• 1 Observation notes, 20 January 2010.

1At the beginning of 2007, shortly before the Property Law (Wuquan fa 物权法) was to be adopted by the National People’s Congress, a citizens’ petition brought the voice of homeowners to the forefront. Attracting more than 180,000 signatures, it called for certain articles of the law to be revisited in the name of the rights and interests of homeowners. In a highly symbolic move at the beginning of 2010, more than 200 homeowners from Chinese cities came together at the National People’s Congress as part of the official launch of a “platform” aiming to coordinate the various actors in “neighbourhood communities.”1 These two events illustrate the appearance of a new “social figure”: the homeowner (yezhu 业主), linked to housing reform taking place in urban China since the mid-1990s. They also reflect the extent to which the deep spatial and social reconfigurations affecting Chinese cities since the mid-1990s and, in particular, during the 2000s, have given rise to many channels through which contestations and calls for recognition linked to the question of housing are expressed. These include protests against the destruction of entire neighbourhoods and the brutal expulsion and relocation imposed on their inhabitants, mobilisations in new residences to defend the rights of homeowners against property developers and the local authorities, and finally collective actions in order to win recognition in the newly created “neighbourhood communities” of new “intermediate actors”: homeowners’ committees (yezhu weiyuanhui 业主委员会). Above all, their national and symbolic dimension shows that although conflicts concerning housing are often local affairs that are tied in with a specific situation, some actors attempt to reach beyond these territorial boundaries to unify different interests and claims.

• 2 Isabelle Thireau (ed), De proche en proche. Ethnographie des formes d’association en Chine contempo (...)
• 3 Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang, “The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of Ba (...)

2By studying the attempt to form a “federation” of homeowners’ committees in the city of Beijing, this article recounts and analyses the various steps taken to construct a collective mobilisation. Why and how have homeowners living in different neighbourhoods of Beijing joined forces?2 How have they constructed and drawn up collective claims based on the definition of a common interest? What strategies have they developed to mobilise and encourage other homeowners to join their movement? Finally, in an uncertain context in which any attempt to form an association may be considered suspicious by representatives of the one-party state,3 how have they drafted their demands to the authorities in order to make them acceptable without neutralising their impact?

• 4 Zhang Jingen and Zhuang Wenjia, “Fei zhengshi zhengzhi: yige caogen NGO de xingdong celüe – Yi Guan (...)
• 5 Daniel Cefaï, Pourquoi se mobilise-t-on ? Les théories de l’action collective (Why do we mobilise ? (...)

3Founded in 2006 by several homeowners’ committee leaders, the yeshenwei (业申委) – shortened from Beijing shi yezhu weiyuanhui xiehui de shenban weiyuanhui (北京市业主委员会协会的申办委员会) or “Application committee requesting authorisation for a federation of the homeowners’ committees of Beijing” in English – is seeking, as its name suggests, to obtain the official creation and recognition of a new body to represent homeowners at the municipal level. This is a relatively rare experiment in China, because as far as we are aware, only one other equivalent association has been formed, in Guangzhou.4 This movement-organisation is not only aiming to win official recognition, but will also attempt to develop its legitimacy and strengthen its capacities through a certain number of actions that need to be described for a better understanding of the stakes involved. A number of events or “collective action situations”5 will therefore be looked at, including the creation of this “application committee” in 2006, the petition to revise the Property Law launched in 2007, the organisation of “training classes” (peixunban 培训班) for homeowners in 2009, and the process of drawing up new local regulations in Beijing in 2010.

• 6 I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professors Guo Yuhua and Shen Yuan and to the other (...)
• 7 See Alain Touraine, Le retour de l’acteur (The Return of the Actor), Paris, Fayard, 1984, pp. 197‑2 (...)
• 8 See Guo Yuhua and Shen Yuan, “Juzhu de zhengzhi – B shi yezhu weiquan yu shequ jianshe de shizheng (...)

