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‘Dancing Between Raindrops’: Politics Education in the Sultanate of Oman 2012–20191

« Danser entre les gouttes » : enseigner le politique au Sultanat d'Oman 20122019
الرقص بين القطرات‟: تعليم السياسة في سلطنة عمان 2012–2019”
Leon T. Goldsmith

Résumés

L'évolution de l'enseignement du politique dans le Sultanat d'Oman de 2012 à 2019 est ici analysée à partir d'une observation participante de cinq années. L'objectif est de mettre en lumière l'importance et les implications des nouveaux programmes explicitement liés aux disciplines du politique, introduits à l'université du Sultan Qaboos peu après les manifestations du « Printemps arabe » qui ont secoué le pays en 2011. L'argument présenté est que l'Oman se trouve à un moment charnière de sa politique éducative dans le domaine des sciences humaines et sociales. L’alternative entre le repli sur des programmes centrés sur l'État et non critiques, courant dans les systèmes autoritaires du Moyen‑Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord, et la poursuite de l'ouverture partielle vers un enseignement qui permettrait de mieux armer la prochaine génération de dirigeants omanais afin de faire face aux défis qui les attendent, constitue l’enjeu abordé par cet article.

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Introduction

1When it comes to political and intellectual freedoms most interpretations of the Arabian Peninsula imagine an arid region. This perception extends to education and especially education in political studies or critical social sciences. Indeed, public universities in the Gulf monarchies are more readily labelled regime instruments than ‘critic and conscience of society’. This image of an intellectual desert does not, however, fully capture a reality that is more complex. The educational history of the Arabian Peninsula is rich, with informal education systems existing in the region well before the establishment of the modern oil monarchies.2 Centres of Islamic scholarship flourished in the Hijaz, Yemen and the Omani interior for centuries. In the 19th century modern multidisciplinary schools were established by the Ottomans, American missionaries, multinational merchants and progressive (modernist) ‘ulamā.3 In this sense, educational pluralism in the Arabian Peninsula was not entirely dissimilar to other parts of the Middle East that have often been considered more dynamic and revolutionary, such as Syria and the Levant.4

  • 5 Shaw, 1993, p. 23; Bahgat, 1999, p. 127.
  • 6 Romani, 2009, p. 1.
  • 7 Anderson, 2012, p. 774‑777.
  • 8 See for example, The Economist, ‘The unlikely rise of book fairs in the Gulf: Can literary culture (...)

2Since the 198os it seemed that the Arab Gulf states were in fact surpassing the rest of the Arab world to sit at the vanguard of an accelerating Middle Eastern educational revolution.5 Over a hundred additional tertiary education providers were established in the 2000s alone in the GCC countries.6 The policies of Arab Gulf governments to diversify knowledge economies led to massive spending on education for nationals as well as openness to hosting international think tanks, research centres and foreign university campuses.7 Enormous international book fairs have become commonplace in most Gulf capitals involving international and regional academic publishers. Despite all this the impression persists, not without some validity, that within the highly authoritarian political environment of the Arab Gulf these educational and intellectual developments must be subject to co‑optation, state supervision or are aimed purely at impression‑building.8

  • 9 Richards, et al., 2013, p. 270.
  • 10 See for example, Campante & Chor, 2012.
  • 11 Richards, et al., 2013, p. 283.
  • 12 Mohamed, Gerber & Aboulkacem, 2016; Anderson, 2012.

3Against this perception the main purpose of this article is to contribute a small but important addition to the literature on the evolving educational and intellectual landscape of one of the less known Gulf monarchies, the Sultanate of Oman. Oman is a relative latecomer to modern, structured educational systems but has been identified as achieving some of the most rapid educational progress in the Middle East.9 Given its steep trajectory of educational transformation in the space of a single generation, Oman could be considered a critical case for addressing wider questions around the intersection of education and politics in the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab world. While researchers have described the impact of frustrated Arab youth with ‘too much education and too little opportunity’,10 or the formation of a “dangerous” class of educated unemployed,11 less has looked at the substance of that education and the impact of different educational approaches and curricula on the unfolding politics of the Middle East. The need for an ‘educational revolution’ has been identified by some scholars as the missing plank in the transition from authoritarianism to pluralism since the tumultuous events of the Arab Spring.12

  • 13 al‑Suqrī, al‑Kindī & al‑Kindī, 2017.

4The research is informed by participant observation from September 2013 until August 2019 when the author was one of the faculty members of Sultan Qaboos University’s (SQU) new political science department. The main themes that emerged from this period of observation and participation was that there is far greater space permitted for substantive politics education in Oman than could be expected in an absolute authoritarian political context. At the same time fundamental contradictions remain between emergent open and critical educational approaches,13 and longstanding national narratives, carefully and repetitively inculcated through a highly authoritarian state education system.

  • 14 Sabour, 2001.
  • 15 Al‑Ma’alolī, 2016.
  • 16 Richards, et al., 2013, p. 311; Mazawi, 2011.

5In the modern Middle East politics education has been firmly anchored for the most part in objectives of nation‑building, manufacturing a loyal citizenry, and maintaining the rule of autocratic regimes.14 With few exceptions, the task of innovation and decision‑making over different options for political and economic development has been the exclusive realm of minority ruling cliques and coalitions. Thus, education in Politics was limited to instilling singular narratives of the 'nation', its history and the main actors in this story. In the Arab republics educational narratives focused on great nationalist struggles, post‑colonial revolutions or anti‑western and anti‑Zionist rhetoric.15 In the Arabian Peninsula, more specifically, these narratives have been about benevolent and wise state‑builders, miraculously lifting humble tribal‑desert societies into prosperity and modernity in the space of a few decades. All other innovative and critical questions related to politics and society were circumscribed.16 Over time, in both the republics and monarchies these narratives inculcated in Arab education systems steadily hollowed out and could no longer satisfy the intellectual appetites and frustrated aspirations of rising generations.

  • 17 Muasher, 2011.
  • 18 AlKawākibī, 1901.

