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Bildung between Kant and Schiller

La notion de Bildung entre deux pôles : Kant et Schiller
Jeremy D. Hovda
p. 97-115

Résumés

Cet article examine les enjeux des théories de la Bildung chez Kant et Schiller, et leur confrontation mutuelle avec la philosophie de l’autre. On propose une voie interprétative médiane qui ne part pas de l’opposition trop réductrice entre la morale et l’esthétique, ni ne lit Schiller comme étant foncièrement opposé à Kant pour des raisons soit morales, soit éducatives, mais situe plutôt la principale contribution de Schiller dans la sphère de la moralisation. Cette approche éclaire plus adéquatement la manière dont la théorie schillérienne de la Bildung répond aux questions fondamentales laissées ouvertes par les conceptions de Kant.

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  • 1 See, for example, G. F. Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The “Critical” Link of Morali (...)
  • 2 See, for example, K. Düsing: “Ästhetische Freiheit und menschliche Natur bei Kant und Schiller”. (...)

1It is often taken for granted that Kant’s theory of Bildung is a theory of moral education, while Schiller’s is one of aesthetic education. When Kant and Schiller are read together, the question usually then becomes whether aesthetic education can somehow contribute to moral education. The result normally tends in one of two opposite directions: it either emphasizes some deep incompatibilities between their respective visions of education, arguing for example that Schiller seeks to naturalize Kant’s a priori principles,1 or else it understands Schiller as developing Kant’s hints that aesthetic sensibility might have some role to play in moralization—that is, in preparing the way for the development of a moral disposition.2 However, neither of these paths is especially effective in illuminating what is at stake in the Bildungstheorien of either philosopher or in their engagement with one another. In what follows, I would like to suggest a third approach that does not begin from the overly reductive moral/aesthetic contrast, does not read Schiller as fundamentally opposed to Kant on either moral or educational grounds, and takes Schiller’s primary contribution as lying on the other side of moralization—after the moral agent has resolved to act always on moral principles. This approach is better equipped to illuminate the ways in which Schiller’s conception of Bildung responds to fundamental questions left open in Kant’s conception.

  • 3 F. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 35.
  • 4 This is despite the fact that Schiller regards the aesthetic as an end in itself within his analy (...)

2The first step on this approach is to show that Kant’s conception of Bildung cannot be reduced to moral education any more than Schiller’s can be reduced to aesthetic education. Kant undoubtedly gives moral education a kind of priority—in fact, as we shall see, he gives it priority in at least four distinct ways—but the formation of our non-moral or ‘natural’ capacities through the arts and sciences is no less vital. It is treated by Kant not only as an end in itself but an end that all finite rational beings have a moral obligation to pursue. And so too with Schiller: though he gives aesthetic education a kind of priority in thinking about Bildung—even naming the text on which we will focus here On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters—his emphasis always lies on the harmonious development of all of our capacities or predispositions—none of which is reducible to the other. He bemoans the one-sidedness that has come to characterize the modern age, in which he says, one “develops into nothing but a fragment.”3 As we shall see, insofar as the aesthetic has a kind of priority in his theory, it has it precisely because it serves to harmonize the development of the other capacities. The end is always holistic development; aesthetic education is only the means.4

  • 5 Ibid., 5.
  • 6 See F. Schiller and J.W. von Goethe, Goethe and Schiller’s Xenions, Selected and Translated by Pa (...)

3These similarities are rooted in another that is even more significant. In the Letters, Schiller makes it abundantly clear that he starts from Kantian moral principles, and he does so because he takes them to be unassailable.5 While Schiller is perhaps best known (at least amongst philosophers) for his epigrammatic take-down of Kant’s stringently rational vision of moral motivation,6 in the Letters, he makes plain that any criticisms are internal and based on a more fundamental agreement. In reading Schiller as accepting Kant’s moral principles and as extending Kant’s conception of Bildung in a particular direction, rather than fundamentally criticizing or altering it, we are simply taking Schiller at his word. This should not blind us to relevant differences in their respective approaches, but it should caution us against assuming too fundamental a contrast.

  • 7 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 443. Similarly, in the third Critique, Kant states tha (...)
  • 8 In general, Kant saw the development of a Sinnesart or ‘method of sense’ as a necessary prelimina (...)
  • 9 See, for example, P. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom.

