The Cyber-reception for Three Hakka Tulou Construction Projects in Taiwan
From the Event to a Critique of Representative Democracy

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ABSTRACT: In the early 2010s, under the second mandate of Ma Ying-jeou (KMT), plans to construct three Hakka tulou in western Taiwan aroused considerable discontent amongst a section of the Taiwanese population. Their disapproval manifested itself in the eruption of small-scale demonstrations and in the expression of differences of opinion and individual experiences in the cybersphere. As actors, internet users took on the role of citizen’s watch and people’s judge and revealed, through a critique of the three projects, the failings and tensions present in representative democracy both in terms of cultural identity and procedural mechanisms, highlighting opposed values of the various social agents.

KEYWORDS: Taiwan, representative democracy, local election, Miaoli, tulou, Liu Cheng-hung, new media, actor, value, process.

In Taiwan, in the early 2010s, the leaders of the Miaoli and Hsinchu districts and the mayor of Taichung – all three affiliated to the Kuomintang (KMT) – drew up a plan for the construction of Hakka tulou (kejia tulou 客家土樓) (1) in each of these areas. Of the three projects, only the Miaoli plan came to fruition: the tulou known as the Hakka Roundhouse (Kejia yuanlou 客家圓樓) was inaugurated on 25 October 2014 in the town of Houlong 後龍. Officially, the aim of these three initiatives was the development of tourism through the valorisation of "Hakka culture." (2)

From the time they were proposed until their realisation or abandonment, these three projects engendered lively criticism on the part of local residents, the media, and Taiwanese intellectuals. The fiercest polemic centred on the Miaoli tulou. (3) In 2010, the building of the Hakka Roundhouse led to the demolition of two clay structures built by the Hakkas of Taiwan in the early 1950s: the “eight-trigram kiln” (bagua yao 八卦窯) and the “tetragonal kiln” (sifang yao 四方窯). In an interview conducted by Liberty Times in July 2013, Ho Chuan-kun 何傳坤, a Taiwanese anthropologist from the National Tsing Hua University, expressed his disapproval of the destruction of a part of Taiwanese Hakka culture, seeing in it the renunciation of a cultural heritage." The value of historic monuments lies in the place where they have their roots. When the government of the district of Miaoli imitates a tulou, is it to attract Taiwanese tourists or Chinese tourists? Why would Chinese tourists come to Taiwan to visit these mountain fortresses, the tulou? [...] If we are not saving the cultural heritage.

1. Tulou literally “earth buildings,” are a type of architecture unique to southwestern China and were added to the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2008 (in the cultural assets category). Built on stone foundations, with a wooden frame and surrounded by a wall made of hard-packed earth, the tulou – often casually termed “mountain fortresses” on account of their fortified appearance – are often categorised according to their shape and ground plan: the three most common plans are the round tulou (yuansuo), the square tulou (fangtou), and the five-phoenix-style tulou (wudefeng). These buildings are inhabited by the Hakka (Kejia in putonghua) and by the Minnan (also known as Fulao or Hoklo in Taiwan), two sub-groups of the majority Han nationality living mainly in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. However, the heritage rhetoric disseminated by the Chinese government contributed to the crystallisation of a tulou-Hakka correlation that assimilated the tulou into a Hakka cultural and territorial marker; thereby obliterating the involvement of the Minnan population in the building of these edifices. Although this omission was denounced in 2009 by the Chinese architect and researcher Huang Hanmin, an article in People’s Daily in 2011 maintained that “the tulou is the emblem of Hakka culture” and likewise that “Hakka culture is the soul of the tulou.” Cf. Huang Hanmin, Fujian tulou: Zhongguo chuantong minju de guibao (The Fujian tulou: Treasures of Chinese vernacular dwellings), Beijing, Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlianshudian, 2009, p.109; Yan Yunxiao and Wu Xinying, “Yongding: ‘rang wenhua wu dong tulou’” (Yongding; “Culture is alive in the tulou”), Renmin ribao, 2011, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmbwb/html/2011-12/02/content_970259.htm (accessed on 15 May 2016).


of the Hakka of Taiwan, could it be because we do not have confidence in our own heritage? (4)

On 21 September 2013, the Taiwan Hakka Think Tank (Taiwan Kejia zhiku 台灣客家智庫) organised a press conference to call upon the Head of the Miaoli district, Liu Cheng-hung 劉政鴻, to “immediately stop the building of a Chinese Hakka tulou that has no connection with Taiwan,” to broaden his knowledge of Hakka culture, and to enhance the cultural heritage of Miaoli District. (5)

