• 1 This special feature corresponds with the publication of oral papers given in the framework of a se (...)
• 2 On this point, see the recent special feature of China Perspectives edited by Jean-Pierre Cabestan: (...)

2Without aiming to be comprehensive, this special feature studies some aspects of China’s policy towards the China Seas.1 It complements an already rich literature that is difficult to summarise here due to the multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary nature of the analysed theme. This special feature, consisting of this introduction and four articles by Mathieu Duchâtel, Shinji Yamaguchi, Benoît de Tréglodé, and Alexandre Sheldon‑Duplaix, attempts to explain the main recent developments in China’s policy toward the China Seas, to identify its goals, and to understand its determinants. The Chinese policy toward the China Seas fits within the dual context of a more ambitious foreign policy seeking to influence the world order through the transformation of some norms and the creation of new institutions,2 and of a domestic policy aimed at building a genuine maritime power. Gestating since the 1990s, this objective to assert China’s power on the seas, either through the modernisation of the Navy or the development of the marine economy, was presented as a priority at the launch of the 12th Five‑Year Plan (2011-2015) and the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012.

• 3 See Wen-Lung Laurence Lin, “America’s South China Sea Policy, Strategic Rebalancing and Naval Diplo (...)

4Analysis of China’s policy toward the China Seas begins with the consideration of geography. Unlike the United States, bordered by two vast oceans, China is riparian to three semi-enclosed seas: the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, beyond which lies a peninsular and island arc shared by nine states (see Map 1). This geography is important, because combined with the current US military presence in South Korea, Japan, and the Pacific, and various strategic partnerships forged by Washington with Taiwan, the Philippines, and Singapore, this deepens China’s sense of ”encirclement,” the reality of which is not really in doubt: firstly because it is a device largely inherited from the Cold War; and secondly because one of the main objectives of the United States since the end of the Cold War has been to counter China’s ambitions in the China Seas and beyond.3 From this perspective, we can highlight the impact of the loss of Taiwan, which has twice deprived China of a direct opening to the Pacific.

• 4 “UNCLOS, Article 74, Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between States with Opposite or Ad (...)
• 5 The project of the Chinese submission and the subsequent exchange of Notes Verbales between China a (...)

6This geography also has important implications for the way the Chinese authorities are mobilising the various maritime delimitation principles established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNC-LOS), which China signed in 1982 and ratified in 1996. In the case of semi-enclosed seas where the limits of the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal states overlap, Article 74 of UNCLOS advocates seeking “an equitable solution” by “agreement” or, pending a final settlement, the conclusion of “provisional arrangements of a practical nature.”4 On this issue, China’s position varies depending on the maritime area in question. In the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, while evoking the principle of equity, China opposes South Korean and Japanese proposals to delimit the maritime boundaries on the principle of the median line (see Map 2). Against Japan, Chinese authorities claim the continental shelf, which is geographically to their advantage, and on that basis submitted, on 14 December 2012, details of their delimitation project (for the northern part of the continental shelf only) to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) of the Law of the Sea, sparking a lively, but unsurprising, Japanese reaction.5 Facing South Korea, China is stuck between rejecting the median line and its inability to claim the continental shelf due to the epicontinental nature of the Yellow Sea. In this context, Beijing has opted with Seoul for a “provisional arrangement of a practical nature” via the delimitation in 2000 of a common fishery zone (see Map 2).

• 6 “Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea (Approved b (...)
• 7 “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Adopted at t (...)
• 8 Liu Zhen, “Fisher Militia? Maritime Units Put Humble Fishermen on Front Line in South China Sea,” S (...)
• 9 Liu Zhen, “Yagong Island Was No Place for a Dog, Now It’s Home to 400 Trees,” South China Morning P (...)

