Introduction

2During the twentieth century, the formalisation of modern state-building based on territorial sovereignty (Agnew 1994: 71, Paasi 2003: 113–16, Peluso and Lund 2011) required the clear definition of political borders. This led to the gradual narrowing of frontier space, reducing the boundary between the two political entities to a single line. This interfered with the territorial perception of the frontier communities, which were based on communal rather than interstate relations (Gottmann 1973: ix, see also Elden 2013: 68), and disrupted ‘border cultures’ (Donnan and Wilson 2020: 12) based on political, economic and social ties that had existed along the loosely defined political border (Huber 2020: 29). This notably affected the livelihoods of herders because the existing system of trans-frontier pasturing was no longer permitted (Bauer 2004: 83, 189).

3Owing to the distances involved and the composite terrain, connectivity to administrative centres remained underdeveloped until recently, particularly on the southern side of the Himalayas. Poor connectivity and cultural barriers instilled a ‘sense of political and social separatedness and otherness’ (Donnan and Wilson 2020: 11) among frontier communities. Economic alternatives to a cross-border existence have remained limited. Special bilateral political arrangements securing at least a degree of the previous cross-border mobility have allowed the frontier population to partially retain their established way of life.

5The tightening of controls on the Nepal–China border and the adoption of extremely radical restrictions on border traffic have recently been reinforced due to two natural disasters: the earthquake in Nepal in 2015 and the COVID-19 pandemic. China skilfully used these disasters to serve its national interests and to boost its influence in the Himalayan borderlands. Both events led to the complete sealing of the China–Nepal border. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, the closure lasted up to four years in some areas. The border became impassable, posing new challenges for frontier communities in the Himalayas and affecting not only their lives and livelihoods but also the Nepalese government’s stance towards them.

6This paper offers insight into the development and change of hierarchies of control over cross-border mobility along the China–Nepal border, resulting from the gradual increase in China’s influence along its Himalayan border. China’s growing involvement is demonstrated by the tightening of regulations in treaties concerning China–Nepal cross-border mobility and by the COVID-19 border closure. The latter irreparably affected borderland infrastructures as well as the social and economic systems of borderland communities; this subsequently led to the introduction of new regulations for cross-border mobility, prompting the Nepalese government to precipitate the development of infrastructural connectivity with its northern frontier.

7The data presented here come from fieldwork conducted at individual border crossings during periods of major border traffic restrictions. Repeated annual visits (each lasting several weeks) to the border districts of Taplejung, Sankhuwasabha, Mustang, Sindhupalchok, Rasuwa and Humla were made between 2016 and 2017 and between 2021 and 2025. Except for Humla, where the weather conditions did not allow for direct access to the border, checks were made at all other local border-crossing points. In addition to the observation of the local situation and cross-border traffic, interviews were conducted with the borderland population, local ward chairmen, district-level administrators and members of the Nepal Police and Nepal Armed Police Force.

Cross-border mobility control after the founding of the PRC

9It is worth noting that this treaty did not specify the exact borderline or the routes and passes that were to be used to cross it. Additional diplomatic notes accompanying the agreement introduced further limitations on the Nepalese presence within Tibetan territory. These included the withdrawal of military escorts and restrictions on contact between Nepali and Tibetan people. One such measure was the conversion of the Nepalese Primary School in Lhasa into an institution reserved exclusively for the children of Nepali nationals, which excluded Tibetan and other children.

10It is most likely that border crossings and travel routes were not specified in the first treaty between Nepal and the PRC due to the absence of a clearly demarcated borderline. Instead, the frontier area functioned as a ‘de facto border in the absence of control’ (Chansoria 2024) – a loosely defined ‘neighbouring’ contact zone (Zhang and Saxer 2017) with a unique sociocultural and administrative ecosystem. The border between Nepal and the TAR was first negotiated in the Nepal–China Border Agreement signed on 21 March 1960 and then formally defined by the Boundary Treaty between the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal, signed on 5 October 1961 (Office of the Geographer, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States of America 1965, Anupam 2020), before being demarcated. A fixed borderline allowed for stricter regulation to govern interactions across the frontier.

