1How and why does the Canadian Department of National Defence conduct stakeholder engagement, and how does this compare to France? This study addresses a gap in the literature as well as a general lack of comparative context available to defence practitioners in Canada. Drawing upon literature, government websites, and interviews with Canadian and French defence officials, the study analyzes how the Canadian Department of National Defence and the French Ministère des Armées engage with domestic academics, think tanks, and other leading defence opinion makers. The article begins by analyzing the different teams within the Canadian Ministry of Defence (MoD) whose primary purpose is to engage stakeholders, followed by a section that examines similar teams within the French MoD. We conclude with a comparative section that also examines what lessons, if any, the two countries can draw from each other.

2Based on our findings, we propose a common framework through which the why of our research question can be understood. This framework proposes that MoDs conduct stakeholder engagement for three main reasons. The first reason is for policy informing purposes, with the aim of drawing knowledge into the MoD from expert communities, such as academics and think tanks, to help solve the MoD’s policy problems and inform senior decision making. In Canada and France, this type of stakeholder engagement also aims at nurturing the growth of a local defence studies academic community, often through funding. This ensures that the pool of strategic thought from which the MoD can pull knowledge will grow in the future. The second reason is for Scientific Innovative purposes, in order to find cutting-edge solutions to the armed forces’ science and technological needs. This type of stakeholder engagement also gives funding to expert communities, though it is closer to a contract, given that the recipients must have a more tangible end product than policy-informing funding. Lastly, MoDs engage stakeholders for information disbursing purposes, pushing out knowledge about the military or MoD with the aim of informing, influencing or educating key individuals and organizations, therefore contributing to the overall public “debate” on defence issues. It is important to note that while some of the organizations we observe fit neatly into only one of the above categories, others may fit in more than one. One example is the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program, whose raison d’être is clearly rooted in policy informing stakeholder engagement, but which also lists “contributing to the Canadian public’s understanding of defence and security issues” as one of its three priorities (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2020a, 6). This means that at least some of the activities it carries out resemble information disbursing stakeholder engagement as well.

	Information Disbursing	Policy Informing	Scientific Innovation
Canada	• ADM(PA) Stakeholder Engagement Team	• Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS)	• Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS)
France	• DICOD – Defence Correspondents Program • EMA-Com • SGA-Com • IHEDN	• DGRIS • Club Phoenix • Pact for Higher Education (PES) • IRSEM	• DGA theses aid • Defence Innovation Agency (DIA) • Innovation Defence Lab (IDL)

Conceptualization

3The first term needing conceptualization is Ministries of Defence (MoDs), due to their complex structures that contain a myriad of subordinate entities. In Canada, some examples include the three operational elements, namely the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Air Force, and Royal Canadian Navy on the military side, and Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) (ADM(POL)) on the civilian side. Many of these individual sub-units have their own teams and methods to engage stakeholders. In order to be parsimonious, we will not attempt an exhaustive analysis of all efforts by all parts of MoDs to conduct stakeholder engagement. We will instead only examine teams that operate at the national and cross-service level, not delving into individual operational elements or other sub-units.

4The second task is to conceptualize both the terms “stakeholders” and “engagement”. As we found out when contacting defence personnel, stakeholder engagement is a concept that has not yet “travelled” between countries or even between different parts of the Canadian government. For the purpose of this study, we define stakeholders as domestic university professors, academic researchers, policy analysts from think tanks or other research bodies and institutes, and leading influential thinkers. Many of these individuals speak publicly, lead networks, conduct research on defence, or teach university-level classes on the subject. In the definition of stakeholders, we also include “future influencers”, the types of individuals found in “top 30 under 30 lists”, and university students, especially at the graduate level. In contrast, we are not examining MoD teams that interact with the media, the general public, film, the defence industry, lobbyists, celebrities, or marketing. While the teams we examine occasionally interact with foreign stakeholders, we focus on those whose activities are mostly domestic.

5When it comes to the term “engagement”, we are referring to small-scale activities that engage stakeholders individually or in small groups. This includes sending military speakers to events, classrooms, conferences, hosting stakeholders at the MoD HQ where they receive or give technical briefs, or military base familiarization visits. We also define engagement as support given to students, professors, think tanks, institutes, universities, NGOs and other organizations in the form of grants, scholarships, or structured agreements. We will therefore exclude from this definition activities that target large numbers of individuals from the general public. For example, we do not examine TV advertisements, media relations, military parades, sporting events, and festivals as they engage large numbers of the general population. We also exclude from our analysis social media pages that belong to armed forces or MoDs, for similar reasons. While military recruitment is a by-product of the activities conducted by some of the teams we analyze, it must be their secondary task and is not the focus of our study.

