and the Union of Islamic Organisations in France (UOIF). Moreover, valuable information was obtained through two interviews with government officials, such as the Consultant for Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France and the Chief-of-Office for Islam at the Central Office for Religious Affairs (Bureau central des cultes) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of France. Interviews with directors of research institutions and governmental officials provided a broader institutional perspective, situating the Bosniak community’s experiences within the larger sociopolitical context of Islam and Muslims in France.

The Bosniaks: European Muslims of Bosnian Origin

  • 2 Imamović Mustafa, Historija Bošnjaka [History of Bosniaks], Sarajevo, Preporod, 2006, p. 13.
  • 3 Ibid. Imamović states that, in medieval literature, inhabitants of Bosnia were mostly called Bogumi (...)
  • 4 Balić Smail, Das unbekannte Bosnien. Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt [Unknown Bosnia: Europe’s (...)

7Bosniaks are indigenous European Muslims. The ethnonym Bosniak goes back to the medieval period of the Bosnian kingdom when the inhabitants named themselves as Bosniaks (Bošnjani).2 At that time, Bosnia was already a multireligious country with Catholics, Orthodox, and heretics (the latter were often identified as Bogumils, Patarens, or adherents of the Bosnian church).3 With the occupation of the Ottoman Empire (1463-1878) the local population gradually converted to Islam and the heretic movement disappeared. Hence, there used to be not only Catholic and Orthodox Bosniaks but also Muslim Bosniaks. However, this integral naming of the population of Bosnia changed with the nation-building processes in the nineteenth century. At that time, awareness of the national identity of neighbouring Serbia and Croatia grew. Religious identity played an important role during the rise of nation states and national awareness. Local Catholic Bosniaks started to gradually identify themselves as Croats, and similarly, local Orthodox Bosniaks saw themselves increasingly as Serbs. Eventually the name Bosniak was left for the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina – and remains so until today. Thus, Serbian Orthodox Christianity and Serbian national identity, Croat Catholic Christianity and Croatian national identity, as well as Bosniak Muslim identity with Bosniak national identity became inextricably linked.4 In fact, with the establishment of Yugoslavia, the Bosniak identity was not acknowledged, forcing Bosniaks to align with categories such as Serb, Croat, Yugoslav, or remain unidentified. In the 1960s, socialist Yugoslavia officially recognized “Muslim” as a national category (narod). This move was significant, as it provided a national identity to those who did not align with the Serb or Croat identities. After the independence from Yugoslavia, in 1994, the Bosniak national identity was reintroduced. The shift from “Muslim” to “Bosniak” was crucial to move away from defining Bosniaks solely by religious affiliation, emphasizing a historical and territorial identity tied to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8When it comes to their religious practice, Bosniaks are Sunni Muslims, belonging to the Hanafi school of law and Maturidi theology. There are as well Sufi tariqats, such as the Rufaiyya, Qadiri, Naqshbandi, Khalwatiyya, and Mevlevi orders. Sufi tariqats are spiritual paths or orders in Islam that focus on the mystical and inner dimensions of the faith, guiding followers through practices aimed at achieving spiritual enlightenment and closeness to God. Throughout the centuries, Bosniaks have developed an adaptability to different political and societal systems, as Bosnia and Herzegovina has been an integral part of different empires and states. Starting from the dominantly Muslim Ottoman Empire, Bosniaks have learned to adapt to the dominantly Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire, then the dominantly Orthodox Yugoslav Kingdom, and then Communist Yugoslavia, where the state policy was to control, marginalize, and repress religious communities. In each of these systems, Bosniaks have preserved their indigenous religious identity (often called the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks), their Bosnian language (officially called Serbo-Croatian at that time), and their identification with the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the ruling systems that followed the Ottoman Empire, they experienced being a minority, often surrounded by hostile and life-threatening state policies, such as during the Yugoslav Kingdom, the Second World War, and the recent war of 1992 to 1995.

What Is Diaspora and Does It Apply to the Bosniaks?

  • 5 Sheffer Gabriel, “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics,” in Gabriel She (...)
  • 6 Safran William, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return,” Diaspora, vol. 1, no(...)
  • 7 Cohen Robin, Global Diasporas: An Introduction. New York, Routledge, 2008.
  • 8 Original: “Le terme diaspora désigne des populations dispersées depuis une terre natale (homeland) (...)

9In general, definitions of diaspora depend on the cause of the migration, forms of social organization, and relations with both the homeland and the host state. According to Gabriel Sheffer, a diaspora aims at preserving ethnic or ethnoreligious identity.5 William Safran claims that diaspora is the movement, migration, or scattering of a people away from an established or ancestral homeland. This deterritorialized group possesses a collective memory, maintains sentimental as well as material relations to the homeland, and has a will to return.6 Robin Cohen reminds us that diaspora is premised on whether it is the result of voluntary or forced migration.7 Christine Chivallon sums it up as follows: “The term diaspora refers to populations dispersed from a homeland who have maintained lasting ties among the members resulting from this dispersion, with the longevity of the sense of collective belonging being built in relation to the memory of the territory of origin.”8

10Indeed, my interviews revealed that the Bosniaks in France maintain a strong Bosniak identity. Almost all interlocutors, when asked about their identity, identified themselves as Bosniaks. Some additionally mentioned that they are also French, Muslim, and have a Bosnian linguistic identity. Thus, they express multiple identities: a French identity related to citizenship, work, and education; a Muslim identity tied to religion; and both Bosnian and French language identities. All of them keep regular relationships with their homeland, built houses there after the war, visit their relatives regularly, and most of them expressed the wish to return at least when they retire. If they die in France, they want to be buried in their place of origin.

  • 9 Wimmer Andreas, “How to study Ethnicity in Immigrant Societies: Herder’s Heritage and the Boundary- (...)
  • 10 Ibid.

11Based on Johan Gottfried Herder, the eighteenth-century philosopher, peoples can be understood by three characteristics: first, they have a community that is held together by close ties among its members; second, they have a consciousness of their identity; and third, peoples have their own culture and language.9 As Andreas Wimmer puts it: “In brief, according to Herder’s social ontology, the world is made up of peoples each distinguished by a unique culture (1) held together by communitarian solidarity (2) and bound by a shared identity (3). They thus form the self-evident units of observation and analysis (4) for any historical or social inquiry – the most meaningful way of subdividing the population of humans.”10

  • 11 Ibid., p. 28.
  • 12 Ibid., p. 29.

12Wimmer continues his elaboration by referring to Herbert Gans and classic assimilation theory, i.e. how ethnic communities become immersed in the mainstream society, which eventually leads to the “dissolution of these ethnic communities through intermarriage and spatial dispersion, the dilution of immigrant cultures through processes of acculturation, and the gradual but relentless diminution of ethnic identities until all that remained was what has been famously called ‘symbolic ethnicity’.”11 When it comes to being accepted as an integral part of the new mainstream society, all depends on the cultural assimilation.12

  • 13 Halilovich Hariz, “Bosnian Global Villages: (Re)Construction of Trans-Local Communities in Diaspora (...)

13This Herderian approach of shared culture and identity as well as communitarian solidarity is applicable to Bosniak migrants in France. All the interviews and the field research revealed that the Bosniak culture, Islam, and Bosnian language are of great importance. This is why they established mosques, which are in fact cultural centres with a prayer room (mesdžid) as well as facilities to grasp a sense of community, social network, and home. Furthermore, all the locations were bought with the help of donations by the community members, which shows their readiness to invest their saved money, to stay independent from any foreign donors, to remain for longer in this new social reality. Hariz Halilovich calls them trans-local zavičaj communities to revive the memory of the home country in a transnational context, whereas zavičaj is the Bosnian word for local community in the home country.13 This research has revealed that the Bosniak mosques are transnational spaces that serve multiple purposes: they are used not only for practicing Islam but also for socializing, organizing sports activities, and preserving the memory of their homeland. This is a common feature of immigrant mosque communities in France.

