• 1 Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?", Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Politi (...)

Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of Enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!
Immanuel Kant1

• 2 Ayse Kadioglu, "Cumhuriyet Kadini: Vatandas mi, Birey mi?" (Republican Woman: a Citizen or an Indiv (...)
• 3 See, Ayse Kadioglu, "Alaturkalik ile Dffetsizlik Arasinda Birey Olarak Kadin" (Women as Individuals (...)
• 4 Fatmagül Berktay, "Türkiye Solu’nun Kadina Bakisi: Degisen Bir Wey Var mi?" (Turkish Left’s View of (...)
• 5 Nilüfer Göle, Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Örtünme (Modern Privacy: Civilization and the Veil), Meti (...)

1In a short essay that I wrote in 1996, I had argued that the limitations of the feminist arguments in Turkey basically stem from an assumption that women are citizens prior to being individuals². Feminist demands in Turkey are usually posed by way of attachment to grand social and political projects such as Kemalism, Socialism as well as Islamic identities³. Kemalist feminists emphasize women’s public visibility in modern attires especially in the political arena, such as their presence and visibility in the parliament and within the political party structures. Socialist women, in the course of the 1970s emphasized a view of equality of women which came to mean “similarity with men”. Hence, they denounced their sexuality and feminity and posed as “sisters” of socialist men⁴. Islamic women, on the other hand, have been staging a fight of the costumes since the early 1980s. With the advent of political Islam, the covered bodies of the Moslem women are perpetuated in stark contrast with the bodies of modern women. These women resort to veiling in order to emphasize their personality rather than sexuality⁵. Veiling has become a way of denouncing sexuality outside of the confines of a marital arrangement. In the course of serving such grand social and political projects, then, Turkish women have subordinated their individual identities. The trajectory of Turkish men is not too different from that of Turkish women in terms of the subordination of individuality. Hence, Turkish men and women, first and foremost perceive themselves first and foremost as Turkish citizens who have the responsibility of performing certain duties.

• 6 Richard Plender, International Migration Law, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden, p. 43.

5The roots of the modern concept of citizenship can be located in the French Revolution. It evolved along with the evolution of various nationalisms in Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution. The beginnings of immigration control in Europe were an outcome of the French Revolution. In England, for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a direct response to the flight of French refugees (about eight thousand) from the Revolution⁶. In America and Switzerland, too, immigration control began as a reaction to the French Revolution and fears that Jacobin emissaries had infiltrated immigrant groups.

• 7 In an earlier article, I have referred to the coexistence of globalization and "Germanization" (exc (...)
• 8 Ayse Kadioglu. "Kamusal Alan ile Özel Alanin Yeniden Eklemlenmesi: Demokratik Vatandaslik" (Reartic (...)

7Today, with the increasing scrutiny of the basic categories of modernity, the modern notion of citizenship has begun to be viewed outside of its attachment to the nation-state. The current need to revise the category of citizenship is a consequence of the process of globalization. Globalization and the transfer of images and populations across countries has prompted the opening up of the public realm to differences that were earlier relegated to the private realm. Such differences are usually expressed in terms of discourses pertaining to gender, race, religion, and ethnicity. At the advent of the twenty first century, the notion of citizenship is going through a transformation along with other conceptual searches within democratic theory. The decline of the supremacy of nation states has captured the attention of many researchers, who emphasizes the increasing importance of regional cooperation as well as globalization. However, Europe has simultaneously been witnessing a remarkable resurgence of nationalism as well. Hence, our times are characterized by conflicting trends which signal the demise of the nation-state as well as the resurgence of nationalisms. Perhaps, one of the distinguishing features of our times is a conflict duality involving the lowering of established barriers to communication among the peoples of the world and, at the same time, the erection of new ones. Hence, while some of the historical reasons that have paved the way to nationalism and xenophobia in the European context are being eliminated, new ones are mushrooming in political cultures laden with racial motifs⁷. The debates regarding citizenship are also revolving around similar themes. On the one hand, there are arguments regarding the dissolution of the modern concept of citizenships along with the nation state, and its replacement by the larger category of human rights and, on the other, there are yearnings for pre-modern, organic communities as the basis of citizenship, along with authoritarian nationalisms. Hence, while the modern notion of citizenship is widening into human rights, it is, at the same time, getting narrower, with the increasing salience of identity politics, and with an urge to glorify private identities. Thus, a revision and redefinition of the modern notion of citizenship involves a “rearticulation of the public and private realms” that were separated in modernity and were fused in pre-modern societies⁸.

