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Benjamin Disraeli (1804‒1881): His Lives and Afterlives (Colloque de la SFEVE 25-26 février 2024)
Part 1: Political Lives and Afterlives

Competing Disraeli-isms: Tory Democracy and One-Nation Conservatism

Un disraélisme pluriel : de la Démocratie Tory au Conservatisme « One Nation »
David Jeffery

Résumés

Ce chapitre explore l’influence de Benjamin Disraeli sur deux courants de l’idéologie du Parti conservateur : « Tory democracy » et Conservatisme one-nation. Tous deux rejetaient le laissez-faire économique et promouvaient la réforme sociale, mais les Conservateurs one-nation étaient en faveur d’un État plus interventionniste. Alors que les démocrates conservateurs ont utilisé Disraeli à la fois comme guide politique et comme outil de légitimation de leur programme, les Conservateurs one-nation se sont contentés d’utiliser sa réputation pour légitimer leur projet, préférant utiliser les outils du keynésianisme pour atteindre les objectifs de Disraeli plutôt que d’actualiser la pensée disraélienne pour le vingtième siècle.

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Texte intégral

‘Though I sit down now, the time will come when you will hear me’. Disraeli’s maiden speech in the House of Commons, 7 December 1837

1Despite many claims to the contrary, the Conservative Party has never been a non-ideological body solely focused on the pursuit of power. The fallouts from the Corn Laws, tariff reform, or Europe show that a strict fixation on electability has rarely been the party’s lodestar. What the party’s ideology should be, however, has been an ongoing debate. One strand of this debate has been between those favouring the free market and a smaller state and those who deem state involvement necessary for addressing social issues.

2A source of inspiration for the latter camp is Benjamin Disraeli. Disraeli’s most famous contribution to Conservative ideological development came through his novel Sybil, or The Two Nations, which highlighted the poor position of England’s working class relative to the rich. In it, Stephen Morley, a radical journalist, tells the hero of the tale, Egremont, that Queen Victoria reigns over

‘Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws’.
‘You speak of—’ said Egremont, hesitantly.
‘THE RICH AND THE POOR’.
 (Sybil, Book II, chapter 5)

3This roman à thèse argued that only Toryism could bridge this deep societal divide. In making this argument, Disraeli was drawing from a deep well of Tory social reformists. Sir Robert Peel (1st Baronet) introduced the first Factory Act in 1802, described as the ‘beginning of the end of laissez-faire’ (Clarke, in Wilkinson 165). The government of his son, also Sir Robert Peel (2nd Baronet), introduced the Mines and Collieries Act 1842 which banned women, girls, and boys under ten from underground work. It was opposed by many Whigs, including William Gladstone. Peel’s Factories Act 1844 further reduced the hours that could be worked by children and women and has been described as ‘the first health and safety act in Britain’ (UK Parliament). The Tory Michael Sadler was known for his work on factory reform and the ten-hour bill and the 7th Earl of Shaftesbury was nicknamed the ‘Poor Man’s Earl’ for his campaigning for improved working conditions, the ten-hour campaign, better education, and reductions in the use of child labour, constituting ‘one of the first attacks on individualism’ (Wilkinson 22). Tory peer Lord Wharncliffe introduced what became the Truck Act 1831, which prevented some employers paying their workers in goods or tokens (at an often-inflated value) rather than money. The Conservative Salisbury government expanded this act twice.

4As such, Joseph Chamberlain could legitimately argue that ‘in social questions the Tories have almost always been more progressive than the Liberals. . . . Almost all the legislation dealing with Labour questions has been initiated by Tory statesmen, and most of it has been passed by Tory Governments’ (Annual Register 154). Wilkinson’s survey of early 19th-century English statutes finds much ‘to substantiate his contention’ (Wilkinson 165).

5Although Disraeli was not the first Conservative to concern himself with social reform, his novels, speeches, and legislative program have inspired later politicians seeking to ameliorate the consequences of the free market. This chapter will explore two strands of Conservative thought seeking to do just that—Tory democracy and one-nation conservatism—examining their relationship to Disraelian thought, their similarities and their differences.

Disraelian Thought, Disraeli in Action

6Whether Disraeli truly believed what he said has puzzled contemporaries like Lord John Manners and later historians such as Lord Blake (Smith 65). We will take his pronouncements at face value, as many Conservative thinkers have done.

7Disraeli’s novels—especially the trilogy Coningsby, Sybil, and Tancred—can be situated within the ideological tapestry of Young England, a political movement led by Disraeli which represented a romantic reaction to the industrialisation and social change occurring in England. Coningsby traced the origin and condition of political parties, Sybil explores the condition of the people, and Tancred probes questions of race, religion, and the state of the Church (Disraeli 1878, xxi–xiv).

8At the core of Young England was a sense of paternalistic obligation towards the working class, a rejection of utilitarian philosophy, and a romantic English nationalism that celebrated English history, tradition, and the constitution. Calls for social reform were thus paternalistic rather than egalitarian in nature, aiming to improve the lot of the working class within the framework of traditional social hierarchies. Disraeli opposed nineteenth-century egalitarian ideas like socialism and utilitarianism, preferring the class-based system which fostered stability and harmony. England, Disraeli believed, was ‘a country of classes, and a country of classes it will ever remain’ (HC Deb vol. 186, col. 25).