Alongside small-scale demonstrations against the destruction of the kilns and the building of a tulou, (6) the protestors exploited the virtual sphere, a privileged forum for the “critical sovereignty of opinion,” (7) which was increasingly becoming a zone and a tool for citizen-based surveillance in Taiwan. (8) This exercise of citizen activity in a democratic context (evaluation, judgement, prevention, etc.) is part of the communication society, structured by social media (Facebook, Wechat, Line, etc.), microblogs (Twitter, Weibo), Bulletin Board Systems (PTT), and other virtual interfaces that transmit information and enable dialogue between internet users. (9) These new online communication platforms have led researchers to investigate the observations of internet users in order to have a better understanding of their engagement and of the politico-social dimension. (9)

This article analyses certain online controversies (10) concerning the reception of the three tulou building projects through a qualitative survey on new media and through the exchange of comments between internet users published between July 2013 and July 2015. The aim of studying these comments is to reproduce the social mood of a section of the Taiwanese population under the second mandate of President Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 (KMT) from May 2012 to May 2016, and at the same time to enable researchers to understand more clearly the censorship role played by internet users, who are often only partially anonymous, and to consider the dynamics of the comments and virtual dialogue of internet users.

Although the question of identity is well and truly present in the online posts, internet users reveal a varied range of concerns that contribute to a common dynamic: the creation of an indictment against the government in power and the elaboration of a common horizon of expectation. Virtually or physically, the players (militants, internet users, and politicians) mobilise in the name of certain values to initiate, stop, or change the direction of a process of reform. This article studies the reception of three tulou construction projects in Taiwan from the perspective of the processual change that led to the realisation or abandonment of the project rather than from the perspective of the result. (12)

Empirical materials, choice of corpus, and methodology

Most of the online articles on building tulou in the Miaoli and Hsinchu districts and in the Taichung municipality were published between 2013 and 2015 in the two biggest Taiwanese daily papers, the liberal democratic Liberty Times (Ziyou shibao 自由時報), in favour of Taiwanese independence, and Apple Daily (Pingguo ribao 蘋果日報), considered to be a moderate daily. (13) Five of the articles are followed by Facebook comments (four in Apple Daily and one in Liberty Times), (14) so a total of 129 Facebook comments were collected. This data base was expanded by 23 Facebook comments posted after an article in the online ETtoday 東森新聞雲, and 15 Facebook comments published on the page of the Taiwanese forum Mesotw (Taiwan xiaozhan台灣小站), entitled “Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou” (Miaoli xianzhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan Kejia yao gai Zhongguo tulou) 慈利縣長劉政鴻 拆台灣客家業 蘭鄭中國樓). Moreover, the survey resulted in the collection of 172 other posts on three articles published on one of the main Taiwanese platforms, PTT Bulletin Board System (Ptitit shiye fang 批踢踢實業坊), mainly used by students. In all, a sample of 367 comments from internet users, of variable quality and length, were analysed. It should be pointed out that the pages of the PTT forum and Mesotw are systematically linked to Liberty Times and Apple Daily.

Online, the context is provided by many elements: the subject of the page on which the comment is posted, its place in a virtual dialogue between internet users, the social network used to publish the comment, etc.


8. The movement of democratization of Taiwanese society in the 1990s led researchers to rethink democratic participation in the light of new information and communication technologies (NICtis); they have raised questions on the virtues and vices of “e-democracy” (wanglu minzhuhui, “electronic democracy”) (dianzi minzhuhui) and “teledeocracy” (dianzi minzhuhui). The expanding role of ICT in Taiwan led, in October 2012, to the foundation of g0v (the ‘g’ of g0v was turned into a ‘v’), inglés zhengzhong in Chinese. The main objectives of g0v – organised along the lines of a liquid democracy model and composed of hackers, engineers, information technology designers, journalists, lawyers, and militants as well as human science researchers such as anthropologists and sociologists – are transparency of information, decentralisation, and openness, that is to say, open data, open source, open government, and open cooperation. The community’s numerous projects are all part of civic tech (civic technologies). Certain g0v participants (canyuhe) are government consultants, others are civil servants. One such is Audrey Tang, appointed minister without portfolio in charge of digital affairs in August 2016, and also the hacker Luo Peiqi, who now works for the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (Weisheng fuli bù).


10. Many more Anglophone and Sinophone studies on the comments of internet users exist than have been published in French. Similarly, quantitative studies are more common than qualitative studies. Amongst the latter, two articles may be cited by way of example: Wu Hsiang-Mei, “Wang-shang xingzhou: Facebook shiyangxue zhai daka zhuanshu yu dibiao shijian” (Travelling the web: Check-in tactics and practice of Facebook users), Xixin we cang (Led by mass communication research), No. 126, 2016, pp. 93–132; Cheng-Ting Liao, “BBS wanghanda Kejia zuqun rongtong jiangyou: yi PTT ‘Hakka Dream’ ban wei” (Constructing the Hakka ethnic identity in BBS: A case study of “Hakka dream” in the PTT), Xuzhou shenli yuxin (Journal of cyber culture and information society), Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 257–293.