• 9 Many international and national conferences held in Turkey were organized around the themes of citi (...)
• 10 On the debates on "Constitutional citizenship" in Turkey, see, Nur Vergin, "Anayasal Vatandaslik Ne (...)

8In the Turkish context, the urge to revise and redefine the notion of citizenship as arisen from a visible accentuation of the expression of women’s as well as Islamic and Kurdish identities, since the late 1980s. Such differences which were previosuly relegated into the private real, begun to make their presence felt in the public realm. The absolute, homogeneous, all-encompassing category of Turkish citizenship has been demystified and has begun to crumble due to the predominance of an “identity politics” in Turkey, based on gender-related, religious and ethnic identities. While this issue has been attracting increasing attention in academic circles⁹, a new notion referred as “Constitutional citizenship” has begun to be discussed in the political circles with the expression even being used by the President, Süleyman Demirel¹⁰. In the midst of these debates on Turkish citizenship, some people have begun to say of themselves “I am from Turkey”(Türkiye’liyim), rather than “I am a Turk” (Türküm). This symbolized the demystification of the official view of Turkish citizenship embodied in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s famous expression “How happy is the one who calls himself a Turk!” (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!). I believe that the issue of citizenship poses the question of democratization in Turkey from the angle of modernity rather than focusing on the specific features and problems of the Turkish modernization project. The scrutiny of the modern notion of citizenship is not peculiar to Turkey. It is a process that was unleashed all over the world as a result of a dynamics set in play by globalization.

• 11 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridg (...)
• 12 See, for instance, Bryan Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Dimens (...)

9Almost all the new analyses of the modern notion of citizenship in the literature refer to T. H. Marshall’s classical works¹¹. Marshall refers to three dimensions of citizenship: civil/legal, political, and social. Firstly civil/legal rights of citizens evolved in the course of the seventeenth century vis a vis the absolutist states. Accordingly, courts and individual legal rights began to appear. Secondly, political rights evolved in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries alongside the evolution of modern parliamentary systems. Thirdly, the social dimension of citizenship is a phenomenon of the twentieth century and is related to the welfare state. This dimension had paved the way to certain social rights of individuals, such as unemployment, health, and education. Marshall, then, pointed to a uniform, evolutionary and teleological history of the notion of citizenship. As a result, his citizenship theory has been criticized extensively in the recent literature for failing to account for various types of modern citizenship¹².

• 13 Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, "Civil Citizenship Against Social Citizenship? On the Ideology of Co (...)
• 14 Hasan Bülent Kahraman refers to the construction of all the Marshallian aspects of citizenship in T (...)

10Still, the sequence in the emergence of the three dimensions of citizenship can be utilized in accounting for different trajectories towards modern citizenship. In cases where democratization preceded bureaucratization, civil and legal rights have acquired predominance, to the detriment of social rights. In the United States, for instance, the notion of “social citizenship” is an oxymoron¹³. Citizens relate to the state either via contractual arrangements or they receive aid from the state in the form of charity. Hence, the recipients of welfare, state benefits are usually viewed as lazy parasites who are unworthy of the honor of citizenship. Quite contrarily, in Germany, and most other Western European countries where bureaucratization preceded democratization, citizens (the members of the Volk) benefit from welfare state provisions as “rights”. In Turkey, the distinguishing feature of civil, legal, political and social rights is the fact that they were given from above, rather than acquired as rights in the aftermath of demands and struggles from below. Hence, citizenship was given from above prior to the birth of a bourgeoisie which posed demands and ignited the fire that culminated in constitutionalism¹⁴.

• 15 Hans Kohn considers these years the formative years of French and German nationalisms. Hans Kohn, P (...)
• 16 William Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard University Press (...)

