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The Theoretical Relevance of Social Epistemology in Library and Information Science and Knowledge Organization

La pertinence théorique de l’épistémologie sociale en bibliothéconomie et en sciences de l’information et en organisation des connaissances
La relevancia teórica de la epistemología social en la biblioteconomía y las ciencias de la información y la organización del conocimiento
Daniel Martínez-Ávila, Tarcisio Zandonade, Andrés Fernández-Ramos et Blanca Rodríguez-Bravo

Résumés

Dans cet article, nous examinons l’influence de l’épistémologie sociale de Jesse Shera et Margaret Egan dans la littérature sur les sciences de l’information et de la bibliothèque et sur l’organisation des connaissances. L’étude complète qualitativement l’étude de Guimarães et al. (2018) et se concentre sur la littérature publiée après Zandonade (2004). Nous discutons de manière critique des interprétations et de la pertinence de la théorie pour la littérature et soulignons son importance pour les développements récents conformément à une approche plus sociologique. En ce sens, nous pensons que l’analyse de domaine de Hjørland peut être considérée comme un véritable successeur de l’épistémologie sociale et un nouveau paradigme dans le domaine.

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In search of a theoretical foundation

1Jesse Shera and Margaret Egan’s project of Social Epistemology can be considered one of the first and most solid attempts to provide a theoretical foundation for Library and Information Science (LIS). In this sense, Shera and Egan’s project has been considered (Martínez-Ávila, Zandonade, 2020) a precursor of Hjørland’s paradigm shifting domain analytic approach (Hjørland, Albrechtsen, 1995 ; Hjørland, 2017b), as well as fundamental influence in many other authors and studies that perhaps have not received the recognition they deserve. Zandonade (2004) provided a very comprehensive description of the genesis of the project as well as of its reception not only by the LIS community but also by other disciplines such as Philosophy and Epistemology. The present paper aims to follow-up the study by Guimarães et al. (2018) and complement it with a qualitatively update of Zandonade (2004) by critically discussing the reception and presence of Shera and Egan’s Social Epistemology in newer publications. The social and ethical implications of the study are that the confirmation of the relevance of social epistemology in LIS can be used to assess and promote studies on practical issues in LIS, as well as the development of knowledge organization systems considering social issues and bias complementing other social-cognitive approaches such as Hjørland’s domain analysis.

Revisions and influence of Egan and Shera’s Social Epistemology in LIS

2One of the most important revisions of Social Epistemology in LIS has been Jonathan Furner’s paper on « Margaret Egan and Social Epistemology » (2004). The main thesis of this paper is that Margaret Egan, who passed away seven years after she and Jesse Shera had published their first paper on « Social Epistemology » together (1952), played a much greater role in the development of the concept than what the historical accounts (and citations) have traditionally acknowledged. Furner states that « the pervasive influence of the pragmatist philosophers and Parsons’s structural-functionalism on Shera’s work is no doubt mediated by Egan’s interpretation of those writers » Egan & Shera, 1952 : 802). It seems that by 1942, Jesse Shera had already identified the necessity of providing a theoretical background for Information Science. However, at that time he thought that it was too soon to « construct a philosophy » as it should « wait upon further research in the field » (Grossman, 2010). It is argued that Egan’s background in Political Science and her interest in Sociology could have been the catalyst of the development of social epistemology when they met (Furner very aptly crossed the biographies of both Shera and Egan to determine the intellectual influence of Egan on Shera). After Egan passed away in 1959, Shera was left alone with the immense task of defending a position that was officially proposed as a team.

3Although Jesse Shera more often than not gave the late Margaret Egan credit, much of the narrative of the late last century erased this reference (mainly via the uncredited reprint of 1965 entitled « Libraries and the Organization of Knowledge »). Jonathan Furner, on the other hand, did not only reclaimed her role in his 2004 paper, but he has also consistently given credit to Egan in his writings, such as when he stated in 2009 that « several authors have recently picked up on Margaret Egan’s social epistemology (Egan & Shera 1952), or at least the version of it promoted by Jesse Shera, as a good source of ideas about what the philosophical foundations of the information sciences are, or what they could be » (Furner, 2009 : 15). However, it should also be noted that Furner’s thesis also presumes Egan and Shera (1952) as the seminal work of Social Epistemology, while for instance Hjørland (2017c) has suggested that the work that perhaps best represents Social Epistemology is Shera’s (1951) solo, especially in relation to classification. As the influence of Egan on Shera’s 1951 paper has not been explicitly investigated, this is an aspect that should be further research. Finally, besides giving Egan a proper credit, Jonathan Furner also cites Don Fallis as « one of the people who is doing a lot to show how this move works » (Furner, 2009 : 15).

