Framing the special feature

1Taiwan – an island in the Western Pacific with a population of 23 million – was long portrayed as the “Orphan of Asia.” As a “contested state” that exercises de facto sovereignty but falls short of de jure international legal recognition (Geldenhuys 2009), Taiwan has been marginalised in the global public sphere for many decades (Cho and Ahn 2017). However, the tide is changing. Since the intensification of US–China competition during the 2010s, Taiwan has gained unprecedented global attention, especially in the West. It has increasingly become a central arena of global geopolitics, embodying issues of international security, economy, democracy, and order.

The rationale for the special feature

6How should we account for Taiwan’s recent evolution into a centre of global geopolitics that vividly embodies global security (as a flashpoint for great power war), the global economy (as the linchpin of the global semiconductor supply chain), global democracy (as a frontline in the democracy–autocracy contest), and global order (as a disputed territory subject to competing conceptions of world order)? More specifically, what motivates the US and its allies to compete so intensely with China over Taiwan in recent years? Over time, the scholarly and policy literature on Taiwan has burgeoned, addressing the global implications of its war risk (e.g., Wang Y. 2019; Santoro and Cossa 2023; Wu 2023), semiconductor industry (e.g., Chiang 2023; Chou 2023; Martin et al. 2023), survival as a democracy (e.g., Templeman 2020; Chen 2022), and international legal order (e.g., Wang K. 2019; Ahl 2020). Written by scholars and experts from different backgrounds and disciplines, and lacking a common theoretical framework, the extant literature – though intensive and thorough – inevitably captures only part, rather than the full picture, of Taiwan’s recent evolution into a centre of global geopolitics. This special feature endeavours to fill that gap by drawing on great power competition theories to explain Taiwan's emergence as a centre of global geopolitics.

7The central argument of this special feature is that the rising “national interests” of the US and its regional allies in Taiwan have prompted them to strengthen their support for the island vis-à-vis China, thereby positioning Taiwan as a critical arena in global geopolitics. In the great power competition literature, “national interests” are defined as the perceived priorities that a country – including global and regional powers as well as small states – seeks to pursue regarding its external environment (Nye 1999). Such national interests may be broadly classified into defence interests (the defence of the country against military threats from other countries, including threats to its system of government), economic interests (the enhancement of the country’s economic well-being), ideological interests (the promotion of values, norms, and beliefs that the country and its people consider as universally good), and world-order/overseas interests (the maintenance of an international order that protects the security of a country’s overseas citizens and enterprises operating beyond its territorial borders), following the classical typology developed by Nuechterlein (1976). Building upon these great power competition theories and concepts – which are derived from an emerging grand theory in international relations called “neo-offensive realism” (Fong 2024a) – this special feature examines the evolution of the US and its regional allies’ interests in Taiwan in recent years and their implications for Taiwan’s rise as a centre of global geopolitics.

8Apart from highlighting the causal importance of national interests in driving the US and its regional allies to compete with China over the island, and hence provide greater support for it, this special issue also pays attention to Taiwan’s own agency in navigating such geopolitical turbulence. One of the biggest paradoxes of great power competition theories is that they must extend their analytical focus beyond great powers to include non-great powers, including regional powers, small states, and quasi-states. In particular, small states and quasi-states are not only “objects” but also “subjects” of global geopolitics. They are probably powerless to prevent great powers from competing over their territories at the system level, but they nevertheless possess – however limited – agency to navigate such competition at the unit level (Fong 2025a, 2025b). In recent years, the Taiwanese government under the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has mobilised its techno-economic and democratic resources to bolster international support through “economic diplomacy” (An, Chen, and Yeh 2023) and “value-based diplomacy” (Otmazgin 2022). This special issue will examine how – and how successfully – Taiwan has leveraged the US-led coalition’s growing defence, economic, and ideological interests in the island for its own survival.

9Overall, this special feature aims to make theoretical and empirical contributions, with important policy implications. More specifically, this special feature will place the case study of Taiwan as a centre of global geopolitics in the theoretical context of great power competition studies. What makes a place a critical domain of global geopolitics? International relations scholars generally argue that small states endowed with strategic geographical locations and rich natural resource endowments are likely to attract the attention of global and regional powers (Van Evera 1984; Klare 2001). However, a full-fledged theory that forcefully explains and predicts “where geopolitics occurs” is still under-developed in international relations scholarship. Moreover, the existing literature is overtly state-centric. It is largely unaware of the critical role of “quasi-states” that fall outside of the orthodox definition of “sovereign states” in global geopolitics (Fong 2022). Taiwan – a contested state that has struggled for survival between China and the US from the Cold War to the present day – is definitely a critical case of quasi-state. Therefore, a holistic empirical study of the national interests of global and regional powers over Taiwan not only helps us understand why they are now jockeying for strategic influence over the island, but will also provide a critical case study with the potential to enrich the theoretical discussion of “where geopolitics occurs.” In addition, Taiwan’s attempts to bolster its international support through economic and value-based diplomacy offer critical insights on how a non-great power – specifically, a contested quasi-state – can navigate strategic competition. On the whole, the case study of Taiwan will help enrich the emerging literature studying non-great powers as both geopolitical objects and subjects (Fong 2025a, 2025b).

Organisation of the special feature

11This special feature brings together researchers from different disciplines – including international relations, international political economy, military studies, and comparative politics – to study the case of Taiwan from a holistic perspective. It includes four articles that together present Taiwan as a critical case study of global geopolitics in the twenty-first century. As an empirical study that aims to explain recent developments, this special feature will principally focus on the time period from the 2010s to 2025, namely from the intensification of US–China competition since the early 2010s.

12The first article will set the theoretical foundation for the special feature. It adopts and applies neo-offensive realism theory for studying the critical research question of “where geopolitics occurs” in the context of US–China rivalry over Taiwan. The second to fourth articles survey the national interests of the US and its regional allies over Taiwan and discuss how such interests have translated into growing support for the island from the 2010s up to 2025. Such interests include defence interests associated with Taiwan’s role in the Western Pacific, geo-economic interests in Taiwan as a critical hub of global trade and technological supply chains, and ideological interests in supporting Taiwan as a democracy. The contributors also examine Taiwan’s agency in leveraging these geopolitical dynamics militarily, economically, and ideologically.

13Following a brief period of relative stability in the post-Cold War years of the 1990s to 2000s, we are once again living in a world defined by geopolitics – despite the once-popular claim of the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). Indeed, “history” did not end with the Cold War. Rather, “history” reminds us that geopolitics is now returning to the forefront of the global stage after the brief US unipolar moment of the 1990s and 2000s (Fong 2024b). In this new era, the geopolitical turbulence currently unfolding in Taiwan is, to varying degrees, mirrored in other geopolitical focal points worldwide. Studying contemporary Taiwan therefore helps us understand “the world as it is” and, correspondingly, reflect on “the world as it should be.”