Navigation – Plan du site

AccueilNumérosVol. 19 n° 2DossierNote de recherche“In Our Hands: Nothing but the Ha...

Dossier
Note de recherche

“In Our Hands: Nothing but the Handle of the Frying Pan”: The Entanglement of Food in Nationalism and Communist Nostalgia Rhetoric in Contemporary Bulgaria

« Dans nos mains, rien que le manche de la poêle à frire » : l’intrication de l’alimentation dans le nationalisme et la rhétorique de la nostalgie du communisme dans la Bulgarie contemporaine
Albena Shkodrova

Résumés

Cette étude explore les intersections entre alimentation et identité nationale dans la Bulgarie contemporaine, en se concentrant sur les interactions entre les idéologies nationalistes et la nostalgie du passé communiste. Elle soutient que l’alimentation est activée comme une catégorie symbolique et opérationnelle puissante pour construire l’identité, reflétant et amplifiant des dynamiques politiques et économiques plus larges. Elle démontre que les discours nationalistes et nostalgiques, qui utilisent l’alimentation comme thématique, partagent une convergence thématique significative. Ils idéalisent l’ère socialiste sur la base de mythes tout en rejetant les valeurs libérales et ils partagent une rhétorique anti-européenne, des sentiments pro-poutiniens et anti-ukrainiens. L’étude met en lumière les mécanismes par lesquels des acteurs politiques et économiques exploitent les récits alimentaires pour promouvoir des idéologies clivantes.

Haut de page

Texte intégral

Bravo, bravo, bravo, Zhivkov,
You were truly great indeed,
Both a leader and a comic,
Fulfilling every need.
[…]

No more chats, no banquets grand,
No sweet treats to go around.
The good times vanished quietly,
Without us hearing a sound.
All the cheap stuff shipped abroad,
And what’s left in our hand?
Nothing but the handle of the frying pan!

Lyrics of a popular song by pop-folk singer Panko, 2003 [translated using AI]

  • 1 The author carried out this research as an independent researcher.
  • 2 Billig Michael, Banal Nationalism, London, Sage, 1995.
  • 3 Brubaker Rogers, Feischmidt Margit, Fox Jon, Grancea Liana, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethni (...)

1The link between food and national identity in Bulgaria has lately become increasingly prominent1. Drawing on Billig’s concept of “banal nationalism,”2 one could argue that the Bulgarian nation is being more and more frequently “flagged” through the imposition of ideology on everyday food practices. Much like ethnicity, national identity can be understood as a modality of experience – a way of thinking, acting, and speaking.3 In this context, it is activated through the universally relatable domain of food and its practices. Food thus becomes an operative category of identity, imbued with political significance.

2This dynamic is unfolding against the backdrop of two intertwined political forces: a rising tide of nationalism and a nostalgic yearning for the communist past, often intertwined with pro-Russian sentiments. These forces, while seemingly at odds, consistently intermingle in surprising ways. How, then, can we theorize their ascent and entanglement, especially given that nationalism is not typically associated with support for foreign powers? And, crucially, are we, as scientists, supposed to assess the moral dimensions of these intersecting currents, and if so, how?

3The perception of food practices as a marker of national identity is, of course, a complex and multifaceted phenomenon shaped by various historical and social factors. Both the study of nationalism and cultural food studies offer well-established frameworks for understanding this. Group identities, as explored in both fields, often serve a dual function: they promote inclusion among members while excluding outsiders. National cuisines are particularly potent in this regard, as they simultaneously unite people through their everyday practices and create boundaries and hierarchies within societies.

  • 4 Ferguson Priscilla Parkhurst, Accounting for Taste: The Triumph of French Cuisine, Chicago, Univers (...)

4Priscilla Ferguson’s study of France offers a compelling example of how food became a key pillar of national identity, both unifying the French people and providing a subtle avenue for a sense of superiority. Ferguson emphasises the unique power of French cuisine as a national symbol, rooted in its deep integration into daily life – unlike more formal symbols such as Bastille Day or “La Marseillaise.”4 Her research traces the evolution of French cuisine over a turbulent century marked by political, social, and cultural revolutions, with influential texts by professional chefs playing a pivotal role in shaping this culinary identity.

  • 5 Montanari Massimo, Italian Identity in the Kitchen, or, Food and the Nation, New York, Columbia Uni (...)

5By contrast, Massimo Montanari details a different trajectory in Italy, where the development of national cuisine was significantly shaped by the Italian diasporas of the late nineteenth century, whose consciousness of national cuisine formed in opposition to the foreign cultural contexts. This process was then further consolidated by the publication of Pellegrino Artusi’s La scienza in cucina e l’arte di mangiar bene [The science of cooking and the art of eating well] in 1891. Artusi’s cookbook, which grew into a collaborative effort through contributions from women readers, represents a more grassroots and participatory approach to crafting a national culinary identity.5

  • 6 Appadurai Arjun, “How to Make a National Cuisine: Cookbooks in Contemporary India,” Comparative Stu (...)

6Similarly, Arjun Appadurai’s study of India highlights how the concept of a national cuisine emerged through the promotion of regional dishes in cookbooks authored by women in the mid-twentieth century. Appadurai argues that “the idea of ‘Indian’ cuisine has emerged because of, rather than despite, the increasing articulation of regional and ethnic cuisines.”6 He emphasises that regional inflections and national standardisation interacted dialectically, with national and regional culinary identities mutually enriching and shaping one another.

  • 7 Notaker Henry, “Cookery and Ideology in the Third Reich,” Food and History, vol. 6, no 1, 2008, p. (...)
  • 8 Helstosky Carol, “Recipe for the Nation: Reading Italian History through La Scienza in Cucina and L (...)
  • 9 Shkodrova Albena, Communist Gourmet. The Curious History of Food in the People’s Republic of Bulgar (...)

7The three examples above reveal an organic process in the formation of national cuisine constructs. However, there are also well-known instances of top-down interventions, particularly in cases where authoritarian regimes have played a key role in shaping national food practices. In Germany, under Hitler’s rule, food was tightly controlled and national cuisine manipulated to reflect ideological goals. Henry Notaker describes how food advice was permeated with “official thinking,” where the idea of a national cuisine was reshaped to align with state-driven guidelines on nutrition and consumption, serving the broader goals of the national economy.7 Similarly, Carol Helstosky’s examination of Italy under Mussolini highlights how the Futurists’ campaign against “xenomania” – the influence of foreign foods – reflected fascist autarky and an effort to purify the national diet.8 My research unearthed similar tendencies in state-controlled cookbooks from early communist Bulgaria in the 1950s, which tried to purge Western European influences, alongside top-down efforts in the following decade to shape the national cuisine as predominantly rural.9

  • 10 Garth Hanna, “‘They Started to Make Variants’: The Impact of Nitza Villapol’s Cookbooks and Televis (...)

8Manipulation of food practices could also come from below, as populations adapted to the material conditions imposed by oppressive regimes. In Cuba, as Hanna Garth shows, the culinary advice of chef Nitza Villapol became a subtle tool for promoting state policies, urging households to adjust their cooking practices in line with the political system.10

  • 11 Spencer Philip, Wollman Howard, “14. Good and Bad Nationalisms,” in Philip Spencer, Howard Wollman (...)
  • 12 Nairn Tom, Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited, London, Verso, 1977, p. 347-348.

9Thus, the “flagging” of national cuisine as an expression of national identity can be understood both in normative and ideological terms. This process reflects “positive” social forces, emphasising the unifying role of national cuisine, as well as “negative” forces, which stress its capacity to distinguish one national group as superior in its food culture, politics, or social practices. The debate surrounding “positive” and “negative” nationalism is longstanding in social sciences. Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman critique the idea of such clear-cut dichotomies, arguing that these distinctions rarely exist in practice and cautioning against treating theoretical divisions as real.11 Meanwhile, Tom Nairn asserts that all nationalisms possess both “healthy” and “morbid” elements simultaneously.12

  • 13 Moore Margaret, The Ethics of Nationalism, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001.

10In Bulgaria, can we discern both “morbid” and “healthy” aspects in the ongoing process of national identity formation through food practices? Are these elements balanced, or does one dominate the other? More importantly, are such distinctions even relevant? Margaret Moore, when examining the ethics of nationalism, argues that national identities emerge from broad social and economic shifts, making these categories both politically significant and personally meaningful. She contends that political elites play a key role in fostering nationalism by shaping the context in which it flourishes.13 This perspective shifts the focus from questions of morality to those of circumstance and context. So, what can the entanglement of Bulgarian food with contemporary ideological discourses tell us? Can we meaningfully distinguish between morbid and healthy elements, and how does this distinction matter?