4This sociological investigation was carried out as part of a post-doctoral study completed in the Sociology Department of Tsinghua University in 2009‑2010 within the research team directed by Mrs. Guo Yuhua and Mr. Shen Yuan,6 who have, since 2006, been following the shocks, high points, and problems encountered by this collective action by Beijing homeowners as part of their research into “urban movements” (dushi yundong 都市运动). Taking inspiration from Alain Touraine’s sociological intervention method,7 the sociologists have been able to get as close as possible to the nascent movement, sometimes welcoming its participants to the university for the purpose of organising meetings, and attending certain events in person. It is this specific position, at once engaged and engaging, that allows them to grasp, in fine detail, all the constraints and contradictions faced by those who are attempting to establish such collective action.8 In June 2009, when I joined the group, certain founding events had already taken place, and others less visible were underway. As a post-doctoral student working in the research team, and sometimes working as a volunteer in the organisation of certain events, I was able to observe many meetings. Collective interviews were carried out with different actors in order to gain an understanding of the latest developments of the movement, and individual interviews were conducted with certain leaders, in particular founding members of the “application committee.” Finally, a considerable collection of documents for internal usage was also gathered.

• 9 See the work of Youqin Huang: “The Road to Homeownership: A Longitudinal Analysis of Tenure Transit (...)
• 10 Luigi Tomba, “Making Neighbourhoods: The Government of Social Change in China’s Cities,” China Pers (...)

6Since the 1990s, Chinese cities have experienced a “housing revolution” in which the model by which housing was distributed by the work units (danwei fenfang 单位分房), a feature of the planned economy, has been replaced by a new market system in which each individual purchases his own home (geren maifang 个人买房).9 The formation of a housing market and the move towards access to homeownership in the upper and middle classes of urban society not only completely changed the morphology of cities but also profoundly modified the structure of urban society,10 creating a new social figure, the homeowner (yezhu), as well as a new organisation, the “homeowners’ committee,” which was responsible for managing the new residential spaces.

• 11 Li Zhang, In Search of Paradise: Middle-Class Living in a Chinese Metropolis, Ithaca, Cornell Unive (...)
• 12 Judith Audin, “Le quartier, lieu de réinvention des relations État-société en Chine urbaine : l’exe (...)
• 13 Conflicts between homeowners and property developers often relate to problems concerning the housin (...)

7Owning one’s own home became a fundamental issue for citizens, because it provided access to a new position of material comfort, indicating a certain level of status or social success, and embodying the promise or achievement of matrimonial and family plans. However, far from being the peaceful havens that had been envisaged, the “neighbourhood communities” (shequ 社区) turned into battlefields where the relations between different categories of actors were brought into play:11 owners grouped together into movements to defend their rights (weiquan 维权) or into “homeowners’ committees” (yezhu weiyuanhui or, in the shortened form, yeweihui), property developers and affiliated management companies or managing agents (wuye gongsi 物业公司), and finally, residents’ committees12 (jumin weiyuanhui 居民委员会 or, in the shortened form, juweihui), which despite supposedly representing the residents, actually represented the most local level of political power.13

• 14 Chen Peng, “Cong ‘chanquan’ zouxiang ‘gongminquan’ – Dangqian Zhongguo chengshi yezhu weiquan yanji (...)
• 15 For example, see the research undertaken by Cai Yongshun on the forms of protest of the urban middl (...)

8This transformation of Chinese cities (and the social struggles it has triggered) has not only attracted the attention of the government, the population as a whole, and the media, but has also become a “field of interdisciplinary research including sociology, political science, law, and public management.”14 The central question facing researchers and actors relates to the reconfiguration of the links and power relations between “state,” “market,” and “society” in these new residential spaces: how is a new order being constructed in these emerging communities? On the one hand, attention is drawn to the “movement,” i.e., collective actions by middle-class citizens to defend their rights (weiquan yundong), the forms such actions take, the resources they mobilise and the interests that they represent.15 On the other hand, interest focuses on the “organisation” of these new residential spaces made completely from scratch into the gated communities described by Luigi Tomba, and on their modes of governance. Homeowners’ committees attract particular attention. These new “intermediate bodies” are legally recognised but controversial, and their election procedures, operating mechanisms, and scope of competence are the subject of many conflicts, including of a political nature. Which forms of intervention are actually exercised by the one-party state through the residents’ committees and various authorities (Sub-district Offices, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Construction Bureaus, etc.), and what degree of independence do these new representative bodies enjoy?

