- 1 See for example Stavrou 1963. For such an appreciation dating back to the period in question see M (...)
- 2 Cf. the letters of Cyrillus of Jerusalem, Jakob and Ierotheus of Alexandria in the Archive of Noro (...)
1The traditional point of view on the Russian ideology towards the Orthodox East and the Balkans considers that Panslavism is at its core1. It also upholds that the heads of the Slavophilic movement and the Slavonic Committees implemented a policy directly stemming out of this ideology. Though this was the prevailing stream of thought in Russian political ideology between the 1850s and 1877, much less is known about another group, which aimed at the support of the Greeks. Up to the Crimean War (1853‑1856) the opposition between the Greeks and the Slavs in the Balkans was not as strong. There would often be prominent Russian individuals promoting cooperation between these two groups. For instance, the prominent Archimandrite of the Russian church in Athens, Antonin Kapustin (who would later become the chief of the Russian mission in Jerusalem), was one of the most passionate philhellenes of the middle of the 19th century. During his service in Constantinople from 1860 to 1865, he helped both Greeks and Slavs. In 1863, he insisted on awarding Stephanos Karatheodoris, one of the well‑known Greek intellectual and political figures in Constantinople, membership in a Russian order. Another great supporter of the Greek interests from the 1830s to the 1860s was Avraam Norov, a senator and the Minister of Education in Russia. He travelled to the Orthodox East several times, edited descriptions of his journeys, and had very close relations with the Patriarchs of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch. In addition, Norov wrote a series of notes addressed to the Russian government in support of the owners of estates2 on lands belonging to the Eastern churches in the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia whose income was being confiscated by their Prince Alexander Cuza.
- 3 This term qualifies the quest for Bulgarian ecclesiastical independence from the Constantinople ec (...)
- 4 Gerd 2003.
- 5 Petrov 1886.
- 6 Filaret 1886.
2After the Crimean War, however, the rise of the Bulgarian ecclesiastical question3 meant that the Russian government could not pursue its policy of indifference. Moreover, it is well known that Emperor Alexander II was a prominent supporter of the Bulgarian struggle for ecclesiastical and political independence. Nevertheless, even in those years, A.P Tolstoy, the general procurator of the Russian Holy Synod, was more inclined towards the Greeks and the patriarchate of Constantinople as being holders of the strict canonic positions4. The same ideas were shared by Archimandrite Petr Troitsky, the priest of the Russian church in Constantinople, who addressed this problem in a series of notes written towards the end of the 1850s5. Even the first authority of the Russian church policy of the 1860s, metropolitan Philaret Drozdov of Moscow, was rather reserved in his views towards Bulgarian activities and regarded them as non-canonical6.
3The results of the war of 1877‑1878 against the Ottoman Empire, coupled with the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, oriented the Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire in a more conservative direction. Moreover, the 1878 Congress of Berlin had demonstrated that the rest of Europe would not support Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. As a consequence, the new emperor Alexander III adopted a more peaceful and reserved attitude in Russian foreign policy, and upheld the stance of indifference with regard to the Greek-Bulgarian issues. As in the previous decades, the government considered the Orthodox Church as the main base of influence in the Near East, and in this regard, Konstantin Petrovich Pobyedonostsyev, chief procurator of the Holy Synod of the Russian Church, expresses adamantly the conservative stance in his letter of 11 November 1881:
- 7 Pokrovsky 1923, p. 355.
It is absolutely clear that now we have a systematic march from the West spearheaded by the Catholic Church in close alliance with the Austrian government… Detachments of the same army undermine our strength, and nation, and Church — in alliance with the same Austria, — in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Bulgaria, in Hungary, and in Serbia… Austria together with Rome has understood very well that they can blow up Russia and its influence in the East only by undermining the Orthodox Church7.
- 8 Sinitsyna 1998, pp. 16‑21; Florovsky & Zvegintsev 1924.
- 9 Dostoyevsky 1981, pp. 45‑50.