11. The term “controversy” is understood here to be an “effervescent moment” as defined by Durkheim, or in other words, as an occasion for the social players to question certain hitherto established balances of power and beliefs, to redistribute amongst themselves ‘greatness’ and positions of power, and to invent new organisational systems and techniques that will shape their future relationships differently.” Cyril Lemeur, “À quoi sert l’analyse des controverses?” (What is the use of analysing controversies?), Ml neuf cent. Revue d’histoire intellectuelle (1990, journal of intellectual history), No. 25, 2007, p. 192.

12. For the idea of “processual change,” I refer readers to Stéphane Cucullu’s presentation of the notion at the opening of the workshop entitled “The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Taiwan. Political, Social and Economic Change” held at the Academia Sinica on 30 and 31 October 2014.


14. Articles published in China Times were not used, since the site blocks comments by internet users.
In the case of the Facebook posts, for example, a survey was conducted on the profile of the internet user in question in order to understand the place of the comment in the news thread. Nonetheless, internet users enjoy partial anonymity, which acts as a definite curb to a comprehensive understanding of the identity of the internet user as a player in the social network. Digital identity also depends as much on the virtual platform (that establishes a normative framework of variable flexibility) as on the internet user. [19]

A chronological analysis of the posts revealed two broad time spans, each relating to a specific subject: the comments from 2013 relate mainly to the question of identity, whilst those from 2014 and 2015 reveal a critique of the local political system. These two issues should be placed against the background of a more general consideration of the uncertainties of representational democracy in the Taiwanese context.

(De)legitimising the representation of identities: Authority figure and political fiction

Miaoli District head Liu Cheng-hung announced in a press release in July 2013:

The construction of the tulou represents the local culture of 65% of the Miaoli Hakka and should enable us to attract tourists. We hope that everyone will be able to assimilate the tulou as an integral part of local culture and benefit from this ancestral wisdom. [14]

This declaration drew numerous comments from both sympathisers and detractors of Liu Cheng-hung’s position, all raising the same question: can the tulou embody the Hakka of Taiwan? Two major fundamental questions emerged from the analysis of internet users’ comments: is the culture and identity of the Taiwanese Hakka distinct from that of the Chinese Hakka? Are local officials justified in representing a hypostatised Hakka community? Over and above previous analyses of the lack of consensus between Chinese culture and Taiwanese identity, these issues may be understood in the light of the tension between the construction of a political issue as an abstract political principle relating to a form of totality, or unity (“the People,” “the Hakka ethnic group”), [17] and the liberal principle whereby each individualised subject has the right to self-determination. [19] Although a comment is a form of individual expression, its rhetoric is characterised by reference to collective forms of designation, synecdoches that use / as an expression of the collective. [19] By using these collective designations as a screen for the /, the internet user tends to set himself up as an authority figure, the legitimate spokesperson for a community.

Chinese Hakka vs Taiwanese Hakka: Aporia of the essentialisation of an identity dualism

Following an article in Apple Daily published on 21 July 2013, entitled “Miaoli district is building a small mountain fortress, ‘a Fujian tulou,’” an internet user with a higher education diploma, Nan Xiang Chu, distinguished between two Hakka communities (see figure 1):

Is this the culture of the Mainland Hakkas? Or is it the culture of Taiwanese Hakkas? Did [the town of] Kaohsiung, and [the districts of] Miaoli and Hsinchu have this kind of architecture before? Is it right to destroy the square kiln, the octagonal kiln, and other historic monuments? [20]

Nan Xiang Chu’s questions on the nature of Hakka culture in Taiwan are similar to those of other internet users who raise the issue of the correspondence between the tulou as an element of representation Taiwanese Hakka culture and the origin of the Hakkas, a diaspora community, whose official history has been structured by several migratory waves in China and the countries of Southeast Asia. [21]

Certain internet users therefore associate the geographic origin of the Hakkas with the legitimacy of the tulou in its function as a representation

