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Elements for a connected history of Eastern Orthodoxy, 14th-19th c.

Sultan’s Clergy: The Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople between Serbian communities and Ottoman Government, 1797‑1813

Le clergé du sultan : le Patriarcat orthodoxe de Constantinople entre les communautés serbes et le gouvernement ottoman, 1797‑1813
Yusuf Ziya Karabıçak

Résumés

Cet article est consacré aux activités du Patriarcat de Constantinople et de ses prélats en Serbie ottomane entre 1797 et 1813. Juste après la guerre ottomano-russo-autrichienne de 1787‑1792, le gouvernement ottoman a essayé de réformer l’organisation de la Serbie ottomane. Mon argument est que le Patriarcat a joué un rôle central dans ces efforts de réorganisation. Il a fait également partie intégrante des politiques ottomanes visant à composer avec les rebelles en 1804. L’accent mis sur le patriarcat nous permet de mieux évaluer le fonctionnement du pouvoir ottoman, la construction des relations sur le terrain et l’enchevêtrement entre religion, autorité et révolte.

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  • 1 See for example: Meriage 1978, pp. 421‑439; Paxton 1972; Vucinich 1982.
  • 2 See: Karal 1982; Börekçi 2001; Aslantaş 2007.
  • 3 The only exception to this focuses on a “Serbian” Orthodox Church which did not exist in the stric (...)

1Scholarship on the First Serbian Revolt (1804‑1813) managed to place the revolt in a wider international context and question the “nationalist” aspirations of the rebels already decades ago1. To this day, a number of scholars has tackled the Ottoman context of the revolt as well2. However, the involvement of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople in the developments in Serbia at the turn of the 19th century has been largely neglected3. Arguably, this was one of the most crucial contexts for the Serbian rebels. Moreover, the Patriarchate of Constantinople was also pivotal to how Ottoman officials in Istanbul related to the Orthodox populations in the Empire, Serbs included. This article proposes to explore the Patriarchate’s involvement in Serbia in the events leading to the Serbian revolt of 1804 and afterwards and argues that this institution was essential for Ottoman policies concerning Serbia and non-Muslim populations in general and vital for the Serbian communities’ relationship to the Sultan.

2To underline the Patriarchate’s crucial position, I would like to focus on three events. First, the creation of a Serbian militia in 1797 to help the governor of Belgrade, Hacı Mustafa Pasha defend the region against ousted janissaries and their protector, Pazvantoğlu Osman of Vidin. I believe this episode tells quite a lot about the Nizam‑ı Cedid program of Selim III and how it related to non-Muslim populations. The second event will be the mission of a metropolitan to Serbia in 1807, three years into the Serbian revolt and just after the start of an Ottoman-Russian War. This mission will underline how important the Patriarchate was in the functioning of Ottoman “soft power” and how the Patriarchate and its clergymen promoted their own aims and discourses while serving the Sultan. The third point will concern Ottoman efforts to negotiate with the Serbian rebels immediately after the end of the Ottoman-Russian War in 1812 and the use of clergymen in negotiations. I hope these discussions will demonstrate the integral role of the Patriarchate in Ottoman government and governance and will add a new element to debates about the Nizam‑ı Cedid.

Nizam‑ı Cedid in Belgrade

  • 4 BOA, HAT 23/1107, Undated.
  • 5 BOA, HAT 181/8201, Undated: “Kederimden dünden berü cevâb yazamadım Allah’a kaldı işimiz cenâb‑ı H (...)

3Selim III’s involvement in Belgrade started in the first year of his rule. The Ottoman-Russian-Austrian War was in its second year when Selim ascended to the throne. The region around Belgrade, called alternatively Sırp and Semendire sancağı by the Ottomans and pashalık of Belgrade by the Serbs, was one of the main theatres of the Ottoman-Austrian side of the war. Many Serbs fought in the Austrian armies; one Ottoman estimate puts the number to around forty thousand4. The most significant event during the Ottoman-Austrian War was the fall of Belgrade because it was used as a pretext by Selim III and his advisors to re‑shape how things were run in and around Belgrade. The document that informed Selim about the fall of Belgrade mentions that the castle was given to the Austrians (Nemçelüye virilmiş oldığı). The sultan was clearly taken aback by what happened: “I could not write a response since yesterday due to my grief. Our affairs are in the hands of God now. May he help us.”5

  • 6 Börekçi 2001, p. 28.

4The eruption of the French Revolution and the Ottoman alliance with Prussia forced Austria out of the war by accepting the status quo ante bellum. All territories controlled by Austrian armies, including Belgrade, were returned to the Ottomans. Following the war, for their “treason” of surrendering Belgrade without a fight, janissaries were ordered out of Belgrade never to return. Ebubekir Pasha was appointed as the guardian (muhafız) of Belgrade charged with settling the janissary problem and confiscating their property. Ebubekir Pasha did just that but Ottoman and Serbian observers agree that he used his new found power to usurp the emptied lands for himself and to continue to oppress the reaya6. Mehmed Efendi, an Ottoman inspector mandated to the region to report on the situation, was quite positive about the Serbs but warned about a possible uprising:

  • 7 BOA, HAT 1130/45046A, 1 Şaban 1207 (14 March 1793): “Sırb reâyâsı zâhiren sert görünüyor ancak gây (...)

The Serbian reaya looks hard on the surface but they are really serving the sublime state with obedience and submission. They take pride in their service to the sublime state. However, they do not have the power to suffer this kind of oppression, enmity and offence and they cannot tolerate it. If they are not spared and protected from oppression, it is conceivable that they will flee or revolt in a short time7.

  • 8 Zens 2002, p. 95.

