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Sébastien Billioud et Joël Thoraval

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Jiaohua : The Confucian Revival in China as an Educative Project

SÉBASTIEN BILLIQUOD AND JOËL THORAVAL

This article explores the rediscovery of “Confucianism” in mainland China in the field of education, understood in the broad sense of training dispensed to others and self-cultivation. It begins by examining the general context of the phenomenon and then analyzes how it is currently taking form and becoming institutionalized. On such a basis, it becomes possible to better understand one of its main features – its paradoxical anti-intellectualism.

The new millennium has brought a significant and growing revival of classic Chinese traditions, particularly “Confucianism,” in mainland China.⁽¹⁾ This phenomenon is not limited to political utilization of culture, nor is it purely the prerogative of the elite. Rather, it has spread progressively to different strata of society, taking on different forms in various states of maturity. It can be best perceived in the area of education, where “reading the classics” by children, rediscovery of ancient institutions, and “national studies” (*guoxue*) courses for businessmen are some examples of the current movement.

The double-faced phenomenon under discussion, well expressed by the traditional word *jiaohua* (transformation of self and training dispensed to others), occurs at a specific historical juncture in which past “traditions” as well as future projects, both realistic and utopian, contribute to the affirmation of the role of Chinese culture. New Confucian engagements have come into being in the interval between the evolving post-communist “structure of experience” and the suddenly enlarged “horizon of expectation” made possible by the development and the opening up of Chinese society.⁽²⁾

It is therefore necessary to describe briefly the context of this “Confucian” rediscovery of education before considering how it is taking form and becoming institutionalized. This will help to provide a better understanding of one of its main features – its paradoxical anti-intellectualism.

Between recollection and anticipation: the context and issues of a “Confucian” rediscovery of education.

We shall first examine what is new in the cultural historicity of the first decade of the twenty-first century before considering briefly the evolution of Confucianism-inspired educative institutions in the twentieth century.

The new conjuncture of the 2000s

To describe the new spirit, it might be useful to compare the different significations attached to the concept of “tradition” during the last three decades.

In the 1980s and the aftermath of Maoism, intellectuals in favour of reviving the Chinese “Enlightenment” (*qimeng*) chose the notion of tradition (*chuantong*) as the object of a double rejection: not only was “tradition” used to designate the imperial past, conceived of as immobile and despotic,

1. The product of a modern science of religions that came into being in Europe during the nineteenth century, “Confucianism” is an occidental concept which only partially overlaps the Chinese notions of *rujia* and/or *rujiao*. These notions can also cover meanings that are very different depending on historical context. We therefore put this term in quotation marks, since in a modern context it expresses more of an assertion of identity than an objective reality.
2. Reinhart Koselleck, “Erfahrungsraum und Erwartungshorizont : zwei historische Kategorien”, *Vergangene Zukunft*, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1989, pp. 349-375

but it was also used to refer to Maoist communism, interpreted, after the disappointed expectations of the 1919 May 4th Movement, as falling back on tradition. In the 1990s, after the traumatic episode of Tiananmen, a very different situation appeared. Two differentiated processes became apparent before their effects were progressively combined around the increasingly vague category of “national studies” (*guoxue*). At first, this was a movement affecting an academic elite. At the outset, it was not characterized by the neo-nationalist spirit that emerged later — it put the emphasis simultaneously on going beyond naive Occidentalism, a feature of the previous decade,⁽³⁾ and on a determination to depoliticise. In fact, this new research on Chinese history and culture had its roots in *xueshu*, meaning scientific or academic value, as opposed to *sixiang*, an ambiguous term for “thought” that was also used under Mao to designate “official” ideology. Parallel to this affirmation of intellectual independence of the 1990s was the burgeoning of a form of mass culture (*dazhong wenhua*) made possible by the revival of market economy after 1992. Although the consumerist appetite was not initially attracted to products of a “traditional” nature, the market became progressively imbued with “Chinese” references, which attained legitimacy not only through the advance of national studies but especially through the openly nationalistic direction of official political doctrine.

The 2000s brought significant progress in the appropriation of “tradition.” First of all, there was a progressive transition from the imaginary to the real. While the immediate post-Mao era could only give birth to a “dreamed-up tradition” because of the widespread destruction of traditional culture, it gradually became possible to re-establish, at least partially, historic continuities that had previously been rejected or ignored.⁽⁴⁾ At the same time, there was a transition from theory to practice. Empty, incantatory references to tradition made way for actual appropriations of ancient cultural heritage, obviously at the expense of ongoing transformation or reinvention. Traditional values were no longer merely invoked; an effort was made to actually live according to them in various ways, from family rituals to styles of dress or decorative arts.⁽⁵⁾ These diversified practices were encouraged by a new climate in the media giving considerable attention to imperial references, historical television series being one of the most striking examples.

How does the revival of Confucianism fit into this context of “cultural tradition” in general?

We should beware of simplistic interpretations of these phenomena, first of all, because of their multifaceted and relatively elusive nature in the context of such a large popula-

tion, and secondly, because the movements in question co-exist with others indifferent or hostile to them. In particular, the “Confucian” revival actually gave rise to anti-Confucianism of a new type that at times served to lend support to old arguments. An illustration of this can be seen in the 2007 debate in which intellectuals favouring a cultural “renaissance” (*wenyi fuxing*) were opposed to those promoting a neo-traditionalist “moral reconstruction” (*daode chongjian*) — in a sense, the former, liberal and individualist, were the heirs of the “Enlightenment” movement.⁽⁶⁾

One could argue that this is not necessarily a new phenomenon: after all, the 1980s witnessed a “Confucian renaissance” in East Asia during the economic development of the “Four Little Dragons” and the rediscovery of the famous “Asian values.”⁽⁷⁾ The consequences of the financial crisis of 1997 and the end of the Singaporean dream contributed to the emergence of more modest and nuanced attitudes. Several considerations, however, indicate that this is a long-term tendency for China, a historical trend subject to cycles of variable speed and importance that do not compromise its long-term evolution.

In fact, whereas references to the Confucian revival previously arose outside of China’s borders (East and South-East Asia, the Diaspora), they became well established within

3. For more on the intellectual climate of this rediscovery of Chinese “cultural tradition” after the Cultural Revolution and on the “comparatist” perspective that places it in relation to “Western culture,” see Joël Thoraval, “La fièvre culturelle chinoise : de la stratégie à la théorie,” *Critique*, n° 507-508, 1989, pp. 558-572.
4. Joël Thoraval, “La tradition rêvée, réflexions sur *L’Élégie du fleuve* de Su Xiaokang,” *L’Infini*, 1990, pp. 146-68.
5. We could cite many other symptoms of this fragmented return of the past: the present fashion of genealogies (*jiapu*), the revival of certain popular holidays, the passion for Chinese antiques, the evolution of names given to businesses (it was fashionable in the 1980s to give Western-sounding names, but now it is more common to use traditional ones), more traditional decoration of restaurants, the renewed popularity of “tea culture,” etc.
6. See for instance, Liu Junning, “Zhongguo, ni xuyao yi chang wenyifuxing !” (China, you need a renaissance!), *Nanfang Zhoumou*, 07/12/2006, p.B15 ; Shu Qinfeng, “Zhongguo zhen de xuyao yi chang wenyifuxing” (China really needs a renaissance), *Liaowang Zhoukan*, 28/12/2006, p.74-76 ; Qiu Feng, “Zhongguo xuyao wenyifuxing hai shi bie de yundong ?” (Does China need a renaissance or another movement?), *Nanfang Zhoumou*, 21/12/2006, p.B15 ; Qiu Feng, “Zhongguo xuyao daode chongjian yu shehui jianshe yundong” (China needs a movement for moral reconstruction and social construction), *Nanfang Zhoumou*, 08/02/2007, p.B15 ; Qiu Feng, “Daode chongjian, shehui jianshe yu geti zunyan” (Moral reconstruction, social reconstruction, and the dignity of the individual), *Nanfang Zhoumou*, 18/01/2007, p.D29 ; Cui Weiping, “Women de zunyan zaiyu yongyou jiazhi lixiang” (Our dignity comes from having an ideal in terms of values), *Nanfang Zhoumou*, 11/01/2007, p.B14. “Wenyifuxing haishi daode chongjian ?” (Renaissance or moral reconstruction?), *Zhongguo xinwen zhoubao*, 22/01/2007, p.2. Li Jing, “Geren de jingshen chengshu yu Zhongguo wenyi fuxing” (Spiritual maturity of the individual and Chinese renaissance), *Nanfang Zhoumou*, 25/01/2007, p.B15.
7. There is a substantial literature on the topic. See for example: David Camroux and Jean-Luc Domenach (eds.), *Imagining Asia, The Construction of an Asian Regional Identity*, London, Routledge, 1997 and Mizoguchi Yûzô and Nakajima Mineo, *Jukyô runessansu wo kangaeru* (Reflecting on Confucian Renaissance), Tokyo : Daishûkan shoten, 1991.

the mainland due to a calculated, but nevertheless decisive, official policy, of tolerance.⁽⁸⁾ This new condition makes it possible to study the enormous “Confucian” heritage in greater depth.