• 16 Shen Yuan, “Vers les droits du citoyen : la défense des droits des propriétaires comme mouvement ci (...)
• 17 Chen Yingfang, “Les mouvements de protestation des classes moyennes” (Middle-class protest movement (...)
• 18 Luigi Tomba, “Residential space and collective interest formation in Beijing’s housing disputes,” C (...)
• 19 Benjamin Read, “Democratizing the neighbourhood? New private housing and homeowner self-organizatio (...)

9The answers to these questions reveal many different realities. Therefore, whereas the sociologist Shen Yuan, citing the city of Beijing as an example, shows how these new “urban movements” are contributing to the emergence of a discourse and claims centred around citizenship and show a certain degree of independence enjoyed by homeowners relative to the existing administrative bodies,16 his Shanghai colleague, Chen Yingfang, underlines the severe constraints weighing on these movements and their actors and the heavy influence of the one-party state.17 Luigi Tomba establishes a link between the emergence of protest actions by homeowners and the closing of residential spaces but also shows that the privatisation of a section of the services owned by the state goes hand in hand with the adherence and loyalty of these middle-class citizens towards the state.18 Finally, Benjamin Read emphasises the extreme variability of the situations that characterise homeowners’ associations, depending not only on the location in question, but also on changes over time, and the intensity of the conflicts.19 This complexity is deepened by the deep-rooted nature of local configurations, and regulations and practices that vary depending on the city, district, and neighbourhood.

• 20 Research team on urban movements, Beijing shi shangpin fang zhuzhai xiaoqu guanli moshi yanjiu baog (...)
• 21 See the 2008 report of the Consultative Conference Congress: “Guanyu Beijing shequ yezhu jingji ziz (...)
• 22 State Affairs Council, “Wuye guanli tiaoli” (Decree on the management of property), 8 June 2003.

11At the start of the 2000s, conflicts within newly constructed commodity residences (shangpin fang 商品房) were increasing inexorably. In Beijing, the movement to defend the rights of homeowners reached its peak in 2005‑2006, when not only did the number of cases submitted to the courts concerning disputes with management companies (wuye gongsi) increase sharply, but collective complaints by homeowners and street protests also became a relatively common phenomenon.20 Although the practices of management companies are often the triggering factor in a collective action taken by homeowners, during the course of the struggle it is the very possibility of forming a “homeowners’ committee” that gradually grows to become the main undertaking of the movement. According to certain statistics, of the approximately 3,000 residences in the city of Beijing in 2007, only 500 had created a homeowners’ committee in accordance with the regulations, which is a percentage of less than 20%.21 Despite the fact that, since 2003, a regulation issued by the State Affairs Council has set out the rules and steps for forming this new representative body,22 in practice, homeowners are faced with a whole series of obstacles from residents’ committees and the various local authorities.

• 23 See Liu Yuewen, Shehui de shanbian: yi B shi yi ge yezhu lianhe zuzhi weili (The transformation of (...)
• 24 Certain presidents of homeowners’ committees had attempted, unsuccessfully and on a number of occas (...)
• 25 See Liu Yuewen, Shehui de shanbian: yi B shi yi ge yezhu lianhe zuzhi weili, op. cit., pp. 44‑46.