5The Sultan and his advisors wanted to achieve three things in Serbia: The definitive expulsion of the janissaries, redistribution of the land to benefit the central treasury and the protection of the Serbian reaya. These aims were, no doubt, related to the Nizam‑I Cedid project. They were also aware that Serbia did not have direct connection to the capital and therefore Pazvantoğlu Osman of Vidin, even at this early date, could decide the fate of Serbia, and maybe even of the entire project. Thus, the first occupant of the guardianship of Belgrade after Ebubekir Pasha fell into disfavor was Şâşit Paşa, a man with close ties to Pazvantoğlu Osman of Vidin. He remained in this position only for a few months8. This may indicate a period of uncertainty at the start of the Sultan’s project. The next choice though of the Sultan and his advisors clearly underlines the intended aims of the capital. Şiniklizâde Hacı Mustafa of Filibe (Plovdiv) was no friend of Pazvantoğlu’s.

  • 9 Zens 2012, pp. 141‑142.
  • 10 BOA, C.AS 1149/51048, Evahir Şaban 1207 (3‑13 April 1793).
  • 11 Nenadović 1969, p. 14.
  • 12 Aslantaş 2007, p. 55.

6Robert Zens argued that Mustafa Pasha’s governorship of Belgrade was part of the Nizam‑ı Cedid (New Order) project. This way the Sultan and his advisers hoped to carve out this territory for the central administration and fight against the influence of many surrounding ayan in the vicinity9. Mustafa Pasha was a relatively untested outsider for Belgrade. Apart from a document where he was ordered to gather new (non-janissary) soldiers for the castle10, sources mention him either as the bina emini (construction superintendent) of the region11 or as a contractor for irad‑ı cedid (new revenue) treasury12. He was a good candidate for being an Istanbul-made man and thus loyal to the new project of the Sultan. And the references to his previous position in the sources bring together solutions to all the problems imagined in Istanbul: new non-janissary soldiers for Belgrade, new construction efforts which brought closer ties to the Serbs and a new treasury that was to benefit the capital.

  • 13 Nenadović 1969, pp. 14‑15.

7The circumstances of Mustafa Pasha’s appointment might allow us to broaden the limits of the Nizam‑ı Cedid to include non-Muslim populations. Matija Nenadović, a Serbian prota (archpriest) whose father was a knez, tells us that the new Pasha was a friend of his father Aleksa Nenadović. Aleksa was providing material for Mustafa who was tasked with the repair of the lower castle that the “Germans” set fire to during the war. He complained to the bina emini Mustafa that the janissaries and the yamaks (janissary auxiliaries) were going to come back with a decree from the Sultan. Mustafa asked him where he heard this and told him he could change it. Then he asked Aleksa to organize the Serbian knezes to petition the capital in his favor. In fifteen days, an order arrived making Mustafa the new guardian of Belgrade13. If we are to believe Matija Nenadović, what went on seems to be this: The Sultan and his advisors wanted to find a new solution to the problem of powerful and semi-independent local powerholders, but they were hesitant because they were not sure if centralist projects could win in Belgrade. They appointed the friend of Osman Pazvantoğlu, who was already making a name for himself as a powerful ayan and protector of janissaries who were kicked out of Belgrade. They found themselves not powerful enough to challenge such local interests. Then they got a petition from the non-Muslim leaders of the region and they decided to appoint the non-Muslims’ favorite, Mustafa, as muhafız. This makes non-Muslim support not only desirable but an inherent part of the Nizam‑ı Cedid project in Belgrade.

  • 14 Ranke 1853, p. 70.
  • 15 Zens 2012, p. 136.
  • 16 Zens 2002, p. 103.

8Overall, it seems the Serbian leaders were very happy with Mustafa Pasha, bestowing on him the nickname Serbian mother, Srpska majka14. However, as Zens pointed out Mustafa Pasha failed to “gain the support of the individuals who possessed military strength in the region.”15 This proved fatal in the end due to the increasing pressure from Osman Pazvantoğlu of Vidin. Pazvantoğlu supported the janissary exiles giving them men, resources and sanctuary and allowing them to organize constant raids into the pashalık of Belgrade16. In this atmosphere a somewhat radical step was taken in Serbia. A Serbian militia was founded to help the forces of Mustafa Pasha against these incursions.

  • 17 Nenadović 1969, pp. 34‑36.
  • 18 Nenadović 1969, p. 36.

9According to Matija Nenadović, Mustafa Pasha felt unable to raise enough men and resources to fight against constant incursions by the allies of Pazvantoğlu. So, he decided to raise the taxes even more, higher than what was set out in the imperial order. The knezes gathered together and had an audience with him. They proposed to him that instead of a tax raise, the Serbs should provide a militia for the Pasha which would fight together with his men and defend the pashalık from incursions17. Unfortunately, Nenadović did not remember when this happened: “I am sorry that I am unable to tell you in what year all this took place.”18 The Pasha agreed, criers were sent to every town and village to announce:

  • 19 Nenadović 1969, p. 36.

Hear, men! Whoever is a Serb and has not a long musket, two pistols, and a long knife, let him sell a cow and buy himself arms. This is the command of the noble vezir. Whoever does not obey shall receive fifty strokes of bastinado and pay fifty grosh fine. Hear and heed well, for this is the vezir’s command19!

  • 20 Nenadović 1969, p. 32.
  • 21 See: Zens 2004, pp. 159‑160; Zens 2002, p. 100; Zens 2012, pp. 138‑139.
  • 22 Nenadović 1969, p. 3.

