What did we see in what we saw?

1Over the last two decades we have observed that the rise of social media has enabled the enrollment of a greater number of amateurs in the instances of meanings production, which previously remained under the yoke of mass media organizations. One of the complexities generated from this process is the emergence of new social collectives engaged especially in the production of discourses (Carlón, 2020), acting from new media systems characterized by the use of social and platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp. Recently many of these collectives began to reorganize themselves around relevant agendas for the societies in which they operate, reaching new stages of organization, beginning to act beyond the production of meanings, reconfiguring themselves as social movements, and even fostering the emergence of new collectives.

2In this scenario we started to focus on questions concerning topics such as the relationship between communication and activism; the role played by social media in the organization, institutionalization and even the disappearance of social movements; the use of social media to compose these movements’ “communication structure”; and how have these processes unfolded throughout the Covid-19 Pandemic, from 2020 to 2022.

4We soon realized that the questions mentioned above, related to activism and communication and their intersections during the Covid-19 pandemic, began to worry us even more after a preliminary observation of the communication actions of Lyon Pour La Liberté. To answer them, however, it would be necessary to analyze the communication structure of the collective itself, which became our main objective throughout this research. And although we'll define communication structure better later, it's worth saying that we understand it as an architecture formed by media, interactional devices, and tools used in communication processes, taking into account the particularities of these uses.

5In order to achieve our goal, it would first be necessary to map the media actions of Lyon Pour La Liberté, in addition to analyzing the communication flows generated or crossed by these actions. We observed that the circulation of meanings - a fundamental characteristic of societies impacted by mediatization - was not only a consequence of mediatization, but also utilized as a communication strategy to “navigate” through various media systems.

6This preliminary hypothesis made us realize that it would be necessary to carry out an analysis of the intersystemic circulation of meanings (Carlón, 2020), since many of the meanings whose communication flows were analyzed were taken up by the members of the collective from other actors’ discourses.

7These efforts required a method based on the analysis of intersystemic circulation (Carlón, 2020), supported by the analysis of correlations and contexts through Voyant Tools. The theoretical framework used throughout the research includes perspectives such as mediatization (Verón, 2014), circulation of meanings (Boutaud & Verón, 2007), and social movements (Jamison & Eyerman, 1991).

8From the research we have drawn some inferences about the relationship between activism and communication, the appropriation of social media by social movements and its impact on the organization of these groups, as well as the use of the circulation of meanings as a communication strategy. Thus, this work presents a descriptive operation model of a specific case in order to understand from it a few more general aspects about the phenomena studied (Braga, 2008).

9However, before detailing the case model we will briefly introduce Lyon Pour La Liberté based on the clues collected since October 2021. The method, theoretical framework, and analysis will then be detailed, followed by the inferences and the case model itself.

Where did all the roads lead to?

10From the beginning of our observations we noticed that Lyon Pour La Liberté did not organize until late 2021. In fact, the earliest evidence collected dates back to October 3, 2021, and the earliest reference to the collective itself dates from September 25, 2021. However, this does not exclude the possibility that Lyon Pour La Liberté already existed under another name, or in a more primary phase of organization and collectivization, in which it did not yet prioritize communication in social media as one of its strategies.

11In any case, our object of interest is Lyon Pour La Liberté, that is, the collective from the moment it acquired the characteristics of a social movement through its communication actions (Blunden, 2012). According to Jamison and Eyerman (1991), communication is at the core of the constitution of social movements, since for them to be constituted as such a political opportunity and a social conjuncture characterized by the existence of a socially perceived and communicable problem are necessary. In other words, the problem is related to signification processes in a society formed by layers of complexity that overlap, cross, and intersect themselves.

12Thus, the Lyon Pour La Liberté late creation was not by chance, but it’s directly linked to a social conjuncture marked by the expansion of the anti-Covid-19 measures, which for the members of the collective represented a threat to their rights as citizens. This was also the problem they recognized as members of the French society, and the political opportunity came at a time when France was preparing for the 2022 elections, when Emmanuel Macron's popularity as President of the Republic was weakened by the pandemic, offering the possibility for opposition groups and movements to expand their zones of influence.