6The political opening presented by the Arab Spring in 2011 was hindered by a striking inability by protesters to articulate and institutionalise tangible alternative political ideas, partly explainable by educational deficiencies over the preceding decades. This made the task of counterrevolution easier for the incumbent autocratic regimes, or for Islamist parties, with well‑established ideologies and networks, to move past the youthful protesters to occupy vacant political space. Hence, the real key to successful transitions lay in education and, more importantly, in the substance of education, including Politics.17 The conundrum that emerges is how to prepare for social and political change in the Middle East in the midst of an authoritarian era which precludes such preparation? The Syrian journalist‑activist ‘Abd al‑Raḥman al‑Kawākibī foreshadowed this dilemma when he wrote at the turn of the 20th century, “What is developed by slow and gradual education may be destroyed by powerful tyranny. How can a building be completed while it is being continuously destroyed?!”18

7The easy and discouraging assumption that most would draw is that it is impossible. It is possible however that relatively free politics education grows cautiously but persistently between the narrow cracks of otherwise watertight autocratic regimes. Also, there are puzzling contradictions between the absolute nature of political regimes and the presence of relatively open political discourse permitted or even prescribed in specific educational contexts. This study examines one such case, the Sultanate of Oman.

Methodology

  • 19 Heywood, 2007, p. 4.
  • 20 This terminology deliberately leaves aside the ‘political science’ formulation preferred in the Un (...)

8This study applies the modern dual definition of politics as both “the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live”, and ‘Politics’ (with a capital P) as the academic discipline that studies this activity.19 Therefore politics education for the purposes of the paper is any formal instruction in Politics or any other curricula that addresses the activity of politics.20

  • 21 Creshwell & Creswell, 2017.

9The research relies on secondary sources to sketch the historical and contemporary outlines of Oman’s political and educational context. The cross‑cultural and ethnographic dimensions of this study, including researcher‑participant relationships, and the subjective nature of interpreting political theory and practice is framed within a constructivist paradigm that acknowledges complexity and the diverse realities of experience.21 The study has followed a qualitative design, combining impressions from participant observation in Oman by the author, documentary and interview data, and preliminary data from recent comparative surveys of politics students at both Omani and New Zealand universities.

10The main contribution of the article arises from the author’s first‑hand experience of teaching Politics in Oman (from late‑2013 to mid‑2019). The period of work (or participant observation) in Oman coincided with the first seven years of tertiary politics education in that country in 2013–2019. This followed the official establishment of a Politics department at Sultan Qaboos University in Muscat in 2012. Thus, it was an opportunity to document and interpret the significance of this educational development.

  • 22 Forster, 2018, p. 1029.

11Given the perception of intellectual and academic restrictions, expatriate social science academics in the Gulf oil states are often considered transitory contractors delivering limited scope or politically sympathetic research and teaching at the behest of wealthy autocratic regimes.22 As such, as one western colleague commented in 2018, “I don’t imagine it would be possible to teach a proper IR [International Relations] course in Oman?” Another claimed, without having visited said department, that the “Political Science Department at SQU teaches very little Politics”. In a different sense, another colleague suggested that teaching Politics in such circumstances must be like “dancing between raindrops”. While the latter image does in fact have some merit as a reflection of the challenges, these types of perceptions, overall, stem from a presumption that there is a direct and obvious correlation between the type of political system and the nature of educational approaches and curricula in a country. This is of course a logical deduction to make but without direct experience it cannot be known for certain whether this assumption is accurate.

  • 23 Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 314.
  • 24 Ibid, p. 316.
  • 25 Mahzarin & Greenwald, 2013.

12Hence, as ethnographers say, “[t]here is no substitute for getting out of the armchair, getting your hands dirty, and observing first‑hand what it is that you are writing about in its natural setting”.23 The necessity of observation and indeed participation allows for a deeper and ultimately more meaningful understanding of the nature and limitations of politics education in Oman. Participating in daily routines over an extended period of time (i.e. five years teaching politics in Oman), watching what happens and listening to what is said, and observing reactions to what you present as a teacher, allows for “thick description” of the social and political lives of subjects and the environment in which they live. 24 As always in participant observer ethnographic studies, there is a risk of losing objectivity regarding the subject of study. It should therefore be acknowledged up‑front that the author, having been part of the educational journeys of dozens of young Omanis over several years, most likely retains both an automatic and reflective partiality in regard to their interests, aspirations and welfare.25 This acknowledgement should be taken into account in interpreting this account.

13The rest of the paper follows three main sections. First, it explores the historic and contemporary context of the decision to establish politics education in Oman, second it documents the evolution of the department’s curriculum and institutional profile in its first years, and finally it evaluates the substance of politics education in Oman using data from Politics students in New Zealand as an approximate point of reference.

The Context of Politics Education in Oman

14Prior to the 1970s structured formal education, in a western sense, was seen as unimportant and even actively discouraged in Oman, let alone any thought given to introducing Politics as an academic discipline. As late as 1958 a visiting British undersecretary raised the idea of a major school building programme with Sultan Said bin Taimūr (r.1932–1970). The sultan is said to have responded:

  • 26 Beasant, 2013, p. 129.

And what will they do once educated? Apart from traditional pursuits such as farming and fishing there will be nothing, generally speaking, for them to do…don’t you know your own country’s history? You built schools for the masses in India! And then look what happened. Once educated they threw you out!26

Educational expansion and state consolidation

  • 27 Takriti, 2013b.
  • 28 Tariq returned from the exile imposed by his brother in 1970, was married to a German, and was rep (...)
  • 29 National Statistical Department, Statistical Year Book, Issue 1, 1972, p. 9.

15Change to Oman’s traditional educational landscape began in 1970 when Sultan Said’s son, Qaboos bin Said (r.1970–2020), came to power via a palace coup. Qaboos was primarily a military man, trained at Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, and he understandably devoted most of his early attention to the rebel insurgency in Dhofar that had persisted since 1965.27 Qaboos initially depended heavily on his British advisors and also his father’s brother Tāriq bin Taimūr — who was installed by the British as prime minster — for many internal developmental policies.28 In contrast to his father, and now with the benefit of a vastly increased income from oil exports, Qaboos’s government launched massive development programmes including school building and education programmes. A ministry of education was established and generously resourced to see to the urgent education needs of the Omani people. In 1970 there were only three schools in all of Oman with 900 students. By 1973 there were sixty‑five schools with 24,335 students. 29 This represented a massive and rapid investment in education.

  • 30 Townsend, 1977, p. 155.
  • 31 Newsinger, 1998.