10Nenadović tells this story after he explains how in 1800, Mustafa Pasha avenged the death of Ranko, the knez of Šabac who was killed by the allies of Pazvantoğlu in a raid20. This creates a confusion about the chronology of the foundation of the Serbian militia. In all his work, Robert Zens tells the story following Nenadović. Thus, he places the foundation of the militia around 1799-1800 without giving a date but placing it definitely after the failure of the siege of Vidin, an operation undertaken to deal with Pazvantoğlu once and for all21. If we accept this date and the account of Nenadović, the Serbian militia becomes only a defensive measure against Pazvantoğlu, although a very significant one. It also becomes a local measure that was decided between Hacı Mustafa Pasha and the Serbian knezes, later to be sanctioned by the Sublime Porte, although Nenadović would not say anything about this sanction. The problem is, Nenadović says he does not remember the exact date of when this happened, and he warns the reader at the beginning of his memoirs that “in my story do not look for historical accuracy, for I cannot here write down events in their due order but will write them whenever I recall them.”22 We cannot simply follow the order of things in Nenadović’s memoirs and hope that he wrote chronologically. The author warns us against this from the outset. We need to get help from Ottoman documents from Belgrade and Istanbul to have a better picture.

  • 23 Šabanović 1956, pp. 42‑43.
  • 24 Šabanović 1956, p. 43: “bu nîmet‑i celîlenin teşekküri zımnında biri birimize kefîl olarak cümlemi (...)

11Fortunately for us, we have the documents that mention the foundation of a Serbian militia. Hazim Šabanović has published a series of Ottoman documents related to the Serbian revolution. Among his selection there is a petition to the Sublime Porte by the knezes of Smederevo, Požarevac, Ćuprija, Jagodina, Kragujevac, Užice, Valjevo, Šabac (Böğürdelen), Rudnik, Sokol (Grocka), Požega (basically all the nâhiyes of the pashalık of Belgrade) dated 4 April 179723. It was originally written in Serbian, translated into Greek to be translated again into Ottoman Turkish. The knezes start by explaining that their revolt during the last war was not because of the “mischief in their nature” (fesâd‑ı tab‘ımızdan) but due to the yamaks and kabadayıs (brutes but also a reference to a janissary title, dayı) in Belgrade who treated them like captives rather than reâyâ, who were joined by the appointed governors in oppressing them. However, since the appointment of Mustafa Pasha they were very content and “in thanks for this great benefaction we become guarantors for each other, and we all guarantee to sacrifice our heads and lives in the service of the Sultan.”24 What they are promising is to provide men for the Pasha and the Empire whenever and wherever necessary:

  • 25 Šabanović 1956, p. 43: “sâkin oldığımız on iki nâhiyelerin her birinden hîn‑i hâcetde üçer yüz nef (...)

[w]e are guaranteeing and undertaking whenever necessary to provide three hundred riflemen from each one of the twelve nâhiyes that we inhabit, to each of which one hundred sekbân soldiers will be added by the aforementioned vizier in order to defend our borders from the mischief of rebels or to prove our presence and serve with loyalty and zeal in the way of the sultan of abundant sanctity wherever we are ordered to go if it becomes necessary for us to join battles and wars in other places25.

  • 26 Šabanović 1956, p. 44.
  • 27 BOA, HAT 180/8111 and 180/8111A. Undated.

12The telhis (summary) of the Grand Vizier of the same document brings in a crucial information: the petition was brought to the Sublime Porte by the Patriarchate. He mentions that the petition was given to the Patriarchate in its Serbian original26. This would mean, it was first translated into Greek in the Patriarchate, then to Ottoman Turkish probably by the Dragoman of the Divan. In the Ottoman archives in Istanbul we have the Greek translation of this petition dated 4 April 179727. Although the Ottoman Turkish translations in the Turkish State Archives are undated, the Greek version has the same date with Šabanović’s, with the possible difference of Gregorian and Julian calendars he might have ignored: 4 April in the Julian calendar would be 17 April in the Gregorian that we are using today.

  • 28 BOA, HAT 164/6809. Undated.

13Šabanović published the documents in chronological order, however some documents are undated. If we assume that he preserved the order he found the documents in, the next one in the book might be connected to the discussion we are having. It is the translation of an undated letter by the Patriarch and the Holy Synod and sent to the metropolitans of Užice and Belgrade. The letter informs the metropolitans that Filotinos (Filotimos?), the metropolitan of Samokov, was sent as exarchos to preach loyalty to Ottoman government. The document comes before another one dated 24 November 1797. Unfortunately, the document from the Istanbul archives mentioning the same event is also undated28.

  • 29 Šabanović 1956, p. 47.
  • 30 Zens 2012, p. 138.

14This discussion allows us to come up with new conclusions. First, it seems that the Serbian militia was founded sometime in 1797. It is before the campaign undertaken under the leadership of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha against Pazvantoğlu. It is before Pazvantoğlu was declared a traitor to the janissary corps by the Janissary Agha in 24 October 179729. Therefore, it is not about a desperate Hacı Mustafa Pasha who found himself pressured to the breaking point by his strong neighbor Pazvantoğlu Osman. It should be read from a more proactive and positive perspective. Hacı Mustafa Pasha is winning. Not only the regions under his governorship are prosperous once again, but also, he is to be appointed the governor of Rumelia in June 179730. However his lands are still troubled by bandits and allies of Pazvantoğlu who are increasing their pressure day by day. The protection of the increasing prosperity of the province depends on increasing the taxes and the number of men the Pasha could utilize. What Nenadović described is not a pasha who had lost the war and thus demanded more and more taxes, but a Pasha hopeful that he was about to win if only he could increase his fiscal and military capacity. In my opinion understanding the question in simply regional terms is a better perspective.

  • 31 Zens 2012, p. 138.
  • 32 Yaycıoğlu, 2016.

15If this is about Pazvantoğlu and the raids he financed continuously into the pashalık of Belgrade, this definitely is a defensive measure. The signatories of the petition say as much. However, bringing Pazvantoğlu into the picture opens new possibilities now. We know that Mustafa Pasha defeated Pazvantoglu’s men in Belgrade in mid‑1797, perhaps with the help of his new Serbian militia. He was just back from an appointment as the governor of Rumelia and he had the support of many other local Muslim magnates. In November 1797, he was to be reappointed to that post and tasked to march on Vidin31. Now, if we can assume that the Ottoman center was already planning to move against Pazvantoğlu by mid‑1797, would it not be possible to see the Serbian militia as partners in this endeavor? Would not the “partners of the Empire” to borrow the term from Ali Yaycıoğlu include the empire’s non-Muslims, Serbs in this case, as well32? This would allow us to link the pashalık of Belgrade to the imperial setting rather than seeing it as an isolated province that was caught in the power struggle between Pazvantoğlu and Mustafa Pasha.