4Once the previous claims are recognized, it becomes apparent that the most fruitful point of contact between Kant and Schiller on the question of Bildung lies in what we might call the backside of moralization—the point at which the moral agent is moving from, not toward, moral principles. While Kant leaves open a role for an aesthetic discipline of sensible nature prior to moralization, as when he writes in the Metaphysics of Morals, for example, that the disinterested love of beauty is a “disposition of sensibility that greatly promotes morality or at least prepares the way for it,”7 he does not accord the idea major importance in either his moral theory or his theory of Bildung.8 And while insightful work has been done on this topic, more fundamental and more difficult questions lie elsewhere.9 Most of the hard questions about human formation arise after the point at which the moral agent has formed a Sinnesart, has accepted the moral law as binding, has drawn up appropriate maxims, and has resolved to act according to them. From this position, anyone who has resolved to pursue their education or cultivation further will be faced with several practical questions: What projects in particular do I want to pursue? What subjects should I devote my time to? How do I balance physical and intellectual pursuits? How do I balance career training with disinterested inquiry? In short, what is the best way for me to go about shaping my life, developing my natural talents and capacities? This, at bottom, is what Bildung is about, and so these are the hard questions that anyone who takes their education seriously will sooner or later have to answer. These are also the questions about which the moral law has the least to say. Though it proscribes actions and projects that would contravene my duties, it provides almost no positive guidance. Finally, and most importantly, these are the questions with which Schiller concerns himself in the Letters. It is therefore on these points that he is able best to complement Kant, to strengthen, and to extend his Bildungstheorie.

5To make this case, I shall begin with a very general overview of Kant on Bildung, first to provide some orientation and second to show how some of the most difficult problems in that theory have nothing to do with moralization or the application of the moral law, and third to show that these problems are by and large left open in Kant’s theory. Then, I shall turn to Schiller, and provide some thoughts on how his theory of Bildung, as found in the Letters can serve to complement Kant’s. In doing so, I hope to make the case that beginning from less reductive accounts of Kant and Schiller—without reducing them to moral education and aesthetic education, respectively—and beginning on the backside of moralization—is a more fruitful way to proceed when dealing with the subject of Bildung between Kant and Schiller.

Kant’s Conception of Bildung

  • 10 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 391.
  • 11 Idem, 392.
  • 12 Idem, 387.
  • 13 Idem, 392.
  • 14 I. Kant, Pädagogik, AA IX: 452.
  • 15 It should be noted that both Kant and Schiller wrote at a time before many of the conceptual dist (...)

6Beginning with Kant’s Bildungstheorie, the first thing to note is that it is a form of perfectionism. The central idea is that humans are born with certain talents, capacities, or predispositions, and it is their obligation, with the help of teachers, and of society in general, to bring them to the highest possible perfection. Kant always distinguishes between ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ capacities, and correspondingly ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ perfection. In the Metaphysics of Morals, he describes natural perfection as “the cultivation [Kultur] of all capacities [Vermögen] in general,”10 which he contrasts with moral perfection understood as “the cultivation [Kultur] of morality in us,”11 or as “the cultivation of one’s will,”12 which has as its goal “doing one’s duty, and doing it out of duty.”13 In his Lectures on Pedagogy, he makes the same distinction, but there refers to ‘moral perfection’ both as ‘moralization’ and as ‘moralische Bildung,’14 while he subdivides natural perfection into (1) cultivation / scholastische-mechanische Bildung, on the one hand, and (2) civilization / technische Bildung on the other.15 The former aims at the development of a general skillfulness (Geschicklichkeit), and the latter at a kind of prudence (Klugheit). Altogether, the idea is to perfect these capacities in harmony with each other and with the ends that one hopes to achieve.

  • 16 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 386.
  • 17 Kant’s conception of educational well-roundedness has both a subjective and an objective side. Su (...)

7But what does it mean to ‘perfect’ our capacities? Kant clarifies this by drawing a distinction between two concepts of perfection: the first, which he calls ‘quantitative’ or ‘material perfection’ involves something like total manifestation, while the second, which he calls ‘qualitative’ or ‘formal perfection,’ by contrast, involves “the harmony of a thing’s properties with an end.”16 It is the latter, teleological conception, that is in play here. Perfection does not entail developing every capacity to the absolute maximum (as if this were possible). It only entails developing them in harmony with one another and with the ends to which they may be put to use. This means harmonizing moral and natural formation but also harmonizing the formation of various ‘natural’ capacities. Because there are many different ends for which one’s capacities might be developed, there are many possible shapes that one’s Bildung might take. The education of the philosopher, for example, will rightly differ in many ways from that of the physicist or fisherman. Though Kant has a certain formal conception of educational well-roundedness, there is no single, one-size-fits-all Bildungsideal.17 The task is to find the formative process appropriate to oneself and one’s goals.

  • 18 For a start in this direction, see F. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 123-134.

