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Chypre moderne et contemporaine

Shades of Disorder in Eighteenth‑Century Cyprus: The Case of the 1764‑1766 Rebellion

Theoharis Stavrides
p. 319-335

Résumés

Cet article étudie la rébellion de 1764-1766 à Chypre, en se concentrant sur les notions concurrentes d’ordre et de désordre dans le contexte provincial ottoman. La révolte fut engendrée par un mécontentement généralisé face à la taxation excessive imposée par le gouverneur Çil Osman Ağa, qui cherchait à recouvrer les coûts de sa nomination. Ses politiques exacerbèrent les tensions sociales, incitant les communautés musulmanes et chrétiennes à demander réparation au gouvernement central ottoman. La crise s’aggrava lorsque Çil Osman fut assassiné lors d’un soulèvement urbain à Nicosie, ce qui fut suivi par l’émergence de factions rebelles à travers l’île, parmi lesquelles les forces de Dizdar Halil Ağa. La réponse ottomane, caractérisée à la fois par la négociation et la répression violente, révéla l’équilibre fragile entre l’autorité centrale et les structures de pouvoir locales. La rébellion mit en lumière les faiblesses de la gouvernance provinciale ottomane, où la corruption, la décentralisation et les conflits d’intérêts entre notables locaux sapaient le contrôle impérial. Alors que les observateurs européens contemporains attribuèrent les troubles aux défaillances systémiques de l’administration ottomane, les chroniqueurs ottomans y virent un échec moral de fonctionnaires corrompus. On montre dans l’étude comment cet épisode illustre la nature contestée de l’autorité politique dans l’empire ottoman du xviiie siècle, où la rébellion et la répression étaient souvent présentées comme des instruments de lutte pour restaurer la justice du sultan plutôt que comme de véritables défis au pouvoir impérial.

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Texte intégral

1Disorder denotes the lack of order, a deviation from the normal state of affairs. In the Ottoman case, we may regard disorder as the deviation from the established and accepted order of the state. The goal of this paper is to reflect on what constitutes order and disorder in the Ottoman context, as various individuals or sections of society perceived order, the deviation from it, as well as the appropriate manner of its enforcement, in different ways, so that we may speak of a variety of shades of these concepts. The relatively well documented urban revolt of November 1764 in Nicosia that ended with the assassination of Muhassıl Çil Osman Ağa, together with the ensuing widespread rebellion, led by the Dizdar of Kyrenia Halil Ağa, that engulfed the entire island of Cyprus for the following two years, offer a fertile case study, through which we may investigate different shades of disorder as perceived by a variety of participants or observers of the events.

An urban revolt

  • 1 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 78r (26 July 1764); Stavrides 2014, pp. 227‑228. On Köse Bahir Mustafa Pasha, s (...)
  • 2 Kyprianos 1788, p. 318; Cobham 1908, pp. 356‑357. On Kyprianos, see Kitromilides 2002, pp. 174‑177 (...)

2In the summer of 1764, a new Muhassıl or Governor, Çil Osman Ağa, a favourite of Grand Vizier Köse Bahir Mustafa Pasha (1763-1765), came to Cyprus.1 One of the contemporary sources, Archimandrite Kyprianos, described the new Governor as being “over head and ears in debt, by reason of the huge sums either extracted from him, or offered by him to the Porte, to obtain the Governorship (μανσούπιον / mansub) of Cyprus. The wretch hoped to regain what he had paid, and fantastic wealth besides”.2

  • 3 On the misfortunes of the island during the 1750s and 1760s, see Kyprianos 1788, pp. 316‑318; Cobha (...)
  • 4 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 80r (26 July 1764).

3As it turned out, however, coming on the heels of a series of bouts of drought and locust, and especially a major outbreak of the plague a few years earlier (1760) that drastically reduced the population of the island, Osman Ağa’s expectations for profit turned out to be gross miscalculations.3 For that reason, his attempt to double the amount of taxation backfired, causing a furore among the locals. French Consul Benoît Astier reported that this imposition led both Muslims and Christians to flee the island, and the problem was aggravated by the practice of transferring the taxes owed by those who had fled on those who had remained.4

  • 5 Mariti 1792, pp. 126‑127. ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 1v. On Giovanni (...)
  • 6 Gara 2012, pp. 413‑414.

4Heavy taxation caused Christian and Muslim reaya to apply to their respective religious leaders, who, after failing to convince Çil Osman to lighten the tax burden, sent a deputation to Istanbul, in order “to lay the case of the people before the Grand Signior, and to implore his protection against a tyranny to which they could no longer bear to become victims”.5 Although decentralization and the increased power of localized authorities was a salient characteristic of eighteenth-century Ottoman political life, local notables retained close ties with patrons in the capital, whose support was necessary for their survival and success. Thus, despite being a period of decentralization, the latter part of the eighteenth century was also an age of intense communication between the periphery and the centre, with the practice of sending petitions and embassies from the provinces to the capital reaching “unprecedented dimensions in that period”.6

  • 7 Mariti 1792, p. 128. ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 95v (18 November 1764). ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648 (...)
  • 8 Kitromilides 1982, p. 93. On the custom of petitioning the Sultan for the redress of grievances, se (...)

5As a response to the petition of the Cypriots, the Porte sent to the island a çuhadar, carrying a series of ordinances enjoining the Governor to reduce the rates to the legitimate limits, prescribing the refund of the taxes “unjustly collected”, and commanding an inquiry into the conduct of the Muhassıl’s servants, asking for “punishment to be inflicted on those whose perfidious advice had led him astray from the paths of equity”.7 Thus, we observe an attempt of the Cypriot taxpayers and notables to use the regular and legal communication channels, in order to convey their grievances to the Empire’s centre. According to Paschalis Kitromilides, the mission of the Çuhadar served as a means of restoring legitimacy, “by expounding the central authority’s writ against the local governor turned rebel through tyranny”.8

  • 9 Mariti 1792, p. 128; Şemdânî-zâde 1978, p. 105; Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49. On Şemdânî-zâde, see DİA 20 (...)

6Upon the arrival of the Çuhadar, Çil Osman invited him to the palace, to read the ordinances publicly in the presence of local religious leaders and notables.9 Thus, on the morning of the 5th of November 1764, Christian and Muslim leaders – the four Bishops, the Dragoman of the Palace, the Kadı of Nicosia and other ulema, as well as the notables of the island, assembled in the saray. According to the eyewitness account of Archimandrite Kyprianos, while the ordinances were being discussed, the floor on which they were standing collapsed, throwing into darkness

  • 10 Kyprianos 1788, p. 319; Cobham 1908, pp. 357‑358; ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 95v‑96r (18 November 1764); (...)

bishops and attendants, Greeks and Turks, with other victims, and the beams of the roof heaped on top of us. With no small damage and risk of our lives we freed ourselves, and were dragged out covered with dust and dirt, scarred all over, a sorry sight! We were carried to our houses, one with an injured back, another with a broken leg: some had internal injuries, some were so terrified that they thought death imminent.10

  • 11 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49; Mariti 1792, pp. 129‑130; ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 94r, 96v‑97r (18 November 17 (...)
  • 12 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 97r (18 November 1764), 134r (25 May 1765).
  • 13 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49; Stavrides 2014, p. 229.