4The new policy of the Russian Empire has to be understood within a broad philosophical and historical background. The 1880s ideology associated to it diverged considerably from the Slavophile movement. A national ideology based on the uniqueness of the Russian Empire and its religious and political superiority in the Orthodox world was replacing the Slavophile ideas. The post‑1878 theoreticians were the ideological descendants of some extremely influential Russian writers and philosophers of the previous decades. Before the Crimean War, the poet and diplomat Fyodor Tyutchev wrote a plan, according to which the Byzantine Empire was to be transferred to Russia. In fact, here we encounter another continuation and modification of the old well‑known theory of Moscow as the Third Rome8. N. Ja. Danilevsky, the author of “Russia and Europe” (1869), was the philosopher standing at the roots of this 1880s ideology. On the eve of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877, Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky expressed the messianic idea of the Russian mission in the Orthodox East, where Russia, as the head of Orthodoxy, had to obtain Constantinople as an act of final rising of Truth and the final word of Orthodoxy9.
- 10 In this article we don’t aim at a detailed analysis of Leontiev’s philosophic essays. See the bibl (...)
5Konstantin Leontiev, writer, journalist, and diplomat, was one of the most original figures of 19th century Russia. In the 1860s to 1870s, he was a consul in Adrianople, Tulcea, Ioannina (1869‑1871), and Thessaloniki (1871‑1872)10. In his diplomatic reports, he stressed the danger of the multiethnic territories of Macedonia and Thrace becoming the battleground between various competing nationalisms (Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian). He considered that as a result Russia had to play the role of peacemaker to prevent these conflicts from occurring.
6Furthermore, Leontiev developed in his diplomatic reports of 1871‑1872 a psychologizing theory about the present and future status of the Ottoman Empire and its inhabitants. According to him, the beginning of the demoralization of Ottoman Turks lay not in the economic situation, but in religious, national, and administrative considerations. However, Leontiev considered that in the Ottoman Empire, the prosperity of the middle class was widespread, the proletariat was absent, and these two factors constituted a guarantee for the future well‑being of the Balkans. In these reports one can find the author’s admiration of the East as well as an absolute aversion to Western democracy that is believed to make people equal, but also banal.
7In 1871 Leontiev fell terribly ill, and he decided to radically change his life. First he attempted to become a monk on Mount Athos, but was stopped by the Russian Athonite monastic leaders. Fathers Ieronym and Makarij, realized that the spiritual state of the diplomat was the result of a romantic impulse rather than serious preparation. In any case, it was absolutely impossible for a Russian imperial diplomat to join the Russian monastery on the Holy Mountain because during the beginning of the 1870s, such an act could be understood as a political provocation.
- 11 Leontiev 1912, p. 273.
8So instead, Leontiev moved to Constantinople, and spent his time in the pleasant atmosphere of the magnificent, at least in those days, Russian embassy, ruled by the famous Count Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev. Leontiev’s spiritual thirst was now quenched during his visits to the Theological School of Halki, the best establishment of its kind in the Orthodox East. Here he had the opportunity to compare the Slavophile atmosphere of the embassy with the more reserved views of the Greek patriots in Halki. His time spent in Constantinople coincided with a period of rapid and stormy political changes, particularly with the development of the Bulgarian question in the days of two patriarchs: Anthimus VI and Ioakeim II. However, it was also in Constantinople where his love of Byzantium and the Greeks grew and found literary forms, thus ending the Slavophile period of his life. As a result, he lent his support to the Greek side with regards to the Greek-Bulgarian question. He expressed his philhellenic point of view in his articles “Panslavism and the Greeks”, and “Panslavism on Athos”. In addition, the phenomenon of Byzantinism became the main object of research for Leontiev, and he tried to explain the different ways the Byzantine legacy was understood by both the European nations, and by Russia. Leontiev understood Byzantinism to mean “our Russian Orthodoxy, our Russian Autocracy, sanctified by Orthodoxy, and many reflections of Orthodoxy and of our Orthodox statehood in literature, poetry, architecture, and so on.”11 Thus, for Leontiev, Byzantinism was, and had always been, its source of strength, the base of Russian civilization. As he wrote emphatically in his work East, Russia, and Slavinism:
Byzantinism gave us all our strength in the fight against Poland, Sweden, France and Turkey. Under its banner, if we remain true to it of course, we should be able to withstand the pressure of all international Europe, which after destroying everything generous in itself, dared to prescribe us the rot and stench of its new laws regarding mean earthly bliss, earthly radical shallowness.