12The birth of the yeshenwei is the result of two events that took place in this context. The first was the opportunity offered to homeowners by the “market” to meet or, in other words, the possibility of forming horizontal relations between the various actors of the movements. As noted by Liu Yuewen,23 the founders of the yeshenwei actually met as a result of a meeting organised by a bank, which invited all the presidents of the homeowners’ committees of the city of Beijing to a promotional seminar.24 However, it was the emotion aroused by a violent incident that took place in April 2006 that convinced the actors in the movement to defend the rights of homeowners to transform this network of acquaintances into an organisation. During preparations for the creation of a homeowners’ committee, two residents handing out ballot papers were violently beaten and injured by thugs working for the head of the security guards of the company managing the residence.25

• 26 For the purpose of anonymity, we have chosen these names which reflect the way these different lead (...)
• 27 Liu Yuewen, “You gushi de ren: siwei zhaoji ren de shengming licheng” (People with stories: The jou (...)

13Three individuals were responsible for the creation of this organisation linking various residences in the city of Beijing: Lao Z., Lao Q., and Xiao C., who would later be joined by Xiao R.26 At the time, they were all presidents of the homeowners’ committees of their residences, and had carried out actions in defence of their rights. For example, the residence where Lao Q. lived was one of the first in Beijing to have formed a homeowners’ committee and to have succeeded in changing the management company. Xiao R. carried out a hunger strike in protest against the property developer of his residence. Whether engaged in contesting or conciliating actions, these four leaders possess a high level of symbolic capital within the movement to defend the rights of homeowners in the city of Beijing. Their biographies show the different trajectories they have taken.27

• 28 “Guanyu chengli Beijing shi yezhu lianhe zuzhi de changyi shu” (Appeal to create an organisation br (...)
• 29 “Guanyu chengli ‘Beijing shi yezhu weiyuanhui xiehui’ de qingshi” (Request for instructions concern (...)
• 30 “The Central Committee of the Party has stated the objective of constructing a harmonious socialist (...)

17In real terms, the process of forming the yeshenwei began in May 2006 with the organisation of a discussion platform at a residential community in Beijing. Bringing together around 30 representatives of residential communities, the platform aimed to discuss the launch of an “Appeal to create an organisation bringing together the homeowners of the city of Beijing.”28 Following this first step, official actions were taken to request the authorisation and registration of the organisation. Having been informed by an official from the Social Organisation Management Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs that this request first needed to be approved by the Beijing City Construction Bureau, the homeowners approached the latter body in August 2006 with a “request for instructions” (qingshi 请示) signed by more than 50 homeowners’ committees in Beijing.29 Several points can be underlined concerning this appeal and the request for instructions. Firstly, the two documents bring to mind the social problems created by housing reform, because although the request evokes the “discordant sounds” within residential communities in a neutral fashion, the appeal mentions “disputes” (jiufen) concerning the management of homes, and owners being “orphans and without assistance” in the face of all kinds of conflicts, in particular when up against “powerful property management companies.” The need to create a federation of homeowners’ committees is closely linked to these difficulties and conflicts, but the request for instructions is careful to base its legitimacy on official rhetoric concerning the construction of a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui).30

• 31 Letter of response from the City Construction Bureau of Beijing, 22 December 2006, internal documen (...)

19In December 2006, after this application had been under consideration for several months, the yeshenwei received a response from the City Construction Bureau of Beijing which, despite not approving the creation of such a federation, did not completely reject the application, either, thus allowing the homeowners engaged in this process a space for action,31 as described by Xiao C. in the following interview extract:

• 33 These spaces for action are also used by other social organisations such as NGOs, which are not off (...)

20The “application committee” or yeshenwei is the outcome of a need to bring together the actors engaged in the defence of the rights of homeowners, and the result of strategic discussions between several leaders of Beijing homeowners’ committees. Like its counterpart in Guangzhou, although it did not obtain official authorisation in 2006, neither was it officially rejected; therefore the non-illegality of this “committee” would allow it to organise certain actions, one of the first of which was the launch of the citizen petition at the start of 2007.33

• 37 Idem. Some signatures were gathered collectively, the official stamp of the homeowners’ committee o (...)