16Qaboos’ British advisors suggested that the new education curriculum should be designed so that graduates could populate a professional civil service and “begin to play a useful part in government,” and that this was especially warranted, they suggested, because government would be the major employer of Omani school leavers for many years to come.30 The implication was for a curriculum that paid attention to the mechanics of government and law, administration and public policy. While the British may have encouraged Qaboos to imitate their civil service, this did not extend to promoting actual democracy. In fact, Britain played a leading role in defeating alternatives to an absolutist sultanate system in Oman by aiding in the defeat of the socialist popular front insurgents in Dhofar by 1976.31

  • 32 Takriti, 2013a, p. 261‑263.

17According to historian ‘Abdul Razaq Tākritī the consolidation of British‑backed sultanistic rule led to a sterilisation of political thought in Oman.32 Since the mid‑1970s with the unification of the country under the rule of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, education related to politics and history did indeed become homogenised and dogmatic and content in the curricula of schools, colleges and universities espousing Oman’s “brilliant renaissance” became ubiquitous.

‘Technical’ tertiary education

  • 33 Farmer, 2016.
  • 34 NCSI, Oman Statistical Yearbook, Issue 45, 2017.

18The first university in Oman, Sultan Qaboos University (SQU), was opened at Al‑Khoudh, north of Muscat in 1986 after it was constructed by a British company with close connections to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.33 From the beginning the curriculum for higher education in Oman was dominated by technical, scientific and quantitative disciplines mostly unrelated to politics education. This remained true until recently. For example, in 2016, across the tertiary sector, only 2,335 Omanis graduated with degrees related to society and culture, creative arts, or religion and philosophy. This represented slightly more than one per cent of all graduates in that year. In contrast, in the same cohort over 80 per cent of graduates attained degrees in management and commerce, engineering, health, information technology or the natural and physical sciences.34 This is not to suggest that graduates of technical and vocational disciplines are not capable of political thought or action, on the contrary. However, students in these fields would not experience a daily intellectual confrontation between their expanding theoretical and comparative awareness of politics, and the restrictive political realities of their country, as would students studying Politics explicitly.

  • 35 Townsend, 1977, p. 154.

19Another factor that was important in determining a market for politics education was the question of recruitment in the public sector. In theory a professional civil service would be self‑reproducing with recruitment based on qualifications and merit, independent of the political preferences of elected officials. However, in the newly established ministries in Muscat ministers, themselves appointed by the sultan, presided over the recruitment of ministry staff.35 This had the effect of encouraging nepotism and loyal patronage rather than meritocracy. An Omani Politics student commented to the author in this regard, “You know Dr., the problem [is] with the wāsta system and with the distribution of tribal powers inside the ministries.” This is of course a familiar story for most of the Middle East states and indeed authoritarian systems everywhere, but in terms of creating demand for educated personnel, knowledgeable in politics, law and economics, it was significant in Oman.

Changing regional dynamics

  • 36 GCC‑STAT, https://gccstat.org/en/statistic/statistics/alphaindex/g.
  • 37 Excluding the foreign campuses of international universities, these include: UAE University; Zayed (...)
  • 38 Boughanmi & Khan, 2019.

20Oman’s lack of attention to politics education is not unique in the Arabian Peninsula. Despite a combined population of around 55 million and GDP of 1.6 trillion USD,36 across the six states of the GCC only a handful of tertiary institutions offered any explicit form of politics education in 2019.37 Grounding in political theory and practice was not necessary for the elites, bureaucrats, academics and subject‑citizens of the Gulf States who interacted within oil‑fuelled neo‑patrimonial systems;38 moreover, the zero taxation policies of the Gulf States excluded the foundation stone of most state‑citizen social contracts. While these rentier systems remained relatively stable, there was little pressure to change political or educational templates.

  • 39 Al‑Saqrī, 2018.

21However, the shock of the Arab Spring combined with sharply declining oil prices in mid‑2014, and as a result of the global COVID‑19 pandemic in 2020, brings growing urgency for ruling elites to change their economic systems through top‑down reforms. Until now, reform policy and rhetoric has mostly focused on diversification away from oil dependency, bringing nationals into the productive workforce, gradual introduction of value added taxes, removal of subsidies, and scaling back bloated public sectors.39

22Among the Gulf monarchies Oman is at the vanguard of the need for economic restructuring. Oman has felt extra urgency due to its dwindling oil reserves and the collapse of global oil prices in 2014, which essentially halved the value of its remaining reserves. Most crucially, increasing budget deficits mean the government will struggle to accommodate a ballooning youth demographic with high expectations and feelings of entitlement to "fitting" work in the public sector. Hence Oman may be the first Gulf state to experience widespread popular calls for political reform, especially as the country begins its transition from a half‑century of increasing prosperity under Sultan Qaboos who passed away in January 2020. While Qaboos invested heavily in education and public sector employment, the country had no explicitly politics‑related curricula in its secondary or tertiary curricula until 2012. This was one year after the first serious rumblings of discontent were seen in protests that flared across the country in January–October 2011.

The Emergence of Politics Education in Oman

  • 40 Takriti, 2013a, p. 261‑263.

23The first semi‑organised and modern politics courses in Oman were possibly the ‘political education seminars’ held in the late‑1960s and early 1970s amongst Dhofari rebels in the mountains behind Salalah. Here fighters were introduced to Marxist‑Leninist, Arab nationalist and Maoist ideology and theory with accompanying critiques of ‘imperialist capitalism’ and liberal ideas.40 Albeit one‑sided, this introduction to political education incubated different debates about how to reconcile traditional culture and religion with the atheist fundamentals of 20th century‑socialism. Over the following decades of national reunification and state building such critical theory curricula in domestic education was mostly frozen until at least 2012.

Externally educated Omani Politics graduates

  • 41 Oman Statistical Year Book 1997.
  • 42 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2019.
  • 43 Oman Statistical Year Book 2000.
  • 44 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2019.

24By the 1990s a number of Omanis started to travel abroad to study Politics and other related subjects due to the lack of opportunity to study at home. In 1997, 269 Omanis were registered in ‘Economics & Political Science’ university programmes outside Oman, with nearly half of them (124) studying in Jordan.41 Some were sent to study security and intelligence doctrine, according to one government source.42 A smaller number of Omanis (18) went to study Politics in the United Arab Emirates around the turn of the century.43 It appears that many of these foreign‑trained Politics graduates struggled to find government employment. One Politics graduate, who studied in Jordan in the late 1990s, failed to find employment in Oman for the entire 2000s — he finally obtained a non‑politics‑related job in 2011 as part of the ‘50,000 job policy’ that Sultan Qaboos granted following the January–October protests.44

  • 45 This was a common theme of a survey the author conducted among Omani IR and Politics postgraduates (...)
  • 46 Oman Statistical Year Book, 1998.
  • 47 Lee, Foster & Smith, 2016.
  • 48 Anonymous interview, 2019.