11On 19 May 1964, a Trade Agreement between the Government of The People’s Republic of China and His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1964) limited cross-border mobility for frontier populations to a 30-kilometre corridor along both sides of the boundary. Within this corridor, traditional small-scale trade and bartering were permitted and were exempt from taxation and other formal trade regulations between the two countries. Nearly two years later, on 2 May 1966, the Agreement between the Government of The People’s Republic of China and His Majesty’s Government of Nepal on Trade, Intercourse and Related Questions between the Tibet Autonomous Region of China and Nepal amended the treaty signed in 1956. It specified that the inhabitants of border districts had to use customary routes when crossing the border and had to ‘register at the border checkpost or the first encountered duly authorised government agency of the other country’ (article 1/3). The agreement also introduced a clause regarding transport services across the border, stating that porters ‘need to hold certificates issued by the local governments of their respective countries or their authorised organs for a period of not more than one year and register at the border checkpoints of the other country’ (State Council of the PRC 1966: article 1/5). Although this suggests that controlled movement across the border was allowed in theory, local accounts indicate that the Nepal–Tibet border was actually sealed for at least part of the Cultural Revolution period.

• 6 The authors’ translation.

hold border resident certificates issued by the authority concerned and register at the border checkpost or the first government-authorised agency encountered, before carrying out activities in the border districts (article 1/3)6

13It was further stipulated that inhabitants of border districts would ‘not be allowed to proceed to the interior of the other country’ (article 1/3). Lastly, motorised and non-motorised service porters can enter the designated border area and operate there when holding either a border resident certificate or another identity certificate issued by local authority and after registering at the relevant border checkpost (article 1/6).

nationals of either country shall not be allowed to engage without permission in such activities as herding, grazing, farming, hunting, felling trees and picking medicinal herbs in the territory of the other country. Any violation of this shall be handled by the host country according to its laws (article 4/2)

15Furthermore, the agreement governs interactions between local officials on both sides of the border. These officials could ‘hold meetings and exchange information as and when necessary’. In order to participate in the meetings, the:

• 10 Global Law. 2002. 中华人民共和国政府和尼泊尔国王陛下政府关于中国西藏自治区和尼泊尔之间的通商和其他有关问题的协定 [Agreement between the Government (...)

local officials of either country shall travel to the other country for such meetings with entry–exit passes of the border district or identity certificates affixed with the pictures of the holders, issued by the authorized agency of their own government and recognized by the other government (article 7/3)10

16The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the gradual restriction of movement on the border and ultimately led to the complete closure of borders for all individuals, with no further explanation or negotiation. China used this situation, along with its economic and political dominance over Nepal, to unilaterally define new conditions for border reopening and cross-border mobility.

• 12 The authors’ translation.

forge a firm sense of community among the Chinese nation, carry forward the spirit of the Chinese nation in defending the unity and territorial integrity of the motherland, enhance citizens’ sense of nationhood and homeland security, and construct a common spiritual home for the Chinese nation.12

18It also encouraged the collection and cataloguing of historical documents and objects related to border demarcation (article 11). Local governments were instructed to constitute

• 13 The authors’ translation.

defence teams for safeguarding the security of national borders, and to support and cooperate with the border guards in their duty, control and management work…Citizens and organisations shall support the activities of border guards in their duties and control, and provide them with facilities or other assistance (article 23).13

20Although border regulations in the above-mentioned treaties and agreements between the PRC and Nepal establish identical conditions for cross-border movement on both sides, in practice it was primarily Nepali citizens living in border districts who benefited from more relaxed rules on entering the neighbouring country. On the PRC side, the application of these provisions was far more restrictive – for example, the latter were limited to specific cross-border communities who live in villages straddling the border, such as Kimathanka.

Asymmetrical neighbourhood relations

24Growing Chinese control over the frontier territory and cross-border traffic is demonstrated by the following example. When Agni Prasad Sapkota, then speaker of Nepal’s House of Representatives, visited the Zhangmu–Kodari border after the COVID-19 pandemic in December 2021, he walked to the middle of the bridge over the Sun Khosi river, which divides the two countries, to observe the border. The place where he stood was still within Nepalese territory, but since the COVID-19 closure, China had begun to control the entire border corridor on both sides of the river. Chinese discontent was subsequently demonstrated through additional restrictions on heavy-goods vehicles crossing the border into Nepal. On the day after Sapkota’s visit, the number of vehicles allowed to pass dropped from the usual seven or eight to only three (Pyakurel 2021).

