- 2 In 1963, the Cypriot cabinet moved Independence Day away from the summer holiday season to 1 Octobe (...)
- 3 Holland, Markides 2006, p. 240.
1The 16th August 2020 marked the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus.2 The London – Zurich agreements, signed on 17‑19 February 1959, created a self–standing, independent Cypriot state. The decolonization of Cyprus, which followed the onset of the E.O.K.A. (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) Revolt for the union of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis), has been described as “the most distorted and enduring experience in the modern Anglo-Hellenic encounter.”3 This paper offers an overview of British policy during the later stages of colonial rule in Cyprus. Specifically, it addresses this issue during the last fifteen years of British rule, from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the declaration of independence in 1960. In doing so it explores the major milestones of British policy vis à vis Cyprus during that period by investigating both external as well as internal developments on the island.
- 4 Anderson 1966, pp. 208-209.
- 5 For the Cyprus Convention see Lee 1934.
- 6 See Georghallides 1979, p. 427.
2Imperial, strategic and diplomatic considerations led London to acquire the administration of Cyprus from the Ottomans in 1878. This decision was inextricably connected to the British desire to preserve the status quo of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which re‑opened the Eastern Question and saw Russia expand as far as Constantinople itself, threatened the very existence of the Sultan’s empire. Undoubtedly, such a possibility posed a great challenge for British interests since, in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the road to the Mediterranean, and even the Persian Gulf, would be left open to the Russians. Preservation of Ottoman stability was therefore imperative to safeguard against these risks.4 Consequently, under the terms of the Cyprus Convention, Britain acquired the administration of the island, while the Sultan retained its sovereignty.5 According to the first census to be taken during British rule, in 1881, the population of the island numbered 186,173; Greek Cypriots amounted to 73.9% of the population, while Turkish Cypriots accounted for 24.4%. Armenians, Latins and Maronites constituted around 1.7% of the total population.6
3The British authorities had to confront the Enosis question, the Greek-Cypriot demand for the union of the island with Greece almost from the outset of their rule on the island. Indeed, this feature made the case of Cyprus distinctive because, unlike other people under colonial rule, the Greeks of Cyprus never wanted independence; rather, they wished to attach themselves to another state. The Greeks of Cyprus welcomed the change of guard on the island in 1878, not only because they hoped for the improvement of their lives but also because they genuinely saw Britain as a philhellenic country; one which had generously handed the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864.
- 7 Katsiaounis 1996 and Varnava 2009 have questioned the Bishop’s exact words. However, although it wa (...)
4The Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Archbishop in particular played a dominant part in Cypriot political life and Church representatives were in fact the first to welcome the British on the island. According to Cypriot folk tradition, the Bishop of Kitium welcomed the first High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, with a direct plea to Britain to cede Cyprus to Greece.7 For the Church itself the transition from Ottoman occupation to British rule posed challenges because the British refused to recognize the Church’s right to involve itself to civil affairs – as it did during the Ottoman rule. Despite this, gradually, assisted by greater freedom in civil life under the new regime, the Church naturally consolidated its place as the second power on the island.
- 8 One of the main grievances regarding economy concerned the so-called Tribute, a sum of 92,000 which (...)
- 9 The Great War had a significant impact on the development of the Enosis movement as it hardened Chu (...)
- 10 Yiangou 2009, p. 944.
5The dynamic of the Enosis movement fluctuated during the following decades: in the early years of British rule, up around to 1900, the movement existed in a comparatively milder form. The Greeks of Cyprus often promoted their national demands concurrently with requests for the improvement of the economic and social conditions on the island.8 Such requests took the form of memorandums submitted to the colonial authorities, while a number of formal delegations often visited London to promote their demands; the Archbishop was invariably at the head of such deputations. Enthusiasm for Greek-Cypriot volunteering to fight in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 and in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 played an important part in shaping the Enosis movement on the island. Until 1914, the British rebuffed any Enosis claims by explaining they did not possess sovereignty over the island and thus could not discuss the possibility of any alteration to the island’s status. The onset of World War I, however, during which the Ottomans sided with the Central Powers against Britain and its allies, brought about the cancellation of the Cyprus Convention and the unilateral annexation of Cyprus by Britain.9 In 1915, Britain offered Cyprus to Greece in exchange for Greece’s entry in the war on the Allied side. The short-lived Government of Premier Alexandros Zaimis, fearing that such a development would risk all that Greece had gained during the Balkans Wars (1912-1913) and alienate the pro‑German king Constantine, sought to keep a neutral stance and consequently refused the offer.10
- 11 Initial plans for developing Cyprus into a military base were abandoned once the British acquired E (...)
6Following the end of the Great War, the British remained immobile regarding Cyprus because their strategic interests pertaining to the island remained the same. Although London never developed Cyprus into a military base,11 they were not prepared to hand the island over to another power, who might do exactly that on their own behalf. This remained particularly true following the end of hostilities, when Cyprus was adjacent to the new lands the British assumed control over in the Middle East. The Greeks of Cyprus sought to exert further pressure on the colonial authorities for the fulfilment of their national demands. Expectations were boosted not only by Cypriot contribution to the Great War as volunteers but also by Allied declarations on the right of self-determination of subject peoples. However, no mention about Cyprus was made at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. A Greek Cypriot delegation under the leadership of Archbishop Cyril went to London to place their demands for Enosis. Despite efforts, the delegation eventually returned to Cyprus empty handed, disillusioned and frustrated. Therefore, the course of the 1920s saw the consolidation of Enosis as an actual movement rather than a vague aspiration in Greek Cypriot consciousness, under the leadership of the Orthodox Church.