Methodology

6In terms of a methodological and theoretical framework, we find some alignment with practice theory. From an ontological perspective, we find that practitioners inside MoDs and the “way in which they do things is essential to understanding macro phenomena such as order, institutions, and norms” (POULIOT and CORNUT 2015, 300). We examine for example how practitioners inside DND’s MINDS team and ADM(PA) stakeholder engagement team (SET) do their job and what types of activities they undertake to engage with stakeholders. In the case of the MINDS program, it is providing funding for stakeholders, organizing competitions, and evaluating applicant’s requests. From an epistemological perspective, we align with most practice theorists by agreeing “on the importance of developing concepts and categories that can travel across cases, while not being so rigid to believe that this knowledge should mirror practices” (POULIOT and CORNUT 2015, 301). In our case we believe that the concept of stakeholder engagement, and the three-part framework we develop, which seeks to explain why MoDs conduct stakeholder engagement, is transferable across different countries. At the same time, we recognize that what we are developing is not a universal law, and that some countries’ MoDs have additional reasons for conducting stakeholder engagement, and therefore teams that will not fit in our framework neatly. One example in Canada from outside DND is the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement Team. While this team fits partly into our framework by engaging academics for policy informing reasons, it also acts in an “operational” fashion by engaging stakeholders as part of CSIS operations. This was evident for example during the Covid-19 pandemic when the CSIS team engaged academics in order to prevent theft by foreign actors of intellectual property related to vaccine development in Canadian universities (LATHEM 2020). This shows us that perhaps in future research a fourth “Operational stakeholder engagement” category could be added to our framework.

7While practice theory is open to a plurality of methodological approaches (ADLER and POULIOT 2011, 22), scholars agree that an inductive approach is often the most conducive, starting “bottom-up with the mundane out of which the social emerges” (POULIOT and CORNUT 2015, 302). In a similar fashion, this study relies on inductive methods, seeking to know how and why MoD practitioners do their jobs, and building a greater understanding of MoD stakeholder engagement from there. In our research we followed a pattern where we reflected on what we knew about Canada’s efforts to engage stakeholders, and then asked ourselves; how is this done in France, and how does this compare to Canada? We also sought to better understand the entirety of Canada’s efforts, not just those of ADM(PA)’s SET, and therefore interviewed officials from other teams within DND whose work also consisted of stakeholder engagement. When it came to France, we had no pre-existing knowledge of how stakeholder engagement was done by their MoD. There was also a limited amount of literature that allowed us to truly open up the “black box” of both the French and Canadian MoDs. Therefore, one of the main methods used in this study were semi-structured interviews with defence public affairs and policy practitioners. In the end we conducted seven different interviews in Canada, and two interviews in France, including one with a group of French officials from a number of different teams within the MoD. The level of our interviewees ranged from Director-General and Colonel down to the manager level. Interviews lasted approximately an hour each, and most were conducted over Zoom with one being conducted in-person.

8Our interviews were supplemented with extensive searches of the websites of both countries’ MoDs to place our findings into context. This search also yielded a number of publicly available documents that proved useful including grant application guidelines, annual reports of teams that conduct stakeholder engagement, a parliamentary report about one of the teams, and strategic guiding documents for others. Lastly, we are standing on the shoulders of giants by using the existing literature on Canadian and French defence studies outlined below to triangulate and confirm our findings.

Literature Review

9In France, several recent pieces of literature examine the field of defence studies domestically, and while it is not their main focus, they touch on the types of support that the French MoD gives to defence academics. Christophe Lafaye (2020) provides an overview of the field of defence history and also examines the role of the French MoD in supporting researchers, and places the contributions of IRSEM to French defence studies in context. Holeindre and Jeangène Vilmer (2015) bemoan the state of French defence studies, and provide a recommendation for the creation of l’Association pour les études sur la guerre et la stratégie (AEGES), a structuring body to help the field gain a foothold in France. Getting closer to our question, Jeangène Vilmer (2017) provides a deeper examination of the roadblocks to robust defence studies in France, and proposes ways in which the French MoD can encourage its growth. In Canada, Philippe Lagassé (2020) provides a personal analysis of Canadian defence studies and some of its challenges when interacting with and building expertise on defence. Meanwhile, in the context of civil-military relations, Stephen Saideman (2020) identifies think tanks and academics as some of the key holders of knowledge on Canadian defence, and covers how they (and other civilian actors) can hold the military to account. Getting much closer to our research question, Juneau and Lagassé (2020) cover DND’s efforts to bridge the gap between academia and defence policy makers. Their article explains the history of the programs DND has used to support academics over the years, and evaluates their successes and shortcomings.