13Once we realized that Lyon Pour La Liberté could be understood as a social movement (Jamison & Eyerman, 1991), we decided to focus on issues related to its communication actions. After mapping them, we began to collect discourses shared on the collective's social media profiles, as well as messages sent by its members and leaders in a Telegram group. This group was created on October 3, 2021 under the name "Lyon Pour la Liberté tchat", and throughout the research we called it Open Group because it allowed all its members to send messages. To carry out the collections, we used the native message export tool of the Telegram application for Windows, which is available for public groups.

14After analyzing the messages sent in the Open Group, we noticed that many of them were taken from other groups and, in particular, from channels on Telegram. One of these channels, created on October 25, 2021 under the name "Lyon Pour la Liberté", caught our attention by being used only to disseminate official material, such as calls for demonstrations, without allowing messages to be sent by members who were not its owners. This channel, which in this paper will be called Institutional Channel, became a fundamental part of the collective's communication structure.

15At this point, it is appropriate to provide a clearer and more concise explanation of what we call the communicational structure. This relationship can be explained through contributions from various authors, including McLuhan to Kittler. However, we base our view on Verón's work (2013, 2014), in order to maintain clarity and conciseness. Our definition of a specific communicational structure encompasses the combination of media, technical interactional devices and tools, along with their particular applications by different actors. Each institution, organization, or social collective constructs its own communication structure based on a specific combination of media, technical interactional devices, tools, and specific appropriations of them.

16Following Verón’s ideas (2014), we can define a device as a tool utilized for communication among two or more individuals. Examples of classic devices include the telephone, radio, and printed media, as well as television, etc. Nonetheless, these components are associated with historical periods characterized by broadcasting (Fernandez, 2020), which, as we will discuss later, was overwhelmingly controlled by mass media. Today, we consider smartphones, computers, and tablets as tools, while platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, and Twitter can be seen as technical interactional devices.

17This is significant to consider as a smartphone's full potential cannot be utilized without apps. In addition to the smartphone itself enabling interaction with external parties, we utilize a technical interactional device. However, this does not signify a regression into technological determinism since the specific uses that individuals, collectives, instituions, or societies make have high significance ins this process. These uses vary depending on geography, time period, political, economic, cultural, and social situations. The manner in which devices (and tools) are configured and utilized determines the means. While a medium may emerge before the apparatus of the devices, its transformations and complexifications over time are typically linked to this configuration. Thus, a communication structure links the media utilized for interaction, which happens through distinct uses of particular techno-interactional devices, utilizing specific tools.

18The observations showed that although the Open Group concentrated interaction between the collective members, the Institutional Channel functioned as a connection point. Often, the external content replicated in the Open Group did not come directly from "outside" Telegram, but from the Institutional Channel. That is, these discourses were taken from sources outside Telegram, replicated in the Institutional Channel, and then replicated in the Open Group.

19This clue was important to perceive the centrality of the circulation of meanings (Boutaud & Verón, 2007) in the communication actions of Lyon Pour La Liberté. More than an effect of the complexities of mediatization, in this case the circulation was used as a communication strategy. Although this kind of appropriation of circulation is not exactly a novelty, it is only more recently that we have been able to grasp its "footprints," which has allowed us to truly understand its complexities. From the point of view of media and communication studies, this moment was crucial to assimilate the nature of circulation as something beyond a "transit zone" or a "link" between the conditions of production and recognition (Verón, 1993).

20Regarding the conditions of production and recognition, we can define them as what is acting "behind" the discourse, the very conditions for its production and interpretation: the individual references and experiences, the ideological and ideology, the historical, social and economic contexts in which the discourse is produced, re-signified and interpreted. In other words, the conditions of production are marked by the intentions of the discourse producers and the possible material conditions available to them for the production of a discourse, while the conditions of recognition involve the experiences of the actors who interpret these discourses. Circulation, then, is the point of collision between the intentions of production and the possibilities of recognition, promoting maladjustments of communication, removing it from the logics of transmission and elevating it to a place of non-hierarchical interaction, where producers (moved by the conditions of production) and receivers (strained by the conditions of recognition) become co-creators of discourses.

21The circulation is marked by a non-homogenizing characteristic, allowing it to function as a kind of "third condition" that promotes discrepancies in what has historically been called production and reception. In other words, circulation is characterized by a non-linearity because it is not "between" the conditions of production and reception, but in the difference produced by non-linear communication practices (Verón, 2013).