16From the start the foundation of the Serbian militia was more than just about Serbia. The effort had to utilize a lot more than the resources in and around Belgrade to succeed. It was not enough for the knezes to convince their governor. They had to ask the Patriarch to convince the Ottoman government. Probably, at the same time, Mustafa Pasha was also going to write to the Sublime Porte. The knezes therefore had to write a petition to the Patriarchate, in Serbian which was going to be translated into Greek and submitted to the Sublime Porte to be translated again into Ottoman Turkish and given to the Grand Vizier and the Sultan. This link in between was not just a bureaucratic hassle, it was what made the whole effort legitimate for both sides. The creation of a militia, the promise to be loyal to the Ottoman Sultan, the promise to fight wherever the Sultan needed them was valid only with the involvement of the Patriarchate, the leader of the flock. These promises were not just on paper, they were taken very seriously. Some sources mention that the Ottomans invited the Serbs to join their war against the Russians in 1806 based on this promise.

17In short, the story of the Serbian militia seems to be this: Mustafa Pasha of Belgrade felt the need to expand his fiscal capacity in a time he felt hopeful of victory. The Serbs promised him armed men instead of taxes and getting his agreement, wrote to the Patriarchate. The Ottoman government was in a process of redefining its relationship to the non-Muslim populations of the Empire as part of the Nizam‑ı Cedid project and felt inclined to accept this as long as it became an empire-wide project even if at the level of a promise. For it to become empire-wide it had to become ecumenical. The Patriarchate did not just forward the Serbs’ petition to the Sublime Porte. It also blessed it by sending an exarchos to Belgrade and Užice after the petition was received by the government. The exarchos, the metropolitan of Samokov, reminded people of their subjection and loyalty to the Sultan at a time when they received a new power in the name of the Sultan. This was an ecumenical Ottoman moment. Nizam‑ı Cedid had a Christian side to it as well.

An Ecumenical Context for the First Serbian Revolt

  • 33 For an account of the siege and participants see: Zens 2004, pp. 134‑149.
  • 34 Börekçi 2001, pp. 36‑37.

18We know the dark end of this story. The siege of Vidin failed33. Even during the siege, the Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha allowed janissaries back to Ottoman Serbia hoping to separate them from Pazvantoğlu Osman34. This policy backfired creating instability in Serbia for years to come. Hacı Mustafa Pasha was left alone against his powerful rival and lost the war in the following years. He was cornered and lost Belgrade in  1801. By the end of September 1801, Mustafa Pasha had already understood that he had lost. He wrote a short missive to the Sultan:

  • 35 BOA, HAT 44/2213L, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1216 (25 September 1801): “Kazalarda olan müsellem voyvodalar (...)

Our voivodes in the districts no longer have any power. The chiefs of Belgrade appointed their own voivodes to Jagodina, Rudnik and Šabac with a salary of eighty gurush. They control the serdârs (rural police chiefs), they control the nâibs (deputy judges), they control the voivodes. May God help the poor! These are huge districts, they used to provide large amounts. But what can be done? The times necessitated this. We are about to remove our voivodes in other districts too. Order belongs to the victor. My Sultan it looks like we have no power left. My Sultan I pray for your favor for my safety35.

19The Sultan did not and could not protect the Pasha. Hacı Mustafa was executed by the janissaries in November. This initiated what is known as the “rule of the janissary dayıs” in Belgrade that culminated in the First Serbian Revolt of 1804.

  • 36 BOA, D. PSK 26/123,
  • 37 Petrovich 1982, p. 280.
  • 38 Nenadović 1969, p. 177.
  • 39 See: Petrovich 1982 and Nenadović 1969.

20In Serbia, more precisely in the Sırb of the Ottomans, there were two metropolitan sees, Belgrade and Užice. Belgrade had the larger jurisdiction. According to a metropolitan berat from 1774, the see of Belgrade included Smederevo, Požarevac, Ćuprija, Jagodina and Kragujevac36. When the revolt broke out Anthimos was metropolitan in Užice and Leontios in Belgrade. Anthimos is generally remembered as a meek person who did not attract much attention. After the outbreak of the revolt, he resettled in Šabac37. Nenadović relates that Anthimos was well‑liked as he supported the revolution: “It is true that he was a Greek, but he was a saintly man.”38 Unlike Anthimos, there is abundant information on Leontius who supported the janissary dayis when they controlled Belgrade, then supported the Serbs when they took over the castle and finally supported the Russians when Russian representatives arrived in Serbia during the war39. He fled to Austria when the rebellion finally ended. These two figures had to be involved in the local politics and find ways to survive in the turmoil brought by the collapse of the Ottoman order in Serbia and their experience is quite interesting. However, we will mostly focus here on other metropolitans that were sent to the region by the Patriarchate of Constantinople on specific missions.

  • 40 For example: BOA, HAT 275/16314A, Undated.
  • 41 For example: BOA, HAT 274/16134, Undated

21When asked by the Ottoman government to send someone to deliver the letters prepared by the Patriarch and sometimes by the Sublime Porte, the Patriarchate appointed a metropolitan from the region as exarchos to go to Niš or Vidin or sometimes into Serbia and meet with the metropolitans located there. In the archives, and all the way until March 1807, we also come across repeated occasions of the knezes and metropolitans of Belgrade and Užice petitioning the Patriarchate for its intercession with the Ottoman government on behalf of the Serbs40. Until the invasion of Wallachia and Moldavia by Russian armies in 1807, the princes of these two regions were also utilized for the delivery of Patriarchal letters41.