10Our main contribution to the existing literature will therefore be to place Canada and France’s MoD stakeholder engagement efforts in a comparative context. Our secondary contribution will be to build upon existing literature by examining interactions between MoDs and defence stakeholders that go beyond solely the MoD policy groups interacting with just academics. We hope to build on this by including the role of public affairs and defence scientific teams in engaging stakeholders as well. At a much more general level, our work on stakeholder engagement lays the foundation for future research into how stakeholder engagement practices from the French MoD could be adopted by Canada, and vice versa. We hope therefore that this literature could be a useful contribution to the field of policy transfer (DOLOWITZ 2000). Besides the fact that this would address a gap in the literature, this could also prove to be useful for French and Canadian defence practitioners and defence academics.

Findings for Canada’s Department of National Defence

Policy Informing - MINDS

11The Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program was born out of a series of initiatives by DND’s policy group (ADM(POL)) to engage Canada’s academic community dating back to the 1960’s. Efforts began in 1967 when the Military and Strategic Studies Program was launched with the aim of supporting military and defence studies at Canadian universities. In 1994, this was replaced by the Security and Defence Forum, with an annual budget of $2.5 million and a mandate to fund 12 permanent centers in universities across Canada (JUNEAU & LAGASSÉ 2020, 213). In 2011, DND switched focus, deciding to pivot away from funding permanent university centers to a model that was more flexible and focused on allowing DND to draw on the most cutting edge and relevant expertise in a timely manner (JUNEAU & LAGASSÉ 2020, 214-215). This effort, named the Defence Engagement Program (DEP) had three main pillars; targeted engagement grants for events such as conferences, expert briefing series, which consist of inviting experts to DND to brief interested internal stakeholders, and scholarships for graduate students (JUNEAU & LAGASSÉ 2020, 217).

13Being made up of only six policy officials and two directors from ADM(POL), the MINDS team is compact. The team’s efforts are focused on promoting their various funding programs to potential applicants, assessing incoming grant applications, choosing winners, and evaluating the work being done by their currently funded collaborative networks and grant recipients. Despite their small size, the financial resources at their disposal allow the MINDS team to carry out an outsized amount of engagement for a team of their size. Through the nine current MINDS-funded collaborative networks, they have been able to mobilize dozens of Canadian academics to focus their research towards policy challenges relevant to DND, who might otherwise have been pursuing other research topics.

14Besides the collaborative networks, in its first year MINDS disbursed 45 targeted engagement grants of up to $50,000 each for a total of $1.7 million (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2020a, 12). These one-time funds helped organize numerous conferences, workshops and other events. In order to more directly channel new and cutting-edge knowledge to as many personnel in the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) as possible, MINDS also hosted 18 expert briefings at (NDHQ) DND’s Headquarters in Ottawa (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2020a, 10). At the same time, MINDS also organizes closed-door expert briefings, between DND/CAF executives and world-renowned academics like John Mearsheimer and Robert Kaplan. The closed-door meetings were a good opportunity for General Officers/ Flag Officers and senior DND/CAF executives to be exposed to some of the leading thinkers in International Relations.

15When ADM(POL) first developed the MINDS program, DND officials were unsure if it would be viable. While their budget increased by 88%, the MINDS team did not yet know if Canada’s defence and security academic community was large enough to support 9 new networks. Looking back after two years, officials in charge of the program are relieved that those fears did not come to fruition. There was a large amount of interest to form networks since the program’s inception, and from a diverse set of academic backgrounds. MINDS officials pointed out that some of the academics were new to studying defence and previously unknown to them. MINDS is therefore on track to achieve its goal of fostering and broadening the academic community that studies defence and security issues in Canada. Through the funding of dozens of conferences and workshops, MINDS also achieved its secondary goal of contributing to the Canadian public’s understanding of defence and security issues. The program is not without some challenges, however. In a recent internal survey of DND/CAF members, a surprisingly small number of individuals outside of a few key directorates knew about MINDS. However, those that did know about it, overwhelmingly indicated that they used its research to a great extent. Going forward, one of the key areas the MINDS team will focus on is making a larger part of DND/CAF aware of MINDS and how it can be of use to them. As a corollary to this, the MINDS team will need to ensure that they foster a deeper level of two-way dialogue between MINDS-funded researchers on one side, and consumers of this research within DND on the other. For example, defence academics are highly appreciative of receiving in-depth feedback on their publications from individuals within DND who work on the files they research.