22This complex nature of circulation implies that the effects raised in the signification processes it generates affect other fields beyond the media. For example, circulation can generate effects in politics or justice, thus complexifying social practices and processes. According to Verón (2014), circulation would be one of the observable and analyzable features of mediatization, understood here as a social process that affects societies in heterogeneous ways, generating effects on private life and even on the functioning of organizations and institutions (Couldry & Hepp, 2016). Thus, we do not speak here of a "mediatization of things". Rather, we are interested in the effects of mediatization on different aspects of the phenomena, groups, and societies we study. We take a materialist and historical perspective on mediatization, relating it to semiosis, or the human capacity to generate meaning (Verón, 2014). Therefore, we can grasp its characteristics and analyze its effects in relation to the time and space in which the objects we study are understood.

23According to Verón (2014), the history of mediatization can be traced back at least to the appearance of the first stone tools, precisely because of its links with semiosis. The author understands semiosis as a communication process, implying that there was communication and production of meanings when the neanderthal man perceived a problem and was able to produce the first stone tools. This would have been one of the first milestones of mediatization, which also includes the emergence of writing, the printing press, the telegraph, radio, the internet, and hundreds of other examples. All of these milestones represent a deepening of social complexities as an effect of the emergence and appropriation of new technical apparatuses, dispositifs, and even communication systems.

24Carlón (2020) explains that when the first discussions about mediatization were held in the late 1970s and early 1980s, mass media organizations dominated the communication horizons, forming the Mass Media System (MMS). However, after the rise of social media, we have observed the displacement of this hegemony to a new communication system, the Personal Media System (PMS), that is, personal or institutional profiles on social media, YouTube channels or other similar platforms, blogs, and even websites. More recently, we have observed the rise of a third system, the Underground, which includes the functionalities of platforms such as WhatsApp, Telegram, Zoom, etc.

25The coexistence of these three systems, without the absolute hegemony of any of them over the others, is called hypermediatization (Carlón, 2018, 2020). It is not an acceleration or a deepening of mediatization per se, but a scenario that presents new complexities, among them the intersystemic circulation. Intersystemic circulation occurs when the circulation of the meanings of a sign across different media systems. For instance, a television program story that has its content commented on in a Facebook post. In other words, meanings circulate from one system (MMS) to another (PMS), allowing a discourse to be "taken up again". We typically graphically represent the three media systems with the MMS above, the PMS in the center, and the Underground below. This allows for analysis of the ascending (Underground to PMS/MMS, PMS to MMS) or descending flows of meanings (MMS to PMS/Underground, PMS to Underground). This is particularly significant because it enables a discourse by a specific individual, previously an amateur without media visibility, to produce effects in other social spheres. Intersystemic circulation makes it possible for this discourse to spread from Telegram to Twitter, for instance, creating repercussions until it reaches MMS.

26In addition, following Carlon's thinking, hypermediatization also affects at least four dimensions of contemporary societies in relation to the media in what concerns the three media system: 1) power: during the hegemony of MMS, power was exercised mainly by institutions, while with the emergence of PMS we began to see a shift in this scenario with the action of amateurs in social networks, and more recently the Underground has offered space to those subjects that were not even present in social networks; 2) the reduced number of protocols for discourse creation and interactions in social networks and, specially, in the Underground, are more common in the mass media; 3) greater access to discourses and their circulation logics in PMS and Underground than in MMS; and 4) the transformations that the existence and coexistence of these systems cause in societies.

27At this point (4), we understand that Carlon's work comes close to the contributions of Andreas Hepp, especially with regard to deep mediatization (Hepp, 2019). The idea of deep mediatization implies a greater importance of the media in our lives and in the construction of our realities and societies. The media, then, do not exist as just a sector or isolated social sphere, but permeate and influence all of our lives, from our basic desires to the way we communicate, make decisions, and organize ourselves in society. Hypermediatization affects the way public, intimate and private spaces are constructed. During the hegemony of MMS, these transformations generated effects on a macro level, while with the emergence of PMS, these transformations became more related to the intimate and private lives of amateurs, which intensified with the emergence of the Underground. But hypermediaization doesn't only have micro effects, strictly localized in people's intimate and private lives: on the contrary, it is characterized precisely by the possibility of generating macro effects on societies, due to the connection between subjects and institutions and the non-linear nature of circulation.