The first decade of the twenty-first century has been characterized by three changes. First of all, “Confucianism” is no longer simply perceived as a means to an end, serving development or “modernization.” The “Weber Fever” of the 1990s never went beyond an attempt to reread Max Weber in the search for examples of a positive relationship between Confucianism and capitalism.⁽⁹⁾ Confucian thought or ideology now claims to find within itself both its foundation and its perspectives for the future. Some of its theorists maintain that Confucianism no longer serves as a complement to Western thought, but intends to replace it. Secondly, an interest in texts and practices inspired by “Confucianism” has ceased to be the privilege of the intellectual elite and has sparked the enthusiasm of the general population. There is a deliberate affirmation of movements based on “popular” Confucianism (*minjian rujia*) outside the sphere of intellectuals and official authorities. Lastly, the progression of Confucian practices, even when their importance remained local or regional, now raises the question of their institutionalisation. This revision of institutional forms consequently creates potential conflicts with existing authorities, from whom *de facto* tolerance or official recognition is expected. For Confucianism, the organisational structures of which were largely destroyed during the last century, this question of institutional forms applies in various degrees to three areas: politics, religion, and education. Since our study concerns education, we shall briefly review the fate of the classic institution of Confucianism during the twentieth century.

The paradoxical destiny of the Confucian classic institution in the twentieth century

The current wave of enthusiasm for traditional culture, dreams projected onto former practices and institutions, did not emerge *ex nihilo*. In fact, contrary to popular belief (which is itself simply the product of anti-traditionalist ideology that dominated the twentieth century because of the specific characteristics of Chinese nationalism), the modern transformation of the education system produced resistance, sometimes even within the modernising camp. One of the benefits offered by the current resurgence of apparently “traditional” forms of teaching is the possibility of a new retrospective examination of history, more complex and richer in

virtual developments than those suggested in the politically progressive version. Indeed, ever since the end of the Empire, there have been attempts to preserve classic traditions of teaching and self-transformation. These attempts have, in particular, taken the form of re-opening *shuyuan* or traditional academies. The development of these institutions, which have played a fundamental role in education in China for over a thousand years, was strongest from the Song Dynasty on, especially due to the influence of neo-Confucian thinkers such as Zhu Xi.⁽¹⁰⁾ Institutions of this kind had been founded by the leaders of Confucian lineages to educate their members, by Confucian masters, and even, starting in the Ming Dynasty, by the government.⁽¹¹⁾ In the sixteenth century, under the influence of such figures as Wang Yangming, academies also promoted broader access to education. Throughout their history, they experienced the tension between self-cultivation and the goal of preparing for official examinations, between integration in the public sphere and resistance to official authority at times of great crisis.⁽¹²⁾ The reforms of the very last years of the Qing Empire were intended to put an end to the structures of traditional teaching. Paradoxically, scholars who were profoundly Confucian were responsible for carrying out this dismantlement.⁽¹³⁾ Edicts in 1901, 1902, and 1904, reviving aborted reforms of

8. See Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism, ‘Cultural Tradition’ and Official Discourses at the Start of the Century,” *China Perspectives*, 2007/3, pp.50-65.
9. Liu Dong, “The Weberian View and Confucianism,” *East Asian History*, Australian National University, 25-26 (2003), pp. 191-217.
10. For a synthetic view of the history of the academies, see Li Hongqi (Thomas H. C. Lee), “Shuyuan, chuantong xueshu de zhongxin” (The *shuyuan*, centre of the traditional academic world), in Wang Shouchang and Zhang Wending (ed.), *Zhongguo wenhua de zhuan Cheng yu Chuangxin*, Beijing, Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006, p.355-64. For the relationship between state policy and private initiative, see Alexander Woodside, “The Divorce between the Political Center and Educational Creativity,” in Benjamin Elman and Alexander Woodside, *Education and Society in Late Imperial China, 1600-1900*, University of California Press, 1994, pp. 458-492. See also Chen Wenyi, *You guanxue dao shuyuan* (From official schools to academies), Taipei, Lianjing, 2004. Chen Wenyi in particular presents a broad picture of the state of research on academies. There have been many discussions and many divergent points of view about the creation of the first *shuyuan*. See, for instance, Li Caidong, *Zhongguo shuyuan yanjiu* (Research on the academies in China), Nanchang, Jiangxi gaixiao chubanshe, 2005, pp.319-22.
11. Thomas H.C. Lee points out that under the Ming, 60 percent of the academies were founded by the government: Thomas H.C. Lee, “Academies: Official Sponsorship and Suppression,” in Frederik P. Brandauer and Chun-chieh Huang (ed.), *Imperial Rulership and Cultural Change in Traditional China*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1994, p.126.
12. Thomas H.C. Lee, “Academies: Official Sponsorship and Suppression,” *op.cit.*, p. 119. This brings to mind in particular the *Donglin* academy in the seventeenth century. See also Jacques Gernet, *L’intelligence de la Chine, le social et le mental*, Paris, NRF Gallimard, p.112.
13. One may think in particular about Zhang Zhidong, who along with his peers resorted to writing a memorial appealing for a thorough reform of the educative system maintaining, nevertheless, a balance between Chinese learning and Western knowledge. Zhang Zhidong was appointed Minister of Education in 1907. See William Ayers, *Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971, pp.196-254.

1898 and inspired by the Japanese example, instituted a new format for schools (in particular the *xuetang*, which became *xuexiao* in 1912) and called for establishing a system to educate the general population. In 1905, the examination system was abolished⁽¹⁴⁾ and education was gradually liberated, at least in part, from the domination of Confucianism.⁽¹⁵⁾ Chen Pingyuan suggests that although putting an end to the system of examinations had been thoroughly thought out, the decision to abandon the academies was made precipitously and without any real prior discussion.⁽¹⁶⁾ During the 1920s and 30s, the question of the *shuyuan* gave rise to a lively debate, and many regretted their disappearance at the time. This was paradoxically the case for professors as westernized as Hu Shi, many of whom had studied in the United States.⁽¹⁷⁾

In any event, a turn was taken that the authorities considered irreversible. But some intellectuals, such as Zhang Taiyan, refused to participate in the new university system, and their educative pursuits continued in a parallel context outside of any real institutional framework.⁽¹⁸⁾ Others tried to recreate academies. This was the case with Ma Yifu (1883-1967), who in 1939, with financial support coming directly from Chiang Kai-shek, established the *Fuxing shuyuan* at Leshan in Sichuan Province. This endeavour continued until 1947, meeting up with many difficulties, in particular that of maintaining academic as well as financial independence.⁽¹⁹⁾ There is also the case of Zhang Junmai (1887-1969) and Zhang Dongsun's *Minzu wenhua shuyuan*, established in Dali (Yunnan Province) in 1938. Financed by the Kuomintang, this establishment aimed at combining Western and Chinese knowledge in order to contribute to a "cultural renaissance" (*wenhua fuxing*) as well as to the creation of a modern China.⁽²⁰⁾ Finally, the *Mianren shuyuan* (Academy for the encouragement of benevolence) was opened in Chongqing by another important Confucian, Liang Shuming (1893-1988).⁽²¹⁾ After 1949, the perpetuation of the humanist spirit of self-cultivation based on the classics was found on the periphery of China. The New Asia College (*Xin Ya shuyuan*), for instance, founded in Hong Kong by Tang Junyi (1909-1978) and Qian Mu (1895-1990), managed to maintain for some time the ideal of an academy adapted to modern times.⁽²²⁾ It must be emphasized that most of these thinkers were generally associated with the movement called "Contemporary Confucianism," about which the significant intellectual production is often all that is remembered. It is clear that they consistently aspired to a real-life commitment greater than the modest one that was possible during these troubled times.

At the beginning of the 1980s, reforms once again provided space for reference to classic institutions, but in a context that was fundamentally new. Placed symbolically under the aegis of Liang Shuming, an Academy of Chinese culture (*Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan*) was established at that moment of "cultural fever" and in the margins of all the official institutions with the objective of initiating a broad public (cadres, engineers, military, etc.) to classical culture and its canonical works.⁽²³⁾ Ever since, in a more or less favourable context, a growing enthusiasm for traditional education has