Scientific Innovative - IDEaS

16IDEaS is a competitive funding program run by Defence Research and Development Canada, the branch of DND that employs defence scientists that “develop and deliver technical solutions to the CAF and DND” (GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 2021). IDEaS is different from MINDS in that the funding it provides is more like a contract, where applicants have to apply to a tender through the government of Canada’s buy and sell system. The funding is meant to cover costs including in the conceptual stage, prototype testing, and even product development (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2020b). Applicants are asked to address defence challenges from the hard sciences, with some examples being persistent maritime surveillance, CBRN hazard detection and planning, and collaboration of robotic systems (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2020b). A small number of IDEaS’ challenges, however, are also related to the social sciences (JUNEAU 2020, 218), and therefore receive applications from academics in that field. One example is the challenge to “recruit, retain, and reach 25% representation of women by 2026” (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2020b). One of the successful applicants was the University of Waterloo, which received $182,000 for a study on how to improve gender diversity in the CAF (PUBLIC SERVICES AND PROCUREMENT CANADA 2018). IDEaS also places emphasis on long term collaboration with academia, and similarly to MINDS, encourages the formation of three-year networks that can receive up to $1.5 million each and that must have a university as a lead (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2021a). The funding amounts, however, are much larger than MINDS, with $1.6 billion over 20 years earmarked for the program (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2021b). It is therefore not surprising that the IDEaS program also attracts applications from large defence companies like General Dynamics and Thales (PUBLIC SERVICES AND PROCUREMENT CANADA 2018).

17In their rationale IDEaS officials clearly see this program as a step in matching countries like the US, UK, and Australia, and point to these countries as recently having earmarked significant budgetary amounts for similar programs (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2018). In terms of measuring success, the decision whether to renew the IDEaS program funding will not be based on the number of contracts signed but on the actual augmentation of CAF and DND capabilities (JUNEAU & LAGASSÉ 2020, 219).

Information Disbursing - ADM(PA) Stakeholder Engagement Team

19The SET’s 2017-2020 strategy calls for engagements with three different categories of individuals; opinion leaders, diversity leaders, and future influencers (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2016a, 1). Examples of individuals that would fit into the opinion leader category include executives, analysts, and academics representing universities, think tanks, industry associations, private and public research and scientific organizations, NGOs, and community organizations. Examples from the diversity leader category include indigenous leaders, women’s organizations, multicultural associations and media, and LGBTQI organizations (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2016a, 1). And finally examples from the future influencer category could include university students, especially those at the master’s and PhD level who conduct research in fields related to DND priorities (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2016a, 1). In practice, however, the majority of interactions the SET facilitates daily is with defence studies academics and think tanks. This is however changing, and some regional offices, especially Vancouver and Montreal, have made broad in-roads in engaging organizations that provide advocacy for diversity issues such as gender, or that represent diaspora communities. An example at the regional level is the advisory council on diversity (ACD), an initiative started by the Vancouver office. The ACD is comprised of individuals from some of the largest ethnic communities in British Columbia, who once a quarter meet with the highest-ranking CAF officer in British Columbia, the Admiral in charge of the Royal Canadian Navy’s Maritime Pacific Fleet (MARPAC).

20The SET traces its origins back to the 1990’s, when National Defence Public Affairs Offices (NDPAOs) were established in regions across Canada. ADM(PA) operated alone in this field with the mandate of building relationships with regional opinion-makers (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2016a, 1). More recently, “the Canadian Armed Forces command and control structure changed to include joint regional headquarters – many of which introduced their own active stakeholder engagement programs, focused on community outreach in major population centres” (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2016a, 1). At the national level, with the establishment of ADM(POL)’s Defence Engagement Program followed by MINDS, the SET HQ team also found its self in a much more crowded operating environment. Co-ordination and resourcing challenges grew in 2012 “when ADM(PA)’s stakeholder engagement operations were reduced by six personnel across the country” (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2016a, 1). The cuts also included the closure of the NDPAOs in Halifax, Calgary and a satellite office in Winnipeg.

21Much of what the SET does is driven by public affairs priorities. The mission of SET is to “advance the understanding of Defence issues among the Canadian public through the engagement of stakeholders”; and the mandate is to “engage stakeholders who have the influence to help advance defence priorities” (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2016a, 4). While MINDS and SET will often engage the same stakeholders, on the SET side these engagements are much more “tactical” in nature. This includes sending DND/CAF speakers to stakeholders’ university classrooms, conferences, workshops, and podcasts. Often the speakers are commanding officers of internationally deployed CAF operations, who will speak from theatre via video, or in-person if they have recently returned to Canada. While the SET co-ordinates hundreds of speaking events each year, its involvement is not limited to sending speakers to external events, but it also regularly organizes its own. These include closed-door roundtables where stakeholders can get technical briefings from DND/CAF personnel in a Chatham House Rules environment at NDHQ or via VTC. The SET will also make an effort to connect stakeholders with opportunities to tour military bases and watch exercises. The hope is that these individuals will come away from these meetings or tours better informed about the CAF and therefore better able to speak to their networks, classrooms, and the media. SET hopes that engaging these stakeholders can be beneficial, as academics and other defence experts can act as translators and purveyors of defence knowledge to the greater public. When it comes to program evaluation, the SET is currently also implementing surveys to identify whether individuals that attended SET events have indeed become better informed.