- 12 Key works on education politics and the British in Cyprus include Heraclidou 2017 and Persianis 197 (...)
- 13 Alastos 1976, pp. 350-351; see also Hill 1952, pp. 546-548.
7In 1923, with the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey renounced its rights to the island and, in 1925, Cyprus became a Crown Colony. Tensions between the Greeks of Cyprus and the British intensified during the 1920s: continuing disappointments regarding demands for Enosis, grievances due to British interference in matters of education,12 and the poor economic condition of the island were causes for intense dissatisfaction. The introduction of a new custom tariff by the colonial authorities ignited a series of events that spontaneously led to widespread riots in October 1931, which the British managed to suppress quickly.13
8The October Revolt marked a turning point in the history of Anglo-Cypriot relations. The British held the Greek Orthodox Church responsible for the disturbances and immediately deported their protagonists, Nicodemos Mylonas and Makarios Myriantheas, Bishops of Kitium and Kyrenia respectively. Eight other Greek Cypriots, including two leading communists (the Communist Party of Cyprus had been founded in 1926) were also deported. With these deportations, the British aimed to deliver a severe blow to both the Enosis movement as well as to communism. Constitutional life was halted: the Legislative Council was abolished, political parties were made illegal, the press was put under strict censorship, elections were cancelled, and all municipal and local authorities were henceforth appointed by the Governor. As these measures were consolidated during the Governorship of Richmond Palmer (1933-1939), and this period remains known in Greek-Cypriot historiography as Palmer’s Rule or ‘Palmerokratia’, which lasted until the onset of the Second World War.
- 14 According to John Darwin, British decolonization was profoundly influenced by the course and impact (...)
- 15 For the ways with which the war affected Cyprus see Yiangou 2010.
9The experience of the Second World War in Cyprus, as elsewhere in the Empire, had a significant impact on British policy and paved the way for decolonization.14 In Cyprus, the war fundamentally altered ongoing realities concerning the future of the island.15 For one thing, the significant Cypriot contribution to the war effort was overwhelming: despite their grievances, Cypriots unanimously stood by the British Empire in its war effort, responding to the call of the new Governor, William Battershill. Cypriots enlisted as volunteers to the Cyprus Regiment, which was formed in February 1940, and to the Cyprus Volunteer Force (formed in June 1940), and many women also joined the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) and the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF). A key date was October 28, 1940, when Greece entered into the hostilities on the Allies’ side. The overlap of British and Greek interests brought about by the war created a new dynamic in the internal politics of the island. Indeed, Greek participation in the war was significant because it marked the revival of the Enosis movement with all its old dynamism. The overwhelming Cypriot contribution to the war by the side of Great Britain and its allies, as well as Greece’s heroic resistance to the Axis Powers, meant the Greeks of Cyprus had increased expectations from the British at the dawn of the post war era.
10The Cypriot contribution to the War forced the colonial regime in Cyprus to relax some of the repressive measures it had adopted following the suppression of the 1931 October Revolt, which in turn allowed the formation of new political parties and resulted in the remaking of Cypriot political life. Undoubtedly, the most important development was the rise of the Progressive Party of Working People (A.K.E.L.), a party of the Left, in 1941. Its quick growth, and the influence it exerted on a large part of Greek Cypriot society, caused anxiety for the colonial authorities and for the Right-wing politicians in the colony.16
- 17 For these themes see generally Yiangou 2012.
11The war transformed the political landscape of the island. Soon, however, suspicions between the British and Greek Cypriots (both left and right wing) arose and, by the end of the War, the colonial administration became anxious about the long-term stability on the island. Time and again during the war the British appeared determined to deflate Greek-Cypriot expectations of Enosis. Greek Cypriots were ultimately disappointed, and this feeling would become a core component of the post‑war Anglo-Cypriot relationship.17
12The end of the war unveiled new strategic pressures regarding the British position in the Middle East in general and in Cyprus in particular. The immediate post‑war years proved to be crucial for the fate of the Cyprus question because Britain had to confront the Enosis question in the background of the challenges it faced elsewhere in the Empire.
- 18 Louis 1984, p. 207.
- 19 Alexander 1979, p. 79. See also Leventis 2002, pp. 125-126.
- 20 Leventis 2002, pp. 125-126.
