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1Many books have been published on China’s 1989 democracy movement and its dramatic end. Nonetheless, few have focused on not only the decision-making process that led the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to repress the protest but also the political context that convinced Deng Xiaoping, the de facto supreme leader of the time, to instruct the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to evacuate Tiananmen Square and regain control of Beijing.

2This is precisely the task that Yang Su, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine, has completed. Relying on many new sources in addition to the ones that have already been exploited by others, he demonstrates that “[Chinese] leaders were busy engaging in factional politics rather than working to end the protest. Instead, they were busy in taking advantage of the protest for gain on the ongoing battle of power succession” (p. 2). As a result, Yang dismisses both the “revolution suppression” and the “two-way factionalism” models of understanding the Tiananmen crackdown, and proposes a “three-way succession” model according to which the situation was not revolutionary, the defining political issue was the question of political succession to Deng Xiaoping, and the elite alignment was characterised by evolving alliances (p. 20).

3Divided into four parts and 11 chapters, Deadly Decision first very usefully revisits the arrival of the Deng Era (1976–1987) before analysing the fate of Deng’s two successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, from 1980, when they were promoted to the positions of CCP General Secretary and Prime Minister, respectively, until Hu’s death on 15 April 1989 (Part One). Then (Part Two), the author dives deep into the interconnexion between the development of the Tiananmen protest and elite politics all the way from the early relatively tolerant response to the movement (15–26 April) to the gradual confrontation between a majority of the CCP leadership and the protesters after the publication of the infamous 26 April 1989 People’s Daily editorial. The most innovative chapter in this part is probably the one devoted to the disappearance of Deng from 25 April to 11 May, as if the old patriarch “was waiting for Zhao and the students to stumble” (p. 107). In other words, even before Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China (15–18 May), Deng had already decided to remove Zhao and move against the protests.

4Part Three deals with the decision for military intervention. The situation was not revolutionary; the protesters did not jeopardise the CCP leadership; they were reformist; students dominated the movement with few working-class participants; the 1989 anti-communist international context did not play much of a role. Yang’s major argument is that it was Deng’s decision to build an alliance with his conservative rivals (Chen Yun, Li Peng, etc.) that led him to adopt a hard line against the protests, impose martial law, and call in the army. The conservatives, particularly Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, also weighed in on the choice of Zhao’s successor, Jiang Zemin. As for the military crackdown, it was both a bloody and symbolic show of force, particularly at Tiananmen.

5The fourth and final part assesses the political impact of the Tiananmen crisis. After all, Deng’s concessions to the conservatives were limited: he managed to promote reformists such as Li Ruihuan, who then was put in charge of ideology; he later sidelined Yang Shangkun and his half-brother Yang Baibing to consolidate Jiang’s power over the PLA; and more importantly, in 1992 he relaunched the economic reforms against the will of conservatives Li Peng et al.

6This book raises a number of interesting and somewhat well-known questions that remain difficult to answer. Why did Zhao decide to leave for North Korea on 24 April and delegate power to Li Peng instead of staying in Beijing to directly manage the protest? Yang’s reply is that he “felt very secure with Deng,” who before his departure had promised to put him in charge of the military after his return (p. 257). Maybe, but Zhao was certainly aware of the growing dissatisfaction of the conservatives, not only with the protest but also with some of the reforms he had introduced at the 13^th Party Congress in 1987. He also knew of their increasing political influence after Li Peng took over economic work in the summer of 1988.

7Likewise, there is a tension in the book between the need for Deng to conclude an alliance with the conservatives and his position of “supreme leader” in full control of the military. Everything indicates that in 1989, Deng was the one making the final decisions, and listened only to the voices he wanted to hear in order to legitimise his own choices. The 26 April editorial was heavily inspired by him. The decisions to find a successor to Zhao, to impose martial law, and to mobilise the PLA into Beijing were also all made by him. Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Li Peng had no influence over the military, and Yang Shangkun would not have made any decision without Deng’s green light. In other words, very early on, Deng felt that he had to use violent methods to restore order, nip in the bud any “peaceful evolution” towards democracy, and consolidate the CCP’s monopolistic power. At no time did he show a willingness to negotiate with the protesters, let alone recognise the existence of their short-lived organisations. Even if we put aside the succession issue, Deng would have never entertained the idea of letting independent social or political forces limit the power of the CCP.

8Despite these few reservations, Deadly Decision is a must read for anyone interested not only in the Tiananmen democracy movement and the subsequent massacre but also in the future of China’s political system and state-society relationship.