14. A detailed analysis of this whole process appears in the book by Gan Chunsong, *Zhiduhua rujia ji qi jieti* (Institutionalized Confucianism and its dismantling), Beijing, Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2003, pp.220-42. See also Zheng Yuan, "The Status of Confucianism in Modern Chinese Education, 1901-49," in Glen Peterson, Ruth Hayhoe and Yonglin Lu (eds.), *Education, Culture and Identity in Twentieth-Century China*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2001, p.194-202.
15. In this respect, we can make a distinction between the institutions and the content of the teachings. Once they were adopted, new institutions were never really in danger. The substance of teachings related to Confucianism (reading of classics, *dujing*, and self-cultivation, *xiushen*), on the other hand, has greatly evolved at different periods in time. The first Minister of Education of the Republican era, Cai Yuanpei, proceeded to undertake a broad "deconfucianisation" of the curriculum. Later, however, Yuan Shikai as well as Chiang Kai-shek contributed to "reconfucianising" them to some degree and in a new spirit. *Ibid.*, p.202-16. Gan Chunsong, *Zhiduhua rujia ji qi jieti*, *op.cit.*, p.236, table 5.2.
16. Chen Pingyuan, *Daxue hewei* (Why the university?), Beijing, Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006, p.5.
17. Chen Pingyuan explains that 50 or so articles were published on the subject during this period. *Ibid.*, p. 3. He quotes in particular an article written by Hu Shi in 1924: "The abandonment of academies, this is one of the most unfortunate things for our country" (p.6). More generally, Suzanne Pepper shows that during the 1920s and 1930s, more and more voices of all political persuasions criticised the unthinking adoption of Western models for Chinese schools: Suzanne Pepper, *Radicalism and Education in Twentieth-Century China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.90. She also relates that young Mao, at the very beginning of the 1920s, had a very nuanced point of view about the system of traditional academies, condemning certain aspects while praising others. *Ibid.*, p.98.
18. In 1935 and 1936, Zhang Taiyan dispensed teaching in the context of a "Study and Discussion Seminar on National Studies" (*guoxue jiangxi hui*). *Ibid.*, p.13.
19. Liu Mengxi, "Ma Yifu yu Fuxing shuyuan" (Ma Yifu and the Academy of the Return to Nature), in Wang Shouchang and Zhang Wending (eds.), *Zhongguo wenhua de zhuanheng yu chuanguang*, *op.cit.*, pp.418-35. This article, which analyzes a large number of texts and letters by Ma Yifu, gives a good idea of the nature of this enterprise and its difficulties. It also provides insight into the relationship between Ma Yifu and Xiong Shili, who came to teach at the academy. See also, for more factual information on the organization of the shuyuan, Hu Zhaoxi, *Sichuan shuyuan shi* (History of Sichuan Academies), Chengdu, Sichuan daxue chubanshe, p.383-86.
20. Roger B. Jeans, Jr, *Democracy and Socialism in Republican China, The Politics of Zhang Junmai, 1906-1941*, Boston, Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, pp. 72-94.
21. Hu Zhaoxi, *Sichuan shuyuan shi*, *op.cit.*, pp.387-88.
22. See in particular Cheung Chan Fai, "Tang Junyi and the Philosophy of General Education," in Wm. Theodore de Bary, (ed.), *Confucian Tradition and Global Education*, Hong Kong, The Chinese University Press, p.59 ff. A collection of articles and speeches demonstrate Qian Mu's activity as an educator when he was head of New Asia College: Qian Mu, *Xin Ya yiduo* (Past echoes from New Asia), Beijing, Sanlian shudian, 2004.
23. See in particular Liu Mengxi, "Zhexue, wenhua, rensheng, jinian zhongguo wenhua shuyuan chengli ershi zhou nian" (Philosophy, culture and life; Commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the Academy of Chinese Culture); Wang Chaomian, "Shuyuan yu jing shi zhi yong, zhi xing he yi" (Academies, Use of Classical Texts, Unity of Knowledge and Action); "Bianzhe hou ji" (Editor's Afterword), in Wang Shouchang and Zhang Liding (eds.), *Zhongguo wenhua de chuanguang yu chuanguang*, *op.cit.*, pp.587-98.

manifested itself in an abundant intellectual production and by a whole series of more recent initiatives to found *shuyuan*, *sishu* or *xuetang*.⁽²⁴⁾ They went hand in hand with a broader resurgence of interest in classic texts in society at large. In this respect, the movement actively promoting the teaching of Confucian classics to children was significant. Coming from Taiwan, whose impact had been growing on the mainland, this movement (*ertong dujing yundong*) was probably the most spectacular manifestation of the different appeals for the “renaissance of tradition.” It was marked by the figure of a Taiwanese professor, Wang Caigui, who claims to follow the spirit of Mou Zongsan and whose engagement resembles that of Tu Weiming, but remains aimed at the dissemination of Confucianism at the basic level (*minjian shehui*) rather than towards the academic world and institutions (Unesco, Parliament of Religions).

To leave or stay inside the academic space? The path to a new institutionalization

Faced with an educational institution established in a rigid manner during the years under Mao, what form can such a movement take in fulfilling its aspirations the training of self and other in accordance with “Confucian” heritage? The situation at the beginning of the 2000s is complex, and the strategies operating are very different. Educative practices based on “Confucianism” may consider the modern institution of schools and universities as either an ally or adversary. Three types of strategies can consequently be observed: those that assert themselves within the very space of the current institutions, those that deliberately try to establish rival institutions, and those that attempt to divert or add a new educative vocation to existing non-academic organizations (such as profit-making enterprises) within society. The underlying question in each instance is to determine the resulting relationship with the official institutional order: complementarity, rivalry, or substitution?

Questions raised within the academic institution

During the first years of the 2000s, the emergence of various strong movements served to relativise both of China’s main university models from the twentieth century: the liberal Western model that appeared at the beginning of the century but became hegemonic after the 1919 May 4th Movement; and the Communist model, inspired for a time

by the Soviet Union but reformulated by Chinese socialism and the specific requirements of Maoist ideology. Nowadays, appeals for a “renaissance of Confucianism” within academia express a variety of sometimes contradictory orientations, ranging from internal institutional reforms aimed at the student body and the intellectual community, to militant activities that use the university as a base but are directed at society at large. To illustrate these two dimensions, we shall examine the People’s University (*Renda*) and Peking University (*Beida*).

Recent initiatives undertaken within People’s University to support “traditional culture” are all the more significant given that right from its inception during the Sino-Japanese War, People’s University was closely connected to the Communist Party. Its main purpose was to train ideologically reliable cadres to serve the government and the Party. In 2001, *Renda* became the first Chinese university to erect a monumental statue of Confucius on its campus, and the following year it established an “Institute for Confucian Research” (*Kongzi yanjiuyuan*) with generous operating funds. This testifies to the current shift of the Communist Party line towards a selective and critical re-appropriation of traditional culture.⁽²⁵⁾

But discussions with various players in this enterprise reveal the complexity of the situation, not only because these initiatives have met with resistance from cadres trained in Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also because the true meaning of these orientations remain the subject of different and sometimes contradictory interpretations.

According to one of the directors of the *Kongzi yanjiuyuan*, the university finds itself in a national context where two different movements are developing: “There is an academic movement (*xueshu yundong*) that only affects scholars. Its objective is to go beyond such disciplines as philosophy, which was not possible before. The second movement is social (*shehui yundong*). It aims to promote confidence in one’s own culture and attend to the question of the spiritual life (*jingshen shenghuo*) in the context of material development of society. The movement for children to study the classics is also a sign — what the education system cannot be

24. From the very beginning of the 1980s, a large number of publications and lectures were given on the subject of traditional academies. See Chen Pingyuan, *Daxue hewei*, *op.cit.*, p.3 footnote 1.

25. On the two important documents relating to point, the “Program to Put into Effect the Construction of Citizen/Citizens’ Morality” (*gongmin daode jianshe shishi gangyao*) in 2001 and especially the “Program for the Development of Culture” inscribed in the 11th Five-Year Plan (*Guojia “shiyiwu” shiqi wenhua fazhan guihua gangyaode*) of 2006, see Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism, ‘cultural tradition’ and official discourses in the 2000s,” *op.cit.*

responsible for falls under the ambit of the ‘people’s space’ (*minjian*).²⁶

Two institutes founded by *Renda* give a better picture of the stratified nature of the problem. The Institute of National Studies (*guoxueyuan*) is still controversial. Its primarily intellectual objective is to compensate for the fragmentation resulting from the application of Western disciplinary logic to the study of traditional Chinese culture, and allow students to expand their study of “literature” or “philosophy” to training in philology and historical disciplines as well. This reasonable aspiration to a more comprehensive access to classic knowledge fell victim not so much to concerns over the danger of nationalist ideologisation²⁶ as to the problem of official validation: in 2007, authorisation for the awarding of master’s degrees (and *a fortiori* doctorates) had still not been resolved. The second institute, the *Kongzi yanjiuyuan*, whose president is philosophy historian Zhang Liwen, aims to organise as well as manage research on Confucian culture (the constitution of a “Confucian canon,” *Ruzang*, more or less in competition with a similar enterprise at *Beida*, is one of its projects), but also to encourage the teaching of traditional culture to non-specialist students.²⁷

The official attitude towards Confucius remains relatively ambiguous, reflecting the divergences that exist within *Renda* itself. “The official line,” they say, “is the one previously defined by Zhang Dainian: Confucius is neither praised nor criticized, he is studied. But some young specialists would like to go a step further. For them, Confucius is not an ordinary man, but a sage or a saint (*shengren*): his teachings are not only the object of academic research (*xueshu de yanjiu*) but also of research on the Way and the destiny of Man (*rendao de yanjiu*). Nevertheless, there is also opposition to this approach.”²⁸

The university has made another contribution to a Confucian revival that extends beyond the student body to various sectors of society at large. The most striking manifestation of this intellectual activism is the flourishing training programs offered to businessmen by Chinese universities (*Beida* and Tsinghua having played a pioneering role in the capital due to the high calibre of their faculty). For instance, since 2003, different faculties of Peking University (the Philosophy Department, the Academy of Chinese Culture, *Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan*) have joined forces to organize “National Study Classes” (*guoxueban*) for cadres and company managers in the form of well-organized intensive training courses that are remunerated accordingly.²⁹ The majority of these businessmen (*qiyejia*) come from other provinces, sometimes far from the capital. The classes are not lectures

but rather commented readings of classical texts, including not only the Confucian classics but also the *Yijing* and Sunzi’s *Art of War* as well as Taoist and Buddhist texts. The sessions we were able to attend in 2006 did not include any nationalist ideology and focused on familiarizing the participants with classical language and culture.

This kind of direct experience makes it possible to go beyond overly simplified assessments. Naturally, the entrepreneurs may satisfy their own professional objectives, and the instructors receive remuneration and recognition not easily available these days in the field of literary disciplines. But the majority of these businessmen and women have relatively little interest in the virtues of “Chinese-style management” (as practiced and exemplified by the South-East Asian Dragons during the 1980s). Whether they are uneducated entrepreneurs who have succeeded by dint of hard work, or have fancy degrees and a fashionable life-style, they share a common desire for this training, which is quite ex-

26. This danger naturally exists, since classical knowledge was not “national” but purported to be universal. It was the creation of national studies (*kokugaku*) by Japanese nationalism that contributed, as a reaction, at the beginning of the last century, to the rise of Chinese “national studies” (*guoxue*) in opposition to Occidental knowledge, but partially unfaithful, in their principle, to the deep inspiration of the Confucian tradition.