17. The ethnic Hakka group (kejia zuqun) is one of the “four big Taiwanese ethnic groups.” In 2001, Chen Shu-bian’s Taiwanese government (2000-2008) institutionalised Hakka identity by founding the Keweihui, the Hakka Affairs Council. In 2002, the Keweihui established an annual festival, the Hakka Tung Blossom Festival (Kejia tong hua zhai), and in 2011 inaugurated Hakka National Day (Quanzuo Kejia n huo dong).
19. Quoting Jean-Louis Fabiani, Cyril Lemieux notes that in cases of controversy, “it is always a question of creating conditions that allow the protagonist to invoke as witness, or even constitute as a resource, the audience to a debate. This audience may be virtual, represent porosity or the universal: the presupposition of its existence opens up a space for the disclosure of truth. […] In this type of conflict, the proviso by which the two adversaries must recognise that each has an equal right to expose their arguments before the public and to present proof tends to be invested by the participants in varying degrees.” Cyril Lemieux, “À quoi sert l’analyse des controverses” [What is the purpose of analysing controversies], op. cit., p. 195.
21. The annexing and management of Taiwan by the Qing Empire between 1684 and 1895 on the one hand, and the establishment of the KMT on the island in 1945 on the other, engendered several waves of migration from China to Taiwan. As a result, almost 98% of the Taiwanese population is of Chinese origin. The Minnan and Hakka sub-groups that inhabit the southwestern coastal provinces of China opposite Taiwan (Fujian and Guangdong) account for most of the Chinese migrants. Along with Mainlanders (waishengren) and Taiwanese Aborigines (Yan Zhu hmin), the Minnan and Hakka make up the four major ethnic groups recognised by the Taiwanese government. The Minnan (70%) and Hakka (15%) represent 85% of the total population.

Figure 1 – Facebook comment published by internet user Nan Xiang Chu following an article in the Apple Daily entitled “The Miaoli District is building a mountain fortress ‘a Fujian tulou’.” Source: Nan Xiang Chu, https://www.facebook.com/q19810115 (accessed on 15 May 2016).
of a homogenous Hakka community whose culture is Chinese. In a comment on Facebook published following the article in Apple Daily, internet user Jimmy Chen declares that the Hakkas are migrants originating from the mainland and consequently, this historical fact is enough to legitimise the construction of a tulou in Miaoli. Similarly, Ma Shan 滬山, a Hakka from Miaoli who supports the Pan-Blue Coalition (25) and is combating what he considers Minnan chauvinism in Taiwan, frequently underlines the Taiwanese Hakkas’ Chinese origin. In a comment dated 21 July 2013, he adds:

The construction of Hakka tulou in Fujian also bears historic witness to what the Hakkas have experienced. [...] Many Hakka friends automatically associate the tulou with a Hakka dwelling place. This does indeed mean that this type of architectural heritage can also represent Hakka culture. (26)

In the same exchange of comments, Wu Mengru 吳孟儒 uses a sarcastic sophism in order to discredit the rhetoric on origins that justifies the idea that Chinese Hakka culture is representative of the Taiwanese Hakkas’ history:

If we want to see the heritage of the Hakkas from over the Strait, we only need to go there; why come to see what the Taiwanese have done? Should we, since human origins lie in Africa, transform all the Taiwanese buildings into African buildings? Though all are related to each other, in the end, all societies, all over the world, develop a local culture [that is their own] [...]. (27)

Nevertheless, although the history of the migration of Hakkas to Taiwan remains an authoritative argument put forward by many internet users, the cultural rhetoric that emanates from it is skilfully treated by those who support Taiwanese self-determination regarding their identity, culture, collective memory, and history. Those who believe that there is a cultural difference between a Taiwanese Hakka community and a Mainland Hakka group concede that the Hakkas who immigrated to Taiwan produced a culture that is all their own since they assimilated part of the native culture. (28) The Taiwan Hakka Think Tank therefore affirmed that “the construction of a round tulou goes against the historical process of the Hakkas of Taiwan.” (29) In a Facebook comment dated 22 July 2013, a student from the National University of Tainan, Wayne Chen, argues that the ancestors of the Hakkas who immigrated to Taiwan never built tulou, so the tulou cannot embody the Taiwanese Hakka community.

Detractors and zealots approach the historical narrative from two distinct, opposing angles. The first group base their arguments on a retrospective determinist historical path to legitimise the Chinese identity of the Hakkas invoked by the tulou monument. The second group, on the other hand, invoke a prospective determinist historical dynamic by which the historic force that moves Taiwan inevitably leads to the formation of a Hakka culture that has Taiwanese foundations. Therefore, those who oppose the tulou construction project condemn the semiotic dimension of the architecture as part of a politically-imposed narrative that conflicts with a historic process of self-determination unique to Taiwan.

**From one collective to another: An attack on Taiwanese sovereignty**

In an attempt to discredit the erection of the Miaoli tulou and to reinforce a feeling of “misrepresentation,” internet user Tsun Wei Lun quotes the introduction to an article in Liberty Times:

Chen Ban 陳板, ex-president of the Hakka television channel and a guest professor affiliated with the Department of Architecture Art Conservation of the National University of the Arts in Taiwan, strongly criticised Liu Cheng-hung by affirming that he had deceived the Taiwanese people by creating a meaningless style of architecture. (27)

This extract sees the “people” as a form of collective interiority with its own character, whose expectations have not been fulfilled. The use of the topic “Taiwanese people” rather than “Hakka” is more evident in the PTT comments than in those of Liberty Times and Apple Daily. On 22 July 2013, an internet user introduced a topic on an article in Liberty Times entitled “Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou.” (28) In a series of three comments, internet user Chunrew makes no mention of the Hakkas and concentrates his arguments on the fragile construction of Taiwan as a nation (see figure 2):

Of course this [the destruction of the kilns and building of the tulou] is inappropriate; this type of procedure will destroy traditional Taiwanese culture and damage its history. But if, however, we are convinced that Taiwanese roots are in China, then this sort of thing is fair and right. A nation without roots is a terribly frightening thing.