8This highly condensed summary of Kant’s theory leaves out many important details. Perhaps most significantly, it leaves out mention of the collective aspects Bildung—the transgenerational, historical movement toward a universal cosmopolitan condition. While this is a rich topic in its own right, and even more so when brought into dialogue with Schiller’s republicanism and his sketch for an aesthetic state, it goes beyond the limitations of the present paper.18 The foregoing summary, despite its brevity, nevertheless suffices to bring out four points relevant for our inquiry: (1) natural (as opposed to moral) self-perfection is an end in itself; (2) we have an independent moral obligation to pursue it; (3) that obligation is ‘wide,’ which means that after one has resolved to self-perfect, the moral law provides no further help in deciding how to self-perfect; and (4) the obligation is ‘imperfect,’ which means that there is great leeway in how we fulfill it. In other words, it is highly indeterminate.

  • 19 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 391.

9To begin with the first point, Kantian Bildung cannot be reduced to moral education. Kant states plainly that natural perfection “is a duty and so itself an end.”19 The pursuit of learning through the arts and sciences and the development of rational capacities, apart from any use they may have in moral reasoning, is an end in itself. It is not merely a means to moralization. This accords well with our everyday, common-sense thinking on this issue. After all, we do not normally study math and science for the edge they give us in moral reasoning. Although such study could conceivably confer some indirect benefit to moralization, it seems rather inefficient to seek moral improvement in the study of algebra or the periodic table.

  • 20 R. B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings, 44.
  • 21 R. B. Louden, “General Introduction” in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, Education, 17.
  • 22 G. F. Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character, 259. Elsewhere, Munzel claims that “the pedag (...)
  • 23 G. F. Munzel, “Kant on Moral Education, or ‘Enlightenment’ and the Liberal Arts,” 50-51.
  • 24 G. Cavallar, “Taking a Detour: Kant’s Theory of Moral Cosmopolitan Education,” 180.
  • 25 To name just a couple: P.J. Crittenden writes: “But the major goal of the process [of education], (...)

10However, despite this seemingly obvious point, the overwhelming majority of contemporary Kant scholars take Kant to be suggesting something like this. They take him to equate Bildung with moralization and to reduce all non-moral (i.e., ‘natural’) education to the status of a moral propaedeutic. Robert B. Louden, for example, calls all aspects of natural education ‘proto-moral’20 (a term which never appears in Kant), and argues that they are “merely preparatory steps” toward the final goal of moralization.21 Likewise, G. Felicitas Munzel states that natural education is “propaedeutic to moral education proper.”22 Bildung itself, according to Munzel, just refers to the development of moral character.23 Georg Cavallar seconds this view, equating Bildung and moral formation.24 Many other scholars advance a similarly reductivist interpretation.25

  • 26 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA IV: 393.
  • 27 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA V: 434-436.
  • 28 Kant writes: “We are cultivated in a high degree by art and science. We are civilized, perhaps to (...)

11Yet despite this widespread consensus, this is not Kant’s position. While it is true that morality and moralization have a clear priority in Kant’s theory, they do not exhaust it. In fact, considering the nature of that priority can help to clarify why Bildung does not equate to moralization. The priority described by Kant is fourfold. First, Kant is clear that a good will is the necessary condition for the worth of all other human faculties. The famous opening lines of the Groundwork say exactly this: talents of mind only have worth when combined with a good will.26 Second, he held that moral ends are higher than natural ends within his teleological system. Moral perfection stands as the ‘final purpose’ (Endzweck) of creation, which is more ultimate than the ‘ultimate end of nature’ (letzter Zweck).27 Third, Kant held that moral education was more urgently needed than other forms of education.28 Fourth, Kant ultimately justifies his conception of Bildung through the moral law—specifically through the duty of self-perfection. If one were to ask why they ought to perfect themselves through the arts and sciences, the final answer would be “because the moral law requires it; because it is your duty.” In all of these ways, morality has a priority over natural education.

  • 29 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA IV: 393. In the Preface to the first edition o (...)

12Yet, if we consider the first type of priority, to say that a morally good will is the only thing that is unconditionally valuable, is not to say that it is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable. To say that a good will conditions the value of other talents of mind, is not to say that those talents derive their value from instrumentally promoting a good will. They may be good in themselves (i.e., intrinsically or non-instrumentally) or as means to other non-moral ends that are good in themselves, provided that they are combined with a good will. It is clear from the text that this is how Kant understands the matter when he writes that these natural talents are “undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects.”29

  • 30 I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA V: 110.
  • 31 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA V: 391.