  • 42 Horace Sébastiani was French ambassador in Istanbul from May 1806 to April 1808.
  • 43 BOA, HAT 1356/54061, Undated: “Rum Patrikinin ayinlerince nush u pendi Boğdan voyvodasının nesâyih (...)

22In an undated document, which must be from late 1806 or early 1807 as it mentions the French ambassador to Constantinople Sébastiani’s advice42, we learn of a discussion about who to utilize for sending an advisory letter to the Serbs. Two candidates that were being discussed at the mansion of the Şeyhülislam were the prince of Moldavia and the Patriarch. It was decided that “the advice and admonition of the Rum patriarch according to their religion would be more useful and effectual than the advice of the voivode of Moldavia.”43 This second option was going to be entirely dismissed de facto anyway following the invasion of Wallachia and Moldavia by the Russian armies in the spring of 1807.

  • 44 Petrovich 1982, p. 119; Yakchitch 1917, p. 146.
  • 45 The Ottoman document is silent on the identity of the functionary, just noting him as a priest: “T (...)

23The examples of numerous missions sent by the Patriarchate in Serbia illustrate that it maintained the relationships and channels of negotiation between the Sublime Porte and the Serbian rebels. In November 1807, for example, the Serbs were promised autonomy by the Patriarch through his exarchos Auxentios who reached them via Vidin. In September 1808, the Serbs were invited to a parley in Vidin by the city’s metropolitan Dionysios44. I would like to focus on a mission that happened in early 1807 as we have access to the report of the metropolitan involved. This mission happened right after the start of the Ottoman-Russian War (1806‑1812). A previous agreement that was concluded in Istanbul with a representative of the Serbs, Petar Ičko, a prominent merchant of Macedonian origin, had been rejected by the Serbs in Serbia and the Ottoman center made a new effort at coming to an agreement by sending an Orthodox metropolitan, probably Auxentios of Vidin45.

  • 46 The document is introduced as “rahibin takriridir” (is the report of the priest) as noted in the p (...)
  • 47 BOA, HAT 134/5534A: “Ve’l‑yevm Rusya askeri Eflak ve Boğdanı zabt idüb İpsilandi’yi memleketine vo (...)

24Although the Serbian rebels decided to side with the Russians in the end, the report of this metropolitan is special in the possibilities it opens for the use of Ottoman language in dealing with a rebellion. The report, which was not a translation as far as it can be told46, uses a peculiar language to talk about an offer made by the Russians through a boyar called Manolaki sent by the Prince of Wallachia, Constantinos Ypsilantis. The metropolitan recounts that the boyar’s envoy told the leaders of the uprising that “at the moment Russian soldiers control Wallachia and Moldavia and they made Ypsilantis voivode to his country (memleket). If Karađorđe desires the independence of his nation (milletinin serbestiyeti) he should march towards Fethülislam with twenty thousand soldiers, a certain number of soldiers of Russia will come from Wallachia and join them.”47

25There are many ways for translating this document, especially the words millet translated as “nation” above, but which can also be understood as “people” or even as a “religious group” and serbestiyyet translated as “independence” above but which can also mean “autonomy,” “liberty” and “privilege.” However, I believe that the appropriate translation here is “independence of his nation.” The Ottoman Empire had been exposed to the ideas that emanated from the French Revolution at least since 1791. The idea of the independence of a people using the word serbestiyet had been in circulation in Ottoman Turkish and it was one of the main fears of post-Revolution monarchies in Europe, the Ottoman Empire included. The combination of the two, as national independence, in its pre‑Romantic version had been in use in Ottoman documents as a result of the threat posed to the Peloponnese after the Treaty of Compo Formio in October 1797, which left the Ionian Islands to Revolutionary France, thus making the Ottomans neighbor to the French Republic.

  • 48 Konortas 1998, pp. 227‑228.

26Auxentios was an ecumenical agent, as much as and probably more than he was an Ottoman agent. He was not just reporting what he saw but was also defending the interests of his institution. If we agree that he wrote the report, his use of the word millet and emphasis of serbestiyet becomes more significant. The autonomy of a region within the Patriarchate’s jurisdiction would have been a blow to the institution’s ecumenicity and also to its finances. Even if it became a region under Russian domination, the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople would have lost. This, the Patriarchate had experienced in 1783 with the loss of Crimea to Russia. When the Ottomans lost the Crimean Khanate to Catherine the Great, the Patriarchate lost the Metropolitanate of Gothia and Caffa48. Even if Auxentios did not write the Ottoman version of the document, the threat and the significance of the warning remain the same. Auxentios chose to define the issue as such, to alert the Ottoman government as well as the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople of the danger of secession. The Patriarchate was allied to the Ottoman center in the issue of the Serbian revolt.

Negotiating one last time: The end of the Revolt and the Patriarchate

  • 49 BOA, HAT 1110/44691, 3 Şevval 1227 (10 October 1812).

27When war with Russia ended and Russian soldiers started to pull out of Serbia, using Patriarchal agents was the first move of the Ottomans to come to terms with the remaining Serbs. A letter by Patriarch Ieremias IV, describes how the superintendent (nâzır) of Sofia, Mustafa Reşid Efendi, wrote to him explaining that the Serbs were anxious due to their “shameless acts until now” (şimdiye kadar vâki olan şenâatlerine mebnî) and that there was a chance that they would incline towards other powers. He asked the Patriarch to appoint a metropolitan or to choose one from the region that would be familiar with the ways and the language of the Serbs. The Patriarch explains that Mustafa Reşid Efendi had already sent advice to the Serbs but feared that his advice would be kept hidden by the leaders and not be read to the public. Reşid Efendi believed this would not be the case if the Patriarch wrote to them. Thus, he asked for a letter from him, that would make clear to the Serbs that their past deeds were forgiven. The Patriarch would sign this letter, stamp it with the stamp of the Patriarchate and make the members of the Holy Synod sign it as well. Then he would send the letter with a priest/monk (keşîş) to Niš. The Patriarch informed the Grand Vizier in the same letter that he had already received some knezes from Serbia about this issue and had sent a letter with them. He asked whether any news came from them before taking a new step49.