22. The Pan-Blue Coalition is an alliance between several Taiwanese parties – including the KMT, the People First Party, the New Party, and the MinKuoTung – who support, amongst other things, the promotion of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan.
23. Huang Yangming and Yang Yongsheng, “Miaoli xian gai shanzhai ‘Fujian tulou’” (Miaoli District is building a mountain fortress “a Fujian tulou”), op. cit.
24. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Huang Yangming and Yang Yongsheng, “Miaoli xian gai shanzhai ‘Fujian tulou’” (Miaoli District is building a mountain fortress “a Fujian tulou”), op. cit.
How should we interpret the effort of internet user Chungheng to rationalise the situation? In his view, it is above all a question of a conflict over the interpretation of the “roots of the identity” of the Taiwanese population. Moreover, he does not hesitate to warn against the risks inherent in the indetermination of these roots for the “Taiwanese nation.”

Whether it is a question of the defenders of the tulou or of its opponents, the question of the balance between the instituted (the Hakkas and secondly the Taiwanese) and the instituting (the tulou) reveals the tension created by the inclusion of the autonomous individual (the internet user) in a personified affective community (“the Taiwanese” people and “the Hakkas”) whose substance has been called into question. This conflict seems unsurpassable in that internet users and the media have not reflected upon the category of “Hakka” as an institutionalised political entity. Moreover, the media have not encouraged the rationalisation of the pluralism underlying this standardising designation.

The “foreigner,” between exemplariness and defiance: A critique of inter-Strait cultural exchange policies

On 22 July 2013, Liberty Times published an article entitled "Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou." The article reproduces the dialogue between public intellectuals and members of the government:

The Miaoli government responded to the unsolicited criticism expressed by Wu Yi-chen [PDP and Legislative Yuan member] in the previous day’s paper, which accused the government of putting pressure on the culture of Taiwanese Hakka. She [Wu Yi-chen] had not understood that cultures can be exchanged and combined [ronghe jiaoliu 融合交流] and do not take account of territorial boundaries. They cannot be neatly compartmentalised. Although public figures use this topic as a pretext for satisfying their own objectives, the government of the district will protest strongly and will not give in.\footnote{In order to foster cultural exchanges, must we begin by mutilating our own culture and destroying its heritage? Does the rest of the world behave like this in order to boost tourism?}

Although these official statements would seem to maintain a distinction between the Hakkas of China and the Hakkas of Taiwan, the topic of the exchange and mixing of cultures annoyed many internet users. In a comment published on 22 July 2013 on the Mesotw platform, internet user Kcm quoted the above passage and denounced the cultural exchange policies between China and Taiwan promoted by the Miaoli government as part of the strengthening of inter-Strait Sino-Taiwanese relations in order to justify the construction of the tulou:

[In order to foster cultural exchanges, must we begin by mutilating our own culture and destroying its heritage? Does the rest of the world behave like this in order to boost tourism?]

The analogy of the foreigner appears again in a comment from Youzi buyi, who says that the United States and Japan do not repress their history and culture in this way.\footnote{This comparison is particularly interesting on account of the history of diplomatic relations between the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and China.} As a result, the two countries mentioned by the internet user have been elevated to the rank of yardstick, or even of an example to be followed in the management of collective memory and national heritage. Similarly, several internet users use the analogy with a foreign country to mock Taiwanese cultural exchange policies and the officials who apply them. In a PTT comment, Bce says mockingly, “If Egypt wanted to destroy the pyramids to build a great wall, saying that it would attract tourists, wouldn’t you find that ridiculous?”\footnote{Xu Jingping guanyu xishan zhonghua mingju weida fuqing de Zhongguo meng lundu (Theorisation of Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream for the great renewal of the Chinese nation), Renmin wang [people.cn], 12 May 2013, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/1205/c40555-23756883-5.html (accessed on 13 December 2016).}

At the same time, certain internet users developed a rhetoric of the “enemy-foreigner,” using an image of China and the local official in which “foreign” is used to describe any entity that is not part of the affective community:

Is he a Chinese spy? Has he come specially to destroy Taiwanese culture when it should be transmitted? The construction of the tulou will not turn me into a Mainland Hakka, will it? Could it be that in becoming an official, one becomes an idiot?\footnote{Comment by Youzi buyi, "Miaoli xianzhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan kejia yao gai Zhongguo tulou (Miaoli District Head Liu Cheng-hung demolishes Taiwanese Hakka kilns to build a Chinese tulou)," viewthread.php?tid=31916 (accessed on 13 December 2016).}

In this comment, internet user Chen Hongling, an interior architect living in Kaohsiung and who previously lived in Miaoli, does not hesitate to question Liu Cheng-hung’s relationship with China and call his competency into question. Similarly, internet user Zeng Huimei, an inhabitant of the district of Changhua 彰化縣 and supporter of the Pan-Green Coalition, disapproves of the Taichung tulou project in the Hakka district of Tungshih 東勢區, calling it a “circular Chinese dream of Hu Chih-chiang [胡志強],” mayor of Taichung and affiliated with the KMT. The expression “Chinese dream” (Zhongguo meng 中國夢) used by the internet user is a direct reference to the political slogan of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of the People’s Republic of China since 2013, for whom “the Chinese dream” is the dream of the Chinese nation, but also that of every Chinese person.\footnote{Comment by Youzi buyi, http://www.mesotw.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=31916&extra=&page=2 (accessed on 13 December 2016).}

So over and above the debate on the politiced representation of Hakka and Taiwanese identities, the indictment made up of the comments of internet users targets heritage management in Taiwan by local officials.

Revealing wrongs: Vices and virtues of the government

Whilst the comments from 2013 are mainly focused on questions of identity, those from 2014 and 2015 reveal new concerns linked to three major events. On the one hand, the precursor of the Miaoli tulou project is seen as a failure by the media and the majority of the inhabitants of Miaoli, Hsinchu, and Taichung. Indeed, the Miaoli tulou, inaugurated in October 2014, contributed to an increase in the budget deficit of Miaoli District, al-
ready deep in debt. The low level of attendance for the site did not succeed in boosting tourism in the region. The media added it ipso facto to the long list of “Mosquito halls” (white elephant buildings) (wenzi guan 蚊子館 in Miaoli, just like the Ma village (Mafen guan 马奮館 or Majia zhongtang 马家庄) and Yingtsai Academy (Yingcai shuyuan 莹才書院). On the other hand, the comments published between June 2014 and July 2015 must be analysed in the light of a socio-political context punctuated by numerous demonstrations that resulted in, amongst others, the Sunflower Movement (18 March - 10 April 2014), a time of civil disobedience and delegitimisation of the then central government that marked a weakening of the presidential function as well as a loss of authority for the KMT. Lastly, the local general election on 29 November 2014 led to the victory of the DPP in most municipalities, districts, and towns. Six localities, however, remained under the domination of the KMT, including the districts of Miaoli and Hsinchu.

Against this background of upheaval in which internet users denounced the wrongs of the system of representation, certain comments opened up a horizon of expectation and formulated the prerequisites for the establishment of a fair and moral government attentive to the demands of the population and which would be unable to govern without its consent.

**An act of accusation against local officials:**

**Personifying corruption**

The internet users took on a censorship role towards the officials they were assessing. As judges, they condemned the acts of these politicians if they did not measure up to an implicit moral and politico-judicial ethic. Liu Cheng-hung, for example, was accused of land speculation. On the Mesotw forum, the internet user NorthStar protested:

Liu Cheng-hung is the biggest bandit in Miaoli. He has taken the people’s land by force and destroyed their heritage. He connives with the entrepreneurs who speculate on building land […].

For Chen Dongfu 陳東甫, Liu’s aim was to increase land prices in order to gentrify the district in which he lived:

First, Liu Cheng-hung built, next to his home, a high-speed train station. Then he had a bilingual school built. The land next to his home was originally agricultural land. Suddenly, land prices increased and now he is building a tulou there. He is continually developing the place […].

Land speculation incited certain internet users to play on the Chinese character tu 土 meaning here “the earth, the ground, the dust,” coupling it with other Chinese characters to create insults. Liu Cheng-hung is called a tufei 土匪, meaning “bandit,” from tu bawang 土霸王, a term meaning a “land despot,” and tu huangdi 土皇帝, an expression that might be translated as “land emperor” (see figure 3):

Liu Cheng-hung is “dust,” he has become land emperor in Miaoli, isn’t it wonderful? The magazines have elected him “chief of the five-star district.” Building an “edifice of earth” for “the land emperor” is the next criteria for becoming chief of a five-star district.