13The Cyprus question divided British official circles, especially the Foreign and the Colonial Office, and discussion of the future of Cyprus took place even as the war progressed. In fact, the Foreign Office appeared willing to discuss the union of Cyprus with Greece as the war neared its end. Foreign Office officials such as Sir Oliver Harvey (Deputy Under-Secretary of State) and W. G. Hayter (Head of the Southern Department) were inclined to acknowledge the demand of Enosis as a genuine wish of the majority of the Greek-Cypriot population,18 while the Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Orme Sargent, noted in September 1945 that Britain should hand Cyprus to Greece simply because “it ought to.”19 Sargent prepared his minute on the occasion of the visit to London by the Greek Archbishop Regent Damaskinos, during which the latter requested, among other requests, the union of Cyprus with Greece. In his analysis, Sargent emphasized that the cession of Cyprus to Greece would weaken the position of Greek communists, since they were in favour of Enosis, and would conversely strengthen the position of the Greek Regent and other elements in Greece favourable to the British. Sargent pressed this point by noting that the British would probably disappoint all other Greek claims on post‑war territorial gains – with the exception of the Dodecanese – and the acquisition of Cyprus would be a powerful off‑set for such disappointments. All in all, Sargent concluded, union of Cyprus with Greece would strengthen the position of both the British as well as of the Greek government during a critical period.20 Similar views were echoed in the Foreign Office until at least 1947. For example, in September 1947, Sir Oliver Harvey noted:
- 21 The National Archives of the UK (henceforth TNA)/ FCO 371/67084/R13462/G, Minute by Sir O. Harvey, (...)
“Our proposed evacuation policy in Palestine and the possibility that we may propose independence for Cyrenaica, when coupled with what we have done in India and Burma, makes our continued presence in Cyprus indefensible […] We have in fact never made use of the island for military purposes and we have spent next to nothing on its material and social betterment. We have nothing to be proud of there […] It can hardly be questioned that Greece, who has long governed Crete effectively, and has now been given the Dodecanese, can equally well govern Cyprus. (There is a small Turkish minority whose rights would be secured) […] For these different reasons I would strongly advocate that consideration be given to the very early cession of Cyprus to Greece, before the Cypriot campaign is embittered by violence and before cession can be represented as yielding to force […]21
- 22 Leventis 2002, p. 128. On an account of the development of relations between Greek and Turkish Cypr (...)
- 23 TNA/CO537/2486, The future of Cyprus in relation to the withdrawal from Palestine, Memorandum by J. (...)
- 24 Hatzivassiliou 1997, p. 8.
- 25 Leventis 2002, p. 128; Louis 1984, p. 210; Stefanidis 1991, p. 214.
- 26 Hatzivassiliou 1997, p. 8.
14The Colonial Office held an opposing attitude to such views, however, and argued against such an eventuality. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, George Hall, was strongly opposed to Enosis, emphasizing both the utility of Cyprus for British strategic and defence interests but also pointing out to the existence of the Turkish Cypriot minority: “…cession would involve the abandonment of our friends the loyal Moslem community, who amount to one‑fifth of the total population. It would certainly mean a disastrous deterioration in the standard of administration…”22 Following British withdrawal from India in 1947, British strategic interests shifted to the Middle East where, following the evacuation of Palestine, Cyprus remained the only territory in the region under direct British rule.23 Furthermore, the onset of the Cold War made Cyprus an important bastion against the Soviet Union. Retaining Cyprus meant the island was denied to a potential enemy.24 In the end, a report prepared by the Chiefs of Staff argued in favour of the retention of the island, emphasizing inter alia that Cyprus was the only territory in the Middle East where the British could pursue measures necessary for defence unfettered by treaties.25 This argument proved decisive for the fate of Cyprus. In fact, up until 1957, the Chiefs of Staff consistently supported retention of the island.26
- 27 Holland 1985, pp. 249-250.
15Therefore, Britain’s declining power after 1945, combined with the island’s strategic value, were factors that undermined the possibility of Enosis. Any sympathy for the fulfilment of Enosis vanished by 1947 in London. By then the Labour Government of Clement Attlee had taken important decisions concerning withdrawal from Jordan (declared independence in 1946), India (1947), Burma (1948) and Palestine, and it simply was not prepared to retreat from the Empire any further, especially in the vital area of the Eastern Mediterranean. This is why, despite expectations entertained by the majority of the Greeks of Cyprus, the British appeared increasingly inflexible regarding their position on the island: since they had to retreat from colonies in other parts of the Empire, it was of great strategic importance to keep their hold on Cyprus, as it had become all the more important in terms of geopolitics and strategy. The same strategic considerations applied for Malta, too, since that insular British possession also remained of critical imperial relevance after 1947; as the situation unfolded, Cypriot affairs were traumatized to a much greater degree, however, than in Malta, where a British presence, based around the dockyards, was much more entrenched.27
- 28 Hatzivassiliou 1997, p. 8.
16Such strategic considerations, quite naturally, held little meaning for Greek-Cypriots. To them the fundamental point had been made by the granting of independence to India and the constitutional evolution in other British colonies.28 Indeed, the mobilization of Cypriot society for a war fought in the name of freedom and self-determination meant that, following the allied victorious outcome of the hostilities, the Greeks of Cypriots were prepared to accept nothing less than Enosis.
- 29 TNA/FO 371/58761/R15605/G, From Foreign Office to Athens, 23 October 1946. See also TNA, CO 67/358/ (...)
- 30 TNA/CO 67/323/7, Political Situation October 1946. See also reactions of Greek-Cypriot press in TNA (...)
17Precisely because the British had decided to retain the island, some reform in the internal situation of the island should be implemented. On 23 October 1946, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, announced the convening of a Consultative Assembly, with Cypriot participation, to draft a new constitution.29 Simultaneously, it was further declared that a new Governor, Lord Winster, was to assume duties on the island. The re‑introduction of political reforms was to be accompanied with a ten‑year plan for the economic development of the island. Both gestures were met with disbelief by Greek Cypriots, and the ten‑year development programme in particular was understood as an effort to distract them from demanding Enosis.30
- 31 For a detailed analysis on the works of the Consultative Assembly see Katsiaounis 2000.