25Several factors are relevant to the challenges faced by foreign‑trained Politics graduates to find employment in the 1990s and 2000s. First, there were already general unemployment problems in the 2000s (which played a large part in the protests that broke out in early 2011). Another factor was that the Jordanian Politics programmes were in Arabic, which disadvantaged these graduates compared to English language‑trained graduates, who are valued in Oman’s public sector. It is possible also that the Politics qualification itself was viewed with uncertainty by government employers, where managers and supervisors are often jealous of qualified employees.45 However, it should be noted that many Omani Politics students who studied overseas received government scholarships (i.e. 77 Politics students were in receipt of scholarships in 1996/97), 46 which indicates that the government was not adverse to the Politics qualification per se. However, permission was required from the Ministry of Higher Education for Omanis to study Politics abroad — even for privately funded studies. It should also be considered that Oman was not immune from negative employability trends for Politics graduates, globally, due to the qualification’s lack of an explicitly vocational nature.47 Finally, and most importantly, the rampant nepotism that had come to permeate government employment in Oman by the 1990s meant that merit and relevant qualifications weren’t always the major recruitment consideration for government employment in any case.48

The Omani Spring and political reforms

  • 49 Johnson, E.B. 2015, p. 32‑62.

26The Gulf monarchies were somewhat insulated from the turmoil of the Arab Spring by their vast oil wealth that propped up the existing rentier social bargain. Along with Bahrain, Oman was however at the vulnerable outer extremity of this insulating bubble of oil wealth and the country was severely shaken by a series of protests. Known as the Green Marches, these protests and public demonstrations pulsated in intensity across different parts of the country for nearly nine months between January and October 2011.49

  • 50 Ibid, p. 56‑60.

27In general, demonstrators’ frustrations were directed at corruption, nepotism, and lack of transparency in the allocation of oil and gas revenue. Hence, protester demands included more employment opportunities in the public sector, raising salaries, lower prices for basic goods, action against corruption and a larger share of Oman’s oil wealth for ordinary Omanis.50 This was not a revolutionary moment seeking to overturn the political system, but rather a demand for a fairer redistribution of the existing system. The unsustainability of the existing rentier system (i.e. patronage linked to a finite oil resource) was not really acknowledged or recognised in the main protest discourse. This was partly the result of a lack of alternative political ideas and the ‘sterilisation’ of politics education from the mid‑1970s until 2011. Yet, amidst the main roar of demands for jobs and opportunities, quieter calls for political reforms were made, including demands for an increased role for the elected Majlis al‑Shūra (lower house of Oman’s parliament) to channel wider political participation and provide oversight of government ministries. There is evidence that those handful of Omanis who had studied Politics abroad had some impact on these calls for political reform. This is discussed below.

Demands for politics education

28In January 2011 an Omani civil society group based in Muscat, calling itself ‘Tawāsul Global Connections Center’, provided an individual submission for the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Oman for the UNCHR. In the standard format of United Nations UPRs the Tawasul submission contained summaries and recommendations related to human rights, civil liberties, freedom of the press, the legal and judicial system, discrimination, and women’s and cultural rights. In addition, however, the final article of the Tawasul submission referred to ‘freedom of specialization’ and politics education, as follows:

  • The Council for Higher Education prevents public and private universities from teaching political science in Oman, including foreign universities operating in the country.
  • There is also a perceived concern among some sectors of the population that acquiring a degree in political science or international relations abroad requires prior permission from the higher education authorities.
  • Recommendations: Restriction on teaching political sciences must be lifted with immediate effect. 51
  • 52 Sunil Vaidya, “Shura will shape future of Oman,” Gulf News, Oct. 15, 2011.

29It is noteworthy that the author of the submission was one of those Omanis who had travelled abroad to study Politics in the late 1990s, and moreover, had received a government scholarship for their studies. The same individual ran for the Majlis Al‑Shūra elections in October 2011 on a platform promoting an “Omani‑style democracy”.52

  • 53 The Basic Statute of the State: Majlis al-Shura Documents for the 7th Term, October 2011–September (...)

30There was substantial interest and expectation surrounding the 2011 elections due to the energising effect of the Arab Spring and, more specifically, due to the fact that demands for an upgrade to full legislative powers of the Majlis Al‑Shūra had been granted via a major amendment to Article 58 of Oman’s Basic Law (1996). Previously, the Majlis had a purely consultative function within the government. In theory at least, after 2011 the Oman parliament had the powers of introducing legislation and oversight of government ministers via interpellation and budgetary controls. 53

  • 54 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2020.
  • 55 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2019.

31Around the same time a royal decree was issued calling for the establishment of a Political Science department at the national university, SQU. Whether or not this decree came as a result of the UN submission and the demands for a lifting of restrictions on Politics education is not one‑hundred‑percent certain. A group of Omani academics from the College of Arts at SQU also claim to have ‘approached the Palace about launching a Politics major’ in 2011.54 Either way, a consultative committee was formed, including representatives of government departments and the heavy involvement of military and security agencies, to discuss the opening of a Political Science department at SQU.55

Politics education begins in Oman

  • 56 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2020.

32Initially, the new department was scheduled to be placed in the SQU College of Arts, where new courses were already being planned, starting with a ‘History of Diplomacy’ paper. Interestingly, when the time came to launch the programme, the Dean of the College of Arts declined on the basis that they did not have the faculty to offer the courses. The University Council approached the College of Commerce about hosting the new programme, and they also declined but were pressured to accept.56

33By mid‑2012 the Political Science Department was formally established by SQU’s University Council, and the College of Commerce became the ‘College of Economics and Political Science’ (CEPS).

34The establishment of the Department was met with excitement by students and older Omanis alike. Many school leavers applied for entry into the programme, some at their own initiative, and others at the behest of parents, many of whom believed the programme would provide prestige (or maybe even wasta) that would advance job prospects in the government sector. Others had harboured longstanding personal interests in Politics but never had the opportunity to study it (in Oman) themselves. In addition, students attempted to transfer from other academic programmes to Politics in 2012.

