Bibliografía
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Notas
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive Victory in Building a Moderately prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Greatest Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017, http://news.xin-huanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm (accessed on 3 January 2018).
Jérôme Doyon and François Godement, “Discipline and Punish: Party Power under Xi,” China Analysis, 14 March2017.
Adam Ni, “China’s Military Backs Proposed Constitutional Amendments,” The Diplomat, 2 March 2018.
“Inclusion of Xi’s Thought Highlight of Amendment to CPC Constitution,” Xinhua, 29 October 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/29/c_136713559.htm (accessed on 3 January 2018).
Front-page editorial, People’s Daily, 24 February 2015. Also see “China’s Xi Jinping Unveils New ‘Four Comprehensives’ Slogans,” BBC News China, 25 February 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-china-31622571 (accessed on 3 January 2018).
“Moderately prosperous”—as set out in Xi Jinping’s full report: Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive Victory in Building a Moderately prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Greatest Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” op cit., 23.
See for instance contrasting Chinese and Western “rule of law” perspectives in Berring (2004) and Rose (2004).
Vladimir Lenin, “Freedom to Criticize and Unity of Action,” Volna 22, 1906 - see Marxists Internet Archive: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/may/20c.htm (accessed on 3 January 2018).
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive Victory in Building a Moderately prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Greatest Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” op cit., 23.
The Four Comprehensives calls for improved environmental protections and some reform efforts have been made; however, Stern (2014: 53) shows the extraordinary difficulties and high costs of suing heavy polluters in China.
The Hurun Rich List 2017 indicates that “over the past year average wealth rose 12.5% to US$1.2 billion, with the Top 100 shooting up 60%,” “China Rich List 2017,” Huron Report, 2017, http://www.hurun.net/EN/Article/Details?num=5A320E03FD31 (accessed on 23 November 2017). As Knight (2017: 312) puts it, “if you are willing to believe the Huron Rich List, China now has more billionaires than the US.”
“Chinese President Xi Jinping Delivers 2018 New Year Speech,” http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-12/31/content_50181054.htm (accessed on 8 January 2018).
From 2002 to 2013, China’s wealth inequality grew at a rate equivalent to one percentage point per annum in the Gini coefficient (Knight 2017: 321).
“Xi’s History Lessons: How China Rewrites the Past to Control the Future,” The Economist, 22 August 2015, 27.
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 30.
Third Plenary Session of 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定 (zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding, Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on Several Major Questions About Deepening Reform), 12 November 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm (accessed on 8 January 2018).
Ibid.
“Xi Jinping Thought Approved for Party Constitution,” Xinhua, 24 October 2017, http://www.chi-nadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/24/content_33644524.htm (accessed on 8 January 2018). At the same time, the Congress approved “Xi’s military thinking and the party’s ‘absolute’ leadership over the armed forces” into its constitution. Also, on “advancing law-based governance,” see: Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive Victory in Building a Moderately prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Greatest Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” op cit., 2.
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 62.
On the “Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” see Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 2.
Xi’s “Belt and Road” initiative was enshrined in the CCP’s charter at the 19th Party Congress. See “The 19th CPC National Congress and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’,” OBOReurope, 25 October 2017, http://www.oboreurope.com/en/19th-cpc-national-congress/ (accessed on 8 January 2018). For further details and various theoretical perspectives on OBOR, see for example, W. T. Wilson, “China’s Huge ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative is Sweeping Central Asia,” The National Enquirer, 27 July 2016. Also see Blackwill and Harris (2016); Yu (2017).
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 30.
“China Embraces the Markets,” The Economist, 11 July 2015, 61.
Ibid.
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 10.
Ministry of Commerce PRC, “MOFCOM Spokesman Comments on the US’ List of Proposed Chinese-Made Goods for Tariffs under the 301 Investigation,” 5 April 2018. http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ag/201804/20180402728771.shtml (accessed on 6 April 2018).
“China’s Xi Jinping Says Tariffs on Car Imports Will Be Cut this Year,” CCN Money, 10 April 2018. http://money.cnn.com/2018/04/09/news/economy/china-xi-jinping-economy-trade/index.html (accessed on 11 April 2018).
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 19.
The Tang code for example held virtue and law as complementary. For details see Teon (2016).
Pils (2015: 83) argues that Professor Peerenboom’s analysis of the Decision does not fully account for the repression of legal and political rights advocacy, which has worsened since the Decision, with serious consequences for the nature and scope of the challenges faced by the Party-state. See also Peerenboom’s (2015) refutation of Pils’s argument.
“Beijing: A Bad Day for Women,” The Economist, 21 March 2015, 24; “China’s Feminist Movement Braves a Government Crackdown on #MeToo,” The Verge, 9 February 2018.
