Building a common political heritage between the two main communities in Cyprus: the troubled years of the 1950s

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Abstract. The aim of this analysis is to explore the ways in which the Cypriot Left confronted the hegemonic nationalist framework within which it was forced to function both in its emergence as a bi-communal movement and in its continuation as communal movements after the 1950s. The following analysis will focus on how the Left as a political force managed to deal with hostile environments as expressed in aggressive hegemonic discourses or actions (political violence). Two examples will be explored: the participation of the Left in the collection of signatures for “union with Greece” within the Greek Cypriot (G/C) community and the emergence of a Turkish Cypriot (T/C) Left at a time when Turkish Cypriot nationalist hegemony took firm root.

Résumé. L'objectif de cette analyse est d'étudier comment la gauche chypriote s'est confrontée au cadre nationaliste hégémonique dans lequel elle a été obligée de fonctionner, aussi bien au moment de son émergence en tant que mouvement bicommunautaire, que par la suite en tant que série de mouvements communautaires après les années 1950. L'analyse se concentre ensuite sur la manière dont la gauche en tant que force politique a réussi à faire face à des environnements hostiles s'exprimant dans des discours ou des actions hégémoniques agressifs (violence politique). Deux exemples sont étudiés : la participation de la gauche à la collecte de signatures pour « l’union avec la Grèce » au sein de la communauté chypriote grecque (G/C), et l’émergence d’une gauche chypriote turque (T/C) à l’époque où le nationalisme chypriote turc hégémonique s’est solidement enraciné.

Methodological framework: residuals of coexistence

Panayiotou noted that in itself the Cypriot Left is a paradoxical movement, if seen from the perspective of ideological purity of conventional political forms: it has been a movement with a consistently revolutionary ideology, and with an equally consistent reformist practice. Panayiotou tried to explain that paradox by situating the Left in its geopolitical and local conjectural political environments. He argued that the seeming paradox was in many ways a successful strategy of a “peoples’ movement” in that particular context. This work aims to

1 Panayiotou 2006, p. 268.
2 Ibid.
tackle another paradox: what did the Cypriot Left draw upon to develop its anti-nationalist ideology, and how did it manage to maintain it during difficult times, such as the 1950s? The concept employed to account for both the lineages from the past and the ability to survive and make a comeback is called “residuals”.

Either by virtue of its own traditions or by inventing new ones, the Cypriot Left opens a new way of studying the Cypriot modernity and as Anagnostopoulou notes, Cypriot modernity is introduced to a certain degree with the establishment of AKEL; that is via the concept of ‘residuals’. The concept of residuals is found in political and social sciences as the element that does not fit in the mainstream taxonomy or typology after the creation of all categories or qualities characterizing the cases classified. The notion of ‘residuals’ is conceptualized as that element which, as a political or cultural stance, does not fit, does not adjust to, nor can be explained within the dominant context of the ‘nationalist certainty’ according to which the dominant nationalist rhetoric appears to hold the absolute truth. It is also in some way a form that pre-existed to a certain extent and that had managed to re-emerge in the modern context, in a new version, but which does not seem to fit in the new hegemonic framework – for example, bi-communal co-existence in the early modern nationalist framework would be the residual factor not taken into account in the claims of the dominant nationalist certainty.

Particularly during the 1950s, this nationalist certainty in Cyprus was expressed by the armed action of the EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) in the Greek Cypriot community with the aim of achieving union with Greece (enosis) and by the armed action of the TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) in the T/C community, which pursued the partition of the island (taksim). These two opposing and confrontational strategies formed a sort of imported ‘higher gaze’ imposed upon the native population of Cyprus claiming their incorporation in another country (Greece and Turkey respectively). Symbiosis in this context was peculiar, even if it was an everyday factual reality, until nationalism, among other factors, eventually separated the two communities. Symbiosis, as a positive memory, was nourished by the Left, which was again a peculiar residual until 1974 in the G/C community, at least.

The concept of ‘residuals’, as was interpreted and practiced politically and ideologically by the Cypriot Left during the turbulent 1950s, is emphasized in two interrelated important themes: G/C–T/C co-existence and anti-nationalist activity. These two pillars of the Cypriot Left heritage emerged as key elements of the leftist agenda and were notably evident even at the time when AKEL endorsed enosis. Thus, intentionally, in the subsequent analysis the focus lies with the 1950s; in that specific period and especially because of the developing (due to


Anti-nationalism existed earlier in the discourse of the Cypriot Left. It was one of the key reasons invoked by the early communists in rejecting enosis in the 1920s (see Katsourides 2014). When the Left became a mass movement in the 1940s, the main ideological issues in its agenda were rather opposition to conservatism, resistance to the colonial regime and its right-wing allies, and class issues.
nationalist violence) hostility in the relations between the two communities on the island, the bi-communal rhetoric of the Cypriot Left was very difficult to understand and acknowledge.

The Cypriot Left seems to have remained consistently anti-nationalist and maintained its focus on cultural pluralism, without undermining the importance of the circumstances and the nationalism that affected the Cypriot Left. The roots of this phenomenon cannot be attributed singularly to ideology as such. The Cypriot movement was indeed a lower- and middle-class ‘people’s’ movement, rather than an ideologically driven one. In this context, following the research on social movements, one has to look for historical antecedents in popular culture as ‘repertoires’ of daily life, which were adopted and invested with ideology, and modern historical connotations of ‘struggle and resistance’ by the Left.