22Unlike in MINDS, where one of the main metrics of success is how much useful research is produced, for SET the metrics of success are first; how large of an audience was reached, second; whether this audience became more familiar with DND/CAF after the engagement, and third; whether their perception of the DND/CAF improved. The fact that the SETs engagements don’t have the requirement to produce useful research means that its staff have great flexibility and are able to innovate when planning activities. Unfortunately, much of this potential latitude for flexibility is lost because of numerous levels of bureaucracy that stifle quick responses to stakeholder needs. Similarly, motivating internal CAF/DND personnel to speak at events can be challenging at times. SET must ask officials and officers to participate in public affairs events, it has no authority to task them.

23Some opportunities for innovative engagement could exist in a post-pandemic environment, for example, the revival of stakeholder visits to deployed operations. This program, which ran during Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan in the 2000’s, saw DND/CAF facilitating visits of defence academics, and think-tank analysts to theatre, much like the embedded journalist program but for a shorter duration. Academics who had been on these visits produced some of the most influential Canadian books on the War in Afghanistan (SAIDEMAN 2016). Reviving this program would be a unique value proposition that could contribute to Canadian civil society’s understanding of the CAF’s international deployments, including in Jordan, Latvia, Iraq, Romania, and Ukraine. Another route that the SET could take is to become an organizer of public consultations. This happened in the lead up to the launch of Canada’s current defence strategy in 2016 when the SET and its regional offices organized dozens of public consultation sessions on what the new document should contain. These sessions were open to the public and often took place in large auditoriums with the Minister of Defence or other senior DND officials in attendance.

Findings for France’s Ministère des Armées

Policy Informing – DGRIS, Pact for Higher Education, and IRSEM

25Despite some successful efforts by the MoD to engage with defence academia since the 1970’s, including through the creation of the Fondation pour les études de défense nationale (1972-1992), it wasn’t until the past decade that the ministry began a renewed effort (JEANGÈNE VILMER 2017, 57). To understand this recent push, one must understand that the 2010’s were a decade where France’s security context changed considerably with “the military entering numerous international operations (Libya 2011, Ivory Coast 2011, Mali 2013, CAR 2013, Iraq 2014, Syria 2015), domestic operations (Vigipirate, Sentinel), and an increased terrorist risk since 2015” (JEANGÈNE VILMER 2017, 57). These events have contributed to a renewed awareness by the public and government of the importance of the military, defence, and importantly the study of these subjects (JEANGÈNE VILMER 2017, 57). Therefore, the minister of defence in 2017, Jean-Yves Le Drian, made a commitment to support the “emergence of an academic strategic thinking within the social sciences and humanities” (JEANGÈNE VILMER 2017, 57). As a result, the French MoD, a year later, launched the Pact for Higher Education (PES) which spelled out the need for the French MoD to help establish “war studies” as a discipline in French higher learning institutions. This pact received endorsements from two consecutive defence ministers, including currently serving Florence Parly, whose strongly phrased statement in support of the program pointed out that it would be a “harmful illusion” for the study of defence to be limited to the hard sciences, while ignoring social sciences (PARLY 2018).

26Similarly to Canada’s MINDS program, the PES is built upon several axes. Under Axis 1, the French MoD sets out the task of rectifying the absence of university courses as well as academic experts specialized in defence, and it points to the “Anglo-Saxon model of War Studies” as one that must be emulated (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2018). Several actions are proposed under this axis, including official collaboration with the French conference of university presidents, as well as structures to bring together academics and policy makers. In comparison, while DND does constantly strive to maintain contact with university leadership, it has not yet made a similar official call for collaboration with Canadian university presidents. In addition, axis 1 calls for increased opportunities for academia and defence personnel to work together, including by “promoting exchanges between defense personnel and teacher-researchers, and by allowing mobility and secondment of experts from the Ministry of the Armed Forces to higher education establishments and vice versa” (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2018). In comparison, in Canada there is only one opportunity for CAF officers to pursue a secondment at a Canadian higher learning institution, namely at Queen’s University, under the Canadian Defence Fellow program.

27Under Axis 2 the PES sets out the goal of “regenerating” a pool of French defence researchers including through long term funding (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2018). Several actions have already been put in place towards this aim, especially at the PhD level. This includes DGRIS funding the studies of individual doctoral and post-doctoral researchers (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2019b). In addition, there is also €50,000 in funding available through the “Ambassador” Post-Doctoral program for French social sciences researchers that wish to spend up to 12 months abroad. In total, the French MoD is funding 40 doctoral students at the moment, a “historically unique level for the French Armed Forces” (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2018). Under MINDS, Canada has made a similar commitment, both in scale and scope, to fund young researchers. In 2020, this took the form of $640,000 in scholarships which were given out to 34 university students researching defence topics (4 undergraduate, 11 Masters, 19 PhD and Post-doc) (DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 2020b).