4Don Fallis has dedicated some of the most detailed writings to the question of Social Epistemology in LIS. In Fallis (2006), he began reviewing the latest incursions of Information Science on Philosophy, such as the work of John Budd, Archie Dick, and Steve Fuller, and vice versa, such as the special issue of Library Trends on « Philosophy of Information » (Herold, 2004), to then state that the main thesis of his paper is that epistemology (and in particular Social Epistemology) is the area of philosophy most central to Information Science. In this same paper, Fallis reviews Social Epistemology and other philosophical concepts related to Information Science, as well as he lists and thoroughly rebuts the major philosophical objections to applying Social Epistemology to Information Science, namely : some information scientists claiming that helping people to acquire knowledge is not the main objective of information services ; the questioning in some Information Science circles of knowledge being some form of justified true belief ; the need for consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as knowledge (especially given the variety of epistemic interests and values of the users of information services) ; and the disconnection between the discussion in epistemology (such as the Gettier problem) with the mundane worries and experiences of users of information services). Finally, and also in relation to the rebuttal of these objections, Fallis presented how Social Epistemology (and epistemology) can be successfully applied in Information Science including aspects related to information ethics such as intellectual freedom and censorship, privacy, intellectual property, and others. In the conclusion, however, Fallis agrees with Floridi (2002) on the observation that « social epistemology may not provide a complete theoretical foundation for information science », as « much work remains to be done » (Fallis, 2009 : 508). It should be noted that Fallis was also one of the contributors (as well as Furner) to the special issue of Library Trends (2004) discussing and rebutting Floridi´s Philosophy of Information (that, as Michael Buckland (2005) summarized, « it is clear that this issue is not a homage to Floridi »).

5In Fallis (2007), he also worked with « epistemic value theory » to determine which distribution of knowledge to aim for in the digital divide. In this 2007 paper, Fallis cited Alvin Goldman (1999) claiming that the job of social epistemology is to identify social policies (such as digital divide policies) that have good epistemic consequences. Although not central to his argument, he also cited Egan and Shera in relation to knowledge acquisition and the evaluation of library policies. Although Fallis seems to agree with Floridi on the incompleteness of Social Epistemology, he also seems to recognize Shera and Egan’s proposal as the main theoretical ground for Information Science. In Fallis (2008), he also studied the epistemology of Wikipedia in light of social epistemology and the ideas of Egan and Shera and others. Indeed, Wikipedia is a social space in which the contributions of social epistemology can be more fruitful. Indeed, Steve Fuller (2010) in his entry on « Social Epistemology » for the Encyclopedia of Library and Information Sciences mentioned Wikipedia as an example of « cutting-edge » social epistemology. In this vein, although not explicitly citing Shera’s Social Epistemology, Matei and Dobrescu (2011) and Mai (2016) might be other good examples of research following a social epistemological approach in LIS.

6If Jonathan Furner wrote in 2004 one of the best recounts of Egan’s academic and personal life, Hal B. Grossman did something similar with Jesse Shera in « ‘Without Reserve’ : Jesse Shera in the Wilson Library Bulletin and Elsewhere, 1961–1970 » (2010). Although Grossman’s paper also reviewed the basics of social epistemology, it mainly focused on personal traits of Jesse Shera that were reflected on his writings for the Wilson Library Bulletin (WLB), such as his relationship with Ranganathan, his relationship with the American Library Association (ALA), his relationship with technologies, and more. In relation to the irruption of computers in the LIS field, Shera maintained an open mind, as he believed that « librarians must share ideas with people in other disciplines, including computer science » (Grossman, 2010 : 158). However, he never abandoned his theoretical aspirations as he also believed that « librarians must ground themselves in a professional philosophy, so as to understand where the computer ought to fit in ». In Grossman’s view, « these pursuits would be a departure from the focus on technique that Shera believed had plagued librarianship since Melvil Dewey’s time ». In relation to the ALA, it is said that Shera criticized the ALA conferences and their National Library Week, « sarcastically proposing an ALA Committee on Comforts and Amenities, an official statement on The Freedom Not to Read, and an ALA clearinghouse for Rumor Evaluation and Dissemination (READ), as well as accusing the ALA of phronemophobia, a made-up word that he defined as fear of thinking » (Grossman, 2010 : 161). Shera’s sarcasm and criticism towards the ALA did not stop here.