13Related to this, the second type of priority, which establishes morality as the highest end of creation, does not establish it as the only end. To say that morality is the highest end is not to say that it is an exhaustive or all-inclusive end. And indeed, Kant does not treat it as an exhaustive or all-inclusive end. This is clear from the second Critique, where the summum bonum is identified, not as morality, but as happiness in proportion to morality.30 Happiness is therefore, an irreducible non-moral good. It is also clear from the third Critique, where the cultivation of natural skill is identified as “the ultimate end of nature.”31 Though this cultivation is ‘subordinate’ to morality, once again because of its conditional status, it is nevertheless an independent end. Hence, despite the fact that morality is the highest end in Kant’s teleological system, the Bildung of natural talents and capacities is still properly final.

14Regarding the third type of priority, it should be obvious that saying that moralization is more urgently needed than other forms of education is not to say that it is the only type of education that is needed. Finally, to justify education through the moral law, as Kant does, is nevertheless to justify it as an independent duty. We have a duty to perfect our natural talents and capacities apart from any contribution they might make to our moral improvement. In sum, none of these types of priority given to the moral law and moral education have the effect of eliminating natural education or of reducing it to the status of the ‘proto-moral.’ The reductivist readings that are so prevalent in the Kantian literature are not only out of line with common-sense, they are out of line with the Kantian text.

15When we read Kant together with Schiller on the subject of Bildung, we have to reject the common starting point that reduces Kant’s theory of Bildung to a theory of moral education. It is that, but it is very much more. The real concern is with the holistic development of all human capacities, moral and non-moral. Once we realize this, problems beyond the contribution of aesthetics to moral formation come into focus. In general, these problems trace back to the fact that the Kantian duty of self-perfection is both ‘wide’ and ‘imperfect.’

  • 32 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 392.

16In Kant’s terminology, to say that the duty is ‘wide’ is to say that it prescribes maxims of action, but not actions themselves. Put differently, the duty is discharged in the resolve to act on a principle to self-perfect, regardless of whether or not one always does so. Kant states: “But this duty is a merely ethical one, that is, a duty of wide obligation. No rational principle prescribes specifically how far one should go in cultivating one’s capacities.”32 Kant further explains that occasionally failing to do all that one can do to self-perfect is not a vice or a violation of the moral law, as long as one does not ‘make it their principle’ to do so. In other words, questions about how far one should go in their self-cultivation lie on the backside of moralization—the point after which one has already adopted the maxim to self-perfect and made it their principle to act on it. At this point, neither the categorical imperative nor any rational principle can prescribe a particular course of action.

  • 33 See, for example, ibid., and idem, 445.

17This is problematic because Kant also describes self-perfection as an ‘imperfect’ duty, which means that it admits exceptions or grants ‘leeway’ in its fulfilment. This means that it is highly indeterminate and can vary according to a great number of contextual factors. Kant names several of these factors, citing things like whether one happens to have certain talents or interests, whether the situation in which one lives allows for a certain course of development, and whether one wants to pursue a certain career path or goal in life.33 All of these will have some bearing on how one goes about perfecting themselves. Kant describes this variability in terms that should pique the ears of Schiller readers—as ‘playroom’ (Spielraum). Kant states:

  • 34 Idem, 390.

“If the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a playroom [Spielraum] (latitudo) for free choice in following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action.”34

18Therefore, the pursuit of Bildung is a highly contingent matter, involving a great degree of variability from person to person, and a great degree of latitude.

19Yet, this cannot be taken to mean that all courses of formation are equally correct or that when it comes to cultivating my capacities, ‘anything goes.’ Playroom is still room; it is still bounded. But if the law cannot specify where the boundaries of this playroom lie, then who or what can? While Kant does not give a clear answer, Schiller responds with his notion of the play drive (Spieltrieb).

Schiller’s Conception of Bildung

  • 35 F. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, 3.
  • 36 Idem, 5.
  • 37 Ibid.

20Turning to Schiller’s theory of Bildung, where the play drive holds center stage, the first things to note are (1) that the structure and aims of the theory are substantially similar to Kant’s, and (2) that it starts from Kantian moral principles, which Schiller endorses without qualification. Taking these points in reverse order, in the first letter of On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller expresses his commitment to Kantian moral philosophy, writing: “I shall not attempt to hide from you that it is for the most part Kantian principles on which the following theses will be based.”35 He then goes on to say: “Concerning those ideas which prevail in the Practical part of the Kantian system only the philosophers are at variance; the rest of mankind, I believe I can show, have always been agreed.”36 Schiller even goes so far as to state that Kantian moral principles “stand revealed as the immemorial pronouncements of Common Reason.”37 A more ringing endorsement is difficult to imagine.

  • 38 Frederick Beiser correctly explains: “Never does [Schiller] doubt Kant’s argument that reason det (...)

21Against those who would read Schiller as providing an alternative to—or a fundamental critique of—Kantian morality, I see no reason to question this endorsement. Schiller’s commitment to, and his understanding of, Kantian moral principles appear sound. We ought therefore to read his Bildungstheorie as starting from those principles.38 This would entail that his theory is more than a theory of aesthetic education. It is no more and no less than Kant’s a theory of moral education.