9In Coningsby Disraeli outlined his concern that the Whigs had undermined key English institutions—monarchy, church and people—in favour of a Whig oligarchy (Willcox 715). In Sybil Disraeli complains of the Whiggish legacy of an un-English system of ‘Venetian politics, Dutch finance, and French wars’ (Disraeli 2003) and argued that the Whigs had allied ‘with a host of undesirable ideologues: utilitarians, Irish Repealers, opponents of the church establishment, and laissez-faire Cobdenite zealots’ (Parry 708). Disraeli interpreted the Whiggish program as one ‘of “exclusion”, by which he meant the exclusion from power of all other interests or institutions: the Crown, the Church, the “People”’ (Blake 194).

10Disraeli’s ire was not reserved solely for the Whigs; he was equally scathing of Peel’s brand of Conservatism. He wrote in Coningsby that:

The Tamworth Manifesto of 1834 was an attempt to construct a party without principles; . . . but the awkward question naturally arose, what will you conserve? The prerogatives of the Crown, provided they are not exercised; the independence of the House of Lords, provided it is not asserted; the Ecclesiastical estate provided it is regulated by a commission of laymen. Everything in short that is established, as long as it is a phrase and not a fact . . . . Conservatism discards Prescription, shrinks from Principle, disavows Progress; having rejected all respect for Antiquity, it offers no redress for the Present, and makes no preparation for the Future. (Coningsby, Book II, chapter 5)

11Disraeli did not abandon his beliefs in office. His 1867 Edinburgh speech, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, railed against the oligarchs of Parliament who would be crushed by an alliance of the Crown and the masses (Wilkinson 19).

12Disraeli’s ideology blended radicalism and Toryism, envisioning a society organized around a feudal ideal where class differences were ameliorated by noblesse oblige from the landed class, which represented ‘the guarantee of the greatness of England and the liberties of her people’ (Smith 67). Disraeli maintained this view throughout his life, writing in the preface to Lothair long after his Young England phase and after enduring the realities of government, that ‘The feudal system may have worn out, but its main principle, that the tenure of property should be the fulfilment of duty, is the essence of good government’ (Disraeli 1878, ix). The feudal system was ‘the noblest principle, the grandest, the most magnificent and benevolent that was ever conceived by sage, or ever practised by patriot’ (Disraeli 1882a, 51).

13Although Disraeli harkened back to an idealized feudal system he also recognised that change is constant and could not be resisted. In his Edinburgh speech he implored Conservatives to ‘ensure change was consistent with the manners, the customs, the laws, and the traditions of the people’ (Hawkins 387). This was a long-held view for Disraeli: thirty-five years previous he had declared ‘I am a Conservative to preserve all that is good in our constitution, a Radical to remove all that is bad. I seek to preserve property and to respect order’ (Disraeli 1882a, 8). This also included social reform, a key element of his 1872 Crystal Palace speech where Disraeli famously outlined the objectives of his Toryism:

another great object of the Tory party, and one not inferior to the maintenance of the Empire, or the upholding of our institutions, is the elevation of the condition of the people. . . . The great problem is to be able to achieve such results without violating those principles of economic truth upon which the prosperity of all States depends. (Disraeli 1882b, 531)

14Thus, Disraeli’s ideology was romantic, benevolent, and paternalistic. He sought to address poverty ‘not so much in the name of social justice as in that of patriotism’ (Utley 8). The class system was not something to overcome but rather a source of strength for the nation and dignity for the individual. The Crown and the House of Lords were not bastions of privilege but rather allies of the working class against financiers and free traders.

15It is through a sense of noblesse oblige, rooted in a romanticised feudalism, that the aristocrats and landowners should improve the lot of the people. Disraeli ‘never believed that the masses were able to improve themselves unaided or that poverty was the result of individual incompetence’ (Willcox 714). If the aristocrats and landowners will not fulfil their duty because they have been captured by Whiggish oligarchic interests then the state must—for as Disraeli noted ‘the palace is not safe, when the cottage is not happy’ (Monypenny and Buckle 709).

16Disraeli can claim to have put his words into action. The Derby governments, in which he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, enacted reforms prohibiting children under eight from working, limiting children under thirteen to half-time work, and restricted servants from being imprisoned for breaching contracts with their employers. They also allowed peaceful picketing and introduced public health measures (Wilkinson 174–75). Disraeli’s own governments also had a proud legislative record including effectively giving workers the right to strike legally, thus balancing the power between the working and the manufacturing classes. Working hours for women and young people were further cut and the minimum working age increased from eight to ten. Factory legislation was consolidated and strengthened, dumping waste into rivers was prohibited, and seamen’s lives were protected by preventing the overloading of ships. Local authorities were given a new legal requirement to monitor and repair sewage facilities, water supplies, and food standards, alongside the power to acquire land for parks for the physical well-being of the public. They were also granted the power to demolish or repair low-quality housing (from a Liberal private members’ bill which Gladstone had previously left stalled in committee), and, under the guiding hand of Disraeli’s home secretary Richard Cross, build housing for the working class. Public bodies were allowed to provide cheap loans to societies to improve workers’ dwellings (Wilkinson 174–78).