35I was interviewed for a position in the new Politics department in Malaysia in mid‑2013 by a delegation from SQU. Amongst the questions raised in the interview was my honest opinion of Oman’s monarchy. I had to admit that I knew very little about it, even as a graduate specialised in Middle East Politics — such was/is the extent to which Oman flies under the radar in Middle East studies. Another colleague, employed at the same time, confirmed that he was asked the same question. It was unclear how the new department was going to integrate into existing educational offerings, approaches and the overall political framework. Expatriate staff in the University Language Center, for example, refused to deliver English language courses for Politics students because their contracts explicitly stated that they should not discuss politics (eventually a compromise was reached whereby they would teach language skills in the context of political economy and business).

  • 57 Heywood, 2007, p. 4.

36Formal undergraduate classes in Politics did not commence until Spring 2014, although a Master’s programme in International Relations and Security Studies catering to government employees, mostly from the intelligence and security branches, had already commenced in 2012/13. The undergraduate Politics programme became bifurcated between IR and political science courses. The former was considered the safer option and course work focused on international affairs, theoretical generalities, and the positive image of Oman’s neutral foreign policy. The other side of the programme was seen as ‘riskier’. I had the uncertain task of designing and delivering the early courses in Politics (Introduction to Political Science and Introduction to Comparative Politics) — essentially the types of courses which would fall within the definition of Politics, set out above, as the academic discipline which studies: “the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live”.57 Despite the “risky” perception of these courses, neither the University or the government officially circumscribed any particular teaching topics or research areas.

Government engagements

37The establishment of the new political science department was greeted with enthusiasm by different government institutions. In the period 2014–2019 collaboration was initiated with numerous ministries and government agencies. Government representatives gave lectures to students at SQU and student delegations visited institutions, mostly at the instigation of the Political Science Department. The most welcoming and accessible institution was the Majlis Oman and its two components, the Majlis al‑Dawla (appointed upper house) and the Majlis Al‑Shūra (elected lower house), both of which hosted students‑staff delegations on numerous occasions. This positive engagement carried substantial opportunity in terms of initiating practical educational pathways for well‑qualified recruits to enter into the civil service or political practice with solid grounding in Politics practice and theory. However, it came at a time when the public sector was being frozen or cut back due to the budget crisis that started in 2014 due to collapsing global oil prices.

  • 58 This was possibly due to the fact that most masters students were in the employ of the Oman securi (...)

38For the most part government institutions were forthcoming and receptive to students who, especially in 2014–15, were eager and excited to express their interest and ideas on politics. There were occasions, however, when it was clear that lines were being breached. For example, students initiated a political forum in 2015 and invited delegations from the MoFA alongside some social media personalities who were considered activists. In this case a senior MoFA director expressed displeasure and made firm verbal suggestions to the Department about guiding students toward prudence and caution. In other cases, students questioned the veracity of official data whilst on a visit to the National Center of Information and Statistics (NCIS), which led to one student receiving an informal message of warning from the intelligence services. And on another occasion the Department had a visitation by security officials from the Royal Diwan after two visiting German scholars had raised discussion points on sub‑national, sectarian and tribal affairs in a master’s class.58 As far as the author is aware, in all of these examples no formal action was taken against any student or faculty member.

Balancing identities and politics

  • 59 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2019.
  • 60 Al‑Ghamārī, 2016, p. 73.

39Great care is taken at the national level to maintain a balanced representation of sub‑national groups among educational faculties, stakeholder committees or student cohorts from the primary to tertiary levels. One of the earliest alumni of SQU explained how in 1987 dormitory allocations were carefully designed so that students would be rooming with students from other parts of the country rather than their home regions.59 And according to government officials, membership of committees, tasked with setting curriculum and textbooks in schools, have long been carefully calibrated to balance representatives of sub‑national groups so as to reduce potential for tendentious or so‑called ‘extreme’ ideas to creep into education in different parts of the country. In short, sub‑national solidarities (‘asabiyyah) are both balanced and discouraged from crystallising in the context of education.60

  • 61 Most students entering the business and commerce programme required a 65 per cent final high schoo (...)
  • 62 Anonymous interview, 2019.

40It would be reasonable to assume therefore the same level of diligence was applied towards mitigating potential biases in the learning and teaching of Politics in Oman from 2012. Students for the new programme were drawn from all parts of the country, genders and different socio‑economic backgrounds. At first students from other colleges, including Law and the Arts were also permitted to enter the programme for elective courses. Interestingly, stringent academic criteria for entry into the programme led to a sizable female majority among the first cohorts.61 Later, male applicants benefited from a gender‑based quota system (50/50), which effectively created a lower threshold for entry into the Politics degree programme for males.62

  • 63 SQU Graduation List, 2018.
  • 64 Hallward & Muellers, 2019.
  • 65 Takriti, 2013a, p. 264.

41In late 2017 the first domestically trained Omani Politics graduate received her degree after being interviewed live on Oman TV. Astonishingly, however, she did not find full‑time employment until late 2018 and when she did it was in the private sector, not in government or politics‑related areas. When the first main batch of twenty‑eight Politics students graduated in 2018, the top ten of the best‑performing students by cumulative grade points average (CGPA) were all female.63 However, none were snapped up by the government sector institutions and many went on to postgraduate studies instead. A number of males on the other hand were selectively recruited for the security and intelligence apparatus. This raises important questions regarding gender politics in Oman and the contradiction between the government’s stated commitment to gender equity and the ongoing reality of discrimination.64 Interestingly many of the most assertive and academically successful female students came from supposedly conservative Sunni‑dominated Dhofar. It is interesting to note in this regard that the early critical politics education that occurred among rebels during the Dhofar war also gave rise to questions of gender politics. At that time, many Dhofari women enthusiastically adopted new ideologies, often fought alongside men, and in the Wadi Nahīz area the local women, not without opposition, “declared themselves equal in every way with men”.65

The employability dilemma

42Politics graduates who had studied abroad in the 1990s had struggled to strongly penetrate public sector employment barriers. In the mid‑2010s this dynamic was repeated amongst the first cohorts of domestically educated Politics graduates. When the first cohort of Politics students at SQU discussed employment opportunities with the author in 2014 they talked about the need for adequate supplies of ‘vitamin wow’, a nickname for wāsta (connections to influential people). Students were dismayed to be told by a senior official, during a field excursion to the Ministry of Manpower (Labour) in 2015, that there were “no longer jobs available in the government sector and that they should all start businesses instead”. This came at the peak of Oman’s budget crisis when new recruitment, salary increases and promotions were frozen by the Ministry of Finance. However, the telling aspect was how the senior official couched his imperative in terms of capacity rather than merit; that government employment was exhausted and job‑specific qualifications or even large doses of ‘vitamin wow’ would not make any difference. On the bus back to SQU exasperated students (mainly females) questioned why they were being trained to work in government and politics when it seemed likely to make no difference to their employment prospects in that sector!

