Andrei GANIN, Kadry General´nogo shtaba v period Grazhdanskoi voiny v Rossii 1917–1922 gg. [Cadres of the General Staff during the Civil War in Russia 1917–1922]
Andrei GANIN, Kadry General´nogo shtaba v period Grazhdanskoi voiny v Rossii 1917–1922 gg. [Cadres of the General Staff during the Civil War in Russia 1917–1922], Moscou : Kuchkovo pole Muzeon, 2023, 2 t., 1968 p.
Texte intégral
Was there a split of the general staff?
- 1 V.L. Kozhevin, Rossiiskoe ofitserstvo i fevral´skii revoliutsionnyi vzryv [The Russian Officer Corp (...)
1In recent years, social history has been facing a noticeable decline in contemporary Russian historiography. Studies focused on reconstructing the social profile, internal structure, origins, careers, and worldviews of various social groups, as well as prosopographical approach have become increasingly rare. Against this general backdrop, research on the pre-revolutionary officer corps stands out in a more positive light. Over the past 15 years, numerous comprehensive studies have examined the officers during the First World War and the revolutionary period1. These works emphasise that the regular officer corps constituted a distinct socio-professional group, shaped by its own set of values, norms, traditions, and behavioural codes. Particular attention is paid to issues of recruitment, social composition, training, material conditions, and political attitudes within this milieu.
- 2 Among more recent works on the White officers, see R.M. Abiniakin, Ofitserskii korpus Dobrovol´ches (...)
- 3 A.G. Kavtaradze, Voennye spetsialisty na sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov, 1917–1920 gg. [Military Specia (...)
2Far less frequently do scholars attempt to trace the social history of the officer corps during the Russian Civil War. The historiographical surge of the 1990s and early 2000s brought considerable attention to the White officer corps. However, this interest has since markedly declined2. When it comes to the so-called voenspetsy, former Tsarist officers who entered service in the Red Army, scholarly attention never generated the same level of academic engagement. For several decades, the most substantial contribution in this field remained the monograph by Aleksandr Kavtaradze3.
3It is precisely in this underdeveloped field that the work of Andrei Vladislavovich Ganin acquires particular significance. He is undeniably one of the foremost Russian experts on the history of the officer corps on the both sides of the Civil War. Ganin has made an indelible mark on the study of the Russian military elite. His latest publication, “Kadry General´nogo shtaba v period Grazhdanskoi voiny v Rossii 1917–1922 gg.” (The General Staff Personnel During the Civil War in Russia, 1917–1922), is impressive even when compared to his previous substantial contributions. Altogether, the two volumes comprise nearly 2,000 pages. The author writes that he aimed to “assemble and present in the pages of this book the broadest, most comprehensive picture possible of the participation of graduates of the General Staff Academy in the revolution, the Civil War, and subsequent events” (Vol. 1, p. 8). As Ganin himself explains, the work is based on his doctoral dissertation defended over a decade ago, but now significantly reworked and expanded nearly threefold (Vol. 1, p. 8).
- 4 For example, Vol. 2, p. 12–35 and 67–83 correspond to Andrei Ganin, “Mozg armii” v period “Russkoi (...)
4The book’s vast scope is its main drawback. The issue is not even that its sheer size risks alienating readers who may struggle to engage fully with both volumes. A key shortcoming is the frequent repetition of material. Large segments (sometimes up to 20 pages) consist of verbatim excerpts from Ganin’s earlier works. This issue is particularly evident in the second volume of “The General Staff Personnel,” where lengthy archival excerpts and previously published reflections reappear. While their inclusion was justified in initial publications – where the documents were inaccessible or unknown – their repeated reproduction here is less justified4.
5As a result, the work functions in part as a synthesis or expanded reissue of Ganin’s previous scholarship, systematised into a unified narrative. The concept is interesting in its own way, but it may disappoint those who have closely followed the author’s publications in recent years. Nevertheless, the book includes new sources and new insights, so in some sense, this review summarises not only “The General Staff Personnel” but also all of Ganin’s recent works on military specialists during the revolution and Civil War in Russia.
6At the heart of Ganin’s study lies a thesis: the General Staff officers constituted a professional corporation that maintained its internal cohesion even amid the disintegration of Russian statehood and the bitter struggles of the Civil War. Although Ganin does not explicitly define the concept of “corporation,” his analysis reveals its meaning: a closed professional community with shared values, norms, and a strong sense of solidarity. This “corporate identity” distinguished General Staff officers from the broader officer corps and shaped their behaviour both before and after the revolution. This analysis aligns closely with a social-historical approach, offering insight into how elite military communities preserved their collective identity amidst political collapse.