  • 14 Borras Saturnino M. Jr., “Understanding and Subverting Contemporary Right-Wing Populism: Preliminar (...)
  • 15 Mamonova Natalia, Franquesa Jaume, “Right-Wing Populism in Rural Europe. Introduction to the Specia (...)
  • 16 Borras, “Understanding and Subverting...,” op. cit.
  • 17 Greven Thomas, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States. A Comparative Persp (...)
  • 18 Hajdu, Mamonova, “Prospects of Agrarian Populism…,” op. cit.
  • 19 Mamonova, Franquesa, “Right-Wing Populism in Rural Europe,” op. cit., p. 703.

11Related to this conundrum is the ongoing discussion in rural studies on populism. These studies understand populism as “the deliberate political act of aggregating disparate and even competing and contradictory class and group interests and demands into a relatively homogenized voice, i.e., ‘us, the people’, against an ‘adversarial them’ for tactical or strategic political purposes.”14 Referring to the electoral support for right wing populist parties in the countryside, they seek to distinguish between progressive (left-wing) agrarian populism and regressive (right-wing) populism, the first examined as a possible alternative which could neutralize the second.15 Saturnino Borras described right-wing populism as a reactionary, conservative, and nationalist movement that upholds and defends capitalism in the name of “the people,” distinguishing it from progressive agrarian populism, which he described as a liberal and socially inclusive movement comprising various rural-oriented groups and classes that advocate for a “peasant way” as a sustainable alternative.16 However, scholars in rural studies were quick to admit the limitations of such classification. They argued that European populism does not come with uniform, clearly defined characteristics: it takes different forms depending on nationally specific factors such as political history, system, and culture.17 Moreover, case studies in Eastern Europe demonstrated the mismatch between the rhetoric and the agenda of progressive rural populism and the discourses of the rural population in Eastern Europe,18 which made it difficult for progressive rural populism to take root (it is certainly fully absent as a movement in contemporary Bulgaria). Finally, rural studies identified a dangerous overlap between the politics and rhetoric of right-wing populist parties and left-wing (green) parties and agrarian movements.19

  • 20 Borras, “Understanding and Subverting...,” op. cit.
  • 21 Mamonova, Franquesa, “Right-Wing Populism in Rural Europe,” op. cit., p. 703.
  • 22 Lubarda Balsa, “‘Homeland Farming’ or ‘Rural Emancipation’? The Discursive Overlap between Populist (...)

12Borras observes that, despite their ideological differences, both right-wing and agrarian populist movements similarly consolidate diverse class and group interests into a unified voice of “the people” positioned against a constructed “other.”20 This distinction becomes especially blurred in the European context, where right-wing politicians increasingly adopt agrarian rhetoric, expressing support for small-scale peasant farming, the localization of agri‑food systems, and sustainable development.21 Importantly, the idea of “food sovereignty” is dominant to all versions of populism. In his analysis of the discursive convergence between right-wing populists and green parties in Hungary, Balsa Lubarda illustrates how right-wing, nativist narratives make growing use of themes related to agriculture, rural development, and land. These themes are central to populist promises of liberating “the people” from malevolent “outsiders” – such as migrants, ethnic minorities, and Western influences – perceived to threaten Hungary’s traditional livelihoods and “authentic” national values. Lubarda concludes that the boundaries between right-wing populists and agrarian green parties are fluid and malleable, often transforming into one another.22 So how does the Bulgarian case fit the European and East European landscape of right-wing and progressive rural populism?

13The two prominent discourses that have emerged in Bulgaria’s sociopolitical landscape – the use of food as a symbol of national identity and food as a focal point for nostalgia towards communist times – have been propagated through a variety of channels. Those include public events, strategies employed by food producers, and a significant stream of information (often misinformation) circulating on social media. A study of social media in this context proves particularly revealing, exposing a web of surprisingly interconnected and far-reaching networks, clearly designed to maximise the dissemination of these discourses. However, as these networks often have affiliations with political parties, businesses, and individual politicians, their external polyvalence cannot be overlooked.

Cluster of Nationalistic Parties and Narratives

  • 23 Spasov Spas, “Изненадата на избори 2024: Коя е партияВеличие’, която влиза в парламента” [The Sur (...)

14The Bulgarian parliamentary elections of June 2024 brought three nationalist parties into the legislature: Vuzrazhdane [resurrection], which secured 13.78% of the vote; Ima Takuv Narod [such people exist] with 5.96%; and Velichie [greatness] with 4.65%. The communication strategies of these parties, particularly Vuzrazhdane and Velichie, have demonstrated striking similarities. Instead of relying on traditional media or paid advertising campaigns, they have utilised a series of interconnected Facebook pages, with content disseminated further via various social media platforms and messaging applications.23 These pages do not openly disclose their affiliations, and the creators often remain anonymous. Nevertheless, their alignment is clear through various forms of consistent support, including reposting content, political statements from the leaders, and specially recorded interviews with these politicians. The nationalist political parties alternate between rivalry and mutual support, a dynamic that is also reflected in the posts and comments across these social media outlets.

15This cluster supporting the nationalistic parties regularly attaches symbols of national belonging to commodities, including food. A notable feature of this network is the fusion of political and food-related populism, blending conservative ideas with direct business interests. This tight connection between political narratives and food-based populism reflects a broader trend of aligning ideological conservatism with economic strategies.

Cluster of Nostalgic Voices on Communist Life and Food

  • 24 Stoynev Veselin, “Nostalgiia po sotsa: kogato biletcheto ot 6 st. e vissha tsennost” [Nostalgia for (...)

16Another cluster is comprised of voices who are not centred on disseminating patriotic messages, but are focused on idealising the communist period, spreading simplified or outright false information. They portray communism as a consumer’s paradise, where products were authentic, affordable, and free of harmful additives, in stark contrast to modern times.24 These online outlets typically characterise communist-era food as “real,” implying that it was free from artificial chemicals, fertilisers, and other modern interventions. They also emphasise that the food of communist times was Bulgarian, in contrast to now, when the food markets are flooded by lower-quality imports.

  • 25 Ibid.

17The media has labelled the creators of similar websites and social media outlets as “Kremlin hybrids,” identifying them as internet trolls financed by Putin’s regime.25 Due to incomplete information regarding authorship or ownership, it is unclear which of these outlets represent grassroots sentiments and which may be part of the suspected Russian propaganda machine in Bulgaria. Some Facebook pages are administered by individuals with Russian names who indicate they live in Russia or include “Russia” in their account names. While business interests are evident behind some of the websites investigated here, the connections in others remain opaque. Nonetheless, the possibility of financial motivation remains a distinct, if less visible, factor in their operation.

18In the following sections, I explore these two clusters in greater depth, examining their visible links to financial interests, politicians, or parties, and the dominant discourses they propagate. However, it is important to note that the distinction between these clusters is often blurred. As we will see, the narratives promoted by these groups frequently converge, particularly when viewed retrospectively over time, further complicating the separation between nationalism and nostalgia in Bulgaria’s contemporary food-related discourses.

Cluster nationalism

19Velichie is the nationalist party most actively trying to influence the narrative around national cuisine. It entered Bulgarian politics during the October 2023 local elections, securing 40.51% of the vote in Vetrino, which gave them six out of 13 municipal seats. By the national parliamentary elections eight months later, Velichie had expanded significantly, winning 4.65% of the national vote and gaining representation in parliament.

  • 26 Zaprianov Yoan, “Vetrino People’s Republic: ‘Historical Park’ is getting armed,” Kapital, 30 April (...)

20The background and the nature of Velichie are shady and speak of financial fraud and involvement in paramilitary activities. Alongside its political work, Velichie has developed militarised units under the guise of a “sports club” called Pazitelite [the guardians] and Bulgarski Yunak [Bulgarian hero]. One of them functions like a private police force and the other offers military training including urban survival, building capture, and tactical retreats.26

  • 27 Zapryanov Yoan, “Khans and Pyramids: What Lies Behind the Historical Park Near Varna,” Kapital, Jun (...)
  • 28 National Assembly, Report of the Temporary Commission Investigating the Activities of Ivan Khotev i (...)

21One of the key figures in the party, Ivelin Mihaylov, is also the owner of The Historical Park, a themed attraction in Vetrino, often referred to as “Patriotic Disneyland.” A journalistic investigation revealed that the park was funded through a pyramid financial scheme involving 70 million BGN,27 prompting a parliamentary investigation. The findings implicated Mihaylov in financial fraud and alleged cooperation with Russian intelligence28 (see illustration 1).