7In relation to the publication of his ideas on social epistemology in his columns for the Wilson Library Bulletin, it is stated that Shera’s argument for Social Epistemology in the WLB provoked a lengthy, critical, hate letter to the editor as well as three favorable letters supporting the article. When Shera was asked whether he wanted to reply to the critical letter in the magazine he declined (saying « Many thanks for the good laugh ») and stated that he would not know how to reply (Grossman, 2010 : 154). As a consequence, Shera never wrote on Social Epistemology for this magazine again and he just continued to argue for the idea elsewhere. Grossman concludes his essay pointing out that one common and overall response to Shera’s work was silence, or praise followed by inaction. In Grossman’s analysis, it is shown that Shera’s personality and inability to connect with the average librarian were not only part of his charm but also one of the main barriers for the spread of Social Epistemology within the field. According to Grossman, if Egan had lived longer perhaps some of those problems would have been overcome : « No one in the library profession stepped forward to build on social epistemology as a theoretical foundation for the profession. The practical, empirical strain in librarianship may have been too strong for that. Social epistemology as Shera described it may not have been sturdy enough to bear as much weight as he hoped. Perhaps if Margaret Egan had lived, she and Shera could have found a way to reach more of the profession with a theory that was sound, of clear practical value, and appealing to librarians in general » (Grossman, 2010 : 165-166).

8Social Epistemology has also been often discussed in Philosophy by several authors and works that did not always acknowledge or agree with Egan and Shera’s contribution. The bulk of this work, although of potential interest for LIS, will not be reviewed in this paper as it falls out of our scope. Frederick F. Schmitt and Oliver R. Scholz, for instance, guest edited a special issue of the journal Episteme and wrote an « Introduction : The History of Social Epistemology » (2010). References to Shera’s work were limited to an endnote for the introduction of the « technical term » social epistemology in the 1950s, « as far as they know ». This special issue claimed to aim « to deepen and broaden the inquiry into the antecedents of social epistemology in ancient, medieval, and early modern philosophy » ( :1). On the other hand, the work of Steve Fuller, although underused in LIS, has sometimes been of the interest of the community in relation to Egan and Shera’s Social Epistemology. Elena Maceviciute (2008), for instance, reviewed Fuller’s book « The knowledge book : key concepts in philosophy, science and culture » (2007) for the journal Information Research. Among the aspects that were discussed in this review, Maceviciute emphasized the origins of Social Epistemology in Information Science and the references to Jesse Shera.

9However, while the work of Steve Fuller has been relatively well received by the LIS community, it cannot be said the same of Luciano Floridi’s project of Philosophy of Information (PI), that is one of the main attempts to replace Social Epistemology as a proper theoretical foundation for LIS. One of the few exceptions is Martens (2015), that reviewed Floridi’s Philosophy of Information in the context of LIS. In her paper, Martens reviews the history of philosophy in information science from Butler’s earliest observation on the lack of philosophical grounds to the work of Luciano Floridi. The work and history of Shera and Egan’s Social Epistemology is also reviewed. In this paper, Martens makes two important remarks for the purpose of our paper : first, Martens corroborates that the LIS community has resisted Floridi’s proposal (especially 2002 and 2004) as it has been viewed as something that already existed in the LIS field in the form social epistemology ( :320) ; and second, and ten years after Furner (2004) introduced this same idea, she still thinks that « the concept of social epistemology as it is generally understood today has little or no direct connection with the term as originated by LIS theorists Egan and Shera, even while their original impetus for the concept (that is, in the service of continuous improvement of bibliographic services to users) is still firmly embedded in ongoing library work » (Furner, 2004 : 320-321). In her study, Martens also identify parallelisms between Floridi’s proposal and Egan and Shera’s work (especially Shera’s latest writings) and states that « Floridi’s contribution to LIS discourse may be significant in a much broader sense than merely as a critique of Egan’s and Shera’s ideas and can even be construed as an evolution from their initial effort « to provide a framework for the effective investigation of the whole complex problem of the intellectual processes of society » (Egan and Shera, 1952 :132), even as the UNESCO conference in 1995 was a successor to the one in 1950, into an exploration of what Floridi (2001a [i.e. 2001] : 18–19) calls the « infosphere ». » ( :325).