“The Communist Party Cracks Down on Political Activists, Even as it Eases up on Some Less Sensitive Legal Cases,” The Economist, 11 August 2016. Also see Fu Hualing (2017: 249).
Chief Justice Zhou’s comments came after the country’s anti-graft watchdog said that a mechanism to keep officials in check that is independent of the Communist Party cannot exist in China. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) pledged to create a national supervisory commission and a corresponding national law as part of a move to reform the oversight system for thousands of Party officials, but the reforms would stop short of placing power outside the Party. See “China’s Top Judge Warns Courts on Judicial Independence,” Reuters World News, 15 January 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-policy-law-idUSKBN14Z07B (accessed on 16 January 2017).
Also see Dixon and Ginsburg (2014: 10) for details on how, historically in China, formal ideas of legalised constitutionalism that constrain the sovereign (the Son of Heaven) were not developed. In this sense, Xi’s elevation at the 19th Party Congress aligns with China’s imperial rule history, but with a modern legitimising narrative. Indeed, some observers suggest a leadership personality cult is being re-established.
The NPC is the national legislature of the PRC and under China’s current Constitution has the power to legislate, oversee the operations of the government, and elect the major officers of state.
See Human Rights Watch, “Chinese Authorities Could Make their Biggest Legal Achievement this Year: An End to this Outrageous Crackdown – and a Step towards a More Just China,” 7 July 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/china-709-anniversary-legal-crackdown-continues (accessed on 8 January 2018).
See “Wu Gan Sentenced to 8Years in Prison,” China Digital Times, 26 December 2017, https://chi-nadigitaltimes.net/2017/12/super-vulgar-butcher-wu-gan-sentenced-8-years-prison/ (accessed on 2 January 2018).
See “China Presses its Internet Censorship Efforts Across the Globe,” The NewYork Times, 2 March 2018, https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20180305/china-technology-censorship-borders-expansion/ (accessed on 3 March 2018).
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 6.
“The Three Stricts and Three Earnests are: to be strict with oneself in practising self-cultivation, using power, and exercising self-discipline; and to be earnest in one’s thinking, work and behaviour” (Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 6: footnote 1). Also see: “The ‘Three Stricts and Three Honests’ educational campaign,” china.org.cn, 26 June 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-06/26/content_35915584.htm (last accessed on 7 August 2017); “Rule the Party With a Firm Hand,” Beijing Review, 3 November 2016, http://www.bjreview.com/Current_Issue/Editor_Choice/201610/t20161030_800070457.html (last accessed on 7 August 2017).
A central element of the Three Stricts campaign focuses on “personal moral character” (Gow 2017: 106). Gow points out that this “illustrates the CCP’s appropriation of the Confucian status of a morally superior person [drawn from Analects 15:15].”The CCP’s message is that a communist must be a virtuous person.
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 61.
Ibid.
“Xi Jinping Flexes His Muscle against Army Corruption,” The Economist, 14 February 2015, 25. The CCP subsequently included Xi’s “military thinking and the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces” into its Constitution at the Party’s 19th National Congress, see: China Daily, 24 October 2017, 1.
Wen and Garnaut claim that the high priority Xi Jinping has given to the international operations of the domestic anti-corruption campaign, “Fox Hunt” and “Sky Net,” “has raised incentives and pressures for police officials at all tiers of Chinese government to bring fugitives back home and uncover hidden assets.” See “Chinese Police Chase Corruption Suspects in Australian Suburbs,” Sydney Morning Herald, 15 April 2015, http://www.smh.com.au/world/chinese-police-chase-corruption-suspects-in-australian-suburbs-20150414-1mkwd2.html (accessed on 8 January 2018). Also see Feng’s claim that the Chinese communist state has taken advantage of liberal democracies around the world “to promote its communist ideology under its ‘United Front’ strategy [which] has two parts: One is ‘unity among friends under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’; the other is the life-and-death struggle against enemies of the state.” “Academic Chongyi Feng: Profits, Freedom and China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Australia,” The Conversation, 6 June 2017, https://the-conversation.com/academic-chongyi-feng-profits-freedom-and-chinas-soft-power-in-australia-78751 (accessed on 8 January 2018).
See习近平总书记系列重要讲话读本 (Xi Jinping zong shuji xilie zhongyao jianghua duben, General-Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speeches), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2014. Contrast the Party-line on rights with Pils’s (2017) analysis of: “liberty and integrity of the person,” “freedom of thought and expression,” and “inequality and socio-economic rights.” Pils’s argument is that the Party-state system is inherently opposed to human rights principles in these areas and that, contributing to a global trend, is becoming more repressive.
Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the greatest success of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” op cit., 8.
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