7As the meeting coincided with the eve of the fair of St. Demetrius (26 October) in Nicosia, a large crowd had gathered in the city from the neighbouring villages. When news of the accident broke, an armed mob of several hundred raided the Muhassıl’s palace and set it on fire, killing him and eighteen men of his retinue, and pillaging the treasury and furniture.11 The French Consul Benoît Astier relates that the fire spread to the entire palace and was raging all through the night, “leaving only the four walls”, and that the mob looted even the nails on the walls,12 while the Ottoman historian Çeşmî-zâde writes that the rebels “transformed the palace into the teke of Uryani Dede”, a sixteenth century mendicant dervish.13

  • 14 Kyprianos 1788, p. 320; Cobham 1908, p. 358; Mariti 1792, p. 130; ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 64 (...)
  • 15 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 136r‑v (25 May 1765).
  • 16 Kyprianos 1788, p. 319; Cobham 1908, p. 358.

8In the aftermath of the uprising, the Muslim notables, fearing an intensification of the riots, which might have led the rebels to sack the houses of the wealthy inhabitants of the city, chose to disperse the people, commanding them, through a tellal, in the name of the Sultan, to return to their villages.14 When the French Consul visited Nicosia shortly after the events, he found the city very quiet, but noticed that the notables of both communities were fearful about the consequences of the revolt.15 The mood in the immediate aftermath of this “terrible tragedy” is captured by eyewitness Archimandrite Kyprianos, who wrote that “all were dumb as corpses, Ulema, aghas and rayahs, all crouching in mute terror, expecting only that the sword of authority would fall on all alike, and that inexorable vengeance, and savage requital would be exacted for the blood thus savagely shed”.16

Convenient fictions and conspiracy theories

  • 17 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 134r‑v (25 May 1765).

9In a meeting held at the mahkeme in the immediate aftermath of the events, described by Consul Astier, the local notables decided to send to the Porte a report (ilam), based on the testimonies of the Kadı, the Çuhadar, the mufti, the military officers, the Bishops, and all the Christian and Muslim notables, arguing that the Governor, in order to hinder the investigation, had devised a plan to exterminate all the local leaders. In this report, the kadı confirmed that, after investigation, he had found that the pillars of the building were half-sawed and had strings attached, so that their collapse could be easily provoked at a sign from the Muhassil.17

  • 18 Myrianthopoulos 1934, p. 55; Kokkinoftas 1997, pp. 33‑34.
  • 19 Mariti 1792, p. 129. See also Kitromilides 1982, p. 92.
  • 20 ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 2r.
  • 21 Şemdânî-zâde 1978, p. 105: “… leyle‑i mezkûrede bir kaç odanın temel direklerini kat’ ettirmiş”; Çe (...)

10This became the official story: the popular local chronicle of Joachim of Palouriotissa takes for granted the Governor’s complicity in the “accident”, describing it as part of Çil Osman’s attempt to assassinate the notables. The latter, all covered in dust, went straight to the mahkeme and denounced the Muhassıl to the Kadı, who ordered him to appear in court.18 Giovanni Mariti adopts a similar version, saying that “the mullah and the vizir, after a strict enquiry, soon discovered that he had caused the pillars and joints which supported the floor to be nearly sawed through; so that, when pulled down by ropes, the ruin of the edifice was the consequence of this basse manœuvre”. Mariti also accuses the Muhassıl of poisoning the Çuhadar’s coffee, but this attempt was also unsuccessful, since “a powerful antidote” was administered to the victim, who managed to survive.19 This same idea is also adopted by most other sources, such as the Venetian Consul Girolamo Brigadi,20 and even official Ottoman historians Çeşmî-zâde and Şemdânî-zâde, with the latter writing that “on the aforementioned night, [Çil Osman] had cut some of the room’s foundation pillars”.21

11The French Consul Benoît Astier is more ambivalent. In a report he wrote shortly after the events, he described the conspiracy theory as follows:

  • 22 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 96r (18 November 1764): “Ce Gouverneur, ayant prévu, dès l’arrivée du Tchoccada (...)

Having foreseen from the arrival of the Çuhadar that the enquiries ordered by the command that arrived could only throw him into the greatest embarrassment, this Governor conceived, in order to get out of this labyrinth, the infernal project to get rid, at the same time and all at once, of the Vizier Çuhadar, the Bishops, and all his other accusers.22

  • 23 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 96r (18 November 1764): “… qu’il avoit fait donner par deux fois du poison au V (...)
  • 24 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 96v (18 November 1764), f. 133r (25 May 1765): “…ce croulement que je croirois (...)
  • 25 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 133r (25 May 1765): “Osman Aga, à la tête des officiers qui formoient son Divan (...)

12According to this theory, Çil Osman placed a double dose of poison in the Çuhadar’s coffee and, during the night, half-sawed the beams supporting part of the hall, where the bishops and the people would be standing, attaching strings, which would bring the floor down at a signal.23 Elsewhere, however, Astier expresses doubts about this version, indicating that he would rather believe (“… je croirois plutôt …”) that the collapse of the floor was caused by the antiquity of the building, while the vomiting of the Çuhadar was a result of his surprise at the suddenness and the violence of the accident.24 In fact, the French Consul relates that the Muhassıl had received the notables in a newly-built hall, which was, however, constructed on old and half-rotten beams.25

  • 26 Kyprianos 1788, pp. 319‑320; Cobham 1908, p. 358; Hill 1952, p. 82 no. 2; Stavrides 2014, p. 229.

13We do not know whether these were mere fabrications or conspiracy theories woven by the Christian and Muslim notables to spare the island from the wrath of the Porte. Archimandrite Kyprianos, our sole eyewitness of the events, casts doubt upon this official version. Describing the crucial decisions that had to be taken by the local leaders in the wake of the revolt, he wrote that they discussed the way in which they would present the events to the Porte, since “the murder of the sovereign’s representative, the pillage of the treasury and robbery of the imperial funds, the burning of the Serai” were “indefensible crimes, which would require tact and wisdom, and common feeling and action of both Turks and Greeks, to make them appear natural results of the tyrannical harshness of the murdered musellim [i.e. the Muhassıl], which had been such as inevitably to drive the people to the fury and daring which they had displayed”.26 Although he does not clearly take a stand, Kyprianos here implies that the official story may have been a convenient fiction.

  • 27 BOA: C. DH 313, 15642.

14Fiction or not, this was the version also adopted by the Porte. An ordinance issued by the central government at the end of Cemaziülevvel 1178 (15‑24 November 1764) and addressed to the judicial authorities of Nicosia seems to reflect the version presented by the locals, by referring to various tyrannical acts (“mezalim‑i mütenevvi”) committed by the assassinated Muhassıl, to his refusal to attend the procedure in the mahkeme, and to his possible complicity in the accident in the saray (“tertib eylediği desteye binaen”). There was also reference to the assertion that the crowd attempted to enter the palace with the intention of saving the men that were lying wounded in the debris of the collapsed room (“içinde kalan mecruhları tahlis içün”) but were shot at by the guards resulting in the death of two men. This was the final straw that enraged the crowd, leading to the assassination of the Muhassıl and the burning of the saray.27

  • 28 Myrianthopoulos 1934, p. 55; Kokkinoftas 1997, pp. 33‑34; Stavrides 2014, p. 230.
  • 29 ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 2v: “siccome il Governatore è un tirano e (...)