Based on the available historical evidence, Cypriot society has been pluralistic for most of its existence – and the pre-modern period witnessed not only peaceful co-existence of the two main communities, Christians and Muslims, but also common struggles. Actually, all major forms of violence were class- or economically based. As Michael states, revolts, especially during the nineteenth century, constituted a means of negotiation with the ruling class to either reduce taxation or for justice and became the most significant problem of the Ottoman state.\(^5\) The period of 1764 to 1833 was a time of revolts by the poor and the peasants from the two communities against an alliance of upper-class administrators, again from both communities. Michael provides evidence of three examples – the triple revolt – during 1833 against the ruling class – either Ottoman administration or Greek Orthodox clergy.\(^6\) Yet, when the leftist/communist movement emerged in the 1920s, the dominant modernizing ideology among the population was nationalism imported from Greece and Turkey, which painted the ‘nation’ of the other community as the historical enemy. In contrast to mainstream ideology, the communists and the mass Left of the 1940s merged co-existence with class and economic issues. It is noted, however, that the local political environment was not anti-coexistence then. The rising nationalisms, as Bryant noted, were a “way of imagining the modern” and were not, experientially, directed against the other community.\(^7\) In both communities, soon the negative concepts of the Turk and the Greek, respectively, started growing. The Left was against this growth of separation and its rhetoric and never failed to note it, even if in a more careful tone in particularly hostile contexts.

In this regard, the question is how the Left could resist after 1948, the year when political and ideological local conflicts coincided with the developments in the Greek Civil War\(^8\) and when the onset of the Cold War made it clear that the Cypriot Left was operating not only in a colony, but also in a local context decisively determined by an anti-communist regime in Athens. The goal of the G/C hegemonic discourse, after the defeat of the Left in the Greek Civil War, was in effect the opposition of everything the Cypriot Left represented. The T/C Left, which was

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5 Michael 2015, p. 118.
6 Michael 2015, p. 119.
still functioning within the bi-communal movement, soon had to face analogous problems. The Turkish Kemalist regime had its similarities and its differences, but they agreed with Greeks on one thing: anti-communism. The ways in which the Left acted in a hostile environment will be analysed by a reference to the position of the Left on the collection of signatures for union with Greece, which was the goal of the G/C nationalist movement, a ‘plebiscite’, that in a way signalled the acceptance of the G/C Left by the local G/C power structures in a regime of ‘negative integration’.9

**Strategies of manoeuvre in a hostile hegemonic environment. AKEL and the ‘plebiscite’ of 1950: more of what it initially seems to be?**

One of the symbolic moments in the entry to that nationalist decade of the 1950s was what came to be known as the ‘plebiscite’ for *enosis*. The term is misleading and as such did not have much of an effect, but it laid down the parameters of the contextual framework. In January 1950, the G/C were called upon by all G/C political forces to sign a petition for union with Greece in local churches. Collecting signatures was nothing novel for the Left – it was part of its repertoire of mobilization. The novelty was that the whole of the G/C political spectrum from Left to Right agreed, especially after the bitter divisions caused by conflicts in the previous decade and particularly by the ideological, political and class-economic conflicts of 1948, which coincided with the advent of the Cold War globally and the climax of the Greek Civil War. That confrontation in Cyprus left the G/C community deeply divided. In that period, the Left, consistent in part to the earlier positions of its predecessor, the Cyprus Communist Party, was supporting self-government as a stage at least in the anti-colonial struggle. Anagnostopoulou stresses that although part of the Cypriot population radicalizes, this radicalization is not demarcated in the framework of AKEL’s anti-colonial policy, resulting thus in the radicalization of *enosis*, the organization of which is undertaken by the Church.10

A few years before the plebiscite, AKEL (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, Progressive Party of Working People) made its appearance in 1941, as a successor to the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK). Its emergence and evolution into a major force in Cypriot society was a result of internal fermentations and regional developments. The publication in 1947 of Nikolas Zahariades’ views, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), on the front page of the leftist newspaper *Democratis*, is expressive of the impact of the regional development, as Zahariades proposed resistance to the “Anglo-American imperialist intervention”. *Democratis* introduces Zahariades’ article, stating its importance for the critical time in Greece and KKE’s way forward.11

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The historical moment of the publication of this article is significant in terms of regional developments. The KKE had decided, as was announced in late June, to form an alternative government and thus transform its guerrillas into an army named the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE). Thus, the Cyprus Left, which anticipated the transformation of the Democratic Army of Greece, lost that prospect, when the DSE did not become a reality.

The internal fermentations and turbulence are manifested by a comment in Eleftheros Typos, a centre-left newspaper supporting an analogous coalition locally, published on 14 July 1947, a day before the publication of Zahariades’ article. The author of the comment claimed that the nationalists [ethnikofrones] wanted to maintain the current status [“They want the current status!”] and the nationalists’ secret plans had been expressed in a statement by one of their leading members in Limassol to a journalist. Per the newspaper, this leading member of the ethnikofrones wanted abstention because they desired the continuation of the status quo in Cyprus and it was preferable for things to remain as they were, because at the time there were at least curators, mukhtars [elected village heads] and azas [elected members of village councils], who although appointed were “theirs”.

The local context within which the pronouncements of the newspaper were made for the above claims and analysis is indicative of the local circumstances. In Cyprus, the Left, with its allies, had already won the municipal elections of 1946 and the archbishopric elections of June 1947 at a time when the guerrillas in Greece were defeated. This resulted as an impact of the Second World War and the discrediting of the right-wing freed vital political space for the communist left, whose emergence in society came to fruition via electoral results. In this context, the drafting of a constitution for self-government was discussed as a stage in the final decolonization in AKEL’s perspective. For this reason, AKEL participated with representatives from the Pancyprian Workers’ Federations in the Constitutional Assembly initiated by the British to involve locals in the country’s internal affairs, of which Britain would maintain administrative functions to ensure Cyprus’ colonial status.

In this framework, there is a historical and a theoretical question evolving around the change of position of AKEL. In 1947, it was mobilizing for self-government. In 1948, in the midst of intense class conflict, it would move to a claim for ‘full self-government’ and a call for a constituent assembly via elections, while in early 1949 it shifted to enosis. In 1950, it was joining its rivals in collecting signatures for enosis. The historical question has to do evidently with the actual reasons that led to the change in AKEL’s position. The theoretical issue is: how does a mass social movement and subculture move from one position to another, seemingly opposed, and yet keeps its cohesion? Subsequently, the historical line of the party would be vindicated, with independence in 1959.