The local impact of sealing off border crossings

25Chinese infrastructure development in frontier areas has generated new employment opportunities – not only in trade but also in the hospitality, tertiary and building sectors. These opportunities have been taken up largely by residents of Nepal’s border districts. Employment is difficult to find on the Nepalese side of the border, and wages in China have become significantly higher than in Nepal. Infrastructure development on the Chinese side has therefore served as an additional incentive for residents of Nepal’s border districts to turn to China and to set up businesses that rely on cross-border movement and transboundary livelihoods. Consequently, any restrictions on movement have had severe consequences. For a better understanding of how border crossings are managed – and of the impact that sudden border closures can have on the livelihoods of local populations – the following section examines recent developments at some of the most frequently used crossing points between Nepal and the PRC. The examples also illustrate the hierarchies of control responsible for the management of cross-border movement, showing the PRC’s increasing dominance.

26Before their closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic, several border crossings operated in each of the 14 Nepalese frontier districts. Under the new regulations, China allowed only a single crossing in each Nepalese district; therefore, by 2024 only 14 border crossings had reopened (Pradhan and Shakya 2025, Ptáčková unpublished: see figure 1). The crossings mentioned below were among them.

Nyalam–Kodari

27The Nyalam–Kodari or Zhangmu–Kodari border crossing formerly served as the main trade route from Lhasa to Kathmandu. In the 1960s, with Chinese funding, expertise and labour, the old caravan route was upgraded and became a road suitable for motorised traffic. Up until 2014, it was the only road between Nepal and China accessible to motor vehicles (Murton 2016). Prior to 2002, Nepali traders and residents of neighbouring villages could travel to the market town of Zhangmu (Nyalam), about seven kilometres inside the border, to buy Chinese products for resale in Nepal. In 2012–2013, growing intervention by the PRC in border movements led to the construction of a new market on the river that divides the two countries. Nepali citizens continued to cross over to shop or work as helpers in the new market halls, using daily entry permits. Up until April 2015, traders and drivers were still allowed to travel to the old market town of Zhangmu (known as Khasa in Nepali) and to stay there for a few nights under similar provisions.

29In addition to the environmental challenges (Murton 2016) that clearly played a significant role in the decline of the Nyalam–Kodari crossing, locals offer another explanation for China’s failure to push for its rapid reopening. According to them, during Chinese rescue operations following the earthquake, flyers promoting the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence were found among the ruins of houses on the Chinese side. This incident contributed to China’s reassessment of its borderland policy. The authorities used the opportunity to close the border, resettle residents from the Chinese side of Zhangmu in Shigatse (Murton 2016) and shift the main crossing point to Rasuwa. As a result, the Nepalese part of Tatopani was abandoned, and since then it has never been fully restored.

30China cited the severe damage to the road at Kodari as grounds for its haste in completing the Kyirong–Rasuwa crossing for motorised vehicles. However, it has repeatedly promised that the border point of Nyalam–Kodari will soon be in operation again. In Nepal, both the authorities and the public have long hoped for its reopening, pending a formal statement from China, and politicians have echoed these expectations. For example, the reopening of the Nyalam–Kodari border was one of the key objectives of the then Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal during his visit to China. He raised the issue at a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the fringe of the Boao Forum for Asia, held in Hainan province on 23–27 March 2017, and received yet more assurances regarding the reopening.

Kyirong–Rasuwa

34The closure of the Nyalam–Kodari crossing in 2015 precipitated the shift of cross-border motor traffic to the Kyirong–Rasuwa border checkpoint. The latter, viewed from the Chinese side as a strategic part of its Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network and part of its international Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Karki 2022: 151–186), subsequently became the primary route for the main freight traffic between the PRC and Nepal.

36The Kyirong–Rasuwa border crossing was in fact opened in haste. China pushed for a 2014 opening even though the road between Rasuwa and Kathmandu was unstable. Due to fragile rock formations along the route, the area is prone to landslides, making it difficult to keep the road open during the monsoon period. Moreover, basic border infrastructures are lacking. Unlike at Zhangmu where goods are transferred close to the border, Nepalese vehicles at Rasuwa have to travel 26 kilometres to PRC territory to be loaded. In addition, various conditions are imposed on drivers of heavy goods vehicles. Since Zhangmu–Kodari had long been the only main crossing accessible to motor vehicles, almost all the vehicles used to carry goods and materials across the Nepal–China border were owned by citizens of Sindhupalchok and Dolakha border districts. When the main freight traffic shifted to Rasuwa, China imposed a new condition: only drivers registered in Rasuwa district would be permitted to cross the border and to travel to Kyirong. This destroyed livelihoods, severely affecting the haulage businesses of those who for years had depended on cross-border freight traffic. Many drivers who had already invested heavily in heavy goods vehicles were eventually forced to spend even more money to purchase land in Rasuwa and to obtain a migration certificate from their place of origin to seek residency in the district.