15Another fiction concerns the sanctioning of the Muhassıl’s assassination by the local judicial authorities. Joachim of Palouriotissa relates that the Kadı of Nicosia was furious with Çil Osman for ignoring his order to appear in the court after the palace incident, and therefore ordered his execution.28 The Venetian Consul agrees with this version, writing that the Kadı sanctioned the assault on the saray and the killing of the Muhassıl by saying, “since the Governor is a tyrant and a rebel against justice and the royal commands, let them storm his palace and kill him”.29

  • 30 Mariti 1792, p. 129.
  • 31 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 96v (18 November 1764), f. 133v (25 May 1765).

16Other sources, however, give the impression that the Kadı’s instructions were rather implicit than explicit. According to Abbé Giovanni Mariti, after Çil Osman refused three times his summons to the court, and as the crowd’s outrage kept increasing, the Kadı “finding authority not sufficient to check their violence, declared the governor a traitor to his sovereign and the laws, and abandoned him to the fury of the enraged multitude”. Unlike the sources cited above, Mariti does not go so far as to say that the Kadı expressly ordered the Governor’s execution, but rather suggests that the people thought that they were authorized in their actions by his declaration.30 Similarly, the usually well-informed French Consul Astier indicates that, fearing the outcry of the people and the insult to their prestige by the Muhassıl’s refusal to obey their orders, the judicial authorities declared Çil Osman a rebel (zorba) vis‑à‑vis the Sultan and justice, indirectly justifying his execution.31

  • 32 Kitromilides 1982, pp. 92‑93.

17According to Kitromilides, the intervention of the judicial authorities, who declared the actions of Çil Osman illegal, served to sanction popular violence, “without damage to the concept of imperial sovereignty”, co‑opting, thus, violence “into the maintenance mechanisms of the power structure”. Kitromilides regards this event as a tax rebellion, on the model of similar ones occurring in early modern Europe around the same period, and “illustrates the maximalization of the potential of violent opposition to authority that was attained in Cypriot traditional society whenever tax extortions beyond normally acceptable levels burdened both ethnic elements”. As we saw above, natural disasters created the preconditions which were precipitated into violence by the sudden tax increase. Setting the incident in the broader context of the Ottoman Empire, Kitromilides highlights “the failure to utilize effectively the time-honoured mechanism of crisis diffusion”, that is the appeal to the central authorities, a fact which was indicative of “the state of imperial decline in the eighteenth century”.32

18Even if they may have been fictions, these versions of the events reflected the sense of many of the inhabitants of the island that the real source of disorder was the Governor, whose actions had turned him into a transgressor and a traitor to the Sultan, and therefore the reaction of the people was justified to restore order.

Bishops and Ağas

  • 33 BOA: C. DH 19, 944.

19The Porte’s instructions to the men who were appointed to investigate the events expressed its desire to “let bygones be bygones” (“maza ma maza”), giving a list of two dozen names, that included both Muslims and Christians, who were regarded as directly responsible for the Muhassıl’s death and the destruction of the palace, and who were to be punished fittingly. The rest of the inhabitants of the island were deemed worthy of the imperial pardon (“afv u safh‑i mülukânem”) with one caveat: that they would have to indemnify the state and the families of the victims for the death and the destruction, something tantamount to extra taxation.33 The Porte regarded this as extremely lenient treatment, which would induce the gratitude of the people of the island. However, this was not how the locals saw it.

  • 34 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 140v‑141v (25 May 1765): “ils respondirent que l’un et l’autre étant les princ (...)
  • 35 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 142r (25 May 1765): “Ce qu’il eut de louable dans leur conduite c’est que penda (...)

20When, as a response to the extra taxation, the inhabitants of the grain-producing plain of Mesaoria rose in revolt, blockading the food supply of Nicosia, the new Governor sent officials to ask them about their motives. As reported by the French Consul, the rebels gave a list of officials, including the Agha of the Janissaries, the Alay Bey and the Kul Kethüdası, as well as the Archbishop and the Dragoman, whom they regarded as responsible for the disorders, and who retained their positions and continued to oppress the people for their own profit, demanding that they be delivered to them. When told that the new exactions had nothing to do with those officials but were imposed by the Porte to cover the expenses incurred from the uprising, they demanded to see the accounts, as well as the order of the Sultan “for whom they would be ready to sacrifice their property, and even their life” (“pour qui ils étoient prêts de sacrifier leurs biens et leur vie”). When it was pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Archbishop and the Dragoman was limited to the Christians, the rebels responded that “both of them were the principal culprits of the unjust taxes imposed on the Christians, causing their flight from the island, and this caused the lands given to them by the Muslims, the produce of which was their only income, to be left uncultivated”.34 The rebels dispersed quietly after a solemn promise by the Governor that he would annul the extra taxation. Despite their apparent disobedience, Consul Astier praises the orderly conduct of the rebels, maintaining that they did not commit any disorders, but brought provisions from their own villages, and if they needed anything from the locals, they paid for it in cash.35

21Therefore, some sources indicate that for a part of the population the culpability of the Muhassıl represented only a superficial level of disorder. Beyond the unfortunate conjuncture of a foolish and greedy governor, consular sources, and especially the French Consul Benoît Astier, saw the sources of disorder as being deeper, emanating from the Ottoman system itself. In fact, Astier saw the case of Çil Osman as no mere fortuitous incident, but as the natural outcome of a corrupt decentralized system, which gave undue power to abusive local Muslim and Christian notables.

  • 36 ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b 648, 13 November 1764, f. 1r: “… temendo loro di qualche sollevazione (...)
  • 37 Kitromilides 1982, p. 93.
  • 38 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 97r, 134r (25 May 1765). See also, ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 Nove (...)
  • 39 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 174v‑175r (31 August 1765).

22Already at the first stages of the revolt, Venetian Consul Girolamo Brigadi wrote that the real motive of the bishops for notifying the Porte about Çil Osman’s tyranny was not pity for their flock, but rather, more importantly, their fear that the situation would lead to a revolt against themselves.36 Thus, in line with Kitromilides’ interpretation, it seems that the appeal of the bishops to the capital was designed to pre-empt the expected popular reaction against them, who were often the first target of such incidents, being the intermediaries between the Ottoman authorities and their flock.37 A similar attitude towards the local notables is also expressed by Consul Benoît Astier, who relates that, in the immediate aftermath of the revolt, the local aghas, who would have deserved to share the Governor’s fate, “because they were the initiators of all avarice”, sought refuge in the mahkeme, and only during the night did they dare to put themselves at the head of their troops, conducting rounds and patrols throughout the city.38 As late as August 1765, several months after the events, Astier wrote that most of the notables were in hiding, as they considered themselves the targets of the ongoing rebellion: the Archbishop was nowhere to be found, the Dragoman was constantly at the side of the Governor, the Bishops of Paphos and Kyrenia had gone to Alanya in Karaman, while the aghas in Larnaca were preparing to embark to exile.39

  • 40 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 212v (24 January 1766). On Haci Baki Ağa, see Hadjikyriacou 2014, pp. 435‑440; (...)
  • 41 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 219v‑220r (6 February 1766).