43Politics students were not alone among the growing waves of graduating youth who were entering an extremely challenging job market after 2014. However, Politics graduates felt especially marginalised and helpless. In early March 2020 the twitter hashtag #العلوم_السياسية_تخصص_بلا_وظائف (#Politics students without jobs) trended briefly in Oman with nearly 2000 tweets. One twitter account posted (in Arabic):

  • The government knows about political science students
  • The university knows about political science students
  • Institutions know about political science students
  • The general public know about political science students
  • But does anyone have a job for us?
  • No one is ignorant of political science students and their ignorance is not my problem66

44Despite the emerging employment challenges faced by graduates (especially females), by 2019 Politics was reasonably well established as an academic discipline at the tertiary level in Oman’s national university, SQU. It had a full programme of undergraduate and postgraduate offerings in IR, security studies and comparative politics. But returning to the assumptions of western colleagues described above, what is the substance and objective of that education? Is it possible to teach a proper Politics or IR course in Oman? And is it possible for faculty and students to ‘dance between raindrops’ (i.e. to navigate the political restrictions) to be able to examine and explore, past, present and future political options? Also, what attributes do Politics students have to offer the Omani public and private job market?

The Substance of Politics Education in Oman

  • 67 Oman Basic Law (1996), Article 41.

45In 2019 Oman sat at a cross roads. Across the previous four decades the Omani regime had looked to inculcate strong loyalties to a unified Omani nation and the person of Sultan Qaboos. Similar to Thailand’s Les Majeste laws, Omani law forbids any criticism of the Sultan, whose person is “inviolable.”67 As the figure at the apex of the political system this presents obvious challenges and limitations around teaching and studying politics in the Omani context.

Persistent indoctrinating Politics education

  • 68 SQU website, Omani Contemporary Society (SOCY1001). http://sisinfo.squ.edu.om/cgi‑bin/crs‑en/clook (...)
  • 69 SQU website, Oman: State and People (SOCY1005). http://sisinfo.squ.edu.om/cgi‑bin/crs‑en/clook.cgi (...)

46In 2019 much of the education curriculum related to Politics remained embedded within the functions of socialisation and indoctrination. For example, all SQU students, regardless of their major, are required to take University Requirement courses from the sociology and history departments, which essentially repeat and reinforce what students are taught at school about Oman’s politics and history. Course descriptions included such doctrinaire and uncritical language as: “This course aims to enlighten students with the reality of contemporary Omani society focusing on the Renaissance and the path to modernization and comprehensive development”.68 Another course on Omani state and society, “aims to shed light on the state's administrative system and the foundations of the Omani Renaissance … based on the thought of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said”.69

  • 70 Anonymous interviews, 2019.

47Of course, it should not be surprising to see such explicit attempts by authoritarian states to act as agents of socialisation to shape unified and ‘compliant minds.’ However, the intended effect is becoming increasingly diluted and possibly even counterproductive. Students describe these required courses as “boring, repetitive” and consisting of memorisation without critique or debate. On the other hand, the cumulative effect of indoctrinating generations with veneration of the personal qualities of Qaboos is that many Omani youth profess to ‘love Qaboos more than they love Oman’.70 This sentiment is possibly more profound in the geographic extremities of the country, especially Dhofar in the south and Musandam in the north where regional loyalties remain strong but Sultan Qaboos was extremely popular. The important point is that whether students absorb educational propaganda or recoil from it, until now there has been little public dialogue, which can facilitate exploration of the basic political options in the era beyond Sultan Qaboos.

Innovating Politics?

48Between 2014 and 2019 Omani students at SQU were exposed to various types of politics education, which opened intellectual and practical doors into politics, whilst maintaining awareness of the realities of Oman’s absolute monarchy. Students experimented with proxy party politics (parties are officially banned in Oman), election scenarios, constitution‑building group exercises and parliamentary legislative role‑plays. All of which provided opportunities for students to practice and explore basic political options, both in the abstract and for Oman specifically.

49The first official Politics course at Sultan Qaboos University, ‘Introduction to Political Science’, was delivered in the Spring semester of 2014. In the first lecture, which involved eighteen students (twelve female and six male; a mismatch caused by the high entry criteria and the superior academic performance of females), I explained how my country, New Zealand, was a constitutional monarchy before asking their thoughts on Oman’s type of political system, expecting them to say full monarchy, sultanate or something similar. A male student raised his hand and confidently declared, “Dr., Oman is a democracy!” This was received with nervous laughter by other students. It was well‑known that classes were regularly observed by intelligence services directly or by proxies. Despite this awareness classes proceeded normally according to a fairly standard Politics curriculum with Western textbooks and resources, combined with basic Arabic political philosophy from Ibn Khaldūn and others.

50At the end of that first semester, having studied four main themes: political ideas, political structures, political progress, and politics of the world, students embarked on an election exercise, which involved four campaigning and competing ‘social groups’ (in lieu of political parties) representing different social classes and functions, including: rural workers, rural landowners, urban workers, and urban merchants. Despite instructions to not depict their groups as political parties, most did, with the group representing urban merchants, espousing a classical liberal ideology and calling themselves the “Freedom Party”. These exercises, which by cultural necessity were conducted in gendered groups were an opportunity to highlight differences of ideology and tradition between females and males. Yet, it was interesting to observe minimal systematic variation in attitudes towards democratic, secular/religious or traditional values. If anything, the main source of divergence occurred along urban‑rural lines, with the latter generally more socially conservative than the former.

51In another exercise in the 200‑level ‘Introduction to Comparative Politics’ course, students were asked to form constitution writing committees and draft constitutions for the continent of Antarctica, which would be submitted to a referendum involving all class members. This was an extremely important insight into the political preferences of a cross‑section of young Omanis three years after the start of the Arab Spring. All students engaged in scenarios with enthusiasm. One of the draft constitutions in late 2014 opened with the declaration:

52We the People of the Antarctica Federation, in order to establish a legitimate and democratic state, implement justice, ensure welfare to the citizens, and for the sake of a modern state, and well distributed power, we establish this Constitution [sic].