14To summarise, the Bosniak Muslim community constitutes a diaspora because it maintains a strong connection to its homeland, preserves its unique cultural and religious identity, and creates a supportive community structure in the host country. This diaspora not only fosters a sense of belonging among its members but also helps to sustain their cultural heritage and identity across generations.

Why France? An Overview of the Migration Waves of Bosniaks

15The migration of Bosniaks from Bosnia and Herzegovina can be categorized into several distinct periods. There have been several migration waves, particularly from the nineteenth century, throughout the twentieth century, and up to today.

  • 14 For more information on the links between migration, diaspora, and Bosniak identity, see Bougarel X (...)

16With the establishment of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, Bosniaks predominantly moved to remaining Ottoman lands, out of fear of losing their religious identity. Many settled in Sandžak, cut off from Bosnia by the Congress in Berlin, while others migrated to other parts of the Ottoman Empire or the Middle East. Thus, Bosniaks who left Bosnia at that time or who were cut off from their homeland have remained present until today in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, North Macedonia, Turkey, and even the Near East, where one can find families with the surname Bushnaq (which means “Bosniak” in Arabic).14 Muslims from coastal Herzegovina cities, like Trebinje, migrated to the USA, establishing the first Islamic community, Džemijetul-hajrijje.

17In the first years of socialist rule after 1945, many Bosniaks fled from the Partisans to Austria, Germany, and Switzerland as political dissidents, with figures like Adilbeg Zulfikarpašić establishing the Bosniak Institute in Zurich or Smail Balić working as expert on Oriental languages at the National Library in Vienna. A major shift occurred in 1963 when Socialist Yugoslavia allowed its citizens to work abroad through agreements with European countries, leading to the settlement of Balkan Muslims as guest workers in leading European industries. In the 1990s, the disintegration of Yugoslavia caused war and genocide, resulting in the massive emigration of Bosniaks to Western Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia. Recent trends show brain drain migration towards Western European countries driven by the search for better economic prospects, continuing the trend of migration driven by the search for stability and improved living conditions.

  • 15 Ekmečić Fadil, Bosna u Francuskoj od najstarijih dana do 1994 [Bosnia in France from the oldest tim (...)
  • 16 Ibid., p. 45. Fadil Ekmečić made a list of the most influential Bosniaks who lived in France with s (...)
  • 17 Ibid., p. 50.

18There are no statistics about the number of Bosniaks who live in France, but the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimates 35,000. For the research on Bosniak jamaats in France, three immigration waves are relevant. The first immigration wave was in the late 1960s and 1970s when France, like other European countries, such as Germany and Austria, invited exclusively able-bodied men as migrant workers to fill the gaps in their respective industries. The approval of family reunification in 1974 led to the migration of a large number of women and children to France. Thus Bosniaks, then Yugoslavs, came to work temporarily, but most of them stayed until their retirement. They dominantly worked in the automotive industry (Peugeot, Citroen, and Renault) as well as in the fashion industry as tailors and dressmakers.15 Some Bosniaks opened their own fashion shops (e.g. Gušić, Bekto, Mulabegović), others opened their own restaurants (e.g. Hasić, Zulfikarpašić, Hodžić), and the brothers Ekmečić ran a library in Paris.16 At that time, as in other diasporic countries, the state of Yugoslavia organized language classes for immigrants with teachers coming from Yugoslavia and established cultural associations and sports clubs. Soon the Croat Catholic mission started to offer their own school in Croat language.17 Bosniaks at that time did not have their own associations, so they occasionally joined these clubs. One interlocutor in Lyon, now activist in the mosque, was twice the president of a Yugoslav club. Then, during the war, he founded the association “Most” (bridge) which had humanitarian, cultural, and sport activities. Today the association has been transformed into a Bosniak Sufi tekke in Lyon.

  • 18 Ibid., p. 57-58.
  • 19 Madelain Anne, L’expérience française des Balkans, Tours, Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, (...)
  • 20 Behloul states this as well for the Bosniak community in Swirtzerland; cf. Behloul Samuel M., “Reli (...)

19When nationalism in Serbia and Croatia became ever more visible in the 1980s, Bosniaks started to organize themselves in their own cultural – and later, due to the war, humanitarian – associations, although not yet religious ones. There were dozens of them in different cities in France.18 Thus, we can hardly talk about the presence of a numerically significant Bosniak diaspora in France before the 1990s. The vast majority of associations with a Bosnian focus (such as the Association Sarajevo) were created during the war (after 1992) in the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. These associations brought together Bosniaks, as well as French and other citizens who were concerned about the war in Yugoslavia. It is estimated that there were around three hundred such associations.19 The first Bosniak mosque registered in France was in Paris in 1997. Hence, until 1997 Bosniaks in France possessed no ethnocultural or religious infrastructure of their own. In most diasporic settings in Western Europe, Bosniak mosques were established in the 1990s. Until then Bosniaks, like other immigrants from former Yugoslavia, gathered, if at all, in so-called Yugoslav clubs. If they wanted to attend prayers in the mosques, Bosniaks and other Muslim immigrants from Yugoslavia would go to Turkish mosques or even to Arab mosques that were closest to their homes.20 When asked during the field research why, back in the 1990s, they preferred Turkish mosques, they would respond that Bosniaks and Turks belong to the same madhab and the prayers are performed the same way. Hence, when there were no Bosniak jamaats, Bosniaks tended to go to mosques where prayers were led by Turks, as the Turkish practice of Islam is similar to the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks.

  • 21 Ekmečić, Bosna…, op. cit., p. 46.

20After the experience of voluntary migrants who moved to France for work or quality-of-life reasons and stayed permanently in France, during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995 the second immigration wave consisted of refugees who experienced forced displacement in the ethnically cleansed territories of what today is Republika Srpska. The number of Bosniak refugees in France was much less than in neighbouring Germany or other European countries, as France did not have a state policy to accept huge contingents of refugees. Fadil Ekmečić estimates that around 15,000 refugees were accepted.21 These were primarily intellectuals and their families, mostly representatives of the old regime, who came to France with the assistance of humanitarian organizations, along with students who had family connections in the country. However, there is no specific data available for any of these groups. In addition, wounded persons were directly transported to France and camp detainees were given refuge. Most Bosniaks came from the ethnically cleansed areas of Podrinje (Eastern Bosnia) and Krajina (Northwestern Bosnia).

  • 22 Halilovich Hariz, “(Per)forming ‘Trans-local’ Homes: Bosnian Diaspora in Australia,” in Marko Valen (...)

21The third immigration wave was about twenty years ago, from about 2000 to 2005, when France granted asylum to displaced persons from the entity Republika Srpska. Bosniaks who returned after the war to their homes have experienced severe discrimination and persecution. Generally, post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina is marked by a high level of unemployment. The third migration wave was a typical example of chain migration – migrants assisting their family members, friends, and neighbours to migrate and join them in desired destinations has been a key feature of Bosnian migration, including to France.22 One of the asylum centres was close to Annecy. When Bosniak asylum seekers received their resident permits, others heard about it and tried it in the same way and in the same place with the help of previously accepted asylum seekers. The jamaats in Annecy, Thonon, Cluses, Sochaux, Mulhouse, Besancon, and Lyon were established during these years, and activists in these mosques have largely once been asylum seekers. Hence, when the concentration of Bosniaks in certain areas increased, soon there was a need to establish a mosque for religious purposes (prayers, education) as well as for the purpose of socialization and sports activities.