27. While this interest in traditional culture has been marked in a university particularly associated with ideological authorities, it has developed even more strongly in other institutions of high learning. For instance, regular lectures on national studies at Guangzhou’s Sun Yat-sen University in 2006 attracted hundreds of students. In most of China’s universities, such as the *Shandong shifan daxue* (Shandong Teachers’ University) in Jinan, extra courses of this type have increasingly become the norm.

28. Interview, Beijing, March 2007.

29. At *Beida* in 2006, businessmen enrolled for a year-long series of courses lasting 3-4 days each month at a cost of 26,000 RMB. A cycle lasting two years is also offered.

pensive, even though they are *already* “successful.” Their motivations are primarily personal: access to culture that was previously inaccessible and to resources for existential or spiritual fulfilment (*an shen li ming*). The sincerity and the pleasure that dominates these exchanges reveal a state of mind that goes far beyond purely pragmatic utilitarianism.⁽³⁰⁾ Thus, for the minority of activists or intellectuals committed to spreading Confucian values, the present-day university functions not only as a training ground for the student population but also as a solid base for educative enterprises in society at large. It has become apparent, however, that the modern institution is not really suited to these new objectives. Might it not be necessary to leave the university environment in order to establish a new base that could illuminate, in turn, the university institution? In fact, there is much talk of the old study halls or academies for dispensing traditional knowledge being given rebirth in a new form.⁽³¹⁾

The situation of Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou demonstrates the interest in this ancient ideal as well as the difficulties of putting it into practice. In the middle of the 2000s, a number of teachers specializing in Chinese culture, but without any credentials in the ideological structures of the Confucian revival, made a plan to establish an “academy” in an ancient sanctuary outside the university that had become a tourist attraction. They planned to use this *Lingnan wenhua shuyuan* to provide complementary instruction to students and to a cultivated general public. Even though the project received formal support from the authorities, however, it fell through due to lack of financial backing.⁽³²⁾ Clearly there is a “grey area” between the various degrees of political control and haphazard economic resources where projects for complementary or alternative instruction can be realized. In reality, the success of this kind of endeavour seems to depend on determination and activism from sources that are not strictly academic or intellectual.

Towards autonomisation? Between complementarity and substitution

Presently, the most original initiatives come from outside the university institution. They always need to negotiate special relationships with the authorities according to modalities specific to the particular place. We observe a sort of continuum between the initiatives taken in the shadow of local authorities, those taken in collaboration with them, and those that try to be as autonomous as possible.

The situation of small private schools (*sishu*) founded in the Pearl River Delta with support from a district official in the

city of Dongguan demonstrates the role personal initiatives can play at a local level. The ideas of Taiwanese philosopher and educator Wang Caigui inspired a veritable “pedagogical revelation” regarding the education of young children in a woman responsible for cultural affairs, who wanted to promote traditional culture in an industrial city. “This it is a real cultural desert,” says this energetic young woman from the North. “Pollution is not only atmospheric. It is urgent to propagate traditional culture. The readings of the classics we encourage should be done on a volunteer basis and not for commercial purposes. They should be based on individual initiatives.”

In a section of a park commemorating the virtues of Ming Dynasty General Yuan Chonghuan, two classes are held for children of 3 and 4 years old. Every day, three sessions are dedicated to the “reading of the classics” (in other words, reciting for memorization), and two others to basic knowledge and good behaviour (small rituals of respect towards teachers, etc.). The movement is presented as “popular” (*minjian*), but the commitment of local cadres has made the authorities more tolerant of instruction presented as “extracurricular interest classes” (*kewai xingqu ban*), and they even provide classrooms free of charge.⁽³³⁾

While these small, locally-established schools set modest objectives for themselves, other programs are designed for young people and adults in the name of reviving study halls (*xuetang*) or the more ambitious academies (*shuyuan*). This is the case of the *Yidan xuetang*, founded in 2001 by Peng Fei, a graduate of *Beida* who has become prominent in the media and whose ambitions are national as well as local.

Strategically located next to Peking University but outside the actual campus, this organization is clearly conceived as an enterprise for progressive reconstruction of a network of institutions to revive not only the learning of classic culture

30. These university professors now also give lectures on classical thinking and culture to cadres from the central administrations.

31. Besides, the notion of “shuyuan” has become sufficiently vague to be acceptable in a conventional academic environment: the *Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan*, established at *Beida* in the 1980s, was more of a patrimonial institution than a living community, and the *Xinya shuyuan* (New Asia College) in Hong Kong, in spite of its prestigious beginnings, is now only one of several “colleges” under a university functioning on the Anglo-American model.

32. Interview with the “Honorary Director” of the *Lingnan wenhua shuyuan*, Guangzhou, December 2006.

33. The existence of this cultural park makes it possible to present this small school as a “Garden of national studies of the Great Harmony” (according to the homonymy that makes the word “yuan” a park instead of an academy). Lodging is also provided to 20 children sent by families interested in traditional culture or moral instruction (*zuoren*); in 2007, they paid 600 RMB per month. The first “classic” studied by these very young children is the *Dizi gui*, a text from the Qing dynasty enouncing the duties of the student. Three masters provide instruction for each class.

A small traditional school (*sishu*) in the Pearl River Delta.

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but also the experience of community and ritual. Peng Fei, who has attracted an enthusiastic following, comes from a modest worker family in Dongbei. His encounter with the tradition of Chinese thinking occurred only after he began studying Western philosophy at *Beida*.⁽³⁴⁾ He now heads a network of supporters and part-time volunteers in several provinces dedicated to the creation of an organized system of schools and academies at some unspecified time in the future. The current activities of *Yidan* have the more limited scope of promoting classes and lectures in schools, enterprises, and media, while also of creating a core of activists sharing common activities (training seminars, assemblies including rituals, study trips, etc.).

The nature of this organization could be defined as amphibious;⁽³⁵⁾ although it benefits from the support of prominent intellectuals and a precarious but legal official status,⁽³⁶⁾ its orientation is opposed to the essential spirit of the modern university in either the liberal or Communist mode. The “national renaissance” (*minzu de fuxing*) to which it is committed requires a “cultural renaissance” (*wenhua de fuxing*) that questions the nature of certain basic paradigms of Western knowledge and pedagogy:

We know that the schools and models of contemporary teaching grew out of a movement of urbanization

and professional associations dating from the end of the Middle Ages in Europe. It is a system based on knowledge and the transmission of techniques, an educative mechanism dedicated to rapid and industrialized fabrication of “intellectual products.” So it is important to take into account that we are faced with an instrumental rationality with no relation to a spiritual life. The result is a huge carnival of knowledge, and not the transmission of wisdom.⁽³⁷⁾

This demand for a kind of “wisdom” (*zhizhi*) as opposed to “knowledge” (*zhishi*) is an element common to many movements in the “Confucian renaissance,” and should inspire a renewal of Chinese teaching establishments. But given the inertia of the establishments and the conformist tendencies of the elites attached to Western models, the “space of the people” (*minjian*) has become the point of de-

34. Interview, Beijing, June 2006.

35. On the “amphibious” character of “civil society” in China, see X. L. Ding, “Institutional Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China,” *British Journal of Political Sciences*, vol. 23, n°3, 1994, pp. 293-318.

36. Administratively, the *Yidan xuetang* is accountable to a work unit called the “Chinese Association for the International Promotion of Science and Peace” (*Zhongguo guoji kexue yu heping cujin hui*), which in turn is registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (*Minzhengbu*).

37. *Yidan Xuetang tongxun* (*Yidan Xuetang Newsletter*), no. 5 (December 2003), p.1.

parture for this endeavour of regeneration. Such an idea can be found in the words of Peng Fei:

As limited as I may be, I think the system of spreading the spirit of Chinese culture is tied to a disciple/master relationship and to a form of oral transmission, in the way a father teaches a son. This should be undertaken within society by the system of academies and study halls. Modern university and educative systems modelled on those of the United States and Europe are completely incapable of this. Education in China today also suffers from a similar shortcoming, which it cannot overcome. Because the essential spirit of Chinese culture is anchored in civil society and the masses, it is only by using concrete methods and local situations as a point of departure that we can return to our roots in order to look towards new horizons and perpetuate the ideals of wisdom. This is the most critical issue in China today. On such a foundation, a cultural renaissance can be built and, if it occurs, there will be a national renaissance.⁽³⁸⁾

In its educative spirit as well as in its vision of the “people,” we observe the ambiguous nature of the *Yidan xuetang*’s relationship to the university institution. While its long-term ideal distances it from the type of rationality that governs the university, it nevertheless continues to depend on permanent exchanges with the academic community whose validity it questions. The classes it managed to organize in Guangzhou can also be seen at the fringes of Sun Yat-sen University: propagative activities and volunteer work also bring together educators who are well established in their institutions, from primary school teachers to professors in university philosophy departments. However, the propositions advanced by the *Yidan xuetang*’s leader do not always receive unanimous acceptance and are sometimes the object of divergent interpretations.⁽³⁹⁾