Illustration 1. A photo from Ivelin Mihaylov’s Facebook page, republished by the Bulgarian daily newspaper Sega

Illustration 1. A photo from Ivelin Mihaylov’s Facebook page, republished by the Bulgarian daily newspaper Sega

22Mihaylov’s The Historical Park aims to recreate the lives of Thracians, Romans, and Bulgarians, offering an immersive experience that includes “authentic” historical cuisine. Visitors can sample dishes such as emmer wheat-based recipes, banitsa, and green cheese, among others. In seeking to legitimise its presentation of historical Bulgarian cuisine, the park’s website highlights the fact that its culinary team was trained by chefs from Tatarstan – a region believed to have historical ties to the Volga Bulgars, the ancient tribe that joined the Slavs in the Balkans to form the first Bulgarian kingdom in the nineth century.29 This narrative not only aims to reinforce the deep cultural roots of Bulgarian identity but also seeks to strengthen the perception of contemporary Bulgaria’s historical and cultural connectedness to former Soviet lands and history.

  • 30 Ibid.

23The website also suggests that Velichie’s leader has business interests extending beyond the park’s shop and restaurant. It mentions a parallel venture involving vegetable gardens near the village of Neofit Rilski, which supply the park’s restaurants.30 Additionally, the park markets related products such as wine, natural juices, craft beer, and lutenitsa, a popular Bulgarian relish made from roasted peppers and tomatoes. Thus, the historical food narrative is directly tied to immediate business interests.

  • 31 Numbers of followers quoted in this text reflect the situation as of mid-September 2024.
  • 32 According to information published on the website on 15 September 2024: https://www.horaotnaroda.bg (...)

24However, the food-related rhetoric in social networks associated with nationalist parties goes far beyond the single narrative of Bulgaria’s ancient origins. Their themes expand to include contemporary issues such as rural depopulation and the decline of livestock farming, alongside appeals for trade protectionism. This investigation has revealed so far two particularly prominent and interconnected channels in social media that disseminate such discourses: Zlatna Bulgaria [golden Bulgaria] (260,000 followers on Facebook, 141,500 followers on Instagram)31 and Hora ot Naroda [common people] (300 members on Facebook). Hora ot Naroda exists in two forms in the state register: as both a non-profit association and a commercial entity. The commercial entity owns stores under the same name in northeastern Bulgaria, maintains franchise agreements with traders in other parts of the country, and is currently developing a new form of collaboration called Partnership Stores.32 The two most visible public figures from this cluster are Galin Ivanov and Plamen Angelov. Together, they manage at least four Facebook pages, two websites, two TikTok accounts, one YouTube channel, a Facebook broadcast channel Zaedno za Bulgaria [together for Bulgaria], and an Instagram account (see illustration 2). The content posted on Zlatna Bulgaria’s Facebook page is reposted on Hora ot Naroda and spread further via the rest of the channels. The websites have different content, which is mainly related to the goods sold in the shops and to the shops themselves, but which also disseminates the same discourses.

Illustration 2. A list of social media accounts maintained by Hora ot Naroda, published on the website of the same name

Illustration 2. A list of social media accounts maintained by Hora ot Naroda, published on the website of the same name
  • 33 Angelov Plamen, “Video Interview s Ivelin Mihalylov,” [Video Interview with Ivelin Mihaylov], Faceb (...)
  • 34 For example, the post of Stefan Kostov, member of Hora ot Naroda’s Facebook page, from 4 September (...)

25The network expands further through the reposting of content by nationalist politicians, interviews with them, or their direct posts in the cluster’s channels. For example, the Facebook page Zlatna Bulgaria (presumably founded by Galin Ivanov) was initially registered on 20 February 2013, under the name Slavi Trifonov for President (referring to the leader of Ima takuv narod). It was renamed Zlatna Bulgaria on November 18, 2015. In the days leading up to the April 2024 elections, Zlatna Bulgaria, which is more or less a personal Facebook page of Galin Ivanov, supported the leader of Velichie, Ivelin Mihaylov, by reposting some of his statements and conducting an interview with him in a video posted on the page. Plamen Angelov also publishes videos promoting The Historical Park and the political figure of Mihaylov.33 Similarly, the Hora ot Naroda Facebook page features posts by other members, who regularly repost speeches by radically conservative politicians (like Boris Yachev, chairman of the party Conservative Bulgaria).34 While this description only scratches the surface of the many interconnected websites and social media outlets, it offers insight into this cluster’s mentality and the strategy used to spread these discourses – reposting content across linked sites created by the same individuals, artificially amplifying the visibility and perceived influence of their messages.

26The food-related discourses circulating on social media, particularly through pages associated with nationalist groups like Zlatna Bulgaria and Hora ot Naroda, reveal several recurring themes that shape their rhetoric. These themes intertwine appeals for a revival of invented traditions, an idealisation of rural life, and a nationalist resistance to globalisation and nostalgia for the socialist past. Together, these narratives offer a vision of what it means to be truly “Bulgarian,” using food as a central symbol of national identity and cultural purity.

  • 35 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Horata ZABRAVIHA istinskia vkus!” [People forgot the real taste!], Facebook, 3 Se (...)
  • 36 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Nishto ne mozhe da zameni vkusut na toplia selski hlyab ot edno vreme!” [Nothing (...)

27A prevalent narrative is the nostalgic longing for the “true taste” of the past, often associated with the socialist era. This rhetoric mourns the loss of authentic Bulgarian flavours, which, according to these accounts, have been replaced by artificial products and the unhealthy influences of contemporary life. Posts on these platforms frequently contrast childhood memories of homemade food with today’s reliance on processed, mass-produced goods. For example, Galin Ivanov posted on Zlatna Bulgaria about the disappearance of traditional foods like mekitsi (pieces of fried dough) and fresh sheep’s milk, which he fondly recalls from the countryside. He lamented that modern society is no longer fed by the cooking of grandmothers and has been conditioned to consume only “junk” food, arguing that a return to real Bulgarian cuisine would improve the nation’s health.35 Similarly, an August 2024 post features an image of homemade bread rolls with the caption, “Nothing can replace the taste of warm village bread from the old days,” evoking the socialist period as a time when such “authentic” foods were still part of daily life.36

28The theme of the nepodpravenia [“unadulterated”] Bulgarian taste is prominent in this cluster’s posts and perfectly aligns with the commercial niche targeted by Hora ot Naroda shops. Their website states: “Through us, you purchase food exclusively from Bulgarian producers. We guarantee the highest quality through constant inspections, as we believe that food sovereignty is crucial for both our health and our prosperous future. Shop here and experience the true, unadulterated Bulgarian taste!”37 In a post from 29 May 2024, Plamen Angelov announced that the greenhouses of Hora ot Naroda had expanded from one to five in just a year. He proudly highlighted the cultivation of 7,000 tomato plants from traditional Bulgarian varieties, claiming they absorb micro-elements from the soil that make people healthy and happy (see illustration 3).38 Such messages quickly frame Bulgaria’s culinary traditions, rooted in small-scale rural production, as superior to the foreign alternatives found in supermarkets today. They also position the goods sold in the shops of Hora ot Naroda as superior to the “junk” in the supermarkets.

Illustration 3. Galin Ivanov and Plamen Angelov from Hora ot Naroda displaying tomatoes harvested from their greenhouse

Illustration 3. Galin Ivanov and Plamen Angelov from Hora ot Naroda displaying tomatoes harvested from their greenhouse
  • 39 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Spokoistvieto na selo” [Tranquility in the countryside], Facebook, 2 September 20 (...)
  • 40 DJ 89, “Zhivot na selo ili zhivot v grada?” [Urban or rural life] (interview with Galin Ivanov,) re (...)