26More than 180,000 people signed the open letter;37 its writers had not imagined it would meet with such a reaction, particularly in view of the problems encountered during the mobilisation process. Despite the initial success enjoyed by this open letter, could this high level of mass mobilisation really transform the drafting of the law to incorporate the demands for revision that it expressed? From this point of view, the homeowners won a partial victory. Having submitted the open letter, the homeowners received no official response. However, the final version of the law adopted during a session of the National People’s Congress, and public comments made by certain officials, appear to indicate that the voice of the homeowners had been taken into consideration, to an extent.

• 40 Interview with Xiao C. conducted in Chinese by the author with another student from the research te (...)

30There is also an aspect that could be seen as progress in the journey towards the rule of law. We are able to do certain things, and if we were able to do this once, we can do it again, can’t we? To start with, it has been possible to use this method, which would have been unthinkable in the past; you might have been arrested. This method makes it possible to better protect the rights of homeowners. But I think it plays a more important role in the background, insofar as citizens can use this legal method as a means of participation, and can actually influence state policies.40

• 41 These classes were open to anybody interested in the question of the governance of residential comm (...)

31The ground won by the yeshenwei has given rise to other types of action, which while less prominent still display the direction taken by this movement-organisation and some of its strategies. Indeed, bringing the various homeowners of the city together around shared objectives means sharing and discussing practices within the homeowners’ committees, and identifying certain problems and their concrete solutions. Therefore, in 2009, “training classes” (peixun ban) for homeowners were organised at Renmin University at the initiative of the yeshenwei, among others.41 In the spirit of the organisers, using as a metaphor the history of the Party and the new China, it was now a case of moving from the “revolutionary phase” (geming jieduan), which saw the first movements to defend homeowners’ rights in Beijing, to a “construction phase” (jianshe jieduan), the main aim of which was to produce and transmit “specialised knowledge” (zhuanye zhishi), to share experiences gathered from the point of view not only of collective protest actions but also from managing residences and the operation of bodies representing homeowners (committees and general assemblies). Rather than focusing only on “objective,” unchanging, and accepted knowledge, these classes therefore involve expressing and discussing knowledge marked with uncertainty and open to debate, experiences and practices that had sometimes succeeded and on occasion failed, as well as judgements on situations involving different actors, including representatives of the public authorities.

• 42 Field notes, 30 October 2009.

32The atmosphere in the classes is often animated, particularly when “opponents” of the movement are invited to speak; for example, one representative of the management companies who came to shed light on the facilities of residences (electricity and hot water) was subjected to several hours of repeated questioning by the homeowners in attendance. The main concern of the participants was: “Are the fees paid to the company that manages my residence reasonable (heli)?”42

• 43 Field notes, 27 December 2009.
• 44 Field notes, 22 November 2009.

34Xiao R., who chaired the session, and Lao S., the main speaker, who is known in Beijing for the active role he played in his residence in Chaoyang District, and was also an independent candidate in the elections of the District People’s Congress in Beijing, both stress the limitations of this document: in the hierarchy of laws and regulations, this internal document does not have the force of law; what is more, “guiding” is not synonymous with “commanding.” The view of Lao S. is that “the leaders need to be transformed” (yao gaibian lingdao), or in other words, their behaviour needs to be modified. However, this would require a “change of mentality” (huan yi zhong siwei luoji), for the legitimacy of the homeowners’ committee comes from the work it does for the community of homeowners, not from an official stamp.43 Xiao R. feels that “if the residents’ committee intervenes [in the business of homeowners], there should be no fear of blaming the government. A particularity of the middle class is that it is afraid of disorder.” He goes on to advise homeowners to use the same united front strategy (tongyi zhanxian) as Mao Zedong: “It is difficult to win the support of homeowners, but it is possible to obtain the minimum level participation. In order to defend rights, you have to give homeowners a few advantages.”44

• 45 During the session of 30 August 2009, Xiao R. set out the principles by which elections must be org (...)
• 46 Session of 30 August 2009, field notes.
• 47 Session of 26 July 2009, field notes.