As far as the historical question is concerned, there are two causes offered: the first is the change of leadership in AKEL in early 1949 associated with the shift to enosis, and the second one was advice from abroad. Zahariades is credited with strong advice to the Cypriots

to abandon self-government. Alecou provides a detailed report on the historical background and its more complex context. According to Alecou, there were actually many more external players who acted as advisers to the Cypriot party, and in the end, it seems that the decision was taken by the Cypriots. Alecou refers to discussions and consultation of AKEL with KKE, which advocated a focus on enosis, as well as Britain’s Communist Party, “which advised AKEL to follow the legal route toward enosis, which included the pursuit of constitutional reforms”.13 Interestingly, “AKEL feared a dictatorship would be imposed on Cyprus after the party was declared illegal”.14 This argument is also put forward by Katsiaounis, as prominent figures of the Left were targeted: Adam Adamantos, Mayor of Famagusta, was charged in court for his participation in a march without the permission of the district administrator. A month later charges were pressed against Adamantos along with a member (representing the left) of the municipal council of the village of Lefkonoiko for a speech they had made that included other topics in addition to the builders’ strikes for which they had permission to speak about, and these speeches could be heard outside the building of the trade union they were at.15

Ktoris, on the other hand sees AKEL’s position for enosis in the frame of its power struggle/antagonism with the Ethnarchic Council for the leadership of the G/C nationalist movement. In support of this position, Ktoris cites AKEL’s memorandum to the United Nations on 23 November 1949, which called for self-determination, specifying that this was nothing more than union with Greece, concluding with a request to conduct a plebiscite under the auspices for the United Nations. Ktoris characterizes this stance as defensive redeployment that reflected the isolation AKEL found itself in after the withdrawal of prominent members and the drop in percentages during the local elections of 1949.16

Panayiotou, on the other hand, views the adoption of “the slogan for enosis” not as “a goal in and of itself; rather enosis (or independence subsequently) were parts of a process leading to human emancipation”, if we look at its broad platform, which was not focused on enosis.17 Panayiotou also puts this strategic shift in the context of the defeat of the Greek leftists in August 1949, and the need of the leftist movement to realign the anti-colonial mobilizations in a broader context of ‘national unity’ – as it was emerging in the Middle East. This aligns with what Katsiaounis suggests in regard to the charges pressed against the General Secretary of AKEL. As Katsiaounis writes, the Attorney General’s office reported at the court that suspects had organized a gathering supporting the strikers of Amiantos:

A demonstration with risen fists followed and with slogans “Hands off the working class”, “We call for self-government”, “Long live the Amiantos struggle”. The demonstration disrupts peace and public order, and defendants have to be punished.18

13 Alecou 2016, p. 120.
14 Alecou 2016, p. 119.
15 Katsiaounis 2000, p. 495.
16 Ktoris 2011, p. 213.
17 Panayiotou 1999, p. 508.
18 Katsiaounis 2000, p. 474.
The aforementioned scholars use different terms to describe AKEL’s stance: Alecou calls it retrogression, Ktoris defensive redeployment and Panayiotou a compromise. AKEL’s stance or shift of position and the reasoning behind it may not be as clear as one would expect, however. Some additional light may be shed, and the understanding enhanced in that respect, if AKEL’s position regarding enosis in the 1950s ‘plebiscite’ is viewed in the analytical context of social movement research and theory. McAdam and Tarrow, in examining social movement processes, take as an example the September 11th responses at various levels and perspectives in the USA. Looking into Movement/Party polarization – as the two scholars call it – they suggest that public anger at the September 11th attack brought anti-war activists before a dilemma: “Oppose every aspect of the rush to war and the public would condemn the movement as un-American; support the war and peace supporters would become despondent and wither away”. Thus, anti-war movement found the solution through the coalition “Win Without War”, which embraced nationalist identities that had a wide resonance among US public, thus “harnessing hegemony” as opposed to “challenging hegemony”. McAdam and Tarrow conclude that the harnessing of nationalist ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire during a hyperpatriotic period such as the post 9/11 one resulted in the relative depolarization between that and symbols of the peace movement. Nevertheless, as “body bags began returning from Iraq, the anti-war movement gained a second wind and began [...] challenging hegemony”. Thus, replacing names, places and time gives a rather logical and historically grounded answer to AKEL’s position for enosis. During hyperpatriotic times, such as the late 1940s, the Cypriot Left, like the anti-war/peace movement in the US half a century later, embraced the dominant symbolic repertoire of enosis and achieved a relative depolarization. Katsourides provides evidence that depolarization was achieved by stating that “AKEL’s electoral strength in the municipal elections of 1943, 1946, 1949 and 1953 increased to over 40 per cent of the electorate in some cases, which attested to the party’s mass character”.

As a result of AKEL’s stance, the party faced three converging predicaments: the nationalist victory in Greece created a decisive advantage for the G/C Right, which presented itself as the local representative of the Athens government, while the Left was accused of being anti-national; the Right, under suspicious circumstances, claimed control of the local Church in 1947, after the brief victory of the Left; and a possible ban, as the British, in the context of the Cold War, contemplated a ban on AKEL.