9Leontiev was led to his prophecies about the future of mankind based on historiographic constructions such as the history of Russia before and after Peter the Great, and the traces of Byzantium that continued to be found in common life and architecture. Of course, his approach to history cannot be considered as an empirical one, and as a result, his works were not valued by the professional byzantinologists of his time, such as V. G. Vasilievsky. Nevertheless, Leontiev’s publications had a significant influence on public opinion, especially in philosophical circles at the beginning of the 20th century. During the 1880s he continued writing articles as a conservative journalist, and he spent the last years of his life as a novice living near the Lavra of Saint Sergius in Russia.
10The period of Alexander III, from 1881 to 1894, can be understood as an example of the revival of Byzantinism, moving it to a new level by adopting the old idea of the Third Rome, only this time understanding it to be located at St. Petersburg. In addition, the Byzantine idea of the Orthodox Oikumene, the Orthodox world, and the family of Orthodox peoples was revalued on the basis of the Russian national idea. Therefore, the opinion that the Russian policy in the East was synonymous to Panslavism is not a correct representation of the 1880s to 1890s. During this period, Russia was internationally isolated in regard to this Balkan policy, which had deadlocked it in a strengthened relationship with only Bulgaria and Serbia. As a result, Russia’s only way out of this impasse was to develop the idea of its uniqueness and superiority in the whole East Christian world. According to these theories, Russia was the only Orthodox Great Power, and as such it had the moral right not only to protect the Christians of the Ottoman Empire, but also to “liberate them from the Turkish yoke” and to determine their future political life. As a consequence, Russia had to bring under its guidance all independent Orthodox states regardless of nationality12.
- 13 Many of the byzantinologists, especially professors of the Theological Academies, also worked as p (...)
- 14 Kapterev 1914.
- 15 See his report on the visit to Constantinople in 1886: Gerd 2001.
11The main ideologists of Russian policy of the 1880s to 1890s, such as Mikhail Nikiforovich Katkov and Konstantin Petrovich Pobyedonostsyev, chief procurator of the Russian Holy Synod, were adamant supporters of this policy. This period also announces the dawn of the golden age of the Russian school of Byzantine studies13. However, the thorough studying of the political and cultural experience of Byzantium was intended to serve the political ambitions of Russia in the Near East. This idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome” was central in the book of Professor N. F. Kapterev, which was dedicated to the relations between Russia and the Orthodox East during the 16th and 17th centuries14, as well as in the works of I. E. Troitsky, a professor at St. Petersburg Theological Academy. Troitsky was an expert on Eastern affairs of the Holy Synod of the Russian church. His point of view, which was hostile to both the Greeks and the Slavs, was well reflected in his unofficial reports that were written for the procurator of the Holy Synod Konstantin Petrovich Pobyedonostsyev15.
- 16 “Νέα Ημέρα”, November 14th/26th, 1892, no. 937 (1925).
12Parallel to this political line existed a minority view, which considered the Greeks necessary for Russian political interests in the Near East. This was expressed in the 1870s to 1890s by few, but key politicians. Tertiy Ivanovich Filippov (1825‑1899), a high government official, who also acted as State Auditor, expressed his opinion on the question of the Bulgarian “schism” and positioned himself fully on the side of the Patriarchate on the eve of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877. Filippov exchanged letters with many of the Eastern Patriarchs and was very popular both in Constantinople and Jerusalem. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem, recognizing Filippov’s help, granted him the honorary title “Epitropos of the Holy Sepulchre”. In November 1892 the Greek newspaper “Νέα Ημέρα”, edited in Trieste, published a piece arguing that Filippov should be the one to assume the position of chief procurator of the Russian Holy Synod as “a friend of Greece, the Greek Church and the Greek language”16. Though the Russian Synod regarded Filippov’s activities as harmful to Russian church policy, the Russian Foreign Ministry found them useful for moderating the tensions arising from the Bulgarian question. As a result, some employees of the Russian embassy in Constantinople, such as M. K. Onou, and later P. B. Mansurov, welcomed Filippov’s initiatives.
- 17 “Гражданин”. February 7, 1891, no. 38.
13Tertiy Ivanovich Filippov’s position in relation to the Eastern policy of the Russian Church can be broken down in two essential components. First, he argued that the Patriarch of Constantinople was the head of the Orthodox world. From this postulate, he derived that Russia, having been baptized by the Byzantines, had to preserve its obedience to the Ecumenical Patriarch at Constantinople. He expressed these opinions in 1891, during the commemoration in Constantinople of the death of Patriarch Photius in 891. Photius, having been canonized as a saint by the Ecumenical Church in 1848, but not by the Russian Church, Filippov wrote an article in which he expressed his pity that the Russian Church was such a disobedient daughter to her mother, the Church of Constantinople. As a result, he considered Russian church policy in Bulgaria to be a failure17. This article provoked great indignation from the side of I. E. Troitsky and Konstantin Petrovich. Troitsky wrote a response to Filippov, in which he expressed the official point of view adopted by the Russian Church of this period:
- 18 “Московские ведомости”. February 17, 1891, no. 59.