23Astier maintains that all the disorders on the island would not have happened, if the officials sent by the Porte to investigate the conditions of the assassination and its causes had done their job well, if the authorities had punished those responsible, instead of the entire island. That is, he saw the uprisings as a direct result of the extortion, which the Governor had carried out with the complicity of the aghas, chief among whom was the notorious Haci Baki Ağa, who became one of the primary targets of the rebellion. According to the Consul, these leeches (“sangsues”), that is the notables of Nicosia, were buying the protection of the Porte and were corrupting each incoming governor,40 while during the previous decade they had been instigating disorders in the countryside and stoking the governor’s intransigeance, in order to enrich themselves.41

24Astier’s reports reveal that there was widespread discontent on the island against both Muslim and Christian notables, who were perceived by the inhabitants as oppressors, who abused their power and were responsible for the imposition of high taxation that left the island desolate. Through these reports it appears that the rebels considered the notables as responsible for creating the conditions that led to the revolt – the taxes imposed by Çil Osman being only the final straw. Through Astier’s reports, we seem to be hearing an echo of the voice of the people, whose actual motives are not expounded in any other sources. We should note, however, that we hear the voice of the rebels through the lens of the French Consul, who was by no means an impartial and unbiased observer of the events, who was himself part of the establishment, and who seemed ready on any occasion to pronounce damning indictments on the Ottoman system.

Tyrants and liberators: Dizdar Halil Ağa

  • 42 Kyprianos 1788, p. 322; Cobham 1908, p. 360.
  • 43 Mariti 1792, p. 133; Stavrides 2014, p. 233.

25When the Governor broke his promises to the rebels and attempted to renew taxation, a group of Muslims contemplated a new revolt. The ringleaders of the conspiracy assembled in August 1765 at the fair of the monastery of St. Panteleimon in the village of Myrtou. There they convinced an Ottoman army officer, the Dizdar of Kyrenia Halil Bey, to become their leader, promising to obtain his appointment as governor of the island, “because he would work for the relief of Turks and rayahs alike, and gain great credit both with the people and the Porte”. Halil, who was characterised by Kyprianos as “a vain silly creature” (“τρελλοχάλιλος”),42 accepted the leadership of the rebels, having one great advantage: he was in possession of one of the strongest castles on the island.43

  • 44 ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 18 August 1766, ff. 2v‑3r: “… ch’egli e li Mossulmani suoi segu (...)
  • 45 Kyprianos 1788, p. 322; Cobham 1908, p. 360.

26According to a Venetian consular report, in August 1765, the “castellano di Cirigna”, after pillaging all the ammunition of his castle, was placed at the head of around 1.000 persons, under a green banner, demanding that the extraordinary taxes should be imposed only on the Greek reaya, while he targeted the local Ottoman authorities, which included the Archbishop and the Dragoman.44 The rebels swore allegiance to Halil, who appointed his own officials and set up “a kind of government”. With threats and promises, he managed to gather an army of 5,000 volunteer malcontents or villagers who were forced to follow him, and then sent letters to the notables, demanding that they should procure from the Porte his appointment as the island’s governor.45

  • 46 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 203r‑v (19 December 1765): “Je ne sçaurois représenter à votre Grandeur l’avil (...)
  • 47 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 218r‑v (6 February 1766): “… la cour brillante que Halil Aga tient depuis quel (...)
  • 48 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 220v‑221r (6 February 1766). On Sheykh Zahir al‑Umar, see Joudah 2013.

27The rapid success of Halil Ağa is clearly described in the reports of French Consul Benoît Astier, who commented in December 1765 on “the debasement of the Governor and his people, who are in the greatest fear and counted for nothing”. On the other hand, Halil Ağa’s “reputation is constantly increasing […] everyone trembles at his name, and especially the petty tyrants, the aghas and the tax-collectors”.46 By February 1766 Astier was writing about “the brilliant court that Halil Ağa held for several months, with a ceremonial similar to those of the most powerful pashas”.47 He suggested that Halil Ağa had decided to become master of the island and that his model was Zahir al‑Umar of Galilee, an Arab Palestinian notable, who had managed for a time to exercise autonomous rule in the region of Acre under the aegis of the Ottomans. Halil was hoping that the Porte, seeing the local power that he had acquired, would accept his authority as it had done with that leader.48

  • 49 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 203r‑v (19 December 1765). “Il n’est guère un village qui ne lui demande sa pr (...)
  • 50 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 213r (24 January 1766): “Ce chef fait des justices de mort et d’autres qui immo (...)
  • 51 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 203r‑v (19 December 1765): “… si cet homme soutient, et qu’il soit réellement (...)

28For the Consul this was not just pomp and circumstance, as he wrote that “there is hardly a village that does not ask for his protection and the whole island resounds with his praises”.49 Consul Astier lionises Halil Ağa, portraying him as the protector of the people (“le peuple”) against the depredations of the aghas and relating that he administered justice in a way “that would immortalise a governor, giving him the reputation of a messenger of God, a liberator”.50 Astier’s conclusion regarding Halil Aga was favourable: “if this man holds out, and if he is really protected by Constantinople […], there is no doubt that the island will be repopulated, especially if he continues to respect the orders of the Grand Seigneur”.51

  • 52 Mariti 1792, pp. 144‑149; Myrianthopoulos 1934, pp. 53‑54; Kokkinoftas 1997, p. 33.
  • 53 Kyprianos 1788, p. 324; Cobham 1908, p. 361.

29State intervention, however, ended Halil Ağa’s pretentions to power. In the summer of 1766, Kör Ahmed, the Pasha of Teke, arrived in Cyprus at the head of a motley group of corsairs and chieftains from Karaman, in order to suppress the rebellion. With a conciliatory message he managed to disperse the greater part of the rebels, so that Halil Ağa retired to the castle of Kyrenia with a group of only 200 faithful followers. The Pasha proceeded to besiege the rebels and obtained their surrender with false promises. Halil and his followers were put in chains as rebels and “enemies of their country” and were brought before the Pasha, who upbraided their leader “for his infidelity towards his sovereign, who had entrusted him with the care of an important citadel” and ordered him to be strangled in his presence.52 Thus, according to Kyprianos, “the country was relieved of the presence of a herd of miscreants” (“από μίαν αγέλην τοσούτων κακοποιών υποκειμένων”).53

Motley crews: levends, corsairs and Karamaniots

  • 54 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 185r‑v (1 October 1765).
  • 55 Mariti 1792, pp. 136‑137.

30In the wake of the revolt of 1764, the island was spiralling into anarchy and disorder. According to consular reports, the new Governor was completely impotent to impose order: gangs were fighting and killing each other in the streets of Nicosia, while irregulars (levends) were ravaging the countryside, stealing and raping with impunity. According to Consul Astier, the authority of the courts of justice was held in such contempt at that time that a new Kadı, who had come to Cyprus in May 1765, decided to return to Istanbul by the end of August.54 Occasionally panic would also spread in the port of Larnaca when rumours spread about the imminent arrival of the rebels. The affluent Europeans attempted to protect their valuable possessions and their families by sending them aboard the “Christian vessels” that were anchored in the port, while “the shops were shut, commerce was suspended, the fields and villages were abandoned”.55

  • 56 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 197r‑v (21 November 1765): “… on ne sçait quoi penser de l’espèce d’indifféren (...)