In this context, enosis was a major political alternative; the other being leftist patriotism: the party’s struggle for social and workers’ rights, the demand for greater political and civil liberties, and the pursuit of a united anti-colonial front in which G/C and T/C and left and right

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19 McAdam, Tarrow 2010, p. 537.
20 Ibid.
22 The archbishop elected by the Left in June 1947 died unexpectedly in July of that year, in circumstances that the Left suggested involved the possibility of poisoning. Immediately after the archbishop’s death the extreme right wing seized control of the church mechanisms and totally transformed the conciliatory approach of the deceased cleric.
Cypriot political forces worked together\textsuperscript{23} for the Greek Cypriot majority in confronting colonialism and in articulating a discourse in relation to the geopolitical fate of the island.\textsuperscript{24} AKEL’s option was to adopt a medium solution for the dilemma very much like the American anti-war position. Consequently, the \textit{enosis} stance and adoption of symbolism of national identity was to “harness hegemony” – as opposed to “challenging hegemony”\textsuperscript{25}.

The above historical interpretation is contextual – it sees converging factors in a conjectural moment. The analysis carries with it a broader framework, which helps provide an answer to the theoretical question also – the framework of hegemony. Hegemony as mentioned above has the Gramscian sense. Gramsci in his \textit{Prison Notebooks} saw two overlapping spheres making up the capitalist state: ‘the political sphere’, which rules through force and ‘civil society’, defined as the public sphere of trade unions and political parties. This approach revealed the realm of ideas and strategies as a means to contest the hegemonic form of legitimacy expressed through consent rather than force. Thus, in this sense, AKEL as “part of the historical process” and as an institutional form of the leftist subculture, which expressed “an instinctive feeling of independence”, as well as an understanding of self (understanding its role in the society, its opportunities and its historical course), took the “struggle of political hegemonies” in “opposing directions”, acclaiming \textit{enosis} outside of what was at the time politically proper and adapted to local, regional and international circumstances.\textsuperscript{26}

Nevertheless, the position for \textit{enosis} exercised a confusing influence upon the Left. As Katsourides states, there were disagreements within the party regarding the national issue that resulted in the expulsion of prominent party members.\textsuperscript{27} This ambivalent situation influenced relations with T/C as well, whose function as ‘residuals’ and ‘non-assimilated’ elements that managed to survive in the shadow of the (nationalist) hegemonic discourse impeded further their understanding and practice. Because of T/C exclusion from the ‘official discourse’, coexistence and anti-nationalism, although real and experiential, could not easily find their way to the public agenda; with the underlying presence of an indigenous, local modernization space they professed political emancipation from the hegemonic nationalist discourse. Thus, it is of critical importance to elaborate further on the emergence and prevalence of a T/C nationalist elite, which was a dominant factor in the marginalization of the T/C Left.

\section*{The nationalist political formation of the Turkish Cypriots}

The 1940s was a very important decade for Cyprus in many respects, mainly because of international and regional changes, as well as serious socio-economic transformations at the local level. The combination of these developments contributed to the revival of the political

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Katsourides 2014, p. 95.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Panayiotou 1999, p. 253.
\item \textsuperscript{25} McAdam, Tarrow 2010, p. 537.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Lemert 1999, p. 260.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Katsourides 2014, pp. 176, 232.
\end{itemize}
life in the T/C community. The political, social and economic pursuits of the community led to a renewed and empowered ethnic-communal formation that emerged both from processes set in motion in previous decades in Cyprus and from the dynamics released by the divergences due to the Second World War. Britain’s plans to reform the regime in Cyprus, the colonial administration’s intention to hold municipal elections in 1943, and the rise of the unionist movement among the G/C,28 were key factors that pushed the elite in the T/C community to establish new organized groups and power institutions. The mobilization of the T/C in this new context was driven by the nationalist elite, whose strengthening provoked conflicts on issues of power within the community.29 During the 1940s, the conservative and pro-British elite of the T/C, led by Sir Münir, deferred to the emerging nationalist elite under the guidance of Fazıl Küçük. Therefore, the political-ideological differentiation of the community, with the shift of balance in favour of the nationalists, seems to have been the natural result of further maturation of its ethno-communal consciousness through the creation of structures and institutions of T/C power.

These power institutions and the separate organizational structures of the T/Cs complemented a wider dialectical relationship within society. These institutions to a certain degree influenced with their content the collective consciousness of the community. Both through their emergence and through their evolutionary course, these institutions sought to establish a specific content for the T/C communal identity. The 1943 municipal elections were the turning point in the process of this mobilization of the T/C nationalists, away from the pre-modern framework of the traditional elite. These elections were particularly important because they brought about political alliances, formations and internal antagonisms, which defined the community’s protagonists for years to come.30 The political mobilization and dynamics caused by the 1943 local elections, and especially the climate created by the victory of the new generation of nationalists led by Fazıl Küçük, raised the issue of a separate formation of T/C power structures even more urgently in the public sphere. Küçük himself argued that the outcome of the elections brought the community back to life and was now demanding the creation of a party.31 Within this framework, KATAK (Institutions of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus) was founded in April 1943.

The establishment of KATAK largely reflected the more empowered and politicized part of the community of that period: the part seeking to create a separate community group based on ethnicity and the composition of the T/C elite. The founding meeting of the organization was attended by elected and appointed T/Cs in the local administration, freelancers, and small-scale shop owners and merchants.32 An important aspect was that both the nationalists and the representatives of the old conservative elite of the community33 were represented in the

29 Altan 1986, pp. 911-934.
30 Oberling 1982, p. 56.
31 Küçük 1999, p. 80.
33 Birinci 2001, p. 250.
leadership group. The importance given to the presence of the old leadership group led by Sir Münir revealed the consensus, or even the encouragement, of the British for such an organization and simultaneously a new reality; namely, that the new state of things towards the end of the war and the strengthening of nationalism alarmed the traditional pro-British circles, because of the increasing loss of their influence. The prospect of materializing the G/C unionist demand, or even the possibility of changing Britain’s status on the island, led to the marginalization of all those who had identified their political and economic influence with colonialism. Consequently, the traditional elite sought to adapt to the new context and become part of the ‘new power’.