53At that time most other constitution drafts included similar democratic and participatory language albeit in various unitary parliamentary or constitutional monarchy forms. Females tended to opt for more democratic models than males, but were no more inclined towards secularism than their male counterparts.

54Overall, the excitement and eagerness of students to learn about different forms of politics and participation, especially democracy, was palpable in 2014 and 2015. However, by 2019 similar exercises revealed a great deal more conservatism or pessimism. Most groups adopted semi‑ or fully authoritarian political systems or, as one group proposed, a 15th century Italian “Doge” system. This illustrated a knowledge of history and politics but also a level of cynicism — interestingly this draft constitution won that semester’s referendum.

55It became clear that the post‑Arab Spring optimism had dimmed significantly among Omani youth in view of the lack of progress in Oman’s political reforms. The tragic unfolding situations in Syria, Libya and Yemen, the democratic reversal in Egypt after 2013, and the apparent decline of western liberal democracy in North America and Europe, also impacted perceptions. Nevertheless, Politics students continued to display eagerness to pursue knowledge and skills surrounding political innovation. In 2019, students held a semester‑long legislative exercise which employed a Westminster‑style parliamentary process to draft new legislation. The choice of social and public policy issues revealed the areas where students felt that exploration of different options was necessary in Oman. Draft legislation included: ‘Activating Protectionism’, ‘Facilitating FDI’, ‘Anti‑Corruption’, a ‘Constitution Court’ bill, and most controversially (between military and non‑military families) a ‘Military Spending and Privileges Reduction’ bill. What was also interesting was that these draft bills, which were debated and voted upon in plenary sessions, contained a diversity of often directly opposing policies; for example, to enact national economic protectionism versus facilitating more foreign direct investment.

56It is noteworthy that’s senior female students were offered and accepted the roles of Prime Minister and leader of the opposition. Other students expressed discomfort about the way that adversarial parliamentary party politics ‘made them feel’ in a culture that values consensus and consultation. Overall, senior Politics students embraced and came to understand the principles of parliamentary debate, process, protocol and professional conduct in legislating law.

57At the institutional level transformation was occurring. In 2015/16 CEPS entered into international accreditation processes with the European education standards authority, EQUIS (in which they were ultimately successful). This process forced CEPS to think hard about what type of graduates we were producing, including in Politics. The essential attributes can be summarised as follows:

  • 71 CEPS Self‑Assessment Report, EQUIS, July 2018.

58Work ethic, positive values, intellectual independence and autonomy, independent lifelong learning and research, good citizenship qualities, consciousness of national identity and social responsibilities, engagement in community affairs and mindfulness of contemporary issues.71

59It is clear that there was an emphasis on a mixture of critical, independent and innovative attributes and state‑centric national values.

Comparing Politics education in Oman and New Zealand

  • 72 The survey titled ‘Students' Experiences of Politics Education’ was carried out online in May–June (...)

60Surveys conducted in mid‑2019 compared fifty Omani and fifty New Zealand‑based Politics students according to a series of questions asking students to rank their conceptual and qualitative understandings of Politics. The results presented here are drawn from a summary of the preliminary analysis. 72

  • 73 Hague, Harrop & McCormick, 2016.

61Students were surveyed after having taken similar courses with similar topics and even the same Politics text book.73 When asked to rank the importance of the concepts: Democracy, Power, Legitimacy, Authority, Ideology, Stability, a majority of both sample populations saw concepts of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘democracy’ as being the most ‘important’ political concepts. The concept that was considered most ‘positively’ amongst both groups was stability, which was unsurprising for the Omani students, given regional turbulence, but was less expected for the New Zealanders who could be expected to take such things for granted. There was almost total consensus in both Oman and New Zealand that some form of politics education or civics should be included from primary school onwards for the benefit of the country.

62Students also experienced similar misgivings about the content of politics education and the job opportunities that might come from it. One Omani student, responded, “They should make many workshops for the students to improve their abilities in politics[‑related] jobs.” And another commented, “Increase the practical courses!” These comments mirrored a desire among New Zealand students for more practical and vocation‑focused curriculum. One respondent asked for Politics content to be “[m]ore practical rather than theory” and another suggested, “Politics … needs to have more policy‑based papers. A lot of it is ideological based and looking at political systems”. Overall, the study revealed very few substantive differences in the way that politics education was delivered, received or conceived between Omani and New Zealand Politics students.

63Anxiety over employment was, however, far more acute among Omani respondents, who often regretted having studied Politics at all, or bemoaned the continuous corruption or wāsta permeating the job market in Oman. Hence, comments from different Omani respondents reflected deep misgivings in this regard: “wāsta [is] needed to get a job”; “Unfortunately there [are] no jobs for us”; “I wish I didn't take political science as a study path. It makes my life miserable and it didn't [allow] me to fulfil my ambitions”. The most pertinent comments, which were not reflected in any of the New Zealand responses, illustrated the contradictions that still reside in politics education in Oman. One commented “[Politics] was a great experience but the perceptions of the society should be changed”. And more saliently another respondent summed up the dilemma of politics education in an authoritarian state: “I do not feel my degree will qualify me to build a better future for Oman because I believe the system does not allow me to practice politics”.

Conclusion

64Near the end of my time in Oman in 2019 I had a conversation with an Omani government official. We discussed the future of the Politics department. His view was that the programme, its current students and graduates were secure provided “they did not try to suggest changes to the political system in Oman”. If this view is representative of the wider government position, as Oman looks to deal with changing internal and external circumstances, the prospects for the ‘raindrops’ of unrestricted exploration of innovative political ideas, to become a ‘downpour’ appear bleak.

  • 74 Al‑Haj, 2000; Rabi, 2002.; Al‑Farsi, 2013.
  • 75 Erlich, 2015.