10Another work that draws on Floridi is Fyffe (2015). This paper presents a critical reconstruction of Floridi’s program on the Philosophy of Information in relation to LIS, sharing his conviction of the insufficiency of Social Epistemology to provide a foundation for LIS. In words of Fyffe : « Floridi’s proposed reorientation of LIS’s philosophical foundation from epistemology to value theory is especially timely as we shift our focus from local collections to shared responsibility for a network of collections held in distributed digital and print repositories » ( :268). Among other aspects, Fyffe reviews the criticism to Social Epistemology and recalls the cold reception of Floridi’s 2002 paper (in which he stated that « LIS should look to the Philosophy of Information instead of social epistemology for its conceptual foundations ») among the LIS community, as well as some of the reactions in the 2004 special issue of Library Trends. Fyffe divides his own paper in four parts : first, the traditional role of social epistemology as the conceptual foundation for LIS, including Floridi’s criticism and questions on normativity such as if it is fundamentally epistemic or related to truth-value and moral principles (that would be semantic and ethical in the view of Floridi) ; second, Floridi’s Philosophy of Information, Floridi’s normative theory of « semantic information », and its implications for LIS ; third, Floridi’s ethical theory of stewardship (i.e., Floridi’s view on LIS that is at odds with Social Epistemology) ; and fourth, a « constructionist theory of librarianship that bridges the Cartesian dichotomy between « information » and « knower » and emphasizes the knower’s role in creating, managing, and sustaining his or her semantic environment ».

11One of the criticisms of Social Epistemology that is echoed by Fyffe is that « Egan and Shera’s conception of social epistemology is descriptive and analytic ; it describes how knowledge is transmitted and analyzes the factors that affect transmission. But Goldman [1999] argues that social epistemology must also be normative with respect to knowledge : that, strictly speaking, knowledge is justified true belief, belief that is true and for which the believer has sound reasons […] Floridi shares Goldman’s commitment to a normative, veritistic understanding of epistemology that not only describes knowledge claims but also evaluates their justification » ( : 270). In this line of thought, Fyffe (based on Floridi) argues throughout the paper that epistemology is prescriptive while LIS is not epistemologically normative (Fyffe also clarifies that it can be distinguished between epistemic and semantic norms so librarianship could be semantically normative but not epistemologically). However, LIS, and especially Knowledge Organization, is inescapably normative as one of its main areas of research deals with the development of norms (i.e., standards) and also epistemologically normative as what is known depends on the epistemology of the developers. In this regard, Jesse Shera himself, in what might be considered one of the main tenets of social Epistemology, stated that : « Even a cursory examination of the history of classification of the sciences emphasized the extent to which any attempt to organize knowledge is conditioned by the social epistemology of the age in which it was produced. This dependency of classification theory upon the state of the sociology of knowledge will doubtless be even more strongly confirmed in the future. Here, then, is an implicit denial of Bliss’ faith in the existence of a ‘fundamental order of nature,’ a rejection of the belief that there is a single, universal, logically divided classification of knowledge » (Shera, 1951 : 82). The different epistemological choices made in the organization of knowledge affect, at least, in a prioritized retrieval of the information/knowledge/documents that are ascribed to elements of a system that privileges one view (scientific or not) over others, as well as in the misrepresentation, knowledge, and marginalization of groups in society. Again, this is an inescapably normative aspect of LIS and knowledge organization (regardless its desirability or political possibilities) in which epistemology is of uttermost importance.