  • 39 F. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, 87.
  • 40 Idem, 181.

22However, the affinities with Kant do not stop there. First, Schiller’s theory—like Kant’s—is a form of perfectionism. Schiller even uses much of the same terminology as Kant, speaking of Bildung (as well as Erziehung or Kultur) as involving the perfection (Vollkommenheit) of all of our faculties (Vermögen) or powers (Kräfte).39 Also like Kant, Schiller tends to make sharp distinctions between the various faculties, emphasizing that one faculty never performs the function of another. So, for example, he says that sensibility and reason “are meant to coexist in perfect independence of each other, and yet in perfect concord.”40 He often speaks of the “infinite gap” that separates one faculty from the other. Finally, and most importantly, Schiller, like Kant, stresses that the goal of Bildung is the development of these faculties into some kind of harmonious whole. The danger is always a one-sided or partial development. Schiller saw this as a particular danger in his own day—with its emphasis on utility and division of labor. He diagnosed the modern condition stating:

  • 41 Idem, 33.

“With us, one might almost be tempted to assert, the various faculties appear as separate in practice as they are distinguished by the psychologist in theory, and we see not merely individuals, but whole classes of men, developing but one part of their potentialities, while of the rest, as in stunted growths, only vestigial traces remain.”41

  • 42 Schiller’s emphasis on harmony is often read as an imposition on Kantian morality if not an outri (...)

23Against the utility, specialization, and fragmentation of the modern age, the goal is, as Schiller says, to develop the harmony of one’s being. This, as we’ve already seen, is essentially a Kantian doctrine.42 The very notion of ‘qualitative perfection,’ which lies at the heart of Kant’s account of Bildung, is about this twofold harmony—of one’s powers with themselves, and with the ends one has set for oneself. In all of these ways, Schiller’s conception of Bildung looks a lot like Kant’s.

  • 43 F. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, 49.

24Where then is Schiller’s innovation? If he accepts the basic structure and concepts of Kant’s theory and grounds everything on Kantian moral philosophy, what is his contribution? First, Schiller sees—and sees correctly—that most of the hard problems in this theory lie on the backside of moralization. They emerge after the point at which the moral agent has apprehended the categorical imperative and resolved to implement it. This is why Schiller writes: “Reason has accomplished all that she can accomplish by discovering the law and establishing it. Its execution demands a resolute will and ardour of feeling.”43 Most of what Schiller has to say, takes moral principles, as discovered by reason (and as expressed by Kant) as a kind of base line, and focuses on the kinds of problems that appear afterwards—problems that cannot be solved by any preordained decision procedure—the kinds of problems that appear in the openness of the Kantian Spielraum. It is there that the aesthetic element of Schiller’s ‘aesthetic education’ becomes operative. It is in response to this problem left open by Kant—how to achieve the harmonious Bildung of a human being—that Schiller responds with his greatest innovation. It is within the indeterminacy of the Kantian ‘playroom’ that Schiller’s ‘play drive’ does its work.

25When Schiller first introduces the notion of the aesthetic, he does so by explaining its role in the harmonious Ausbildung of human powers. Despite its length, the passage is worth quoting in full:

  • 44 Idem, 141-143 (note).

“Everything which is capable of phenomenal manifestation may be thought of under four different aspects. A thing can relate directly to our sensual condition (to our being and well-being): that is its physical character. Or it can relate to our intellect and afford us knowledge: that is its logical character. Or it can relate to our will […]: that is moral character. Or, finally it can relate to the totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any of them: that is its aesthetic character. […] This last has its aim the development [auszubilden] of the whole complex of our sensual and spiritual powers in the greatest possible harmony.”44

  • 45 Thus, we should be careful when contrasting ‘aesthetic education’ with ‘scientific education’ as (...)

26So, the aim of the aesthetic is the Ausbildung of all of our powers in the greatest possible harmony. Aesthetic education, therefore, entails less a specialized or narrow focus on art and beauty to the exclusion of other human pursuits. It is not that one studies paintings and poetry instead of moral philosophy and natural science, or that one develops their aesthetic sensibility rather than their intellect or will. Nor is it that aesthetics is supposed somehow to supplant moral education. It is rather that a balanced, holistic development, of all of our faculties, involving a broad range of human pursuits is the special achievement of an aesthetic power.45

27What does this mean? Speaking broadly, it means that to give form to one’s development—to determine which projects I pursue, which skills I develop, which areas of knowledge I deepen, and to what extent—involves some measure of taste, creativity, and imagination. There are no laws of reason that can lay out a course of Bildung for me. There is no rational calculus or decision procedure on which I can rely. Whether the components of my formation are in harmony or whether they have become one-sided or imbalanced in some way is a matter for the play drive.