31More than one year after the initial revolt, the Porte did not seem to respond to events on the island. Consul Astier described the continuous peasant uprisings in the preceding spring and summer, expressing his amazement at the “kind of indifference that [the Porte] seemed to show in this regard”. The lack of response created rumours that the local notables had justified the uprisings to avoid a deeper official investigation into the affairs of the island, or that the Porte wanted to gain time to organise more general measures, taking care not only of the disorders of Cyprus, but of similar conditions that afflicted other neighbouring provinces.56

  • 57 Kyprianos 1788, p. 324; Cobham 1908, p. 361; Stavrides 2014, pp. 238‑239.
  • 58 Mariti 1792, pp. 141‑142.
  • 59 ASV: Archivio del Consolato Veneto a Cipro, b. 21, no. 100 (15 June 1766); Stavrides 2023, pp. 63, (...)

32The long-awaited response of the Porte came in June 1766, in the form of Kör Ahmed, a Pasha of two tails, Gölgelioğlu Mustafa Bey of Silifke, and Cafer Bey, Alaybey of Antalya.57 The latter arrived in the port of Larnaca with 200 men and proceeded to occupy the fort. However, deliverance from the rebels was not necessarily a positive development for the inhabitants. According to Mariti, “there was no excess which this disorderly band did not commit: and they at length rendered themselves much more odious than even the rebels; for the latter had as yet always respected individuals”,58 while the Venetian Consul, in a petition to Cafer Bey, exclaimed that “we do not have security and tranquillity in this province anymore!”.59

  • 60 Mariti 1792, pp. 141‑143.

33Halil Ağa sent a message to Cafer Bey that “as the citadel, and even the whole island, were under the protection of faithful subjects, and people friends to justice, they were able to defend it from every foreign attack; and that they had no occasion for the interference of a handful of insolent banditti, commanded by a pirate”. Thus, the rebel leader assumed the role of loyal subject of the Sultan, in contrast to the men sent by the Porte, who were characterized as bandits and pirates. In fact, after Cafer Bey left Larnaca, a detachment of rebels recaptured the citadel, “and having hoisted the Grand Signior’s standard, declared themselves the defenders of the fortress of their sovereign”.60

  • 61 Mariti 1792, pp. 142‑143.
  • 62 Myrianthopoulos 1934, p. 54; Kokkinoftas 1997, p. 33.
  • 63 ASV: Archivio del Consolato Veneto a Cipro, b. 27, no. 19 (30 June 1766); Stavrides 2023, pp. 63, 1 (...)
  • 64 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f 291r (12 November 1766): “Enfin jusqu’aux choses inanimées aurvient à se plaindr (...)

34Although this expedition was dispatched by the Sultan to restore order on the island, various sources relate “the most horrid ravages” committed by the men of the Bey of Silifke. According to Mariti, “robbery, plunder, and theft were all exercised by this band of barbarians; and the island, which ought to have looked up to them for safety, received from them a treatment which it had not experienced from the rebels”.61 The atrocities committed by Gölgelioğlu’s men are confirmed by other sources, such as the chronicler Joachim of Palouriotissa62 and petitions addressed by villagers to Kör Ahmed Pasha.63 The French Consul reported that the disorderly Karamaniot troops had also made extensive damage to monuments, such as the Selimiye mosque, the old gothic cathedral of Hagia Sophia, as they removed from the exterior walls all the figures, “which had escaped the rigours of the seasons and the barbarity of the army which conquered the island [in 1570]”.64

  • 65 Mariti 1792, pp. 145‑146.

35As in the period of rebel domination, Larnaca was also terrified of Gölgelioğlu’s men, and when rumours spread of an impending attack of the Karamaniots, “the people fled in all quarters, and endeavoured to carry along with them their money and most valuable effects; the Europeans collected their books and their papers, in order to convey them on board the vessels that were in the harbour; and the Turkish, Grecian, and European women, reduced almost to a state of despair, knew not where to conceal themselves”. Thus, the people of the city flocked to the seashore, planning to seek shelter on the ships anchored in the port.65

  • 66 Kyprianos 1788, pp. 324‑325; Cobham 1908, p. 361.

36We see thus that the inhabitants of the cities and villages of the island were perhaps more afraid of the troops sent by the Porte to restore order than of the rebels themselves, and the “official” troops were seen as a source of even greater disorder than that reigning on the island before their arrival. These forces were characterized by sources such as Kyprianos as “a set of savages, thieves and murderers”.66

Moral tales and system failures

  • 67 Cobham 1908, p. 369.
  • 68 Mariti 1792, pp. 149‑150.
  • 69 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 175r (31 August 1765): “Dans la Syrie et en Caramanie il règne de pareils désor (...)

37Eighteenth-century European observers tended to attribute the events, and the general condition of the island, to the failings of the Ottoman system, and especially the application of the tax farming system, coupled with the lack of accountability of the muhassıls. Writing at the end of the century, British Consul M. de Vezin observed that “the income of the Governor is undefined, he can amass just as much as his conscience allows”.67 In a similar vein, Giovanni Mariti concludes his account of the events with a criticism of the Ottoman administrative system on the island: “whoever may be governor, this beautiful but unhappy island will never recover from the disasters which it has suffered for so many years, if it continues to be sold, as hitherto, to the person who bids most of it”.68 Consul Astier, ever ready to criticise the Ottoman system, closed his August 1765 report with a general comment: “In Syria and Karaman reign similar disorders, so that one can say that the Ottoman Empire is collapsing by its own weight on flimsy and shaky foundations”.69

  • 70 Kyprianos 1788, p. 318; Cobham 1908, pp. 356‑357.

38On the other hand, authors associated with the Ottoman system, such as the official palace historians Çeşmî-zâde and Şemdânî-zâde, or Archimandrite Kyprianos, a cleric of the Greek Orthodox Church, tend to emphasise the moral aspect of the events. Kyprianos, for example, calls Çil Osman “that rock of offence, that cause of all our ills”, implying that the greed of the deceased Governor was to blame for the revolt.70

  • 71 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 51: “Bu kadar bagy ü isyân ve şaka vü tuğyân ne maslahat gördüğü ashâb‑ı fehm ü (...)
  • 72 Şemdânî-zâde 1978, p. 105.
  • 73 Ibid., p. 106.
  • 74 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49.

39Ottoman official historians Çeşmî-zâde and Şemdânî-zâde, turning the revolt of 1764 into a moral tale, interpret it as a result of the greed of Ottoman officials. At the end of his account of the events, Çeşmî-zâde wrote that “the reason that led to so much oppression and rebellion and villainy and insubordination should be a lesson to be learnt from, and a matter that requires close examination and study”.71 For his part, Şemdânî-zâde entitles the relevant chapter of his history “Τhe damage that comes as a result of greed” (“Tama’dan hasıl olan zarar”) and goes on to demonstrate that the revolt was caused by the undue increase of the island’s taxes by the Grand Viziers, and especially by Köse Bahir Mustafa Pasha.72 Both historians then recount Mustafa Pasha’s attempts to cover up his complicity in the revolt by conducting a false investigation.73 According to Çeşmî-zâde, “because there was no investigation, it was said that the scoundrels and the rabble, who find pleasure in looting and pillaging, were always ready and waiting to commit disorders and sedition”.74 That is, these historians regarded that the investigation was rigged from the start in order to shift responsibility from the Grand Vizier’s greed to the unruliness of the people, with the corollary that the real culprit was personally the top Ottoman official.

40The accounts of Ottoman authors contain accusations against many targets for the violence and the disorders in Cyprus: the oppressed and exasperated people of the island, the greedy Grand Vizier, the rapacious Muhassıl, the embezzling aghas, the oppressive bishops, the unruly Karamaniots. However, one crucial component of the system is missing from their accounts, and that is the Sultan. Sources connected to the system, such as Şemdânî-zâde, Çeşmî-zâde and Kyprianos, avoid criticising the system itself or its main representative and opt to focus their criticism on the vices of individual actors.