However, the ‘loyalty’ towards the colonial regime expressed by the conservative elite, as well as the full identification with the British administration, was not something that the new nationalists could agree on. The policy of maintaining the status quo in Cyprus caused a serious contradiction. Maintaining the status quo on the island entailed the preservation of the colonial system, which was already questioned by the new international context of the period. This contradiction was later described by Rauf Denktaş as follows: “We called our case ‘a continuation of the status quo’, and we did not want to believe that a day would come when the English would leave the island. Ignorant about a changing world, we blindly pursued an English friendship”.

The outbreak of the confrontation within KATAK stemmed from disagreements about how the British administration should be dealt with. Küçük’s team supported a tougher policy. As a result, Küçük left KATAK and founded the Turkish People’s National Party of Cyprus in 1944 (Kıbrıs Milli Türk Halk Partisi). It was no coincidence that the founding of the party took place on 23 April 1944, the anniversary of the establishment of the National Assembly of Turkey. Thus, the symbolism referred to a new secular-nationalist view that departed from the traditional and archaic framework of community power. Simultaneously, this symbolism also revealed the devotion of this elite group to an imported form of modernization, that of Turkish nationalism. Moreover, the founding of the party cleared the strategy that would be followed by the new nationalists from then on. They sought a more dynamic response to the unionist movement and the British administration. Ultimately, the internal confrontations in the T/C elite led to the unification of KATAK with Küçük’s party in a new political formation, the National Turkish Unity Party of Cyprus (Kıbrıs Milli Türk Birliği Partisi) in 1949. The same year, the Federation of Turkish Institutions of Cyprus (Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu) was also founded and was headed by Faiz Kaymak, who had also cooperated with Küçük. The Federation formed the cultural and economic linkage of the new nationalist party.

34 Yaşın 1997, p. 147.
37 Tekakpınar, Doğasal 1993, p. 37.
38 Arslan 2012, p. 122.
Consequently, up until the end of the 1940s, there was a clear nationalist organizational structure within the T/C community, expressed politically by the National Turkish Unity Party of Cyprus and culturally by the Federation. Simultaneously, the emergence of these structures, which became dominant after a period of intense contradictions in the upper classes of the T/C community, enabled a significant degree of emancipation of the ethnic-communal consciousness. However, this process of power centralization, led by nationalist orientations, had to face the alternative dynamics that were developing during the same period, resulting to the strengthening of the Left, both in the T/C and the G/C community.

Creating the new residuals of ‘common struggles’ and modern ‘memories of the future’: the common Cypriot space of the Left as an anti-nationalist alternative

The dynamic course of modernization of the T/C community at a political, social and economic level, expressed by the emergence of separate T/C institutions of power in the 1940s, as described above, resulted in the clear dominance of the nationalists. However, the prevalence of the nationalist hegemonic framework, which ultimately legitimized separate power structures and the political programme of the division that was comprehensively expressed in the 1950s, led to centrifugal tendencies. The 1940s were very decisive for the rise of the T/C nationalist elite, but also for the rise of the Cypriot Left in general, which was expressed in a bi-communal framework for at least a period, thus managing to create a different political and cultural space.

The modern movement of the working class in Cyprus emerged during the interwar period and gradually succeeded in becoming a prominent political force in the 1940s; a period of major social and economic changes, the main focus of which lay on the massification of the working class as a result of urbanization. The massification of the working class was, clearly, a bi-communal phenomenon, as it was related to the poorer strata of both the G/Cs and the T/Cs. Within this framework, the politicization of ethnic or national diversity, recorded at the level of the nationalist elite, was not equally reflected at the level of the working class. Evidently, Küçük’s nationalist populism could initially attract parts of the intellectual and of the working strata. He also managed to attract some support from the T/C farmers’ strata, whose stance against the pro-British big landowners had often been criticized. Kemalist nationalism, being a form of imported modernity, influenced the poorer masses of the Turkish Cypriots, too. In competitive nationalist terms, the interpretation of diversity did not extensively affect a large percentage of the T/C working class, as the popular masses – workers, servants, peasants – are the last to be affected by ‘national consciousness’.

40 Panayiotou 2012, p. 71.
41 Katsiaounis 2000, p. 177.
42 Hobshawm 1994, p. 25.
This ‘delay’ in adopting nationalism also formed an obstacle to the fragmentation of the workers’ consciousness along ethnic lines. G/C and T/C workers participated in joint trade and labour unions. They jointly experienced the adverse environment of impoverishment. These harsh conditions were, in essence, commonplace working-class experiences. The G/Cs and T/Cs, who were organized in the same trade unions, were not merely experiencing a form of cohabitation, but a bi-communal co-operation aimed at upgrading their position through social struggles. They confirmed, in this manner, the theoretical paradigm of Thompson that experience plays an important role in the process of class formation. Briefly, this position underlines that class is formed when a group of people with the same experiences acknowledge and express the identity of their interests among them and against others who have different, or even opposite, interests. Thus, despite of the different, and very competitive, approaches of the nationalist elite of the two communities about the future status of Cyprus in the 1940s, the quantitative and qualitative development of the working class created parallel conditions for the cooperation of the G/C and T/C workers on the basis of the trade union movement. As Attalides notes, “the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) formed the basis for the interrelation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots when they left their villages and joined the construction works, mines and factories”.