28As described by Schiller, the play drive functions, first, as a kind of mediator between the rational and sensible aspects of one’s character. The one-sidedness of a one-sided Bildung can manifest itself, first, as an excess of rationality. One might get lost in conceptualization and formal systems and neglect the concrete particularity of the senses. Such over-intellectualization constitutes one form of imbalance or lack of harmony in one’s formation. Another resides in the opposite tendency—an overindulgence in the life of the senses to the detriment of reason. If one is to correct for these imbalances in one’s development, one must first be able to apprehend them as imbalances, but this cannot be a function of the involved capacities themselves. Reason cannot reason itself to the awareness that there is an overreliance on reason, nor can the senses sense the overindulgence of the senses. Schiller therefore posits the play drive as a third capacity capable of perceiving the harmony or lack of harmony between these two broad domains.

  • 46 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA IV: 389.
  • 47 I. Kant, Pädagogik, AA IX: 472.

29Though Schiller’s claim that the use of reason can be excessive and needs to be balanced by a sensible principle is sometimes read as a criticism of Kant—a rejection of the sovereignty of reason in self-legislation—this is not the best reading. As we have seen, Schiller accepts the role that Kant assigns to reason in discovering and establishing the moral law. In those roles, there is no such thing—for either Kant or Schiller—as ‘too much reason.’ Schiller is not arguing that the categorical imperative needs to be validated or counterbalanced by sensibility. But in many other domains beyond the moral law, including in the application of the moral law to concrete circumstances, there might be such a thing as ‘too much reason.’ The application of the moral law, according to Kant himself, calls for “a judgment sharpened by experience,” that is, by awareness of particularity.46 In some cases it even requires the assistance of sensible models or images. Schiller’s point is best understood as in keeping with Kant’s points in the Lectures on Pedagogy, about the distortions that result from the overdevelopment of, and over-reliance on, some faculties at the expense of others. Kant mentions, for example, those who have made themselves into “a living lexicon” by developing their memory without proportionally developing their judgment.47 It is this type of fragmentary development that both Kant and Schiller are concerned with.

  • 48 I. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, AA VI: 192.
  • 49 In the first Critique, Kant writes: “Virtue, and with it human wisdom in its entire purity, are i (...)
  • 50 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 383.
  • 51 I. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, AA VI: 62.
  • 52 For a more extended treatment of this issue, see J. D. Hovda, “The Role of Exemplars in Kant’s Mo (...)

30Second, Schiller’s emphasis on creativity, play, and imagination expands on Kant’s suggestion that the notions of ‘perfection’ and ‘harmony’ so central to Bildung call for some kind of sensible correlate to make them intuitive. Because of their abstraction and because of their almost infinite variability in varied circumstances, they are difficult to grasp and still more difficult to implement in practice without some kind of visual model. Kant suggests that exemplars—both living and as embodied poetically and mythically—can assist in this role. He writes: “Yet for the human being the invisible needs to be represented through something visible (sensible), indeed, what is more, it must be accompanied by the visible for the sake of praxis and, though intellectual, made as it were an object of intuition [Anschauung].”48 In both the first Critique and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant names the Stoic sage as a kind of ideal of total perfection that can provide us with an original image or archetype (Urbild) to emulate.49 In the latter he writes: “In its highest stage, [perfection] is an ideal (to which one must continually approximate), which is commonly personified poetically by the sage.”50 In the Religion text, Kant gives the example of Christ as fulfilling the same role—providing something for the imagination to picture, when thinking about harmonious perfection.51 Whether we find either of these particular examples compelling, it is significant that Kant is suggesting a role for the imagination—and a role for poetic images—precisely in helping us grasp the elusive idea of harmonious perfection.52 Schiller’s concept of a play drive, therefore, goes beyond Kant, but in a way that develops what is already present in nascent form.

Conclusion

31The common assumption that Kant’s theory of Bildung is a theory of moral education and Schiller’s is one of aesthetic education, does not hold up under closer scrutiny. In fact, both theories are better characterized as holistic and perfectionist. The goal of both is the perfection of all of one’s capacities—moral and natural—into a harmonious whole. Both theories start from the same universal moral principles, which are established by reason, and which condition the worth of all other development. Schiller does not attempt to supplant the moral with the aesthetic or reason with sensibility, as is sometimes alleged. His great innovation is rather to assign to aesthetic education the task of harmonizing this holistic development. This follows Kant’s suggestions that the poetic and mythic representation of moral exemplars is necessary to render the concept of perfection intuitive and practically efficacious. But Kant does not develop this line of thinking in any detail, and he offers few resources for someone who has in good faith decided to fulfill the duty to self-perfect and who would like to understand how to go about doing so. Therefore, Schiller’s Bildungstheorie, in which a play drive orchestrates the harmony of one’s capacities within the rationally indeterminate space of the Kantian playroom, is best understood, not as a critique of Kant’s theory, but as an enlargement of it.