  • 50 BOA, HAT 1110/44691A, 21 Ramazan 1227 (28 September 1812).

28Attached was the original letter of Mustafa Reşid Efendi to Ieremias. In it, the superintendent of Sofia explained that waiting for a metropolitan from the Patriarchate would take some time, so he had tried to find someone to be quickly sent to the Serbs and iterated in the letter over his options. The metropolitan of Niš was familiar with Serbian ways and language, but he was old and bedridden. There was a priest called Miho(?) in Niš that knew the language (lisan-âşinâ) and was loyal (söz anlar). Although he could be trusted with the job, he was not a metropolitan and his word would not be as powerful as a metropolitan’s. The metropolitan of Sofia was loyal, but he was too old and did not know the language. The metropolitan of Plovdiv and Kyustendil was also found inadequate for the job, for reasons Mustafa Reşid does not elaborate on. The metropolitan of Samokov was chosen in the end as he was loyal, knew the language and had already done the job twice before. However, he was late in his reply and excused himself due to his old age and illness. Reşid Efendi had to turn to the Patriarch50.

29We know that this attempt failed to bring the desired results and the Ottomans mobilized an army against Serbia to ensure its submission. However, in the details they provide, these correspondences underline how integrated the Patriarchate had become to Ottoman efforts of using soft power. A local governor knows exactly what he wants in the religious representative for sending to Serbia: that he knows the Serbian language, that he is loyal, that he is a metropolitan and that he is not too old. The first thing that he can think of in order to ensure that Serbs don’t turn to other powers after Russia, is using the agents of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. It also underlines how local governors with full powers to deal with certain problems, did not have to apply to the capital for everything. Mustafa Reşid shops for a useful metropolitan in his region and writes to the Patriarch only after he fails. The Patriarch’s letter is widening our perspective to underline that the Serbs had already contacted him for a settlement and the Patriarch had already sent letters to Karađorđe. It seems everyone involved knew who the guarantor of a settlement would be.

  • 51 Belgradi Raşid, Tarih‑i vaka‑i hayretnüma Belgrâd ve Sırbistân, (Istanbul: Tatyos Dividciyan Matb (...)
  • 52 BOA, HAT 951/40859, Undated; BOA, HAT 952/40870, Undated; Börekçi 2001, p. 127.

30After the military operations ended in 1813, Belgrade was given to Süleyman Pasha as guardian and Miloš Obrenović, who was to dominate Serbian affairs for decades to come, was confirmed as the knez of Rudnik51. Serbs petitioned the Patriarchate pledging their loyalty and asking for the lift of the excommunication on them. This desire was granted by Sultan Mahmud II52. Once again, the Patriarchate proved to be the key node in the realization of Serbian submission, respected and utilized by both sides.

Conclusions

31This article focused on the involvement of the Patriarchate in Ottoman politics around the Serbian revolt. One of its key points was that the Patriarchate was not a tool, it was an ally. As an independent agent it followed its own logic and this logic was against the loss of an Ottoman territory. It could use the new meanings of the concepts such as millet and serbestiyet to underline the necessity of joint action. In this shared apprehension over the transformation of concepts, the Ottoman officials and the Patriarchate of Constantinople were tied in an alliance of interests.

32This alliance was already in formation from mid-18th century. Even without a risk over transformed concepts and new imaginations; the threat of Catholicism, the financial troubles of autocephalous churches and the desire to transform the governance of non-Muslim populations into a unified if not unitary imperial experience pushed the Patriarchate and the Ottoman governments into an alliance. This was shaped slowly, but surely, in Peć, in Ohrid, in Alexandria, in Antioch, in Jerusalem and in so many other places. The formation of this alliance made the Patriarchate truly ecumenical and brought about new opportunities.

33Linking local populations to the Ottoman capital was one of these two edged opportunities. It was a responsibility in that the Ottomans started expecting this in the last decades of the 18th century. It was a possibility, because it carved a larger space for the Patriarchate in Ottoman governance and provided it with leverage. The Nizam‑ı Cedid project, with its timid steps to change the position of non-Muslim populations came on top of it. Sultan Selim III and his kitchen cabinet was not at all unified in the desire for such a change; but conditions in the Empire gave reason to try measures for the better incorporation of Orthodox populations in different parts of the Empire to Ottoman governance. In Serbia, this would be through the foundation of a Serbian militia to assist not only the local governor, but also, at least theoretically and definitely as a legal obligation that was written down, to Ottoman armies wherever they would be. This came at the cost of increased local power. This power could be used to balance the power of magnates such as Pazvantoğlu although the Ottoman center failed in this regard. In the end, this local power laid the foundations for Serbian autonomy and, gradually, independence. The guarantor of the loyalty and submission to the Sultan of the reâyâ involved in such projects, was the Patriarchate.

  • 53 Nenadović 1969, p. 212.
  • 54 BOA, HAT 1132/45140, 21 Cemaziyelevvel 1230 (1 May 1815); HAT 1125/44966, 29 Cemaziyelevvel 1230 ( (...)