The Church of Constantinople held the leading position among the other Churches, since it was the Church of the Empire. If Constantine the Great had not transferred the capital of the Empire from Rome to Constantinople, the bishop of Constantinople (the so called “Ecumenical”) would have remained a simple provincial bishop, subordinate to the Metropolitan of Irakleion. If Peter the Great had not abolished the Russian Patriarchate, the Patriarch of Russia would have taken earlier or later the first place among the other Patriarchs on the same reason on which the Patriarch of Constantinople was distinguished among his elder fellows. He would have been the bishop of the Reigning City of the Russian Empire, which took the place of Byzantium with all its rights and preferences both in international and ecclesiastical spheres18.
14We are thus presented with two opposing perceptions of the idea of Ecumenicity: the traditional Byzantine conception based on historical genealogy and the church canons, versus the Russian imperial one based on the idea of translatio imperii and the theory of the Third Rome.
15With regard to the Bulgarian ecclesiastical question, Filippov demonstrated himself as a passionate defender of the Greek canonic position. Even before the Russian-Turkish War of 1877‑1878, when Russian society infused with Panslavistic enthusiasm, he was brave enough to express this point of view in a book19. Filippov offered an appreciation of his activities on the Bulgarian question in his letter to Patriarch Dionysius V, who was a well‑known opponent of the Bulgarians, written on 15 May 1889:
- 20 State Archives of the Russian Federation, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 1300, fol. 12‑12v.
I dare to recognize one service of my own. In the days of mass confusion of minds and deviation to hostile and dangerous routes, I stood on the way of God… which had been shown to us and broken by history. It was the way which my native land followed for centuries without turning left or right. I can testify with joy that after a short period of wondering out of this unique right way, my compatriots have made sense from their sad and heavy experience and step by step are returning to the basis of our Christian and national being20.
- 21 Their letters to each other are edited: Fetisenko 2000.
16Though Filippov did not find support from the governmental authorities and stood apart from the main streams of Russian foreign policy, both before and after the war of 1877‑1878, he did have some notable sympathizers. Konstantin Leontiev, whom Filippov tried to help in the beginning of the 1880s with the editing of his articles, sympathized with him regarding the Bulgarian question21. And N. Dournovo, a journalist who edited the philhellenic newspaper “Vostok” from 1879‑1885, was another ally. This newspaper supported not only the Greeks, but also the Russian old-believers, and for this reason was soon prohibited by the Holy Synod of the Russian Church.
- 22 In 1872, the Orthodox Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Jerusalem condemned the pro (...)
17The second main pillar of Filippov’s political views was closely connected with the first, and was in harmony with the traditional role of Russia as the protector of the Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire. One of Filippov’s most important proposals dealt with the question concerning the properties of the Eastern Orthodox monasteries in Bessarabia. During the 18th century the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia granted large estates to the monasteries of the Holy Land and Mount Athos. Then, in the middle of the 19th century, one portion of the lands of Bessarabia passed to Russia, and the major part to the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which formed Romania. In the 1860s Duke Alexander Cuza began to confiscate the incomes of these estates. The Russian government tried to do its best in returning to the owners their violated rights. The Russian representative in the International Commission in Constantinople and the Russian ambassador opposed the French who supported Cuza and insisted on the total confiscation of the lands. Russia regarded these actions as an expression of its traditional duty to protect the Orthodox Churches of the East. Nevertheless, all attempts of this kind failed due to the obstinate position of both sides. Even in Russia, following the partition of Bessarabia the rights of the administrators of these estates (metochia) were not legally documented. In 1863 a special commission tried to regulate the situation, but the owners failed to produce the documents that would confirm their rights. Finally, in 1873 the Russian government changed its position and began to confiscate these properties as a reaction to the Eastern patriarchates’ policy with regard to the Bulgarian ecclesiastical question22. As a result, the owners now received only 2/5 of their incomes, and this was done through the Russian embassy in Constantinople. This act, analogous to the confiscation of the estates of the Eastern Churches in Romania by Alexander Cuza in the 1860s, provoked a storm of protests.