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Bibliographie

Beiser Frederick C., Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Cavallar Georg, “Taking a Detour: Kant’s Theory of Moral Cosmopolitan Education,” in: Wallace Brown Garrett, Telegdi-Csetri Áron (eds.), Kant’s Cosmopolitics: Contemporary Issues and Global Debates, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019, p. 179-199.

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Notes

1 See, for example, G. F. Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The “Critical” Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment, 296-313. For a more nuanced and sympathetic treatment that nevertheless argues for deep incompatibilities between the two, see K. Deligiorgi, “The Proper Telos of Life: Schiller, Kant and Having Autonomy as an End.”

2 See, for example, K. Düsing: “Ästhetische Freiheit und menschliche Natur bei Kant und Schiller”. See also, P. Guyer, “The Ideal of Beauty and the Necessity of Grace: Kant and Schiller on Ethics and Aesthetics.”

3 F. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 35.

4 This is despite the fact that Schiller regards the aesthetic as an end in itself within his analytic of the beautiful. See F. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination, 122-123; W. Düsing, Friedrich Schiller, Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, Text, Materialen, Kommentar, 138-141.

5 Ibid., 5.

6 See F. Schiller and J.W. von Goethe, Goethe and Schiller’s Xenions, Selected and Translated by Paul Carus, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1915, 122-123. As Philip Stratton-Lake has pointed out, “the view Schiller satirizes is not Kant’s,” since Kant does not oppose the idea of inclinations cooperating with moral motivations—a position he clarifies in the later Religion text. P. Stratton-Lake, “Moral Motivation in Kant,” 324.

7 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 443. Similarly, in the third Critique, Kant states that the fine arts “very much reduce the tyranny of sensible tendencies and prepare humans for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power.” Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA V: 433. Earlier in the same text, he states: “Taste as it were makes possible the transition from sensible charm to the habitual moral interest without too violent a leap […].” Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA V: 355.

8 In general, Kant saw the development of a Sinnesart or ‘method of sense’ as a necessary preliminary to the real work of forming a Denkungsart or ‘method of thinking.’ It is not surprising then, that he gives no attention to aesthetic appreciation in connection with moralization in his Lectures on Pedagogy. As William Frankena has pointed out: “Since aesthetic appreciation and creation involve judgment in Kant’s view, this point about education by practice carries over to aesthetic education, about which he says almost nothing in his book on education (there he mentions taste, condemns the reading of novels, and says we pursue music in order to make ourselves liked!)” W. Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education: Aristotle, Kant, Dewey, 89.

9 See, for example, P. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom.

10 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 391.

11 Idem, 392.

12 Idem, 387.

13 Idem, 392.

14 I. Kant, Pädagogik, AA IX: 452.

15 It should be noted that both Kant and Schiller wrote at a time before many of the conceptual distinctions we now take for granted had solidified. Both men use a host of synonyms for Bildung, including Ausbildung, Erziehung, Vollkommenheit, Kultur, and Kultivierung, amongst others. Neither makes a distinction between Bildung on the one hand and Ausbildung or Erziehung on the other in the way a modern speaker would. Thus, to find Schiller’s theory of Bildung one has to turn to a book on aesthetic Erziehung.

16 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 386.

17 Kant’s conception of educational well-roundedness has both a subjective and an objective side. Subjectively, the ideal is to develop the ‘lower’ human faculties, such as memory, imagination, and wit for the sake of the ‘higher’ faculties of reason, the understanding, and judgment. See, for example, I. Kant, Pädagogik, AA IX: 472. Objectively, the ideal is to gain sufficient knowledge of the various arts and sciences to see where one’s particular area of focus fits into the larger whole. This is no small part of what Kant means when he writes in the first Critique that “the culture of human reason culminates in metaphysics.” I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A850-B878, A851-B879.

18 For a start in this direction, see F. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 123-134.

19 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 391.

20 R. B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings, 44.

21 R. B. Louden, “General Introduction” in Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, Education, 17.

22 G. F. Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character, 259. Elsewhere, Munzel claims that “the pedagogical issues of discipline and cultivation are in their essence ultimately a moral question.” G.F. Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy Toward Education for Freedom, 202.