29This romanticisation of rural life extends beyond food and veers into the realm of antagonising rural and urban populations, portraying them as adversaries. The opposition between rural and urban life was first brought to the fore by socialist ideology, which viewed rural culture as backward and sought to urbanise and industrialise the countryside. This divide was further entrenched by the communist regime, which restricted free movement and settlement into cities, reinforcing the division in social hierarchies. Since the 1990s, however, this divide has begun to weaken as villages have been conceptualised as spaces of recreation. In this context, Galin Ivanov’s posts repeatedly emphasise the contrast between the perceived tranquillity of village life and the stress of urban living. In his narratives, the city symbolises a loss of connection to the land and traditional values, while the countryside is portrayed as a haven of peace and authenticity. In a video post on Zlatna Bulgaria, he criticised the noisy, hectic nature of city life, arguing that Bulgaria needs to return to its agricultural roots to restore the “peace of the Bulgarian soul.” According to him, rural life – where one can grow their own food, make their own wine and preserves, and enjoy a simpler, more self-sufficient existence – is key to national well-being.39 Another video featuring discussions about the choice between life in the village or life in the city made the case that urbanisation has led to societal decay. The speakers in the video argued that working in the city means paying rent and eating inferior supermarket food, whereas life in the village allows for self-reliance and a closer connection to nature. Galin Ivanov warned that losing the village means losing Bulgaria itself, suggesting that depopulation of rural areas is part of a broader strategy to undermine the nation’s strength and traditions.40

  • 41 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Kato bulgari tryabva da pazim i da pochitame bulgarskite traditsii” [As Bulgarian (...)
  • 42 Homepage of Hora ot Naroda, https://www.horahoraotnaroda.bg/m.
  • 43 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Zaedno v borbata za hranitelen suverenitet” [Together in the fight for food sover (...)
  • 44 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Zaedno za Bulgaria” [Together for Bulgaria], Facebook Reels, 13 August 2024, http (...)
  • 45 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Kak chuzhdite magazini zalugvat horata” [How foreign retail chains deceive people (...)
  • 46 Yakimova Milena, “Strah i propaganda” [Fear and Propaganda], Iztok-Zapad, 2022, p. 12.

30At the heart of these discussions is a deeply nationalist perspective, where Bulgaria is positioned in opposition to the forces of globalisation (see illustration 4). A recurrent theme across these social media pages is the idea that Bulgarians must protect their traditions, particularly in relation to food.41 There is a clear resistance to foreign influences, whether in the form of holidays, cultural practices, or food imports. In a post from August 2024, the administrators of Hora ot Naroda urged Bulgarians to preserve their customs and not allow foreign holidays and cultures to overtake their homeland. This message translates into direct calls for food sovereignty – a concept frequently invoked on these webpages, particularly when discussing the importance of supporting local producers. This idea is centrally featured on the webpage, connecting to the shops of Hora ot Naroda, whose homepage reads: “We guarantee the high quality of our goods through regular inspections because we believe that food sovereignty is essential both for our health and for our successful future.”42 The Facebook page reposts continuously the publications of Zlatna Bulgaria, in which the expression “regaining food sovereignty” is a constant refrain. Such posts regularly feature images of traditional Bulgarian foods, such as homemade sausages or fresh produce, accompanied by messages about the need to support Bulgarian farmers and protect the country’s food independence.43 For example, a casual post from August 2024 congratulates small Bulgarian producers for their role in the fight to “regain food sovereignty”; it features a video of a group of producers and tradesmen standing together, and the speaker concludes with the call “long live Bulgaria!”44 This rhetoric not only celebrates Bulgarian traditions but also frames the open market and foreign food store chains as a threat to national identity and wellbeing. As one example, a recent video by Zlatna Bulgaria is titled “How foreign retail chains deceive people,” and emphasises that the products sold in large stores are “not fit for consumption” and are “imitation products.”45 Such messages, which combine anti-European sentiments with anti-globalisation and xenophobia, align the rhetoric of this cluster to world populism, which has been very much centred on the idea that peoples should reinstate their sovereignty, of which they were robbed by the liberal elites and globalisation.46

Illustration 4. A video of Galin Ivanov from Zlatna Bulgaria and Hora ot Naroda, subtitled “Let’s Make Bulgaria Great Again!”

Illustration 4. A video of Galin Ivanov from Zlatna Bulgaria and Hora ot Naroda, subtitled “Let’s Make Bulgaria Great Again!”
  • 47 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Nie pomnim” [We remember], Facebook, 15 October 2023, https://www.facebook.com/ph (...)
  • 48 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Tova e polozhenieto v durzhavata” [This is the situation in the country], Faceboo (...)
  • 49 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Oruzhia za Ukraina ili vuzstanovyavane na hranitelnia suverenitet?” [Weapons for (...)
  • 50 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Da izprashtash oruzhie sreshtu durzhava, koyato te e osvobodila…” [To send weapon (...)

31Zlatna Bulgaria regularly promotes expansionist and nationalist ideas, often invoking historical grievances from a century ago. For instance, the page marked the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, signed on 27 November 1919, which stripped Bulgaria of territories acquired during World War I. The event was marked with a poster depicting Bulgaria’s borders before the Treaty, accompanied by the slogan, “We will not forget, we will not forgive.”47 Additionally, Zlatna Bulgaria frequently posts anti-Ukrainian messages, stoking resentment by contrasting the treatment of Ukrainian refugees with the hardships faced by Bulgarians, and portraying the arms support for Ukraine as national disgrace and a disastrous decision. One post compared luxurious accommodations, allegedly provided to Ukrainian refugees, with a dilapidated bungalow given to Bulgarians who lost their homes in fires, highlighting perceived inequities (see illustration 5).48 Another frames Bulgaria’s food sovereignty in opposition to Bulgaria’s support for Ukraine: “Weapons for Ukraine or the restoration of food sovereignty?” reads the title of a recorded conversation, posted recently on the Facebook page of Zlatna Bulgaria.49 Another one reads: “It is a national disgrace to send weapons against a country that liberated you from five centuries of oppression.”50

Illustration 5. A post from Zlatna Bulgaria with the caption: “Shelter for Ukrainian refugees (above). Shelter for Bulgarians whose homes have burned down”

Illustration 5. A post from Zlatna Bulgaria with the caption: “Shelter for Ukrainian refugees (above). Shelter for Bulgarians whose homes have burned down”

Cluster Nostalgia for the Communist Past

32The cluster of players distributing the message of strong nostalgia for the communist past acts as an echo chamber for idealised memories of socialism. In many cases, these nostalgic platforms overlap with pro-Russian and anti-Western sentiments, creating a multifaceted narrative that mixes longing for a simpler past with contemporary political grievances. Some of the leading voices in this cluster include Retro Museum, a Facebook page with 313,000 followers run by Tsvetan Atanasov, the owner of a private museum in Varna with the same name as the Facebook page. Other key platforms are Sotsnostalgiia (64,000 followers), a Facebook group focused on “sharing fond memories of socialism and discussions on current issues” that is moderated by Igor Serebryakov, listed as residing in Moscow, and a Facebook account named Bulgaria-Russia, which regularly posts pro-Russian content. The group shares around 35 posts daily, often featuring statements from Kostadin Kostadinov, a politician from the nationalist party Vuzrazhdane. His comments on Bulgarian history, especially regarding the positive role of Soviet presence in the past, or the greatness of Russia today, frequently appear in the feed. Another group, Retro Memories (66,000 followers), republishes content from Sotsnostalgiia. It also runs three websites: starokino.com, retro-bg.net, and senzacia-bg.com, although no administrators are named. They often repost content from the website BGSpomen.com (spomen means “reminiscence”). The Facebook page Memories of the People’s Republic (199,000 followers) is linked to a website of the same name, functioning as a media outlet with an editor-in-chief. Their posts are also often cross-published across various outlets in the cluster. A smaller group, Memories of the People’s Republic 2.0 (3,400 members), also re-shares Sotsnostalgiia’s content, particularly Kostadinov’s statements.

  • 51 “Prez socialisticheskia period v Bulgaria e imalo bezplatni zakuski za uchenitsite, osobeno za tezi (...)
  • 52 Sotsnostalgiia, “Lunch in a Soviet kindergarten, 1970,” 10 September 2024, https://padlet.com/alben (...)

33A key focus of this cluster is to depict food from the socialist era as high-quality, natural, and affordable. These claims are often bolstered by nostalgic imagery of children, evoking not only a longing for an imagined past but also for one’s own childhood, encouraging readers to project these memories onto the lives of their own children. For instance, Retro Museum posted an old advertisement featuring a child surrounded by jars of jam and fruit juices, accompanied by the caption, “This is what kids ate during socialism. Today, these things are only sold in ‘bio stores,’ and they don’t taste as good as they used to.” Similarly, Retro Memories shared the claim that during the socialist era, free meals were provided to students, especially those in primary school.51 Sotsnostalgiia posted an idyllic scene titled “Lunch in a Soviet kindergarten, 1970”.52

  • 53 Shkodrova, Communist Gourmet, op. cit., p. 1-32.
  • 54 “Kogato kiseloto mlyako beshe kiselo, a mlyakoto ot krava” [When yogurt was sour and milk came from (...)
  • 55 Spomeni ot Narodnata republika [Memories of the people’s republic], “A pomnite li Rodopa?” [Do you (...)