7The General Staff officers, trained at the prestigious Nicholas Military Academy, formed an elite cadre within the Russian army. Admission to the academy was competitive, and graduates were almost guaranteed high-ranking positions. This rigorous selection and advanced training fostered a sense of intellectual and professional superiority, which Ganin describes as transforming them into a “closed and privileged caste” (Vol. 1, p. 98). These officers were bound not only by shared education and professional goals but also by a common set of traditions and internal values that reinforced their collective identity. According to Ganin, their cohesion as a corporation was one of the defining characteristics that distinguished the General Staff from other military groups.
8Ganin highlights the meritocratic nature of the General Staff, describing its officers as the technocrats of their time (Vol. 2, p. 802). Their careers were determined primarily by education and professional achievements, making them indispensable for military planning and administration. In addition to their military expertise, General Staff officers were highly qualified managers, capable of organising complex military operations and overseeing large administrative structures. However, their exclusivity and perceived aloofness often created tensions with the broader officer corps. Regular officers, who lacked access to the Nicholas Academy and its privileges, viewed the General Staff with resentment and envy.
9Compared to the broader officer corps, during the First World War, the General Staff officers largely retained their sociocultural identity. Although the Nicholas Academy’s curriculum was accelerated during the war, its graduates were still distinguished by their advanced education and professional competence. Unlike regular officers, who suffered catastrophic losses on the front lines, General Staff officers experienced relatively low casualties – 6.4% of them died between August 1914 and October 1917, including those killed during revolutionary violence or suicides (Vol. 1, p. 106). This lower casualty rate, combined with their continued professional role, allowed the General Staff officers to maintain a degree of cohesion even as the broader officer corps fragmented under the pressures of war and revolution.
10One of the book’s key contributions is its analysis of the factors that influenced General Staff officers’ alignment with one or the other side during the Civil War (Vol. 1, pp. 206–278). Ganin identifies several common motivations, which were surprisingly similar across the camps. His classification of motivations for alignment reflects a nuanced social-historical understanding of how structural conditions and group identities shaped individual choices during the Civil War.
11First and foremost was the inertia of continuing military service. Many officers, shaped by their professional training, chose to remain in the military structures that emerged after the revolution, which had been transformed into new armed forces. This desire for professional continuity was accompanied by a drive for self-realisation and career advancement regardless of the political circumstances.
12Economic necessity also played a major role. In the aftermath of the revolution, providing for one’s family and ensuring their survival became an urgent priority. Ganin provides numerous examples of General Staff officers who joined either the Red Army or the White formations simply to support their loved ones. Both sides valued the expertise of Nicholas Academy graduates, and the demand for their skills gave these officers a degree of bargaining power.
13Pragmatic considerations, including the desire to avoid repression, further influenced officers’ decisions. Joining the Red Army often provided a measure of personal safety, as affiliation with a military structure could protect individuals from accusations of sympathy for the enemy. Conversely, some officers joined the White armies to escape persecution under Bolshevik rule.
14Ganin also emphasises the role of political and ideological motivations, albeit to a lesser extent. A shared belief in “strong authority” was a unifying factor for officers on both sides (Vol. 1, p. 998). For some, the Bolsheviks represented a force capable of restoring order and stability, while others saw the anti-Bolshevik movement as the last hope for saving Russia.
15Patriotism, too, played a significant role. Red officers often cited the need to defend Russia against the German offensive on the Eastern Front or to “stand with the people,” and fulfil a “duty to the Motherland.” While White officers framed their struggle as a fight to preserve territorial integrity, restore order, and honour alliances from the First World War. Joining the anti-Bolshevik movement was often based on the perception of the Bolsheviks as German agents. In national armies, such as the Ukrainian forces, patriotism was often tied to nationalism and aspirations for independence. While General Staff officers shared common principles, Ganin demonstrates that the choice of sides was influenced by differences in ideological beliefs, perceptions of authority, and types of patriotism.
16The author also highlights the significant role of subjective factors, such as personal experiences (including positive or negative interactions with soldiers) and psychological traits. Family ties, professional connections, and geographical circumstances also played critical roles. General Staff officers joined the Reds, Whites, or national armies depending on who controlled the territory where they were or wanted to be. It is not surprising, therefore, that according to Ganin’s calculations, General Staff officers were almost evenly split between the Reds and Whites: 46.6% served in White formations, 39.3% joined the Red Army. The remaining 14.3% served in national armies (Vol. 1, p. 374).
17One of Ganin’s most important conclusions is that ideological commitment was relatively rare among General Staff officers. An independent choice driven by ideological considerations in favour of either camp was the prerogative of a minority (Vol. 1, p. 378). As one officer, who had known general Anton Denikin but remained in Soviet Russia, wrote in a letter, those who stayed were not “the worst” or ideologically aligned with the Bolsheviks – they were simply less fortunate (Vol. 1, p. 250).