  • 75 Mariti 1792, p. 132.

41Nevertheless, the Sultan was, at least theoretically, at the centre of this story as almost every actor claimed to be acting in his name and on his behalf. Çil Osman came to collect the taxes on his behalf, while in the aftermath of the revolt the new Muhassıl, using sultanic authority, ordered the collection of indemnity from the reaya. This caused the reaction of some of the subjects, who thought that the Sultan should consider them “as the deliverers of the empire, and the destroyers of a tyrant who was endeavouring to ruin it” and reasoned that “to submit to this new tax […] is to affix to a glorious and necessary insurrection the name and criminality of a shameful revolt; it is to declare ourselves rebels; and such a title is undoubtedly not at all suited to the avengers of their country, and the protectors of justice”.75 Halil Ağa, who claimed to be the restorer of sultanic order, was in the end executed as a traitor to the Sultan and his head was sent to Istanbul as proof. Therefore, all actors claimed to be using violence to fight disorder in an attempt to re‑establish the Sultan’s order.

  • 76 Gara 2012, p. 405.
  • 77 Gara 2011, p. 93.
  • 78 Faroqhi 1992, p. 16.

42The Sultan was seen as the ultimate protector of them all and “the dual imagery of subjects as a powerless flock in need of their shepherd’s protection and of the Sultan as defender of the common people […] constituted a major pillar of Ottoman imperial ideology”.76 The protection afforded by the Sultan to his subjects, “celebrated in the well-known ‘circle of justice’, were the most important legitimizing principles of Ottoman rule and were daily evoked as the ones guiding the ruler’s decisions”.77 As pointed out by Suraiya Faroqhi, the idea of a benevolent and just ruler “whose good intentions are thwarted by the abuses of his advisors” was “an age-old legitimizing device” that was to be found not only in the Ottoman empire, but also in early modern Europe, reinforcing the notion that “the ruler was not a party to the depredations of his officials and his role as a protector of the reaya was reasserted”.78

  • 79 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 189v‑190r (9 November 1765): “… et dont les Rayas n’ont pas le crédit ni la ha (...)

43It is a paradox that, while the Sultan is at the centre of this story, his name being invoked by all actors, who claim to act in his name, he essentially remains in the shadows. The orders, the officials, the armies dispatched to the island by the central authorities do not really emanate from his person, except symbolically. In fact, in these events he is a non-actor, who seems hardly to be aware of them, relying on corrupt officials and biased investigations. When in the midst of the anarchy reigning on the island, the Muhassıl punished severely the perpetrator of an act of vandalism against a Catholic religious institution, Consul Astier commented that he had done so with the connivance of the aghas, out of fear that the French Ambassador in Istanbul would complain to the Sultan. Such a development would have provided an opportunity to find out about the disorders of Cyprus, which they would have an interest to keep secret, since they were the result of their own misgovernment, “and of which the reaya do not have the credibility nor the boldness to inform him”.79

  • 80 Faroqhi 1992, p. 2.
  • 81 Anastasopoulos 2002, p. 87.

44It is telling about the condition of the decentralized Ottoman empire in the middle of the eighteenth century, that a foreign Ambassador could be better informed than the Sultan concerning the situation in one of his provinces. The reaya had few opportunities of expressing their grievances and their avenues of communication with the Porte were extremely limited.80 As in other cases around this time, the Sultan chose to remain in the background and play the role of final arbiter of local infighting, as long as his legitimacy was not at stake. As Antonis Anastasopoulos points out, although it did not lose control over the provinces, the Ottoman state exercised a “flawed control” that did not seek to remedy the roots of the problems arising but was rather content with a symptomatic treatment.81

  • 82 Gara 2011, p. 104.

45In the final analysis, no changes could be effected in the provinces unless they had the consent of the local notables. According to Eleni Gara, “the success of protest did not depend on a favorable sultanic rescript but on the current constellation of power relations and on the leverage of protesters”.82 In our case, the rebellion failed because of the inability of the central government to impose its authority on the local notables. The rhetoric of sultanic justice notwithstanding, the local aghas not only avoided punishment, but were ultimately rewarded. Their victory is exemplified by the rise to power a decade later of Haci Baki Ağa (1777-1784), who had been one of the primary targets of the rebellion.

Conclusion: re‑establishing the Sultan’s order

  • 83 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 51; ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 144r‑v.
  • 84 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 51. On Muhsinzâde Mehmed Pasha, see Yaycıoğlu 2016, pp. 134‑135; Nagata 2020.

46When at the end of the story presented by Çeşmî-zâde Grand Vizier Köse Bahir Mustafa Pasha is deposed and executed for his complicity in the events of Cyprus, this is done, again, in the name of the Sultan.83 With the accession of the new Grand Vizier, Muhsinzâde Mehmed Pasha, the extra purses, which had been imposed by Mustafa Pasha for the right to collect the taxes of the island were immediately abolished. As Çeşmî-zâde concludes exuberantly, because of this “the honour of the Imperial State was restored”.84 Thus, while the Ottoman system experienced troubles caused by the personal failures of the officials who operate it, the Sultan remained imperturbably seated at its centre, not as an actor, but rather as a symbol of the unassailable legitimacy of the dynasty and the state.

47The Sultan and his legitimacy, expressed through the cycle of justice, represented order for the Ottomans and disorder was anything that violated sultanic justice. Order and disorder, however, were contested notions, varying according to an individual’s or a group’s perspective: who was the cause of disorder? A greedy vizier? A rapacious governor? An embezzling bishop? A tyrannical notable? An ambitious official? An unruly mob? A group of irregular soldiers? This is hard to discern, as they all claimed to be acting with a view to fighting disorder and establishing order in the name of the Sultan.

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Bibliographie

Archival sources

ANP: Archives nationales de Paris

        AE/B/I/639.

ASV: Archivio di Stato di Venezia

        Archivio del Consolato Veneto a Cipro, b. 21, no. 100.

        Archivio del Consolato Veneto a Cipro, b. 27, no. 19.

        V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648.

BOA: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri

        C. DH 19, 944.

        C. DH 313, 15642.

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Bombardieri L. 2012. “Viaggi e studi del georgofilo fiorentino Giovanni Mariti nel Levante e a Cipro (1760-1768)”. Atti della Accademia dei Georgofili 8, pp. 747‑768.

Bombardieri L. 2024. From exploration to exploitation. Giovanni Mariti, Domenico Sestini, Antonio Mondaini, and the early history of Cypriote archaeology. Venice.

Cobham C. D. 1908. Excerpta Cypria. Materials for a history of Cyprus. Cambridge.

Çeşmî-zâde M. R. 1959. Çeşmî-zâde Tarihi, ed. Bekir Kütükoğlu. Istanbul.

DİA. 2010. “Şem‘dânîzâde Süleyman Efendi”. Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 38. İstanbul, pp. 501‑503.

Faroqhi S. 1992. “Political activity among Ottoman taxpayers and the problem of sultanic legitimation (1570-1650)”. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 35, pp. 1‑39.