37Locals report that the Nepalese border has to adopt Chinese time and its calendar. Office hours operate according to Beijing time, which is two hours and fifteen minutes ahead of Nepal, and observe Chinese public holidays. This contrasts with daily routines on the Nepalese side of the border and limits the scope of cross-border activity. Local requests to adapt operational arrangements to come into line with the Nepalese context and to avoid having to follow Chinese rules have gone unanswered. Altogether, these obstacles suggest that the priority of the Chinese is not the smooth running of cross-border traffic but the consolidation of full control over the frontier.

Riwu–Olangchung Gola

39If the 2015 earthquake and the COVID-19 pandemic posed serious challenges for populations dependent on cross-border mobility in Kodari and Rasuwa, they proved disastrous for border communities in mountain areas with no road access to inland Nepal. One such community is to be found in Olangchung Gola in the eastern Nepalese Himalayas. Olangchung Gola and Yangma are the only two villages in Ward 7 of Phaktanglung Rural Municipality, Taplejung District. In 2022, there were 63 households in the area (Ganden 2022: 8).

40Historically, Olangchung Gola lay on a trade route (Ganden 2022: 12) along which wool and salt were exported from Tibet, and grain and yak products were imported from there. These traditional goods were later replaced by modern consumer products. The main trading centre was located in the Liu valley within the PRC’s Tibetan area. In contrast to Kodari or Rasuwa, modern infrastructures have not yet reached Olangchung Gola which lies about only 20 kilometres from the Chinese border. As the local community’s livelihood largely depended on cross-border activity, and in particular trade, establishing a stable relationship with the PRC was a priority.

45Aid has increased significantly alongside the expansion of infrastructures on the Chinese side of the border. Following the 2015 earthquake, officials from the neighbouring Chinese border district provided spot deliveries of basic food items, such as rice and tea to the Nepalese border districts, which were enough to support local households for almost a year. After the border was sealed due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, supplies of rice, oil, tsampa, sugar, flour and other goods began arriving on the Chinese side of the border. Members of the local government in China would inform the ward chairman in Nepal of the delivery schedule, and he would then pick up and distribute the goods among households in the area.

47The closure of the border had a severe impact on the local household’s economy. Not only were many inhabitants of the border districts deprived of their livelihoods as cross-border traders or workers seeking employment in China, but the reduction – or complete interruption – of deliveries of food and household items from China also led to price increases, as all goods had to be transported via a longer and logistically more complicated route from Nepal.

49The border closure created problems not only for importing goods into mountain communities lacking stable infrastructural connectivity to Nepal but also for exporting products. In previous years, traditional products, such as woollen carpets or wooden bowls, had found their way from Nepalese border districts to Tibetan markets in China. After the border closed, the market for local goods dwindled. In addition to the logistical difficulties associated with transporting goods to the heart of Nepal, there is no demand for the animal or agricultural products the mountain people are able to produce, as cheaper alternatives are readily available further south. As a result, mountain communities in Nepal found themselves effectively trapped between the mountain ranges and the political border.

Chentang–Kimathanka

50In May 2024 the Government of Nepal announced that Kimathanka in Sankhuwasabha, along with 13 other trans-Himalayan trade points along the Nepal–China border, had finally reopened after four years of closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Owing to the lack of infrastructures on the Nepalese side, the reopening ceremony – attended by Nepal’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Narayan Kaji Shrestha, and the Vice-Chairman of the TAR, Silang Nima – was not held at the border itself, but instead in Chentang on the Chinese side.

51The chief district officer (CDO) of Sankhuwasabha, who accompanied Mr Shrestha during the event, disclosed that the Nepalese Armed Police Force border post (comprising seven to nine staff members) is not located at the crossing point itself. While Chinese border guards are stationed directly at the crossing point, a corresponding Nepalese border post has yet to be established. The only active Nepalese security post is situated a few kilometres away. Moreover, the customs office has been relocated to Khandbari, the district capital, due to the lack of traffic in recent years, as well as the absence of adequate infrastructures at the border.