- 23 A. I. Nelidov-N. K. Giers, July 8th 1891. Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. F. Grec (...)
18In 1891 Filippov raised the question of providing a supplementary income to the Athos monasteries from their Bessarabian properties. This income would be used for the needs of the Patriarchate of Constantinople23. The official report accompanying Filippov’s proposal underlined the fact that the governmental act of 1873 did not really contest the rights of the Eastern monasteries. According to the document, it only aimed at the redistribution of the income, so that the larger part would be used for philanthropic purposes. To support his argument, Filippov mentioned in his report that in 1881 the Russian Foreign Ministry had already decided to provide the Patriarchate of Jerusalem 4/5 of its incomes from its Bessarabian properties.
- 24 A note by Nekliudov, July 5th/17th 1891. State Archive of the Russian Federation, ff. 4‑16.
- 25 State Archive of the Russian Federation, ff. 44‑64v.
19Responding to Filippov’s request, the Council of Ministers decided to initiate a discussion on the question of economic relief brought to the ecclesiastical institutions of the Holy Land24. Following the rejection of his original proposal, Filippov composed another note on 17 March 1893 regarding the needs of the Holy Places of the Orthodox East and their properties in Bessarabia25. In this note, Fillippov upheld that beginning from 1893 the Russian government should only retain a small sum from the incomes yielded by the Bessarabian properties in order to compensate for their administration instead of withholding 3/5 of the incomes as was originally done. He wrote:
- 26 State Archive of the Russian Federation, f. 13.
The Russian government always tended to strengthen our benevolent influence on the Eastern affairs not by appropriating the estates of the Eastern Churches, not by violently withholding of their incomes for an uncertain period, but by absolute abstention from the smallest infringement of these rights and by fully guarding the grandeur of the Orthodox Eastern Church. It is obvious, that the breaching of the inviolability of these rights must have led, and in fact led to humiliation of the Orthodox church, to humiliation of our influence on the Eastern affairs and—what is most important—to an essential change of the quality of our influence26.
- 27 Iona archimandrite 1903.
- 28 K. P. Pobedonostsev to the Holy Synod. March 2, 1902, no. 6123. Russian state historical Archive, (...)
- 29 Russian State Historical Archives, f. 796, op. 184. 6 dep., 1, d. 5263.
20Fillippov was not the only friend of the Patriarchate on the Russian side. The Archimandrite of the Russian Church Iona (1899‑1913) can also be counted among the Patriarchate’s Russian friends in Constantinople. He was a great admirer of the Greek clergy and church customs, and printed many articles in support of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire27. In 1900, he was elected member of the Society of Church Music in Constantinople. In 1912, Patriarch Ioakeim III awarded him the title of Great Archimandrite of the Ecumenical Apostle See, and also in the same year, he was bestowed a golden cross with a piece of the True Cross by the Patriarch of Jerusalem. He spoke vehemently against the Russian disinterest in providing financial aid to Greek schools, churches and monasteries in the Ottoman Empire. In his opinion, the rich Russian monasteries of Mount Athos should set aside annual funds for support of the poor Greek schools. Regarding this specific point, Iona was confronted by the Director of the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople, Fyodor Ivanovich Uspensky, who regarded the Russian monastic communities of Mount Athos as a stronghold of the Russian political influence in the East. Soon after the 1901 reelection of Ioakeim III as Patriarch of Constantinople, Iona became the mediator between the newly elected Patriarch and the Russian Holy Synod on the question of the official distribution of the Patriarchate’s newspaper “Εκκλησιαστική Αλήθεια” to all seminaries and theological academies in Russia. This amounted to 62 copies of each issue paid for by the Russian government and meant as a support for the Ecumenical See28. Iona’s efforts for a Greek-Russian alliance can also be explained by his opposition to Catholic proselytism in the Ottoman Empire as is attested by his other activities. For example, in 1903 he founded a school for Greek Orthodox children in Galataria near Constantinople that was aimed at opposing Catholic missionary efforts in the fields of education and relief. This initiative was funded by the Russian government, which granted an annual subsidy of 700 rubles from the incomes of the Bessarabian estates29.