34The most popular items of food nostalgia include yogurt, meat products, and tomatoes, all celebrated as more natural and tastier during socialism, and much cheaper, all three claims being largely a myth.53 For example, Retro-BG.net published a short article titled “When Yogurt Was Sour and Milk Came from Cows,” which, despite its title, only makes two claims: that during socialism no one stole, and that Bulgaria’s dairy industry before 1989 was among the world’s leaders. The post concludes with a rhetorical question, “How much would this jar of yogurt cost in today’s ‘bio stores’?”54 Such posts often spark lively discussions and double as advertisements for the Retro Museum, complete with practical details about its location in Grand Mall Varna and its opening hours. However, in other outlets, the economic motive behind such posts is less transparent. As one example of their activity, Memories of the People’s Republic posted, “Remember ‘Rodopa’... Meat without dyes, sausages without preservatives, and frankfurters made from meat,” which was reposted by Sotsnostalgiia55 (see illustration 6).

Illustration 6. A post in Spomeni za Narodnata Republica (Memories of the People’s Republic)

Illustration 6. A post in Spomeni za Narodnata Republica (Memories of the People’s Republic)

The text reads: “Do you remember ‘Rodopa’… Meat without dyes, sausages without preservatives, and frankfurters made from real meat.”

  • 56 Vlaeva Tanja, “Spomeni ot SOCa: Vuv vseki zavod praveha banket za vseki golyam praznik” [In every f (...)
  • 57 Kirilov Kiril, “Kak vzemah 120 leva zaplata” [How I received a salary of 120 leva], posting in the (...)
  • 58 “Bulgarian Lev” is the name of the Bulgarian currency.

35Another recurring theme is the portrayal of socialism as a time of carefree living and affordable, even free, pleasures. Nostalgic references are made to the regular free banquets at factories and enterprises56 (see illustration 7) or the practice of going to a restaurant every week on an average salary (a claim quickly disputed by members of the group).57 Recently, this cluster reintroduced the 2003 song of pop-folk singer Panko, which portrays the Zhivkov era as one when Bulgarians lived “with just a few levs58 a year” and enjoyed endless banquets and free treats.

Illustration 7. An archival photo of a banquet, posted in Socnostalgiia

Illustration 7. An archival photo of a banquet, posted in Socnostalgiia

The caption reads: “In every factory, they held a banquet for every major holiday.”

  • 59 “Tseliiat sviat zhaduvashe za nashite plodove i zelenchutsi, a sega vnasiate boklutsi!” [The Whole (...)

36The cluster also celebrates the success of the socialist-era food industry, as illustrated by previous examples related to the meat industry (e.g., Rodopa) and dairy production. These topics are frequently paired with criticism of modern products, particularly imports, and the quality of goods in supermarkets. Supermarket chains like Kaufland and Lidl are sometimes singled out, with direct personal attacks on their executives, accusing them of arrogance towards their neighbours. Imported foods are often dismissed as “garbage.” For instance, Memories of the People’s Republic published a short, undated article titled “The Whole World Craved Our Fruits and Vegetables, and Now You Import Trash!” The article praises socialist industry while criticising today’s imports, attributing the sentiments to “Bay Tosho” – the informal and slightly mocking nickname for former communist leader Todor Zhivkov.59

  • 60 “Koshmarut na terorostite: nai-strashnite ruski oruzhiia” [The Terrorists’ Nightmare: Russia’s Most (...)

37In this cluster, the theme of food nostalgia is often intertwined with numerous pro-Russian posts. Some refer back to Soviet-era Russian culture, which was well known in Bulgaria (for example, mentions of once popular pop singer Alla Pugacheva). However, others focus on contemporary references, such as articles praising the superiority of Russian weaponry.60 These discourses, combined with the support for Kostadin Kostadinov, an openly pro-Russian politician, and with the evidence about the administration of some of these social media outlets from Moscow or by Russians, strengthen the legitimacy of the claims of massive trolling paid with Russian money in Bulgaria.

Discussion

38This ongoing research so far clearly suggests significant thematic overlap between the discourses of the two clusters – the nationalist and the nostalgic. Common themes include the romanticisation and beautification of the socialist period, portrayed as a time of lost prosperity; lamenting the disappearance of the “authentic” taste from the past; the decline in the quality of urban food; resentment towards imported products, often dismissed as “junk”; and, more broadly, anti-European rhetoric combined with anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian views.

39These discourses reflect criticism of the present, and their resonance is tied to Bulgaria’s real economic and political issues. The chaos in political life, the corruption, and the deepening economic stratification of society create a framework that drives segments of the population to look nostalgically to the past. There has been an actual collapse of Bulgarian agricultural production compared to the mid-1980s, when socialist agriculture was at one of its peaks. The decline in production of most of the staple products central to Bulgarian food practices has been dramatic, with a few exceptions. The production of most primary goods now stands at only 10-20% of the levels recorded in 1985 (see charts 1, 2, 3). The disappointment of the older generations, especially those from rural areas whose families were once involved in production, is understandable given the failure of contemporary political leadership to create conditions for restoring production, even with the support of European programs for agriculture and organic farming. Specifically in the realm of food, this societal stratification has also been particularly evident. Poorer segments cannot afford the increasingly expensive quality products and, unless they engage in personal farming or animal husbandry, tend to buy the cheapest available products on the market.

Chart 1. Bulgaria’s annual production of dry beans, tomatoes, chilies and peppers, and wine from 1960 to 2022

Chart 1. Bulgaria’s annual production of dry beans, tomatoes, chilies and peppers, and wine from 1960 to 2022

Figures are in thousands of tons.

Source: based on data from FAOSTAT, the statistical database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Chart 2. Bulgaria’s annual production of apples, apricots, cherries, peaches and nectarines, and watermelons from 1960 to 2022

Chart 2. Bulgaria’s annual production of apples, apricots, cherries, peaches and nectarines, and watermelons from 1960 to 2022

Figures are in thousands of tons.

Source: FAOSTAT statistical database

Chart 3. Bulgaria’s annual production of poultry and meat from 1960 to 2022

Chart 3. Bulgaria’s annual production of poultry and meat from 1960 to 2022

Figures are in thousands of tons.

Source: FAOSTAT statistical database.

  • 61 Ivanov Martin, Simeonova-Ganeva Ralitsa, Ganev Kaloyan, “Измерване на инфлацията в България от 1750 (...)
  • 62 Kabakchieva Petya, Komunisticheskite modernosti [The Communist Modernities], Sofia, Sofia Universti (...)
  • 63 Shkodrova, Communist Gourmet, op. cit., p. 1-32 on industry; p. 39-64 on canning industry in partic (...)

40Yet, much of the nostalgia is fuelled by widespread – and actively propagated – misconceptions. One of them is the myth of the “cheap life” of the past. A recent study by Martin Ivanov, Ralitsa Ganeva, and Kaloyan Ganev created a price index that allows us to compare the cost of living during socialism (or even earlier) with that of 2020. The researchers placed 10 basic food items, each one kilogram or one litre – bread, flour, sugar, milk, oil, wine, brandy, etc. – in a basket and calculated how much of these could be bought with the average salary during the “golden years of socialism” and how much in 2020. It turned out that during socialism, people could buy 14 shopping carts full of these goods, while in 2020, they could buy 22 carts. The study concluded that, in fact, Bulgarians have never lived more prosperously – neither during the “golden socialism” nor during the “golden capitalism” of the late 1930s and early 1940s.61 The study indicates that the average Bulgarian consumer has little substantial cause to yearn for the past and, except on a sentimental level, has suffered little from the crash of Bulgaria’s domestic production of food products. Moreover, the issue of social stratification, though very real, was certainly present under communism as well. While studies on this topic remain minimal, they suggest that even within the narrative of “everyone being poor back then,” by 1975, significant contrasts had emerged: 20% of the population lived without basic infrastructure (sewage, water, and in some cases, even electricity) and had little more than beds for furniture, while 10% not only lived in modern apartments with full sets of soft furniture but also owned cars.62 Similarly unsubstantiated are the claims of a well-developed communist food industry, which was underfunded, chaotic, slow to develop, and notoriously produced poor-quality food along with chronic shortages.63

  • 64 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR PARLIAMENTARIAN RESEARCH (NCPR), 30 godini ot 10 noemvri 1989. Prehodut v obsht (...)
  • 65 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR PARLIAMENTARIAN RESEARCH (NCPR), Natsionalnoto samosuznanie na bulgarite [The n (...)