12The years between 1789 and 1815 signaled the emergence of both French and German nationalisms¹⁵. German nationalism emerged alongside a cultural movement, i.e. Romanticism. One of the most distinguishing features of this tradition was its critical attitude towards French cosmopolitanism. German Romantics thought that the rationalism of the eighteenth century was artificial. They relied on intuitions and emotions rather than reason and intellect. The German Romantic movement revealed the dark and anti-rational aspects of German nationalism. The notion of a German nation that evolved in the course of the nineteenth century stemmed from a Volkisch ideology which later formed the basis of the National Socialist worldview. The German Romantic literature became the medium for the expression of German nationalism in the nineteenth century, prior to the formation of a German nation-state. Since German nationalism preceded the nation-state, it was expressed in ethnic and cultural terms. Accordingly, William Rogers Brubaker refers to an “ethnocultural conception of nationhood” in Germany¹⁶. In comparing the German and French conceptions of nationhood and citizenship, Brubaker says:

• 19 I have studied extensively the origins of German nationalism and citizenship earlier. See, for inst (...)

14Hence, the temporal distance between the state formation and nation-building processes, as well as their sequence, gave shape to the different conceptions of nationhood and citizenship in France and Germany¹⁹. Since French nationalism appeared at about the same time as the French nation-state, political and social unity was the work of statesmen. German nationalism preceded by half a century the formation of the German nation-state. The German Romantic tradition was laden with motifs of yearning for a national state. Such a temporal distance made ethnic and cultural unity constitutive of German nationalism. This paved the way to the significance laid on blood ties and/or descent as the basis of modern German citizenship.

• 20 Ayse Kadioglu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity", Midd (...)

15The distinction between the French and German nationalisms and conceptualizations of citizenship is significant in understanding Turkish nationalism in two aspects: First of all, Turkish nationalism displays the characteristics of both French and German nationalisms - it embraces both Civilization and Culture. Hence it has a paradoxical nature²⁰. The paradox between Civilization and Culture is nowhere better expressed than in the writings of Ziya Gökalp. The type of nationalism that Ziya Gökalp mentioned in his writings was individualist and cosmopolitan, yet it also espoused the retainment of a local, pristine identity. Thus, the concepts of Civilization and Culture were not antithetical, mutually exclusive entities in Ziya Gökalp’s thought. Rather he tried to synthesize them. Niyazi Berkes in his analysis of Ziya Gökalp’s thought maintains that:

• 22 See; Ayse Kadioglu, "Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliginin Açmazlari" (A State in Search (...)

16Secondly, it is important to point to the sequence of the emergence of the state and nation in Turkey. Whereas in the German case, it is possible to refer to a nation preceding a state (i.e. “a nation in search of its state”), in the Turkish context, the historical order of things was reversed. In the case of modern Republican Turkey, one can refer to a state preceding a nation (i.e. “a state in search of its nation”)²². Hence, state-political unity appears as the constitutive unit of the Turkish nation-state. In short, the indivisibility of the Turkish state with its nation, and the irreversibility of the borders -contrary to the case in Germany- constitutes the cornerstone of Turkish national identity. Hence, Turkish citizenship appears as a notion defined from above by the state authorities. The distinguishing features of this notion of citizenship were delineated in the 1931 Congress of the Republican People’s Party and were formulated as the “six arrows”, which became the insignia of the Party. These were: Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Republicanism, Etatism, and Revolutionism. These principles were introduced to the Constitution by 1937 and Turkish citizens were expected to internalize them.

• 23 Adrian Oldfield, "Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice", Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton (eds), Citiz (...)
• 24 Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World, op.cit., p. 1
• 25 Adrian Oldfield, "Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice", op. cit., p. 190.