8A brief overview of the chronology of Chinese initiatives in the South China Sea reflects the existence of a long-term strategy. Having inherited the “U‑shaped line” (see Map 3) and territorial claims gradually built during the Republican period, the Communist authorities officially reaffirmed the South China Sea Islands as Chinese territory in September 1958 as part of their “Declaration on the Territorial Sea,”6 and again in February 1992 with the promulgation of the “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.”7 Since May 2009 and the joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia on the limits of their continental shelves, verbal notes sent by the Chinese authorities to the Secretary General of the United Nations and recalling Chinese sovereignty over the islands have multiplied. In the case of the oil rig HYSY981, cited by Shinji Yamaguchi in his article, the arbitration proceedings initiated by the Philippines and Chinese constructions in the Spratlys were particularly conducive to this increase. These various official claims were reinforced by coups and annexations in 1974 (Battle of the Paracels), 1988 (skirmish over the Johnson South Reef), 1994-1995 (annexation of Mischief Reef), and 2012 (takeover of Scarborough shoal). In this context, it is difficult not to see the recent developments as a logical and additional step toward increasing presence in the archipelago, strengthening control over the surrounding maritime areas, and working toward integration of a border region by fait accompli. Official support and subsidies received by Hainan fishermen recruited into maritime militias to fish in the disputed areas,8 as well as the desire to maintain a human presence and develop cruise tourism in the Paracels9 in the wake of the establishment of Sansha Municipality in 2012, are in my view part and parcel of this strategy.

• 10 This “nationalisation” consisted of the Japanese government’s purchase of three islets (Minami-koji (...)
• 11 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu guanyu diaoyudao ji qi fushu daoyu linghai jixian de shengming” (...)

9In the East China Sea, Beijing’s claim on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands came later. Officially expressed in December 1971, it actually duplicated the claim made several months earlier by Taiwan, which the PRC had just replaced on the UN Security Council. Although newer and post-1949, we again find something like a legacy of the Kuomintang. Clearly mentioned as territory belonging to China in the Law of 1992 but not in the 1958 Declaration, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands subsequently became subject to ongoing tensions between China and Japan. When the Japanese government announced the “nationalisation”10 of the islands in September 2012, the Chinese authorities established baselines around them before submitting coordinates to the United Nations.11 A little more than a year later, in November 2013, Beijing defined an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering the islands and almost all of the East China Sea (see Map 2).

• 12 Jiagu Richter, Wolfgang Richter, “The ‘East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone’ of the Peopl (...)
• 13 Ibid., pp. 25-46.

12The extension of the ADIZ beyond the territorial sea that took place a year later did not appear, however, to be a direct response to this “nationalisation.”12 If the new area, including the islands, intends to challenge Japanese “sovereignty,” its purpose is primarily military. It aims, in the context of the anti-access/area denial strategy evoked by Alexandre Sheldon‑Duplaix in his article, to demonstrate a greater military presence inside the first islands chain and in this way to show to Japan and the United States that China has the military capabilities (and confidence) to control this space. Under consideration since the early 2000s, its materialisation in November 2013 was mainly a response to the changing strategic environment around the East China Sea characterised by reform of the Japanese Constitution and the deepening of security relations between Japan and the United States in the context of the American policy of “Pivot to Asia.”13 Xi Jinping’s ascent to power and the priority given to building up China as a sea power could be another factor.

• 14 Wu Jiao and Pu Zhendong, “Nation Merging Maritime Patrol Forces,” China Daily, 11 March 2013, http: (...)
• 15 Masayuki Masuda, “China’s Maritime Strategy and Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies: Quest for a Mari (...)
• 16 Author’s interviews, Beijing, April 2015.
• 17 Liu Zhen, “Fisher Militia? Maritime Units Put Humble Fishermen on Front Line in South China Sea,” a (...)

13As with the project of the ADIZ, the plan to unify various maritime law enforcement agencies in favour of the Coast Guard (Zhongguo haijing 中国海警), unveiled in March 2013,14 had been raised back in the 2000s during the Hu Jintao era without being brought to fruition .15 As noted by Shinji Yamaguchi in his text, the fact that this plan was implemented after Xi Jinping came to power testifies to Xi’s strong influence on China’s maritime policy. Despite the difficulties and resistance that can result from such a reform, the unavoidable divergences and interests of different maritime players do not seem to be jeopardising China’s overall policy toward the China Seas. Shinji Yamaguchi, like other observers,16 sees a greater centralisation of decisions and better coordination among maritime actors in recent years under the auspices of a stronger power eager to realise one of its policy priorities. Xi Jinping’s visit to the marine militia of Tanmen in Hainan in the month following his enthronement as China’s paramount leader could also be a sign of this will toward coordination.17

• 18 “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the Unit (...)
• 19 “US Seeks Access to Philippine Bases as Part of Asia Pivot,” Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 2015, (...)