52Although logistical adjustments have become commonplace, especially due to the absence of cross-border traffic during the COVID-19 closure, central government officials appear to have been unaware of the limited Nepalese presence at the border. During an interview in September 2024, the CDO of Sankhuwasabha district received a call from the attorney general’s office enquiring about when the customs officer would be deployed to the Kimathanka border post. The CDO responded that it would only be possible to relocate the customs office to the border crossing if the Government of Nepal allocated sufficient funds to build the necessary infrastructures. Only then, he noted, could the Kimathanka crossing function properly as a trade and transit point.

53The absence of Nepalese border controls allows China greater scope to act in its own interests and to consolidate control over the entire frontier corridor. Moreover, it facilitates the uncontrolled sale and smuggling of highly sought-after goods. As in Olangchung Gola and Humla, residents of Kimathanka exported medicinal herbs, woollen rugs and livestock to Tibetan areas of the PRC. The main crops grown in Bhotkhola Rural Municipality are millet, maize and potatoes. Villagers sold these products to Tibetan buyers and then purchased rice and wheat from Nepal for their own consumption. According to Border Ward Chairman Chyaba, the price of millet in Tibet is three times higher than in Kimathanka, making it more profitable for residents to sell their produce than to eat it themselves.

55Local residents on the Nepalese side had eagerly awaited the reopening of the border crossing. According to Wang Chhedar Bhote, chairman of Bhotkhola Rural Municipality in Sankhuwasabha, the people of Kimathanka, Chyamtang, Chepuwa, Hatiya and other Bhotkhola settlements stood to benefit from sourcing food and daily necessities from China instead of Khandbari. Reaching these mountain villages on foot takes porters around five days. After the reopening of the border, however, cross-border mobility has been largely restricted by the Chinese, leaving uncertainty as to the extent to which supplies from China will actually resume.

56The Chentang–Kimathanka border crossing occupies a more favourable geographical position than, for example, Riwu–Olangchung Gola. It lies on the Arun River at an elevation of approximately 2,200 metres above sea level where there is no risk of altitude sickness. A single community originally lived on both sides of the river before the imposition of a political boundary. The ward chairman of Bhotkhola Rural Municipality recalls that about 20 years ago, Tibetans still came to Makalu Rural Municipality to work in fields in Nepal because, at that time, Nepalese living standards were higher than those of Tibetans in the PRC. Since China began to invest heavily in infrastructure development along the frontier and to provide large subsidies to the Tibetan population, the situation has reversed: people from Nepal have started crossing into the PRC to work on construction projects, including roads and even houses for local people.

58The Chentang–Kimathanka border crossing is intended to serve as the entry point for the future Koshi Highway, a PRC–India road link and part of the BRI network (see, for example, Rana 2020). The Koshi Highway and the Tamor Corridor, accessed via the nearby Riwu–Olangchung Gola crossing and representing the shortest routes between the PRC and India, currently seem to be competing for attention. Local Nepalese administrations are trying to attract interest from central government authorities and to secure priority funding for development projects. These days, it takes a sturdy four-wheel-drive vehicle a day or two to reach Chyamtang from Khandbari (approximately 100km away), and from there it is still a full day’s walk to the border. The construction of the road extension to the PRC border is underway; however, in 2025, it was still difficult to imagine this becoming a viable transport route for substantial volumes of freight. Several upgrades will be needed to convert it from a simple jungle track to a highway suitable for regular heavy traffic.

Purang–Yari

60The Karnali corridor was historically an important trade route linking Tibet and Nepal and, further south, with India. Salt from Tibet was traditionally exchanged for grain from the south via a bartering system. Other traditional goods exported to China included dairy products, yak or tahr wool, honey and timber (see for example Fürer-Haimendorf 1976, Budha 2021). These were later replaced by modern manufactured items, such as clothing made in Nepal or India. On the Chinese side, Purang (Chin Pulan) has long served as the main marketplace in the area. Shopkeepers from Simikot used to travel there to purchase goods, including food and household items, for resale in Simikot. Purang also offered employment opportunities in hotels and the building sector, with more job opportunities and higher daily wages than on the Nepalese side.

61The border closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic severely disrupted the cross-border way of life. Nepali workers with permanent jobs in Purang were given the option to stay there or to return to Nepal because commuting across the border was no longer permitted. Trade was also affected. The food products sold in Simikot had to be sourced from within Nepal or India, leading to higher prices due to increased transportation costs from inside Nepal. Several small shops in Simikot that had previously sold Chinese household goods were forced to close.