Being a Bosniak Muslim in France: Identity, Integration, Assimilation

  • 23 INSEE [Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques], Population immigrée et étran (...)
  • 24 Statista, “L’islam en France ‒ Faits et chiffres,” 13 December 2023, https://fr.statista.com/themes (...)

22France is the country with the largest number of Muslims in Europe. The National Institute of Statistics reported that in 2021, there were over 67 million inhabitants in France, including about 13 million immigrants, which is 11% of the total population.23 It is difficult to obtain accurate data on the number of Muslims in France because the census does not include questions about religion. Generally speaking, among the religious communities, the largest group is Catholics, followed by Muslims, Protestants, and Buddhists. It is estimated that there are 5.4 million Muslims in France, of which 2 million are in Paris.24

23The majority of Muslims come from the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and other African countries, primarily Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as from Turkey, Southeast Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria), and other parts of the Muslim world. Most Muslims in France are Sunni, adhering to the Maliki and Hanafi schools of thought. There are various Sufi orders (for example from Senegal) and an Alevi community. France is also home to a large number of Kurds (around 150,000) and Iranians (around 25,000). The highest concentration of Muslims is around the capital city, Paris. The President of the Bosniak jamaat in Paris estimates that 5,000 Bosniaks are living in Paris.

  • 25 Jalila Sbaï, “Les racines coloniales de la politique française à l’égard de l’islam,” Orient XXI. L (...)

24Many factors influence the specific position of Islam and Muslims in France, including the integration of immigrants from former colonies and immigrants from other parts of Europe and the world, the arrangement of relations between the state and religions based on the principle of laïcité, terrorist attacks, and certainly the ambiance of Islamophobia in Europe and the world.25

  • 26 Behloul, “Religion or Culture?” op. cit., p. 301.
  • 27 Bougarel Xavier, “The Role of Balkan Muslims in Building a European Islam,” European Policy Center (...)
  • 28 Behloul, “Religion or Culture?” op. cit., p. 306.

25Generally, as Behloul states, the discourse in Western Europe on Islam and Muslims has initially questioned the possibility of integrating Islam into the normative system of European and Western societies, and recently has focused rather on security issues, the relationship between religion and the state, architectural design of public spaces (the building of minarets), and the ability of Islam and Muslims to be a subject of criticism, satire, and humour.26 None of the respondents I interviewed used the term Sharia. This might be in line with Xavier Bougarel’s statement that Bosnian Muslims are irreversibly secularized.27 Similarly, Behloul, concludes for the Bosniaks that “state and religion never formed an indivisible unit; nor was life and commerce lived and conducted strictly by the rules of Sharia.”28

  • 29 Valenta Marko, Ramet Sabrina P., “Bosnian Migrants: An Introduction,” in Marko Valenta, Sabrina P. (...)
  • 30 Halilovich, “(Per)forming ‘Trans-local’ Homes,” op. cit., p. 73.

26Earlier research has indicated that Bosniak human capital in combination with their European identity and appearance as well as the high participation of Bosniak women in the work force eased their integration in western countries.29 Whether they arrive as immigrant workers, refugees, or asylum seekers, Bosniaks largely build successful livelihoods, complete their education, establish businesses, buy apartments and houses, and send their children to university. Mostly they work in construction and restoration, in the automotive industry, as nursing personnel in hospitals, as bus drivers, and in the service industry, as well as in highly qualified positions, such as engineers. Thus, they constantly continue to redefine their individual and collective identities.30 If we think of integration as the extent to which immigrants are able to achieve their needs and fulfil their interests in the new country, then we can conclude that Bosniaks present an example of a Muslim minority that is well integrated into the French society and economy. The research has revealed that members do not only devote their spare time to mosque activities but also to voluntary work, such as a 33-year-old activist in Mulhouse who transports disabled persons, or a 47-year-old activist in Paris who cooks for needy and homeless people. There are as well other Bosniak activists who worked on a voluntary basis at Caritas and other humanitarian organisations in France.

  • 31 Ramet Sabrina P., Valenta Marko, “Changing Places, Changing Identities: A Conclusion,” in Marko Val (...)
  • 32 Ibid.

27Integration is dependent on factors such as class, education, employment, housing, language acquisition, social networks, and the government’s migration and integration policy.31 In general, Bosniaks, due to the colour of their skin and European appearance and identity, experience less discrimination and stigmatization, as other studies have indicated and my interlocutors during the interviews have confirmed.32 The president of the jamaat in Annecy, who came to France as a detainee of the concentration camp Trnopolje at the age of eight with his mother, said:

I personally have not experienced discrimination. I am a proud Muslim and my colleagues at work know that. My experience is that when someone is aware of his identity others will respect you. I bring cookies for bayram to my neighbours. My neighbour Jacques helps me even if he knows that I am a practicing Muslim. On the other side I have had the experience when they hear that I am performing my prayers and they change their attitude towards me. For many, a good Muslim is the one who does not practice Islam.

  • 33 The legal framework of the 1905 law asserts the neutrality of the state when it comes to accommodat (...)

28However, some of my interlocutors, women with headscarves and men with beards, stated that they faced discrimination because of their religious identity. As one woman explained: “I could not get a job because of my headscarf. Sometimes I feel and see that people are staring at me and treating me unkindly. Nonetheless, I want to fully integrate myself into French society and I hope one day that I will have as well a French identity” (engineer, female activist in the jamaat in Strasbourg). This visible expression of their faith made them more distinctly Muslim in the eyes of non-Muslims. Women who do jobs such as cleaning have no problems with the headscarf, but for educated women in public institutions, such as schools, or companies where there is contact with clients, the headscarf and Islamic practice are not permitted.33

29My interlocutors worry about assimilation, whereas the notion of integration is rather something they are proud of, and they stress that they have successfully integrated into France. The debate on assimilation versus integration in France is particularly nuanced and often charged with political implications, especially when discussed in the context of Muslim communities. Assimilation implies a complete cultural absorption and loss of distinct identity, which many view as a threat to their Bosniak identity. Conversely, integration refers to the successful incorporation of individuals into the broader society while allowing them to maintain their unique cultural identities. This distinction is evident among the Bosniak community in France. While they express pride in their integration, highlighting their successful participation in French society, there is also an underlying concern about assimilation. This is seen through the increasing interethnic marriages and the diminishing use of the Bosnian language among younger generations, indicating a gradual shift from a distinct Bosniak identity towards a broader Muslim diaspora. This trend can be further illustrated by the data collected during my research, where several interlocutors shared personal experiences of linguistic assimilation and cross-cultural relationships, reflecting these broader changes. The French media and political discourse often blur these terms, adding to the complexity. For the Bosniak community, maintaining a balance between preserving their cultural heritage and integrating into French society remains a delicate issue.

30Nonetheless, assimilation takes place and interethnic marriages are becoming common, even if the parents would rather prefer that their children marry Bosniaks. However, my field research revealed that there are many young Bosniaks who got married to non-Muslim and Muslim French citizens of immigrant background (Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey).

31When asked what France means to them, typical pull factors in migration studies come to the surface: employment, high wages, welfare state benefits, education, medical care, social security, living standards, stability, and rule of law. Many responded that France is their second home country and that they are very satisfied.

  • 34 Ulram Peter A., Integration in Österreich, Vienna, GfK Austria on behalf of Ministry of Interior Af (...)
  • 35 Šehagić Merima, “The West, the Balkans and the In-Between: Bosnian Muslims Representing a European (...)
  • 36 Duraković Alen, “Bosniaks of the Balkans – European Muslims in Switzerland,” in Dževada Šuško (ed.) (...)