28When MMS had hegemony over the production of discourses, the circulation had a mostly "horizontal" character: we could only analyze what circulated among the mass media (radio, television, or printed newspapers and magazines). With the Internet and the rise of new systems, amateurs began to produce discourses whose meanings could be taken up and circulated in any other system.

29This characteristic of intersystemic circulation makes it widely used as a communication strategy. In recent years, several meanings-producing groups have denounced and made demands through posts on social media or through messages sent in groups and channels on Telegram and Whatsapp, with effects ranging from the enactment in defense of minorities to the formation of anti-democratic camps after the 2022 presidential elections in Brazil.

30And although the mere fact of existing as a social movement is enough for Lyon Pour La Liberté to be affected by the media, the circulation and its deliberate use as a communication strategy complexify the effects on the collective and its communication structure. Given the importance of these effects, we will proceed with a description of the method and analysis, as well as the inferences drawn about the object.

On the road

31The key to understanding the functioning of a communication structure based on intersystemic circulation is to analyze not only the communication flows, but also the temporal and spatial dimensions of the circulation (Carlón, 2018). In other words, what matters for the analysis is when the meanings were triggered, by whom, in what scenarios, and for what purpose.

32To address these questions, Carlón (2018, 2020) uses an analytical tool focusing on specific communication episodes. For this purpose, in addition to the description of the processuality of circulation and the actors involved in the signification processes, a general model is assembled in order to help to understand the functioning of the object as a whole. An analysis of the most relevant communication episodes of Lyon Pour La Liberté has already been carried out (Ruedell, 2023) and serves as a basis for the conception of the model of the functioning of the collective's communication structure.

33In what concerns the analytical tool itself, we can methodologically define it as a model built from a case study (Becker, 1993). The function of the model is to describe the general from the specific, revealing the operating rule of a particular phenomenon studied from the analysis of a singular case (Braga, 2008).

34The steps for constructing the analytical tool were therefore similar to those for a case study: throughout the research, we collected clues (messages, posts and comments) from the communication actions of Lyon Pour La Liberté, especially from the Open Group and the Institutional Channel, while mapping the circulation flows. We then carried out contextual analysis and lexical correlations using Voyant Tools in order to identify the positions of the actors involved in the communication exchanges.

35This movement was necessary because the analytical tool requires an analysis in two dimensions. The first is time related and identifies the processualities of circulation, as well as the conditions of production and recognition. The second dimension describes the "geography" of circulation: the actors involved in the signification processes, their positions in relation to the discourses of reference, and their localizations in the media systems.

36Thus, it is important to highlight some details, such as the fact that the messages sent on Telegram by the leaders of Lyon Pour La Liberté always contained links to join the Open Group and the Institutional Channel. However, the meanings they took up often came from other groups and channels, from media organizations’ websites, from profiles of these organizations on social media, from other actors profiles in social media, as well as from the websites of institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO).

37In order to facilitate the understanding of this analytical model, graphical tools are used. As far as the intersystemic circulation is concerned, we have observed some recurrences that can be considered as the general functioning of the circulation in the case studied and that have allowed the creation of these graphs.

38In order to build the working model of the temporal dimension of the circulation, we have to perform a "reverse engineering" movement. First, we identified messages from leaders in the Open Group (Underground) that were widely commented on by members of the collective. These messages were taken from the institutional channel (Underground) and contained clues and references that pointed to discourses on social media or news portals (PMS). These discourses, in turn, usually contained references to official discourses of institutions such as the WHO or the French government.

39Thus, reading the graphic apparatus of Image 1 from left to right, i.e. chronologically, reveals that official discourses, whose production conditions P(D) are external to the media systems, were published on the portals of the institutions. These discourses were replicated in media organizations websites or social media profiles, which served as a basis for the creation of the messages sent in the Institutional Channel and later shared in the Open Group.

Image 1: Temporal Dimension of the intersystemic circulation of messages sent by the collective’s leaders.

40With regard to the messages sent by the members of the collective in the Open Group, a main single recurrence was not identified. Image 2 shows some patterns, such as the replication of meanings from official institutions' websites through the sharing of links in the Open Group; of discourses from media organizations’ websites or profiles in social media; and even from other groups not linked to the Collective.

Image 2: Spatial dimension of the intersystemic circulation of messages sent by the collective’s members.