17In sum, Disraeli’s legacy was that ‘to elevate the condition of the people became an integral part of Tory policy’ and ‘he impressed a progressive stamp on the political creed of the Conservative party’ (Wilkinson 58–59). The next section of this chapter will look at how this legacy has been taken up by Conservative politicians, beginning with Tory democrats.

Tory Democracy

18Tory democracy is a challenging ideology to define. It is often labelled a rhetorical device, partly because its most famous advocates—Disraeli, Randolph Churchill, and F. E. Smith (later Lord Birkenhead)—had an ‘obvious liking for the style of personal politics as opposed to its successful competitor, party-politics’ (Ploom). And yet, all three ran on party platforms, took part in party governments, and articulated a vision of what a successful governmental programme should look like.

19Tory democracy sought to win over the newly-enfranchised working-class voters. The ardent and self-described Tory democrat Sir John Gorst described Tory democracy as ‘democratic because the welfare of the people is its supreme end; it is Tory because the institutions of the country are the means by which the end is to be obtained’ (Shannon 3). For Lord Henry Bentinck Tory democracy ‘rose above the mere interest of class . . .  standing for great principles, it identified itself with the welfare and happiness of the people’ (Shannon 3–4). Following Disraeli, Tory democracy rejects the idea that all men are equal. There is a natural elite, an ‘aristocracy of those most competent to lead’ who have a duty to govern paternalistically, constrained by regular elections and the balance of classes (Willcox 715).

20Economically, Tory democrats place themselves between the extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and socialism, believing as F. E. Smith did that ‘Humanity is composed neither of men struggling to arrive at all costs nor of men ready to sacrifice anything to a common end . . .  Security to those who need it, opportunity to those who desire it, on what a better foundation can the state of the future be built?’ (F. E. Smith 44–45). The aristocratic elite’s role—and indeed their obligation—is to balance class interests. They oppose the ‘Whig oligarchs’ or unscrupulous owners of capital and seek to strengthen the position of the worker without upsetting class balance: the rights of the working man vis-à-vis the rich were not guaranteed by the vote alone but by active state interference (Willcox 715–16).

21Tory democracy first entered the public lexicon in the 1882 Liverpool by-election, when it was used by Tory candidate Arthur Forwood to describe his platform of ‘universal household suffrage, a redistribution of seats, reapportionment of church endowments, temperance reforms, and an extended Employers’ Liability Act’ (Waller 37). This ‘almost radical kind of progressive Conservatism’ led The Times to portray Forwood as ‘an advanced tory whose views were far too liberal for the Conservative leaders’. Lord Randolph Churchill, perhaps the most famous Tory democrat, said Forwood used the term ‘without knowing what he was talking about’ (Quinault 142).

22Churchill was made Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House in 1886 in the Salisbury government, the same positions held by Disraeli in Derby’s ministries. Once in office, Churchill outlined the goals of Tory democracy in a speech at Dartford, covering local government, elementary education, and land legislation, inter alia, and which was described by The Times as ‘a policy of reform so comprehensive and progressive as to take the old Tories’ breath away’ (Wilkinson 117). Local government reform was, Churchill said, ‘the great question which overshadows all others’ and the government would enact a ‘genuinely popular form of local government’, even in Ireland (Churchill 1912, 234–35). The result was the Local Government Act 1888 which covered England and Wales (Scotland would follow in 1889 and Ireland in 1898), and brought local county government under democratic control. For Gorst, local government was essential for the programme of Tory democracy, as social reforms ‘do not originate in the public departments of the Government’ as ‘The civil service had a deadening effect on progressive and humanitarian impulses’. Taking his cue from Disraeli’s approach to public health and housing legislation, Gorst sought to place upon local government ‘the responsibility for the social welfare of the people and to confer upon them the necessary powers’ for effective action (Wilkinson 203).

23The Dartford programme also outlined plans for free elementary education, which Churchill called ‘the truest Conservative legislation’. If through educational legislation, he argued, ‘you can increase the material prosperity of English homes, you have done nearly all that you can for the happiness of the people throughout the country’ (Churchill 1889, 236). In his 1888 Paddington speech Churchill spoke about social ills related to health, overcrowding and sweating (cheap labour). He argued that while the state could not ‘regulate the price of labour’ it could remove those conditions which existed under the sweating system, and which violated all the ‘principles of health decency… and morality.’ Churchill also sought to enforce temperance laws, linking drink to a great deal of social, health, and economic woes (Churchill 1889, 373). Unemployment was also a key concern for Tory democrats such as Gorst but this is one area where Conservative governments were found lacking, at least until the Unemployed Workmen’s Act 1905 (Wilkinson 199–200).