17There exists another classification of the modern notion of citizenship in the literature. This classification stems from a philosophical distinction between the liberal or liberal-individualist traditions and the classical or civic-republican tradition. Adrian Oldfield, who classifies modern citizenship on the basis of these philosophical traditions, refers to the differences between citizenship as “status” and citizenship as “practice”²³. Liberal-individualism has been the dominant strain of thought in Anglo-American political theory since seventeenth century, roughly from Hobbes onwards. According to Oldfield, liberal individualism accords the individual an ontological, epistemological and moral priority²⁴. Liberal individualism defines citizenship as a status on the basis of “rights”, and hence gives rise to a language of citizenship in terms of needs and entitlements. “The status of citizenship” imposes no “duties” the individuals beyond the minimally civic ones. Individuals relate to each other on a contractual basis. Any other form of public involvement and political activity is their “choice”. Hence, in the liberal-individualist tradition, the conception of citizenship generates no social bond other than contract. It does not prompt any type of social solidarity, cohesion, or sense of common purpose²⁵. It produces an individual who is deficient and impoverished as a social being.

• 26 Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World, op. cit., p. (...)
• 27 Adrian Oldfield, "Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice", op.cit., p. 192.
• 28 Ibid., p. 191.
• 29 Ibid.

18The classical or the civic-republican tradition has its origins in the ethical and political thought of Aristotle. It was reinforced and modified by a succession of political thinkers from Macchiavelli to Rousseau and beyond. In the words of Oldfield, “it addresses much more cogently the twin themes of citizenship and community”²⁶. In the classical tradition, citizenship appears as an activity or a practice such that not to engage in the practice is, in important senses, not to be a citizen²⁷. Citizenship, in this tradition, is expressed in terms of a language of duties and/or obligations to the community. Practices empower individuals to act like citizens. It is the shared commitment to these practices what makes individuals citizens. It is action in such spheres as military service, which is both constitutive of citizenship and sustaining of the community of which the citizen is a member. In this view, individuals are not thought of as logically prior to society²⁸. Moreover, they have no moral priority. As a result, claims may be made on their time, resources, and lives for the morally superior entity which is the community²⁹. Oldfield’s major endeavor is to achieve an articulation between these two different traditions and redefine the notion of modern citizenship by drawing the good aspects of each. As he puts it:

• 30 (my emphasis) Ibid., p. 193.

19In the Western world, the ideal of citizenship as status is one which it is not difficult to think of as achievable, even if vigilance is required to ensure that the achievement is sustained. Our confidence here is in large part a product of the sheer amount of thought and struggle which have been invested in the ideal. The same cannot be said of the ideal of citizenship as practice, and in large part this reflects the very success of the liberal-individualist achievement, which was to liberate the individual from the constricting influences of society and the state. The thinking has been there, but the struggle has not. The question, therefore, is whether the struggle is worthwhile. We must not expect to displace the idea of citizenship as status, but we can use elements of this conception to further the project of citizenship as practice³⁰.

• 31 Füsun Üstel, "Cumhuriyet’ten Bu Yana Yurttas Profili" (The Citizen Profile Since the Republic), Yen (...)
• 32 Ibid.

20In the aftermath of the proclamation of the Republic the Turkish notion of citizenship evolved in a manner that is more akin to the civic-republican tradition. Accordingly, Turkish citizenship is based more on “duties” than on “rights”. In a study surveying the books utilized in citizenship education courses in primary and secondary schools in Turkey in the Republican era, Füsun Üstel underlines the evolution of a notion of citizenship based on duties³¹. Accordingly, the most important aim of citizenship education is the achievement of civilization and the inculcation of patriotism. Üstel refers to a “militant” citizen who evolved until the end of the 1940s, and who was “burdened with duties”³².

• 33 Fuat Keyman, "Kemalizm, Modernite, Gelenek" (Kemalizm, Modernity, Tradition), Toplum ve Bilim, 72, (...)
• 34 Ibid., p. 92.
• 35 Ibid., p. 93. See also, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "Kemalist Cumhuriyetçilik, Yurttaslik ve Demokrasi D (...)

21Fuat Keyman presents a notion of Republican citizenship that is constituted of duties on the basis (in order to promote a “common good”), to the detriment of individual rights³³. He interprets the concept of citizenship in Turkey within the framework of the Platonic nature of the Kemalist project of modernity. Accordingly, “common good” is defined by reference to a “will to civilization” on the part of the state elites. Hence, politics in this context does not entail an articulation of different demands into the decision-making process, and, therefore, their representation, but rather the steering of society towards a common good defined by the state elite in accordance with their will to civilization. This common good has ontological priority over demands coming from the society³⁴. As a result, the citizen appears both as the object of the Kemalist modernization project and its carrier. She is not only expected to internalize this project but also reproduces the sovereign dominant of the state³⁵.