- 32 Hatzivassiliou 1997, p. 45-46; Holland, Markides 2006, p. 220.
18In July 1947 Lord Winster invited Cypriot representatives to join the Consultative Assembly31 – an invitation which Turkish Cypriots accepted. The Greeks of Cyprus, however, were divided: the Church and the Right-wing politicians in general rejected participation, condemning any such effort for the introduction of a constitution insisting on the ‘Enosis and only Enosis’ line; A.K.E.L., on the other hand, nominated delegates. The Assembly’s work began on 1 November 1947, and Greek-Cypriot delegates asked for self-government. This was rebuffed by the British, who preferred to retain full control of the government in an era when they faced increasing challenges in the Middle East; instead, the British offered, inter alia, a Greek-Cypriot majority in the Legislative Council (a longstanding Greek-Cypriot demand since the late 19th century), but with no right to discuss Enosis. Greek Cypriots rejected these proposals, and the Assembly soon reached a deadlock.32 By that time, polarization in Cypriot society, itself a reflection of the civil war then taking place in the Greek mainland, unfolded in full force. Despite factors that eventually undermined the success of the Consultative Assembly, it can be suggested the British proposals were an important constitutional offer – in which, compared to later British proposals, the Turkish factor was absent – and as such may be seen as a lost opportunity in the history of constitutional proposals the British tabled after 1945.
- 33 TNA/CO 537/4970, Summary of local press, 12 July 1949.
- 34 See for example TNA/CO 537/4970, Minute by J. S. Bennett minute 27 May 1949: “Personally I believe (...)
- 35 TNA/FCO 141/4281, The Influence of the Orthodox Church, 22 June 1949.
19The failure of the Consultative Assembly left the Cyprus Question at an impasse. Lord Winster resigned and was replaced by Sir Andrew Wright. Despite speculation in the press,33 as well as the views expressed by officials who believed constitutional discussions ought to resume,34 no initiative took place. Greek nationalist agitation on the island intensified, and in early 1949 A.K.E.L., having previously supported a policy line of self-government as a preliminary to full self-determination, now reversed itself to pursue unconditional Enosis. This reversal, however, was an important blow to the party, which appeared to give in to the pressure exerted by the Church and the Right, giving the Church in particular room for reorganization and a chance to regain its influence.35
- 36 Governor Wright reported that while the Bishop initially appeared to be moderate, he was now intran (...)
- 37 TNA/FCO 141/3155, A Patriotic Speech by the Bishop of Kitium, 14 January 1950.
- 38 See generally political report for January 1950 in TNA, CO 537/6235.
- 39 TNA/FO 371/87718/ RG1081/86, see pamphlet under the title, “Turks of Cyprus protest against the des (...)
20It was at this juncture that the future Archbishop, Makarios, was called back from Boston, where he was studying, to assume duties as the Bishop of Kitium. As the Bishop of Kitium, Makarios played an instrumental role in the organization of the plebiscite for Enosis in January 1950.36 His speech on the eve of the plebiscite revealed the new state of affairs: “The plebiscite”, the Bishop told his audience, “is a key which is designed to open the doors of our bondage. Should the foreign ruler refuse to open them, we shall force them open.”37 Makarios took the leadership of the Enosis campaign as organized by the Church. Indeed, a plebiscite on 15 January 1950 showed 95.7% of the voters wanted to exercise their right of self-determination. The plebiscite was understood by colonial authorities as a direct challenge to its position;38 it also triggered the opposition of the Turkish Cypriots.39
- 40 Minute by J.S.B Bennett, 11 July 1950, TNA/CO 67/367/1. See also Kelling 1990, pp. 120-122.
- 41 See Vanezis 1971, pp. 77-84.
21On 18 October 1950 the Bishop of Kitium was elected to the archiepiscopal throne as Makarios III. He was described by British officials as “a reasonable man, more reasonable than the Bishop of Kyrenia though for political reasons connected with his ambition to succeed to the Archbishopric he was for the moment following the customary church line on Enosis.”40 Makarios was born Michael Mouskos on 13 August 1913 in the village of Ano Panagia in Paphos to the family of a poor shepherd-farmer. Despite difficulties he distinguished himself at elementary school and was admitted at the age of twelve as a novice at Kykko Monastery, and he enrolled at the renowned Pancyprian Gymnasium of Nicosia for the higher forms of secondary education. In 1938 he was ordained deacon and was awarded a scholarship to study Theology and Law at the University of Athens. In 1942, in the midst of the German occupation of Greece, he served as a curate of church of St. Herene in the Greek capital. Following the liberation of Greece, he received a scholarship to study for a higher degree in Sociology of Religion at the University of Boston in the USA. In 1948, while still studying in Boston, he was elected Bishop of Kitium and returned to Cyprus.41
- 42 The Ethnarchy Bureau was formed in 1948 by Makarios (then Bishop of Kitium) to serve as an advisory (...)
- 43 Although a ‘National Assembly’ was formed in 1922, thus operating until the suppression of the 1931 (...)