24Following Churchill’s resignation from the Salisbury government, and especially after his illness and death in 1895, Tory democracy lost its most effective champion. Arthur Balfour’s ascension to the leadership saw the Conservative Party vacate the ground of social reform, instead falling back on ‘negative’ policies and relying on the middle-class vote. Consequently, the Liberals quickly made a pitch for the working-class vote through social reform. Apt, then, was Churchill’s remark ‘So Arthur Balfour is really leader—and Tory democracy, the genuine article, at an end!’ (Ridley 391).

25If Tory democracy was seen to have won the Conservatives on the 1885 and 1895 general elections, its abandonment was seen by many as the reason for their loss in 1906 and their inability to win back working-class seats in either of the general elections of 1910 (Wilkinson 245). Leo Maxse, editor of the right-wing National Review, noted that ‘Outside Birmingham, the Labour party is robbing us of the Tory democracy which has been the mainstay of the Unionist cause for the past twenty years’ (Skyes 1181). Under the new regime, Bentinck fretted that the Conservative Party ‘had declined from a national party, becoming a selfish faction which had opposed the “People’s Budget” and endangered the constitution, and was now conniving with the plutocracy’ (Eccleshall 130–31).

26Between the Liverpool by-election in December 1882 and the start of the Great War Tory democracy, unlike one-nation conservatism, never became the dominant ideology within the Conservative Party. Despite this, it was a discernible political project with clear goals: defending existing institutions, rejecting laissez-faire economics, empowering the localities, and a desire to improve the lot of the people through social reform, typically via enabling legislation and relying on local inspection regimes to ensure minimum standards were met. However, differences did exist between Tory democrats. Although outside the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting the lack of consensus on foreign policy: Churchill sought to keep England out of European entanglements (especially following the election of 1880), a far cry from Disraeli’s approach to Europe in the latter part of his premiership (Wilkinson 69).

One-Nation Conservatism

27The term ‘one nation’ first entered the political lexicon following a speech by Stanley Baldwin on 4 December 1924 at the Albert Hall. Baldwin called for national unity against sectional class interests amid the interwar period’s political, economic, and social turbulence: ‘We stand for the union of those two nations of which Disraeli spoke two generations ago: union among our own people to make one nation of our own people at home which, if secured, nothing else matters in the world’. According to Lord Lexden, the official historian of the Conservative Party, this moment marked the birth of ‘One-nation Conservatism’ (Lexden), although Baldwin’s use of ‘one nation’ went unnoticed by biographers and historians until after the Thatcher premiership, when scholars sought to typologize Conservative thought (Williamson). Like Disraeli, Baldwin argued that social stability required ‘a course of action that utilized policies of the extended state to ameliorate the lot of the worker’ (Seawright 7).

28One-nation conservatism is most often defined as an ideology, representing ‘a holistic, socially minded brand of conservatism which claims sympathy towards social problems and seeks to promote social peace and national unity to preserve existing institutions and systems of power’ (Jones). To that end it is often contrasted with Thatcherism: whereas ‘the One Nation tradition stressed pragmatism, balance, and moderation, the Thatcherites (or New Right) believed in radical social and economic change in pursuit of free-market principles’ (Hickson, Page, and Williams 335).

29As with Tory democrats, one-nation conservatives were influenced by ‘a certain Disraelian spirit of noblesse oblige’ and a desire for social harmony, which was underwritten by a robust welfare state, funded via economic growth delivered by the capitalist system (Espiet-Kilty). In this era the sense of noblesse oblige was found in ‘young MPs who returned from the trenches imbued with a sense of social responsibility towards the men they had commanded’ but who were also ‘persuaded by the wartime direction of industry that government could do much more to master economic forces’ in peacetime (Eccleshall 180). As such, one-nation conservatism was ‘socially paternalistic, Europhile, economically interventionist (its most controversial aspect) and generally favourable to a strong United Kingdom acting as one nation’ (Espiet-Kilty).

30Although first used by Baldwin in 1924, the term ‘one nation’ first became a self-conscious label in 1950 when a group of newly-elected Conservative MPs used it for their publication and later for their exclusive dining club, the One Nation Group, although the reference was ‘wholly to Disraeli’ rather than Baldwin (Williams; Williamson). However, Seawright notes that this group did not reflect the current understanding of one-nation conservatism, as its membership spanned ‘the full range of the Conservative ideological continuum’ (Seawright 8).

31Following Williams, this chapter covers the interwar period to 1964, which represented the high point of one-nationism within the Conservative Party. Given the limits of space, it is not possible to cover the full range of outputs which contributed to the development of the one-nation cannon, so this section will focus on two influential texts: Harold Macmillan’s The Middle Way and the Conservative Party’s The Industrial Charter.

32Macmillan’s The Middle Way was published in 1938 and laid out the future prime minister’s centrist political philosophy to address social, economic, and international issues in the context of the Great Depression. Macmillan believed the state could promote both social and economic harmony, and as such advocated for a more active and interventionist state as a middle ground between socialism and laissez-faire liberalism. Unlike for socialists, the state would be an ‘enabler and facilitator, rather than direct owner and controller of British industries’, but it would still be involved in ‘economic co-ordination and indicative planning under the auspices of a Central Economic Council, and also partnership between workers, trade unions and employers in industry’, a system known as tripartism (Dorey and Garnett). The CEC would also determine investment flows (Eccleshall 180–81) and the state would commit to full employment (Williams), a platform labelled as ‘nearly Bennite socialism’ by David Willets (Garnett and Hickson 17).