41In general, there are many indications that nostalgia is more closely related to negative experiences in the present than to positive ones in the past. A 2019 study by the National Centre for Parliamentary Research (NCPR) found that 31.8% of Bulgarians believe life was better under Todor Zhivkov, with 19.7% preferring to live under his rule if given the choice. In contrast, only 21.2% think they are better off post-1989.64 A 2023 survey revealed that 32.6% would still choose the Zhivkov era over any other period in contemporary history. The strongest supporters are older adults (53% of those over 59), individuals with low educational attainment (60%), and those in extreme poverty (57%). The highest levels of nostalgia were found among rural residents (40%) and those in small towns (36%).65

  • 66 Ibid.

42Interestingly, the same study also noted that nostalgia for communism is particularly pronounced among individuals with nationalist-patriotic views.66 While nostalgia for socialism can be traced to the economic transformations and hardships experienced by generations of Bulgarians, the roots of nationalist sentiment are more elusive. Since World War II, Bulgaria has not experienced border changes, irredentist threats, or foreign aggression, aside from the overarching dominance of the Soviet Union during the communist period. Moreover, Bulgaria lacks large oppressed minorities abroad, which means that nationalist discourses of territorial expansion, as identified in this study, are not born from widely shared historical traumas among contemporary Bulgarians. Yet, these narratives gain momentum when linked to immediate, tangible concerns, amplifying their appeal in unexpected ways.

43Food, in particular, emerges as a potent – and therefore potentially dangerous – conduit for such radicalizing messages. As a symbol, it becomes loaded with meanings beyond culinary identities. The organization Hora ot Naroda, which bills itself as a “patriotic Bulgarian entity dedicated to restoring and elevating the Bulgarian state, nation, and culture,” deploys food imagery to channel these sentiments.

44From the perspective of nationalism theories, the fascinating element here is the strategic packaging of seemingly insignificant everyday themes with pressing societal grievances, creating a potent amalgamation that resonates widely. Through this bundling process, political players tap into public frustrations while concealing the self-serving motives and business interests often lurking beneath these messages.

  • 67 Stephens Bret, “A Party of Prigs and Pontificators Suffers a Humiliating Defeat,” The New York Time (...)

45The political players’ roles in this manipulation raises critical questions. Are they, as Moore has suggested, mainly setting the context that gives rise to nationalist sentiment? Or are they actively and deliberately misleading the public into embracing extreme and unhealthy ideologies for economic gain? If nationalism is a symptom rather than a cause, should we shift our focus from judging its moral value to understanding and managing the circumstances that make these messages resonate? This argument has been repeatedly presented as populism gains momentum across Europe and the United States. For example, after Donald Trump’s electoral victory, liberal democratic elites were accused of prioritizing “incessant moral condemnation” of Trump over articulating superior policy responses to valid public concerns. Their responsibility for the rise of populism was attributed to their “forcible imposition of bizarre cultural norms,” pushed through social engineering, and neglect of the population’s actual problems.67 Can we – and should we, as human beings and especially as researchers – refrain from applying moral judgment in analysing social events to bridge the growing gap in our divided societies?

46So far, studies of populism have retained normativity, even in terminology, labelling right-wing populism as “regressive” and left-wing as “progressive.” These terms generally reflect these ideologies’ support for or opposition to liberal democratic values. However, if such values are increasingly questioned or even rejected by half the global population, is it productive to discuss them in normative terms? Alternatively, should scholars abandon their moral judgments and avoid discussing populism in such terms? When considering whether any balance exists between the unhealthy and constructive elements in nationalistic discourses (on food, identity, or otherwise), it seems the conceptual framework needs re‑evaluation. We must first consider what “healthy” means: healthy for whom, for what purpose, and in what way?

  • 68 Hajdu, Mamonova, “Prospects of Agrarian Populism…,” op. cit., p. 890.
  • 69 Also observed by Hajdu, Mamonova, “Prospects of Agrarian Populism…,” op. cit.

47Hajdu and Mamonova’s analysis of progressive agrarian populism in Romania highlights the point that critiques of capitalism, globalized agriculture, and free trade agreements failed to resonate with rural populations. Disillusionment with the political system over the past 30 years has led to resentment toward the EU, particularly over liberal values related to LGBTQ and Roma rights. Rural communities perceive these values as threats, linking their concerns to populist victories like Brexit.68 The situation in Romania is similar to that in Bulgaria, albeit slightly more optimistic, as Romania has a progressive populist movement, even if it does not fully engage rural communities. In Bulgaria, no such movement exists, and the idea of food autonomy has been monopolized by right-wing populism. The rise of populist discourses on food and production is evidently shaped by history, circumstances, and well-documented processes like accelerated deindustrialization and de-agrarianisation, resulting in unemployment, out-migration, and a sense of abandonment among rural residents across the developed world.69 The retreat of the state under neoliberal capitalism and the crisis of representative democracies further exacerbate these feelings. Left-wing agrarian populism in Eastern Europe is trapped by historical associations. Progressive ideas continue to carry the stigma of the communist past, even as some post-communist societies yearn for greater state-provided social welfare, idealizing communism.

48Yet, both clusters of discourse in Bulgaria align their views on food with anti-democratic, pro-Putin, anti-human rights, and expansionist ideologies. The dissemination of these views is often motivated by business interests and economic power, bringing moral considerations to the forefront. This suggests a conscious agency where regressive right-wing ideas are exploited for profit. Such manipulations thrive on existing rural discourses but also actively distort them, often as part of an information war inspired by figures like Putin and Trump.

49Moreover, there is a structural issue with the form of national identity these discourses promote: they are driven by disappointment, fear, and despair, rather than constructive social energies. So should we move beyond normative frameworks while still seeking “healthy” elements within these narratives?

  • 70 Luhmann Niklas, “Globalization or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern Society?,” International (...)
  • 71 Luhmann, “Globalization...”, op. cit.

50Even if we consider liberal democratic values as temporary moral constructs, how can we observe the motivations, strategies, and mechanisms that aim to dismantle them without invoking moral judgment? On the other hand, as Luhmann noted, “we may continue with our habits and resort to moral claims that are as justified as ever. But who will hear these complaints and who can react to them, if society is not in control of itself?”70 He thought so because he thought that the world had grown too complex, with structural contingencies, unpredictable changes, and deeply interlinked dependencies. Centralized, objective planning had become ineffective, and causal analyses now varied depending on the observing systems.71 The notion of central guidance appears compromised. Yet, if Luhmann does not suggest that political elites, players, or voters should be absolved of their responsibilities due to the complexity of social and political issues, he is likely correct in implying that efforts to achieve universal consensus on values in a globalized world may be futile. His philosophy does not clarify the role or significance of our moral judgment, but it does, in a way, redirect our focus: toward adapting our democracies to our increasingly polycentric and multi-contextual societies.

Haut de page

Notes

1 The author carried out this research as an independent researcher.

2 Billig Michael, Banal Nationalism, London, Sage, 1995.

3 Brubaker Rogers, Feischmidt Margit, Fox Jon, Grancea Liana, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 207.

4 Ferguson Priscilla Parkhurst, Accounting for Taste: The Triumph of French Cuisine, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 20.

5 Montanari Massimo, Italian Identity in the Kitchen, or, Food and the Nation, New York, Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 48.

6 Appadurai Arjun, “How to Make a National Cuisine: Cookbooks in Contemporary India,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 30, no 1, 1988, p. 7, 22-23.

7 Notaker Henry, “Cookery and Ideology in the Third Reich,” Food and History, vol. 6, no 1, 2008, p. 81.

8 Helstosky Carol, “Recipe for the Nation: Reading Italian History through La Scienza in Cucina and La Cucina Futurista,” Food and Foodways, vol. 11, no 2-3, 2003, p. 129.

9 Shkodrova Albena, Communist Gourmet. The Curious History of Food in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, Budapest, CEU Press, 2021, p. 194-195.

10 Garth Hanna, “‘They Started to Make Variants’: The Impact of Nitza Villapol’s Cookbooks and Television Shows on Contemporary Cuban Cooking,” Food, Culture & Society, vol. 17, no 3, 2014, p. 373.

11 Spencer Philip, Wollman Howard, “14. Good and Bad Nationalisms,” in Philip Spencer, Howard Wollman (eds), Nations and Nationalism: A Reader, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2005, p. 197.