14Finally, although doubts remain as to the actual date on which they were launched, the reclamation work and other construction in the Spratly Islands were probably facilitated and accelerated by the decision of the Philippines to resort to arbitration in January 2013 and by Manila signing the “enhanced defense cooperation agreement” (EDCA) with the United States on 28 April 2014.18 Signed again as part of the US “Pivot to Asia” policy, one of the objectives of which is to rebalance power relations and limit Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, the EDCA gives the Philippines armed forces access to US Army troops, ships, and aircraft in some Philippine military bases since its ratification by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on 28 July 2016.19

• 20 In Hong Kong, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised a special press conference for fore (...)

15It is also legitimate to ask whether these constructions were motivated in anticipation of the arbitration award on the South China Sea, issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on 12 July 2016 and the terms of which are largely unfavourable to China. In view of important communication that the Chinese authorities made to the public and to foreign media during preceding weeks, it is clear that the Chinese government was making plans on this issue well in advance.20

• 21 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of th (...)

16While these few introductory pages are not intended to provide an in‑depth analysis of the award, it is useful at this point to recall its main conclusions, which emphasise that this award is clearly against Chinese interests. The first conclusion states that there is no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to water resources located within the U-shaped line. The second finds that China’s recent actions in the South China Sea (obstruction of Philippines fishing and hydrocarbon exploration, large‑scale reclamation work and construction of artificial islands, and failure to regulate its own fishing activities) are in violation of many of the principles of UNCLOS. The third finds that the features occupied by China in the Spratlys are “rocks” or “low‑tide elevations,” thus prohibiting any delimitation of an EEZ, or even of territorial sea in the case of low-tide elevations.21

• 22 Chinese society of international law, The Tribunal’s Award in the “South China Sea Arbitration” Ini (...)

17Not surprisingly, given the position it had taken at the beginning of the arbitration process, China has firmly opposed this award, not only in statements to the media, which are generally limited to qualifying this award as “null and void” and to recalling the “ancient sovereignty” of China over the islands, but also by the publication of a legal argument.22

• 23 Richard A. Bitzinger, “China’s Militarisation of the South China Sea: Creating a Strategic Strait?” (...)
• 24 Choi Chi-yuk, “Chinese Fishermen Prepare to Return to Disputed Waters of South China Sea,” South Ch (...)
• 25 Minnie Chan, “If China Builds in Scarborough Shoal, It Would Come ‘after G20 Summit’,” South China (...)
• 26 Bong Miquiabas,“Fidel Ramos: Duterte’s Icebreaker in South China Sea Row,” South China Morning Post(...)

18The main question that emerges after the publication of this award is to what extent it will affect (or not) China’s policy in the South China Sea. For now, the Chinese authorities continue to maintain a strong military presence23 and fishermen continue to frequent the disputed areas despite the risks.24 The questions about current and future Chinese developments on Scarborough Shoal do not seem to indicate a change in posture.25 The weight of the inheritance, the willingness to build a maritime power, the influence of the military, and the strategic rivalry with the United States are all factors that may anchor this inflexibility for the foreseeable future. In this context, the key to the lull is probably in the hands of neighbouring countries, especially the Philippines, which following Rodrigo Duterte’s ascent to power responded to the first wish of Beijing by accepting the resumption of contacts. The visit to Hong Kong in August 2016 of former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, known for his pragmatism vis-à-vis China, seems to constitute a first step.26

• 27 “UNCLOS, Article 123, Cooperation of States Bordering Enclosed or Semi-enclosed Seas,” op. cit., p. (...)