33The influence of Keynesian economic policy on Macmillan’s thinking, including demand management by the central state and the broad acceptance of the centralized welfare state, in some cases went further than Labour including support for a National Nutrition Board that would deliver free food to the unemployed, ill, and elderly (Garnett and Hickson 11). This also represents a considerable leap from what Tory democrats would ever be prepared to countenance even if both policies originate from a paternalistic desire to improve the lot of the working class. Although Macmillan did situate his work in the Disraelian milieu, his ideas were far removed from the role of the state envisaged, or enacted, by Disraeli or subsequent Tory democrats.

34Published nine years later in 1947, The Industrial Charter demonstrated the post-war Conservative Party’s acceptance of the leftward shift in British politics, embracing what became known as the post-war consensus of ‘the mixed economy, the advocacy of industrial partnership, social reform and achieving full employment in a free enterprise system’ (Williams). Williams describes the Charter as ‘a One Nation Conservative document’ (Williams) and Macmillan claimed it belonged to the tradition of Disraeli (Eccleshall 191). While in the same vein as The Middle Way, the Charter was designed under Rab Butler’s leadership to be more acceptable to the average Conservative MP and party member and thus was milder in tone. Like Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto, which restated Conservative principles in light of the Great Reform Act 1832 (and which attracted Disraeli’s opprobrium), The Industrial Charter aimed to show voters that Conservatives ‘have accommodated themselves to a social revolution’ (Butler 133).

35As with The Middle Way, the Charter accepted the welfare state as constructed and pledged the Conservative Party to full employment as the first aim of a Conservative Government (Conservative and Unionist Central Office 16). Furthermore, The Industrial Charter was important because it represented the Conservative Party’s ‘wholehearted embrace of the ‘Keynesian’ approach to economic management’ (Garnett and Hickson 27), including deficit financing and, in Butler’s words, ‘strong central guidance over the operation of the economy’ (Butler 146). Indeed, the Charter sought to recast Keynesianism in a Conservative mould (Eccleshall 185). In terms of economic planning, and as with Macmillan’s proposals, ‘the state would be restricted to exhortation, advice and the collection of helpful statistics; free enterprise would remain the chief engine of economic growth’, presenting the classic middle way between Labour’s socialist version of planning and the laissez-faire free market approach (Garnett and Hickson 26). However, there were still elements of which went far beyond what Tory democrats would have supported, such as proposals for wage fixing. The Conservatives also accepted nationalization when no viable alternative existed—such as with the Bank of England, coal, and railways (Eccleshall 185–86)—but opposed it in principle and sought to abolish Labour’s rationing regimes and state bureaucracy (Garnett and Hickson 26).

36As such, one-nation conservatism and Tory democracy share a common goal, namely a concern for social stability and a paternalistic duty to alleviate the plight of the less fortunate. Both reject laissez-faire economics and socialism, positioning themselves as a middle way responding to shifts in political circumstances: for Disraeli and Tory democrats it was the impact of an expanding working-class electorate, while for one-nation conservatives it was the ‘war-induced leftward drift in the electorate and the unexpected popularity of the Beveridge Report’ (Prescott 289).

37However, the differences between the two strands of thought are significant. Due to changing political contexts, both in terms of the new economic orthodoxy of Keynesianism and in terms of changing patterns of electoral pressures, one-nation conservatism was much more economically interventionist than Tory democracy. This is most evident in terms of state-backed economic planning and intervention in both industry (through tripartism) and the economic cycle (through Keynesian demand management), as well as reluctant acceptance of the nationalisation of some industries (see Williams for a full overview of these positions). When Butler ‘stressed that Conservatives had favoured the efficient and benevolent use of state power since the time of the first factory legislation’ (Eccleshall 185–86), he was being disingenuous. There is a major difference between Disraeli’s government legislating minimum safety standards in private enterprise and an inspectorate regime to enforce that legislation versus the state being actively involved in planning economic investments and having ownership of swathes of industry. These differences will be explored in more detail in the next section.

Tory Democracy and One-Nation Conservatism

38Disraeli inspired both Tory democracy before World War I and the one-nation ideology after World War II. However, these two strands of Conservative thought are not synonymous, and their differences are largely a consequence of the varying contexts in which each emerged. As argued by Dorey, ‘it is a mistake to look for an authoritative exposition of “One Nation” ideas either from Disraeli himself . . .  while Disraeli certainly expressed sentiments which many post-war Conservatives found congenial, the context of his career bears no resemblance to the situation in Britain after 1945’ (Dorey and Garnett 69). Marshall notes that ‘If it was a myth that Disraeli had something of practical significance to say to post-war Britain it was an effective myth’, and it was put to good use by one-nation conservatives (Marshall 3). Instead, it is better to follow Jones and consider Disraeli’s ideological legacy as a starting point for subsequent Conservatives who sought to stress ‘the organic, paternalistic, and pragmatic nature of society’ whilst also emphasising ‘faith in the people—and the democratic electorate—as well as concern for their social welfare and the unity of the nation, founded on national institutions’ (Jones).