21Following the death of Alexander III in 1894, his son Nicolas II attempted to continue his father’s policies. However, being a weak politician, Nicolas II was influenced by his ministers, among whom there were many defenders of the active role of Russia in the Balkans. Up to 1905 the Russian ecclesiastical policy towards the Orthodox East did not change, and the period of Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev continued to be in harmony with the passive position of the Russian government, which was linked to its agreement with Austro-Hungary. But after the 1905 revolution and the subsequent political changes in Russia, the nationalist line in Russia’s Near East policy prevailed. In the ecclesiastical sphere the projects of church reforms and the restoration of the Patriarchate in Russia were actively discussed both in official commissions and in the press. Within the context of the stormy atmosphere in the Balkans during the 1910s, the Russian policy had to mediate between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Bulgarian Exarchate. These tendencies were especially vivid in 1911 and 1912, with the process of preparation of the Balkan Union. During this period Russian diplomacy was very close to reaching success in its desire regarding the Bulgarian ecclesiastical question: to mend the schism. Nevertheless, even in these more favorable conditions, this plan was not fruitful. Meanwhile the excitement of public opinion in Russia in the 1910s led to the rise of a nationalistic foreign policy, which steadily increased up to the beginning of the World War. Of course, given the situation, it would be difficult to expect a great number of politicians sympathizing to one wing or another of the fighting Balkan nationalities. Russian foreign policy still continued its traditional help to the Orthodox peoples by sending financial subsidies and other kinds of aid. At the same time, it was obvious that Bulgaria would not support Russia; as for Greece, it was a matter of constant disillusion. Even the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which had always been regarded as a potential center of Ecumenism undertaking the role as peacemaker among the Orthodox nationalities, turned more into a Greek nationalistic center in the 1910s. This process, though rather unpleasant for the Russians, was only natural after the separation of many national Balkan Churches from the Patriarchate.
- 30 Among them we must mention B. S. Seraphimov, expert on ecclesiastical affairs of the embassy in Co (...)
22From another perspective, the church reforms in Russia provoked a more attentive study of the Byzantine roots of Russian Christianity and the Russian Church. What should be the place of the Russian Patriarch in regard to the Pentarchy of the Apostolic Sees? What should characterize the relationship between the Russian Patriarch and the Patriarch of Constantinople? Questions like these were among the most hotly debated topics of the period. The attitude towards the Greeks and their church in the Ottoman Empire was a matter of research from the side of the Russian diplomats, some of whom also sympathized with the Patriarchate30.
23For example, in the beginning of the 20th century, Filippov’s philhellenic activities were followed by Ivan Ivanovich Sokolov (1865‑1939), a professor at St. Petersburg’s Theological Academy, who was a well‑known byzantinologist. Sokolov’s main argument was based on the term “Byzantinism” and its relation to the creation of an ideal theocratic state based on the model of Byzantium. His credo in matters of ecclesiastical policy was first declared in his 1903 speech at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy31, where he argued that
Under “Byzantinism” we mind all the totality of peculiarities of church and state life of Byzantium, which characterize this Empire with special cultural-historical features of its internal system and way of life, different from the other European states. Byzantinism is a synthesis of the characteristic features of Byzantium as an independent state, it is the main spirit and character of its church-religious system, a principle of its political way of life, the main line and goal of the local culture, the ideal of the dominating population.
24In addition, he stated that Byzantium, as the ideal state, “has declared the idea of co‑subordination of the goals of the church and the state, a close union between these two institutions with a juridical independence from each other”.
25Byzantium suffered a decline in the Palaeologian period according to Sokolov, but it flourished in terms of spiritual life; it had survived up to the fall of the Empire and had even survived after it, having passed some of its features to modern Hellenism. Sokolov concluded that Byzantium was “the first to elaborate a system of a church state, to establish such principles of private and social life, to create such cultural-historical ideals, which in their final practical realization could give mankind the always attractive happiness.” The pursuit of happiness through Byzantinism inspirited I. Sokolov during his whole career as a scientist, professor, politician and journalist. Since the early 1900s he started publishing reports and articles about the Orthodox East in the “Church Messenger” («Церковный вестник»), the official periodical of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy. Soon he became its editor‑in-chief and wrote many short articles and extensive research works on the life of the Eastern Patriarchates, especially that of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In 1904 he published his book “The Church of Constantinople in the 19th Century” as a result of 8 months of his work in the archive of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the mere fact of which attested to his close contacts with Patriarch Ioakeim III32. Sokolov’s political position was steadily on the Greek side. For example, in 1906 during the massacres of the Greeks in Bulgaria, the Russian government stood aside and abstained from officially interfering. Different reasons explain such a position. First of all, Ioakeim III who had been elected for the second time to the Patriarchal See with the help of the Russian diplomacy did not live up to the Russian expectations. He had preferred being more obedient to the policy of the Greek kingdom and of Britain, and had not attempted to solve the religious and ethnic conflicts in a way that was suitable for Russia. In this situation Sokolov was the only Russian publicist who dared to raise his voice in favor of the Greeks.