65Assumptions of an arid climate for politics education in the Arab Gulf states are, paradoxically, both justified and overly simplistic. In the Oman case, there is evidence to suggest that a real opening of the intellectual and political arena is yet to arise. On the other hand, genuine space for politics education did open up, as described above regarding the Politics programme at SQU. This may lead to a tension between Oman’s absolute authoritarian political system and the accompanying indoctrinating educational curricula, and new (partly granted) demands for opportunities for innovative and unrestricted politics education. The major question for Oman, and the rest of the transforming Gulf Arab states, is whether the contradiction between the indoctrinating and innovating forms of politics education will be resolved in favour of eliminating the former or the latter? Youthful populations imbued with nuanced awareness and knowledge of politics can be effective incubators for reform and innovation, as was seen with those few international Politics graduates who came back to Oman from the 1990s. The economic, political and social challenges facing Oman in 2020 are severe and will be exacerbated by the global pandemic. The Oman government should consider accelerating its policy of “gradualism” in moving towards greater political participation.74 In managing this difficult transition it has a valuable resource in its newly educated cohorts of Omani Politics graduates (male and female) who are enthusiastic, qualified and civic‑minded. For Oman, and the Middle East, it is increasingly clear that well‑educated youth will be a major factor in determining the country and the region’s future shape.75

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Notes

1 Corresponding author: Leon T. Goldsmith, University of Otago, Politics Programme, New Zealand, leon.goldsmith@otago.ac.nz (Previously Sultan Qaboos University, Department of Political Science).

2 Profanter, 2011, p. 1257.

3 See Arabian Humanities Special Edition: “Education in the Arabian Peninsula during the first half of the Twentieth Century.”

4 See for example, Talhamy, 2011.

5 Shaw, 1993, p. 23; Bahgat, 1999, p. 127.

6 Romani, 2009, p. 1.

7 Anderson, 2012, p. 774‑777.

8 See for example, The Economist, ‘The unlikely rise of book fairs in the Gulf: Can literary culture thrive in the absence of free expression?’ 4 Jul. 2019, Print edition.

9 Richards, et al., 2013, p. 270.

10 See for example, Campante & Chor, 2012.

11 Richards, et al., 2013, p. 283.

12 Mohamed, Gerber & Aboulkacem, 2016; Anderson, 2012.

13 al‑Suqrī, al‑Kindī & al‑Kindī, 2017.

14 Sabour, 2001.

15 Al‑Ma’alolī, 2016.

16 Richards, et al., 2013, p. 311; Mazawi, 2011.

17 Muasher, 2011.

18 AlKawākibī, 1901.

19 Heywood, 2007, p. 4.

20 This terminology deliberately leaves aside the ‘political science’ formulation preferred in the United States to avoid the circular debate over whether the study of politics can actually be ‘scientific’. See Danziger, 2012.

21 Creshwell & Creswell, 2017.

22 Forster, 2018, p. 1029.

23 Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 314.

24 Ibid, p. 316.

25 Mahzarin & Greenwald, 2013.

26 Beasant, 2013, p. 129.

27 Takriti, 2013b.

28 Tariq returned from the exile imposed by his brother in 1970, was married to a German, and was reputed to frequent the Beirut cabaret scene. See Townsend, 1977, p. 79.

29 National Statistical Department, Statistical Year Book, Issue 1, 1972, p. 9.

30 Townsend, 1977, p. 155.

31 Newsinger, 1998.

32 Takriti, 2013a, p. 261‑263.

33 Farmer, 2016.

34 NCSI, Oman Statistical Yearbook, Issue 45, 2017.

35 Townsend, 1977, p. 154.

36 GCC‑STAT, https://gccstat.org/en/statistic/statistics/alphaindex/g.

37 Excluding the foreign campuses of international universities, these include: UAE University; Zayed University; Kuwait University; King Saud University; Doha Institute; Applied Science University, Bahrain; the University of Sharjah; Sultan Qaboos University.

38 Boughanmi & Khan, 2019.

39 Al‑Saqrī, 2018.

40 Takriti, 2013a, p. 261‑263.

41 Oman Statistical Year Book 1997.

42 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2019.

43 Oman Statistical Year Book 2000.

44 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2019.

45 This was a common theme of a survey the author conducted among Omani IR and Politics postgraduates in 2017.

46 Oman Statistical Year Book, 1998.

47 Lee, Foster & Smith, 2016.

48 Anonymous interview, 2019.

49 Johnson, E.B. 2015, p. 32‑62.

50 Ibid, p. 56‑60.

51 Tawasul Global Connections Center, Submission to the UNHCR, Article 8(b) (Jan. 2011).

52 Sunil Vaidya, “Shura will shape future of Oman,” Gulf News, Oct. 15, 2011.

53 The Basic Statute of the State: Majlis al-Shura Documents for the 7th Term, October 2011–September 2015, First Edition, 2013, Article 58 [bis 1‑44], p. 31‑41.

54 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2020.

55 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2019.

56 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2020.

57 Heywood, 2007, p. 4.

58 This was possibly due to the fact that most masters students were in the employ of the Oman security apparatus.

59 Anonymous interview, Muscat, 2019.

60 Al‑Ghamārī, 2016, p. 73.

61 Most students entering the business and commerce programme required a 65 per cent final high school grade in Arabic, Maths and English, whereas Political Science entrants required 80 per cent.

62 Anonymous interview, 2019.

63 SQU Graduation List, 2018.

64 Hallward & Muellers, 2019.

65 Takriti, 2013a, p. 264.

66 Twitter, 7 March, 2020, translated by the author.

67 Oman Basic Law (1996), Article 41.

68 SQU website, Omani Contemporary Society (SOCY1001). http://sisinfo.squ.edu.om/cgi‑bin/crs‑en/clook.cgi?CC=SOCY1001.

69 SQU website, Oman: State and People (SOCY1005). http://sisinfo.squ.edu.om/cgi‑bin/crs‑en/clook.cgi?CC=SOCY1005.

70 Anonymous interviews, 2019.

71 CEPS Self‑Assessment Report, EQUIS, July 2018.

72 The survey titled ‘Students' Experiences of Politics Education’ was carried out online in May–June 2019.

73 Hague, Harrop & McCormick, 2016.

74 Al‑Haj, 2000; Rabi, 2002.; Al‑Farsi, 2013.

75 Erlich, 2015.

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Leon T. Goldsmith, « ‘Dancing Between Raindrops’: Politics Education in the Sultanate of Oman 2012–2019 », Arabian Humanities [En ligne], 13 | 2020, mis en ligne le 10 juillet 2020, consulté le 29 mars 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/cy/5913 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/cy.5913

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Leon T. Goldsmith

University of Otago, Politics Programme, New Zealand

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