32While there is a positive public image of Bosniaks in many diasporic communities, such as in Austria,34 Germany,35 and Switzerland,36 my interviews within institutions in France that deal with Islam and Muslims in France showed that they rarely had contact with Bosniaks. However, many interlocutors stated that they tell their employers, their colleagues at work, or their clients that they are practicing Muslims, and they are respected because they are loyal and responsible in the workplace. Some have as well said that, due to their European Muslim identity, they are rather perceived as unproblematic Muslims. Here are some statements of the interlocutors:

France and the French people helped me to become what I am today. I work and live here in Paris. I achieved all of it not because I had good connections but because I gave my best and worked hard. I am happy with my life in France. I pursued my career. Additionally, I am happy to serve my jamaat. (architect and woman activist in the jamaat in Paris, 38 years)

Bosniaks are very successful in the diaspora. They work hard and are respected by the French people. Some French told me that it would be much easier if all Muslims were like the Bosniaks. (president of the jamaat in Besançon, 62 years)

33However, there are also concerning voices:

France is a country that gave me a better future in the material sense. I am happy with my private life. I am married and the father of four children. I play basketball and contribute to the jamaat. Thank God, I do not want to complain. However, if I stay here, my children and I will lose our religious and Bosniak identity. Already, the first generation is losing its identity. I have a feeling that I will never be fully accepted as a Muslim in France. (president of the jamaat in Annecy, 39 years)

34Continuing with the perspective of another interviewee, we hear from a woman activist, a graduate in the food industry with a specialization in industrial technician training. At 34 years old, she moved to Strasbourg for a family reunion, having fallen in love with a Bosniak who had already been living in France. Her journey highlights the complexities of balancing personal relationships and integrating into a new country: “The person who assimilates best is the one most accepted in France. I feel threatened as nationalism is on the rise here. The only solution is integration. Integration means living like all other French people – educating ourselves, working – but we must also preserve our rich culture and find a way to present it,” said the activist, who is now 38 and works as an engineer while also being involved in the jamaat in Paris. This reflection adds another dimension to the ongoing challenges of identity and belonging within the Bosniak diaspora, underscoring the tension between assimilation and the desire to maintain cultural roots. To bridge the discussion on identity, integration, and assimilation of Bosniak Muslims in France with the subsequent focus on the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its connection to diasporic Bosniak jamaats, it is essential to explore how transnational religious institutions contribute to shaping and sustaining these identities within diaspora communities.

The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Relation to Diasporic Bosniak Jamaats

35Understanding the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini [ICBH]) and its relationship with the Bosniak diaspora in France is crucial for several reasons. The ICBH, established in Sarajevo in 1882 during the Austro-Hungarian period, serves as the representative organization for Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, neighbouring countries, and the diaspora. It addresses the spiritual and organizational needs of Bosniaks wherever they live, providing religious guidance and supporting the organization of religious activities in mosques. This connection ensures that Bosniaks, regardless of their geographic location, remain linked to their religious practices as well as to the songs, customs, traditional celebrations, and material objects that reflect the Bosniak identity, ensuring continuity of both cultural and religious heritage across generations and locations.

36The ICBIH’s extensive network, which includes around 1,900 mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina and approximately 300 in the diaspora (Europe, North America, Australia), plays a significant role in maintaining the religious and cultural identity of Bosniaks abroad. This network is essential for understanding how Bosniak communities in France, although a minority compared to other Muslim communities, sustain their unique practices and traditions. By exploring the ICBH and its impact on Bosniak jamaats in France, we gain insight into the mechanisms that help maintain religious cohesion, cultural continuity, and a sense of belonging among Bosniaks in the diaspora. This examination also highlights the broader context of Muslim integration and the role of religious institutions in supporting diasporic communities.

  • 37 Alibašić Ahmet, “The Profile of Bosnian Islam and What West European Muslims Could Benefit from It, (...)

37Practicing Bosniaks are usually members of the ICBH. The spiritual leader is the reisu-l-ulema (Grand Mufti), who is elected for a maximum of two mandates. Hence, wherever Bosniaks live and need religious guidance, it is the ICBH that helps them to organize their religious activities in the mosques. It manages six Islamic high schools (medresa), three Islamic faculties, a library with an impressive archive (Gazi Husrev begova biblioteka), a publishing house (El Kalem), two research institutes, and a media centre (RTV Bir, Journal Preporod). The Faculty of Islamic studies in Sarajevo educates imams, theologians, and religious teachers and could, according to the Faculty, serve as a model for how to educate imams in a European context. 37

38The ICBH maintains its autonomy and independence financially and organizationally from the state and other countries or donors. The Community is not a state institution and has always operated independently. However, this autonomy should be contextualized by considering the various historical periods. After the fall of the Communist regime and the subsequent war, financial support and scholarships from dominantly Muslim countries were pivotal, with much of the aid focused on humanitarian assistance, scholarships, and rebuilding more than a thousand destroyed mosques. Despite these collaborations and donations, the Islamic Community has maintained a clear policy ensuring that its mosques, schools, faculties, and institutions remain under its sole control. ICBH enforces a strict policy that imams must be Bosniaks, and both their preaching and the interpretation of Islam must align with the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks. Furthermore, imams must receive approval from the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and the Grand Mufti, ensuring that foreign influences do not affect local religious practices.

39Bosnia and Herzegovina is a secular state and has developed a model of separation with cooperation. For example, Islamic high schools (medresa) are regular public schools which follow the curriculum like any other public school, but with additional religious classes. Thus, a graduate from that school can pursue studies at a university in any discipline. Similarly, the Faculty of Islamic studies, established by the Islamic Community, is a regular faculty of the state University of Sarajevo, and their staff receive a salary from the state. Public schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina have religious classes and the teachers of religion in these schools are educated either at the Faculty of Islamic studies in Sarajevo or at the two other Faculties of Islamic Pedagogy in Zenica or Bihać. A medresa does not award a degree in religious sciences. It is a high school diploma. However, anyone who wants to work as an imam must have completed both a medresa and the Faculty of Islamic studies.

  • 38 Pravilnik o organiziranju Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini u dijaspori [Regulations on the (...)

40The headquarters of the Islamic Community in Sarajevo has adapted to the increasing numbers of diasporic communities who wanted to maintain a link to the spiritual authority in the home country. The highest administrative body, the so-called Rijaset, runs a Department for Foreign Affairs and Diaspora with an Office for International Cooperation and Bosniak Diaspora. Another department for Religious Affairs is also in direct contact with all the jamaats in Bosnia and the diaspora. Several regulations have been introduced, such as the regulation for the diasporic communities.38 They work in line with the Statute of the Islamic Community (Ustav Islamske zajednice). All imams who perform their duties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the region (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia), and in the diaspora are designated by a decree (dekret) of the Grand Mufti. Hence, an imam without permission from the Grand Mufti to perform the duty in a Bosniak mosque is not considered to be connected to the ICBH. Since all imams must have a university degree from the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, the Islamic Community wanted to make sure that these imams interpret and teach Islam according to the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks which refers to the unique way Islam has been practiced, taught, and interpreted in Bosnia and Herzegovina for centuries. This approach is characterized by a moderate, inclusive, and tolerant interpretation of Islam, influenced by Bosnia’s history of coexistence with different religious and cultural communities, including Christians and Jews. It emphasizes a balance between religious practice and engagement with broader European and secular contexts, as well as a respect for democratic values and human rights. The Grand Mufti in Sarajevo also appoints the main imams and muftis in Europe, North America, and Australia who have their seats in the legislative body (Sabor) and in the Council of Muftis (Vijeće muftija). Thus, a regular institutional exchange is provided. All the instructions and regulations provided by the Rijaset are binding to all diasporic communities, although in alignment with the legal provisions of the respective state where these diasporic communities are situated.