62An important source of income for people in Humla is the pilgrimage route over the Purang–Yari crossing to Mount Kailash, a sacred site for both Buddhists and Hindus which is located within PRC territory. The journey from Simikot to Mount Kailash covers approximately 250km, and the services that local residents provide for pilgrims and tourists offer a significant opportunity for them to earn an income. Most of the buildings lining the main road in Simikot are hotels and tourist facilities; in 2020 they suddenly emptied of all their guests, causing a major economic downturn. The Purang–Yari crossing remained closed until 2023. The majority of informants reported that they had not sought alternative sources of income during the three-year closure. Instead, they waited for the border to reopen, hoping to resume their previous livelihoods based on cross-border trade and tourism.

63The only notable change during the border closure was an increase in the sale of medicinal herbs collected in the Humla mountains. Herbs destined for the Chinese market had to be transported via Kathmandu before being sold. This imposed additional controls and costs on herb traders.

Conclusion

64Since the massive infrastructure development programme was launched by the Chinese government on the Tibetan plateau in the 2000s, there has been a marked contrast between the two sides of the border. In the mountain villages to the south on the Nepalese side, time seems to pass more slowly. Villagers continue to herd livestock and cultivate their fields, and only a limited range of modern materials and products can be found in areas with no reliable road access. By contrast, north of the border, the extensive road network that China has built has enabled the modern consumer market to extend into every corner of the TAR countryside.

65China is pursuing multiple objectives through the development of its frontier regions. One of these consists in raising the living standards of populations inhabiting remote areas of the Tibetan Plateau. However, politically speaking, this objective is firmly rooted in the assumption that citizens whose material needs are readily met are less likely to rebel against the regime and are more likely to express gratitude towards central government for its ‘gift of development’ (Yeh 2013). This acceptance is seen as ‘embracing’ the Communist Party of China.

66Improving living conditions in frontier areas not only targets the local population but also sends a signal to those living across the border. Although Nepalese observers witness the relatively comfortable lives of Tibetans in the PRC, they may question international reports of China’s suppression of the Tibetan minority nationality, and may even come to admire the Chinese political system for its capacity to achieve rapid development. These perceptions may also highlight the underdevelopment of Nepalese remote regions and the central government’s neglect of these regions. To some extent, this strategy appears to be succeeding on both sides of the border.

67Nevertheless, China’s large-scale infrastructure development along the border also appears to serve another strategic purpose. The construction of roads and settlements maintains Chinese territoriality and reinforces the presence of the Chinese state. The region is no longer seen as shared land used by traditional cross-border communities; instead, it has been physically and symbolically claimed by the state. As mentioned above, the modern infrastructures on the Chinese side highlight the relative underdevelopment of the Nepalese frontier, subtly reinforcing a narrative of Chinese superiority.

68Chinese material assistance – such as the delivery of food and everyday goods or CIDCA’s donation of heavy machinery to frontier regions – further reinforces the image of Chinese dominance. This may create the impression among mountain communities that the PRC government is more attentive to their needs than their own national government. Provisions from the CIDCA and other subsidy schemes are, however, not purely humanitarian in nature; they are part of a broader strategy to appease Nepali communities. In return, China seeks not only admiration but also greater tolerance of its territorial expansionism among the frontier population.

70The PRC’s growing political and economic self-confidence has led to a shift in decision-making hierarchies pertaining to cross-border mobility regulations. Since the founding of the PRC, both the drafting of mobility regulations and the enforcement of border controls have gradually shifted from Nepal to the PRC. These regulations have increasingly come into line with the PRC’s security interests or, to be more precise, the Communist Party of China, rather than with the needs of the frontier population. The general tendency has been to reduce the number of open border crossings and to limit cross-border mobility. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing global mobility restrictions enabled the PRC to impose a complete border closure, a move that countries with limited diplomatic leverage, such as Nepal, found difficult to challenge. China used this closure to revise its border policy, to strengthen its borders and to develop a new set of regulations consistent with its own security interests. These measures, implemented after the recent reopening, have completely undermined the remaining cross-border social and economic relationships in the region.

This paper is based on research undertaken within the project Migration and Us: Mobility, refugees, borders from the perspective of the humanities (Reg No CZ.02.01.01/00/23_025/0008741), co-funded by the European Union and by the Czech Academy of Sciences’ Oriental Institute’s research platform Power and Strategies of Social and Political Order.