Another step towards becoming autonomous is made when the structure established by the adepts of a “Confucian Renaissance” acquires not only its very own locality but also the permanent elements of community life. This is the case for an institution in Guangdong that calls itself an academy, the *Pinghe shuyuan*. Founded in 2005 in Zhuhai by a scientist who went on to head a successful commercial language school, this institution occupies two vast apartments in a large modern compound. Its founder, who studied in the United States and turned to “Confucianism” after a period

of belief in Baháism, combines a spirit of enterprise and association with successful Cantonese businessmen with a visionary conception devoid of erudition. He is open in a rather undefined way to the religious and political as well as educative aspects of Confucianism. Even though he has no academic credentials, he maintains friendly relations with professors known for their “cultural conservatism,” such as Jiang Qing, the main theoretician behind “Political Confucianism.” One of the Academy’s apartments serves as a workplace for study or meetings, which are sometimes accompanied by simple rituals, while the other serves as a guesthouse for boarders staying for varying lengths of time. The academy employs several people on a full-time and part-time basis. They share an enthusiasm for spreading Confucian teachings, even though their backgrounds vary widely: a former schoolmaster in charge of organising ceremonies (births, marriages, etc.) in the region, a management specialist responsible for promoting the theory of good “human relations” (*lunli*) in the businesses community, a teacher specializing in English but who also propagates “Han clothing,” and a computer engineer who focuses on the Academy’s website and the many relationships developing now on the Internet among supporters of a “Confucian renaissance.” The *Pinghe shuyuan*, funded by donations and the resources of its directors, can be considered a “private” institution, but is nevertheless an official member of the “Association for Research on Traditional Culture” (*Chuantong wenhua yanjiuhui*), which is registered with a department of the local government.⁽⁴⁰⁾

By combining idealist activism with economic realism, the academy also introduces a third vector of educative engagement that stems from Confucianism: firms and companies in general (*gongsì*). Sometimes they are motivated by commercial considerations or social strategy, but most often it is out of conviction and personal commitment that businessmen and women add an educative and cultural vocation to their economic enterprise.

Somehow, this situation has given rise to a crucial legal problem. It is difficult in China to receive official legal status

38. *Yidan Xuetang tongxun* (Yidan Xuetang Newsletter), no.4 (July 2003), p.1.

39. Peng Fei’s talents for inspiration and organisation has developed a network in Guangzhou that brings together very different personalities: volunteer activists, students, employees. A philosophy professor thus made a clear distinction between the spirit of self-training and moral renaissance of which he approved, and the scientific and democratic values to which he remained attached (interview, December 2006). We re-discover this phenomenon everywhere that the *Yidan Xuetang* operates. The individuals engaged in this organisation are far from sharing homogenous opinions on social and political issues. Moreover, the management of *Yidan Xuetang* does not seem to require such unanimity, but emphasises concrete action and self-cultivation.

40. Field observation, December 2006.

when establishing a private institution whose activities cover a quite a wide area, including social, cultural, and even religious dimensions.

It is significant that a convert to Wang Caigui's pedagogical methods, the director of one of the main Chinese companies specializing in the distribution of audio-visual material for reciting and memorizing the classics by children (the *Ertong jingdian songdu gongcheng*), insists on the fact that his company is not primarily commercial: "The model of a NGO would have been more suitable for us, but officially we can only be recognized as a company (*gongsi*)."⁽⁴¹⁾ This company develops its activities on a national scale by supporting small schools attracted to its programs, organizing competitions of reading classics, (*Lun Yu* reading clubs), and lobbying for official recognition of its objectives. It also shares with the new *xuetang* and *shuyan* the practice of applying to itself the educational and moral principles it promotes: the 20 or so employees of the company start their workday by reciting the classics and participating in a weekly discussion group.

To this judicial context is also added a change in attitudes in the economic sphere, where the traditional model of *rushang*, the "literary merchant," has undergone an unexpected modern evolution. This traditional notion, which described development in the Ming Dynasty of a closer relationship between merchants and the milieus of Confucian scholars,⁽⁴²⁾ is a sort of "floating signifier" in today's China, sometimes the subject of jokes, but also a strategy for social recognition.⁽⁴³⁾ But the businessman who takes on (or more frequently, since the term is considered flattering, does not refuse) such a title does not do so merely to augment his economic success with the symbolic capital of reputation. For some, it expresses a responsibility and commitment that is part of the daily life of their companies. In Guangzhou, for instance, the head of a prosperous educational company (*jiaoyu jituan*) is a realistic man aware of contemporary intellectual issues. Though he rejects the religious and political aspects of Confucianism, he upholds the message of moral instruction promoting independence of character (*reng de duli*) and "existential" education (*shengming de jiaoyu*). While he affects a liberal attitude, he does not hesitate to provide his thousands of employees with courses in national studies (*guoxue*), distributing bonuses to encourage the best students.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Although it is always difficult to determine whether ambition takes precedence over personal commitment, certain experiences suggest a genuine missionary vocation arising within some *gongsi*. This was the case for a young woman from

Dongbei who experienced an existential crisis that led her to Buddhism. The manager of a restaurant in Shenzhen, she developed a commitment to Confucianism that led her to systematically proselytize her employees as well as some of her clients and their families. Her passion as an autodidact (her library includes works of philosophy such as those of Mou Zongsan), goes beyond organizing classes for children to recite the classics, and she gives great importance to the training and personal well-being of her employees, some of whom have experienced the hardships of working in factories in the Dongguan region. Far beyond her pedagogical conceptions, which we will examine a little later, this is a significant albeit atypical case of a small business with a communitarian vocation dedicated to an almost messianic degree to the ideal of "Confucian renaissance."⁽⁴⁵⁾

We thus see the variety of solutions for reviving Confucian teachings through institutional structures that sometimes appear in very unexpected forms. But whether it is in the context of universities rethinking and broadening their educational vocation, of new institutions inspired by classic models, or of businesses taking responsibility for educative functions, these militant movements exist in a new context without which the rapidity and scale of their commitments would be unthinkable — the means of communication made possible by the Internet. In fact, no "Confucian" organization of any importance is without its own website, sometimes visited daily by thousands of Internet users.⁽⁴⁶⁾ The Internet, moreover, has become the main tool for isolated activists who are just starting out. From Shenzhen to Qufu, we were able to observe the effectiveness of these virtual networks, these "immaterial academies," in organising discussions as well as

41. Interview, Beijing, June 2006. Naturally, we have to take into consideration that this is a version intended for foreign researchers working on Confucianism; the company is described by other sources as having primarily commercial motivations. It is probable that it was created for various reasons: it is first of all clearly a commercial enterprise, but nevertheless run by individuals who also have a sincere interest in promoting the classics

42. About the emergence of this new "merchant spirit," cf. Yu Ying-shih, *Zhongguo jinshi zongjiao lunli yu shangren jingshen* (The modern religious ethic and the merchant spirit in China), Taipei, Lianjing, 1987, pp. 99-166.

43. A training institute called *Rushang* at Zhejiang University tries to give management students an indispensable complementary course on the subject of commercial ethics. According to its director, "The mentality of these young MBA graduates is often horrendous, and their ignorance of elementary rules of behaviour (without even mentioning economic life) is a considerable liability." (Interview, Qufu, October 2007).

44. Interview, Guangzhou, December 2006.

45. Interviews, Shenzhen, December 2006. In a forthcoming study, we will focus again on the religious aspect of this particular enterprise.

46. Among the main websites dedicated to the revival of Confucianism, we may cite Yuan-dao, Guoxue luntan (bbs.guoxue.com), Huaxia fuxing (hxfx.net), hanminzu.com, Confucius 2000 (a more academic site), etc.

activities in common with participants from all regions of China.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Having thus presented a picture of the multiplicity of forms taken by the “Confucian revival” in the context of educative projects, we may now focus our attention on one of the dominant features of this revival: its paradoxical anti-intellectualism.

A modern anti-intellectualism: the body, the child, the people

In opposition to the theoretical: the body

The motto of *Yidan xuetang*, “Less talk, more action,” reflects in general terms the deep suspicion of the theoretical that characterises the current revival of Confucianism, in which self-transformation is not an intellectual operation; even if the text is assuredly one of its vehicles, it must engage the whole person, including the body. The *Yidan xuetang* organizes regular sessions of morning readings of classic texts (like *The Great Learning*) in small groups held in parks where passers-by are welcome to join. The sessions, generally lasting 50 minutes, start with a series of gymnastic exercises:

These exercises are derived from ancient practices of self-cultivation, which we have simplified and modified and which we continually try to improve. Their purpose is to relax the body and the mind, to regulate breathing (...).⁽⁴⁸⁾

The small groups alternate different modes of reading (reading by the coordinator to the other members, collective, alternating, or solitary reading; varying rhythms, emphasizing slowness, etc.). These methods make it possible to take into account the variety of origins and “levels” of the participants while stimulating their pleasure of learning as they steep themselves in texts in different ways.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The goals of these readings are explained in the following terms:

One of the objectives of the morning reading is to unify our knowledge with our actions (zhi xing he yi), so it is appropriate not to read more than one chapter of the Analects of Confucius each week. We read and reread it so as to learn it by heart and be able to recite it. Establishing a connection between our daily lives and passages of the Analects in this gentle way allows them to truly innervate our lives. The second objective is to cultivate our nature — if we spend a lit-

tle more time and go to a place with a wide panorama, a pleasant landscape, and start with a session of physical exercises, and if we also choose a slow reading rhythm to give us a sense of the eternal, all of these things serve mainly to purify our hearts, cultivate our natures and strengthen our “noble spirit” (hao ran zhi qi).⁽⁵⁰⁾