Jay Fang, a young man of 35 living in Taipei, called into question the relative credibility of the system for rating districts. Indeed, in 2012, Liu Cheng-hung was designated chief of a five-star district following a “poll measuring the level of satisfaction [of the population] with the officials at the head of the districts and municipalities” (xianshizhang shizheng xianshizhang shizheng manyi du da diaocha 縣市長施政滿意度大調查), published annually by the magazine Yuanjian （遠見雜誌）. The nomination of Liu was interpreted as an act of complicity between the Miaoli district chief and the media. In his exchange with Jay Fang, Lin Zugungh 林祖光, a young Taiwanese from Kaohsiung and supporter of the Black Island Nation Youth Front (Heise daoguo qingnian zhexian 黑色島嶼青年陣線), added, “925,000 NT$ to buy the magazines and get yourself elected chief of a five-star district.” Comments, as a form of protest, and more generally, those in the virtual sphere, have come to compensate for a lack of surveillance institutions and consequently, a failing of the democratic government to
regulate itself. Therefore, for internet user Chen Hongmou 陈弘謀, if the
government is not competent in the exercise of the power bestowed on
it, it is up to the sovereign people to make themselves known and defend
their rights. [43]

The role of the internet user-censors was to reveal abuses in a the system.
They associated the demolition of the Hakka kilns in Miaoli in 2013 and
the mobilisation solicited by the forced buying by the state of land belong-
ing to the peasant farmers of Zhudong in 2015 for the construction of a
tulou, with the destruction set in motion by Liu Cheng-hung. Many internet
users reminded their readers that since 2010, Liu had been behind a wave
of expulsions and the demolition of homes that had led to several suicides
in the village of Dabu 大埔, in the district of Miaoli. Subsequently, the
population of the district organised several demonstrations in order to
denounce the expropriation of land by the local government. For example,
the demands of the big protest movement of 18 August 2013, whose slogan
was “Today Dabu has been demolished, tomorrow the government will be
destroyed” (Jintian chai Dabu, mingtian chai zhengfu 今天拆大埔，明天拆政
gu), included the revision of the Law on the Expropriation of Land (Tudi zhi
shou tiao7 土地徵收條例). In response to these injustices, several internet
users took part in a virtual collective movement that transmitted a form of
vengeance that expressed itself in the – virtual – destruction of Liu Cheng-
hung’s house. In reaction of the demolition of four homes in Dabu in 2013,
internet user Kuso posted on Facebook a photograph in which he staged
the destruction of Liu Cheng-hung’s house with the help of an animated
miniature mechanical digger (see figure 4). [44] At the same time, several
internet users suggested destroying Liu Cheng-hung’s home and replacing it
with a famous monument. In a comment dated 22 July 2013, internet user
Lin Damao 林大毛 suggested:

[…] Why not simply destroy the Chief of Miaoli’s house and build a
Statue of Liberty? I think that’s not a bad idea. [45]

A majority of internet users would have liked to see Liu Cheng-hung resign,
citing the lack of possible remedies in the face of his prevarications. On
the one hand, some accused Liu Cheng-hung of being protected by the govern-
ment of Ma Ying-jeou [46] and in particular by the Legislative Yuan. [47] On
the other hand, the comments remind us that this corrupt politician was
elected by the ballot box. As a result, Taiwanese internet users who are not
from Miaoli District incriminated the local inhabitants who gave him pro-
cedural legitimacy through the local elections just as much as they blamed
Liu Cheng-hung himself.

From local elections to the democracy of authorisation

The internet users displayed real disenchantment with an electoral system
that no longer legitimises elected officials. Although the election attributes
a function to an individual, the authority this confer is only partial in that
the governors test the officials during the exercise of their mandate. Al-
though local officials such as Liu Cheng-hung in Miaoli and Chiu Ching-chun
in Hsinchu obtained procedural legitimacy through the elections (also called
“legitimacy of establishment”), [48] they did not acquire the social legitimacy
granted by those they governed. Indeed, the relationship of trust between
the governing and the governed is established in the course of the mandate
and not through the electoral procedure:

How dare you! The Hakka of Taiwan have never lived in a tulou...
[…] Can someone tell me where the value and meaning of all that
is?? If that isn’t liquidating the budget, what is? Don’t lie to me, there
are no talented men [rencai 人才] in Hsinchu. Just how competent
[gaodu 高度] are our leaders? In which direction is the region devel-
oping? I implore these incompetent leaders [mei gaodu de ren 没高
度的人] not to stand for election again […]. [49]

In this comment, Alan Hsieh underlines the lack of perspective in the bud-
getary policies applied in Hsinchu, which he associates with the incompetence
of the local officials in administrative matters. As a result, the electoral pro-
cedure does not allow “men of talent” and experts to be chosen. Concern over
the management of expenses by the local executive branch is frequent in the
comments of internet users. The deficit in Miaoli District, an example not to
be repeated, is used as an authoritative argument by internet users to ration-
ale their corresponding rejection of the Hsinchu and Taichung projects.