12On the other hand, Fyffe also states that most of the disagreement between Floridi and his LIS disputants might be rooted in the different meanings of the word knowledge. According to Fyffe, for philosophers, knowledge means « justified true belief », while for sociologists or economists it may include forms of informational or information-like content. The latter, according to Fyffe, very influential after the work of Fritz Machlup’s The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (1972) – that was indeed a great influence in Shera. Unlike the definition of knowledge for philosophers, the definition of knowledge « for sociologists or economists » is not clarified by Fyffe (and being fair, perhaps this is an aspect that the LIS community might have not dedicated too much thought to). In fact, the philosophical argument of information as justified true beliefs is something that no few LIS researchers might find counter-intuitive due to the strong link of the field with the History and Sociology of Science. As a consequence, one of the points in the second part that seems questionable is the statement « Librarians do not practice or enforce the norms (disciplinary or otherwise) that establish beliefs as justified on the basis of evidence » ( : 275), as most of the examples provided by Fyffe refer to classifiers (and other end professionals), one might wonder if this argument also applies to classificationists. Would not the ideologically-driven and biased methodology of developing controlled vocabularies be epistemologically normative too ? Is not this aspect one of the core elements of Knowledge Organization that Shera was talking about ?

13Fyffe stated, when explaining Floridi’s meaning of epistemological normativeness, that « Librarianship is not responsible for justifying the knowledge claims of physicists (for example) or assessing the methodology used by epidemiologists » ( : 271). However, if they are not responsible, they at least participate in the process. There are several studies in LIS, mainly from critical points of view, that have reported the consequences and « justified beliefs and knowledge » of library users in relation to sensitive matters such as sexuality, ethnicity, and others after experiencing the epistemological decisions that were taken in the development of library standards. Richard Smiraglia, for instance, points out that « when a gay adolescent searches for literature to help understand and finds that it all falls under ’perversion’ then we have oppressed yet another youth » (Smiraglia, 2006 : 186). Another example is tatiana de la tierra’s recount of a seventeen-year-old girl who wanted to learn about herself and was shocked after asking for material about homosexuality at New York Public Library and finding notes such as « see Deviancy » or « see Pathology » (de la tierra, 2008 : 94). Olson (2002) also includes a good number of similar examples in her book « The power to name ». In all these examples, the epistemological point of view of the standards is affecting the justified true beliefs of the users.

14Finally, there are also some papers such as Zhang’s (2016) that have provided alternatives not only to Egan and Shera’s Social Epistemology but also to Floridi’s Philosophy of Information. In this paper, Zhang also reviewed the epistemological foundations of Librarianship, from Egan and Shera’s social epistemology to Floridi’s Philosophy of Information, and proposed a new epistemological foundation based on the Ackoff’s DIKW hierarchy (1989). The main argument of this proposal is that « the epistemological approach is helpful to identify the nature of knowledge, but it does not reflect the moving feature of knowledge, that is, knowledge as a process to know. Therefore, the DIKW model is employed to examine the moving process. Examining law librarianship through the DIKW lens helps identify not only the abstract knowledge base but also the practical value that law librarians, as a profession, contribute exclusively and uniquely to society » ( : 600). Zhang states that « Shera’s social epistemology and Floridi’s philosophy of information as the core theoretical basis of LIS do not necessarily conflict with each other. However, neither of the approaches reflects a holistic view of LIS studies and librarianship. In fact, I argue that the knowledge basis of LIS can be revealed in the DIKW hierarchy, which includes four essential elements : data, information, knowledge, and wisdom » ( : 609). Zhang discusses his new proposal in the context of law libraries. However, we consider this approach to be unfruitful mainly because of two reasons : first, it seems odd to state that social epistemology does not reflect the moving feature of knowledge when Shera (1951), for instance, argued for classification as something dynamic ; and second, the use of the DIKW hierarchy has been proven to be unfruitful in Information Science (as Frické, 2009, has argued). Overall, it seems that one of the main problems revealed by this paper might be again the definition of the concept of knowledge.