34I limited the discussion here to certain aspects of the Serbian experience between 1797 and 1813. The story of the complex of Serbia-Ottoman Empire-Patriarchate did not end there. A second revolt erupted in 1815 under Miloš Obrenović. Matija Nenadović, author of one of our sources, was conducting diplomacy as he did in 1804 and later. He met with Nedoba, former Russian representative in Belgrade, in Vienna during the Vienna Congress. He told him that “if something does not happen soon I too will go into Serbia to lead my brothers and a hundred men of the best families, sons or brothers, and take them to Stambul, swear to the Patriarch, and the Patriarch to the sultan that they will stay there as hostages, only that the oppression should cease.”53 Indeed, this had become a new aspect of the center’s relationship to the Serbs. Serbian knezes were sent to Istanbul as hostages as a guarantee of loyalty to the Sultan to be changed every few years. What is perhaps fitting is that they were held hostage by the Patriarch at Phanar54. The Patriarchate was the solid link between Orthodox populations and the Ottoman government. Or maybe, the Patriarchate was Ottoman government.

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Bibliographie

Aslantaş 2007 = Selim Aslantaş, Osmanlı’da Sırp İsyanları: 19. Yüzyılın Şafağında Balkanlar, İstanbul, Kitap Yayınevi, 2007.

Börekçi 2001 = Mehmet Çetin Börekçi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sırp Meselesi, İstanbul Kutup Yıldızı Yayınları, 2001.

Karal 1982 = Enver Ziya Karal, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising, 1807‑1812”, in Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), The First Serbian uprising, 1804‑1813, Boulder (CO), Social Science Monographs, 1982, pp. 207‑226.

Konortas 1998 = Paraskevas Konortas, Οθωμανικές θεωρήσεις για το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο- Βεράτια για τους προκαθήμενους της Μεγάλης Εκκλησίας 17ος- αρχές 20ού αιώνα, Athens, Alexandria Pub., 1998.

Meriage 1978 = Lawrence P. Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804‑1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern Question”, Slavic Review, vol. 37/3 (September 1978), pp. 421‑439.

Nenadović and Edwards 1969 = Prota Matija Nenadović and Lovett F. Edwards (eds), The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenadović, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969.

Paxton 1972 = Roger Viers Paxton, “Nationalism and Revolution: A Re‑examination of the Origins of the First Serbian Insurrection”, East European Quarterly 6/3 (1972), pp. 337‑362.

Petrovich 1982 = Michael B. Petrovich, “The Role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the First Serbian Uprising 1804‑1813”, in Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), The First Serbian uprising, 1804‑1813, Boulder (CO), Social Science Monographs, 1982, pp. 259‑302.

Ranke 1853 = Leopold von Ranke, Mrs. Alexander Kerr (trans.), The History of Servia and the Servian Revolution with a sketch of the Insurrection in Bosnia, London, Harrison and Sons, 1853.

Šabanović 1956 = Hazim Šabanović, Turski izvori o srpskoj revoluciji 1804, Belgrade, Istorisko društvo Narodne Republike Srbije, 1956.

Vucinich 1982 = Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), The First Serbian uprising, 1804‑1813, Boulder (CO), Social Science Monographs, 1982.

Yakchitch 1917 = Grégoire Yakchitch, L’Europe et la résurrection de la Serbie (1804‑1854), Paris, Hachette, 1917.

Yaycıoğlu 2016 = Ali Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the empire: the crisis of the Ottoman order in the Age of Revolutions, Stanford (CA), Stanford University Press, 2016.

Zens 2002 = Robert W. Zens, “Pasvanoglu Osman Pasha and the Pashalik of Belgrade, 1797‑1814”, International Journal of Turkish Studies 8/1‑2 (2002), pp. 88‑114.

Zens 2004 = Robert W. Zens, The Ayanlik and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin in the age of Ottoman social change, 1791‑1815, unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004).

Zens 2012 = Robert W. Zens, “In the Name of the Sultan: Hacı Mustafa Pasha of Belgrade and Ottoman Provincial Rule in the Late 18th Century”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 44/1 (February 2012), pp. 129‑146.

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Notes

1 See for example: Meriage 1978, pp. 421‑439; Paxton 1972; Vucinich 1982.

2 See: Karal 1982; Börekçi 2001; Aslantaş 2007.

3 The only exception to this focuses on a “Serbian” Orthodox Church which did not exist in the strict sense in Ottoman domains: Petrovich 1982.

4 BOA, HAT 23/1107, Undated.

5 BOA, HAT 181/8201, Undated: “Kederimden dünden berü cevâb yazamadım Allah’a kaldı işimiz cenâb‑ı Hakk imdâd eyleye.”

6 Börekçi 2001, p. 28.

7 BOA, HAT 1130/45046A, 1 Şaban 1207 (14 March 1793): “Sırb reâyâsı zâhiren sert görünüyor ancak gâyetle devlet‑i aliyyeye itâat ve inkıyâd ile hidmet itmek üzeredirler devlet‑i aliyyenin hidmeti ile iftihâr ideyorlar lâkin ol vechile zulm ve taaddî ve tecrîme tâkatları yokdur ve tahammmül idemezler fimâba‘d dest‑i mezâlimden vakî ve himâye olunmazlar ise az zamanda firâr iderler yâhud isyân itmeleri melhuzdur.”

8 Zens 2002, p. 95.

9 Zens 2012, pp. 141‑142.

10 BOA, C.AS 1149/51048, Evahir Şaban 1207 (3‑13 April 1793).

11 Nenadović 1969, p. 14.

12 Aslantaş 2007, p. 55.

13 Nenadović 1969, pp. 14‑15.

14 Ranke 1853, p. 70.

15 Zens 2012, p. 136.

16 Zens 2002, p. 103.

17 Nenadović 1969, pp. 34‑36.

18 Nenadović 1969, p. 36.

19 Nenadović 1969, p. 36.

20 Nenadović 1969, p. 32.

21 See: Zens 2004, pp. 159‑160; Zens 2002, p. 100; Zens 2012, pp. 138‑139.

22 Nenadović 1969, p. 3.

23 Šabanović 1956, pp. 42‑43.