- 44 TNA/FCO 141/3490, L. G. Durrell to Director General of Information, 30 January 1956.
22The elevation of Makarios III to the archiepiscopacy was a turning point in the history of Cyprus, as the Archbishop was one of the key protagonists of the Cyprus Question during the 1950s and up until his death in 1977. Under Makarios the Enosis movement acquired more organizational complexity and communication with Cypriot society, thus extending the range and depth of its influence. Alongside the Ethnarchy Bureau,42 the Archbishop reformed the Ethnarchy Council under his presidency; this council comprised around thirty laymen who were important Greek-Cypriot personalities.43 Supplementary to the National Council, a National Assembly was also formed in 1952 comprising more than three hundred representatives, though in reality this body rarely met. Special attention was given to the Ethnarchy’s links to Greeks beyond Cyprus, particularly in Greece and the United Kingdom but also in the USA. Liaison bodies were thus formed in Athens and in London. Although the Archbishopric did not maintain a propaganda service, these agencies were at the core of Makarios’ actions. As Lawrence Durrell, the Director of Public Relations Department noted, a web of newspapers, lawyers, priests, Cypriots abroad and the Athens Radio all served in promoting the Enosis cause.44
- 45 TNA/FCO 141/3490, Commissioner of Labour to the Colonial Secretary, 11 January 1955.
- 46 French 2015, p. 40.
23Simultaneously, links with the right wing Trade Unions (S.E.K.) were further strengthened, and communication with Trade Unions abroad, such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.) and the Greek Confederation of Trade Unions (G.S.E.E.), were established, and financial assistance was received from these organisations in 1952, perhaps even earlier.45 Furthermore, the Archbishop bolstered links with the farmers’ union (P.E.K.); in 1953 the appointment of Andreas Azinas to the post of the union’s Secretary General was important, as he was to play a fundamental role in the organization of the E.O.K.A. Revolt.46
- 47 Persianis 1978, p. 139.
24At the core of Makarios’ programme was the youth. Traditionally, education was of vital importance for Greek Cypriots, being also under the aegis of the Orthodox Church. Education always brought friction to relations between the Church and the colonial authorities, especially as the latter had long endeavoured to assume its full control. A new Secondary Education Law, enacted in 1952, exerted further pressure on the Church-State relationship. In January 1952, on the second anniversary of the plebiscite, Archbishop Makarios delivered one of his most passionate sermons at Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia. In front of a crowd of many thousands which included communists, nationalists and youths, he called for the intensification of the Enosis struggle and promised to bring the Cyprus Question to the United Nations, with or without Greece’s help. His speech remained known as the ‘Call to Youth’. This was especially true as the Archbishop remarked: “The hopeful Cyprus youth comes to the arena of noble ideas with the flag of freedom and justice hoisted. In the disciplined and organized ranks of our youth the Greek demand for union with Greece acquits a new vigour and support.”47
- 48 Heraclidou 2017, pp. 187-88.
25The Pancyprian National Organization of Youth (P.E.O.N.) was subsequently established and was to become the nursery of many E.O.K.A. fighters. Here we can trace the onset of the active involvement of students in the Enosis struggle.48 The first P.E.O.N. political activity took place in June 1953, when secondary school students demonstrated against the occasion of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. While P.E.O.N. was banned in June 1953, it managed to continue its operations underground; many of its members enrolled in the religious orthodox union of O.H.E.N. (Orthodox Christian Union of Youth).
26Makarios hardened his attitude towards the British, encouraging his flock to refuse to co‑operate with the colonial authorities. In doing so he sought to demonstrate that what the Greeks of Cyprus desired was union with Greece without compromise.49 The Ethnarchy therefore denounced the establishment of improvement areas on the island as a British manoeuvre to distract the Greeks of Cyprus from Enosis. Similarly, when in January 1950 Governor Wright (1949-1953) proudly announced the elimination of malaria on the island, the Church saw this as an effort to distract public opinion away from the conduct of the plebiscite, a reaction which outraged the Governor. Such examples demonstrate the degree to which the British and the Greeks of Cyprus continued to remain far apart. Consequently, British attitudes hardened, too, and in 1951 the British enacted fresh repressive legislation.
27In March 1951 Makarios visited Athens for the first time as Archbishop. It was the first of many visits and exchanges with Greek authorities, which revolved around another pillar of his agenda: to exert pressure on the Greek Government to take the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. The Greek governments of the Centre during 1950-1952 were, however, unwilling to pursue such a demand, one that would bring them into direct confrontation with Great Britain at a time when Greece sought N.A.T.O. membership. Although Britain had withdrawn from Greece following the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the experience of the Greek civil war and its aftermath left Greece in a weakened state; the country continued to depend on Britain and thus refused to take the Cyprus issue to the UN.
28In November 1952 Field-Marshall Alexandros Papagos took over as Premier of a strong conservative Greek government, and he did not share the doubts of the previous Greek governments with regard to Cyprus. Assisted by his secretary-general of the Foreign Ministry and permanent representative to the UN, Alexis Kyrou, the Greek Prime Minister gave in to pressure from Makarios and to Greek public opinion. An incident with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, in which Eden rebuffed any possibility of discussing the Cyprus issue, seems to have been the trigger that convinced Papagos to confront the British by placing the question of Cyprus before the UN. The Greek government hoped that by appealing to the U.N. it would exert pressure on the British to finally discuss Cyprus.