Similarities

39The first similarity is a paternalistic concern about the living standards of the working man. As Disraeli famously wrote in Sybil, ‘Toryism will yet rise from the tomb over which Bolingbroke shed his last tear, to bring back strength to the Crown, liberty to the Subject, and to announce that power has only one duty—to secure the social welfare of the PEOPLE’ (Disraeli 2003), sentiments reinforced in his Manchester and Crystal Palace speeches thirty years later. Although Disraeli eulogised the feudal system, whereby the lord treats the serf with dignity without relying on coercion by the state, in reality he saw it as the role of the aristocracy in parliament (or local government) to deliver paternalistic social reform. Tory democrats ultimately ‘transferred their sense of paternal responsibility from the precincts of the “hall” to those of Parliament’ (Wilkinson 281). For one-nation conservatives, the experience of war and serving alongside men from other classes imbued them with their sense of paternalism, coupled with the visible consequences of state inaction during the hardships of the 1930s. Public schools like Eton and Harrow also ‘inculcated a strong sense of civic duty and public service in their pupils, and imbued them with recognition that their privileges entailed corresponding responsibilities’ and a ‘sense of noblesse oblige (Dorey and Garnett 75).

40This shared paternalism led to the shared rejection of laissez-faire economics and a tension with the ‘Manchester School liberals’ within their own parties (Eccleshall 17). For the Tory democrats ‘inhuman conditions were not unavoidable, as they obviously appeared to the apologists of the “doctrine of the survival of the fittest”, but could and should be improved in a civilised country’ (Ploom). For one-nation conservatives this rejection of free-market economics was shown in their commitment to the welfare state, tripartism and Keynesianism (Eccleshall 14).

41Another area of similarity is how these Tories positioned themselves as representatives for the whole nation, not a class. This is not surprising given the role of Disraeli in inspiring both movements and his statement that

the Tory party, unless it is a national party, is nothing. It is not a confederacy of nobles, it is not a democratic multitude; it is a party formed from all the numerous classes in the realm—classes alike and equal before the law, but whose different conditions and different aims give vigour and variety to our national life. (Disraeli 1882b, 524)

42Disraeli, Tory democrats, and one-nation conservatives sought to balance the interests of each class in society, so that the state institutions served the national interest and fostered social stability rather than a narrow sectional interest. For Williamson, Baldwin was perhaps the best at articulating this message and he ‘transposed the meaning of Unionist from a territorial into a social sense’, whereby the ‘Unionist or Conservative Party was always declared to be the national and patriotic party, representing and defending the interest of all members of the nation, whatever their social position’ (Williamson). This was also hugely useful as a rhetorical tool in the face of Labour’s claim to be the party of the working class. To unite the nation both Tory democrats and one-nation conservatives argued that they were charting a third way between socialism and free-market liberalism: F. E. Smith distinguished ‘Tory reformism from the “Radical-Socialism” of Lloyd George and the Labour Party, as well as from the “Individualist-Whig” principles of free-marketeers in the Liberal and Conservative Parties’ (Eccleshall 129). The meaning behind the title of Macmillan’s one-nation book The Middle Way is not hard to decipher.

43In his characteristically flamboyant style, it is F. E. Smith who best describes the differences between his strand of Tory democracy, liberalism, and socialism and their relationship with the state:

The laissez-faire Conservative or Whig wishes the State to touch nothing: the Socialist, and to a lesser degree the Radical-Socialist, wishes the State to touch everything and to touch it in the wrong way. The modern Conservative, like the old Tory, wants the State to touch some things but to touch them in the right way. (F. E. Smith 25–26)

Differences

44The first key difference between Tory democracy and one-nation conservatism is the role of the state, especially in relation to the centralisation of power. Churchill advocated for a ‘genuinely popular form of local government’ in his Dartford programme and Wilkinson notes that for Gorst the subject of democratic local government was ‘almost a fetish with him’ (Wilkinson 203). Whilst an emphasis on local government did speak to the Disraelian ‘patrician sense of responsibility towards the poor, rooted as it was in the localized ties of rural communities’, this sat uncomfortably with the one-nation concept of ‘a centralized state bureaucratically confronting the problems of a complex industrial society’ (Eccleshall 121). The Disraelian government’s legislation was ‘of the “permissive” kind, designed to facilitate, but not compel, activity at the local level’ (Jenkins 113), and as such gave local authorities the power to decide which issues were pressing. The ‘subsidiarity principle, for especially local autonomy’ was seen as one of the most important characteristics of Disraeli’s social Toryism (Drechsler, in Ploom).

  • 1 Although whether Bevan actually said this is debatable, see Rees (2015).