28Another new initiative under Axis 2 is the launch in 2019 of the Phoenix Club, a new forum that already has 80 members, which, besides academic researchers, also includes think tanks, large defense or civil companies, start-ups, and consultancies. The Phoenix club meets once every two months to discuss various defence thematic issues (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2019a). While Canada’s DND organizes ad-hoc meetings and roundtables with defence experts frequently, it has yet to create a body like the Phoenix Club for these opportunities to take place systematically.

30Under Axis 4 of the PES, the French MoD recognizes that while France is one of the few countries that has a military expeditionary capacity, “French strategic thinking does not occupy the place that it should hold on the international scene” (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2018). The MoD therefore commits to several actions that will increase the visibility of French defence researchers, including the promotion of their work through communication efforts by DGRIS staff, who will also ensure that they maintain an up-to-date map of the French research community (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2018). In this axis the French MoD also commits to organizing a Biannual “Strategic Defence Studies” conference, under the patronage of the minister of defence, which will bring together “the entire academic community” working in this field (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2018). In comparison, a logic of promoting Canadian defence research abroad is still absent from any of DND’s programs. While MINDS may fund some academic research which goes on to subsequently get attention outside of Canada, it does not undertake a systematic effort to promote this work internationally.

31Outside of the PES, another aspect of how the French MoD engages defence stakeholders that does not have a Canadian equivalent is through institutes that have an affiliation with the MoD or military. The most prominent example is the Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire (IRSEM). While its researchers have scientific independence, IRSEM is directly funded by the MoD, and under the supervisory authority of the DGRIS. Being neither a think tank nor a university institute, where it brings added value is that it is positioned “at the intersection of the two worlds of the MoD and university research” (JEANGÈNE VILMER 2016). Founded in 2009 the institute currently has about 40 staff, all with PhDs, researching and publishing on a variety of topics related to defence and national security (IRSEM 2021). This institute plays a significant role in developing war and defence studies in France, and is one of the few places in the French academic world where the military and academia work closely together (LAFAYE 2020, 51). Thus, in terms of categorization, IRSEM flips our concept of policy informing stakeholder engagement on its head. Instead of having the MoD go out to draw research from externally affiliated civilian academics, it creates a space where they can conduct this research, but under the tutelage of the MoD. Similar to other policy informing initiatives, it also helps to build the next generation of defence research in France by supervising doctoral students, and providing stipends and post-doctoral opportunities (JEANGÈNE VILMER 2016). In a way, IRSEM’s role also overlaps with Information Disbursing stakeholder engagement, as it contributes significantly to the national debate on defence. It does so by distributing its research in different formats, hosting conferences, and even running a podcast.

32However, far from showing that the French defence academic scene is well developed, this multitude of government-sponsored initiatives is actually seen in France as an indicator of a problem. It points to the fact that civilian universities do not yet have sufficiently developed defence and war studies departments, and government-sponsored work is therefore necessary to fill this gap (LAFAYE 2020, 49). A main problem in France is the marginalization of defence studies due to a legacy of anti-militarism in French universities. This phenomenon can be traced to a societal desire for peace after WWII, then intensified by the war in Algeria in 1960, and even more so after the end of the cold war by the hope that international relations would thereafter be defined by peace (LAFAYE 2020, 50).

Scientific Innovative - Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA)

34The key players within French defence that conduct scientific innovative stakeholder engagement are the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) and its sub-unit the Agence de l'innovation de défense (AID), which is the research and development service of the French MoD. While defence procurement and innovation are administered separately in Canada, with military procurement being a civilian process outside of DND, in France they are unified within the MoD. The DGA in total has placed €13.8 billion in orders to industry in 2020, has a staff of 10,000, and an annual budget for investing in military innovation of €992 million (DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE L'ARMEMENT 2021a), a scale that is unparalleled in Canada. This fact is reflected in the scope of the DGA’s engagement with academia, and expert communities. For example, unlike anything found in Canada, the DGA subsidizes four entire higher learning institutions which are under its supervision. These universities include the prestigious Institut Polytechnique de Paris, and the Higher Institute of Aeronautics and Space (ISAE), both with thousands of military and civilian students (DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE L'ARMEMENT 2021b). These universities serve the MoD by not only training the next generation of engineers that will help French defence industry meet its needs, but also by conducting research in the field of defence (DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE L’ARMEMENT 2021b). In Canada, there is no equivalent to this arrangement in scale or scope.

35Through direct funding, the DGA has also been instrumental in fostering a new generation of researchers and scientists (LFAYE 2020, 49). This support comes in the form of funding for 130 doctoral students each year, mostly from the hard sciences and engineering but since the mid-1990s also a few from the social sciences (JEANGÈNE VILMER 2018, 28-29). Some of these social sciences students that have received DGA funding now tend to hold high level positions and have become renowned defence studies and international relations academics (JEANGÈNE VILMER 2018, 29). Successful applicants will generally receive approximately €120,000 for a three-year period of research (AGENCE DE L’INNOVATION DE DÉFENSE 2021). Since 2011, each year ten of the students receiving DGA funding are also selected through a Franco-British co-operation agreement that allows PhD students to carry out their work in both French and UK defence laboratories under dual supervision (AGENCE DE L’INNOVATION DE DÉFENSE 2021).