24 Šabanović 1956, p. 43: “bu nîmet‑i celîlenin teşekküri zımnında biri birimize kefîl olarak cümlemiz hidmet‑i pâdişâhide fedâ‑yı bâş u câna müteahhid olub.”

25 Šabanović 1956, p. 43: “sâkin oldığımız on iki nâhiyelerin her birinden hîn‑i hâcetde üçer yüz nefer tüfengci ihrâc itmek ve her üç yüz nefere vezîr‑i müşârun ileyh tarafından yüzer sekbân neferâtı dahi terfîk olunarak hudûd ve sinurlarımızı şerr ü fesâd‑ı ‘ussâtdan muhafaza itmek veyâhut ahar tarafa varub cenk ü harbe mübâderetimiz iktizâ ider ise kanğı canibe me’muriyyetimiz irâde buyurılur ise derhâl isbât‑ı vücud ile uğur‑ı kerâmet-mevfur‑ı pâdişâhide cânsiperâne ve sâdıkâne hidmete tecviz‑i kusur etmemek üzere mütekeffil ve müteahhid oldığımıza.”

26 Šabanović 1956, p. 44.

27 BOA, HAT 180/8111 and 180/8111A. Undated.

28 BOA, HAT 164/6809. Undated.

29 Šabanović 1956, p. 47.

30 Zens 2012, p. 138.

31 Zens 2012, p. 138.

32 Yaycıoğlu, 2016.

33 For an account of the siege and participants see: Zens 2004, pp. 134‑149.

34 Börekçi 2001, pp. 36‑37.

35 BOA, HAT 44/2213L, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1216 (25 September 1801): “Kazalarda olan müsellem voyvodalarımızda iş kalmadı ve Yağodina ve Rudnik ve Çaçka kazalarına Belgrad serkerdeleri taraflarından mahiye seksan ğuruşla müsellem voyvodalar ta’yin itdirmişlerdir serdar kendülerinden nâ’ib kendülerinden müsellem voyvodalar dahi kendülerinden oldukda fukaraya cenab‑ı Hak imdad eyleye bunlar cesim kazalardır külliyetlu meblağ hasıl olur idi ancak çaresi nedir vakt‑i hal böyle iktiza eyledi ve bundan böyle sa’ir mahallerde olan voyvodalarımızı dahi kaldırmak üzereyiz hüküm ğalibindir sultanım vakt ü hale göre bizde nüfuz kalmadı heman halasımıza himmetleri niyazımdır sultanım.”

36 BOA, D. PSK 26/123,

37 Petrovich 1982, p. 280.

38 Nenadović 1969, p. 177.

39 See: Petrovich 1982 and Nenadović 1969.

40 For example: BOA, HAT 275/16314A, Undated.

41 For example: BOA, HAT 274/16134, Undated

42 Horace Sébastiani was French ambassador in Istanbul from May 1806 to April 1808.

43 BOA, HAT 1356/54061, Undated: “Rum Patrikinin ayinlerince nush u pendi Boğdan voyvodasının nesâyihinden ziyade müsemmir ve müessir olacağına.”

44 Petrovich 1982, p. 119; Yakchitch 1917, p. 146.

45 The Ottoman document is silent on the identity of the functionary, just noting him as a priest: “The report of a priest that was previously sent to Serbia.” (Bundan akdem Sırp canibine irsal olunan bir nefer rahibin takriridir) and “The report of the priest who was sent by the Patriarch to the Serbians and has returned.” (Patrik tarafından bundan akdem Sırplu tarafına gönderilub avdet eden rahibin takriridir). BOA, HAT 134/5534A, 5 Muharrem 1222 (15 March 1807). In November 1807, the metropolitan of Vidin, Auxentios, was to negotiate with the Serbs; it is not clear whether he was in Serbia in previous negotiations but in the absence of other information we can assume that the same person was involved: Petrovich 1982, p. 284.

46 The document is introduced as “rahibin takriridir” (is the report of the priest) as noted in the previous footnote, rather than as “rahibin takririnin tercemesidir” (is the translation of the report of the priest) which is the common way to introduce any translation to Ottoman language. This could mean that either the metropolitan himself prepared the document, or had a scribe who was able to produce Ottoman bureaucratic documents. BOA, HAT 134/5534A.

47 BOA, HAT 134/5534A: “Ve’l‑yevm Rusya askeri Eflak ve Boğdanı zabt idüb İpsilandi’yi memleketine voyvoda etdiler Kara Yorgi dahi milletinin serbestiyetini ister ise Fethülislam tarafına yirmi bin nefer asker ile gelse Eflak içinden bir mikdar Rusya askeri efraz ve gelub anlara ilhak olunacaktır.

48 Konortas 1998, pp. 227‑228.

49 BOA, HAT 1110/44691, 3 Şevval 1227 (10 October 1812).

50 BOA, HAT 1110/44691A, 21 Ramazan 1227 (28 September 1812).

51 Belgradi Raşid, Tarih‑i vaka‑i hayretnüma Belgrâd ve Sırbistân, (Istanbul: Tatyos Dividciyan Matbaası, 1291 [1874]), 7‑8; Aslantaş 2007, p. 154.

52 BOA, HAT 951/40859, Undated; BOA, HAT 952/40870, Undated; Börekçi 2001, p. 127.

53 Nenadović 1969, p. 212.

54 BOA, HAT 1132/45140, 21 Cemaziyelevvel 1230 (1 May 1815); HAT 1125/44966, 29 Cemaziyelevvel 1230 (9 May 1815).

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Référence électronique

Yusuf Ziya Karabıçak, « Sultan’s Clergy: The Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople between Serbian communities and Ottoman Government, 1797‑1813 »Bulletin de correspondance hellénique moderne et contemporain [En ligne], 2 | 2020, mis en ligne le 23 décembre 2020, consulté le 29 mars 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/bchmc/423 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/bchmc.423

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Yusuf Ziya Karabıçak

McGill University, EHESS

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