• 36 Bryan Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", op.cit. Bryan Turner, "Contemporary Problems in (...)

22Bryan Turner forwards a classification of the modern notion of citizenship based on the two axes of active versus passive, and the extent of its definition within the public realm³⁶. Turner’s analysis contains a critique of Marshall’s evolutionary and uniform trajectory of modern citizenship. As he puts it:

• 38 Ibid., p. 46.

23According to Turner’s classification, there exist four types of modern citizenship, which have evolved in four different contexts. First of all, in revolutionary contexts, citizenship involves a struggle from below (active citizenship) with an emphasis on the public arena (citizenship evolved in the public realm). As a result, the private world of the individual is regarded with suspicion. Second, in the liberal pluralist context, citizenships, once again involves a struggle for rights from below (active citizenship), yet there also exists a continuous emphasis on the rights of the individual for privatized dissent (citizenship evolved in the private realm). Third, in passive democratic mediums, citizenship rights are given from above without, or prior to, a struggle from below (passive citizenship or citizen as subject), combined with a legitimacy of representative institutions, courts and the welfare state system (citizenship evolved in the public realm). Fourth, in plebscitary authoritarian mediums, citizenship rights are once again given from above (passive citizenship). Yet, although the state invites the citizens to periodically elect a leader, the latter is no longer responsible to the electorate on a daily basis, and therefore private life emerges as a “sanctuary from state regulation” (citizenship evolved in the private realm)³⁸.

• 39 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
• 40 Bryan Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", op.cit., p. 10.

24Turner refers to the French conception of citizenship within the revolutionary tradition, where there existed an attack on the private space of the family and religion. The American conception of citizenship contained motifs of the liberal pluralist solution since participation was emphasized yet contained by a continuous emphasis on the privacy and the sacredness of individual opinion. Tne English case was, under the seventeenth century settlement, in Turner’s opinion, an example of the passive democratic solution, since citizens appeared as mere subject combined with a legitimacy of the representative institutions. German fascism constitutes a degeneration of plebscitary democracy, where “the individual citizen is submerged in the sacredness of the state, which permits minimal participation in terms of election of leaders, while family life is given priority in the arena of personal ethical development”³⁹. The failure of a radical bourgeois revolution in Germany in the 1840s, and the realization of unification from above in 1870 by means of Bismarckian legislation, paved the way to passive citizenship which became the main carrier of social rights. The absence of a successful liberal revolution produced an underdeveloped public realm in Germany⁴⁰.

• 41 Bryan Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", op.cit., p. 56.
• 42 Füsun Üstel "Cumhuriyet’ten Bu Yana Yurttas Profili", op.cit.

25The Turkish conception of modern citizenship, when viewed from the angle of Turner’s classification, seems akin both to the revolutionary French tradition - since there exists an attack on the private space of the family and religion - and the German passive tradition. In Turner’s formulation, the former tradition may collapse into totalitarianism when the “state in pushing egalitarianism to the extreme closes off the private sphere from influencing the course of political affairs”⁴¹. The Turkish conception differs from the French one in that it was defined from above and therefore was passive. It is similar to the German conception in that the absence of a successful liberal revolution - and hence participation - produced an underdeveloped public realm. Turkish citizenship was defined from above (passive), within an exaggerated public space smothered the individual and invade the private space of the family and religion. Üstel observes an effort to supervise and regulate the private realm in citizenship education for example in the listing of appropriate fun and recreational activities, the regulation of health and hygiene, as well as dress codes, until the end of the 1940s⁴².

• 43 Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?", Hans Reiss (ed), Kant’s Politic (...)

26Perhaps what distinguishes the Turkish notion of citizenship from the French tradition is the absence of Enlightenment prior to the establishment of citizenship. If, following Immanuel Kant, Enlightenment is defined as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity”, then we might say that the Turkish notion of citizenship precludes an unenlightened, immature individual⁴³. Hence, the notion of Turkish citizenship was constructed on the basis of an enlightened, “free” individual capable of producing demands. Such a notion purports to steer the common lives of immature beings by means of duties. The citizens are not expected to reason. Rather, they are expected to follow. In elaborating on national morals, Atatürk says:

• 46 I have elaborated on Ahmet Agaoglu’s thought in greater detail in "Secularism and Limits of Liberal (...)