The importance of Social Epistemology for current Knowledge Organization

15Our premise is that the « seed » of Social Epistemology can be found in Egan and Shera’s « Prolegomena to Bibliographic Control » (1949) (a forgotten work that was not even included in Conrad H. Rawski bibliography, 1973). Thus, Social Epistemology can be considered the foundation for bibliographic control. The importance of Social Epistemology (and Egan and Shera’s project in general) for Knowledge Organization is something that is also often highlighted in the literature too. Furner (2010 : 189), for instance, listed knowledge organization first as one the areas of activity that may benefit from applied social epistemological analysis (citing an example by Jack Andersen, 2002, in which decisions must be made about how to organize documents in such a way that knowledge acquisition is maximized). Jack Andersen (2004 ; 2008) also emphasized that the notion of knowledge organization as a communicative instrument in the production, dissemination, and use of documents is something that was indeed envisaged by Egan and Shera : the link between social organization and knowledge organization. Elsewhere, Andersen and Skouvig (2006) also worked with the application of Habermas’ theory of public sphere to LIS (and more specifically to knowledge organization) stressing its resemblance to Egan and Shera’s project. While Wayne A. Wiegand had wondered « Yet who in our profession is researching the role of the library in creating and sustaining the public sphere, in facilitating the exchange of social capital, identifying its influence on community trust, or weighing its symbolic value ? » (2003 : ix), Anderson and Skouvig stated that the theory of the public sphere requires knowledge organization to be understood as part of social communication, something that « has also been put forward by Margaret Egan and Jesse H. Shera [1952], when they argued that bibliography should be understood as part of social communication » ( : 312).

16Maceviciute and Janonis (2004), while studying the Theory of Bibliography in the USSR, directly linked Egan and Shera’s approach to Smiraglia’s theory of knowledge organization (2002) and Hjørland’s approaches to domain analysis (2002). As Maceviciute and Janonis (2004 : 40) put it : « The term « theory of bibliography » is also used in the context of what today is called the « knowledge organisation » area, which in the 1950s was referred to as bibliographic organisation (Shera 1951) ». Martens (2015 : 321) commented on the original definition of Social Epistemology by Egan and Shera (1952) that « much of their ensuing emphasis, therefore, was on the improvement of knowledge-organization processes, such as the design, development, and diffusion of both bibliographic records and bibliometric data ». Martens (2015 : 323-324) also distinguishes two main areas of investigation in Egan and Shera’s work that make that « their social epistemology legacy is still very much alive within LIS » : « situational analysis » (that would correspond with today’s user studies), and « analysis of the information unit » better known as « knowledge organization studies » (citing Smiraglia, 2008). Within knowledge organization, Don Fallis (2008) identified that « Shera (1970 : 90-92) himself focused primarily on one particular application of social epistemology to information science : namely, classification », and Birger Hjørland did not hesitate to include Jesse Shera’s definition of classification (1965 : 120) in his entry for « classification » at the ISKO Encyclopedia of Knowledge Organization (IEKO) (also published in Hjørland, 2017a).

17Hansson (2006) also stressed that the problems that Egan and Shera address in their quest for creating a theoretical basis for LIS in the form of social epistemology were most visible in knowledge organization. Hansson recalls Shera’s arguments on the Dewey Decimal Classification and « the classification of his contemporaries », including Bliss and Plato, that are deemed to be essentialists and taxonomical : « The theory of the organization of knowledge, from Plato to Henry E. Bliss, has been founded upon four basic assumptions ; First, that there exists a universal ‘order of nature’ that, when discovered, will reveal a permanent conceptual framework for the entirety of human knowledge » (Shera, 1951 : 72, emphasis in original). This is a very important aspect of Social Epistemology that sets grounds for knowledge organization and how practical problems should be approached. According to Smiraglia (2003), Jesse Shera may have been the first to arrive at this pragmatist and post-modern conclusion in 1950.