Gara E. 2011. “Popular protest and the limitations of sultanic justice”. E. Gara, M. Kabadayı, Ch. Neumann (eds.), Popular protest and political participation in the Ottoman empire. Istanbul, pp. 89‑104.

Gara E. 2012. “Patterns of collective action and political participation in the early modern Balkans”. A. Anastasopoulos (ed.), Political initiatives ‘from the bottom up’ in the Ottoman empire. Halcyon days in Crete VII. A symposium held in Rethymno 9‑11 January 2009. Rethymno, pp. 399‑433.

Hadjikyriacou A. 2014. “Local intermediaries and insular space in late 18th century Ottoman Cyprus”. Osmanlı Araştırmaları 44, pp. 427‑456.

Hill G. 1952. A History of Cyprus, vol. 4. Cambridge.

İlgürel M. 2020. “Mustafa Paşa, Köse”. Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 31. Istanbul, pp. 345‑346.

Joudah A. H. 2013. Revolt in Palestine in the eighteenth century. The era of Shaykh Zahir al‑‘Umar. Piscataway (NJ).

Kitromilides P. M. 1982. “Repression and protest in traditional society: Cyprus 1764”. Κυπριακαί Σπουδαί 46, pp. 91‑101.

Kitromilides P. M. 2002. Κυπριακή λογιοσύνη 1571-1878. Nicosia.

Kitromilides P. M. 2015. “The Patriotism of the expatriates”. Il pensiero politico 48, pp. 518‑526.

Kokkinoftas K. 1997. “Το Χρονικό του Ιωακείμ Παλλουριωτίσσης”. Πολιτιστική Κύπρος 12, pp. 32‑42.

Kütükoğlu B. 1993. “Çeşmîzâde Mustafa Reşid”. Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 8. Istanbul, pp. 289‑290.

Kyprianos A. 1788. Ιστορία χρονολογική της νήσου Κύπρου. Venice.

Mariti G. 1792. Travels through Cyprus, Syria, and Palestine: with a general history of the Levant, vol. 1. Dublin.

Myrianthopoulos C. 1934. Χατζηγεωργάκις Κορνέσιος ο Διερμηνεύς της Κύπρου 1779-1809 ήτοι Συμβολαί εις την Ιστορίαν της Κύπρου επί Τουρκοκρατίας (1570-1878). Nicosia.

Nagata Y. 2020. “Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa”. Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 31. Istanbul, pp. 48‑50.

Stavrides Th. 2014. “Champions of the Sultan: the rebellion of Cyprus 1764-1766”. E. Balta, G. Salakides, Th. Stavrides (eds.), Festschrift in Honor of Ioannis P. Theocharides. Studies on Ottoman Cyprus, vol. 1. Istanbul, pp. 225‑246.

Stavrides Th. 2023. Ottoman documents from the archives of the Venetian consulate of Cyprus, 1765-1797. Nicosia.

Şemdânî-zâde. 1978. Şemdânî-zâde Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi Târihi Mür’i’t-Tevârih, vol. II.A. Istanbul.

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Notes

1 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 78r (26 July 1764); Stavrides 2014, pp. 227‑228. On Köse Bahir Mustafa Pasha, see İlgürel 2020.

2 Kyprianos 1788, p. 318; Cobham 1908, pp. 356‑357. On Kyprianos, see Kitromilides 2002, pp. 174‑177 and Kitromilides 2015, pp. 523‑524.

3 On the misfortunes of the island during the 1750s and 1760s, see Kyprianos 1788, pp. 316‑318; Cobham 1908, pp. 356‑357.

4 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 80r (26 July 1764).

5 Mariti 1792, pp. 126‑127. ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 1v. On Giovanni Mariti, see Bombardieri 2012 and Bombardieri 2024, pp. 11‑28.

6 Gara 2012, pp. 413‑414.

7 Mariti 1792, p. 128. ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 95v (18 November 1764). ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 1v.

8 Kitromilides 1982, p. 93. On the custom of petitioning the Sultan for the redress of grievances, see Faroqhi 1992, p. 2; Gara 2011, p. 93; Gara 2012, p. 401.

9 Mariti 1792, p. 128; Şemdânî-zâde 1978, p. 105; Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49. On Şemdânî-zâde, see DİA 2010. On Çeşmî-zâde Mustafa Reşid, see Kütükoğlu 1993. On the unofficial institution of assemblies of representatives of the local population, see Gara 2012, pp. 411‑412.

10 Kyprianos 1788, p. 319; Cobham 1908, pp. 357‑358; ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 95v‑96r (18 November 1764); ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, ff. 1v‑2v; Şemdânî-zâde 1978, p. 105; Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49; Mariti 1792, pp. 128‑129. Kyprianos, using the Julian calender, gives the date as October 25, while Mariti, using the Gregorian calendar, gives November 5: Stavrides 2014, pp. 228‑229.

11 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49; Mariti 1792, pp. 129‑130; ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 94r, 96v‑97r (18 November 1764); ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, ff. 2v‑3r.

12 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 97r (18 November 1764), 134r (25 May 1765).

13 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49; Stavrides 2014, p. 229.

14 Kyprianos 1788, p. 320; Cobham 1908, p. 358; Mariti 1792, p. 130; ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 3r.

15 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 136r‑v (25 May 1765).

16 Kyprianos 1788, p. 319; Cobham 1908, p. 358.

17 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 134r‑v (25 May 1765).

18 Myrianthopoulos 1934, p. 55; Kokkinoftas 1997, pp. 33‑34.

19 Mariti 1792, p. 129. See also Kitromilides 1982, p. 92.

20 ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 2r.

21 Şemdânî-zâde 1978, p. 105: “… leyle‑i mezkûrede bir kaç odanın temel direklerini kat’ ettirmiş”; Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49.

22 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 96r (18 November 1764): “Ce Gouverneur, ayant prévu, dès l’arrivée du Tchoccadar, que les enquettes ordonnées par le commandement apporté ne pouvoient que le jetter dans les plus grans embarras, il forma, pour sortir de ce labyrinthe, le projet infernal de se défaire en même tems, et tout à la fois, du Vizir Tchoccadar, des Évêques, et de tous ses autres accusateurs”.

23 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 96r (18 November 1764): “… qu’il avoit fait donner par deux fois du poison au Vizir Tchoccadar dans du caffé, et qu’il avoit fait affoiblir pendant la nuit et scier par moitié les solives et les appuis de la partie de la sale de son Divan, où se devoient tenir les Évêques et le Peuple, et qu’il y avoit fait attacher des cordes pour les faire crouler à un signal”.

24 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 96v (18 November 1764), f. 133r (25 May 1765): “…ce croulement que je croirois plutôt l’effet de la vetusté de l’appartement, comme il se peut que les vomissements du Vizir Tchoccadar, attribués au poison contre lequel il prit des remedes, ayant été causé par la surprise de l’émeute soudaine et imprevue …”.

25 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 133r (25 May 1765): “Osman Aga, à la tête des officiers qui formoient son Divan, les reçut dans une sale neuve qu’il avoit fait faire à son arrivée à Nicosie sans considerer que les poutres et les solives sur lesquelles elle appuyoit étoient à moitié pourries”.

26 Kyprianos 1788, pp. 319‑320; Cobham 1908, p. 358; Hill 1952, p. 82 no. 2; Stavrides 2014, p. 229.

27 BOA: C. DH 313, 15642.

28 Myrianthopoulos 1934, p. 55; Kokkinoftas 1997, pp. 33‑34; Stavrides 2014, p. 230.

29 ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 2v: “siccome il Governatore è un tirano e ribelle alla giustizia et ai commandi reggij, che li diano l’assalto al suo palazzo e che lo ammazzino”.