Information Disbursing – DICoD, EMA-Com, and SGA-Com

37In France the main actors that conduct Information Disbursing stakeholder engagement are the MoD’s various public affairs bodies. In addition, we find that the Institute for Higher Studies in National Defence (Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, IHEDN) also conducts a form of Information Disbursing stakeholder engagement through its courses that engage a broad cross section of influential French individuals.

38In France the rough equivalent of Canada’s ADM(PA) is the Defense Information and Communication Delegation (DICoD). Similar to ADM(PA) this organization provides public opinion analysis, creative services, imagery, social media, websites management, and media relations. Also similar to Canada, each branch (land, air, marine) of the French military has its own public affairs service, named SIRPAs. In addition, other directorates-general like the Directorate General of Armaments (DGA), the Chief of Defence Staff Office (EMA), and the General Secretariat of Administration (SGA) all have their own communications branches (DE GANAY 2021). DICoD centrally employs 122 personnel, while each of the three SIRPAs (air, land, marine) employs approximately 40 personnel each, with DGA-Com, EMA-Com, and SGA-Com also employing 20 to 40 additional personnel each (DE GANAY 2021).

39One difference between the two countries, is that while ADM(PA) has seen growth in its budget and personnel in the past decade, DICoD has seen the opposite. Between 2008 and 2020 DICOD’s budget has been cut by 50% and its staff by 55% (DE GANAY 2021). Much of the staff is located in Paris, while others are spread out throughout France, with DGA-Com for example posting staff in 9 different centres throughout the country (DE GANAY 2021). While no team exists within the broad French defence-communications community that solely conducts stakeholder engagement like the SET does in Canada, there are several teams which conduct some aspects of it.

41SGA-Com is yet another team which conducts some stakeholder engagement activities, especially when it comes to youth, and learning about the French military and veterans historically. In France this task is called “maintaining the army-nation bond” and is comprised of several initiatives to which a total of €38 million is allocated annually (DE GANAY 2021). A whole communication effort and website presence is dedicated to the many initiatives through which the French military engages young people at the elementary and high school level. Some of these initiatives include internships, organization of a youth civic service volunteer force, and the Global Defence and Security Class (CDSG) program that links individual military units with middle and high school classes. This latter initiative was founded in 2016 through an “inter-ministerial protocol” aimed at developing links between youth, defense and national security (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2021a). With 370 CDSGs spread over the whole country, involving more than 9,250 students, it is larger in scale and scope than any equivalent Canadian project.

42DICoD itself is involved in the organization of the Defence Correspondent program. This initiative sees the selection of an elected municipal-level official to become the “Defence Correspondent” for their respective jurisdiction. In this function, they are charged with overseeing several activities that raise awareness of the military in their community. This includes conferences, military base visits, veteran’s visiting classrooms, townhalls on defence issues, and raising awareness of defence in local media (MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES 2021b).

Comparative Discussion

44So far, we have examined why Canada and France’s MoDs engage defence stakeholders in detail. We have established that it is for three reasons; to inform policy; to promote scientific innovation; and to disburse information. We find that this pattern holds true across both countries, and that all of the organizations observed can more or less fit into this framework. We have also established how MoDs conduct each type of stakeholder engagement, through the myriad of teams, programs, institutes, and methods we outlined above.

45What conclusions can we now draw about how the two countries’ efforts compare? To begin with, we find that both MoDs’ policy shops, through competitive processes, have sought to support the establishment of academic networks and centres of excellence that can produce useful research. In both countries, this was done out of a need to support and build up a defence academic community that was perceived as being inadequately developed. In Canada, the narrative is that of a defence studies scene that was once great but had in recent decades declined (LAGASSÉ 2019). In France, it was outlined numerous times in academic literature and in officials’ rhetoric that French defence studies had never achieved the greatness of peers like the UK and US, and that France had to catch up to the “Anglo-Saxon” world. What we can see is that both countries have stepped up considerably in the past five years with financial support and official frameworks to support the growth of defence studies. Canada’s MINDS program has achieved remarkable success and will soon have nine new academic networks to its name. One of the side-effects of this surely will be to establish a new generation of Canadian doctoral students interested in defence, some of whom will hopefully go on to hold important academic positions.