Continuing to read the classics in the morning can enable our negative (literally “muddy”) energy to purify itself. This energy (qi) and our spiritual dimension (shen) reach a state of perception and serenity (shen qing qi shuang). Not only does our body strengthen itself, but we obtain access to greater authenticity and a fuller, more unified form of humanity. From the classics, we become aware of the roots of our culture, and we are surprised to discover that the ancients were confronted with the same problems we are, even if in different forms. Since they remain identical nonetheless, we can draw from the classics wisdom that is still effective. Through this daily exercise of reading, we enter into daily exchanges with the sages.⁽⁵¹⁾

These testimonies are not intended as theoretical explanations, but as a sharing of and reflection upon the actual experience of self-transformation, which originates in the body. The process is that of *incorporation* of the text, an experience of savouring and impregnation, facilitated by physical exercises, breathing, and slowness. These testimonies include an attempt to suggest explanations of what is experienced (purification of “muddy energy,” evocation of authenticity and of access to a fuller form of humanity, etc.). But what really matters is the emphasis on temporary access to another state (serenity, perception) and the more lasting feeling of self-transformation, which is not an act of faith, but a real experience, accessible to everyone. These experiences are nourished by the back-and-forth movement between

47. Interviews, Qufu, March and October 2007; Shenzhen, December 2006. The situation is perhaps represented by the creation of an “academy” that is still immaterial, the *Zhusi shuyan*, founded by people from relatively modest backgrounds (specialized workers, teachers) in the old “holy city” of Qufu in Shandong Province. Another example of an individual initiative is the development of the new site, *shiru.cn*, which promotes practical Confucianism. These sites may not be very influential, but exemplify new forms of activism.

48. *Yidan Xuetang tongxun* (*Yidan Xuetang Newsletter*), No.9, January 2006, p.2.

49. *Ibid.*, p.2.

50. *Ibidem.*

51. *Ibidem.*

daily life and texts that are constantly repeated and thus progressively memorized. For most people we met, the effectiveness of this process was self-evident.

This valorisation of concrete experience, of a total commitment of the person and his acts, is also found in the *Yidan xuetang*'s activities in the countryside. For some Confucians nowadays, the soil and the world of the peasant are invested with a strong "mystique" or imaginary dimension. The project of reconstructing Chinese civilization based on the countryside thus makes Liang Shuming a tutelary figure for these reinvented genealogies. The example of barely educated peasants gaining access to wisdom and illumination from their own experience, far removed from intellectual pedantry, is also held up as a model for the *Yidan xuetang*. In view of this, it is not surprising that the movement invites its participants to return to the countryside, in particular by arranging field trips. Without the means to organise truly structured activities in the countryside, this orientation mainly serves as a rite of initiation — plunging into the peasant world and striding along country paths becomes for these young urbanites a much more tangible, almost physical, experience of the Chinese civilisation of their dreams.

We have now seen that the anti-intellectualism of the popular Confucian revival can take the form of a self-cultivation that engages the whole person. However, this anti-intellectualist position can also be expressed as an endeavour to transform and shape other people: in that case, its attention is focused on the child.

Transformation of self, transformation of the other: the child

The movement called "children read the classics" (*shao er dujing*) is one of the most spectacular phenomena of the present return to traditional culture. Even if these classes are not limited exclusively to Confucian texts,⁽⁵²⁾ the four books (*The Great Learning*, *The Analects of Confucius*, *The Doctrine of the Mean* and *Mencius*) are nevertheless the preponderant reference. We have seen that the movement has developed in very different environments: (remunerated) private schools where children attend reading classes every week in addition to their obligatory curriculum; study periods in public schools between classes or after school; informal associations of friends and neighbours who hire a teacher; reactivated traditional structures (*sishu*, *xuetang*, *shuyuan*); and enterprises where directors, inspired by Confucianism, invite their employees and their families to read the classics. It is difficult to provide statistics on this move-

ment, but all indications suggest that it is gathering tremendous force and may be affecting millions of children.

The role of Wang Cangui, a Taiwanese disciple of Mou Zongsan, has already been mentioned. He has played an important role not only in promoting these readings of the classics, but also as a "theoretician" of education. The teaching he recommends is based on an analysis of children's capacities, which is not based on ability to understand knowledge, but on the development of the child in four successive phases according to age.⁽⁵³⁾ The second phase, which is centred on reading classic texts, is for children from four to 13 years old. Characterised by a very strong capacity to memorize and a fairly weak capacity for comprehension, this phase stresses the accumulation of basic knowledge that will serve the children throughout their lives, even if they are not able to understand it for the time being. This knowledge, which aims to nourish "the moral intelligence of the sages" and "cultivate the rectitude of the heart/mind, of nature and of action," consists of the progressive assimilation of the classics, "starting with the most difficult and going towards the simpler" (*cong nan dao yi*), in other words going in the opposite direction of comprehension ease. It is only much later, as their capacity to understand develops progressively, that the classics become intelligible resources for these children, illuminating their daily lives, their acts, and their choices.

We were able to attend several teaching sessions of classic texts in different contexts and were also able to talk with the instructors. The children read and reread the texts collectively — out loud — until they memorized them completely. The tone was usually monotonous and mechanical, the rhythm often fast, in marked contrast to the deliberate cult of slowness practiced by the young participants of the *Yidan xuetang*. In fact, memorization is less an objective than a consequence. The children are not pushed to retain for the sake of recitation, but constant repetition of the texts results in the children ultimately memorising them with increasing ease, to the point where they can recite long passages and sometimes even complete texts.⁽⁵⁴⁾ This is the case for

52. Our interlocutors often told us that the children could also be introduced to Taoist texts and to Western "classics," including Shakespeare.

53. Wang Caigui, "Ertong jingdian songshu de jiben lilun" (Fundamental theory for children reciting classics), in *Jingdian daodu shouce*, Beijing, Beijing shifan daxue yinxing chubanshe, 2005, p.4-10. In the same manual see (by Anonymous but inspired by the theories of Wang Caigui) "Wanmei de rencai, rensheng si jieduan jiaoyu linian" (The perfect man, conceptions of four phases of education of the individual), pp.1-3.

54. Jacques Gernet also points out that the term *du* (used in the expression *dujing*) carries the double meaning both of reading and rote learning. Jacques Gernet, "L'éducation des premières années (du 11ème au 17ème s.)," in Christine Nguyen Tri and Catherine Despeux (eds.), *Education et instruction en Chine, vol. 1, L'éducation élémentaire*, Paris and Leuven, Editions Peeters, 2003, p. 41.

A poster promoting the reading of the classics by children. The inscription on the right asks the question: "Have you read the Analects of Confucius?"

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"Western classics" as well: we heard children recite entire sonnets of Shakespeare, which they had memorized through phonetic Chinese transcriptions and recordings without speaking a single word of English. Parents and teachers all say how much they enjoy these readings (*le zai qi zhong*).⁽⁵⁵⁾ The diametrically opposite example constantly cited is the teaching of mathematics in the modern education system, where children are considered to have difficulty assimilating knowledge that is not useful (either professionally or for personal development), and which is beyond their abilities.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The reading of the classics is also accompanied by the teaching of "rites," which are most often little rules of behaviour (greeting adults with a slight bow, dressing neatly, being tidy, etc.) modelled on the precepts of someone like Zhu Xi, who like other Neo-Confucian reformers insisted on the importance of having children acquire physical habits and better control of themselves.⁽⁵⁷⁾

The conceptions of education promoted in the reading of classics naturally have strong historical roots.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Jacques Gernet, in a study on early education of children based on texts from the Song to the Qing dynasties, explains that "Chinese authors are very careful to specify the ages in terms of the development of the child." The role of memory before puberty is emphasised: for Lu Shiyi (1611-1672), "children under 14 have not been troubled by sexual feelings, have good memories, and little comprehension."⁽⁵⁹⁾ Thus, it is necessary to take advantage of the extreme malleability of these years — especially before 10 — to instil basic teachings. But Jacques Gernet also shows that theories differed regarding the necessity of making children understand the content of the texts. Though Xie Zhaoshe (1567-1624) insisted on the benefits of rote learning without comprehension, others such as Wang Yun (1764-1854) were extremely critical of this approach.⁽⁶⁰⁾ The rather marked dissociation of learning from comprehension that is often found among contemporary Confucians is not, therefore, necessarily legitimised by historical precedent. In any event, there seemed to be a common emphasis on the importance to be given to texts considered the most precious. Cheng Duanli (1271-1345), followed by Lu Shiyi, maintain that commentaries should be set aside for concentration on the Four Books and the Five Classics, the cornerstones of the Confucian body of work.⁽⁶¹⁾

This valorisation of the fundamental texts is also an important feature of the contemporary movement in China. While these activists may rightfully refer to historical tradition in legitimising their practices, the emphasis is deliberately placed on direct literal access to ancient texts without any kind of interpre-

tative mediation. Pushing aside exegetes and commentators, and along with them the whole hermeneutic tradition that was an important part of Confucian teaching, presents a more general problem: that of the possible development in today's China of a specific form of "Confucian fundamentalism."

The effectiveness attributed to this particular approach to the canonical texts without mediation is striking, and was already advocated by the young adults of the *Yidan xuetang* mentioned above. But parents we met also considered this training a fundamental source of education for their children. For the small fringe of the most radical militants, who go as far as taking their children out of the compulsory education system and put them in private *sishu*, the reading of these texts seems to be endowed with a unique and almost magical quality — the child who learns them will necessarily be faster than others, his ability to integrate with society (*hequn*) will increase, and the path of the sages will be open to him.

55. Historically, many authors have nevertheless underlined the extremely disagreeable nature of this mechanical method of learning, even when they were genuinely convinced of its effectiveness. See, for example, the case of Xie Zhaozhe (1567-1624) discussed a little further on.