41Hence, Bosniak mosques in France are an integral part of a well-organized, interconnected global network of religious communities linked with the ICBH with its headquarters in Sarajevo. The connection to the ICBH with its religious leader the Grand Mufti (reis ul-ulema) seems to be of great importance, as the interviews revealed. This highly organized Islamic community’s more than 300 diasporic mosques are usually registered as Bosniak Islamic Centres in Europe, North America, and Australia. The largest diasporic community is in Germany with about 80 jamaats. In France there are nine jamaats with about 4,800 members.

42In comparison to the dominant Algerian, Moroccan, and Turkish Muslims communities, Bosniak mosques in France were established much more recently, with the first jamaat in Paris opening in 1997, followed by mosques in Sochaux in 1999, Mulhouse in 2000, Strasbourg in 2004, Besançon in 2005, Lyon in 2007, Thonon in 2009, Cluses in 2011, and Annecy in 2012. Whereas Bosniak mosques in other countries have been established in the 1980s and 1990s with the rising number of Bosnian refugees in Europe, North America, and Australia, the majority of mosques in France were registered in the years around 2000. This can be explained by the low number of immigrants and refugees as well as the timing of the immigration waves to France. Furthermore, representatives of Bosniak mosque associations in France pointed out that, until the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Bosnian Muslims were not pious and practicing religion in the same way as today. It has to be taken into consideration that they lived in a state that defined itself and its communist ideology as atheist and was led by its headquarters in the capital city Belgrade. Then as well a Yugoslav identity existed. The rising Serb and Croat nationalism, the establishment of democracy, human rights, and particularly freedom of faith, led eventually to a revitalization of religion and to a greater awareness of the Bosniak identity. All of this helps explain why Bosniaks started to gather around the idea of mosques in their diasporic settings in the 1990s. As one activist in the jamaat in Strasbourg stated: “Until the age of 30 I did not practice Islam, but because of the happenings in Bosnia and Herzegovina I started to think about my religion. When I came to France in the 1990s, I did not know any Bosniak who prayed.” This statement adds nuance, suggesting that religious practice and identity are more likely shaped by specific historical circumstances, rather than being inherent or self-sustaining elements. Nonetheless, even if, as the interviewee mentions, they may not have performed daily prayers, this does not mean they lacked a religious identity altogether.

  • 39 Before France introduced the separation of church and state (laïcité) in 1905, the Concordat was in (...)

43The legal positioning of faith communities in the Alsace-Moselle region is different from the rest of France.39 Due to the still existing Concordat, faith communities cooperate with the state on different levels, and there is more flexibility and liberty to manage faith communities. Since most Bosniak mosques are situated in the Alsace-Moselle region, they are registered as cultural associations, which offers more flexibility. Thus, religious and cultural activities are allowed. The Bosniak mosque in Paris is registered as a religious association where cultural activities, such as sports, education in the Bosnian language, or commemoration of the genocide in Srebrenica, are not permitted.

  • 40 There are many Bosniak theologians and imams who were named as sources of Islam. The following theo (...)
  • 41 The following three online preachers were mentioned: Safet Kuduzović, Sejad Islamović, Elvedin Pezi (...)
  • 42 The publishing house El Kalem was established in Sarajevo in 1973; it publishes books from various (...)
  • 43 Radio Bir was established in 2008 and the TV station in 2020. Both work under the name RTV Bir and (...)
  • 44 The journal Preporod has its offices in Sarajevo. The first issue was published in 1970. It is dist (...)

44My interviews included as well a question about people’s sources of information on Islam. Most responses were that they ask the imam of the Bosniak jamaat or a previous imam that used to serve there. The second source of information is the website of the ICBH, which has a Q&A section with all kinds of questions on current issues. Other sources are lectures on YouTube.com and posts on social media by theologians of the Islamic Community, such as professors at the Faculty of Islamic studies and imams.40 However, some also named online preachers of questionable theological background who are interpreting Islam in a rather conservative manner.41 They are considered suspicious online preachers due to their promotion of conservative and sometimes radical interpretations of Islam. Critics argue that their educational background is less clear and that they espouse views that can foster division and extremism within communities. Their teachings often emphasize strict adherence to Salafi principles, which can be at odds with the more moderate practices traditionally observed by Bosnian Muslims. This ideological rigidity poses a threat, as it may undermine social cohesion, promote intolerance, and potentially radicalize vulnerable individuals, thereby posing a risk to both community harmony and national security. The president of the jamaat in Lyon stated that people are listening to all kinds of online preachers. Some interlocutors mentioned as well foreign theologians, such as the very popular US-based Nouman Ali Khan and Omar Sulayman. One interlocutor named as well two French preachers, Eric Younus and Imam Rashid Eljay. Further sources listed are books of the publishing house El Kalem,42 the radio and TV channel RTV Bir,43 and the bimonthly journal Preporod,44 all of which belong the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reason for this variety of choices is explained by the president of the jamaat in Besançon: “On social media everyone can say whatever he wants. This is not a safe place.” There is a tendency to emphasize the importance of keeping the connection with imams and theologians of the ICBH as a guarantee against extremism and interpretations of Islam that encourage violence.

Bosniak Mosques in France as Transnational and Multifunctional Places

45In terms of numbers, as mentioned above, the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimates that there are 35,000 Bosniaks living in France. Based on field research conducted in nine communities, 1,200 families were registered as jamaat members. If this number is roughly multiplied by four, which is the average size of a family, the total comes to 4,800. This means that about 14% of Bosniaks in France are members of a jamaat of the Islamic Community.

46Having a closer look at the activities, symbols, and premises of Bosniak mosques, an observer can easily tell that the mosques do not only serve to meet the religious needs of the members but have multiple purposes. The prayer room is fully covered with a carpet and has the typical interior furnishing with a mihrab (place of the imam) and minber (stairs for the obligatory juma prayer). The walls of the mosques reveal an interesting symbolism. There are calligraphies, maps of Bosnia, paintings of Sarajevo, the crescent, the French and Bosnian flags, as well as the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina with lilies, which was used during the 1992-1995 war. Lilies are an interesting symbol present in all Bosniak mosques. They represent the historic continuity of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the medieval Bosnian kingdom used to have lilies as its state symbol. When Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in 1992, the state reintroduced the lilies on the flag. Additionally, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina has used lilies as a symbol of defence of the state. The crescent is also present in many ways as a symbol of Islamic identity. On the other hand, the French flag is a symbol of respect to the state where Bosniaks are residing.

47The symbols and premises are in line with the activities. The primary activities are regular prayers, juma, religious education of children and adults, additional prayers (teravija) and recitation of the whole Quran (mukabela) during the month of Ramadan, prayers on Islamic holidays (bayram), lectures (vaz), celebrations of the birthday of the Prophet (mevlud), Islamic marriages, celebration and supplication for members who leave for hajj, i.e. the pilgrimage to Mecca and Madina (ikrar dova), etc.

48Bosniak mosques play a role in cultivating the Islamic tradition specific to Bosniaks, a tradition shaped by the unique historical and cultural context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This tradition, which differs from how other Muslim communities around the world interpret, teach, and practice Islam, is reflected in several aspects of religious and community life. For instance, religious education in these mosques is designed to reflect the Bosnian experience of Islam, while cultural practices such as performing traditional Bosnian songs (ilahije) at community events, celebrating religious holidays in ways specific to Bosniaks (mevlud), and promoting the use of the Bosnian language are all part of this distinct identity. The study of Islamic literature written by Bosnian scholars further reinforces the preservation of Bosnian intellectual heritage. These elements help maintain and nurture the distinctive Islamic identity of Bosniaks, ensuring that their unique way of practicing and understanding Islam continues to thrive within their communities.

  • 45 For example, in Paris this women’s section named itself “Mothers of Paris” (Majke Pariza), while in (...)