28Ironically, the state elite’s will to civilization hardly received any fundamental criticisms from the liberal opposition in Turkey in the 1930s. The priority of will over reason is also evident in some of the liberal texts of that era. In what follows, I will fortify this argument by briefly focusing on the liberalism and peculiar individualism of Ahmet Agaoglu⁴⁶.

• 47 Ahmet Agaoglu, Serbest Firka Hatiralari (Memoirs on Free Republican Party), Dletisim Yayinlari, Ist (...)

29Ahmet Agaoglu (1869-1939) is one of the most interesting thinkers of the early Republican era. He was actively involved in the formation of a legitimate opposition party, the Free Republican Party (Serbest Firka) in 1930, which lasted less than four months. The Free Republican Party was founded upon the wishes of Atatürk who wanted to create a controlled opposition. In his memoirs, Agaoglu describes how he was given the task of being among the founders of such a party⁴⁷. The Free Republican Party’s political impact remained quite limited but the impact of the whole experience on Agaoglu’s thought was quite significant. He never returned to the ranks of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi) after this episode. He spent his final years producing a fascinating literature in terms of a peculiar brand of liberalism.

• 49 Ahmet Agaoglu, Ben Neyim? (Who am I?), Istanbul, 1939.

32Agaoglu envisioned a type of individualism that would open up Eastern societies to a vision of freedom. This individual was quite different from the egoistic individual described in classical liberal texts. Agaoglu described this liberalism in his book Ben Neyim? (Who am I?), which was originally published in 1936, three years before he died⁴⁹. In this book, Agaoglu pointed to a distinction between egoism and altruism, and while he detested the former, he advocated the latter. The egoist individual, according to him, typically existed in the Orient. Such an individual did not care about the good of others. They were, in other words, put into their own sheath.

• 50 Ibid., p. 15.
• 51 Ahmet Agaoglu, "Özcülük ve Özgecilik" (Egoism and Altruism), Akin, May 30, 1933.
• 52 Ahmet Agaoglu, "Serbest Kadin" (Free Woman), Akin, June 25, 1933.

33Agaoglu listed three reasons for the emergence of such selfish individuals in the Orient. The first one related to the family structure and the position of women within the family in Eastern societies; the second concerned the educational system and the poor state of the existing literature; and the third was grounded in the existence of long-lasting despotic regimes in the East⁵⁰. He argued that, since the family structures separated the male’s and female spaces, there was no solidarity between them. This consequently nurtured egoism⁵¹. Moreover, he also blamed the literary figures for being alienated from the society and for not providing the society with role models⁵². Hence, the Ottoman-Turkish soil was not a fertile ground for the blossoming of virtues such as altruism or selflessness. In placing his hopes in an altruist, selfless individual, rather than a selfish one, Agaoglu was displaying his longing for a solidarist structure in the society.

• 53 Such a feature of Agaoglu’s thought is depicted in a very eloquent article by François Georgeon, "A (...)
• 54 Ahmet Agaoglu, "Entellektüellerin Zaaflari" (Weaknesses of the Intellectuals), Akin, June 7, 1933. (...)
• 55 Ahmet Agaoglu, Serbest Dnsanlar Ülkesinde (In the Land of the Free Men), Istanbul, 1936.

35Agaoglu did not place too much emphasis on the role of institutions and laws in creating selfless individuals. In the tradition of Montesquieu and Tocqueville, he laid his hope, rather, on the adoption of certain moral values since he thought despotic frames of mind lingered on in the Turkish Republic despite the Kemalist reforms⁵³. Such a moral, virtuous individual was rather to be created by two methods: First of all, Agaoglu placed a lot of importance on the role of the leading literary figures, such as poets, novelists and intellectuals of his time. He considered literary figures and intellectuals to be motors of progress. Accordingly, he at times voiced a major disillusionment with the works of such figures in the Ottoman-Turkish lands⁵⁴. His elitism is nowhere more clearly expressed than in his utopian novel, Serbest Insanlar Ülkesinde (In the Land of the Free Men).⁵⁵ Here, he describes the process through which an egoist individual becomes a selfless man. All along, he is guided by a group of intellectuals which he refers as the “pir”s. Hence, Agaoglu’s individualism contains elitist motifs.