36From this point of view, the various contributors in the training classes all stress certain “principles” (yuanze) that must guide both the process of forming a homeowners’ committee (elections)45 and its day-to-day operation and the actions it organises in order to ensure its legitimacy (hefaxing). Putting in place “procedural rules” and “management rules,” “the separation of powers” and the “protection of minorities” are essential principles to ensure a committee functions properly, and represent “the constitution of the xiaoqu” (xiaoqu de xianfa).46 The training sessions are not merely an exercise in chanting abstract principles; they introduce “institutional innovations” (zhidu chuangxin) that make it possible to put these rules into practice. For example, Lao S., committee ex-president in his residence in Chaoyang District, bluntly states the main problem facing homeowners’ committees: “How can dictatorship and corruption be avoided?” He sets out the rules he put in place concerning the use of the official stamp of the committee and the recruitment of a secretary in order to avoid any abuse of power by the committee president.47

• 48 The question of the “legality” of the collective actions gave rise to a heated discussion during th (...)

37However, promoting “grassroots democracy” (jiceng minzhu) through “citizen education” (gongmin jiaoyu) is not without obstacles. During the sessions, many voices questioned or even challenged the validity of the actions and principles put forward by the yeshenwei. Older homeowners were particularly doubtful about the strategy that was being followed: “You are too idealistic,” “These principles cannot be achieved,” “The yeshenwei is not a legal organisation,” “All that you have undertaken to do over recent years is worth nothing…” were sentences often heard during the training classes. Some advised the yeshenwei to “cooperate with the government,” even emphasising that “the Party should be left to manage property and homeowners,” while others criticised the inefficacy of the rational and legalistic strategy adopted, compared to activities of a more disruptive nature (naoshi).48 The vocabulary of “citizenship” (gongminquan) used by certain leaders is also challenged owing to its politically “sensitive” (mingan) nature: talking of “civil society” (gongmin shehui) and “citizen awareness” (gongmin yishi) is thought to scare the laobaixing and create risks for the movement organisation and its participants. These differing reactions reveal the fragility of agreements built up between the participants in the movement to defend homeowners, and the doubts expressed with regard to the strategy adopted and principles of action put forward by certain leaders. At a more fundamental level, the commitment of one section of the elite of the movement to the “construction of civil society,” or in other words, greater independence of society from the state, finds itself scrutinised in the name of the effectiveness of the actions undertaken.

• 49 Interview with an official responsible for housing questions in the district of Haidian, December 2 (...)
• 50 Zhou Mojun, “Debating the State in Private Housing Neighbourhood: The Many Meanings of Homeowners’ (...)
• 51 Meeting of 12 July 2010, field notes.

39Although when it was first created, the yeshenwei was not considered to be an illegal organisation, it nevertheless attracted a certain amount of suspicion from state and Party representatives.49 Following a period of “tacit tolerance” (moxu 默许), in spring 2010, an official invitation by the Construction Bureau of Beijing to the members of the yeshenwei to take part in the process of producing a new local regulation concerning homeowner committees and general assemblies indicated a degree of “recognition” (renke 认 可 ) of the organisation. To the surprise of its members, the yeshenwei, which was considered to be the homeowners’ representative, was asked to produce its “version” of the regulation, which was to be compared to that of the Construction Bureau of Beijing. This invitation gave rise to a number of internal discussion meetings during which the general strategies to be adopted were debated – should “compromise” be the watchword from the outset or, conversely, was it wiser to adopt a firm position aiming to impose a maximum number of constraints on the government?50 – in addition to many technical details on the proposed rules.51

• 52 Meeting of 18 July 2010, field notes.

40The meeting and official discussions were then followed by a new meeting between the homeowners. In his report, Xiao R. expresses his surprise that not only was the tone of the discussion cordial (the representatives of the Construction Bureau even used the expression “ zanmen 咱们” to stress the idea that the new regulation was to be a shared co-production), but more surprising still, roles previously assigned to the residents’ committees had disappeared from the Construction Bureau’s version! Some “institutional innovations” previously introduced and put into practice in certain residences, such as the “Homeowners’ representative assembly” (yezhu daibiao dahui), an intermediate level between the homeowners’ general assembly and the homeowners’ committee, also appeared in the text, giving these innovations a legal value. However, vigilance did remain: “Don’t consider them to be too generous,” commented one activist, referring in particular to certain proposals such as the creation of a “pool of experts” that would become responsible for monitoring the creation of the committees. “We don’t need experts; what we need is citizens”; “The government sells services, and washes its hands of its responsibility, yet this gang of lawyers is worse still.”52

• 53 Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang: “The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of Ba (...)