49Furthermore, there are usually women’s sections and youth sections (mreža mladih) offering a variety of social activities.45 The role of women in the jamaat seems to be increasing, as the first woman who was elected in the executive board of the jamaat in Paris said: “A jamaat would become weak if women would not contribute to the activities. Women are a factor of stability. The separation of men and women is obsolete.” This statement is not unusual and reflects a growing trend, both in Bosnia and in the diaspora, where more women are increasingly involved in the leadership and activities of jamaats, roles that were traditionally dominated by men.

50Trophies displayed in offices, classrooms, or restaurants show that sport is another activity of the mosque community. For example, the jamaats in Annecy and Thonon have on their social media accounts posted many sport activities, mainly football.

51The jamaat restaurant is another integral place for gatherings. Meals are prepared or brought from home, mostly traditional Bosnian cuisine, and shared with the community members. There are regular lunches or dinners on weekends. Especially during Ramadan, these common meals for breaking the fast (iftar) are very important for members, as it reminds them of home where such a meal is shared with family, neighbours, and friends.

  • 46 Halilovich, “(Per)forming ‘Trans-local’ Homes,” op. cit., p. 67.
  • 47 While I was doing my research in the period from September 2022 to February 2023, the earthquake in (...)

52The link to the home country Bosnia and Herzegovina is kept alive within the premises of the mosque. It is the place where Bosnian language is spoken, where members talk of their memories and of the current political situation. It is also a place to remember, discuss, and share memories – what Halilovich calls the “emotional baggage of personal and collective sufferings.”46 This demonstrates that the experience of forced migration, mass killings, persecution, ethnic cleansing, and genocide are addressed in the mosque activities. There are posts on social media, lectures, movies, and commemorations of the genocide in Srebrenica as well as the ethnic cleansing in Northwest Bosnia, such as the case of white ribbons displayed in Prijedor. This is to be expected, as many Bosniaks come exactly from these areas. The experience of sufferings and the Islamic obligation to help those in need makes humanitarian aid as well an integral part of activities in the jamaat. There are regular collections of donations to help families in need in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere.47

53While in Turkish, Algerian, and Moroccan mosques in France the imams are usually employees of the respective state and the mosques are largely financed by those states, all Bosniak mosques are financially and organizationally independent from the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other local or foreign entity. Bosniak imams are employees of the mosque and the mosque finances itself from membership fees and donations of their members. All premises of the Bosniak mosques are purchased by the community members and are the property of the vakuf of the mosque, meaning the mosque’s charitable foundation. Every mosque has its own charitable foundation; its purpose is to serve the community. Except for the imam, all activists including the steering board are committed on a voluntary basis for the common good. Another characteristic of Bosniak diaspora jamaats is that the members are not only Bosniaks but Muslims from the Balkans in general, such as from Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, all of whom speak Bosnian.

54Unlike in other diasporic settings, France does not offer mother-tongue education in public schools. Thus, Bosniak mosques also serve as a place to practice the language. The jamaat in Strasbourg offers additional Bosnian language courses. The libraries in each mosque have dominantly literature in Bosnian language, but there are also books in Arabic and French language. There are many copies of the Quran and textbooks for religious education (ilmihal). Further books are either translations from Arabic, such as collections of hadith, translations from English, German, or French language, such as those by Seyyid Hossein Nasr, Le guide pour le jeune musulman (The guide for the young Muslim), or Murad Hofmann, L’islam comme alternative (Islam as an alternative). Books written by Bosniak imams and theologians are about the life of the Prophet Mohammad, a guide for performing the prayer, Muslim names, interpretations of some surat, etc.

55When asked what the mosque means for them, my interlocutors responded that it is first of all a spiritual place, a place of peace, consolation, and to feed one’s soul, but also a place to preserve the Islamic and Bosniak identity: “Jamaat is home, homeland, religion, culture and, peace. When I come to the jamaat it is as if I come to Bosnia and Herzegovina” (president of the jamaat in Strasbourg). In this sense, one interlocutor even claimed that the jamaat is the guarantee for survival. Some responded as well that they grew up going to a mosque, and that it is a habit in their family as well as an obligation to God to be a member of a jamaat.

  • 48 Halilovich, “(Per)forming ‘Trans-local’ Homes,” op. cit., p. 64.

56Furthermore, the mosque is the only place where their children can obtain a religious education and socialize with Bosniak children: “If we do not stick with the Islamic Community and the jamaat, future generations will forget that they are Bosniaks” (president of jamaat Sochaux). It is a “little Bosnia” as one interlocutor said. One of the questions in the interviews was what Bosnia and Herzegovina means for them, and the responses revealed a deep feeling of belonging and a strong emotional link with Bosnia and Herzegovina as one’s intimate and ultimate home, whereas France is seen as the second homeland. This relates to what Robert Sack claims: that humans are inherently geographical beings who are able to master different locations and position themselves in different locations.48

  • 49 Glick Schiller Nina, Basch Linda, Blanc-Szanton Cristina, “Transnationalism: A New Analytical Frame (...)

57All these above-mentioned perceptions and activities represent factors of cohesion which make the Bosniak mosques a distinct social world. They explain as well the transnational character of Bosniak mosques, as transnationalism is defined by Glick Schiller and others as “processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement.”49

The Principal Role of an Imam

58The imam in a mosque, like the priest in a church or the rabbi in a synagogue, plays an important role. Their main role is to guide and perform the regular obligatory daily prayers, the obligatory juma prayer, religious education for children and adults, recitations of the Quran, lectures, additional Quran recitations and teravija prayers during the month of Ramadan, prayers for Eid (bajram), dženaza prayers for a deceased person, and generally being available for any further activities related to Islamic practice. In addition to these formal duties, the imam also plays a consultative role within the community, offering guidance and support to families and individuals on various personal and religious matters. It is common for them to answer questions from the congregation at the end of Friday prayers. Furthermore, the imam often socializes with the community, sharing coffee and conversation with the congregation after prayers, fostering a deeper sense of connection and support within the jamaat. Since diasporic mosques are not, as elaborated above, only places of religious worship, the imam has additional obligations. This is the difference from imams in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose obligations are exclusively related to Islamic practice. Thus, the president of the jamaat in Lyon who used to be an imam says: “It is more difficult to be an imam in the diaspora than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The expectations are much higher.”

59In the diaspora, the imam is the one who participates in sports activities, organizes gatherings with the youth, and prepares of all kinds of activities inside and outside the mosque. The members of the mosque expect them to bring together the community also for non-religious purposes outside the mosque. Furthermore, the imam is, as the interviews revealed, a model of a good Muslim, a representative of Islam, psychologist, consultant, and mediator. The imam is considered to be the link to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to other jamaats in France. But the most important task is religious education for the younger generations, as an interlocutor stated: “If the imam is good, the jamaat is good.”

  • 50 Jouanneau Solenne, Les imams de France: une autorité religieuse sous contrôle, Paris, Agone, 2013.

60One of the crucial problems that Bosniak jamaats have is obtaining residence and working permits for their imams. The French system does not recognize “imam” as a profession.50 Three out of nine jamaats have, however, solved this issue. The jamaat in Strasbourg employed the imam as animateur. The imam in Paris was lucky to have a good relationship with the then Socialist-led municipality that enabled him to obtain a permit to work in the jamaat as teacher (enseignant). In Mulhouse, the imam is registered as an educator (éducateur). Furthermore, there is the option for an imam to work as a chaplain (aumônier) in prisons or in hospitals, but one must first complete a special one-year degree program. The Bosniak imam in Paris has completed this degree and works additionally as an imam in a prison.

61In Europe generally, imams mostly come from their countries of origin and often do not know the language and culture of the country where they are supposed to serve. In the case of France, imams from Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey are employees of their respective countries. Hence, the education of imams in France, in order to avoid the influence of foreign countries in French internal affairs, is one of the priorities that has been addressed at the French Ministry of Interior Affairs in cooperation with Muslim activists of different professional profiles. Therefore, the French state, starting from 2024, no longer allows seconded imams who are employees of their state of origin to serve in France. However, this does not include Bosnian imams, as they are not employees of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina but rather employees of the mosques.