- 50 Holland 1994, pp. 152-153.
- 51 Hatzivassiliou 1997, p. 8.
29In reality, however, British determination to stay on the island became firmer. In 1950 a new Chiefs of Staff report reasserted Cyprus’ strategic value to the Empire.50 Britain appeared determined to keep its hold on the island – this was deemed imperative for retaining strategic control of the Middle East in an age when British imperial power was declining. The rise of Egyptian nationalism in 1952 would also affect Britain’s position in the region. Indeed, the rise of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser signaled the rise of Egypt as a leading enemy of Britain in the Middle East. In 1954 London agreed to withdraw from its Suez base, a decision which was highly criticized by the ‘Suez group’ of Conservative members of Parliament, who accused the Churchill administration of ‘selling out the Empire’.51 While the agreements demonstrated the pressures London faced in the region, the fact was they further elevated Cyprus’ strategic importance and increased London’s inflexibility: Cyprus now simply had to be kept in British hands even though the Cypriot Enosis movement was reaching its peak. These conflicting aims brought about the collapse of the Anglo-Cypriot relationship while they forced Britain to seek for a regional ally; Turkey was identified for this role.
- 52 Hansard, HC Deb 28 July 1954, vol. 531, column 508.
- 53 Holland 2012, p. 308.
30The British communicated their views in a statement on 28 July 1954 by the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson. According to Hopkinson, Cyprus could ‘never’ expect to be fully independent.52 The announcement came after confirmation that the British Middle East Land Force Headquarters was to move from Suez to Cyprus; the statement was accompanied by ‘anti-sedition’ warnings in Nicosia.53 This statement caused an uproar and inspired the Archbishop’s famous ‘Phaneromeni Oath’ speech, which signaled the onset of an intransigent phase of the struggle against the British. Athens finally appealed to the U.N. for Cyprus in late August 1954. In December the U.N. General Assembly decided not to discuss the issue ‘for the time being’. This signaled a defeat for the Greek side, it made the Cyprus Question an international affair, rather than a colonial one and it precipitated the outbreak of the anti-British revolt in April 1955.
31The collapse of the Anglo-Cypriot relationship and the onset of the E.O.K.A. Revolt was triggered by longstanding confrontations between the colonial authorities and the Greeks of Cyprus. The element of disappointment is crucial in understanding the ‘crisis of mistrust’ between the British and the majority of Greek Cypriots: closer examination of relations between the British and Greek Cypriots from the onset of colonial rule reveals the examples of the disappointment of Greek-Cypriot expectations. Taking their cue from the anti-colonial mood then emerging in other parts of the Empire, Greek Cypriots believed the time had come to press more forcefully for the fulfilment of their national demands. The revolt of E.O.K.A. – unlike the 1931 October Revolt which was spontaneous – had been in preparation since 1953 under the military leadership of Georgios Grivas. Despite Makarios’ initial hesitation to sanction an armed struggle, he finally agreed to it, provided it would be undertaken for a short period of time and directed exclusively against British installations.
32At the beginning of the revolt, the strategic aim of E.O.K.A. was to exert pressure on the British to abandon their intransigent policy toward Cyprus. E.O.K.A. operated at multiple levels. There were the guerrilla groups in the mountains and the sabotage groups in the towns. The role of the students, and of youth in general, in assisting the struggle was of significant importance. The youth were organized under A.N.E. (Alkimos Neolea E.O.K.A. –Young E.O.K.A.) and were responsible for many tasks, including the formation of sabotage groups and the organization of demonstrations. The political responsibility of the organization was vested in P.E.K.A. (Politiki Epitropi Kipriakou Agonos – Political Committee of Cypriot Struggle), whose members were responsible for hiding guerillas, watching important governmental institutions and organizing an ongoing passive resistance – a very important means of protest which enforced Greek-Cypriot solidarity.
33E.O.K.A. declared truces when important diplomatic developments took place to facilitate their implementation – overall E.O.K.A. declared four truces between 1955 and 1959 (declaring truces also gave E.O.K.A. the opportunity to re‑organise when under pressure). While the movement was eulogized by the Orthodox Church and the Right-wing politicians in general, its anti-colonial appeal also won over Greek Cypriots from a wide social spectrum, making the Cypriot struggle a genuinely mass movement. At the outset of the revolt, A.K.E.L.’s leadership denounced any resort to violence, and this remained a source of friction between the party and E.O.K.A., though this was not openly expressed until 1958.
34The appointment of Field-Marshall Sir John Harding as the new Governor of the island in October 1955 emphasized the urgency of the situation. Harding was given extensive powers in relation to security. The police – which E.O.K.A. had managed to penetrate by creating a small but highly effective network of police informers – was re‑organized. Indeed, an Auxiliary Police consisting of Turkish Cypriots was formed. This resulted in extensive mistrust and suspicion between the two communities. On 26 November 1955 a State of Emergency was declared, and in December A.K.E.L. was proscribed, even though the party was by no means the most critical threat at the time to the colonial regime.
- 54 Hatzivassiliou 2002, p. 55.