45Conversely, the nascent one-nation conservatism of Macmillan’s The Middle Way and The Industrial Charter enthusiastically embraced using the power of Whitehall. The 1951‒1964 one-nation governments further weakened local government, a process that had been ongoing since the 1930s and which has continued to this day (Prescott 291). In endorsing the Beveridgean welfare state, one-nation conservatives also adopted Bevan’s philosophy that ‘if a hospital bedpan is dropped in a hospital corridor in Tredegar, the reverberations should echo around Whitehall’.1 One-nation conservatives sought to use the power of Whitehall to right social wrongs through the welfare state and economic planning. However, the 1951‒1964 governments could have tackled Beveridge’s five evils through a locally-administrated welfare system or one which saw a greater role for the private sector through an insurance scheme, both of which are present in many European countries using the Bismarckian welfare model. Instead, one-nation conservatives chose to follow the Labour government’s lead in a ‘Whitehall knows best’ model and which is a far cry from Drechsler’s subsidiary principle.

46A similar push for centralization is seen in Macmillan’s creation of the National Economic Development Council, which encouraged a form of corporatism whereby government pushed employers and trade unions ‘to cut convenient deals at the expense of consumers’. This, according to Dorey and Garnett, ‘threatened to introduce a new variety of ‘Two Nations’ politics, in which the division lay between powerful institutions and the population at large’ (Dorey and Garnett 77). Corporatism is far removed from Tory democrat ideas of copartnership, whereby workers and owners come together and with workers taking a share of profits or of capital, thus ensuring the interests of the two groups are aligned. Most importantly, and most differently from one-nation corporatism, is the role of the state: Rockow argues ‘Copartnership cannot be enacted by law, but the government should educate public opinion and encourage it in every possible way’ (Rockow 20). Again, we see the difference between Tory democracy’s permissive or enabling approach to legislation versus the one-nation tendency to use Whitehall to compel certain activity or behaviours.

47Furthermore, the difference between Tory democracy and one-nation conservatism is pronounced in terms of economic demand management. Even as late as the 1945 general election Winston Churchill—a man who deeply admired his own Tory democrat father Randolph—denounced ‘planned capitalism as a leap towards totalitarian socialism’ (Eccleshall 185). However, the 1945 defeat forced one-nation conservatives to accept and adopt Keynesianism, which seemed necessary for electoral purposes and to avoid a repeat of the negative social effects of the interwar period. The public support for the Beveridge Report of 1942 strengthened the resolve of one-nation conservatives.

48The new political, social, and ideational context meant that ‘One Nation Conservatism became more overtly committed to social and economic reform through the intervention of the central state’ (Hickson, Page, and Williams 336), and the party was forced to adopt:

many of the proposals previously advocated by the Conservative left: Keynesian fiscal techniques; town and country planning; industrial reorganization; mechanisms for involving the state, employers and trade unions in decisions about production; and a move towards industrial self-government through joint consultative committees for management and the labour force. (Eccleshall 182)

49As noted by the journalist T. E. Utley, Disraeli’s actions were far less collectivist, and he did not embrace large-scale government intervention despite his concern for the poor (Utley). Of course, alternative ideas were available to the Conservatives—the Bismarckian model of social welfare which had been adopted in much of Central Europe, for instance, and had also been admired by Tory democrats such as Gorst, stood in contrast to the Beveridge model which formed the cornerstone of the post-war consensus (Gilbert 164).

50We will never know if, provided with Keynesian ideas in the late 1800s, Disraeli or later Tory democrats would have taken up the mantle of Keynesianism to ‘dish the Libs’, undermine the laissez-faire wing in parliament and provide an alternative economic programme to that of the socialists. Similarly, for one-nation conservatives, we will never know if without the pressures of the Second World War the ‘Treasury view’—which ‘presented a formidable block to Keynesian-style policies throughout the interwar period’ and ‘advocated low government expenditures and balanced budgets’ (Weir 60)—would have won out, as it did in the 1930s. Perhaps in this context centralisation, corporatism and Keynesianism would have remained consigned to the more radical Tory MPs in the post-war era. As it was, however, by 1947 the Treasury had accepted Keynesianism. A member of the Tory Reform Committee reflects popular Tory opinion when he said ‘to follow Adam Smith in the age of Keynes is like adhering to the Ptolemaic astronomy after Copernicus’ (Molson 250).

Conclusion

51This chapter highlighted the differences between two ideological strands within the Conservative Party, both of which drew inspiration from Disraeli and positioned themselves as a middle way between laissez-faire economics and socialism.

52The first, Tory democracy, was a fluid set of ideas placing social reform at the heart of the Conservative Party and which defended existing institutions and sought to balance class interests. Practically, this involved the creation of, and subsequent empowerment of, democratic local government and a legislative approach which emphasised minimum standards enforced by a local government inspectorate class. Tory democrats also generally supported an insurance-based welfare system. In contrast, while one-nation conservatism also aimed to improve the people’s welfare and prevent social unrest through reform, it advocated for a stronger role for the central state through Keynesian demand management, economic planning, and corporatism. Unlike Tory democracy, this approach diminished the role of local government in favour of a centralized Beveridgean welfare state controlled by Whitehall. Key elements of the welfare state, such as the National Health Service, were generally paid for by general taxation rather than insurance and over time the link between National Insurance and pensions was eroded.