26In the first period of the Young Turk revolution of 1908, Sokolov appealed for vast help in favor of the Orthodox East, considering such a course of action to be in line with the best interests of traditional Russian policy. The military success of the combined Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian forces during the First Balkan War of 1912, and especially the liberation of Mount Athos, constituted for him a real triumph of Hellenism and Byzantinism.
Hellenism, converted by the national genius into Byzantinism, has reached wonderful development on Athos. (…) Hellenism has reconciled all inhabitants of Athos, irrespective of their nationality, it has subordinated them to its dominating stream, has led them into the sphere of common monastic ideals, and has motivated them to live and pray according to the rules and canons it has generated.
- 33 “Вести с Афона” (“News from Mount Athos”), Церковный вестник (1912) 42, pp. 1317‑1318.
27For Sokolov, the question of the international status of the Holy Mountain, which was so much discussed by the Russian diplomats, was “an artificial shift of the right policy into various hesitations and adventures33.” He followed up in 1912 by printing a large article in memoriam of Ioakeim III, whom he considered the most prominent Patriarch of his time, still advocating in favor of a closer relationship with the Patriarchate at Constantinople.
- 34 For an appreciation of these questions regarding Russia and Constantinople observed from the side (...)
- 35 See Luneva 2010.
- 36 Published: Lisovoj 2002.
28One of the most vivid expressions of Sokolov’s political line is his 1915 “Opinion” on the question of Constantinople and the Straits. In 1915 the Allied Dardanelles campaign began. In order for the Allies to stimulate Russian military action on all fronts (especially on the Bosporus) and given that the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire seemed like it would be a matter of few months, Britain and France agreed to sign a secret treaty. This treaty, signed on 8 and 12 March 1915, outlined that after the victory over the Ottomans was secured, Russia would receive Constantinople and its surrounding territories. If this treaty had been put into action, its results would have been the fulfillment of Russian political dreams from all the previous centuries34. Between the 1890s and the 1910s Russian ministries had discussed, on several occasions, various projects regarding the annexation of the Straits, but each time the projects were rejected due to the unsuitable circumstances35. During the First World War the “Byzantine” ambitions of the Russian politicians rose to their highest degree. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, experts from the main ministries of economics and war science had to write their “Opinions” on the future Russian Constantinople, i.e. Tsargrad. The Holy Synod invested I. I. Sokolov with the mission of drafting the notes about the future church organization of Constantinople36. In his extended secret report “Constantinople, Palestine and the Russian Church,” he gives a vast historical panorama of the church administration in Byzantium to draw a conclusion on the canonical status of the Patriarchate in the 20th century:
The change in the political status of Constantinople should not change the basic canonical status in the system and the function of the Ecumenical Patriarchal See, which is fixed in the self-awareness of the Orthodox world and is fastened in its historical realization by the canonical Codex of the Greek-Eastern Church37.
29In fact, here Sokolov continued along the line of T. I. Filippov and stressed that up to the 20th century, the Patriarchate of Constantinople kept its dominant position in the Orthodox world. As a result, the time had come to
restore justice and to understand that the deficiencies and abuses of the Greek clergy are exaggerated by the enemies of Orthodoxy in a high level38. The Patriarch of Constantinople in his future status whithin the borders of the Russian Empire should be entitled to the same rights and duties that he enjoyed according to the canon rules during the Byzantine period.
- 39 Lisovoj 2002, pp. 171‑175.
30According to the author, the position of the Ecumenical Patriarch during the Ottoman period was humiliating and did not correspond to his high destination. The “Third Conquest” of Constantinople should return the Patriarchate to its true purpose: to be the centre of the Ecumene, i.e. of the Orthodox world. Since the civil authority of the Patriarch that was obtained during the Ottoman period would be abolished under these new conditions, Constantinople “could serve as, if not a constant, at least a temporary residence of the Monarch of the great Russian State, in fact receiving from the brilliance of the emperor’s crown the equal significance of ʻEmpress of all the Citiesʼ39.”