The internet users expressed their anxiety over the local general elections
in November 2014, some of them evoked the possibility of a KMT victory
in their locality and thought that the tulou construction projects in Hsinchu

43. Huang Yixin, “Zhudong ni jian kejia tulou minzhong kangyi bai chongtu” (Zhudong plans the con-
struction of a Hakka tulou: Conflicts are emerging following popular protests), op. cit.
44. Lin Xihan and Fu Chaobiao, “Wangyou Kuso jewei chichu Liu Zhenghong laojia” (Internet user Kuso creates a trompe l’œil and demolishes
(consulted on 10 January 2017).
45. Huang Yixin, “Zhudong ni jian kejia tulou minzhong kangyi bai chongtu” (Zhudong plans the con-
struction of a Hakka tulou: Conflicts are emerging following popular protests), op. cit.
46. Lin Xihan and Fu Chaobiao, “Wangyou Kuso jewei chichu Liu Zhenghong laojia” (Internet user
Kuso creates a trompe l’œil and demolishes Liu Cheng-hung’s home), Liberty Times, 22 July 2013,
47. Huang Yangming and Yang Yongsheng, “Miaoli xian ga i shanzhai ‘Fujian tulou’” (The district of
Miaoli is building a mountain fortress ‘a Fujian tulou’), (The district of
Miaoli is building a mountain fortress ‘a Fujian tulou’), op. cit.
48. In a comment dated 30 October 2014, Wang Liren called Liu Cheng-hung “one of Ma’s [Ying-
jeou] dogs” (Ma go), Cf. Su Fanghe and Fu Chaobiao, “Miaoli xianzhang Liu Zhenghong chi Taiwan
kejia yao qie zhongguo tulou” (Miaoli District Chief Cheng-hung is destroying Taiwanese Hakka
kilns to build a Chinese tulou), op. cit.
49. Comment by Heng Aitai, Taiwan xiaozhan, 22 July 2013, http://www.mesotw.com/bbs/
viewthread.php?tid=31916 (consulted on 10 March 2016).
50. Pierre Rosanvallon, La légitimité démocratique. Impartialité, réflexivité, proximité (Democratic Le-
and Taichung were a means for the KMT candidates already in office to rally the Hakka electorate, which is well represented in these regions. Moreover, many internet users questioned the reasons that incited the inhabitants of Miaoli to give free rein to Liu Cheng-hung, this “local tyrant” (tuhao土豪) who “tramples on the people.” Indeed, although the civil servant Liu has a supporting social role, the choice of a representative is the responsibility of the citizens of Miaoli. Huang Zhengyu 黄正羽 expressed the shame Liu Cheng-hung caused him and other inhabitants of Miaoli:

When I see the King of Miaoli [Liu Cheng-hung], I don’t dare say that’s where I come from. As they say, it’s the choice of the Miaoli electorate. We have to accept all their choices. In any case, on the day of the elections, everyone will swallow their tears and vote for the shadow state party [KMT]. This is Taiwan EJ4, [14]

What does this prophetic fatalism mean, and on what implicit argument is it based? Does it amount to recognition of the importance of the role of the local factions in Miaoli, the majority of whose electoral candidates are affiliated with the KMT? [19]

The construction of a horizon of expectation at the heart of a crisis of representative democracy

In this context, qualified by Frank Muyard as “political autism,” [44] internet users, who are not simply critical spectators of a negative policy, are participating in a reflexive dynamic of wrongs that they heap upon the local leaders. The comments open up a horizon of expectation resulting in a process, initiated by internet users, of giving meaning to the polémical events linked to three tulou construction projects. To create this prospective horizon, the internet users offer alternative solutions to the bad management of budgetary expenditure. For internet user Jeffrey Bai, the sum invested in the building of the Hsinchu tulou could have been used to finance the army for several years. [50] In another commentary dated 17 July 2015, Frank Tien exclaims:

It’s not enough that the neighbouring district already has one great ‘earthen’ white elephant, but they have to go and build another ‘earth’ building! Is it part of Zhudong’s history? If there really is land available for building and a budget, why not build some social facilities for the people of the district? [18]

Many internet users were demanding more effective management of local expenditure. Moreover, they sought the application of fairer policies founded on a consensus between elected officials and the populace that contributed to the common good. Internet user Lai Mengling 賴孟玲, young and with a higher education diploma, advised the government to “give the inhabitants of Taichung the future they desire and to which they aspire” and suggested reinforcing Taiwanese soft power. [19] Internet user Ci Chang suggested using the money allotted to the Miaoli project for the protection of the historic and cultural Hakka heritage already present in Taiwan. [60]

Conclusion

Over and above the particular nature of the events analysed, the comments seem firstly to shed light on the uncertainties inherent in representa-