12 Nairn Tom, Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited, London, Verso, 1977, p. 347-348.

13 Moore Margaret, The Ethics of Nationalism, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001.

14 Borras Saturnino M. Jr., “Understanding and Subverting Contemporary Right-Wing Populism: Preliminary Notes from a Critical Agrarian Perspective,” paper presented at the ERPI 2018 International Conference Authoritarian Populism and the Rural World, 17-18 March 2018, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, online: https://www.tni.org/files/article-downloads/erpi_cp_47_borras.pdf (accessed in August 2024); Hajdu Anna, Mamonova Natalia, “Prospects of Agrarian Populism and Food Sovereignty Movement in Post-Socialist Romania,” Sociologia Ruralis, vol. 60, no 4, 2020, online: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12301.

15 Mamonova Natalia, Franquesa Jaume, “Right-Wing Populism in Rural Europe. Introduction to the Special Issue,” Sociologia Ruralis, vol. 60, no 4, 2020, online: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12306; Hajdu, Mamonova, “Prospects of Agrarian Populism…,” op. cit.; Calvário Rita, Desmarais Annette Aurélie, Azkarraga Joseba, “Solidarities from Below in the Making of Emancipatory Rural Politics: Insights from Food Sovereignty Struggles in the Basque Country,” Sociologia Ruralis, vol. 60, no 4, 2020, online: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12264.

16 Borras, “Understanding and Subverting...,” op. cit.

17 Greven Thomas, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States. A Comparative Perspective, Washington, DC, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2016, online: https://dc.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/RightwingPopulism.pdf (accessed in August 2024); Mamonova, Franquesa, “Right-Wing Populism in Rural Europe,” op. cit., p. 703.

18 Hajdu, Mamonova, “Prospects of Agrarian Populism…,” op. cit.

19 Mamonova, Franquesa, “Right-Wing Populism in Rural Europe,” op. cit., p. 703.

20 Borras, “Understanding and Subverting...,” op. cit.

21 Mamonova, Franquesa, “Right-Wing Populism in Rural Europe,” op. cit., p. 703.

22 Lubarda Balsa, “‘Homeland Farming’ or ‘Rural Emancipation’? The Discursive Overlap between Populist and Green Parties in Hungary,” Sociologia Ruralis, vol. 60, no 4, 2020, online: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12289.

23 Spasov Spas, “Изненадата на избори 2024: Коя е партияВеличие’, която влиза в парламента” [The Surprise of the 2024 Elections: Who Is Velichie Party entering the Parliament], Dnevnik, 9 June 2024, online: https://m.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2024/06/09/4635627_iznenadata_na_izbori_2024_koia_e_partiia_velichie/ (accessed in August 2024).

24 Stoynev Veselin, “Nostalgiia po sotsa: kogato biletcheto ot 6 st. e vissha tsennost” [Nostalgia for socialism: When a 6-stotinki ticket is a supreme value], Dеutsche Welle, 21 March 2023, online: https://www.dw.com/bg/nostalgia-po-soca-kogato-biletceto-ot-6-st-e-vissa-cennost/a-65057190 (accessed in August 2024).

25 Ibid.

26 Zaprianov Yoan, “Vetrino People’s Republic: ‘Historical Park’ is getting armed,” Kapital, 30 April 2024, online: https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2024/04/30/4620465_vetrinska_narodna_republika_istoricheski_park_se/ (accessed in August 2024).

27 Zapryanov Yoan, “Khans and Pyramids: What Lies Behind the Historical Park Near Varna,” Kapital, June 2019, online: https://www.capital.bg/specialni_izdaniia/kapital_gradove/2019/06/15/3915771_hanove_i_piramidi/?_gl=1*18gpeot*_ga*MjA4ODk3MzUyNy4xNzI0ODU2Mzg2*_ga_T1H9YLR9SR*MTcyNDg1NjM4Ni4xLjEuMTcyNDg1NzcyMS4wLjAuMA (accessed in August 2024).

28 National Assembly, Report of the Temporary Commission Investigating the Activities of Ivan Khotev in Vetrino, 2 August 2024; Zapryanov Yoan, “Report on the ‘Historical Park’: A Scam of 70 Million BGN and Links to Russian Agencies,” Kapital, 12 August 2024, online: https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2024/08/12/4662324_dokladut_za_istoricheski_park_izmama_za_70_mln_lv_i (accessed in August 2024).

29 Istoricheski park [historical park], https://ipark.bg/.

30 Ibid.

31 Numbers of followers quoted in this text reflect the situation as of mid-September 2024.

32 According to information published on the website on 15 September 2024: https://www.horaotnaroda.bg/obekti.

33 Angelov Plamen, “Video Interview s Ivelin Mihalylov,” [Video Interview with Ivelin Mihaylov], Facebook, 11 July 2023, https://www.facebook.com/100023490430368/videos/1456132081818406 (accessed in August 2024).

34 For example, the post of Stefan Kostov, member of Hora ot Naroda’s Facebook page, from 4 September 2024, https://www.facebook.com/groups/2162497577256067/permalink/2648940798611740/ (accessed in August 2024), which reposted a video by Boris Yachev, “Kak 1 miliard izteche v kanala” [How 1 Billion Got Wasted], Facebook, 2 September 2024.

35 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Horata ZABRAVIHA istinskia vkus!” [People forgot the real taste!], Facebook, 3 September 2024, https://www.facebook.com/GoldBulgaria7/videos/524044943614830 (accessed in August 2024).

36 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Nishto ne mozhe da zameni vkusut na toplia selski hlyab ot edno vreme!” [Nothing can replace the taste of warm village bread from the old days], reposted by Hora ot Naroda, Facebook, 17 August 2024, https://www.facebook.com/groups/2162497577256067/posts/2634026513436502/ (accessed in August 2024).

37 Homepage of the website Zlatna Bulgaria, https://www.horaotnaroda.bg/.

38 Angelov Plamen, Facebook post (video) from 3 April 2024: https://www.facebook.com/reel/955714609360677; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2452723928262817; https://www.tiktok.com/@edinaka_06/video/7353663928418766113 (accessed in August 2024).

39 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Spokoistvieto na selo” [Tranquility in the countryside], Facebook, 2 September 2024, https://www.facebook.com/GoldBulgaria7/videos/1578295515904885 (accessed in August 2024).

40 DJ 89, “Zhivot na selo ili zhivot v grada?” [Urban or rural life] (interview with Galin Ivanov,) reposted by Hora ot Naroda, Facebook, 11 August 2024, https://www.facebook.com/reel/842184851148434 (accessed in August 2024).

41 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Kato bulgari tryabva da pazim i da pochitame bulgarskite traditsii” [As Bulgarians, we must honour and preserve Bulgarian traditions], reposted by Hora ot Naroda, Facebook, 24 August 2024, https://www.facebook.com/groups/2162497577256067/permalink/2640049152834238 (accessed in August 2024).

42 Homepage of Hora ot Naroda, https://www.horahoraotnaroda.bg/m.

43 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Zaedno v borbata za hranitelen suverenitet” [Together in the fight for food sovereignty], Facebook Reels, 17 August 2024, https://fb.watch/x7yHgLVg5G/; Zlatna Bulgaria, “Chast ot proizvoditelite na magazinite Hora ot naroda zaedno shte si vurnem hranitelnia suverenitet” [Part of the producers in the stores Hora ot naroda - together we will reclaim our food sovereignty], Facebook Reels, 28 August 2024, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=saved&v=1167799621000870 (accessed in August 2024).

44 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Zaedno za Bulgaria” [Together for Bulgaria], Facebook Reels, 13 August 2024, https://www.facebook.com/reel/1223073242373811 (accessed in August 2024), reposted by Hora ot naroda, Facebook, 13 August 2024.

45 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Kak chuzhdite magazini zalugvat horata” [How foreign retail chains deceive people], 12 August 2024, https://fb.watch/xcSFtVIqG6/ (accessed in August 2024).

46 Yakimova Milena, “Strah i propaganda” [Fear and Propaganda], Iztok-Zapad, 2022, p. 12.

47 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Nie pomnim” [We remember], Facebook, 15 October 2023, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=723396536499101&set=a.406120584893366&type=3 (accessed in August 2024).

48 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Tova e polozhenieto v durzhavata” [This is the situation in the country], Facebook, 23 July 2024, https://www.facebook.com/GoldBulgaria7/posts/pfbid0pNcD7ScTKK25xwt6AvGXMY67iEW5DQCuyeBG4hZEki1hxx5LPp2pqiHtdrLAbgQYl (accessed in August 2024).