62For years there have been several attempts to organize the diverse Muslim communities under umbrella organizations, but all of them so far have been unsuccessful. Bosniak jamaats have not yet participated in any of these initiatives, mostly due to their size and to the competing interests of the three dominant Muslim communities (Algerians, Moroccans, Turks), all of which are financed and backed by their respective states.

Bosniak Jamaats and the Outside World

63Another question during the interviews was about radicalization and violent extremism. All interlocutors were clearly opposed to any sort of violence except in the case of self-defence: “Islam is a religion of peace and liberty. It is absolutely contradictory to relate Islam with violence” (activist in the jamaat in Mulhouse, 33 years). Similarly, the president of the jamaat in Annecy responded:

I do not support at all violence except if my life is in danger. In Bosnia we were the greatest pacifists in the world. I condemn the terrorist attacks. Killing innocent people and killing myself is not in line with Islam and what the Prophet teaches us. I am totally against it. The French are putting us all in the same box and I find it so hard that the whole Muslim community pays the price because of one individual.

64When asked whether there is cooperation or exchange between the Bosniak mosque and other Muslim communities, the responses were rather negative. Most of the interviewees said that there is very little exchange and cooperation between Bosniak and other jamaats: “There is very little cooperation, rather out of politeness and when there are special festivities” (main imam in Strasbourg). The jamaat in Mulhouse started religious education (mekteb) in a Turkish mosque when Bosniaks did not have their own premises. When the jamaats in Annecy and Lyon were about to establish their mosques, they received donations from the Turkish jamaats (carpets, chairs for the classroom).

  • 51 Behloul, “Religion or Culture?” op. cit., p. 306.

65The Bosniak mosque in Paris temporarily hosted an Arab and Bangladeshi jamaat for the obligatory juma prayer, as their premises were closed and the Bosniak mosque was the nearest. Actually, most Bosniaks have encountered the ethnic, cultural, and political diversity of Islam for the first time – a Muslim community (ummah) in France.51 There are also contacts and friendships in the neighbourhood, in the workplace, and at school or university: “I have Muslim friends from other parts of the world: Turks, Arabs, Senegalese. They know us Bosniaks from our famous football players. I also have a good friend from the Ivory Coast” (activist in a jamaat in Lyon, 38 years)

66Regarding relations to public authorities, there are annual visits of the territorial intelligence service (renseignement territorial) to talk to the president of the jamaat. The communication has been kind and cooperative. So far, no Bosniak jamaat has been closed down by state authorities, nor has a Bosniak imam ever been sent back to the country of origin. In general, as the main imam in Strasburg puts it: “There is no concrete cooperation, no support. We are organizing ourselves on our own. There are no obstacles from public authorities. We don’t have any problems. In general, public authorities are very reserved and closed.”

Conclusion

67This article has highlighted the unique yet often overlooked presence of the Bosniak community in France. As a significantly smaller community compared to those originating from France’s former colonies, such as Algeria and Morocco, as well as Turkey, it is not surprising that Bosniaks are underrepresented in public discourse and religious institutions within the French state. Their “invisibility” is partly a result of this smaller population and partly due to their smooth integration into French society, where they are often perceived as a minority that does not present significant social or political challenges. Although they have successfully integrated into French society and acquired French citizenship, Bosniaks have maintained strong connections to their country of origin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to the Islamic Community headquarters in Sarajevo. This enduring connection stems, in part, from a desire to preserve their religious and cultural identity; many have expressed a concern about losing their Bosniak identity in the diaspora. However, this creates a sense of dual belonging, as Bosniaks often feel split between France and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many own homes in both countries and navigate these dual identities, balancing their roles as integrated French citizens with their efforts to preserve their cultural and religious heritage.

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Notes

1 When I speak of mosques, I do not necessarily mean separate buildings with minarets. It is in the proper sense rather a jamaat, a religious community situated in either a separate building or as part of a bigger building adapted to the necessities of religious and social activities. The Bosniaks use the term džamija (mosque) or džemat (congregation) interchangeably in the Bosnian language.

2 Imamović Mustafa, Historija Bošnjaka [History of Bosniaks], Sarajevo, Preporod, 2006, p. 13.

3 Ibid. Imamović states that, in medieval literature, inhabitants of Bosnia were mostly called Bogumils, relating to the Bulgarian heretic pope from the tenth century. The local population referred to itself instead as “krstjani” (Christians), “good Bosniaks,” or “good people.” He cites as well one source from a monastery which talks of “Bogumil heretics.”

4 Balić Smail, Das unbekannte Bosnien. Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt [Unknown Bosnia: Europe’s bridge to the Islamic World], Wien, Böhlau Verlag, 1992, p. 39.

5 Sheffer Gabriel, “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), Modern Diasporas in International Politics, New York, Saint Martin’s Press, 1986, p. 1-15.

6 Safran William, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return,” Diaspora, vol. 1, no 1, 1991, p. 83-99.

7 Cohen Robin, Global Diasporas: An Introduction. New York, Routledge, 2008.

8 Original: “Le terme diaspora désigne des populations dispersées depuis une terre natale (homeland) qui ont conservé des liens durables entre membres issus de cette dissémination, la longévité du sentiment d’appartenance collective se construisant en rapport avec la mémoire du territoire d’origine.” Chivallon Christine, “Diaspora,” Anthropen, 2017, https://doi.org/10.17184/eac.anthropen.064.

9 Wimmer Andreas, “How to study Ethnicity in Immigrant Societies: Herder’s Heritage and the Boundary-making Approach,” in Marko Valenta, Sabrina P. Ramet (eds), The Bosnian Diaspora, Surrey, Burlington, Ashgate, 2011, p. 27.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 28.

12 Ibid., p. 29.

13 Halilovich Hariz, “Bosnian Global Villages: (Re)Construction of Trans-Local Communities in Diaspora,” in Dževada Šuško (ed.), Both Muslim and European: Diasporic and Migrant Identities of Bosniaks, Leiden, Brill, 2019, p. 183-196.

14 For more information on the links between migration, diaspora, and Bosniak identity, see Bougarel Xavier, “The Diasporic Experience as Opportunity and Challenge for the Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks,” in Dževada Šuško (ed.), Both Muslim and European: Diasporic and Migrant Identities of Bosniaks, Leiden, Brill, 2019, p. 57-69.

15 Ekmečić Fadil, Bosna u Francuskoj od najstarijih dana do 1994 [Bosnia in France from the oldest times until 1994], Paris, Librairie Ekmečić, s.a., p. 41-44.

16 Ibid., p. 45. Fadil Ekmečić made a list of the most influential Bosniaks who lived in France with short biographical information. See ibid., p. 183-216.

17 Ibid., p. 50.

18 Ibid., p. 57-58.

19 Madelain Anne, L’expérience française des Balkans, Tours, Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2019.

20 Behloul states this as well for the Bosniak community in Swirtzerland; cf. Behloul Samuel M., “Religion or Culture? The Public Relations and Self-presentation Strategies of Bosnian Muslims in Switzerland Compared with other Muslims,” in Marko Valenta, Sabrina P. Ramet (eds), The Bosnian Diaspora, Surrey, Burlington, Ashgate, 2011, p. 301-318 (310).

21 Ekmečić, Bosna…, op. cit., p. 46.

22 Halilovich Hariz, “(Per)forming ‘Trans-local’ Homes: Bosnian Diaspora in Australia,” in Marko Valenta, Sabrina P. Ramet (eds), The Bosnian Diaspora, Surrey, Burlington, Ashgate, 2011, p. 63-81 (63).