18On the other hand, there are still a good number of studies that continue with Ranganathan’s assimilation of Shera’s conception of knowledge to the universe of knowledge in the Indian tradition of knowledge organization (originally reported in Shera, 1970, and still discussed for instance in Satija, 2008 ; Satija, Singh, 2008 ; Satija, Singh, 2010 ; Satija, et al., 2014 ; Satija, Martínez-Ávila, 2017), and that emphasize Shera’s debt and praise to Ranganathan and his Colon Classification (e.g., Grossman, 2010, who also stressed Shera’s opinion on Melvil Dewey’s legacy as mere technique). M.P. Satija (2017 : 296-297) has even suggested the key role of S.R. Ranganathan in the development of Social Epistemology : « Ranganathan’s research in social epistemology has been lauded as an everlasting « intellectual contribution to the underlying philosophy of librarianship » by the late Jesse H. Shera (1903–1982) (Shera 1970 : 106) ». Again, Satija is talking about the mode of growth of subjects in relation to the growing universe of knowledge. In this point, however, it should be said that some authors might disagree on the resemblance between Shera’s and Ranganathan’s approaches. While Jesse Shera’s project could be considered a pragmatist milestone in the history of classification (as he was indeed influenced by several pragmatist philosophers), there is no consensus on the epistemic stance that was followed by Ranganathan and his facet-analytical approach (see Hjørland, 2014). If, as Hjørland (2013) argues, facet analysis and Ranganathan followed a rationalist approach, then his ideas would be at odds with the pragmatist project of Social Epistemology.

19Finally, although Jonathan Furner (2009) echoed Floridi’s observation on the insufficiency of Social Epistemology alone to provide a complete philosophy of information, he also added that in the ethical call for just or diverse information services, « maybe a metaphysics and an ethics of identity [the main point of his paper] is just what is needed to augment the social epistemological approach to a philosophy of KO » (p.15). Thus, although susceptible to be improved, Social Epistemology is suggested to be the theoretical basis for knowledge organization.

Current and future alternatives and complementations

20The historical importance of Egan and Shera’s Social Epistemology in the development of Information Science is present in almost every account of the field (see for instance Hjørland 2018a ; 2018b). Their contributions and philosophy can be considered foundational for LIS and also for Knowledge Organization as it characterizes a definite school of thought that is still acknowledged in references. Egan and Shera’s paper in Library Quarterly (1952) has been considered « one of the most influential American contributions to the literature of librarianship » (Osburn, 2006 : 51) and Shera’s paper on classification (1951) « be the most fruitful theoretical frame for classification theory, knowledge organization and library and Information science » (Hjørland, 2017c). Social Epistemology has been established as a landmark in what Cronin (2008) called « the sociological turn in information science » (see also García-Marco, 2011). Although Jesse Shera has been called more « sociologist than philosopher » (Budd, 1995 ; Osburn, 2006), it must be recognized that Social Epistemology has also opened spaces for discussion and interaction between Philosophy and Information Science too. While several authors in KO and LIS have proposed new theories that show strong ties with these and other fields, such as Smiraglia’s cultural synergy, Furner’s ethics of identity, Andersen and Skouvig’s use of Habermas public sphere, and Hjørland and Albrechtsen’s domain analysis (1995 ; 2017b), their acknowledgement and citations to Egan and Shera’s suggest that Social Epistemology effectively serves as a theoretical ground for LIS. Although several authors have pointed out the insufficiencies of Social Epistemology today, and some have also proposed alternatives, perhaps only the domain analytic approach (that also recognizes the antecedence of Social Epistemology, e.g., Hjørland 2017b, and goes further incorporating elements from Kuhn’s The structure of scientific revolutions, 1962) can be considered a well-established successor in LIS that counts with a large base of LIS studies and publications that cite it as a theoretical framework. While the influence of Philosophy, Sociology, and other sources were key in the search for theoretical grounds in this sociological turn of Information Science, these same concerns should still be explored in the current theoretical development and definition of the field.

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Daniel Martínez-Ávila, Tarcisio Zandonade, Andrés Fernández-Ramos et Blanca Rodríguez-Bravo, « The Theoretical Relevance of Social Epistemology in Library and Information Science and Knowledge Organization »Communication, technologies et développement [En ligne], 17 | 2025, mis en ligne le 01 mai 2025, consulté le 11 juillet 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ctd/14087 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/1414e

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Daniel Martínez-Ávila

Universidad de León, Spain.

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Tarcisio Zandonade

Universidade de Brasilia

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Andrés Fernández-Ramos

Universidad de León, Spain.

Blanca Rodríguez-Bravo

Universidad de León, Spain

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