19Although not fully addressed in this special feature, the exploitation of resources is another key aspect of Chinese policy toward the China Seas. In the case of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, Article 123 of UNCLOS encourages the establishment of coordination or bilateral or multilateral cooperation in fisheries management, protection of the marine environment, and scientific research.27

• 28 Zou Keyuan, “Sino-Japanese Joint Fishery Management in the East China Sea,” Marine Policy, No. 27, (...)

20Specifically in terms of fishing, the Chinese authorities are not resistant to compromise and cooperation, as reflected in the three common fishery zones established in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Gulf of Tonkin (see Maps 2 and 3). In general, fishing has always been a subject of dialogue between China and its neighbours. With Japan and Vietnam, for example, fisheries agreements were negotiated in the 1950s. Bordered by countries that are among the world’s largest fish producers and consumers, and with fish stocks in strong decline since the early 1970s, the China Seas are under tremendous pressure, indicating that states have a common interest in cooperating in the management of resources. Nevertheless, beyond the good intentions toward these joint areas, management continually faces political inertia, as shown by Benoît de Tréglodé in his article on the Gulf of Tonkin, or as in the case of the East China Sea, is threatened by Sino‑Japanese rivalry and the issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.28

• 29 “S. Korea, China to Hold Joint Inspection on Illegal Fishing inYellow Sea,” Yonhap News, 5 April 20 (...)
• 30 Suk Kyoon Kim, “Illegal Chinese Fishing in the Yellow Sea: A Korean Officer’s Perspective,” Journal (...)

21On the domestic level, delimitation of these areas, one of the main objectives of which is to regulate catches and thus counter overfishing, has had an impact on China’s inshore and pelagic fishing sectors. Many fisheries in Guangxi, Hainan, Fujian, and Zhejiang have been forced to reduce their fleet with significant impact on employment but without eliminating illegal fishing. Immense and expanding in the Yellow Sea, Chinese illegal fishing is the main cause of negative perceptions circulating in South Korea about the common fishery zone. Due to the South Korean coastguard’s inability to deal with the influx of Chinese trawlers, and despite occasional joint surveillance operations between the two countries,29 the Yellow Sea is considered by many South Korean observers to be a sea of lawlessness.30

• 31 Hongzhou Zhang, “Chinese Fishermen in Disputed Waters: Not Quite a ‘People’s War’,” Marine Policy, (...)
• 32 Stephen Chen, “China Pledges to Cut Size of its Massive Fishing Fleet due to Serious Threat to Nati (...)

22This example is symptomatic of the difficulties that China faces in persuading its neighbours to accept its view on the joint development of resources such as fishing or hydrocarbons in the China Seas, perceived rightly or wrongly by neighbouring countries as a way for China to increase its presence in the disputed areas and thus to serve the irredentist cause. A major difficulty in analysing Chinese policy in the China Seas is the sometimes blurred relationship between the exploitation of resources and political objectives. If the installation of the CNOOC’s oil rig HYSY981 off the Paracels in 2014 had a political objective, as Shinji Yamaguchi shows, the actions of the Chinese fishermen who do not belong to the militias are motivated less by the desire to defend sovereignty than by food security and economic imperatives.31 This complexity is of course exemplified by the role of economic actors such as fisheries and oil companies, but also by the role of coastal provinces, where the maritime economy represents an important part of their development. Forced to reduce their inshore fishing fleet in order to fight against overfishing, these provinces now subsidise and develop fishing in distant waters, indirectly encouraging illegal fishing in neighbouring EEZs and disputed waters.32

• 33 Kristin Huang and Catherine Wong,“China-Philippines Fishing Deal ‘May Help Calm Troubled South Chin (...)

23Despite these difficulties and these different issues, economic cooperation is more than ever in Chinese eyes the only way to maintain or restore trust with neighbouring countries. It is therefore no wonder that the Chinese side proposed a joint exploitation of fishery resources around the Scarborough Shoal during Fidel Ramos’ visit to Hong Kong.33 Another illustration of the ambivalence of this policy is Xi Jinping’s launch of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative, which aims to promote economic and cultural exchanges in Southeast Asia, while reclamation work was underway or about to be initiated in the Spratly Islands.