23 INSEE [Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques], Population immigrée et étrangère en France, 29 August 2024, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2381757.

24 Statista, “L’islam en France ‒ Faits et chiffres,” 13 December 2023, https://fr.statista.com/themes/6482/l-islam-en-france/#topicOverview; Pew Research estimated in 2016 that 5,7 million Muslims live in France (8,8%).

25 Jalila Sbaï, “Les racines coloniales de la politique française à l’égard de l’islam,” Orient XXI. Le journal de référence du monde arabe et musulman, 16 August 2016, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/les-racines-coloniales-de-la-politique-francaise-a-l-egard-de-l-islam,1426.

26 Behloul, “Religion or Culture?” op. cit., p. 301.

27 Bougarel Xavier, “The Role of Balkan Muslims in Building a European Islam,” European Policy Center EPC Issue Paper, no 43, 2005.

28 Behloul, “Religion or Culture?” op. cit., p. 306.

29 Valenta Marko, Ramet Sabrina P., “Bosnian Migrants: An Introduction,” in Marko Valenta, Sabrina P. Ramet (eds), The Bosnian Diaspora, Surrey, Burlington, Ashgate, 2011, p. 1-23 (10).

30 Halilovich, “(Per)forming ‘Trans-local’ Homes,” op. cit., p. 73.

31 Ramet Sabrina P., Valenta Marko, “Changing Places, Changing Identities: A Conclusion,” in Marko Valenta, Sabrina P. Ramet (eds), The Bosnian Diaspora, Surrey, Burlington, Ashgate, 2011, p. 325.

32 Ibid.

33 The legal framework of the 1905 law asserts the neutrality of the state when it comes to accommodating religious diversity in the public space. Prohibitions of religious symbols due to the principle of secularism and neutrality came with laws adopted a hundred years later. See Bauberot Jean, Histoire de la laïcité en France, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2000. Headscarf-wearing women, however, claim that the headscarf is not a religious symbol but a religious practice. There are some private companies where the employer does not mind employing women who wear a headscarf. Nonetheless, the structural discrimination against these women remains. See Benaïssa Hicham, Le travail et l’islam. Généalogie d’une problématique, Vulaines-sur-Seine, Éditions du Croquant, 2020.

34 Ulram Peter A., Integration in Österreich, Vienna, GfK Austria on behalf of Ministry of Interior Affairs of Austria, 2009, p  4, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 35.

35 Šehagić Merima, “The West, the Balkans and the In-Between: Bosnian Muslims Representing a European Islam,” in František Šistek (ed.), Imagining Bosnian Muslims in Central Europe: Representations, Transfers and Exchanges, New York, Berghahn, 2021, p. 226-232.

36 Duraković Alen, “Bosniaks of the Balkans – European Muslims in Switzerland,” in Dževada Šuško (ed.), Both Muslim and European: Diasporic and Migrant Identities of Bosniaks, Leiden, Brill, 2019, p. 73-85; Behloul, “Religion or Culture?” op. cit.

37 Alibašić Ahmet, “The Profile of Bosnian Islam and What West European Muslims Could Benefit from It,” Lecture at Bosnischer Islam für Europa, Stuttgart Hohenheim, Akademie der Diözese Rottenburg-Stuttgart, 16-17 November 2007. This faculty has been training imams for about 150 years and has a curriculum which has been applied at other faculties, such as in Tübingen, Germany.

38 Pravilnik o organiziranju Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini u dijaspori [Regulations on the Organization of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Diaspora], 23 December 2017. The regulation contains, among others, the following provisions: All organs of the Islamic Community in the diaspora must abide by the Statute and all other regulations of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the practice of Islam must be according to the Hanafi legal school and Maturidi theology; the visual identity must include the logo of the Islamic Community; the organizational units in the diaspora consist of an umbrella association and the local congregations (jamaat); the diasporic communities are obliged to respect the legal system of the state; all jamaats need to have the same standardized statute; the imams need to have a working permit from the grand mufti.

39 Before France introduced the separation of church and state (laïcité) in 1905, the Concordat was in effect. This 1801 agreement between the Vatican and France recognized four religious traditions: Catholicism, Lutheranism, Reformed Christianity, and Judaism. The 1905 law on the separation of church and state abrogated the Concordat, but it remained in force in Alsace-Moselle due to its annexation by Germany at the time. Even after Alsace-Moselle was returned to France, the French concept of laïcité was not applied there. Under the Concordat, there is greater cooperation between the state and religious communities, including religious education in public schools, salaries for pastors, priests, and rabbis from the Interior Ministry, and the availability of theology studies at public universities.

40 There are many Bosniak theologians and imams who were named as sources of Islam. The following theologians and imams were repeatedly listed: Kenan Musić (Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo); Amar Bašić (imam in Sarajevo); Husein Čajlaković (imam in Zenica); Izet Čamdžić (chief imam in Zavidovići); Sulejman Bugari (previously imam in Sarajevo, now based Montenegro, and teaches at the madrasa in Podgorica); Muamer Zukorlić (former mufti in Sandžak, Serbia, deceased in 2021); Aljo Cikotić (imam in Travnik); and Halil Mehtić (Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Pedagogy in Zenica).

41 The following three online preachers were mentioned: Safet Kuduzović, Sejad Islamović, Elvedin Pezić.

42 The publishing house El Kalem was established in Sarajevo in 1973; it publishes books from various fields of Islamic studies, but also focuses on the cultural and spiritual heritage of Muslims in general, and particularly of Bosnian and Balkan Muslims.

43 Radio Bir was established in 2008 and the TV station in 2020. Both work under the name RTV Bir and have their studios in Sarajevo. It is a media platform through which the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina maintains contact and communication with the Muslim and Bosnian-Herzegovinian public. The program offers religious content (announcements of prayers, Qur’an recitations, lectures, etc.) as well as news and content on cultural heritage, health and lifestyle, and Islamic music (ilahije i kaside).

44 The journal Preporod has its offices in Sarajevo. The first issue was published in 1970. It is distributed throughout the entire area of the Islamic Community, both within Bosnia and Herzegovina and abroad. The intention of the bulletin is to offer the public all relevant information related to the work of the organs and institutions of the Islamic Community, its leaders, notices about events in the jamaats, majlises, and mufti offices, current affairs among Muslims, and other issues of interest to Islam and Muslims. It also provides information about current events in the Islamic world.

45 For example, in Paris this women’s section named itself “Mothers of Paris” (Majke Pariza), while in Strasbourg they named their group “Active Time” (Aktiv Asr). These women’s sections in different jamaats visit each other from time to time.

46 Halilovich, “(Per)forming ‘Trans-local’ Homes,” op. cit., p. 67.

47 While I was doing my research in the period from September 2022 to February 2023, the earthquake in Turkey and Syria happened. Many Bosniak mosques announced a call for donations on their social media sites and organized humanitarian aid in coordination with Turkish organisations.

48 Halilovich, “(Per)forming ‘Trans-local’ Homes,” op. cit., p. 64.

49 Glick Schiller Nina, Basch Linda, Blanc-Szanton Cristina, “Transnationalism: A New Analytical Framework for Understanding Migration,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 645, no 1, 1992, p. 1-24.

50 Jouanneau Solenne, Les imams de France: une autorité religieuse sous contrôle, Paris, Agone, 2013.

51 Behloul, “Religion or Culture?” op. cit., p. 306.

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Dževada Šuško, « Bosniak Diaspora as a Religious Minority in France »Balkanologie [En ligne], Vol. 19 n° 1 | 2024, mis en ligne le 30 juin 2024, consulté le 01 décembre 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/6138 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/12q7s

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Dževada Šuško

Sarajevo School of Science and Technology (SSST)
dzevada.susko[at]ssst.edu.ba

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