41In both cases, however, one peculiarity can be observed: the position of the members and leaders of the collective regarding the official discourses of the institutions was always critical or debauched. The same happened with the discourses published on media organizations’ websites when openly in favor of the sanitary and vaccination passports or the preventive measures adopted by the French government. On the other hand, there was unanimous support for discourses questioning the health security measures or opposing the vaccination and sanitary passports coming from profiles on social media and non-professional information websites, or even from other Telegram groups.

Image 3: Spatial analysis of the intersystemic circulation regarding (D1).

Image 4: Spatial analysis of the intersystemic circulation regarding (D2).

44In order to make this analysis of the spatial dimension possible, we carried out a correlation and contextual analysis of the messages sent by the members of Lyon Pour La Liberté, using as reference words the names of the media organizations, institutions or the authors of the reference discourses (D1) and (D2).

45In addition to the analysis of the circulation, we also carried out an analysis of the correlations and contexts of the term "liberté", which is so important for the collective. It is interesting to note that, in many cases, the definition of “freedom” for the members of Lyon Pour La Liberté is only related to a notion of popular self-government, either as something to be reclaimed or even rebuilt because it has been "lost"; or as something to be taken back since it has been "stolen" from the people.

46Finally, it should be noted that "liberté" is only one of many signs that make up a very broad and complex lexicon that the collective used to build its activist identity. However, this brief analysis has served to reveal the existence and importance of a distinct lexicon that also constitutes the communication structure of Lyon Pour La Liberté, as will be discussed below.

En avant !

47The analysis of the temporality of the circulation supports the hypothesis raised at the beginning of the research that the circulation did not manifest itself only as an effect of mediatization on the actions of the collective. It was deliberately used to attract new members, to communicate a socially identified problem (Jamison & Eyerman, 1991), and to promote consensus and conflict actions (Montevecchi, 2021).

48Thus, the general model of the communication structure of Lyon Pour La Liberté has at its center the Open Group and the Institutional Channel on Telegram, which are its main communication tools. They are in adherence and in interpenetration through circulation. Around them, in a “zone of influence”, we perceive the profiles of the collective in social media, whose relations among themselves and with the Open Group and the Institutional Channel are only possible through circulation. The signification processes in these communication exchanges are precisely those that make up the particular lexicon of Lyon Pour La Liberté, which is composed not only of linguistic signs but also of cultural signs.

49In addition to being the basis for the functioning of this communication structure, the circulation has also played an important role in the organization of Lyon Pour La Liberté itself throughout its history. With the arrival of new members and the growth of movements in opposition to the Macron government, the collective began to include this position in its agenda. After that, other references were built, and Lyon Pour La Liberté's opposition to Macron began to focus on issues related to governance, corruption, and public policy.

50Over time, we observed that the collective began to give greater visibility to one of its leaders, popularly referred to as “Thibault”, who had not previously stood out among the other founding members. This became even more evident when meanings began to be taken up in the Open Group from a Telegram channel owned by Thibault, affecting the very organization of Lyon Pour La Liberté. This began to happen both through the bureaucratic route and through issues related to consensus actions.

51These effects culminated on September 10, 2022, when the collective changed its name to “En Avant !”. This change was first noticed after the names of the Open Group and the Institutional Channel were replaced by "En Avant ! Tchat" and "En Avant !" respectively, as well as the identifying images of both. In addition, a message was sent to both the Open Group and the Institutional Channel explaining the name change and referring to a new stage in the collective's existence.

52After these events, Thibault's presence in the discussions and in the bureaucratic structure of En Avant ! continued to grow to the point that at this moment we can hypothesize that the collective is in a new phase of organization, from both the activist and political paths, to its communication structure. The signs point to a possible institutionalization of En Avant ! in French politics, which does not necessarily imply its transformation into a political party, but perhaps its inclusion in the bureaucratic structure of the state, centered on Thibault's actions.

53However, we cannot predict the future of En Avant ! or even simplify it to an isolated hypothesis, after all, an investigation never exhausts an object. The research that we presented through this text, in a similar way to the Collective, is also in a new phase. The next few years in France will be marked by presidential, legislative, departmental and municipal elections, offering fertile ground for both En Avant ! and Thibault to continue towards an institutionalization process, which could mark the death of a social movement (Blunden, 2012).

54In any case, we will continue this investigation, which will soon have new inferences and insights published, highlighting the different transformations undergone in the organization of En Avant ! from its communicational actions.