18Ganin also highlights a notable correlation between an officer’s age and their likelihood of switching sides. Younger officers were more inclined to join the Whites, as this choice often entailed greater risks and hardships, requiring deliberate commitment. In contrast, older officers were more likely to align with the Reds, sometimes due to being captured during the rapid shifts of the front. For these older officers, the physical demands of retreat made joining the Reds a more practical and feasible option (Vol. 2, p. 214).
19Although Ganin titles one chapter “The Split of the General Staff,” he argues that the notion of a fundamental ideological divide within the officer corps is problematic. Officers on opposing sides retained similar values, principles, approaches to military service, and professional identities. To illustrate this point, Ganin provides a comparative analysis of two prominent General Staff officers, Anton Denikin and Boris Shaposhnikov. Despite serving in opposing camps, both men were patriots, adhered to liberal beliefs before the revolution, and career officers who rose through the ranks by their own merit. Both were critical of the old Russian army and sought to reform it, and both displayed personal courage during the First World War (Vol. 1, p. 257).
20In this sense, Ganin shows that there was no significant ideological conflict among General Staff officers as a unified professional corporation. This prompts an important question: was there truly a “split”? The author suggests that the Civil War was not primarily a political struggle but an intra-corporate conflict within the pre-revolutionary military elite (Vol. 1, p. 278). The war divided General Staff officers along practical and circumstantial lines, and in some cases, officers perceived the conflict as professional rivalry among classmates (Vol. 1, p. 228).
21Ganin’s analysis indicates that the conflict was more about preserving the professional identity and career positions of the pre-revolutionary General Staff – a privileged group of military technocrats and intellectuals. Regardless of the side they chose, General Staff officers pursued similar objectives: securing their place in the emerging Russian state, maintaining professional status, accessing resources, and exerting influence. Ultimately, however, Ganin concludes that the old General Staff failed in this endeavour, yielding to a new military elite that rose within both the Red Army and the anti-Bolshevik forces (Vol. 1, p. 1000).
22The author underscores: “The history of the opposing armies during the Civil War represents an intriguing example of grassroots armed self-organisation by a segment of society to defend their rights and interests amidst the collapse of former statehood” (Vol. 2, p. 806). The actions of General Staff officers in opposing camps exhibited a distinctly corporate character. Within the Red Army, they fought to preserve their professional status and regain influence over military affairs, with some secretly hoping for the eventual dissolution or transformation of the Bolshevik regime. In the White armies, officers aimed to restore their lost positions and revive the pre-revolutionary order. Meanwhile, in national armies, such as the Ukrainian forces, graduates of the Nicholas Academy actively sought to enhance training and service systems for General Staff officers, focusing on implementing regular field rotations to improve their qualifications.
23At the same time, within this corporation, there was another, less obvious conflict: generational and service-related. Young graduates of accelerated courses and recent academy attendees, whether with the Reds or the Whites, competed for positions with pre-war officers, creating friction. The older generation often viewed their younger colleagues as inadequately trained, while younger officers sought to assert their ambitions (Vol. 2, p. 808). This dynamic underscore the corporate nature of the General Staff, as the cautious attitude toward newcomers can be interpreted as an attempt to protect the rights and privileges of its established members.
24Importantly, Ganin does not limit his scope to the Red and White forces. He devotes attention to the national armies where graduates of the Nicholas Academy also served. These cases are fully integrated into Ganin’s prosopographical and analytical framework. By including them, Ganin not only demonstrates the geographic and political breadth of the General Staff’s dispersion, but also reinforces his core argument: that these officers acted primarily as members of a coherent professional corporation, rather than as ideologically divided partisans. In this way, the national cases serve not as exceptions, but as vital evidence of the General Staff’s trans-factional cohesion.
25Ganin’s study is more than a detailed account of the General Staff officers during the Civil War. It is a broader exploration of how professional communities respond to radical political and social upheaval. “The General Staff Personnel” highlights how a corporation, with its strong internal connections and traditions, sought to preserve itself amid radical change. General Staff officers, as products of the late imperial educational system, faced the destruction of their former state, but their professional identity became a unifying factor, prevailing over ideological preferences. This research reveals which elements of corporate culture – education, internal hierarchy, and informal connections – ensure the resilience of professional communities and their ability to adapt to dramatic changes.
26By examining the General Staff as a corporation, Ganin’s work highlights the strategies employed by the pre-revolutionary elite as they adapted to new political realities, even as they gradually ceded influence to emerging elites. This underscores the broader significance of his study, offering valuable insights into the mechanisms of elite turnover during periods of profound transition. This perspective is closely aligned with social history, which seeks to explain how institutions, professional cultures, and social groups respond to structural transformation. By focusing on the General Staff’s internal logic of survival and adaptation, Ganin implicitly contributes to a social-historical understanding of the mechanisms that enable such groups to adapt, resist, or transform in times of crisis. By illustrating how professional corporations strive to preserve their relevance and identity amidst epochal challenges, Ganin’s research not only deepens our understanding of the Civil War but also provides a framework for examining the resilience and transformation of professional communities in times of crisis.