This ‘workers’ interrelation’ was almost immediately understood by the T/C nationalist elite as a threat. This particular elite saw the risk of a further diffusion of the socialist views to other parts of the T/Cs; a prospect that would further hamper the implementation of a nationalist political programme. Thus, the efforts of actors such as Küçük, as well as of KATAK from 1944 onwards, focused on the creation of defences against the influences exercised by the joint activation of T/C and G/C workers in bi-communal labour struggles. It is observed that the breakup of the workers’ movement on a national basis could facilitate in this way a smoother course towards the homogeneity of T/Cs. The outcome of the above procedures was the emergence of separate Turkish Cypriot trade unions. As early as 1942, an effort was made by Niyazi Dağlı, who founded the Turkish Labour Union (Türk Amele Birliği). In the same year, the Association of Nicosia Turkish Workers (Lefkoşa Türk İşçiler Birliği) appears, and in 1945 it is replaced by a wider organization, the Council of Turkish Workers’ Associations ( Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Birlikleri Kurumu – KTIBK) which functioned on a federal basis. In the meantime, on 1 May 1943, the Cyprus Association of Turkish Farmers ( Kıbrıs Türk Çiftçiler Birliği – KTCB) was founded, as a result of disagreements with G/Cs on the issue of union with Greece. One of the primary goals of the KTCB was to solve problems related to land divestiture and agricultural debts, and teaching the rural population reading and writing. Particular efforts were also made on an ideological level to consolidate the concept of “unity of all Turks of Cyprus”, in a way that would neutralize the social issue.

43 Moustaka 2010, p. 255.
44 Thompson 1963, pp. 10-12.
45 Attalides 2000, p. 424.
46 Ismail 1985, pp. 15-16.
48 Deniz 1986, pp. 30-36.
The above efforts apparently gave the KTIBK an important place in the process of creating an alternative political space beyond the nationalist boundaries. Two years after its establishment, the Council began publishing the magazine *The Invincible Course of the Worker*. Although this magazine closed at the end of 1947, it formed the basis of public discourse on intense ideological differences among the T/C workers. Soon, the KTIBK revealed two ideological tendencies, the right wing and the left wing. The right wing of the trade union was expressed by Hasan Ali Şaşmaz, Niyazi Dağlı and Halil Sıtkı. The left wing, which soon became more dynamic, was expressed by personalities like Ahmet Sadi Erkurt, Aziz Tuncay, Cahit Ahmet, Mehmet Alkan, Mehmet Salih and Arif Bolkân. The increase of the leftist opposition’s influence in the trade union was the main reason that led the T/C nationalist leadership to withdraw from whatever cooperation it initially sought with the left-wing cadres of the organized T/C workers.

The emergence and gradual strengthening of left-wing opposition to the nationalist leadership of the community were signs of the growth of an alternative format where bi-communal action was also possible. The class maturity of the lower strata of T/Cs that identified with the corresponding G/C class was also made evident in the pages of the magazine of the Council of Turkish Workers’ Associations. For example, an article titled “It is not our turn to be silent” in November 1947 claimed that for many years it was the Turkish community who suffered under the Turkish capitalists and fascists and kept quiet while they [Turkish capitalists and fascists] took over Evkaf’s administration, and spent Evkaf’s fortune on teas and beers. The article concludes that now poor people would speak up, demonstrate and write to the extent they could: “We, the poor people, will not be silent against injustice, because there is no more blood left in our veins...”.

The appearance of such texts, including Ahmet Sadi's attempt to publish an article on the analysis of socialism, led to the forced closure of the magazine. However, such reflexive actions by the T/C nationalist leadership seem to have been unable to stop, in a direct and definitive way, either the rejection of the centrifugal forces from below or the co-operation with the G/C workers. These processes occurred in the midst of a particularly polarized social reality, characterized by both the intensification of the debate on self-government in Cyprus and the conflict foreshadowed in the economic struggle. The strengthening of the organizational and political influence of the left-wing workers’ opposition, within the separate trade union formations of the T/Cs, eventually generated successive dynamics. These dynamics rose to new levels when Aziz Tuncay became General Secretary of the Turkish Cypriot Workers’ Union and played a key role in the joint strikes of miners in 1948.

It was no coincidence that the political fermentations of the period in the strata of G/C and T/C workers focused on the mining sector. Already by mid-1947, the trade unions of Lefka Miners cooperated in order to develop a joint line of action. The head of the local committee of PEO (Pancyprian Workers’ Federation) was Pantelis Varnavas, while the head of the local com-

49 An 2003b, p. 55.
50 An 2003b, p. 61.
51 An 2003b, pp. 63-64.
52 Tuncel 2011, p. 89.
mittee of the Turkish Cypriot Workers’ Union was Mehmet Halil Kahraman. The first ‘test’ of the bi-communal action in the mining field was given in May 1947. Despite the threats and the closure of the mines by the CMC (Cyprus Mining Corporation) leadership, the two trade unions proceeded with mass celebrations on May Day. In fact, veteran trade unionist, Kamil Tuncel, had described the size of the crowd that took part in May Day commemorations as “linking the area from Xeros to Lefka” (several kilometres). A few months later, the Council of Turkish Workers’ Unions signed a cooperation protocol with PEO regarding both the planned strikes in the mines and a joint effort to safeguard the collective agreements of employees.

The completion and signing of the protocol of co-operation between the two trade unions on 8 January 1948 also released dynamics that went far beyond the mining sector. The cooperation and the effort for joint left-wing activity expanded almost immediately in the field of ports, cargo shipments, buildings, public and army construction works, as well as in the clothing industry. However, the mining sector remained the focal point for the emergence of a parallel opposition to the nationalist leadership. Following the signing of the protocol, preparations started for the strike mobilizations, which would eventually turn out to be the largest and most intense in the modern history of Cyprus. Groups of T/C and G/C workers carried out campaigns to inform the public, to organize the material and give political assistance to strikers. Tuncel reported that the campaign became so wide that it covered areas such as Lefka, Xeros, Morphou, Elia, Petra, Pentagia, Ambelikos, Pyrgos, Flasos, Limnitis, Kalopanagiotis (all in the northwest part of the island).

The geographical breadth of the solidarity campaign had direct political implications in the T/C community. Local authorities of these areas, and even Küçük himself, were forced to ‘tolerate’ and to silently support the strikes, despite the nuisance caused by the clear hegemony of the Left.