35The onset of E.O.K.A., combined with the possibility of a new appeal to the U.N., forced London to take initiative with regard to the Cyprus Question. The advent of Antony Eden as the new Prime Minister was an important development; his Foreign Minister, Harold Macmillan, proposed a Tripartite Conference (with British, Greek and Turkish participation) to address the general scope of strategic matters in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was the first time the problem was discussed on an international level.54 Archbishop Makarios opposed Greek participation in the conference, though the post-civil‑war government in Athens was too weak to resist British pressure to attend. Greek-Cypriot representatives were notably excluded from the proceedings of what was ostensibly an international conference.
- 55 For the pogrom see Vrionis 2005.
36The conference collapsed – as Prime Minister Eden in London had intended it should do – following a stark presentation of Turkish objections to any change in the status quo, with the anti-Greek riots in Constantinople on the night of 6‑7 September serving as a convenient coda.55 Nevertheless, the Tripartite Conference is important, as it marks the return of Turkey to developments concerning Cyprus for the first time since 1923, when it had forfeited its rights on the island with the Lausanne Treaty.
- 56 For an analysis of the Makarios – Harding negotiations see chapter four of Holland 1998, pp. 83-120
- 57 Eden 1960, pp. 403-404.
- 58 Hatzivassiliou 2002, p. 56.
37In October 1955 Governor Harding and Archbishop Makarios were engaged in a series of meetings to discuss the future of Cyprus.56 The Archbishop insisted that London should recognize the principle of self-determination for Cyprus and introduce a liberal constitution; Harding proposed a formula which, while not indicating what London’s position actually was, in essence stepped away from the ‘never’ position. Harding stated that “it is not their [the British] position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus.”57 At the same time, however, any right to self-determination was subjected to many preconditions. The new premier in Greece, Constantinos Karamanlis, who supported the process, indicated to the British that the formula made the right of self-determination unrecognizable.58
- 59 Members of the British Labour Party, who at that time formed the opposition in the Parliament, occa (...)
38Following various alterations to Harding’s formula, the Archbishop finally accepted it in early February. Makarios then negotiated the island’s internal regime. At the same time, however, he asked for a Greek-Cypriot elected majority in the Assembly and demanded that, following an interim period, the control of internal security passed into Cypriot hands and amnesty declared for all E.O.K.A. fighters. In late February, the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, visited Cyprus for talks. Makarios rejected British proposals, in the hope of gaining more advantages, but regional developments, including the crisis in Jordan, renewed vociferous criticism of London’s policy in the Middle East. The British, hoping to show strength and exert pressure on the Greek Cypriots, deported, in March 1956, the Archbishop and three other prominent members of the Ethnarchy to Seychelles. Makarios’ deportation had multiple effects: it impacted negatively on the relations between Greece and Britain, with Greece recalling its ambassador from London, and popular protests in Greece and Cyprus took place. The British authorities reacted by adopting a string of severe repressive measures such as collective punishments, curfews, house searches and the construction of military camps where Greek-Cypriot suspects were held and often treated brutally. It was also during 1956 that the first E.O.K.A. fighters were hanged – Andreas Demetriou, aged 22, and Michail Karaolis, aged 23, on 10 May 1956. The hangings aroused sharp criticism of British methods for dealing with the crisis, even within the British Parliament.59 In total nine members of E.O.K.A. were hanged between 1955 and 1959. Though the British entertained hopes new leadership would emerge on the island following the exile of Makarios, no Greek Cypriot stepped into Makarios’ place as a negotiator, not even when London assigned Lord Radcliffe the task of submitting a new constitution for Cyprus.
- 60 Hatzivassiliou 2005, pp. 285-301.
- 61 Darwin 1988, p. 216.
- 62 Hatzivassiliou 2002, p. 62.
- 63 Holland 1998, p. 167.
39Nevertheless, developments in the region did little to help the Greek-Cypriot cause, and Britain’s dependence on Turkey increased. The Suez Crisis, which had culminated in the autumn of 1956, highlighted Turkey’s importance for Britain.60 Turkey was the only British ally in the Middle East, one which remained unaffected by Nasser’s influence, and Britain came to see Turkish friendship as an indispensable safeguard of its regional interests. As a consequence, the Cyprus Question was further complicated as London sought, especially after the summer of 1956, not to displease Ankara over the fate of the island. Indeed, any signs of British weakness on Cyprus would now have a severe impact on Britain’s relations with Turkey and its Baghdad Pact allies, a coalition Britain joined in April 1955.61 Turkey, which by now had become once again an inseparable part of the Cyprus Question, pressed Britain to accept the possibility of the partition of Cyprus. Despite doubts in official British circles, London eventually decided to acknowledge this. The Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox Boyd’s statement on ‘double self-determination’ for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots which accompanied (and eventually undermined) Lord Radcliffe’s Cyprus proposals, presented in the British parliament on December 19, 1956, must be examined against this background. Radcliffe’s proposals were by far the most comprehensive, but they were entirely undermined by the double self-determination statement.62 As Robert Holland notes, by acknowledging double self-determination on the island, the British released the genie of partition from its bottle.63 Even if London intended to exert pressure on Greece and on the Greek-Cypriot side (rather than putting it in effect immediately), in reality Lennox Boyd’s declaration enabled Turkey and Turkish Cypriots to press more forcefully for their own demands on Cyprus.