49 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Oruzhia za Ukraina ili vuzstanovyavane na hranitelnia suverenitet?” [Weapons for Ukraine or the restoration of food sovereignty?], Facebook Reels and TikTok, 3 June 2024, https://padlet.com/albenashkodrova/research-screenshots-gallery-3utpkve25yby08bj/wish/v3w8ZwvzvEABQN52 (the original post does not allow direct linking), https://www.tiktok.com/@goldenbulgaria/video/7376322742657862945 (accessed in August 2024).

50 Zlatna Bulgaria, “Da izprashtash oruzhie sreshtu durzhava, koyato te e osvobodila…” [To send weapons against the state, which liberated you…], Facebook, 4 November 2022, https://www.facebook.com/GoldBulgaria7/posts/pfbid02GuNvGGU3tGi9GJvv29bNVqgAGGcGAnhqjQLyFgN9jfbq4XcfeoLBY9TPt5CcdHSTl (accessed in August 2024).

51 “Prez socialisticheskia period v Bulgaria e imalo bezplatni zakuski za uchenitsite, osobeno za tezi v nachalnite klasove” [During the socialist period in Bulgaria, there were free snacks for students, especially for those in the primary grades], BGSpomen, reposted by Retro Memories on Facebook on 7 April 2024, https://www.bgspomen.com/2024/09/blog-post_41.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawFWT1NleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHZxyUbxmQX2zIBkBLy6V2Q1j9Ajm-X1IPDXy8d4Sar7VJBI1izrrRR7MaA_aem_sWD5ulmqVkbm8_1jC3RC9w (accessed in August 2024).

52 Sotsnostalgiia, “Lunch in a Soviet kindergarten, 1970,” 10 September 2024, https://padlet.com/albenashkodrova/research-screenshots-gallery-3utpkve25yby08bj/wish/J24jalgxzLJmW0A1 (screenshot of the post, the original post seems no longer available).

53 Shkodrova, Communist Gourmet, op. cit., p. 1-32.

54 “Kogato kiseloto mlyako beshe kiselo, a mlyakoto ot krava” [When yogurt was sour and milk came from cows], retro-bg.net, 7 December 2020, online: https://www.retro-bg.net/2020/12/blog-post_7.html (accessed in August 2024).

55 Spomeni ot Narodnata republika [Memories of the people’s republic], “A pomnite li Rodopa?” [Do you remember Rodopa?], Facebook, 4 September 2024, https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=811200374551860&set=a.477605851244649 (accessed in August 2024).

56 Vlaeva Tanja, “Spomeni ot SOCa: Vuv vseki zavod praveha banket za vseki golyam praznik” [In every factory each holiday was celebrated with a feast], posting in the group Sotsnostalgiia, Facebook, 7 September 2024, https://www.facebook.com/groups/348438555641398/permalink/1869975956820976 (accessed in August 2024).

57 Kirilov Kiril, “Kak vzemah 120 leva zaplata” [How I received a salary of 120 leva], posting in the group Sotsnostalgia, Facebook, 13 January 2025, https://www.facebook.com/share/1YSJTqMKiv/ (accessed in August 2024).

58 “Bulgarian Lev” is the name of the Bulgarian currency.

59 “Tseliiat sviat zhaduvashe za nashite plodove i zelenchutsi, a sega vnasiate boklutsi!” [The Whole World Craved Our Fruits and Vegetables, and Now You Import Trash!], socbg.com, undated, online: https://socbg.com/2022/01/целият-свят-жадуваше-за-нашите-плодов.html (accessed in August 2024).

60 “Koshmarut na terorostite: nai-strashnite ruski oruzhiia” [The Terrorists’ Nightmare: Russia’s Most Fearsome Weapons], socbg.com, undated, online: https://socbg.com/2020/02/кошмарът-на-терористите-най-страшнит.html (accessed in August 2024).

61 Ivanov Martin, Simeonova-Ganeva Ralitsa, Ganev Kaloyan, “Измерване на инфлацията в България от 1750 г. до днес” [Measuring Inflation in Bulgaria from 1750 to the Present Day], Yearly Conference of the Economic Faculty of Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, 13-15 December 2023, online: https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.29275.75045.

62 Kabakchieva Petya, Komunisticheskite modernosti [The Communist Modernities], Sofia, Sofia Universtiy St Kliment Ohridski Press, 2016, p. 210-212.

63 Shkodrova, Communist Gourmet, op. cit., p. 1-32 on industry; p. 39-64 on canning industry in particular.

64 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR PARLIAMENTARIAN RESEARCH (NCPR), 30 godini ot 10 noemvri 1989. Prehodut v obshtestvenite predstavi [30 years since 10 November 1989. Public perceptions of the transition period], 2019.

65 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR PARLIAMENTARIAN RESEARCH (NCPR), Natsionalnoto samosuznanie na bulgarite [The national self-perception among Bulgarians], 2023.

66 Ibid.

67 Stephens Bret, “A Party of Prigs and Pontificators Suffers a Humiliating Defeat,” The New York Times, 6 November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/06/opinion/donald-trump-defeat-democrats.html (accessed in August 2024).

68 Hajdu, Mamonova, “Prospects of Agrarian Populism…,” op. cit., p. 890.

69 Also observed by Hajdu, Mamonova, “Prospects of Agrarian Populism…,” op. cit.

70 Luhmann Niklas, “Globalization or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern Society?,” International Review of Sociology, vol. 7, no 1, 1997, p. 67-79, online: https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.1997.9971223; Hayles N. Katherine, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990.

71 Luhmann, “Globalization...”, op. cit.

Haut de page

Table des illustrations

Titre Illustration 1. A photo from Ivelin Mihaylov’s Facebook page, republished by the Bulgarian daily newspaper Sega
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-1.png
Fichier image/png, 1,8M
Titre Illustration 2. A list of social media accounts maintained by Hora ot Naroda, published on the website of the same name
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-2.png
Fichier image/png, 405k
Titre Illustration 3. Galin Ivanov and Plamen Angelov from Hora ot Naroda displaying tomatoes harvested from their greenhouse
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-3.png
Fichier image/png, 4,2M
Titre Illustration 4. A video of Galin Ivanov from Zlatna Bulgaria and Hora ot Naroda, subtitled “Let’s Make Bulgaria Great Again!”
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-4.png
Fichier image/png, 3,6M
Titre Illustration 5. A post from Zlatna Bulgaria with the caption: “Shelter for Ukrainian refugees (above). Shelter for Bulgarians whose homes have burned down”
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-5.png
Fichier image/png, 3,7M
Titre Illustration 6. A post in Spomeni za Narodnata Republica (Memories of the People’s Republic)
Légende The text reads: “Do you remember ‘Rodopa’… Meat without dyes, sausages without preservatives, and frankfurters made from real meat.”
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-6.png
Fichier image/png, 646k
Titre Illustration 7. An archival photo of a banquet, posted in Socnostalgiia
Légende The caption reads: “In every factory, they held a banquet for every major holiday.”
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-7.png
Fichier image/png, 696k
Titre Chart 1. Bulgaria’s annual production of dry beans, tomatoes, chilies and peppers, and wine from 1960 to 2022
Légende Figures are in thousands of tons.
Crédits Source: based on data from FAOSTAT, the statistical database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-8.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 83k
Titre Chart 2. Bulgaria’s annual production of apples, apricots, cherries, peaches and nectarines, and watermelons from 1960 to 2022
Légende Figures are in thousands of tons.
Crédits Source: FAOSTAT statistical database
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-9.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 99k
Titre Chart 3. Bulgaria’s annual production of poultry and meat from 1960 to 2022
Légende Figures are in thousands of tons.
Crédits Source: FAOSTAT statistical database.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/docannexe/image/6544/img-10.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 63k
Haut de page

Pour citer cet article

Référence électronique

Albena Shkodrova, « “In Our Hands: Nothing but the Handle of the Frying Pan”: The Entanglement of Food in Nationalism and Communist Nostalgia Rhetoric in Contemporary Bulgaria »Balkanologie [En ligne], Vol. 19 n° 2 | 2024, mis en ligne le 01 décembre 2024, consulté le 12 mai 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/6544 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/13war

Haut de page

Auteur

Albena Shkodrova

Leuven University
albena.shkodrova[at]gmail.com

Haut de page

Droits d’auteur

CC-BY-ND-4.0

Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY-ND 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

Haut de page
Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search