53The role of Disraeli also differed between these ideologies. Key Tory democrats such as Churchill and Gorst sat in the Commons when Disraeli was prime minister and regularly communicated with him in the brief period after his retirement. The governments which Disraeli served in and led were direct influences on the policies developed by subsequent Tory democrats, although that is not to say Tory democrats agreed with everything Disraeli advocated—for example, they downplayed ‘Disraeli’s notion of invigorating and popularizing the monarchy and the territorial aristocracy’ (Rockow 13) and there were different views on foreign entanglements—but on questions of social reform and strengthening institutions they were in lockstep.

54In contrast, one-nation conservatives used Disraeli as a justificatory figure, a way of signalling to contemporaries and to voters that social reform was part of the Conservative Party’s history. Whilst the Disraelian sentiment still inspired one-nation politicians, the actual policies of Disraeli or his governments were not a source of inspiration—which should not be a surprise given the wildly differing contexts of the late nineteenth century compared to the mid-twentieth century (Dorey and Garnett 69). This was explicitly stated by Butler, when justifying his desire to accommodate the post-war social revolution:

I had derived from Bolingbroke an assurance that the majesty of the State might be used in the interests of the many, from Burke a belief in seeking patterns of improvement by balancing diverse interests, and from Disraeli an insistence that the two nations must become one. If my brand of Conservatism was unorthodox, I was committing heresy in remarkably good company. In fact, Conservative principles adapted to the needs of the post-war world meant that we should aim for a ‘humanized capitalism’. (emphasis added, Butler 134)

55As Ploom notes, ‘a political tradition finds its ultimate meaning in the immediate contextual circumstances’ (Ploom), so it is unsurprising that Tory democracy and one-nation conservatism differ substantially, even though both opposed laissez-faire economics and socialism and are seen as being on the ‘left’ of the Conservative Party. Another key contextual difference is the party system faced by proponents of these ideologies. Tory democrats contended with a Liberal Party supportive of free trade, while one-nation conservatives faced a Labour Party favouring nationalization and Keynesian demand management explicitly appealing to the working class.

56Two consequences flow from the argument presented here. Firstly, we should not see the development of these ideologies as a direct thread from Disraeli to Tory democracy to one-nation conservatism. Instead, we should see Disraeli’s influence on the two schools as broadly distinct. For one-nation conservatives, Disraeli was a useful legitimising figure for their ideological project, even if the changed social, political and economic context meant the Disraelian policy platform was of limited use. For Tory democrats, however, Disraeli was both a legitimising figure—evidenced by the success of the Primrose League as a broad-based membership organization—and provided a policy blueprint for social reform. Although one-nation conservatives were aware of the Tory democrats, the one-nation project did not seek to revive Tory democracy or bring it into the twentieth century. Instead, they looked to use the new tools of Keynesianism to achieve Disraelian goals.

57Secondly, and relatedly, we should treat Tory democracy and one-nation conservatism as discrete ideologies, which differ not only because of the context within which they emerged but because they envisage different roles for the state. Tory democrats sought to empower localities through democratic self-government and enforce minimum standards through a localized inspectorate regime, alongside a contributory insurance-based welfare system. One-nation conservatives, however, sought to use the power of the central state when it came to welfare provision, industrial relations, and social legislation, at the expense of local democratic control.

58Disraeli looms large in the history of the Conservative Party. His novels, speeches, and legislative legacy will continue to be used by those who seek to fight both socialism and laissez-faire economics and who seek to improve the position of the worst off in society to ensure social stability. As shown by both Tory democracy and one-nation conservatism, Disraeli—and Disraeli-ism—has proven adaptive to changing political contexts, which is fitting given Disraeli’s belief that ‘Change is inevitable… Change is constant’ (Hawkins 411).

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Notes

1 Although whether Bevan actually said this is debatable, see Rees (2015).

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David Jeffery, « Competing Disraeli-isms: Tory Democracy and One-Nation Conservatism »Cahiers victoriens et édouardiens [En ligne], 101 Printemps | 2025, mis en ligne le 07 avril 2025, consulté le 17 juin 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/cve/15476 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/13qsw

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David Jeffery

Dr David Jeffery is a senior lecturer in British politics with a particular research interest in the Conservative Party. He is the author of Whatever Happened to Tory Liverpool?, co-editor of Statecraft: Policies and Politics under Prime Minister Theresa May and Thatcherism in the 21st Century, and is currently co-editing the Handbook of the History of the Conservative Party for Routledge. He is also convenor of the Political Studies Association’s Conservatism Studies specialist research group.
Dr David Jeffery est Maître de conférences en civilisation britannique et spécialiste de politique. Ses recherches portent en particulier sur le Parti conservateur. Il est l’auteur d’une monographie intitulée Whatever Happened to Tory Liverpool?, co-éditeur de l’ouvrage Statecraft: Policies and Politics under Prime Minister Theresa May and Thatcherism in the 21st Century. Il co-édite actuellement le Handbook of the History of the Conservative Party pour Routledge. Il coordonne également le groupe de recherche spécialisé en études du conservatisme de la Political Studies Association.

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