31Sokolov was an active defender of restoring the Patriarchal system in Russia, and he took part in the debates on church reforms in Russia in 1906 to 1907, and 1917. He believed that it would be possible to restore the Pentarchy of Patriarchates in the future church order, and the Russian Patriarch would be able keep the second place after the Patriarch of Constantinople.
- 40 Lisovoj 2002, pp. 203, 201.
32While Sokolov evoked the restoration of Byzantium under Russian rule as a realization of the idea of the Third Rome, Antony Chrapovitsky, the well-known Russian metropolitan, proposed a restoration of the Byzantine Empire under Greek domination as a realization of the Greek Great Idea (Μεγάλη ιδέα). Metropolitan Antony Chrapovitsky was a famous publicist and the author of different articles on the Greek-Bulgarian ecclesiastical conflict. In 1911 he wrote an article on the mending of the Bulgarian schism, in which he compared the Bulgarians with the ancient Donatist heretics, and proposed a complete subordination of the controversial regions to Constantinople. In April 1915 he addressed a note to the Holy Synod, where he wrote that “in the interests of truth, in the interests of religion and science and at last in purely Russian national interests, Constantinople should become the capital of the Byzantine Empire and all the Greek provinces of the Balkans and Asia Minor have to be included in it.” The expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople should be regarded as only the first step to the complete liberation of the Christian world from the Muslims. He added that Russia must restore “the Byzantine Empire by uniting the present-day free Greece with Constantinople under the domination of the Ecumenical Patriarch and thus to thank the Greek people for delivering us from slavery to the devil, by making us Christians”40.
- 41 “The Church of Constantinople and the Russian domination”. Russian National Library, St. Petersbur (...)
33Alexey Afanasievich Dmitrievsky, a famous specialist on Greek liturgy, was another professor-theologian who expressed his opinion on church policy in the years of the First World War. He was a professor at the Kiev Theological Academy up to 1906, and later moved to St. Petersburg to become secretary of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. During this time, the political orientation of the Palestine Society had shifted and was advocating a rapprochement with the Greeks. Though he was more reserved regarding the extent of Greek domination on the future Russian Constantinople, he could not deny that the church of Holy Wisdom (Agia Sofia) should become a Greek church, while Vlacherna church would become a Russian one. The Russian part in the church administration should be in appointing a Russian metropolitan in the Patriarchal Synod41.
34On 2 March 1915 Dmitrievsky made a report before an audience at the Slavonic Philanthropic Society in Petrograd. He stressed in his speech that the traditional orientation of the Palestine Society in favor of the Arab element in Palestine should be considered a mistake and that Russia had to support the Greek element, for historical as well as theological reasons.
- 42 “The Church of Constantinople and the Russian domination”. Russian National Library, St. Petersbur (...)
It is enough for us to have one native Patriarch on the Antiochian See and it is not desirable for us to have a second one in Jerusalem, where our interests are so great (…). It is well known that the Greek clergy made a lot of mistakes, but these mistakes can be corrected. Nobody would refuse the indisputable service of the Greek clergy, that it has saved up to our days the Holy Places. Finally, the Greek clergy works according to its possibilities in the field of enlightenment and as a whole the Greek clergy is more educated and more viable than the Arab one…42
- 43 See Anastassiadis 2013.
35To conclude, it is thus obvious that Russian policy-making was far more complex and hotly debated than the doxa of the 19th c. “Panslavist menace” would like us to believe. There was no clear alignment between the Russian Church and the Imperial officialdom and even within these structures, positions varied depending on the circumstances and the period examined between the 1830s and the 1910s. There was even a moment, during WWI, when for certain influential Russian figures, there was a possibility of a “Greek” or “Byzantine” moment in the Russian Empire, as long of course as Constantinople passed from the Ottomans to the Russians. WWI and the 1917 Russian Revolution put an end to this period of political romanticism. The projects of Russian Constantinople, as well as the ideas of collaboration with the Greek clergy in Palestine would not be realized. Following the Paris Peace conference, it was now time for the Greeks to cherish their own, albeit short, moment of political-religious romanticism and envision the restoration of the Byzantine Empire around Constantinople, with the Russians being reduced to a secondary role.43