Notes
1 V.L. Kozhevin, Rossiiskoe ofitserstvo i fevral´skii revoliutsionnyi vzryv [The Russian Officer Corps and the February Revolutionary Explosion], Omsk: Omskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2011; A.O. Buravchenkov, Ofitsers´kyi korpus rosiis´koi armii v roky Pershoi svitovoi viiny [The officer corps of the Russian army during the First World War], Kyiv: Akvílon-Plyus, 2011; I.N. Grebenkin, Dolg i vybor: russkii ofitser v gody mirovoi voiny i revoliutsii. 1914–1918 gg. [Duty and Choice: The Russian Officer during World War and Revolution, 1914–1918], M.: AIRO-XXI, 2015; K.B. Nazarenko, Zakat tsarskogo flota. Morskie ofitsery Pervoi mirovoi voiny [The Decline of the Tsarist Fleet: Naval Officers of the First World War], M.: Yauza, 2018; V.N. Suriaev, Russkoe ofitserstvo na perelome epokh (1905–1917 gg.) [The Russian Officer Corps at the Turn of the Eras, 1905–1917], M.: Russkaia panorama, 2022.
2 Among more recent works on the White officers, see R.M. Abiniakin, Ofitserskii korpus Dobrovol´cheskoi armii: sotsial´nyi sostav, mirovozzrenie. 1917–1920 gg. [The Volunteer Army Officer Corps: Social Composition and Worldview, 1917–1920], Orel: A. Vorob´ev, 2005; E.V. Volkov, Pod znamenem belogo admirala: Ofitserskii korpus vooruzhennykh formirovanii A.V. Kolchaka v period Grazhdanskoi voiny [Under the Banner of the White Admiral: Kolchak’s Officer Corps during the Civil War], Irkutsk: Sarma, 2005; N.P. Buchko, Voennaia elita Belogo dvizheniia v Sibiri i na Dal’nem Vostoke: ideologiia, programmy, politika (1917–1922) [The Military Elite of the White Movement in Siberia and the Far East: Ideology, Programs, Politics, 1917–1922], Khabarovsk: Chastnaia kollektsiia, 2009.
3 A.G. Kavtaradze, Voennye spetsialisty na sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov, 1917–1920 gg. [Military Specialists in the Service of the Soviet Republic, 1917–1920], M.: Nauka, 1988.
4 For example, Vol. 2, p. 12–35 and 67–83 correspond to Andrei Ganin, “Mozg armii” v period “Russkoi smuty”: stat´i i dokumenty [“The brain of the army” during “Russian Smuta”: articles and documents], M.: Russkii put´, 2013, p. 35–58 and 67–83; Vol. 2, p. 134–146 correspond to Andrei Ganin, Povsednevnaia zhizn´ genshtabistov pri Lenine i Trotskom [Daily Life of the General Staff under Lenin and Trotsky], M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2016, p. 233–242 and 251–253; Vol. 2, p. 338–345 correspond to Andrei Ganin, Sem´ “pochemu” rossiiskoi Grazhdanskoi voiny [Seven “Whys” of the Russian Civil War], M.: Piatyi Rim, 2018, p. 377–386; Vol. 2, p. 570–571 correspond to Andrei Ganin, Zakat Nikolaevskoi voennoi akademii, 1914-1922 [The Decline of the Nicholas Military Academy, 1914-1922], M.: Knizhnitsa, 2014, p. 430–432; Vol. 2, p. 577–599 and 623–637 correspond to Ganin, Povsednevnaia zhizn´ genshtabistov, p. 383–394 and 406–418; Vol. 2, p. 816–817 correspond to Andrei Ganin, Ofitserskii korpus v gody Grazhdanskoi voini v Rossii 1917-1922 [Officer Corps during the Russian Civil War 1917-1922], M.: Staraia Basmannaia, 2018, p. 223–225.
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Konstantin Andreevich Tarasov, « Andrei GANIN, Kadry General´nogo shtaba v period Grazhdanskoi voiny v Rossii 1917–1922 gg. [Cadres of the General Staff during the Civil War in Russia 1917–1922] », Cahiers d’histoire russe, est-européenne, caucasienne et centrasiatique, 66/4 | 2025, 692-698.
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Konstantin Andreevich Tarasov, « Andrei GANIN, Kadry General´nogo shtaba v period Grazhdanskoi voiny v Rossii 1917–1922 gg. [Cadres of the General Staff during the Civil War in Russia 1917–1922] », Cahiers d’histoire russe, est-européenne, caucasienne et centrasiatique [En ligne], 66/4 | 2025, mis en ligne le 01 décembre 2025, consulté le 15 février 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chreecc/15767 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/15k7u
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