46However, what Canada lacks in comparison to France is the level of ambition in supporting defence academia, especially when it comes to attention and rhetoric from senior officials. When two consecutive defence ministers make strongly worded statements in support of a program, it means that it is taken very seriously. This is the case in France with the Pact for Higher Education, and it is unfortunately not the case yet with MINDS in Canada. However, with a new minister of national defence that has a background as a law professor, there is hope that engaging with academia will become even more of a priority for DND. In this regard, Canada still has much to learn from France. For example, one model seen in France but not in Canada is that of a strategic research institute like IRSEM, housing civilians with a defence studies academic background under the direction of the MoD’s policy unit. This is not a uniquely French model but is also seen in Germany, for example, with the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies. In both France and Germany, these institutes are fairly young, having been established in the last decade, yet both have already built a strong reputation. Canada could over time build such an institute, perhaps attached to the Royal Military College and under the supervision of ADM(POL).

47Other smaller scale policy informing stakeholder engagement initiatives are present in France which could be adopted in Canada. This includes the Phoenix Club, a more structured way to bring together top defence stakeholders and their MoD counterparts on a quarterly basis. Canada could also emulate the French promises under the PES to host a biannual “Strategic Defence Studies” conference under the patronage of the minister of defence, as well as promote the work of defence research internationally. This latter promise could consist of ensuring some MINDS funding is dedicated to having defence academics participate in international strategic conferences. Finally, reflecting promises under Axis 1 of the PES, Canada could make a pledge to facilitate exchanges between military officers and teacher-researchers, placing the former in universities, and the latter in the MoD for temporary exchanges. This type of experience, lasting up to one year, could be funded under MINDS, and would allow defence academics to understand practitioners’ work better and vice versa (JUNEAU 2020, 224).

48When it comes to scientific innovative stakeholder engagement, we have a harder task of providing a direct comparison between Canada and France. It is clear that in this space France is several tiers above Canada, driven in large part by its world-renowned defence industry. It is admittedly difficult for Canada to emulate such an industrial powerhouse, yet there is one smaller scale initiative, the Innovation Defence Lab, which could be adopted in Canada. This semi-independent entity, under the joint supervision of the French Chief of Defence Staff office, which helps accelerate innovations at a smaller scale would be ideal for engaging Canada’s many defence small and medium enterprises, and ensuring their ideas reach maturity. Asides from this, for a country of Canada’s stature when it comes to defence innovation, IDEaS is an excellent start and more than adequate.

49Comparing the two nations’ information disbursing efforts reveals a more level playing field. The French MoD’s public affairs branch is roughly the same size as Canada’s, and unlike Canada it has been shrinking for at least a decade. This is a puzzling development for France, especially at a time when new communication technologies like social media, and the proliferation of misinformation would point to a necessity to grow, not shrink, public affairs staff. Unlike France, Canada also has a dedicated stakeholder engagement team within ADM(PA) that interacts with important domestic individuals and organizations from a public affairs perspective.

50Still, France remains ahead of Canada in several aspects of information disbursing stakeholder engagement. For example, its efforts to engage youth with the military are far more extensive than Canada. There are several initiatives like the SDGS that are aimed at engaging young people not just for recruitment purposes, but also to maintain an “army-nation link”, spread civic values, and learn about war from a historical perspective. Lastly, the IHEDN is a giant when it comes to engaging stakeholders, especially those which are interested in defence but are not experts or defence academics. The scale of the IHEDN is impressive and would be difficult for Canada to emulate. Canada could begin by opening up a few “auditor” spots in professional military courses to civilian defence academics and think tank analysts, including at the Canadian Forces College.

Future Research Agenda and Conclusion

51Our study on France and Canada’s MoD stakeholder engagement answers some questions, yet opens the door to many others. For one, we would like to know not just why and how MoDs conduct stakeholder engagement, but also what works well, and how this is measured. We only began to scrape the surface of program evaluation by asking defence officials how they measure success. Yet we believe a whole comparative study could be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of MoD stakeholder engagement programs. Another important limitation of our study is that in many ways our examination is a mile wide and an inch thick. We analyzed all stakeholder engagement programs whether policy informing, scientific innovative, or information disbursing across two countries. Comparing stakeholder engagement across only one of these categories could be a comprehensive study by itself. We therefore hope to carry separate analyses of each type of stakeholder engagement in the future. For added comparative context, we also hope to examine not just Canada and France but other liberal democratic allies in Europe, North America, and the Indo-Pacific.

52In conclusion, we intend for this study to be a useful reflexive exercise for defence practitioners in Canada and France who conduct stakeholder engagement. If we can spark conversations in both countries about what more can be done to engage defence stakeholders, then we will consider our study a success. We similarly intend that defence stakeholders, such as academics, armed with the knowledge of programs from abroad will ask more of their MoD in terms of being engaged if they learn it is being done better elsewhere. We also hope that our study will spark a transatlantic dialogue between French and Canadian defence practitioners in order to share best practices in stakeholder engagement. As Canadians with experience in both academia and government we certainly learned much from France, and hope to take several of these lessons back to Canada.