- 64 Makarios received a hero’s welcome in Athens in what has been described as the ‘apogee of his entir (...)
- 65 Hatzivassiliou 2002, p. 66.
- 66 Markides 2009, p. 61.
40In April 1957, Makarios was allowed to return from exile, though only to establish himself in Athens.64 At the same time, Harold Macmillan’s advent as the new Prime Minister of Great Britain signaled a change in London’s priorities. Indeed, Whitehall now believed that the retention of Cyprus as a base was no longer essential.65 This change, however, did not minimize London’s dependence on Turkey. Following Lennox Boyd’s statement on Cyprus, Ankara kept pressing for the island’s partition. Turkish-Cypriot municipal councilors asked for separate municipalities; when the British refused they resigned en masse.66
- 67 Hatzivassiliou 2002, p. 69.
41The proposition of a new plan from the new Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, which excluded the unilateral imposition of double self-determination, angered the Turkish-Cypriot community. In January 1958 Turkish-Cypriots rioted against the British Police. The following summer T.M.T. (Turk Mukavement Teskilati - Turkish Resistance Organization) – a paramilitary Turkish-Cypriot organization formed to counteract E.O.K.A. – began attacking Greek Cypriots, making the situation in the colony extremely critical. At this point the British presented the Macmillan Plan which, as Evanthis Hatzivassiliou has noted, “marked the peak of the invasion of international considerations in the planning for the internal administration of Cyprus.”67 The plan was very divisive, as it constituted the two communities equal in power while providing for their institutional separation. It further proposed a partnership between Greece, Turkey and Britain in Cyprus: the first two would appoint two government representatives to assist the Governor as, according to the plan, Cyprus was to remain under British rule for seven years; following this period, the possibility of forming a tridominium (British, Greek and Turkish) would be examined. The double self-determination statement was still valid, so should the plan for tridominium be rejected, the prospect of partition remained in force. Even more critically, the plan could be implemented without the agreement of all interested parties. Therefore, when Greece rejected the plan, Britain went on to implement it with Turkey alone. This development brought the Cyprus issue to an extremely critical point and pushed both Makarios and the Greek Government to seek, with far more urgency than previously, some kind of settlement. The Archbishop himself for the first time supported independence, thus abandoning the goal of self-determination. The motives behind the Archbishop’s change of policy are difficult to explain; however, it is possible that critical events that took place on the island in 1958 strongly impressed him, convincing him Enosis would be difficult to achieve because of Turkey.
42However, by that time, regional developments also made Turkey willing to accept a compromise. The result was the Zurich (5‑11 February 1959) – London (17‑19 February 1959) agreements. The Greek-Cypriot side abandoned Enosis and agreed to the formation of an independent Cyprus. Partition was also ruled out. The constitution was extremely complicated as it was designed according to the international milieu rather than Cypriot needs. It granted the Turkish-Cypriot minority far-reaching veto rights and other privileges, making it almost equal with the 78% Greek-Cypriot majority. The Treaty of Guarantee called for the sovereignty of the island to be guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, the Treaty of Alliance provided for cooperation on matters of defence between Greece, Turkey and the infant Republic and for the stationing of Greek and Turkish military contingents on the island. The British were granted two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Dekeleia and Akrotiri, totaling ninety-nine square miles, a much smaller extent than they had originally hoped for when that thread in the negotiation had begun.
43The constitutional construct that had emerged at Lancaster House was astutely summed up by François Crouzet in his magisterial work on the conflict in late colonial Cyprus from 1946 through to its climax in 1959. His own conclusion merits a slightly extended quotation:
- 68 Crouzet 1973, vol. 2, p. 1145.
“D’autre part, il n’est pas douteux que le système de Zürich et de Londres, tout en condamnant en principe le partage de Chypre, tendait, comme le plan Macmillan, à réaliser un «partage non territorial», à institutionnaliser la division entre deux communautés separate but equal; il créait pour elles des institutions indépendantes […] qui échapperaient très largement au contrôles du gouvernement central, si bien que l’on aurait pratiquement deux gouvernements parallèles. Cette dichotomie était sans doute inévitable, étant donné le conflit passionné qui opposait les deux communautés au moment où fut réalisé le règlement de Zürich et de Londres et notamment le méfiance at la haine des Turcs envers les Grecs; mais ce règlement établissait un régime «antagonique», qui, loin de favoriser la rapprochement at la fusion entre les deux communautés, ne se contentait pas de les «entourer d’un mur», mais bien plus tendait à les opposer, à renforcer leur conscience «nationale», à nourrir et intensifier le conflit intercommunautaire.”68
- 69 For the 1959 elections see Yiangou 2017, pp. 127-142.
44Scholars today may take issue as to the inevitability involved in this process, but Crouzet’s description of a polity designed on peculiarly ‘antagonistic’ principles captures the essential outcome. It was on such a basis that in December 1959, the first elections took place, and Archbishop Makarios – having returned to the island in March that year – was elected the first president of the nascent republic, with Fazil Kuçuk its vice president.69 Eventually, on the night of 15 to 16 August, the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was signed. Following the signing of the Treaty the last Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot and his family departed from Famagusta port on HMS Chichester, marking the end of colonial rule. However complicated the constitution of the new state was, it remained profoundly true that Cyprus now entered a new phase of its turbulent history.