56. The teaching of mathematics, while very strongly promoted in China, is denounced vigorously by Wang Caigui: "Ertong jingdian songshu de jiben lilun," *op.cit.*, pp. 8-9.

57. *Ibid.*, p.25.

58. Many studies have been made of the education of children and of the methods of learning Chinese classics. See, for instance, the writing of Thomas H.C. Lee on the Song, or more recently, the very interesting work by Bai Limin, *Shaping the Ideal Child*, Hong Kong : The Chinese University Press, 2005.

59. Jacques Gernet, "L'éducation des premières années (du 11ème au 17ème s.)," *op.cit.*, p. 38.

60. Jacques Gernet translates a text by Wang Yun: "The students are human beings, not dogs or pigs. Learning texts by heart without explaining their meaning is like reciting sutras or chewing on a piece of wood." *Ibid.*, p. 42. In the same spirit, Jacques Gernet shows that Qing author Tang Biao is also extremely critical of mechanical learning, whereas Wang Rixiu, from the late North Song Dynasty, maintains that children should be given an explanation of the texts they learn by heart.

61. *Ibid.*, p.37.

This poster promoting the reading of the classics proclaims: "Marching forward with the classics, becoming friend with the Sages." The first of the volumes presented on the poster encompasses three famous texts of the Confucian corpus: *The Great Learning*, *The Doctrine of the Mean* and *The Classic of Filial Piety*.

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The movement for promoting the classics expresses itself in a triangular relationship between children, parents, and masters. In reality, the breeding ground for transmission of the texts is less the individual than the family group. Indeed, parents are encouraged to accompany their children's reading at home, and may also participate in collective recitations that bring different generations together, thereby regaining contact with their traditional culture.

For the masters, the child presents an opportunity for wider diffusion of the texts. However, distinctions must be made when referring to the role of the master. The "master" can of course be the person who directs the reading sessions, but he can also be the activist responsible for promoting the classics, and who uses the child strategically or politically as a lever to promote cultural renaissance. These two kinds of masters are radically different, and their complementarity provides insight into the "charisma" at work in the *dujing* movement. In his research on the *qigong* movements that developed in the 1990s, David Palmer evokes the connection that exists between the masters, the adepts, and the *qi* (breath/energy) itself. He thus shows that *qi*, as a force that can be experienced physically, produces and reinforces charismatic relationships; *qi* becomes the substrate for the master's charisma, even if this produces the secondary effect of undermining his personal authority.⁽⁶²⁾ The role of *qi* can be compared with that of recitation (*du*) of the classics even if the actual physical aspect of the two experiences is noticeably different. Nevertheless, we have previously mentioned the "incorporation" of the text, its performative nature and recitation as a practice of personal transformation: there is an objective power resulting from "incorporation" of the text, a power that can be experienced by each person as in the case of *qi*. Charisma is primarily expressed through the reading of the text.⁽⁶³⁾ In that context, the personal charisma of the master directing the readings tends to be insignificant. We were able to observe this when visiting several private *sishu* in the Pearl River Delta: at one of them, the parents had chosen as "masters" young girls around 20 years old without university educations, who had themselves become acquainted only recently with the Confucian texts. Their main "qualification" was their ability to share their aspiration to self-cultivation, and thereby offer moral credibility.⁽⁶⁴⁾

Confucianism outside of the elite: the people

The actual revival of Confucianism has broad popular roots. Many activists come from modest backgrounds, peasant or

working-class. Peng Fei, the charismatic director of *Yidan xuetang*, is one example; we have already mentioned his openly acknowledged working-class background. Today, activists who create Confucian websites, organise reading groups of the classics in society, invite employees to read the classics in their enterprises, and even open schools, are often from similar backgrounds. They have not necessarily attended universities, and their rediscovery of Confucian tradition follows very different paths.⁽⁶⁵⁾ It is clear that this phenomenon, on the whole, is not a top-down movement led by an academic or politically institutionalised "elite" (*jingying*): it is a popular endeavour (*pingmin*) in both origin and vocation.⁽⁶⁶⁾ In addition to the activists, supporters, and sympathizers of this movement, who are sometimes recruited from more privileged classes of society (students, cadres, and members of the business community), there are also large numbers of salaried employees and workers.⁽⁶⁷⁾

Thus, during a discussion group about traditional culture and Confucianism at the previously mentioned Shenzhen restaura-

62. David Palmer, "Rationalizing Re-enchantment: Charisma, Affiliation and Organization in Contemporary Body Cultivation Movements," a paper presented at *The International Conference on Religion and Social Integration in Chinese Societies*, Hong Kong, 28-30 June 2007, p.7. (Forthcoming in *Nova Religio*).

63. The charisma also comes, via the reading of the text, from the authority imparted to it by Chinese history and tradition. Obviously these two aspects are also relevant as far as parents are concerned.

64. Field observation, June 2007.

65. In a future article, we will examine the motivations that push people to turn to Confucianism and classical culture. We do not have comprehensive statistics on the social origins of the Confucian activists, but we have observed the frequency of this phenomenon during many extensive interviews with activists in various regions of China.

66. This doesn't, of course, mean that there are no intellectuals participating actively in this movement.

67. Our study up to now has been carried out for the most part in urban and peri-urban areas, and further field investigation would be necessary to obtain a better understanding of the situation in the rural areas.

rant, about 50 or so people in the audience came from modest backgrounds and various age groups. Among them: workers, owners of small businesses, and restaurant employees (waiters, a cook). Some with “peasant household registration” (*nongmin hukou*) had come to look for work in the city, whereas others had jobs as manual labourers for government enterprises. Several told us they had become dedicated to the practice of daily readings of the Analects of Confucius, going so far as to memorise them in classical – not vernacular – Chinese. They openly expressed their pleasure at having access to this form of culture, and regret at not having done so earlier. We observed comparable phenomena in other cities and contexts.⁽⁶⁸⁾

What are the references for this kind of “Confucianism for the masses”? Rarely are they scholarly academic treatises. Direct access to the ancient texts is the priority; when commentaries are taken into account, it is primarily to shed light on the relationship between the teachings of the sages and concrete daily life. The role of the intellectual Nan Huaijin, a specialist and propagator of Buddhism who went to Taiwan as a refugee in 1949, is important in this respect: his works have been very popular on the mainland ever since 1990 as much on account of his personality as for his personalized reading of the classics (including Confucian ones), which for many people constitute an entry into traditional culture. In a somewhat comparable spirit, the *Yidan xuetang* recently edited three works from the late Qing Dynasty written by a certain Wang Fengyi, a peasant who “gained awareness of The Way” (*wu dao*).⁽⁶⁹⁾ In his introduction to these works, Peng Fei stresses the fact that Wang never had any formal education and that his wisdom was above all grounded in life experience: “This rural language he uses,” declares Peng, “is the living language of life.” In other words, the teaching originates from the common people and returns to the common people. It avoids the detour made by the sophisticated discourse of the so-called elite. It is the diffusion of this rediscovered tradition among the masses that will enable a renaissance of culture and the nation.

Indeed, the relationship between the “people” and the “elite” no longer offers the neat simplicity that still characterised it in the 1980s, when intellectuals, united in a widely shared vision of their role as defenders of the “Enlightenment,” spontaneously considered themselves to represent the superior interests of a nation faced with the authoritarianism of political and ideological power. The former model of “universal intellectual” was replaced by much more diversified figures: independent academics, media intellectuals, think tankers, militants committed to the recognition of spe-

cific rights... The relationship of the intellectual to the “people” evolved to the same degree as his relationship to the State. In this we can see tensions that were unthinkable before: the idea of the “intellectual against the people” (and the reverse) has now become a perfectly acceptable model. Intellectuals with different qualifications who consider themselves part of the Confucian revival sometimes diverge in their critical assessment of the manifestations of “popular Confucianism” (*minjian rujia*). Some radical cultural conservatives extol the virtues of authoritarian Confucianisation controlled by an elite who would take into account both national interests and cultural tradition.⁽⁷⁰⁾ Some other intellectuals are critical of the vulgarisation of teaching and the populist derivations they can produce. Thus Peng Guoxiang, a Tsinghua professor, cautioned at the end of 2006 against the risk of “narrow nationalism,” which he considered “the kiss of death” for Confucianism.⁽⁷¹⁾ Accordingly, he called for a serious study of the Confucian tradition in view of its authentic “re-establishment” (*chongjian ruxue chuantong*). Naturally, this serious study is subject to the intellectual credentials of those who speak in the name of Confucianism. The expression of the ambiguous relationship between the “Confucian” intellectual and popular movements is particularly clear in a veritable social phenomenon – the reading of the classics by Yu Dan.

A professor of media studies, Yu Dan is not a specialist in Confucianism. In October 2006, Central Television (CCTV) invited this charismatic woman to create a program on the Analects of Confucius. In this program, she gives a lively presentation of a text accompanied by commentaries that emphasises personal experience and daily life. The program has been a triumphant success, and the book based on it has sold millions of copies. Reactions to this phenomenon, however, vary widely. Some prominent intellectuals support Yu Dan. For instance, a discussion article by

68. Popular Confucianism often means to be “useful” and applicable in resolving concrete problems. The meeting to which we have just referred dealt for the most part with the positive role that traditional culture could play for educating children. For this reason, it was centred on sharing experiences, each person revealing his problems, and the coordinator of the session offering solutions. There is even a Confucian website calling itself *shijian ruxue*, “Practical Confucianism” (see note 46).