23 G. F. Munzel, “Kant on Moral Education, or ‘Enlightenment’ and the Liberal Arts,” 50-51.

24 G. Cavallar, “Taking a Detour: Kant’s Theory of Moral Cosmopolitan Education,” 180.

25 To name just a couple: P.J. Crittenden writes: “But the major goal of the process [of education], the ultimate aim with reference to the individual, is the formation of moral character—that is, the development of a disposition according to which a person chooses nothing but good ends.” P.J. Crittenden, “Kant as Educationist,” Philosophical Studies, 11. K. Moran writes that “moralization […] is the stage that bears the name of Kant’s overall goal.” Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, 154.

26 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA IV: 393.

27 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA V: 434-436.

28 Kant writes: “We are cultivated in a high degree by art and science. We are civilized, perhaps to the point of being overburdened, by all sorts of social decorum and propriety. But very much is still lacking before we can be held to be already moralized.” I. Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, AA VIII: 26. Italics in original.

29 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA IV: 393. In the Preface to the first edition of his Religion text, Kant also makes clear that the products of natural perfection are conditionally good. The point is not that they are instrumentally good; it is that they need to be combined with a good will. He writes that “of this perfection there can be many aspects (such as skill in the arts and the sciences, taste, physical agility, etc.) But these are always only conditionally good, that is, good only on condition that their use does not conflict with the moral law (which alone commands unconditionally); hence natural perfection cannot be, when made into an end, the principle of the concepts of duty.” I. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, AA VI: 4 (note).

30 I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA V: 110.

31 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA V: 391.

32 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 392.

33 See, for example, ibid., and idem, 445.

34 Idem, 390.

35 F. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, 3.

36 Idem, 5.

37 Ibid.

38 Frederick Beiser correctly explains: “Never does [Schiller] doubt Kant’s argument that reason determines the fundamental principles of morality […]. And never does he question the importance of enlightenment, the need to disseminate and apply the principles of reason throughout the political world. In Schiller’s view, the problem is not with Kant’s principles, still less with the ideals of the Enlightenment, but only with the application of these principles, the execution of these ideals. Nothing more reveals his allegiance to the cause of enlightenment and republicanism than his emphasis on education as the means of overcoming the gap between theory and practice.” F. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 131. Italics in original.

39 F. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, 87.

40 Idem, 181.

41 Idem, 33.

42 Schiller’s emphasis on harmony is often read as an imposition on Kantian morality if not an outright perversion of it. L.A. Willoughby, for example, writes that Schiller’s ideal of the harmoniously developed person, the elements of whose character exist in “a state of equipoise,” gainsays Kant’s ideal of one-dimensional rational mastery. Willoughby states: “And it was here primarily that Schiller parted company with Kant who had declared that the test of the truly moral is when reason has to do violence to feelings. Schiller, for his part, knew that no categorical imperative could be of avail which was not sanctioned by the whole man.” L.A. Willoughby, “Schiller on Man’s Education to Freedom through Knowledge,” 166. In fact, the categorical imperative itself demands natural and moral self-perfection, understood precisely as the harmonious development of character, and Schiller embraces that imperative without reservations.

43 F. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, 49.

44 Idem, 141-143 (note).

45 Thus, we should be careful when contrasting ‘aesthetic education’ with ‘scientific education’ as if the two were in opposition. Frederick Beiser, for example, writes: “The scientific education will not help because simply enlightening people’s intellects does not make them act […]. Hence what we need is an aesthetic education because, after the decline of religion, this alone enlivens, exercises and educates sensibility.” F. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 128. Yet, while it is true that Schiller advocates for aesthetic education on these grounds, such an education is not exclusive of scientific education. The latter would be an integral part of the kind of holistic education that is harmonized by the aesthetic.

46 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA IV: 389.

47 I. Kant, Pädagogik, AA IX: 472.

48 I. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, AA VI: 192.

49 In the first Critique, Kant writes: “Virtue, and with it human wisdom in its entire purity, are ideas. But the sage (of the Stoics) is an ideal, i.e., a human being who exists merely in thoughts, but who is fully congruent with the idea of wisdom. Thus, just as the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a case serves as the original image [Urbild] for the thoroughgoing determination of the copy; and we have in us no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine human being, with which we can compare ourselves, judging ourselves, and thereby improving ourselves, even though we can never reach the standard.” I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A569-B597.

50 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA VI: 383.

51 I. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, AA VI: 62.

52 For a more extended treatment of this issue, see J. D. Hovda, “The Role of Exemplars in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” p. 31-44.

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Jeremy D. Hovda, « Bildung between Kant and Schiller »Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg [En ligne], 52 | 2022, mis en ligne le 12 décembre 2022, consulté le 11 décembre 2023. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/cps/5992 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/cps.5992

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Jeremy D. Hovda

PhD in Philosophy, University of Leuven.

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