• 56 Henri Bergson’s works became quite influential among the intellectuals in Istanbul in the 1920s. On (...)

36Secondly, the selfless individuals were to be created by their own internal self. Inner self was expected to tame the outer self. At this point, Agaoglu’s thought was influenced by the works of Henri Bergson, which had a metaphysical dimension.⁵⁶ The Turkish followers of Bergson in their journal, Dergah, argued that, the secret of success of the War of Independence was to do with more than just technical advances in the military. It was not something that could be measured by the categories of positive sciences. Rather such a success spilled from a basic instinct of all living creatures which was called élan vital (elan of life).

• 57 Samet Agaoglu, Babamin Arkadaslari (My Father’s Friends), Nebioglu Yayinevi, Istanbul, no date.
• 58 Ahmet Agaoglu, Serbest Dnsanlar Ülkesinde, p. 75; see also, Agaoglu’s description of the cleansing (...)

37In a fascinating book, where he described the life and works of his father’s friends, Ahmet Agaoglu’s late son, Samet Agaoglu, pointed to a difference between his father’s and Ziya Gökalp’s ideas.⁵⁷ He argued that in Ziya Gökalp’s thought, the individual had to surrender to the state entity - hence there were no rights but only duties. Agaoglu, on the other hand, brought the individual to the forefront, outside of the realm of the state. Nevertheless, he still placed more emphasis on duties than on rights. What distinguished Agaoglu was his vision of an individual who would eventually be aware of his duties through the efforts of his own inner self. Hence, Agaoglu underlined the significance of will over reason. Since spirit was made up of both reason and will, reason had to give in to will for the achievement of a solidarist social structure composed of selfless, responsible individuals. Given all his descriptions of duty-oriented, moral, selfless individuals led by “pir”s, Agaoglu’s land of the free man seems rather like a dystopia where moral despotism reigns. The selfless individuals of this puritan free land seem to have gone through what he calls the three types of cleanliness cleansing of the body, heart, and spirit⁵⁸.

• 59 Ahmet Agaoglu, "Nizamli Hürriyet" (Ordered Freedom), Akin, June 5, 1933.

38It is obvious that Agaoglu’s individualism carried both elitist and solidarist motifs due to its emphasis on the intellectuals and altruism at the expense of egoism. His individual was not someone who was expected to use his reason but rather was to be dragged to an “ordered freedom” under the guidance of intellectual leaders⁵⁹.

• 60 I have elaborated on the notion of "Republican epistemology" in Ayse Kadioglu, "Republican Epistemo (...)

41Ironically, the Republican epistemology shaped the contours of the liberal arguments in the Turkish context as well. One of the self-acclaimed liberals of the 1930s, Ahmet Agaoglu, for instance, formulated an individualism which was delimited by a Republican epistemology. This epistemology had two distinguishing features: First of all, it was essentialist, i.e. it was based on an essentialist distinction between the East and the West and/or the Orient and the Occident. Secondly, it was based on a managerial attitude on the part of the Republican elite who identified civilization as a societal goal, and who initiated a process of social engineering geared towards constructing a modern national identity at the expense of traditional, local, religious identities⁶⁰. Agaoglu’s liberalism, defined within the confines of a Republican epistemology was laden with positivist, vanguardist, solidarist, and moralist motifs. The characteristics of Agaoglu’s individual, were quite akin to the Republican citizen who was a militant follower rather than a reflecting, reasoning being.

• 61 (my emphasis) Hans Reiss (ed.), "Introduction", Kant’s Political Writings.

43He (Kant) does not consider it to be the purpose of politics to make people happy. Happiness is subjective...This argument, of course, does not mean that he does not wish people to be happy. It only means that political arrangements should not be organized in such a way as to aim at promoting happiness, but that they should permit men to attain happiness in their own way⁶¹.