69. Wang Fengyi, *Cheng ming lu* (On the brilliance of authenticity – vol. 1), *Du xing lu* (On a firmly established practice – vol. 2), Changchun, Jilin sheng chubanshe, 2003. Wang Fengyi, *Jiating lunli jiangyanlu* (On family morality, vol. 3), Beijing, Yishu yu renwen kexue chubanshe, 2006.

70. See for instance Kang Xiaoguang, *Renzheng, Zhongguo zhengzhi fazhan de di san jiao daolu* (Policy based on humanity, a third way for Chinese political development) Singapore, Global Publishing, 2005.

71. Peng Guoxiang, “Ruxue fuxing de shensi” (Considerations on the renaissance of Confucianism), *Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao*, 18/12/2006, pp.34-35.

philosopher Li Zehou points out that “her contribution was to reawaken an interest in the classics.”⁽⁷²⁾ He describes Yu’s role as not that of an intellectual but of a preacher or an evangelist (*budaoshi*) who serves as a bridge between the elite and the common people (*jingying yu pingmin zhijian de qiaoliang*). Li Zehou also explains that the religious dimension of Confucianism has certainly been well presented by the scholarly works of contemporary Confucianists such as Mou Zongsan, but that the complexity and abstract nature of their formulations limit their effect on society. What is openly acknowledged here is the inevitable and desirable division of tasks between the scholar and the media populariser. The intellectual historian Ge Zhaoguang also recognises certain positive aspects of the phenomenon, but goes on to emphasise the responsibility of the elites for the presentation and the popular diffusion (*tongsuhua, puihua*) of the classics. He feels they should have better control of the difficult art of vulgarisation “in order to progress in concert with the general population, and not be pulled down by it (*yao gongtong tisheng bu neng jiti chenlun*).”⁽⁷³⁾ Many academic criticisms, however, point out errors committed by Yu in her interpretation of the texts and the superficiality of her analyses. For her detractors, Yu is simply not qualified to express herself on the subject. In an effort to have her book withdrawn, 10 doctoral candidates signed a widely-circulated petition in which they denounced the betrayal of the teachings of the old master and the way he was being thrown into the pasture of the ignorant masses.

At present, the two poles of the Confucian revival – *pingmin* (common people) and *zhishi jingying* (intellectual elites) – still do not communicate much with each other, but there are, of course, areas of mutual permeability, and many intellectuals participate in the current movement of *ruxue fuxing*. This is particularly apparent in the revival of the classic institution within the university. A number of university professors also support the idea of social and educative commitment inspired by Confucianism and going beyond the narrow horizon of their professional obligations. It is, however, necessary to take into account the gap between the academic world, which hardly expected the resurgence of interest for cultural tradition, and the forms this tradition takes today as it becomes progressively re-appropriated by the general population.

China has experienced the development of a series of educative movements in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Claiming to be different forms of “Confucianism,” they are striking in their scope as well as their variety. This does

not represent a rejection of the educative revolution that occurred in the 20th Century, but rather a relativisation that expresses itself in the reshaping of the historical conscience, placing the past century in a more modest position between the glory of the imperial era and the uncertain promises of a future power on an international scale. It also expresses itself not by simply revalorising a prestigious heritage, but by an active, inventive, and unpredictable exploration of new forms of training that are not necessarily forms of indoctrination. The fact that these initiatives often emanate from the “people” (however this term may be interpreted) indicates that they are not purely ideological phenomena that can be reduced to mere political instrumentalisation or the invention of a new cultural market. In its most extreme forms, this is certainly a minority movement, but its motivations are deeper, and it merits an attentive examination.

We have undertaken this analysis of the present aspirations of a “Confucian revival,” taking into consideration its educative dimension, because this particular dimension can be expressed with relative freedom in the official institutional area – or in a calculated relationship of distance from it. But the educative practice is naturally part of a larger cultural context. “Self-transformation” also carries the hope of being able to justify such an enterprise by referring to values that transcend the worldly, and to receive some kind of official recognition from government authorities: religion and politics are necessarily on the horizon of such ambitions.

In a recent article, the historian Yu Yingshi emphasised the importance in the Chinese cultural tradition of a hierarchy of notions and of roles that secularisation clearly has not been able to eliminate: “Heaven, earth, prince, parent, master.” In villages, these five characters are still sometimes written in “parallel sentences,” even if, from the beginning of the Republican era, the prince (*jun*) has been replaced by the national state (*guo*): “Today, whether we do research on the culture of the elite (*shangceng*) or that of the general population (*minjian wenhua*), the value system expressed by *Tian di jun qin shi* calls for our attention.”⁽⁷⁴⁾ The upheavals of the twentieth century have certainly undermined this hierarchical universe to some extent, but for any appeal to a

72. “Li Zehou : tamen shi jingying he pingmin zhijian de qiaoliang” (Li Zehou: They are the bridge between the elite and the general population), interview with Li Zehou in *Nanfang Zhoumou*, 22/03/07, p. 28.

73. “Ge Zhaoguang : yao gongtong tisheng bu neng jiti chenlun” (We must rise together, not pull each other down), interview with Ge Zhaoguang, in *Nanfang Zhoumou*, 22/03/07, p. 28.

74. Yu Yingshi, “Tan ‘Tian di jun qin shi’ de qi yuan” (On the origins of ‘Heaven, earth, ruler, parents, masters’), *Xiandai ruxue lun* (On contemporary Confucianism), Taipei, Global Publishing, 1996, p. 101.

“Confucian” future, this imaginary order nevertheless constitutes the fabric of new and interdependent enterprises, some of which are called upon to become realities while others will surely remain partially virtual.

In a way, it is the figure of the master (*shi*) that has held our attention, even in his paradoxical anti-intellectual manifestation. Two forthcoming studies will focus on the relationship

of the master to new personalities, and their attempt to provide new interpretations of the word “Confucianism” in the spheres of religion and politics. •

• Translated by Nina Levin Jalladeau

Glossary

An shen li ming	安身立命
Beida	北大
budaoshi	布道師
Chen Pingyuan	陳平原
Cheng Duanli	程端禮
chongjian daode	重建道德
chongjian ruxue	重建儒學傳統
chuantong	傳統
Chuantong wenhua	傳統文化研究會
yanjiuhui	
cong nan dao yi	從難到易
dazhong wenhua	大眾文化
Donglin	東林
du	讀
dujing	讀經
ertong dujing yundong	兒童讀經運動
Ertong jingdian	兒童經典誦讀工程
songdu gongcheng	
Fuxing shuyuan	復性書院
Ge Zhaoguang	葛兆光
gongsi	公司
guo	國
guoxue	國學
guoxueban	國學班
guoxueyuan	國學院
hao ran zhi qi	浩然之氣
Hu Shi	胡適
Jiang Qing	蔣慶
jiaohua	教化
jiaoyu jituan	教育集團
jiapu	家譜
jingshen shenghuo	精神生活
jingying	精英
jingying yu pingmin	精英與平民
zhijian de qiaoliang	之間的橋梁
jun	君
kewai xingqu ban	課外興趣班
Kongzi yanjiuyuan	孔子研究院
le zai qi zhong	樂在其中

Li Zehou	李澤厚
Liang Shuming	梁漱溟
Lingnan wenhua	嶺南文化書院
shuyuan	
Lu Shiyi	陸世儀
lunli	倫理
Ma Yifu	馬一浮
Mianren shuyuan	勉仁書院
minjian rujia	民間儒家
minjian shehui	民間社會
minjian wenhua	民間文化
minzu de fuxing	民族的復興
Minzu wenhua shuyuan	民族文化書院
Mou Zongsan	牟宗三
Nan Huaijin	南懷瑾
nongmin hukou	農民戶口
Peng Fei	逢飛
Peng Guoxiang	彭國翔
Pinghe shuyuan	平和書院
pingmin	平民
pujihua	普及化
Qian Mu	錢穆
qi	氣
qigong	氣功
qimeng	啟蒙
qiyejia	企業家
qu	區
Renda	人大
rendao de yanjiu	人道的研究
renge de duli	人格的獨立
rujia	儒家
rujiao	儒教
rushang	儒商
ruxue fuxing	儒學復興
Ruzang	儒藏
shangceng	上層
shao'er dujing	少兒讀經
shehui yundong	社會運動
shen	神
shengming de jiaoyu	生命的教育

shengren	聖人
shi	師
shuyuan	書院
sishu	私塾
sixiang	思想
Tang Biao	唐彪
Tang Junyi	唐君毅
tian di jun qin shi	天地君親師
tongsuhua	通俗化
Wang Caigui	王財貴
Wang Fengyi	王鳳儀
Wang Rixiu	王日休
Wang Yangming	王陽明
Wang Yun	王筠
wenhua fuxing	文化復興
wenhua zixin	文化自信
wenyi fuxing	文藝復興
Xie Zhaozhe	謝肇淛
Xin Ya shuyuan	新亞書院
xiushen	修身
xueshu	學術
xueshu de yanjiu	學術的研究
xueshu yundong	學術運動
xuetang	學堂
xuexiao	學校
yao gongtong tisheng,	要共同提升，
bu neng jiti chenlun	不能集體沉淪
Yidan xuetang	一耽學堂
Yu Dan	于丹
Yu Yingshi	余英時
Zhang Dainian	張岱年
Zhang Dongsun	張東蓀
Zhang Junmai	張君勱
zhihui	智慧
zhishi	知識
zhishi jingying	知識精英
zhi xing he yi	知行合一
Zhongguo wenhua	中國文化書院
shuyuan	
Zhu Xi	朱熹