30 Mariti 1792, p. 129.

31 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 96v (18 November 1764), f. 133v (25 May 1765).

32 Kitromilides 1982, pp. 92‑93.

33 BOA: C. DH 19, 944.

34 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 140v‑141v (25 May 1765): “ils respondirent que l’un et l’autre étant les principaux moteurs des taxes injustes et forcées auxquelles on soûmettoit les Chrétiens, ils occasionnoient la fuite de l’isle et par consequent l’inculture des terres que les Turcs leur donnoient à travailler et dont le produit étoit leur seule richesse”.

35 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 142r (25 May 1765): “Ce qu’il eut de louable dans leur conduite c’est que pendant les trois jours qu’ils ont demeurés attroupés à Chitrea, ils n’y ont commis aucun desordre. Ils faisoient venir leurs vivres de leurs villages, et lorsqu’ils avoient à se pourvoir de quelque chose, ils payoient argent comptant”.

36 ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b 648, 13 November 1764, f. 1r: “… temendo loro di qualche sollevazione delli rajà contro se medemi”.

37 Kitromilides 1982, p. 93.

38 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 97r, 134r (25 May 1765). See also, ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 13 November 1764, f. 3r.

39 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 174v‑175r (31 August 1765).

40 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 212v (24 January 1766). On Haci Baki Ağa, see Hadjikyriacou 2014, pp. 435‑440; Stavrides 2023, pp. 71‑82.

41 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 219v‑220r (6 February 1766).

42 Kyprianos 1788, p. 322; Cobham 1908, p. 360.

43 Mariti 1792, p. 133; Stavrides 2014, p. 233.

44 ASV: V Savi alla Mercanzia, b. 648, 18 August 1766, ff. 2v‑3r: “… ch’egli e li Mossulmani suoi seguaci non si sarebbero mai sottoposti a pagare le gravezze state imposte sul Regno, che solo cader devono sopra li Raia Greci…”.

45 Kyprianos 1788, p. 322; Cobham 1908, p. 360.

46 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 203r‑v (19 December 1765): “Je ne sçaurois représenter à votre Grandeur l’avilissement du Gouverneur et de ses gens. Ils sont dans la plus grand crainte et on les compte pour rien” … “Il en est bien autrement de Kallilaga, sa considération va toujours en augmenter … tout tremble a son nom, et surtout les petits tyrans, les agas et collecteurs qui se chargeoient de la perception de la droite”.

47 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 218r‑v (6 February 1766): “… la cour brillante que Halil Aga tient depuis quelques mois avec un appareil semblable à ceux des Pachas les plus puissants”.

48 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 220v‑221r (6 February 1766). On Sheykh Zahir al‑Umar, see Joudah 2013.

49 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 203r‑v (19 December 1765). “Il n’est guère un village qui ne lui demande sa protection et toute l’isle ne retentit que ses louanges”.

50 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 213r (24 January 1766): “Ce chef fait des justices de mort et d’autres qui immortaliseroient un gouverneur, et elles lui ont fait la reputation d’un envoyé de Dieu, d’un libérateur”.

51 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 203r‑v (19 December 1765): “… si cet homme soutient, et qu’il soit réellement protégé à Constantinople…, il n’est pas douteux que l’isle ne se repeuple, s’il continue surtout dans son système de faire observer … les commandements du Grand Seigneur”.

52 Mariti 1792, pp. 144‑149; Myrianthopoulos 1934, pp. 53‑54; Kokkinoftas 1997, p. 33.

53 Kyprianos 1788, p. 324; Cobham 1908, p. 361.

54 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 185r‑v (1 October 1765).

55 Mariti 1792, pp. 136‑137.

56 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 197r‑v (21 November 1765): “… on ne sçait quoi penser de l’espèce d’indifférence qu’elle paroit témoigner à cet égard”.

57 Kyprianos 1788, p. 324; Cobham 1908, p. 361; Stavrides 2014, pp. 238‑239.

58 Mariti 1792, pp. 141‑142.

59 ASV: Archivio del Consolato Veneto a Cipro, b. 21, no. 100 (15 June 1766); Stavrides 2023, pp. 63, 99‑100.

60 Mariti 1792, pp. 141‑143.

61 Mariti 1792, pp. 142‑143.

62 Myrianthopoulos 1934, p. 54; Kokkinoftas 1997, p. 33.

63 ASV: Archivio del Consolato Veneto a Cipro, b. 27, no. 19 (30 June 1766); Stavrides 2023, pp. 63, 101‑102.

64 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f 291r (12 November 1766): “Enfin jusqu’aux choses inanimées aurvient à se plaindre car il a fait couper toutes les belles figures et masques qui se trouvoient encore sur les murs extérieurs de la mosquée de Nicosie, autrefois église de Sainte Sophie, qui avoient échappé aux rigueurs des saisons et à la barbarie de l’armée qui fit la conquêtte de l’isle”. See also Stavrides 2014, p. 242.

65 Mariti 1792, pp. 145‑146.

66 Kyprianos 1788, pp. 324‑325; Cobham 1908, p. 361.

67 Cobham 1908, p. 369.

68 Mariti 1792, pp. 149‑150.

69 ANP: AE/B/I/639, f. 175r (31 August 1765): “Dans la Syrie et en Caramanie il règne de pareils désordres, de sorte que l’on peut dire que l’empire ottoman s’affaisse par son propre poids sur des fondements peu solides, et qui s’ébranlent”.

70 Kyprianos 1788, p. 318; Cobham 1908, pp. 356‑357.

71 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 51: “Bu kadar bagy ü isyân ve şaka vü tuğyân ne maslahat gördüğü ashâb‑ı fehm ü şu’ûra bâis‑i intibâh olmağa sezâvâr bir emr‑i mûcibü’l-istibşârdır”.

72 Şemdânî-zâde 1978, p. 105.

73 Ibid., p. 106.

74 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 49.

75 Mariti 1792, p. 132.

76 Gara 2012, p. 405.

77 Gara 2011, p. 93.

78 Faroqhi 1992, p. 16.

79 ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 189v‑190r (9 November 1765): “… et dont les Rayas n’ont pas le crédit ni la hardiesse de donner la connoissance”.

80 Faroqhi 1992, p. 2.

81 Anastasopoulos 2002, p. 87.

82 Gara 2011, p. 104.

83 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 51; ANP: AE/B/I/639, ff. 144r‑v.

84 Çeşmî-zâde 1959, p. 51. On Muhsinzâde Mehmed Pasha, see Yaycıoğlu 2016, pp. 134‑135; Nagata 2020.

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Theoharis Stavrides, « Shades of Disorder in Eighteenth‑Century Cyprus: The Case of the 1764‑1766 Rebellion »Cahiers du Centre d’Études Chypriotes, 55 | 2025, 319-335.

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Theoharis Stavrides, « Shades of Disorder in Eighteenth‑Century Cyprus: The Case of the 1764‑1766 Rebellion »Cahiers du Centre d’Études Chypriotes [En ligne], 55 | 2025, mis en ligne le 06 octobre 2025, consulté le 18 février 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/cchyp/2130 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/151c4

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Theoharis Stavrides

University of Cyprus

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