41Although this official meeting was seen as recognition of the legitimacy of the yeshenwei as representing the interests of homeowners, the experiment was to be short-lived; as early as August, the departure of the official who had been the main contact of the homeowners, and his replacement with a new cadre, resulted in this dialogue being broken off. Therefore, although the new regulation introduced some of the “citizen” proposals of the yeshenwei, it did not achieve the aims that had been hoped for. This conclusion shows the significant limitations to these forms of dialogue with official state representatives, the manipulation of the participation of representatives of society, and the extreme vulnerability of this non-legal and non-illegal association to any change in the political context.53

• 54 Isabelle Thireau, “Introduction,” De Proche en proche (Face-to-face), op. cit.

42As I have emphasised over the course of this article, the emergence of the yeshenwei as a “political collectivity”54 takes place at the point of convergence of a number of phenomena: a reform of the status of home ownership in urban China, an “urban modernisation” campaign that incorporates various strategies (transformation of the forms of social control and recognition of new bodies representing inhabitants), and the coming together of actors who, using their diverse forms of capital and legitimacy, are establishing a sense of collective mobilisation around a common cause: the defence of the rights of homeowners.

• 55 Sun Liping, “‘Guocheng – shijian fenxi’ yu dangdai Zhongguo guojia – nongmin guanxi de shijian xing (...)
• 56 Yongshun Cai and Zhiming Sheng shed light on this combination of requests from the mixed motivation (...)

43Studying the process of forming and developing this organisation from founding events55 that characterise its history makes it possible to grasp how these mobilised homeowners have been able to construct a space for action on the fringes of legality and how this space for action has served as a place not only where common claims have been formulated but also where norms and practices of operation of homeowner associations have been promoted. Observing the actions of this movement-organisation (for example the open letter of 2007 or the training classes of 2009) encourages one to take seriously both the actual economic claims that are drawn up and the principles and repertoires of action that are developed. Far from being in opposition to each other, it is actually the conjunction of economic claims on the one hand and “citizen” practices on the other that explains the success of certain collective mobilisations. By moving away from the area of concrete claims, the elite of the homeowners’ movement is running the risk of cutting itself off from its social base and increasing the number of political threats that hang over the organisation. Conversely, without the establishment of shared rules based on the principles of democracy and equality, and without learning about the constraints that hinder collective action and condition its legitimacy, the new representative bodies constituted by homeowners’ committees run the risk of “dictatorship” and “corruption,” or are at the very least unable to build up the legitimacy and authority they need in order to operate.56 Furthermore, potential disputes within homeowners’ committees and disputes between residents concerning the principles according to which their representative bodies should operate weigh heavily on relations between these new organisations and state and Party representatives. From this point of view, we have been able to observe how the yeshenwei, owing to its origins and the characteristics of its founding members, as well as the various collective actions it has carried out, combines contestation with conciliation to make the voice of its homeowners heard. As certain members of the yeshenwei like to mention during their meetings, often jokingly, they are “acting in favour of the Party” (wei dang zuo shi’er): they are calling on the one-party state in the name of its role as arbiter of interests between different social groups, denouncing the hold certain privileged groups (tequan shehui tuanti) such as property developers have over public policy and local governments. They are also calling on the one-party state in the name of its role as guarantor of the law and its application, with “law” being seen in this context less as a basis of legitimacy than as a battlefield on which to not only influence the concrete content of certain laws and affect the process by which certain regulations are drawn up, but also, at a more fundamental level, to restrict the area of intervention and limit the powers of the one-party state (in particular its local representatives) and to promote the development of a civil society.