The strikes began on 13 January 1948 and lasted until May of the same year. About two thousand G/C and T/C workers struggled for rights such as eight-hour work, the right to vacations and improved working conditions. Considering that the strikes were also attended by the miners’ families, the number of strikers must have reached up to 5,000 people. Consequently, material assistance, which came from the surrounding areas and elsewhere, to meet the basic needs of such a large number of people, formed an important indication of the social and political response of the collective effort of trade unions. For example, Tuncel remembers that every afternoon, together with other left-wing T/C trade unionists, they organized the collection of aid from different neighbourhoods of Nicosia. Among them was the area of cami Ömerye, where prostitutes worked at the time, and who were very willing to help, as Tuncel said, by offering small sums of money, jewellery and even food prepared for the strikers.

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53 Tuncel 2011, p. 91.
54 Moustaka 2010, p. 257.
55 Tuncel 2011, p. 92.
56 Ibid.
58 Tuncel 2011, p. 93.
The intensity and massification of the mine strikes, their duration, and the bi-communal social movement created by the diverse participation of workers from all over the island, formed pillars that structured a different political programme, one totally contrary to the boundaries of the nationalist elite. These dynamics eventually altered the stance of the T/C nationalist elite. For example, Küçük had initially promised support to the strikes through his newspaper, Halkın Sesi, but any articles of solidarity with the strikers soon disappeared. The position of tolerance towards the strikes turned again into an anti-communist hysteria. According to the then T/C leader Küçük, “this strike is not for you. It has turned into a political affair”. The dynamic development of the strike and its transformation into a “political affair”, with the practical implementation of the joint activity, not only created channels of communication between the workers of the two communities, but also influenced new political power relations within the framework of the Consultative Assembly.

At a moment in history when the question of self-government of the Cypriots was prominent and when the nationalist elites entered a period of competition for the future status of the island, part of society – the Left – was responding with an incomplete, but utterly different, political proposal.

Within this framework, up to the early 1950s, there was a growth in the organization of T/C workers, both in the AKEL-affiliated PEO and the Turkish Cypriot Workers’ Associations. Despite the obstacles created by the adoption of the unionist approach, PEO approached the T/C workers further by establishing the “Turkish office”. At the same time, the left opposition, which was already dominant in the Turkish Cypriot Workers’ Unions, achieved a closer cooperation with PEO and replaced the KTIBK with the Turkish Educational Association (Türk Eğitim Kulübü), reflecting the widening of its activity to matters concerning the protection of workers from gambling and alcoholism.

Nationalist hegemony with a foreign hand: internationalization of the Cyprus problem and violence against the Left

The obstacles created by the various demands of the community’s popular strata to the completion of the hegemony of the T/C nationalism were finally overcome, through the way the Cyprus problem was internationalized, among others. The massification of the nationalist claims in the T/C community, and its total dominance, were determined by important processes, including the transformation of the Cyprus issue into a national issue of Turkey, and the simultaneous transfer of the problem to the international political arena. Within this framework, the nationalist hegemony was completed, acquiring, at the same time, more dynamic organizational and paramilitary forms, such as TMT.

59 Tuncel 2011, p. 95.
60 Katsiaounis 2000, p. 418.
62 Tuncel 2011, p. 118.
One year after the London Conference in 1955, where Turkey officially claimed a role as interested party to the Cyprus issue, the British Colonial Secretary, Lennox Boyd, encouraged the Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes, to adopt the position of separate self-determination rights in Cyprus. This development made partition officially the new strategy of Ankara for a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Since the early 1950s, the Menderes government had reinforced the activities of organizations in Turkey such as the “Cyprus is Turkish” Association, decisively contributing to the transformation of the Cyprus issue into a top national issue. Gradually, the pursued status of the island evolved into a case for Turkish national security that did not merely involve the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community on the island. It was the period when the slogan “Ya Taksim ya Ölüm” (Partition or Death) became dominant.

Within this framework, nationalism in the T/C community took on new characteristics, as nationalist elite gradually adopted a more dynamic approach, dominated by violence. Rauf Denktas was presented as an ideal personality, whose leadership would further develop the new phase of activation of the nationalist elite. Denktas’s appointment in the leadership of the Federation of T/C Organizations in 1957, replacing Kaymak, made evident the choice for a more aggressive policy. This development, in turn, contributed to a more comprehensive practical application of ethnic separatist measures; for example, TMT was established during this period. Some sources report that in 1958, the Turkish government and general army staff were mobilized for the organization and equipping of the paramilitary organization in Cyprus. Rıza Vuruşkan, a Turkish officer, arrived in Cyprus in the summer of 1958 and created the first nuclei of TMT, with the contribution of Denktas himself. The establishment and dominance of TMT in the T/C community was a turning point in the course of ideological diversification and formation of separate structures. One of the key features was the organizational set-up of TMT. Nicosia was headed by Bayraktar, who was at the top of the leadership structure, while the provinces were headed by Sancaktar. Almost all leading positions were held by Turkish officers, aided by Turkish Cypriots.

Its strict organizational structure, and the internationalization of the Cyprus problem combined with the tension in the interior, enabled TMT gradually to become dominant. An additional critical factor was the exercise of violence. On 27-28 January 1958, seven Turkish Cypriots died in clashes with the British Army during protests in favour of partition. On 7 June of the same year, 13 more people were killed, while on 12 June, nine Greek Cypriots were murdered in Gyoneli village.

However, apart from the instrumentalization of the intercommunal conflicts, the violence of the period also targeted another strategic goal: the goal of eliminating the centrifugal

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63 Fırat 2001, p. 604.
67 Tansu 2001, p. 52.
68 Egemen 2006, p. 147.
forces at intra-communal level. For the nationalist elite, violence was a method of politically homogenizing the community and removing all positions that did not include partition. Thus, the T/C Left was at the centre of violent repression. The experience of the bi-communal activity of previous years expressed a kind of Cypriot patriotism\textsuperscript{70} that was easily adopted by the T/C Left. In very difficult circumstances, the left-wing personalities stressed the need for co-existence and co-operation between the two communities. In this sense, they questioned both the doctrine of the “impossibility of co-existence” promoted by TMT, and the essence of the views on partition. For example, members of the Turkish office of AKEL under Derviş Ali Kavazoglu, in their letter to Nihat Erim, the representative of the Turkish government who was sent to study the prospects of partition in Cyprus in 1957, stated:

\begin{quote}
\begin{quote}
The inseparable Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have lived for centuries together in this land. They cultivated their fields together, worked together in their workplaces, lived side by side, embracing each other in towns and villages; they laughed together through good days and suffered through bad ones, in joint fates ... The idea of the island's partition ... cannot be the final form of solution to the Cyprus problem, nor can it be implemented.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

Placing emphasis on the historical traditions of coexistence between the two communities, as well as highlighting these traditions as a political platform for a different solution to the Cyprus problem beyond the boundaries of partition (and of union), precisely formed the target for violence against the Left. The extermination and marginalization of the left T/Cs was immediate, short in duration, and accompanied by methods of ideological penalization against those who chose to continue their leftist action. Between May and July 1958, a number of armed attacks against T/C communists and trade union leaders\textsuperscript{72} resulted in the near-total marginalization of the left-wing opposition.

In this way, until the end of the 1950s, TMT achieved multiple objectives in strengthening its own framework. At a critical period, just before the establishment of the Cyprus Republic, the nationalist elite reinforced the view that the co-existence of the two communities was impossible, while it sought to legitimise partition as a form of political settlement of the Cyprus problem in the overall processes of internationalizing the problem. The violence that prevailed just before the establishment of the Cyprus Republic was an authoritarian type of national homogenization of the community, which did not allow the emergence of a vision of a common political and economic activity that would start from the grass roots level. In short, violence managed to create barriers to the articulation of an alternative course of modernization of the T/Cs that would include Cyprus, and its population as a whole, and not separately through partitionist policies and economic processes.

\textsuperscript{70} Panayiotou 2006, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{71} Kızılyürek 2016, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{72} Arslan 2012, p. 127.
What does this legacy of anti-nationalism and working with the Turkish Cypriots mean for the Cypriot left?

To answer the question of whether AKEL’s position of enosis and the rise of nationalism in the T/C community halted collaboration, anti-national and common struggles at the trade unions level, a closer view of the relations between the two communities during the years when these developments were taking place provides a perspective of significant importance. After 1947 when AKEL’s shift occurs, G/C and T/C workers participated in joint trade and labour unions, experiencing a bi-communal co-operation and social struggles, as mentioned above. The action in 1947 is exemplary, when PEO and Turkish Cypriot Workers proceeded with mass celebrations on 1 May, while a little later they signed a cooperation protocol.

In the early 1950s, the increase of T/C workers in both PEO and the Turkish Cypriot Workers’ Associations was significant and so was the close cooperation between the left opposition of the Turkish Cypriot Workers’ Unions with PEO. In addition, in these turbulent times, left-wing personalities, such as Derviş Ali Kavazoğlu of the Turkish office of AKEL, stressed the necessity for co-existence and co-operation between the two communities.

It is of significant importance to note that it was during these challenging times, when attempts of extermination and marginalization were taking place, the most dramatic strike became a symbol of struggle, class and ideological autonomy for the communist left in the contemporary history of Cyprus, and it was experienced by the left culture as an epic moment of the bi-communal class and anti-colonial conflict. Such was the legacy of this historical moment that it became a point of reference in the recent revival of the bi-communal and reunification movement for the following decades up to the present day.

Looking at history from the vantage point of the 21st century, one may say that the Left, a product of the residuals of historical daily co-existence, managed to create its own modern form of residuals in the 1940s and 1950s. These residuals created a historical consciousness of “struggle and resistance” and in effect forms of counter-hegemony. The Left managed to survive in both communities and to affect and determine policies, despite the attacks, despite the forced separation of the Left itself, after 1958, and the subsequent division of daily life by 1974. The G/C Left played a key role in the formation of the welfare state, in the adoption of independence as a desired goal, of a balanced (between East and West) foreign policy, etc. The T/C left spent more time in opposition, and under direct repression, but it re-emerged and seems to have a decisive historical role. Its continued presence was felt strongly by the nationalist authorities and moved accordingly in efforts to co-opt the criticism. After 2000, the T/C Left, in a new form – more as a social movement – took a leading role in efforts at reunification.

The two parts of the bi-communal Left, which have been separated by nationalist violence, managed to construct a common image (even if constructed separately) of Cyprus as the com-

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73 Moustaka 2010, p. 255.
74 Moustaka 2010, p. 257.
75 Panayiotou 2006.
mon country of all Cypriots, which was achieved by building on the memories/residuals of coexistence in daily life, and acting within the framework of the modern residuals of leftism (the framework of “struggle and resistance”). During the historical process, both parts of the Cypriot Left acted strategically vis à vis the hegemonic framework as the G/C left did in the 1950s. Methodologically, in this sense social and political analysis has to take into account the historical framework and the cultural-political context in its historical development.

**Abbreviations**

AKEL: Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, Progressive Party of Working People
CMC: Cyprus Mining Corporation
DSE: Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδας, Democratic Army of Greece
EOKA: Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
G/C: Greek Cypriot
KATAK: Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu, Institutions of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus
KKK: Komünist Parti Kıbrıs, Communist Party of Cyprus
KTCB: Kıbrıs Türk Çiftçiler Birliği, Cyprus Association of Turkish Farmers
KTIBK: Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Birlikleri Kurumu, Council of Turkish Workers’ Associations
PEO: Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία, Pancyprian Workers’ Federation
T/C: Turkish Cypriot
TMT: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, Turkish Resistance Organization
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